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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T192901
CREATED:20231223T134606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:63187-1323408600-1323408600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Concept of Autonomy in French Strategic Thought
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Bharat WariavwallaDiscussants: Philippe Laurent\, Nicolas Blarel\, Krishnappa Venkatshamy and Lion Koenig \n \nThis paper focuses on the concept of strategic autonomy as a defining element of the French strategic culture while demonstrating how throughout history France has shaped a bi-dimensional concept of autonomy. It emphasizes that the concept of strategic autonomy is key to gaining a deeper understanding of all underlying elements of France’s attitude as a contemporary global actor. By focusing on three specific historical periods spanning the last two centuries\, the author examines the origins of the French definition of autonomy and goes on to highlight the main challenge of contemporary French strategy: to reconcile its limited material power with its global ambitions and its Universalist model. The author notes that the paper is the first stage of analysis of a larger comparative study between Indian and French strategic cultures. \nThe paper argues that the French concept of autonomy\, with its particularities\, is the central ideational element of France’s strategy. It defines the way France perceives the world as well as itself. Though the concept of autonomy all by itself cannot entirely explain French foreign policy or predict France’s positions\, the paper suggests that it gives meaning to France’s past and potentially helps anticipate the French perspective in future. In other words\, even though the concept of autonomy doesn’t explain everything on its own\, it remains significant as far as French strategic culture is concerned.  \nThe paper follows Johnson and Larsen’s definition of strategic culture. It argues that the overarching goal of the study of strategic cultures is to understand strategic behaviour at the global scale. This approach does not reject the idea that states try to achieve their interests rationally\, but considers these interests as not only circumstantial and resulting from the distribution of resources and power in the world\, but also influenced by norms and values and shaped in a certain ideational framework. The paper tries to find elements of consensus\, values\, and ideas which have defined French strategy for a certain period of time. \nIn analysing the historical construction of France’s focus on the concept of autonomy\, the paper focuses on three core historical episodes which it considers to have strong dialectic values: \n\nThe Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars give the philosophical foundation and theoretical base to the concept.\nThe French colonisation process under the Third Republic (1871-1939) illustrates the main paradox in this concept when put into practice. \nThe example of Gaullist policies during the Cold War enables the author to illustrate the greatest challenge of French foreign policy in the 21st century.\n\nThe author prefers the term ‘autonomy’ over ‘independence’\, although both are often used interchangeably\, because of the semantic difference between the two: whereas the latter stresses on the negation of dependence\, the former has a more affirmative nuance. Moreover\, the French concept of autonomy implies a responsibility towards the world. Thus\, in the context of France\, the original concept of autonomy is active and strongly positive. \nThe meaning French autonomy bears today is the result of a tension between two attitudes:  \n\nFirstly\, protective autonomy or a defensive posture marked by fear of imperial expansionism that threatens France’s safety; \nSecondly\, active/affirmative autonomy or imperialist dreams based on France’s glorified past and the urge for spreading its values. \n\nAs a kingdom and then as a nation-state\, France has historically constructed itself in opposition to an empire as well as with the great memory of an empire\, thus constantly oscillating between the two extremes like a pendulum. The French concept of autonomy is therefore essentially bi-dimensional\, the active dimension historically emerging after the defensive element.  \nThe idea of French autonomy contains the paradox of French imperialism. The paper attempts to reconcile the French concept of autonomy with French imperialism by bringing in a Universalist dimension and suggesting that the French model can be viewed as a universal model\, thus\, the notion that what is good for the Frenchmen is good for everyone. Moreover\, identity is a key element in the construction of a strategy according to the French bi-dimensional notion of autonomy. The paper argues that the defence of the national identity is singularly more prominent in the case of France. This is justified by the idea of French exceptionalism\, a nationalist notion that France is granted with a unique role in world history and has the responsibility to offer a certain model to humanity.  \nA specific facet of this responsibility and the memory of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars translate into a self-perceived notion of France as the ‘liberator of nations’. This perception of uniqueness\, stressed by French historiographical frame which designated the French Revolution as the commencement of the Modern Times\, is very close to American exceptionalism and the role it perceives for itself in the world. Although both consider themselves to be carriers of the heritage of the Enlightenment\, the US notion is partially based on religious considerations whereas the French model is more political and is derived from the perceived grandeur of French history. \nIn conclusion\, the paper engages with France’s main challenges and attempts to answer the question: in the aftermath of the Second World War\, how can France continue to exist as a global actor without the material capacities to compete with the greater powers? After the ‘war of twenty years’ that constituted the decolonisation process\, France’s limited material capacities were well-admitted by the French government and the foreign policy was designed accordingly. French autonomy was preserved by framing an ambiguous geopolitical situation whereby independence from all powers would be constantly affirmed\, but alliance with the Western bloc would be presupposed. France’s withdrawal from NATO’s command in 1959 and the Gaullist policy towards the US is a perfect example of this ambiguity. The strength of French foreign policy lies in the geopolitical ambivalence of the French position and not in its material capacities. The French concept of autonomy leads France to transform all technical and economic matters into political decisions (politicization) and refuses to see its foreign policy dictated by its limited material capacities. \nDiscussion and Comments\nMr. Laurent commented on the ability of the paper to successfully assess and summarise the diverse French character. The author received many suggestions for his bigger project of a comparative study. Mr. Blarel pointed out the need to look at a series of case studies and test alternative hypotheses. A suggestion was made to study different phases of colonisation and take into account factors other than strategic culture that marked the enterprise and examine different incarnations of French strategic culture based on different leaders and circumstances. The notion of French strategic culture was further problematised by questioning whether actions are governed by an overarching rhetoric or are they for domestic consumption. \nGp Capt Venkatshamy pointed out the long historical period the paper is trying to engage with and suggested picking up a more specific issue and operationalizing it for a more focused argument. He further raised the issue of convergences and divergences between French and Indian strategic culture and noted a need for the paper to provide a well-fleshed out answer to the question: how are India and France comparable? Towards this end\, he provided a specific pointer to attempt a comparative study between Nehru and De Gaulle.  \nMr. Koenig commented on the merit of the project to theorise an undertheorised concept and suggested some points in connection with paper structure and flow. He suggested disentangling the concept of strategic culture and first exploring the broader concepts of strategy and culture and explaining why they should be studied\, before moving on to the study of strategic culture and examining whether the concept is tautological\, oxymoronic or more than the sum of its parts. He commented on the singular voice/consensus used in the paper and suggested that ruptures in the concept be taken into account. He suggested a more elaborate analysis of the three core historical examples the paper deals with in order to capture a clearer genealogy of the concept.  \nMr. Blarel and Mr. Koenig jointly suggested that the paper should attempt to address the question of homogeneity of strategic culture: can we talk of ‘a’ French strategic culture? \nDiscussion from the floor revolved around:  \n\nthe question of continuity and ruptures in French Strategic culture after and before the colonial era; \nthe element of uniqueness in the French desire for autonomy\, and\, \nsuggestions to clearly define means and goals and frame strategic culture as the ideational base that leads to autonomy. \n\nThe Chair concluded by keenly engaging with the cultural dimension of France’s distinct idea of civilization and its notion that it should give this idea to the colonised nations. He stressed on the impact of civilizations in the Indian context and commented on the importance of French thinking. \nReport prepared by Bhavna Tripathy\, Research Intern at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-concept-of-autonomy-in-french-strategic-thought
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T192901
CREATED:20231224T103558Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:64100-1323408600-1323408600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Integration/Jointness in the Indian Military: The Role of Civil-Military Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr Manoj JoshiDiscussants: Air Marshal (Retd) S G Inamdar\, Lt Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar and Vice Admiral (retd) PS Das \n \nThe event began with the welcome address of Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Acting Director general\, IDSA. He welcomed the former home secretary GK Pillai\, who recently superannuated from his post and joined IDSA as a Distinguished Scholar and other distinguished guests.    \nAnit Mukherjee’s Presentation\nAnit Mukherjee presented his paper on the topic “Integration/Jointness in the Indian Military: The Coordination Model and the Role of Civil-Military Relations.” This paper was third in the series of seminars examining civil-military relations and military effectiveness in India. As such this event report should be read in conjunction with the following: \n\nThe Absent Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness in India\nFailing to Deliver: Post Crises Defence Reforms in India\, 1998-2010\n\nIn this paper Anit Mukherjee examines jointness or integration between the three services and the role of civil-military relations.  Like his previous presentations he began by arguing that all too often studies of jointness have turned into a “blame game” and as a departure from that norm this paper argues that the structure of the system is at fault.   \nAnit divided his presentation in four sections. In the first section he made a descriptive analysis of jointness in India’s post-independence wars. While doing so he concentrated on inter-services operations\, higher command of war and the role of the civilian policy-makers. He argued that the 1965 India-Pakistan war was our first real experience with joint operations and in this we were found wanting. Inadequate sharing of information led to an absence of joint planning which was compounded by inter-services rivalry. However after this operation considerable efforts were made by the Indian Air Force\, Army and civilian bureaucrats in emphasizing joint operations\, the results of which was evident in the 1971 Bangladesh war. At the same time victory was an awful teacher as problems in jointness were glossed over. The period after that witnessed considerable inter-services tension usually over turf\, like maritime reconnaissance and ownership of helicopters. In the Indian Peacekeeping Keeping Force operations in the late 1980s\, jointness was notable by its absence. Due to the absence of a joint command the services operated in their own silos. Lack of interoperability also proved to be a handicap during these operations. The Kargil war of 1999 saw considerable army-air force tension and the lack of interoperability was again glaring. The lack of joint planning and training was also self-evident. Unfortunately in all these episodes the role of the Ministry of Defence has been minimal.   \nIn the next section he described four main problems with jointness: the single-service approach\, turf wars\, lack of interoperability and poor training for conduct of joint operations. In the third section\, he explained how each of these problems can be attributed in part to the unique characteristics of civil-military relations.  In the final section he discussed some recent developments like the creation of integrated defence staff (IDS)\, Joint commands and so on but also argued that these will not suffice until there are structural changes both in the Service Headquarters and in the MoD. While conceding that there is no perfect model of jointness\, Anit also argued that “perfect should not be the enemy of good.” He concluded by advocating for the “integrated model” instead of the existing “coordination model of jointness.”      \nDiscussion Points\n\nThere is an urgent need to create awareness about national security and generate a healthy and informed discussion on various dimensions of it. For this to happen however declassification of files is of paramount importance. Service Headquarters must take the lead in this process as it has fallen through the cracks between Service Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence. \nIt was observed by many participants that change off mindset is most essential in order to make any headway in the direction of jointness as equipment\, resource issues\, etc. come only next.  Jointness can be managed by adjusting attitudes. Personality-cult has been the bane of India in all walks of life and military is no exception. \nThe problems in civil-military relations are more cultural than bureaucratic\, a point strongly brought out by many participants. Thus\, the human side of the problem came out prominently during the discussion.  \nThe importance of communication devices for interoperability – an important aspect of jointness was emphasized\, since the devices used by the three services are not at par or matching each other. It was pointed out by some of the participants that integration should start at the functional level instead of just focusing at the Service Headquarter level. Hence\, for instance\, theater commands should be established with joint staff. However it was also appreciated that this idea will face considerable opposition especially from the respective Service Headquarters. \nThe need for promoting domain expertise in the MoD was strongly advocated by many participants. It was pointed out by one of the participants that CDS could have come up in 2003-2004\, but for a latent fear among the political class of an empowered military.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/integration-jointness-in-the-indian-military-the-role-of-civil-military-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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