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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T225252
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
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SUMMARY:Maoists' Tactical United Front (TUF) and Urban Movement
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: A K DovalDiscussants: J N Roy and G D Bakshi \nA Communist party\, according to classical understanding\, requires ‘three magic weapons’ to achieve its goal of capturing political power. These are: Party\, i.e. a strong organisation; Army\, i.e. a body of fighters; and United Front\, i.e. alliances or linkages with groups that would facilitate its ultimate goal. United Front is of two types –– ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’. The Strategic United Front (SUF) is formed with various underground organisations of the CPI (Maoist)\, which are engaged in waging New Democratic Revolution (NDR). In the Tactical United Front (TUF)\, through forming coalitions with persons and groups that are opposed to the state and its policies\, on one issue or the other\, the Maoists seek to fight the state through ‘peaceful’\, political means\, as well as broaden their support base.  \nThis paper seeks to understand the United Front tactics of the CPI (Maoist). According to the CPI (Maoist)\, “it is essential that we unite with such struggling organisations and build up broad struggles against the ruling classes”. In this light\, this paper also seeks to examine the ‘urban activities’ of the CPI (Maoist).  \nThe TUF is a secret committee. It functions directly under the guidance of the Sub Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO)\, which itself is a sub-set of the all-powerful and apex Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist). In 2002\, the TUF activity took a firm shape with the formation of an outfit known as Forum against Imperialism and Globalisation (FAIG)\, which is a conglomerate of various revolutionary and mass organisations.  \nThe TUF serves the agenda of the Maoists in the following ways: \n\nTo consolidate various ‘anti-imperialist’ struggles and bring them on to one platform on the basis of a common working understanding;\nTo expand the reach of the Maoists to various sections of the society by building contacts with them;\nTo expand over-ground cadre strength\, thoroughly indoctrinate them\, and then completely incorporate them into organisational work\, especially in urban areas;\nPoach partners for potential leaders and ideologues;\nServes as a good cover from the long arm of the state;\nEssentially being a political activity\, it reinforces the military activities\, i.e. armed struggle. \n\nThe activities of the CPI (Maoist) in urban areas –– cities and towns –– need to be understood because of the implications they hold. These activities should be understood together with TUF activities\, because urban presence would give a fillip to TUF activities. The Maoists have also prepared an Urban Perspective Plan\, which is a road map to the type of activities they would undertake in towns in order to enhance their support base. The Urban Movement has a defined role in the political strategy and military strategy of the CPI (Maoist). \nThe Maoists contend that the urban movement should be conducted through various types of mass organisations; the wider the organisations\, the better. These organisations are of different types –– secret revolutionary mass organisations\, open and semi-open revolutionary mass organisations\, open legal mass organisations which are not directly linked to the CPI (Maoist). The last of these would include Maoist-inspired cover organisations and legal\, democratic organisations. \nThus\, the Tactical United Front and Urban Movement are extremely important elements of the CPI (Maoist). These are just about taking shape over the past three to four years. Being political and peaceful in nature\, it is not surprising that TUF activities have not received adequate attention in the media. At the same time\, because they are legitimate\, over-ground\, democratic activities\, the state’s hands are tied-down. At best\, it can keep a close watch on these organisations but cannot halt their activities. However\, if it was possible on the part of the state to prove that outfits that are part of the Maoist-led TUF are\, indeed\, Maoist fronts or have direct linkages with them\, it is then feasible to proscribe such organisations. Because these organisations mobilise\, organise\, propagate and indoctrinate the people to attract them towards over-ground activities (i.e. create a sympathiser base)\, and\, perhaps\, subsequently as part of the underground\, the state should make every effort to expose these organisations and ban them. Moreover\, if and when the Urban Movement catches on among the industrial workers\, the state will have to deal with possible sabotage activities and industrial unrest. Besides\, when the Urban Movement becomes strong\, the state will then have to deal with urban terrorism.  \nPoints raised during the discussion\n\nTactical United Front and Urban Movement require immediate attention at the policy making level.\nThe Maoists’ ideology appealed a lot during Charu Majumdar’s days\, but at the organisational level the group was weak.\nFront organisations are a platform to express dissent in a democracy.\nThickly forested areas are the ideal guerrilla zone.\nMaoists are targeting the unorganised sector.\nThere is need for strengthening intelligence.\nMoving towards urban centres is an indication of the failure of the Maoist movement.\nThere is lack of political will in dealing with the Maoist insurgency.\nState police do not have the capacity to deal with Maoist violence; time might come for the Army to intervene.\nNaxalism is a rural phenomenon.\nUrban areas will become major sources of finance for the Maoists. \n\nPrepared by M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/maoists-tactical-united-front-tuf-and-urban-movement
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T225252
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055818Z
UID:63694-1247203800-1247203800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Piracy\, Maritime Terror and Policy Response
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Amb. Arjun AsraniDiscussants: Dr. Vijay Sakhuja and Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra \nIn recent years\, piracy and terrorism on high seas are posing serious threats to international security and economic development. With increasing interdependence\, the use of sea route for transportation has become vital. In this paper\, Dr. Panda addresses three main issues: piracy with focus on Somalia and the Gulf of Eden; terrorism impacting trade through Malacca Straits; and policy response of the countries whose trade is adversely affected by sea piracy and terrorism. \nAccording to Dr. Panda\, there exists a very thin line between an act of terrorism and piracy\, primarily because both acts are undertaken to achieve private ends. Still\, there are certain factors which distinguish piracy from terrorism. In terms of ends\, while piracy is usually driven by financial gains\, terrorism is politically motivated. The line between the two\, however\, is still blurred because terrorists could acquire funding for their political ends through piracy – tactically piractical\, but strategically terrorist. In terms of means\, while pirates are usually associated with basic tactics (e.g\, boarding\, theft\, use of force or violence)\, terrorists usually aim at achieving a strategic effect. Today\, piracy and maritime terrorism are no longer considered discrete. In fact\, there is a complex piracy-terrorism continuum.  \nDr. Panda states that both piracy and terrorism have made the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait region highly insecure. The Indian Ocean is home to many choke points\, such as the Straits of Hormuz\, Straits of Malacca\, Lombok and the Sunda Straits. Any disruption in traffic flow through these points can result in grave and disastrous consequences. As far as the Straits of Malacca is concerned – the sea route transiting it and Singapore is the busiest in the world – 25 percent of world trade passes through this route every year. The criticality of the Malacca Strait is further reinforced by the increase in global economic interdependence and the consequent increase in the volume of mercantile traffic transiting the Strait.  \nTerrorism and piracy have begun to engage the global community\, especially due to the rise in fundamentalist forces after 9/11 and 26/11 attacks in the US and Mumbai\, respectively. The importance of container security to maritime terrorism was particularly felt after the US Navy’s discovery of a group of al-Qaeda terrorists hiding inside a well equipped shipping container in January 2002. While the US is engaged in its search for terrorists and their personification in al-Qaeda on land\, the prospect of a terror ship used by the al-Qaeda terrorizing the maritime arena continues to threaten tranquility at sea. After the recent 26/11 terrorist attack on Mumbai\, guarding sea lanes and territorial waters has become new priorities of naval forces of many countries. \nPiracy in the Malacca Straits has historically been an unresolved threat to ship owners and mariners who ply the 900 kilometer long sea lane. The geography of the Strait makes the region very susceptible to piracy. During 1991-2001\, nearly 2375 incidents of piracy were registered across the world\, with South and Southeast Asia registering the highest number of incidents. The Indian Ocean area too has been invaded with merchant vessels that are suspected to belong to terrorist organizations such as the LTTE and al-Qaeda. In fact\, the LTTE is suspected to own an entire flotilla engaged in dubious maritime trade. As the checking mechanism in place is flawed and entangled in legal matters\, such ships are considered safe for engaging in terrorist-related activities. The Indian Ocean region is notorious for narco-terrorism as well. It is also widely believed that oil leakage at sea might create havoc with the ecology in the maritime environment which would ultimately affect maritime security.  \nThe recent spike in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia has generated a great deal of international media attention. Somalia’s modern pirates represent not only a very real menace to maritime security\, but also a growing threat to international commerce. The sensational nature of their crimes\, while drawing the ire of the international community\, has also ensured that the Somali pirates remain shrouded in mystery.  \nAccording to Dr. Panda\, instances of piracy around the Gulf of Aden by Somali pirates have increased in recent years basically because of the absence of an effective government in Somalia. In 2008\, piracy off the Somalian coast has more than doubled. So far\, over 60 ships have been attacked. Hijacking ships for ransom is a new model. By most estimates\, the pirates took in around $30 million in 2008\, although actual figures may be many times this amount. Kenya in fact claims that the pirates collected over $150 million in ransom in 2008 alone. The increased threat of maritime piracy has heightened the shipping industry’s financial concerns in the context of the current global economic recession.  \nThere is consensus in the international community that maritime terrorism and piracy ought to be addressed with urgency. The misuse of sophisticated technology by pirates and non-state actors calls for continuous up-gradation of technology to counter those engaged in terrorist activities. However\, despite increased naval presence by major powers\, patrolling one million square kilometres of open sea has so far proved to be a major challenge. The existing international law governing territorial waters also place legal constraints on countries capable of checking maritime terrorism.  \nThough the UN has intervened to check the piracy menace\, it has not been very effective. Still a number of unilateral\, bilateral and multilateral security initiatives pursued so far have been able to become regionally successful in tackling maritime threats. Malaysia has embarked upon several regional maritime security initiatives\, including the establishment of SEARCCT (Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism) and hosting the IBM’s regional piracy centre. Singapore\, being the most vulnerable state to any major piracy attack or maritime terrorist act\, gives utmost priority in securing the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) for navigation in regional waterways. There are other regional powers as well\, like the US\, Japan\, China and India whose interests are intrinsically embedded with littoral states like Malaysia and Singapore. In view of the overreaching security and economic interests of all trading nations\, a collective security mechanism involving littorals and extra-regional players to share the burden of policing the Malacca Straits through capacity-building\, intelligence and sharing of financial resources\, and technology transfers seems to be the sine qua non for any attempt to securing the SLOCs.  \nIt transpires that regional actors have their own agendas and compulsions to deal with issues of piracy and maritime terrorism. For example\, Japan’s economic interests are so huge that bolstering SLOC security is of top most foreign policy priority at the moment. Elsewhere\, domestic political interests may be a factor in determining a country’s approach towards regional maritime security cooperation. There may be countries like China with great power ambition which might propel them to enhance their maritime profile. Unless a coordinated approach among countries in the region is adopted\, the coming decades might see a fierce battle in the maritime security ‘chess game’ that seems to be pregnant with unpredictable consequences in shaping the geopolitics of the region.  \n \nPoint raised during the discussion:\n \n\nThe issues of piracy and terrorism should be dealt with separately. At the same time\, a clear distinction between the two terms should also be made. \n \nThe author needs to update some of the data he has provided in the paper.\n \nAlthough in case of policy response\, the author basically concentrated on the Japanese government’s policy\, the title of the paper does not indicate a case study of that country.\n \nWhile the paper gives a lot of information on piracy\, maritime terrorism does not seem to be given so much importance.\n \nIt is necessary to take into account how state failure led to poor governance in Somalia.\n \nThe paper needs to address extensively the issue of capacity building to deal with piracy and maritime terrorism.\n \nThe author needs to take into account the following differences between piracy and terrorism: i)While terrorism has a political goal\, piracy does not; ii) Terrorism is basically land based while piracy is sea based; iii) Terrorists basically target state apparatus\, but pirates do not involve in such activities.\n \nThe author has mentioned that terrorists may use piracy as a means to acquire money. This point needs to be elaborated. \n \nWhether piracy leads to statelessness in Somalia or vice versa needs to be analyzed.\n \nThe author also needs to analyze why the Malacca Strait is less prone to piracy than Gulf of Aden. \n \nAnalysis needs to be made on the legal constraints in resolving piracy and maritime issues. \n \nThe author needs to take into account the military solution to piracy.\n \nThe author talked about the linkage between the Al-Shabab\, a Muslim terrorist group and Somali pirates. But such a linkage is yet to be confirmed.\n \nAlthough it has been mentioned that pirates do not usually have a political agenda\, some pirates in Nigeria do have political goals\, i.e.\, to bring about reforms in Nigeria.\n \nThe author needs to elaborate the policy difference between various agencies and governments in dealing with piracy.\n \nSince the author has extensively talked about piracy in Somalia\, he should consider making it a case study in the paper.\n \nThe LTTE case is dominant in the paper. So much emphasis on that terrorist group is not necessary as it can no longer be considered a significant terrorist group.\n \nChina’s growing naval presence needs to be taken into account. The author should extensively deal with the steps China has taken in response to piracy.\n \nThe author needs to elaborate upon how money gets transferred from pirates to terrorists\, and if there actually exists a linkage between piracy and terrorism. \n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/piracy-maritime-terror-and-policy-response
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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