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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T225241
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055529Z
UID:63691-1247808600-1247808600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Piracy in Somalia: Need to Address the Root Cause
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Subodh Malakar and Patrick Hoenig \nDuring the last one year Somalia has captured global attention\, due to the surge in piracy off the Somali coast. Piracy off the Somali coast has had a severe commercial\, global and regional impact. The piracy and the resultant dangers posed to international shipping has brought an array of naval deployments from various external actors\, including\, the United States\, EU\, Japan\, China\, South Africa and India. The pirate attacks have disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid to thousands of Somalis and have had a negative impact on the economies of states neighbouring Somalia. \nThough piracy off the Somali coast is not a new phenomenon and has been going on since the beginning of the Somali civil war in the early 1990’s. The collapse of Said Barre’s government in 1991 ushered in a wave of illegal fishing and waste dumping in Somali waters. However\, few years ago the incidence of piracy was quite limited. The statistics suggest that the incidence of piracy grew from less than five to thirty-five in 2005. In 2006 it declined to a mere ten incidents only to grow in 2007 to thirty-one pirate attacks. In 2008 the problem intensified with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reporting 134 acts of piracy. The pirates have been operating in small fast crafts and have used an array of firearms mainly from Yemen while attacking ships. \nPirates are making full use of modern technologies such as mobile phones and Global Positioning System (GPS) devices and in some cases they have used mother ships to allow them a longer range. Currently\, there are two main networks of pirates: one based in Puntland (north-eastern Somalia) comprising mainly members of the Majerteen clan\, and others based in central Somalia\, consisting primarily of members of the Habar Gidir clan. However\, to an extent the two networks overlap and cooperate. \nVarious factors have contributed to the rise of piracy off the Somali coast. These factors include: illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste\, existence of busy sea lanes high rewards and ineffective security structure\, Eritrea’s hostile relationship with Ethiopia and instability within Somalia. \nSeveral measures have been taken by the international community to prevent piracy. Since the beginning of 2008\, the United Nations has issued several resolutions regarding piracy in Somali waters. The US is primarily involved through the deployment of its Naval and aerial units as part of the Combined Task Force CTF-151 under the command of US Navy Rear Admiral Terence Mcknight. In December 2008\, France along with other states initiated Operation Atlanta – a joint naval and aerial operation to protect shipping off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden. This year long operation involves 20 ships from Belgium\, France\, Britain\, Germany\, Greece\, the Netherlands\, Spain and Sweden.  \nRegional countries like Oman\, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have been extensively involved in naval efforts. Apart from escorting the ships\, Yemen is constructing\, Global Maritime Distress Service Stations (GMDSS) in Hodeida and Aden. Similarly in a joint project with Italy Yemen is setting up a Vessel Tracking System (VTS) on a chain of bases along the coast that will considerably improve surveillance capabilities. Many Asian countries such as India\, Japan\, China\, Malaysia\, Singapore\, Russia and Pakistan have dispatched their navies to the Gulf of Aden. However\, Yemen remains the most consistent source of arms and military material to Somalia. Though the Yemeni government has introduced some curbs for arms sales in 2008.  \nThus\, in finding a solution to the conflict in Somalia and consequently the piracy issue is for working towards reduction in tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The African Union (AU) and a panel of African elder statesmen in particular should gently push the two countries towards a dialogue. The international community should intensify its efforts in securing the AU’s early deployment of the African Standby force. \n \nPoints in the Discussion:\nNeed to develop a frame work of cooperation at the regional level to prevent piracy\, because regional cooperation is important to strengthening anti-piracy efforts in Somalia. \nEfforts should be made to stem financial flows. Unfortunately most non- state actors supporting the pirates and the Islamists have followed the informal route of Hawala\, creating logistical problems. \nNeed to examine cultural linkages between pirates and Islamist groups. Report suggests more than 70 percent of Somalis support pirates. \nConflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea are also contributing to emergence of piracy in Somalia as well as in the region. \nNeed to focus Yemeni people’s role in supplying arms and extending cooperation to Somali pirates. What isn’t the Yemeni government curbing support to Somali pirates? There is a need to set up central authority to resolve the problems of piracy. \nNeed to focus UN resolution regarding piracy \nNeed to examine Somali concerns regarding India’s support to prevent piracy in the African region. \nEmphasis should be given on China’s involvement in the region.  \nWhy does Eritrea support Islamist groups in Somalia? \nPrepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/piracy-in-somalia-need-to-address-the-root-cause
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T225241
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130249Z
UID:63692-1247808600-1247808600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Thinking about Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime\, Crisis and War
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Brahma ChellaneyDiscussants: R R Subramanian and Sitakanta Mishra \nThe main focus of this paper is the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and for this purpose the secrecy of nuclear weapons is the most important aspect. However Clary presumes that even the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan may not have knowledge about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its placement plans. The paper seeks to collate\, sort through\, and organize the reams of publicly available information to provide a systematic assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear security apparatus. It also attempts to examine the scenarios which are associated with various types of nuclear risks. After reviewing available evidence\, the author concludes that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is reasonably secure. He examines three elements of Pakistan’s nuclear posture – that is peacetime\, crisis and war and under these scenarios he probes the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The paper concludes by examining the policy implications that emerge from this analysis.  \nThe author examines in detail the scale and general disposition of Pakistan’s nuclear force\, Pakistan’s nuclear command and control as well as role and importance of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). He elaborates how SPD sought to operationalize the deterrent after the 1998 nuclear tests and come to grips with the A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network even as it sought to ameliorate international concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. He also analyses the threats to the civilian nuclear apparatus in Pakistan. The author establishes a baseline that during peacetime\, the system is reasonably secure\, though the risk of “insider threats” is perhaps more pronounced than in other established nuclear weapons states. \nDescribing the war time posture\, the author discusses changes in nuclear risk factors in Pakistan. There is a corresponding increase in nuclear risk in the event of India-Pakistan crises. He points out three dangers associated with Pakistan nuclear arsenal during war time. First\, there is a modest increase in the risk of an accident since Pakistan’s road infrastructure is poor and the traffic system is terrible. For the liquid-fueled missiles\, the mobile platform would have to be accompanied by a highly flammable fuel. It appears likely that mobile launchers would be sent away from the forward edge of battle that means they would most likely be sharing the road with internally displaced people also moving away from combat. All of this contributes to the potential for accident in transport. Second\, maintaining a communications link between the mobile launcher and the National Command Authority may prove difficult during an attack on command and control nodes. Third\, there has been some concern about the security of mobile nuclear units\, when they are away from the static and reinforced security provided at a fixed storage sites. Though Clary points out that this concern is overblown since any mobile launcher is likely to be accompanied by a large security team. He points out that a risky situation which is not completely under the control of central policymakers raises the most critical question\, whether commanders of individual nuclear units either have the authority or the technical ability to launch weapons if they believe Pakistan’s nuclear redlines have been crossed. According to the author there is insufficient information today to definitively conclude one way or the other on this matter.  \nIn the last section\, Clary examines how such a system would likely respond under the stresses of large-scale domestic instability or internal crisis. Distinguishing between different types of instability can assist with thinking about associated nuclear risks. He describes five different types of instability which can lead to associated nuclear risks. First\, the most extreme form of risk would be the take over of Pakistan by radical Islamists\, a scenario that Bruce Riedel has documented at length. Second\, an internal coup within the Pakistani Army would result in Islamist officers overthrowing the more moderate current Army leadership. This is one route by which it can be imagined an Islamist Pakistan despite the fact there is no majority support for such a regime. Third\, there might be an internal coup attempt or some sort of lower-level fracturing within the Pakistani officer corps. Lower-level officers of an Islamist bent\, perhaps together or separately with ethnic Pashtuns\, angered by support to the United States or Pakistan’s operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border might be able to launch a successful\, localized mutiny. Fourth\, Pakistan faces a sudden loss of territory to Islamic or separatist insurgents. Fifth\, this is related to some sort of sudden\, multifaceted state collapse. After describing these scenarios\, Clary concludes that the current Pakistan command and control arrangement appears to be designed to confront the most plausible scenarios with regards to domestic instability in Pakistan. He suggests that the international community should continue efforts to stabilize Pakistan\, in part so that scenarios that currently seem implausible\, do not become more likely. \nClary concludes his presentation by putting forward two recommendations\, one to India and second to the United States. His recommendations appear to be guided by the concerns related to Pakistan’s reactions to Indian and American actions. He suggests Indian policy makers have a clear strategic vision on their broader strategic equations while making efforts to improve the accuracy of nuclear-capable missiles and programs to develop missile defenses. India must take into greater account Pakistan’s reactions to its technical developments and decisions. Clary also suggests to the United States that its officials must take into account Pakistan’s reactions to U.S. discussions about Islamabad’s nuclear stewardship. While acknowledging that US officials have taken the right tone\, he points out that discussion about whether or not\, there are U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in a worst-case scenario are remarkably unhelpful. Clary concludes his presentations on a cautious note that nuclear risks are shared risks and awareness of this interrelationship is one of the important consequences of the nuclear revolution.  \nPoints Raised during the discussion: \n\nIt is difficult to conclude that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals are in safe hands. Intent\, motivation and capability of nuclear weapons are crucial factors which must be taken into consideration while discussing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its security.\nSabotaging the nuclear installations in Pakistan may be possible. This danger cannot be ignored. Similarly dangers posed by a dirty bomb also exist.\nIt is worth examining how Pakistan’s emergency response mechanism works. However the threat level should not be exaggerated. \nThere is a need to identify grey areas in Pakistan’s nuclear security apparatus.\nThere should not be too much attention on Pakistan’s heavy water and natural uranium research reactor\, Khushab.\nThere could be a comparison between North Korea and Pakistan but Pakistan’s nuclear programme cannot be compared with Iran’s.\nPakistan nuclear arsenal is India specific. \nThe question remains how safe and secure is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has developed a code system which runs the risk of being decodified.\nIt is important to understand that all is not well within the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in Pakistan. SPD is facing a lot of pressure to be staffed by politicians. The New establishment in Pakistan is planning to put its own people inside SPD. There is a power tussle within SPD.\nThere is a poor security culture in Pakistan which is evident by the release of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. The situation in Pakistan cannot be brought under control.\nChina factor has not been taken into consideration. \nThe author should use interviews within Pakistan to obtain more data on the subject. \nIt is very difficult to stop nuclear black marketing with laws and regulations.\nThe paper should have mentioned the Special Forces Programme as well. \nThe paper should highlight what are the fundamental problems in Pakistan. Pakistan is not a normal state\, rather it is an abnormal state. There are fundamental challenges to Pakistan’s security\, including radicalization both of society and even more importantly the military \nPeople implementing the Personal Reliability Programme in Pakistan seem to have a Jihadi mindset. In such a scenario personal reliability cannot work.\n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/thinking-about-pakistans-nuclear-security-in-peacetime-crisis-and-war
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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