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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090731T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090731T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T224629
CREATED:20231223T222040Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055152Z
UID:63688-1249018200-1249018200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Will Japan go Nuclear?
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Rajaram PandaDiscussants: J Madan Mohan and Sitakanta Mishra \nThe tremendous transformation in the strategic and security environment of Japan in the last decade has once again influenced the nuclearization debate in the country. North Korea’s second nuclear test followed by the launch of three short-range missiles on May 25\, 2009 and the subsequent launch of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 4\, has prompted widespread speculation on Japan’s principled position on non-proliferation and disarmament. The international community is worried whether Japan will abandon its nuclear abstinence and acquire a nuclear capability. In this paper\, the author makes an effort to analyze circumstances under which Japan might consider crossing the nuclear Rubicon. An attempt is also been made to trace the nuclearization debate which has resurfaced in Japan periodically when the national interest seems is threatened.  \nThe Japanese position on the nuclear weapons option has been ambivalent. Japan has never made any official decision on whether or not to exercise the nuclear option. Still its pacifist constitution clearly deters the state from maintaining land\, sea and air forces\, as well as other war potential. The right of state belligerency too has been denied in the Japanese constitution. The constitution’s stance on nuclear arms\, however\, remains ambiguous and it has led many pro-nuclear advocates to debate the possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Although the Constitution may be interpreted to allow for possession of nuclear weapons\, the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 clearly emphasizes the essence of Japan’s policy in maintaining a peaceful\, transparent nuclear programme. Besides\, Japan has also adopted the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ expressing the policy of not possessing\, not producing\, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. This position was reiterated in 1976 when it ratified the NPT and committed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. However\, though the validity of these principles has been upheld by successive cabinets\, the degree of restraint that these principles place on Japan’s nuclear policy remains uncertain. Most importantly\, they do not represent a legal restraint\, because Diet resolutions are passed as an expression of the will of the chamber and are non-binding. Further\, over the years\, allegations have been made regarding the violation of the third principle of the three non-nuclear principles right from the Cold War period. Still\, the support for a robust nuclear weapon policy has not gained enough momentum and Japan continues to remain committed to an anti-nuclear policy.  \nThe dynamic changes in the regional and security areas of Japan have deeply influenced the revival of the nuclear debate in Tokyo. Due to factors like the expanding nuclear programme of China and North Korea; the failure of the Six Party Talks; growing suspicion among the Japanese people over the credibility of the U.S nuclear umbrella; the increasing proximity of U.S.-China bilateral relations\, etc.\, there has emerged an open debate within Japan about whether it should adopt the policy of nuclear disarmament.  \nAt present\, many security analysts are of the view that Japan may go nuclear within the next ‘ten to fifteen years’. According to the author\, Japan might compromise its principled stand on nuclear armament if the following scenarios unfold: the weakening of the US-Japan alliance; a North Korean nuclear attack on Japan; a war in the Korean Peninsula; a reunified nuclear Korea; a North Korean nuclear test; Chinese nuclear expansion; U.S. withdrawal from the region; possible breakdown of the NPT; rise of a new generation of nationalistic Japanese politicians; China’s response to a sudden collapse of North Korea. Although some of the above scenarios are extreme\, they cannot be disregarded altogether by Japan. \nWhile explaining the implications for India\, the author states that Japan’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons will be a major setback for the NPT. States like India who are not part of the NPT because of its discriminatory nature will be demoralized to uphold the principles and obligations of the treaty which it has done so far.  \nAccording to the author\, in order to avoid nuclearization of Japan\, a comprehensive and prioritized plan is required. As part of the plan\, following measures should be adopted: the US must provide clear assurances of its security umbrella for Japan; efforts should be made for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue; measures should also be made to establish regional organizations for security and trade\, facilitating greater cooperation and mitigating distrust among Asian countries; and above all\, the U.S. and the other NPT members must take initiatives to strengthen the NPT regimes so that all countries feel secure in it including Japan. \nPoints raised during discussion: \n\nIf Japan decides to go nuclear\, it has to deal with two main hurdles: i) it has to revise domestic laws and conventions related to Japan’s stance on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation\, which is going to be quite complicated; ii) it also has to withdraw from the NPT\, a step which will definitely be against Japan’s national interest.\nThere has occurred an attitudinal shift in the current nuclear debate in Japan. Although the Japanese population is considered to be suffering from the so-called ‘nuclear allergy’\, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has called for active discussion of possible nuclear weapons option. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)\, which is projected to be the virtual winner of the upcoming August 30 general election in Japan\, has also talked about a ‘radical revision’ of the Japan-U.S. Security alliance and advocated an independent security policy for Japan. \nEven if Japan decides to pursue the nuclear option\, it will probably do so with the tacit support of the U.S.\nThe U.S. will inevitably reduce its involvement in Asia over the longer term. It will eventually lead Japan to think seriously about its nuclear option for national security.\nEngagement in Iran\, Iraq and Afghanistan won’t make the U.S. compromise its security pact with Japan. \nIt is true that Japan has not gone nuclear yet. However\, the real question is how long Japan can prevent itself from going nuclear. \nIn the near future\, Japan will probably decide to keep its nuclear option ambiguous\, as it will enhance its bargaining power with the West\, particularly the U.S.\nYukiya Amano of Japan is the new chief of the IAEA. His election will probably intensify the gap between Japan’s ardent support for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation on the one hand\, and Japan’s aspiration to go nuclear for national security reasons on the other hand.\nIn terms of method and theory\, the paper could be expanded in scope. Instead of a one-dimensional approach\, it should adopt a multidimensional approach in drawing the scenarios. In the paper\, the author has identified the scenarios assuming that Japan will go nuclear in the near future. Instead\, she should build scenarios keeping in mind different possibilities in terms of outcomes. \nMost of the scenarios drawn by the author are not realistic enough. The bilateral security arrangement between Japan and the U.S. is still going strong. China has been a security threat to Japan throughout its history. Contrary to assumptions made by security analysts regarding the nuclear issue of North Korea provoking Japan to go nuclear\, the North is still not considered such a big threat by most Japanese. Only the hawks in Japan offer the excuse of China and North Korea to discuss Japan’s nuclear option. \nInstead of offering ten different scenarios\, most of which are not ‘realistic’ enough\, the author should concentrate on four or five ‘most probable’ scenarios.\nThe paper is very light with respect to the implications for India. \nThe author needs to take into account the contributions of the strong anti-nuclear movements (especially the hibakusha movements) within Japan. \nIn the paper\, the author mentions that the constitution of Japan does not talk about nuclear weapons. However\, Japan’s Defence White Paper 2008 interprets that the constitution bans possessions of WMDs\, ICBMs and fighter bombers. \nThe author needs to discuss the anti-nuclear culture within Japan.\nThe paper needs to analyze the positions of major political parties (particularly the LDP and DPJ) over the nuclear issue in the last few decades\, their stances on the same issue before and after the upcoming election in August.\nThe author needs to categorize the scenarios into two parts: one\, Japan going nuclear and the second\, Japan maintaining an ambiguous position on the nuclear issue.\nAs for public opinion\, instead of concentrating on the present situation alone\, the author should analyze public opinion on nuclear issues over the last two or three decades.\nThe author needs to discuss in detail the domestic compulsions which are driving Japan’s path to nuclearization. \n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/will-japan-go-nuclear
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090731T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090731T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T224629
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055043Z
UID:63689-1249018200-1249018200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Understanding Chinese Perceptions of India
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Srikanth Kondapalli and Rajeswari Rajagopalan \nThe objective of this is paper is to understand the China’s strategic perception of India. To do so the author Manjeet S Pardesi divides the paper in two broad sections. In first he analyses the validity of the arguments of two prominent scholars who are of the view that there exists an asymmetry of mutual perceptions between India and China. The author then identifies problems in their arguments. In the second section he goes on to show that the Sino-Indian rivalry is not quite one sided and asymmetrical as often claimed and believed to be. It is asymmetric only to the extent that India regards China as its “principal rival”\, and China regards India as its “strategic rival”. The author then puts forward four prominent themes which\, according to him\, shape China’s perception of India. He concludes by arguing that\, contrary to popular belief\, India has always been on the strategic radar of China and that its recent economic rise has only accentuated Chinese security concerns vis-à-vis India. \nThe first section begins with Susan Shirk’s argument. According to Shirk the focus of Chinese strategic and military planning continues to be East Asia- in Taiwan Straits and in South China Sea rather than India. The Chinese don’t see India as any kind of strategic threat. The author points out three problems with Shirk’s one sided rivalry theory. \nFirst Shirk does not define what she means by the concept of rivalry. Consequently\, she conflates the notions of “strategic rivalry” and “principal rivalry”. \nSecond\, she does not give adequate consideration to the assessment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)\, including that of China’s military analysts and their perceptions of India. Thirdly\, she does not attempt to adequately understand the nature of the Sino-Pakistani “entente cordiale” and the reasons behind China’s proliferation of strategic technologies to Pakistan. Based on these three points\, the author argues that China is far more concerned about its security vis-à-vis India than argued by Shirk \nJohn W. Garver is the second scholar whose arguments are examined by the author in the paper. According to Garver China appears dismissive of any security challenge from India even as India perceives a serious threat from its northern neighbor. He supports his analysis based on two forms of evidence. Firstly he shows that China’s public Media and journals have systematically downplayed Indian threats to China’s security while opposite is the case with Indian Journals. And Secondly\, he argues that the status quo – defined as the outcome of China’s invasion of Tibet\, the outcome of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war\, and the Sino-Pakistani entente – all favor China. Consequently\, China does not perceive a serious security threat from India. These arguments\, according to Garver\, point towards the existence of asymmetrical threat perception between India and China. \nThe author is of the view that Garver’s analysis of Sino-Indian mutual perceptions by demonstrating “asymmetrical coverage” in foreign policy journals is inadequate to prove the existence of an asymmetry of threat perception between the two. \nAfter demonstrating that there exist flaws in the arguments which point towards the existence of an asymmetrical relationship between the two countries\, the author comes out with his own findings. The author is of the view that today China’s emerging perception of India is guided and influenced by four prominent themes. They are namely strategic implications of India’s economic growth\, Indo–U.S and Indo–Japanese strategic partnerships\, India’s Look East strategy and India’s growing military power. In sum it is the author emphasizes that recent Chinese analyses of the rise of India’s growing economic strength\, military capabilities\, and diplomatic relationships has fundamentally led to a new image of India in China. While India was perceived in the context of the status of Tibet\, Sino-Indian border issues\, and the security situation in the subcontinent in the past\, recent analyses of India regard it as a growing strategic player in Asia and beyond. This does not mean that the older issues have become unimportant. Instead\, it means that the Chinese have begun to seriously acknowledge India’s growing strategic profile and its impact on the security architecture of Asia. \nPoints Raised During Discussion\n\nWhile evaluating the Chinese perceptions of India\, the roles of the institutional actors in the Chinese establishment are very important. The significant institutions in this regard are the Politbureau Standing Committee\, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\, the People’s Liberation Army and the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce.\nIn China apart from the Realist and Neo-Realist School of thought on Sino-Indian relations\, there is also a growth of Constructivist School of thought which looks at Sino-Indian relations from a “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” perspective.\nThe author is advised to look into the arguments of more scholars before drawing a conclusion. Consulting one or two samples might lead to a wrong or one sided conclusion.\nThe author needs to incorporate more official Chinese views to substantiate his arguments. Moreover\, sources like the PLA Daily and Chinese language articles on the same topic should also be included in the paper to make the findings more authentic.\nWhile the author promises to bring out the Chinese perceptions of India based on a “Socio-Psychological process”\, the arguments used are realist and neo-realist in nature.\nThe author should include more Indian authors and their perceptions of China rather than giving emphasis to American authors.\nIndia’s stand on Tibet needs to be elaborated in the paper as it would be difficult to understand the Chinese perceptions of India without understanding it.\nThe author has devoted almost half of his paper to refute the arguments of two scholars. Instead\, he should focus more on the main theme of the paper.\n\nPrepared by Sandeep Anand\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/understanding-chinese-perceptions-of-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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