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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T191818
CREATED:20231223T134507Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
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SUMMARY:Escalation and De-escalation of Violence in Insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri G K PillaiDiscussants: Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch and Shri Sanjoy Hazarika \n \nDr. Namrata Goswami’s paper defines insurgencies as irregular warfare which engages in non-frontal attacks against the adversary with small groups of fighters and which is marked by the absence of fixed battlefields. Insurgencies\, therefore\, involve a complex mix of political legitimisation\, support base\, emotional category\, symbolic gestures and historical narratives buttressed by the elements of time and space. Escalation of violence\, as defined in Dr. Goswami’s paper\, implies increases in the level of conflict over a period of time and de-escalation signifies decreases in the level of conflict over a period of time. \nThe paper\, however\, analyses the escalation and de-escalation process in insurgencies with regard to the National Socialist Council of Nagalim Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)\, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)\, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its political front\, the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) of Manipur. While the first two insurgency movements have witnessed stages of escalation and de-escalation of violence spreading across decades\, the PLA offers an intriguing example of an insurgent group that continues to remain hostile to peace negotiations. \nThe paper further offers an analysis of the factors leading to the escalation of violence taking into account the three cases mentioned above. Political motivation plays a vital role through which the insurgents garner support from the people for their violent activities. Hence\, political mobilisation is the first vital step in any armed movement in order to acquire critical mass and to create space for conflict escalation. In case of NSCN-IM\, political objective of Naga territorial unification and sovereignty based on the historical narrative of Naga independent status before the British occupation plays a vital role. The ULFA also utilises the politics of Assamese exploitation at the hands of New Delhi in order to vindicate its demand for a separate Assamese homeland. \nThe availability of arms is one of the important factors leading to the escalation of violence level in an insurgency. The easy availability of arms in Northeast India enables the NSCN-IM\, the ULFA and the PLA to sustain their armed movements. Of the United Nation’s estimated 640 million illegal arms in the world\, 40 million small arms are in India alone\, with Manipur accounting 32 percent of small arms. \nState response plays an important role in deciding the escalation or de-escalation of violence in an insurgency. For example\, the state of India responded with massive use of force in response to the insurgent groups in Northeast at their initial stage. As a consequence\, militant groups escalated their violence which resulted in non-combatant deaths. \nPopular support base is one of the important factors which help escalating the violence level of an insurgency. The local support for the insurgent groups of the Northeast of India mentioned above depends on their ability to reflect the grievances of the people in the affected areas like alienation and deprivation\, political marginalisation\, etc. Similarly\, the insurgent groups use violence as a tool to get support from their target population. For example\, ULFA is known for its violence tactics of killing non-Assamese Hindi-speaking people. \nLegitimacy of a particular insurgency movement escalates the violence level. Insurgents use various methods to enjoy legitimacy from a targeted population. These groups engage in violence in order to provoke the regular army to escalate its use of force\, thereby creating enormous hardship for the local population. Disproportionate counter-measures by the state forces only provide these groups an opportunity to act as the security provider for the people. \nExternal support also helps escalating the violence level in a conflict. In the case of Northeast of India\, it shares a 4500 Kilometer highly porous border with China\, Bhutan\, Myanmar and Bangladesh.  Both the NSCN-IM and ULFA have/had their training camps in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Moreover\, both the armed groups had strong connections with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) of Myanmar. There are lots of instances on how these groups used the bordering countries as their safe heavens. \nTime and space are important factors for the escalation of violence. Time enables irregular groups to wage a protracted war aiming to gradually reduce the political and psychological will of the stronger power. Taking advantage of the strategic dimension of time\, the NSCN-IM has established constituencies for the purposes of recruitment and resource generation. Similarly\, ULFA has taken advantage of time to generate resources for their fight\, recruit new cadres\, establish base areas\, create support networks amongst the local population and spread their ideas. \nThe geography and terrain of a particular place is critical for the continuation of insurgent movements. Without supportive terrain\, lightly armed\, highly mobile insurgents stand little chance to offset the technological superiority of the stronger power.  \nThe organisational structure of an insurgent group plays a very vital role in the escalation of conflict level. A cohesive organization with a strong leadership helps an insurgent group act better. For example the NSCN-IM has a highly centralized political structure known as Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN). Similarly\, both the PLA and the ULFA are highly centralized outfits with radical sense of loyalty. Intra-group conflicts or factionalism with on a group escalates the violence level. This happens because the rival factions adopt an escalated violence means in order to establish social and political dominance. The leadership differences between Muivah and Khaplang in 1988 and the escalated violence level can be a case in point. \nDe-escalation in violence\, according to Dr. Goswami\, is dependant upon the state response to insurgencies\, political motivation\, and absence of popular support\, lack of legitimacy and loss of external support. De-escalation can occur also when the insurgent group identifies an opportunity to resolve the conflict in a positive sum manner if it believes that the state is willing to concede to most of its demands. \nState response to the insurgency movements plays an important role in de-escalating the violence level. The state of India’s response to the insurgency movements can be located with in three conceptual parameters. The proportionate use of force has been the key determining factor of a responsive state in the post 1970s. The significance of proportionality of means and non-combatant immunity are absolutely critical for the Indian state’s response to the insurgencies in the Northeast. Because\, since ULFA\, NSCN-IM and PLA project a certain degree of society support\, the disproportionate use of force by the Indian state can be counter-productive. \nUse of dialogue and negotiation is one of the important responses of the state of India in bringing down the violence level in the Northeast. The ongoing peace talks between the Government of India and the ULFA and NSCN-IM can be a case in point. Similarly\, the grant of greater autonomy and the statehood to some of the areas where the insurgent groups are active can bring down the conflict level. \nLack of legitimacy of an insurgent group may bring down the conflict level. The NSCN-IM is under constant pressure from the civil societies to bring down the violence level. For example\, in 2007 the Naga Hoho (Apex Council) in a strongly worded statement demanded that all Naga factions abstain from violence and give peace a chance. Similarly\, in recent years ULFA’s claim of legitimate representation of Assamese aspiration for political sovereignty has also come under deep critical scrutiny since the outfit is seen as non-transparent and run by a handful of men and women.  \nLack of external support is a major factor in de-escalating the violence level of an insurgency movement. Nearly 30 under-ground ULFA camps were destroyed in Bhutan in 2003 which forced the ULFA to shift its base to Bangladesh. After the crackdown on the militant outfits in Bangladesh by Sheikh Hasina Government in 2009 many of the ULFA leaders were arrested and handed over to India.  \nDr. Goswami’s paper concludes that when the insurgent groups are fighting for the establishment of separate independent statehood\, violent responses by the state is counter-productive and leads to a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence. The paper finds three key variables with regard to escalation and de-escalation i.e. popular support\, loss of legitimacy and state response. \nMajor points of Discussion and Suggestions\n\nThere is a need to understand the background of all insurgency movements. There is also a need to study various insurgent groups in the northeast separately.\nThere has been abrogation of the constitutional norms by the political party in power in Assam. Hence\, ULFA is a created problem.\nThe deployment of Security Forces as a state response has to be changed. There is a need to find out the sources of funding for these groups since the local funding for them is not sufficient for them to sustain.\nThe time factor has always been with the Government. The time has come not to see the insurgency as simply a military problem. There is a need to take governance issues into consideration.\nThe role of political parties in escalating the violence level should have been discussed.\nThere has been a shift of Insurgents activities i.e. from legitimate demands to criminal activities.\nIt is difficult to decide as when is the perfect situation for conflict resolution.\nThere is a need to address the governance issues because more people have died in governance failure than because of insurgencies.\nInsurgencies in Northeast will be difficult to resolve since there are many stakeholders. It can only be controlled to a point.\nGiving statehood to Nagaland was an end of the bargaining power of state of India\n\nReport prepared by Dr. Anshuman Behera\, Research Assistant\, Internal Security Centre\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/escalation-and-de-escalation-of-violence-in-insurgencies-insights-from-northeast-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T191818
CREATED:20231223T134553Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63182-1326432600-1326432600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The CBMs in Sino-Indian Relations: Need for Revamping and Enlarging the Structural and Institutional Mechanisms
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Gautam H BambewalaDiscussants: Professor Sreeram Sunder Chaulia and Professor Alka Acharya \nThe fellow paper of Dr. R. N. Das focussed on how the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) play a critical role in India-China relations. According to him their importance is due to the persistence of ‘security dilemma’ in the India- China context. Factors that have led to security dilemma include among others baggage of the 1962 War\, differences in the system of governance\, competition in acquiring greater space at the international arena and the scramble for resources.  \nDr Das opined that India’s threat perception of China is not baseless and\, therefore\, the need for India to establish CBMs with China arises. After the 1962 India- China war\, the bilateral relationship was restored in 1976. The 1979 visit by the then minister of external affairs\, A. B. Vajpayee was a good gesture but it failed to bring warmth in the relationship. During his visit\, China attacked Vietnam\, India considered it undiplomatic and Vajpayee prematurely ended his visit to return to New Delhi in protest. \nThe turning point in the India- China relationship was former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit of 1988\, which led to the formation of important CBMs in India- China relations. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s landmark visit in 1993 gave a real boost to the CBMs\, which materialised\, according to Dr Das\, due to the visionary leadership of Rao. India and China signed the agreement on troop reduction along the border\, which was followed by arms reduction agreement in 1996. Avoidance of large-scale military exercise and air intrusions was also agreed upon\, among other things. Since 2003\, a number of bilateral visits have taken place; these include the 2003 Vajpayee visit\, 2005 Wen Jiabao visit\, and Pranab Mukherjee’s 2006 visit.  \nIn the context of military CBMs one of the biggest steps taken was to cnduct the ‘Hand in hand 2008’ India- China joint military exercise. The two sides have been taking numerous slow yet steady moves on that count.  \nSince 2006\, India- US relationship started strengthening and that\, according to Dr. Das\, led to rise in Chinese suspicions of India’s intentions to some extent. On the other hand\, India has been wary of Chinese intentions\, as China has been issuing stapled visa to Indian citizens hailing from Jammu & Kashmir\, and Arunanchal Pradesh on several occasions since 2006.  \nDr. Das made several recommendations for strengthening the India- China relations. Checking border transgression and bringing the relationship on an equal footing and on reciprocal basis are prominent among his recommendations. He also recommended that India take its diplomatic steps carefully to avoid any miscommunication with China.  \nThe Chairperson\, Gautam Bambawale\, concurred with Dr. Das that border transgression by Chinese troops and stapled visa are concerns for India. In order to improve relations with India\, China must understand and handle Indian sensitivities carefully.  \nPoints of Discussion:  \n\nSino- Indian boundary question cannot be seen as a purely boundary issue. It is far bigger and complicated. \nChina’s vision of a uni-polar Asia and its position on India’s candidature for UNSC are at cross-purposes with India. \nChina does not want to discuss the nuclear CBMs with India\, as that would automatically approve India’s nuclear power status\, which China doesn’t want. \nResponses from the Chinese side on India’s rise have not been very positive in the past. However\, one must keep in mind that China does have its own insecurities and China’s responses to India’s relations with the US and Japan indication these. \nChina’s cooperation with India on the UNSC issue will help strengthening the relationship. \nThus far\, CBMs have not been able to remove the persistent security dilemma in the India- China context. They have been effective only in managing the relationship. Nevertheless\, contribution of CBMs in maintaining India- China relations has been significant. \nIt is important to assess the effectiveness of CBMs in India- China context\, as that would help in planning further CBMs that could be put in place. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-cbms-in-sino-indian-relations-need-for-revamping-and-enlarging-the-structural-and-institutional-mechanisms
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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