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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T200536
CREATED:20231223T220738Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63590-1299216600-1299216600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Evolution of Sri Lanka’s Counter Insurgency Strategy 2002-2009
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch\, SM\, VSM (Retd)Discussants: Shri N Manoharan & Shri M R Narayan Swamy \nHemantha Dayaratne’s paper focuses on the Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In his view\, the military strategy adopted by the Sri Lankan army offers an example for other countries facing similar internal challenges. He discusses the fragile peace process started in 2002 and critically analyses the role played by Norway in facilitating the process. Dayaratne argues that Norwegian facilitation could not achieve the desired result because: i) of Norway’s inability to inspire the confidence of Sri Lankan Government and its efforts to equate the government with a terrorist organization (LTTE); ii) lack of sincerity on the part of the LTTE\, which used the ceasefire to strengthen itself; iii) differences between then prime minister Ranil Wickramsinghe and then president Chandrika Kumaratunga. Moreover\, Norway was partial towards the LTTE which made the latter even more inflexible. Thus\, the peace process did not succeed.  \nAfter Rajapakse’s election as president\, the LTTE launched several attacks\, which forced the government to undertake military action. For its part\, the Sri Lankan government took advantage of the division within LTTE (Karuna’s defection) and through an innovative strategy pushed the LTTE into a small area created by the army called the “no fire zone”. This strategy helped defeat the LTTE. The US war on terror post 9/11 also provided an opportune moment for all out military action against the terrorist group\, LTTE. Dayaratne also states that in this operation preventive measures were taken by the Sri Lankan government to guard against civilian casualties and human rights abuses. He concludes that the failure of the Norwegian Peace Process\, the use of military force and the overall strategy of the Sri Lankan government was entirely judicious and led to a successful campaign  \nThe major points of discussion and suggestions to the author were: \n\nExcellent account of the COIN strategy applied by the military and of the Norwegian Peace Process\, but could have been more detailed in terms of providing an insider’s view of the whole process that led to the dismantling of the LTTE.\nThough mainly expressing  author’s personal experience \, the paper could have attempted to establish links between the actual evolution of Sri Lanka’s military and COIN Strategy and diplomatic aspects of the process.\nNorway has been singularly blamed for the failure of the peace process without taking into account intrinsic factors like LTTE’s arrogance in the political sphere\, India’s role in neutralizing LTTE camps\, and the fracture in LTTE’s top echelons. \nOne important detail that is missing in the paper is LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s role in the defeat of the outfit\, committing blunders like killing of Indian Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi which led to India’s non-intervention\nThe role of navy and air force both of which had a major contribution in the operations have been overlooked. \nDisparity of information regarding human rights abuses is evident in the paper. \nCOIN campaign can be said to have been successful only if the root causes have been addressed\, which the paper does not mention.\nNot viable to use as a lesson / example of successful COIN strategy for other battlefields like Kashmir\, Afghanistan\, etc. as these cannot be isolated like Sri Lanka.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/evolution-of-sri-lankas-counter-insurgency-strategy-2002-2009
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T200536
CREATED:20231223T220738Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63591-1299216600-1299216600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Insider Threat: The New Nuclear Danger
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseDiscussants:  Dr Sitakanta Mishra and Dr Aditi Malhotra \nDr Reshmi Kazi introduced the paper by saying that the danger of insider threats is emerging as the new nuclear threat and the risk of insider threats is invariably linked with terrorists seeking fissile materials to build a nuclear device. In the present paper\, Dr Kazi aimed to analyse the severity of the danger of insider threats. She also tried to address the motivating factors that are greatly responsible for giving rise to potential insider risk to a nuclear establishment. \nDefining the insider threat\, Dr Kazi said that the risk of insider threat is present in all organisations. The potential of this threat lies in the act of a trusted employee who might betray his allegiances and obligations to his employer and cause damage or espionage against the employer or the organisation. Moreover\, access of all people without adequate identification to an organization’s critical facilities increases the chances of potential insider threat to the infrastructure.  \nShe pointed out three categories of actors from which there is the risk of insider betrayals: a) psychologically-impaired disgruntled or alienated employees; b) ideological or religious radicals; and c) criminals. She indicated that a trusted employee can develop a malicious intent due to various factors such as vengeance for a seeming wrong; radicalisation for advancement or religious or ideological objectives; and simple unlawful financial gain. Individuals are also motivated to malicious actions because of the growing\, exacerbated or unaddressed discontent with their place or value in the organisation; recruitment by hostile outside entities or groups; infiltration of a malicious actor to a trusted position on an infrastructure operator’s staff; and nuclear industry is affected by workplace trends that currently indicate there will be fewer jobs in the future\, and individuals who are employed will be required to have greater technical skills. However\, according to Dr Kazi\, insider betrayals may not necessarily be from individuals who have been directly affected by discontent or perceived injustice from within the organisation. There might also exist within the category of active insiders\, a subset of unwitting or passive insiders. \nBy highlighting the future trends and the danger of insider threats\, the presenter said that the world of nuclear weapons is expected to gradually undergo revolutionary changes in the coming decades since the nuclear world is surrounded with debates relating to nuclear disarmament\, revamp of the nuclear industry\, emergence of new nuclear states\, rising proliferation\, and spread of nuclear energy. She assumed that the world of nuclear weapons will undergo transformation that will impact issues relating to nuclear weapons in the future which might increase the risk of potential insider threats. \nOn Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and the severity of the danger of insider threats\, the author stated that in Pakistan there is a strong possibility of insider threats. Quoting David Albright\, she said\, “Pakistan tends to leak vital nuclear information. It’s the nature of the system.” She also cited the famous A Q Khan case which bears testimony to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology to several countries and also demonstrates the poor security culture of the state. In addition\, the risk of insider threats is further compounded by a rising wave of Islamist and anti-Western sympathies within Pakistan army and the ISI.  \nReferring to some of the recent incidences of insider threats like a group of peace activists’ security breach at Kleine-Brogel Airbase in Belgium in February 2010\, four armed men’s security breach into the Pelindaba nuclear facility in Pretoria in November 2007 etc.\, the presenter said that the case of AQ Khan perhaps posed the greatest insider threat when he was able to proliferate centrifuges\, nuclear technology and blueprints to Iran\, Libya\, and North Korea. She pointed out that the danger of insider threat is a global problem which has to be addressed by all the leading partners of the international community. The presenter felt that it was important for the nuclear institutions and organisations to become wiser to the tactics of potential insiders. While taking adequate steps to secure fissile materials worldwide\, substantial efforts must be made to overhaul the personal reliability programme\, which must transcend beyond merely evaluating the suitability of bodyguards to the management of expanding stockpile of nuclear materials and weapons.  \nAs part of this comprehensive effort\, she also recommended suggestions for more safety and security of nuclear reactors. Some of the important recommendations in managing the insider threats are: stabilise the economic status of the nuclear personnel in order to prevent nuclear scientists\, engineers\, workers and guards from stealing nuclear weapons and materials or selling nuclear knowledge; redirect the aging workforce into civil nuclear programmes and thereby provide them alternative employment; expand capabilities of nuclear forensics\, police force and human intelligence to intercept nuclear thieves; strengthening international nuclear emergency search and response capabilities etc. \nIn conclusion\, she said that the danger of insider threat must be managed with intelligence\, process\, and technology through a defence-in-depth strategy. If the systems are maintained according to the security configurations necessary\, duties are segregated\, accounts and passwords are controlled\, and employees are made aware that their actions are being logged and monitored\, there is less likelihood of a disgruntled employee attempting the unwanted activity.  \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nThe other aspects of insider threats could have been mentioned. \nInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identified insider threats as violent and non-violent insiders. Violent insiders are active insider threats.\nThe paper could have dealt with the case of North Korea in greater detail and linking with security threat as its nuclear programme is not indigenous.\nIslamisation of Pakistan Army and the deeply religious mindset of the nuclear scientists further compound the danger of insider threats.\nAn insider threat who works with outsiders would pose the most dangerous threat. This dander is also emerging as a new nuclear threat linked with terrorism. \nThe various insider threats should have been further researched in a greater detail and explained.\nWhat are the potential threats to nuclear reactors and what are the nuclear protection safeguard measures have been taken to protect from insider threats? \nThere are a number of international treaties which are responsible for safeguarding nuclear reactors but what the domestic laws and measures exist in this regard.\nThe author has mentioned about various insider threats who are working in different countries like Pakistan\, Iran\, North Korea etc but is there any cross connection? Instead of working on larger issues the author could have been focused on specific issues\, for instance\, the case of Pakistan could have been studied in more details. Perhaps\, the author was trying to do exactly that.\nIs there any possibility for Taliban or extremists getting access to nuclear devices? For small terrorist groups getting access to nuclear devices or weapons and exploding them are not possible. \nAn accident is not an insider threat. If one intents to use sensitive nuclear devices for sabotage\, proliferation and terrorist activity can be said as insider threat. \nIt was suggested that the author needed to clearly define insider threat in order to be able to deal with the issue in a comprehensive manner. Before writing the paper\, the author also needs to visit the places to observe and find out how various reactors are operating\, how they are safeguarded and to note where insider threats can come from.\n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/insider-threat-the-new-nuclear-danger
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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