BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:MP-IDSA
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Asia/Kolkata
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0530
TZOFFSETTO:+0530
TZNAME:IST
DTSTART:20080101T000000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T215938
CREATED:20231223T222005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63677-1261114200-1261114200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:To Develop or not to Develop?: The Political Dimension of BMD Procurement in Japan and India
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr. Rajaram PandaExternal Discussants: Dr. P.K. Ghosh Senior Fellow\, CAPS and Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra\, JNU \nPresentation\n\nThe paper’s core question “What factors influence why states make the decision to import advanced weapon systems or to develop them indigenously?” \nBoth India and Japan had similar threat perceptions owing to similar kind of neighbourhood situation.\nThe paper discusses the political processes behind BMD acquisition and not its scientific effectiveness or military utility.\nThere is research on suppliers’ perception of arms transfer but litter research on recipients’ perspectives.\nIn the case of Japan\, discussion on BMD began with Reagan’s “Star Wars” address. In the late 1980s and through the 1990s Japanese defence industry conducted research in this area. There was some joint research with the United States as well.\nNorth Korea’s 1998 Taepo Dong I test convinced Japan of BMD’s usefulness and formal joint research with United States began.\nAfter the United States withdrew from ABM treaty\, the Japanese Cabinet decided to introduce BMD systems. As of December 2009 4 SM-3s and 12 PAC-3s are deployed.\nJapan’s Foreign Policy concerns influenced the timing of the BMD deployment. Its perception about threats from the neighbours mattered in the decision about BMD. The Taiwan strait crisis of 1995-96 and earlier Chinese nuclear tests caused the difference. North Korean tests became an incentive to introduce BMD system\, but was not a decisive factor that made Japan decide to join the American system.\nJapan did not consider self reliance because there are restrictions due to import controls and limited R&D budgets.\nIn the case of India\, Pakistan’s acquisition of M-11s caused it to think of BMD. Chinese and Pakistani co-operation was looked at seriously. The political decisions behind it have not been fully analysed.\nIndia has been aiming for self-reliance in its defence procurements.\nIndia’s desire for independent policy also caused it to focus on self reliance. In the cold war period\, the United States and USSR had tied their arms sales to alliance partnerships and there still exist political hurdles to delivery of weapons. Thus indigenisation and diversification have been two pillars of the Indian arms policy.\nDRDO has conducted tests successfully and India should be able to deploy its BMD system by 2011.\nEven if it was economically difficult\, India decided on indigenous development of BMD for political and strategic reasons.\nThus\, foreign policy and threat perceptions matter equally in decisions over BMD policies.\n\nComments and Discussion:\n\nNeed to go deeper into the use of the Defence Industry perspective. 1998 alone cannot be the reason for Japanese policy on BMD. Japan favours two layered system and not two staged system. \nMTCR has been critical in decisions about BMD by different countries.\nIndia decided against co-development because it was turning out to be more expensive.\nJapan’s R&D numbers are impressive; in fact the United States wanted to collaborate with Japan for its own advantage.\nThat Japan became more independent in its foreign policy with the end of Cold War is a very tall claim.\nImpact of the Japanese BMD is going to be same regardless of its origin.\nEconomic benefit of the Japanese BMD programme is an outcome and not a cause. This has happened because the United States has subsidised Japanese BMD programme.\nThere is need to elaborate on the reasons why Japan decided not to develop indigenous capacity when it could and why India decided to do so when it did not have the knowledge.\nEven while the nature of arms transfer has changed and even as marketisation has taken place\, co-operation on BMD still remains a political decision.\nThe author could compare the different nature of relationship that India and Japan have with the United States and its impact on their BMD policy.\nIn Japan\, public opinion has played an important role.\nCredibility of the Indian BMD can be questioned. One should not look at statements but the results of the tests.\nBMD is a work in progress. It is useful for its psychological and political utility. No one would share it if it was perfect.\nIn India this has not been a strategic political decision but a military technical decision.  \n\nReport Prepared by Avinash Godbole\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/to-develop-or-not-to-develop-the-political-dimension-of-bmd-procurement-in-japan-and-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T215938
CREATED:20231224T104423Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T051013Z
UID:64188-1261114200-1261114200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Management of Medical Stores in Indian Armed Forces
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/management-of-medical-stores-in-indian-armed-forces
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR