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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110225T053000
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SUMMARY:The Salience of Interdependence in India China Economic Relations\, 1992 -2008
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor V P DuttDiscussants: Shri Ravi Bhoothalingam & Dr Partha Mukhopadhyay \n \nThe paper attempted to answer 3 key questions: \n\nWhat has been the quality and content of trade and investment (beyond an ostensible focus on nominal values) in the India-China dyad?\nHas high “economic interaction” translated to operationalization of “economic interdependence” in the India-China dyad? \nHow could the economic partnership be steered to create “constraint interdependence”?\n\nThe author organized his argument by re-visiting the scholarship on economic interdependence in International Relations theory\, recounting the “Liberal” versus “Realist” prioritization of trade and its relationship with conflict. He outlined the framework that he employed in his study (Crescenzi’s Exit cost-Exit threshold model)\, which deals more directly with the issue of opertionalization of interdependence\, and applied the same to the India-China dyad (focusing chiefly on India’s chief product export in its trade basket with China – Iron Ore). He went on identify the key impediments to engendering further interdependence from the Indian and Chinese side using case analyses of Chinese investment in India (telecom sector)\, and impediments to India’s export expansion (pharma sector) in China. \nBy examining key phases of the trade and investment patterns\, the author argued that operationalization of interdependence was discernible in this dyad post-2004 i.e. the costs incurred by each state (both China and India) to remove itself from the dyad to have increased post-2004\, while much of the earlier phase represented economic interaction which\, unlike economic interdependence\, was relatively costless to change. In particular\, he drew out a schema which applied the Crescenzian framework for India-China economic interdependence to reflect different equilibria obtained in various phases of economic interaction\, and argued that the relationship had moved away from “escalation” (high-level conflict; 1949-1992)\, and was currently moving towards the second notional form of “bargaining equilibrium (1st notional form 1992-2004; post-2004 moves towards second notional form). The author concluded by outlining five key recommendations\, which could steer the relationship towards some sort of “constraint equilibrium” in the future (when economic interdependence constrains the behavior of “challengers”\, and ultimately induces partners to eschew conflict scenarios)\, and argued that the interim of the next 3-4 decades were crucial for India to shape its economic relationship with China. By employing the framework of exit costs and exit threshold\, the author argued that an increasing focus on core sectors of competence could be obtained\, which becomes instrumental in teasing out a more complex understanding of when economic interdependence constrains states from entering into high levels of political conflict. \nDiscussants’ comments\nEXTERNAL\na) Ravi Bhoothalingam [former President\, The Oberoi Group of Hotels; former Director of ITC Limited\, Calcutta]\nMr Bhoothalingam welcomed the approach in the paper viz analysis at the dyadic level\, and pointed out that such an approach brought into focus similar complexities and patterns that were discernible in other dyads (China-Japan\, China-Korea\, China-Taiwan and even China-US) which made the study of economic interdependence and conflict in the India-China dyad more relevant. He pointed out\, however\, that dyadic relationships also exhibited the mathematical “step-function” phenomena\, wherein the economic relationship and political relationship were interrupted by a plateau (citing India-China relations improving until the 1998 nuclear tests\, then exhibiting a plateau where accusations of Chinese goods harming Indian manufacturing were rife owing to business pressure\, followed again by the rising curve of improved bilateral interaction in 2003 and thereonwards). This according to him was demonstrative of the absence of linearity in the economic and political trajectories in a relationship. He identified institutional support as a key factor missing in the Indian approach to dealing with China (knowledgebase\, language capacity\, Joint-research avenues) even as several complementarities existed (entertainment\, education\, consulting\, Infrastructure\, among others) for both countries to build on the relationship. \nb) Dr Partha Mukhopadhyay [Economist\, currently working as Senior Research Fellow with the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi]\nDr Mukhopadhyay complimented the organization of the argument employed by the author in his paper by applying a framework on the operationalization of interdependence\, focusing on sectoral evidence to support the claim\, and identifying the problem areas. He\, however\, pointed out that the framework could be expanded further to explain the switch in “bargaining” outcomes\, which was also possible (economic payoffs reflecting the switch in “target” and “challenger”). He wanted the author to incorporate the authors’ personal experiences in China in the introduction segment\, and cited the need to update the segment on the healthcare and pharma sector with primary data\, and summarise individual segments in the paper by reverting to the framework employed in the study for conciseness. He felt that disaggregating the hurdles (for instance Indian entry into the active pharmaceutical ingredients’ space\, use of guanxi by Chinese telecom companies\, China’s employment challenges\, etc) would bring further clarity on the challenges that lie ahead in the relationship. \nINTERNAL\na) Dr R. N. Das  \nDr Das complimented the author on the paper. He suggested the need to restructure the introduction to reflect the dyadic focus and framework at the outset of the study. In its present structure\, the paper outlines the debate in IR\, which\, according to him\, could be preceded by the restructured introduction. He also pointed out the need to update some references and citations.  \nb) Dr. G. Balachandran\nDr Balachandran felt that the two notional forms suggested in the “bargaining equilibrium” status of the Crescenzian framework (original framework) were conflicting\, and that the measurement of “exit cost thresholds” was problematic. According to him\, an entire of set of vectors for goods in the bilateral trade basket should be employed\, to ultimately arrive at a unique scalar. Due to these methodological issues in the original framework\, he found a disconnect between segment 1 of the paper (where the author outlines the framework) and the remaining 4 segments of the paper weak (application of the framework to the India-China dyad). The latter 4 segments\, he clarified\, did stand outstandingly well\, but it was the connection from the 1st to the remaining 4 segments which was problematic\, according to Dr Balachandran. \nThe author clarified that the Crescenzian framework was being applied in the India-China context only with respect to the largest trade category reflected in top export commodity and top import commodity\, and that the paper was not trying to generate a metric of interdependence based on ‘n’- number of goods\, which could be a task of future research. The author acknowledged the need to strengthen the connection between segment 1 and the remaining 4 segments in terms of outlining the Crescenzian framework with the necessary caveats.  \nThis was followed by the Q&A segment saw deliberations from the audience on issues such as the interplay of dyadic analysis and the “globalised” world at the systemic level\, concerns on China’s intentions\, effect of interdependence on “core” political concerns\, among other issues.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-salience-of-interdependence-in-india-china-economic-relations-1992-2008
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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SUMMARY:India and Iran's Nuclear Issue 2002-2010: Strategic Autonomy\, Regional Stability\, National Security
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseDiscussants: Ambassador K C Singh & Professor P R Kumaraswamy \n \nRajiv began his presentation by delineating the theme of his paper. In the introduction\, he noted that given the fact that Iran is part of India’s extended strategic neighbourhood\, the Iranian nuclear issue has generated a lot of ‘heat and dust’. He pointed out that the aim of his paper is to distil the Indian government’s policy as well as the nature of the debates in India regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. In this regard\, three broad themes can be discerned in the Indian reactions to the Iranian nuclear issue: ‘Strategic autonomy’ as it relates to India’s foreign policy decision making;’ Regional stability’ as it relates to events in its “proximate neighbourhood”\, the term used by India’s Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao; and ‘National security’ implications on account of operative clandestine proliferation networks.  \nRajiv noted that strategic autonomy has been and continues to be a cardinal ordering principle of India’s foreign policy practise\, as Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Sign has called it an ‘article of faith” for India. On the Iran nuclear issue\, India had to take positions at multi-lateral forums like the IAEA and UNSC since the issue was becoming internationalised. While explaining the Government of India’s position on Iran issue\, Rajiv noted that India is walking a tightrope. India voted against Iran at IAEA. However\, India also supported diplomacy and consultations at multilateral forums where initiatives were undertaken to find solutions to the Iranian nuclear impasse. Apart from these efforts\, India did profess its intention to act as a conduit to help in the resolution of the issue. He noted that in August 2005\, for instance\, in reply to a Lok Sabha debate on his visit to the United States\, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pointed out that India could act as a “bridge reconciling differences between Iran and the other country”.  \nRajiv noted that on the domestic front\, the left parties were against India’s decision to vote against Iran at the IAEA. While BJP was not against the Indian decision per se\, but it was critical of the government for its manner of dealing with the Iranian issue. He noted that the US factor has been crucial in India’s Iran policy. Ahead of the second IAEA vote\, then US Ambassador to India David Mulford had warned that the Indo-US nuclear deal could “die” and US congress would “simply stop considering the matter” if India did not vote against Iran at the IAEA.   \nDiscussing regional strategic stability\, he pointed out that implications on the regional stability of the possible presence of another additional nuclear weapon power in India’s ‘proximate’ neighbourhood have figured prominently in Indian considerations. Citing several statements by Indian officials\, he noted that Indian policy makers were wary or pessimistic about the possibility of another nuclear weapon power in their ‘proximate’ neighbourhood. Mentioning about India’s proliferation pessimism\, Rajiv noted that India’s pessimism does not seem to be embedded in fears about weak Iranian nuclear organisations but due to the impact on regional security of the spread of sensitive technologies and capabilities.  \nWhile discussing about national security imperatives\, Rajiv noted that Iran-Pakistan linkages on nuclear linkages have been revealed by IAEA reports. It stretches as far as back 1987\, with Iran informing the IAEA in October 2003 that it received “drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign intermediary”. These linkages were highlighted again when in Mach 2010\, the Washington Post revealed Pakistani government complicity in giving Iran “bomb-related drawings\, parts for centrifuges to purify uranium and a secret worldwide list of suppliers.” This information has been reportedly found in a 11-page document written by A. Q. Khan.   \nIn conclusion\, Rajiv noted that in the Indian responses to the Iranian nuclear issue\, the most important factor has been the issue of independence in Indian foreign policy decisions making\, specifically as it related to interactions with the United States. He\, however\, noted that despite hiccups on account of the nuclear question\, there has been a steady stream of interactions at the highest levels between India and Iran\, including the conduct of strategic dialogues. He pointed out that the next one or two years could be crucial with regard to Iran’s nuclear weapons programme\, and suggested that India’s diplomatic efforts should be focussed on reducing the range of ‘unsatisfactory strategies’ (NSA Shivshankar Menon’s term describing US options vis-a-vis Iran in a Wikileaks cable) and expand the space for the application of ‘satisfactory strategies”. He noted that Indian diplomacy has its task cut out\, especially as these two years coincide with its non-permanent membership in the UNSC. \nPoints raised during discussion\n\nIt is a very well researched paper. However\, author needs to explore the Indian dilemma while analysing India’s Iran policy.\nIndia came close to Iran when Taliban captured Afghanistan but now situation has changed. Iran has been involved in creeping nuclear proliferation activities. The United States has gone after Iran. Iranians wanted to buy time aimed at tiring out the United States. Since India wants closer cooperation with the United States\, it would be worth looking at whether India could have handled Iran policy differently. Was there any alternate way available? \nEarlier Iran was preachy to India with regard to nuclear non-proliferation since it is a NPT signatory and India is not. But Iran was not satisfied as India got several benefits without being a member of the non-proliferation regime which Iran could not get despite being a signatory. On nuclear issue\, India has never agreed with Iran.    \nIndia’s Iran policy during UPA-I was different from that being followed by the UPA-II government. \nEvery nation calls itself strategically autonomous. In fact strategic autonomy is a very relative concept. No nation is fully autonomous\, not even the United States.\nIndia cannot be a bridge. To be a bridging power\, a nation needs to be between the two sides. Dealing with the Iranians is very difficult. India should not attempt to be a bridge as it could be knocked out by either side while attempting to play that role. To be a bridge\, we must understand the fundamental problems of both sides. There is a need to look whether there is convergence of interest.  \nAuthor needs to explore whether there is any strategic autonomy in India with regards to Iran. He needs to take a step further. He needs to critically examine the statements given by Prime minister and other documents and take his own stand. \nThe LNG deal went through problems after New Delhi signed the energy deal with Tehran. Where did India go wrong?\nChina supported the UN sanctions against Iran. While analysing the domestic debate\, there is need to look at whether this reflected on the positions taken by the left parties in India. \nSouth Asia is a strategic liability for India whereas West Asia is an opportunity. Iran is very important for India because of its energy resources. \nThere are non-parallel interests involved in India-Iran ties. On energy issue\, India wants cooperation with Iran while on nuclear issue India is opposed to Iran’s nuclear programme.\nAuthor has structured the paper very well. However\, paper needs to be more focused with regard to its objectives. \nAuthor needs to look at whether there is any divide between government and influential groups such as media\, think tanks\, etc. Is there any government stand on regional stability? \nIn the paper\, strategic autonomy has been dealt at significant length but regional stability and regional security have been given less coverage. The paper may need some restructuring in order to make it appear even. \nThere is a need to examine what a nuclear Iran would mean for India’s national security interests. \nIt is also necessary to look at the role of minority politics in India while understanding the domestic political debate in India vis-à-vis Iran.  \nThanking the speakers for their useful comments and suggestions\, Rajiv noted that the Iran issue is over shadowed by the US factor. Iran could be a major worrying point in the future of India-United States relations. He noted that keeping in mind the prescribed word limit\, he would incorporate these suggestions as much as possible. \n\nReport is prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastava\, Researcher at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-and-irans-nuclear-issue-2002-2010-strategic-autonomy-regional-stability-national-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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