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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T222206
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63681-1256275800-1256275800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Limitation in Nuclear War: Doctrinal Implication for India of Pakistani Nuclear Use
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Aditya SinghDiscussants: R. Dahiya and Gaurav Kampani \nAim and Scope\nImplications of Pakistani nuclear use for India’s nuclear and conventional doctrine. This paper revisits the ‘Sundarji doctrine’ to assess its suitability for limitation and termination of nuclear war. In a nutshell\, the ‘Sundarji doctrine’ calls for termination of a nuclear war at the lowest level of escalation. \nThe paper then intends to recommend the institution of a standing strategic dialogue mechanism with Pakistan to enable limitation in conflict\, even a nuclear one. The continuing imperative of limitation even in nuclear war compels a review of India’s conventional and nuclear doctrines.  \nSummary\nThe speaker validated the argument that nuclear initiation\, in the context of a future India-Pakistan war\, is with Pakistan. Therefore its implication on India’s nuclear and conventional doctrine would emerge. While validating such an argument the speaker put forth the following arguments. \n\nDemocracy as the chosen political system in India\nIndia’s war strategy which is offensive\, broad front\, highly lethal\, short duration and red line cognisant vis-à-vis Pakistan’s counter strategy which is likely to comprise war avoidance\, conventional defence\, counter offensive with strategic reserves if possible\, and a resort to asymmetric war.\nNine factors which contribute to deterrence instability are:\n\n‘First use’ not ruled out by Pakistan\nPakistan’s lack of strategic depth\nQuestions about the credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine\nMomentum of conflict\nStrategic rationale of the Pakistan army\nRight wing pressure in Pakistan\nFog of war\nNuclear signaling\n\n\nThe possibility of nuclear use increases with the increase in threat to vital interests. Nuclear threat would heighten as the war progresses and the weaker the Pakistan army gets\, especially if it is apprehensive about India’s aims.\n\nHaving put forth the context of future conflict dimensions between India and Pakistan\, the speaker then described the “nuclear dimension of the conflict” and nuclear strike (first) options located within it. \nThe speaker downplayed “decapitation strike” and “first strike” as viable options. Thereby arguing that nuclear use options of a lower order may appear more attractive. The speaker cited the advantages of late nuclear use as it would not be unambiguously illegitimate in case Pakistan is faced with extinction as a state. Pakistan would be resorting to it at a stage in the war when it is vulnerable\, possibly having exhausted other military options.  \nIn essence the paper argued that late nuclear use could prove more dangerous and damaging to India than early use. \nExternal Discussant I (R. Dahiya)\n\nNuclear weapons are not for use\, but to deter others from using them.\nWill rationality prevail in a scenario of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan?\nThe imperative of controlling the escalation ladder especially by India at every stage of the conflict.\n\nExternal Discussant II (Gaurav Kampani)\n\nThe paper must also include the naval and air dimensions and not restrict itself to the land component.\nInclude a discussion on Pakistan’s civil-military relations\nThe paper must reduce its dependence on secondary sources and include primary sources such as interviews of retired and serving officers of the armed forces.\nThe paper also needs to be clear as to what “cold-start” doctrine actually is.\n\nPrepared by S.Rajasimman\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/limitation-in-nuclear-war-doctrinal-implication-for-india-of-pakistani-nuclear-use
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T222206
CREATED:20231224T104458Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054322Z
UID:64195-1256275800-1256275800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Sky's no Limit: An Evaluation of Space-based Solar Power as the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs\nChair: Jasjit Singh\nDiscussants: V. Siddhartha and Subodh Kumar
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/skys-no-limit-an-evaluation-of-space-based-solar-power-as-the-next-major-step-in-the-indo-us-strategic-partnership
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
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