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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213359
CREATED:20231223T221839Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63662-1268976600-1268976600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Obama Doctrine: Deciphering Obama’s Nuclear Policy and What it bodes for India
DESCRIPTION:In his paper “The Obama Doctrine: Deciphering Obama’s Nuclear Policy and What it bodes for India\,” A. Vinod Kumar examined President Obama’s nuclear policies and critically assessed its implications for India. By addressing Obama’s “nuclear policy” as Obama’s “nuclear doctrine”\, the paper attempted to show how America’s nuclear policies achieve a consistent doctrinal character even when successive Presidents promise paradigmatic change. In this light\, the paper was divided into four main sections. First\, the evolution of Obama’s thinking on nuclear weapons was elucidated. Secondly\, the paper detailed how Obama’s nuclear policy was in fact a doctrine in the making. In the next section the paper critically probed where the doctrine could fall apart. And in the final section\, the implications of Obama’s nuclear policy for India were examined.  \nFrom the beginning the paper showed how the purported nuclear policies of Obama were a continuation of Bush’s doctrine. While analysing the genesis of Obama’s thinking about nuclear weapons\, the paper showed how Obama was buffeted between forces of pragmatism in national security issues and those favouring elimination of nuclear weapons. The four statesmen – Henry Kissinger\, George Shultz\, William Perry and Sam Nunn – emphasized nuclear disarmament but paradoxically they also encouraged nuclear modernization. In this context\, the paper argued that though Obama’s nuclear policy favours traditional non-proliferation goals he was also forced to consider aspects of Bush’s dogmatic policies as well. Article IV of the NPT was reemphasized by Obama in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887; but even here issues like the need for a credible nuclear deterrent; the absence of prioritization of punitive action on NPT defectors and the absence of practical steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons\, according to the paper\, has not created anything new beyond the Bush doctrine. \nBut the need for a credible nuclear deterrent\, the absence of prioritization of punitive actions on NPT defectors and the absence of practical steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons all meant that the Obama nuclear doctrine could not go beyond the Bush doctrine. The author also showed how the revival of traditional instruments of the non-proliferation regime\, central to Obama’s vision\, could not escape his predecessor’s doctrinal style. For example\, on the NPT\, the paper asserted that the problems of non-compliance\, constraints on nuclear commerce\, threats from non-state actors\, nuclear test ban\, FMCT\, strengthening safeguards and restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing technologies are all issues that need immediate redressal for the treaty to be strengthened; and these were the issues on which Bush was not decisive. Between merely setting an agenda for the 2010 Review Conference and formulating a grand 21st century version of the NPT\, the paper argued that reviving the NPT could be a long haul. Similarly\, on CTBT\, the paper showed that securing support within the Senate for its ratification would be a difficult task. Most importantly\, it stressed that Obama’s strategies to combat nuclear security and terrorism were a copy from the Bush administration. The paper however suggested that a new framework could be derived through the UNSCR 1540 to ensure that non-state actors do not access sensitive nuclear technology. Alongside\, it also suggested that “the summit could also formalize counter-proliferation instruments like PSI within the non-proliferation edifice so as to generate global templates for prevention and responses.” Therefore\, even in counter-proliferation\, Obama might not devalue Bush’s initiatives. Finally on Ballistic Missile Defences (BMD) and promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes\, the paper showed that Obama’s nuclear policies were inadequately grounded. While Obama voted for major cuts in BMD programmes and was non-committal on Bush’s deployment plans\, upon assuming office Obama favoured limited deployment plans to provide minimum protection to the United States and its allies. He cancelled the Kinetic Kill Vehicle programme but remains apprehensive of Iranian\, North Korean\, Chinese and Russian missile modernization. The paper predicts that this could “force Obama to open funding for both missile defence as well as space weapons.” The same ambiguity was reflected in promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; while Obama favoured international nuclear fuel-cycle centres he also felt that over-emphasis on nuclear energy is unwarranted. To conclude\, the paper asserted the continuities of doctrines regardless of the paradigmatic change promised. \nIn the next section\, the paper laid out two important issue areas where Obama’s doctrine might fail. First\, it questioned whether Obama’s nuclear disarmament is at best a utopian dream. The reason for such scepticism according to the author is that (a) total elimination cannot happen at one stroke as this will not be a consensual or sequential movement among the nuclear weapon states; (b) incremental steps towards elimination\, involving test-ban and fissile material cut-off\, would be a long haul; and\, (c) new weapon states that might emerge could reverse the reduction process. The failure to move from non-proliferation to disarmament\, and ever lingering security dilemmas have created more questions about prospective nuclear disarmament ambitions of the President. Second\, reducing the salience of nuclear weapons and maintaining a robust deterrent is a problem. Maintaining extended nuclear deterrence\, sentiments of the armed forces on modernizing the ageing nuclear forces along with demands for RRW and Stockpile stewardship program has created disagreements over Obama’s policies. Therefore\, the paper\, while arguing how Obama’s doctrine could fall apart\, also stressed that reductions and total elimination of nuclear weapons would also imperil CTBT and FMCT operationalisation.  \nFinally\, the paper assessed the implication of Obama’s nuclear policy for India. On a broader platform of integrating India into the non-proliferation regime\, NPT\, CTBT and FMCT options were discussed. On NPT\, notwithstanding India’s apprehensions to join the club as a NNWS\, the paper stated that Obama might not initiate sweeping reforms by opening up the NWS club. Therefore India’s call for a new non-proliferation bargain transcending the NPT centric regime might not fructify. Similarly\, on CTBT\, the paper stated that India cannot accept the treaty without a disarmament roadmap; the possibility of offering sophisticated weapons design data and simulation capabilities by United States to woo India was discussed with a caveat that Obama would not offer such capabilities as it would undermine his larger disarmament objectives. Finally on FMCT\, the paper stated that since India has committed itself to the treaty’s early conclusion without resolving all its contentions\, it might hope for a third party spoilsport if Obama couldn’t rectify the problem areas including verification and the EIF clause. \nSecondly\, discussing the divergent perceptions on disarmament for understanding the implications of Obama’s nuclear policy on India\, the paper drew attention to three factors. One\, the paper stated that India disowns the NPT and believes it could only retain a non-proliferation edifice without conditioning disarmament and therefore India has reservations on the traditional NPT route of Obama to achieve total elimination; two\, the paper argued that Rajiv Gandhi’s Action Plan of June 1988 could be a solution to Obama’s scepticism of not achieving disarmament in his lifetime; and finally\, the paper stated that de-legitimisation of nuclear weapons could be a right step towards total elimination with a universal agreement on no-first use and reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. The paper was sceptical of the Obama administration taking such paradigmatic steps in the near future to achieve total elimination. \nLast but not the least\, the paper discussed counter-proliferation policy and its implications for India. It noted that the main stumbling block in India’s participation in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the reference to IAEA comprehensive safeguards in the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention (Suppression of Unlawful Activities at Sea). India’s apprehension is that PSI is being targeted at non-NPT states. On missile defence the paper reiterated that with Obama’s own reservations India might have fewer worries of his policies impinging on Indian interests. Finally\, however\, the paper noted that Obama is likely to push for India’s participation in counter-proliferation initiatives which is in consonance with the Hyde Act but such pressures would also require India’s commitment to support US action against Iran which could prove problematic. \nDiscussion\n\nObama has limited options in seeking an alternative to Bush policies. Therefore\, the study is not presumptuous in giving Obama’s policies a doctrinal character. \nNuclear terrorism is a very serious problem which the paper could consider in more detail. \nThough a pragmatic disarmament timeline is absent there is some hope of progress; therefore the paper could explore how Obama could carry forward this agenda. \nOn Rajiv Gandhi’s Action plan\, the paper could also highlight similarities with Obama’s larger disarmament objectives rather than merely pointing out dissimilarities.\nThe paper could consider the implications of Obama’s policy on the forthcoming NPT RevCon and how it would impact on India. \nThe paper could discuss in more detail the proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention\, the key differences between NWC and NPT obligations\, and how India can cooperate in ensuring its successful implementation.\nWhile the paper initially stated that India might need to adopt a wait and watch policy\, during the discussion the author acknowledged the need for India to be proactive. \n\nReport prepared by Shanmugasundaram Sasikumar\, Research Assistant.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-obama-doctrine-deciphering-obamas-nuclear-policy-and-what-it-bodes-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213359
CREATED:20231224T104406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:64176-1268976600-1268976600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Recent Trends in Myanmar-US Relations: Implications for Myanmar’s Political System
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh\, in his paper\, pointed out that the United States has been critical of the military regime in Myanmar. The US approach towards Myanmar was essentially based on a policy of sanctions and non-engagement with Myanmar. While China\, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and neighbouring countries engaged with Myanmar\, the United States continued to practice its policy.  \nOf late\, there has been a shift in the American policy towards Myanmar\, which is making an impact on Myanmar’s SPDC also. In the case of Myanmar\, it is apparent that contrary to its practice in Southeast Asia the US is not following the ‘Security First Policy’. For this\, pointed Dr. Singh\, China could also be one of the important factors.  However\, whether the shift in US policy is significant is yet to be examined. The shift in the US policy towards Myanmar has been evident as the two parties have made several official visits to each others’ capitals.  Still\, the US is consistent on the point that sanctions will remain in place until Myanmar becomes a democracy.  \nAnother contentious issue between Myanmar and the US has been Myanmar’s nuclear programme. While some scholars doubt Myanmar’s nuclear capability and its ability to make nuclear weapons\, one cannot deny the fact that Russia (and possibly North Korea too) has been cooperating with Myanmar on nuclear issues. In the changed circumstances\, SPDC’s objective is to integrate with the international community and to increase the level of manoeuvrability. Drug trafficking is another issue of concern for the US in light of the fact that Myanmar is the world’s second largest drug producer.  \nAnother reason\, as pointed out by Dr. Singh\, is the role of the Burmese diaspora based in the US. The US- and Canada-based Burmese diapsora is playing an increasingly significant role in influencing US policy towards Myanmar. For instance\, the Massachusetts-Burma Law was heavily influenced by the Burmese diaspora based in the US. What are the implications of such a change in the approach?  \n\nThe possibility of change in the Burmese Junta’s policy depends on SPDC’s ability to face the challenges\, both domestic and international. \nThe US so far has focused attention on just one person and just one party\, which has failed to deliver positive results. \n\nPoints of Discussion:\n\nStudying the US policy towards Myanmar will not help without understanding US policy towards the Southeast Asian region. \nThere is a realisation in the US that because of Myanmar its policy towards Southeast Asian region is also getting stifled. \nThe US is not able to engage Myanmar constructively because of domestic legislative constraints.\nThe shift in the US policy is a result of President Barak Obama’s attempt to reach out to recalcitrant countries. China factor is not significant since during the Bush administration nothing was done regarding Myanmar. It is to be noted that Bush administration had the policy of trying to forestall China’s rise in Asia. \nA reference to Andrew Selth’s article on Chinese bases in Myanmar was made during the discussion on Chinese bases in Myanmar. It was said that reports on Chinese bases in Myanmar was an overreaction. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/recent-trends-in-myanmar-us-relations-implications-for-myanmars-political-system
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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