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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T235624
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061104Z
UID:63695-1245994200-1245994200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:‘New’ Radicals and ‘Old’ Islamists: Understanding the Politics of Religious Radicalization in Pakistan and its Implications
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Kalim BahadurDiscussants: Ashok Behuria and Anwar Alam \nPakistan has witnessed a significant shift in the politics of religion. Islam in the initial years after the creation of Pakistan was confined to constructing a national identity by defining the role of the state on religious grounds. However\, the politics of religion now permeates society and shapes mass opinion. The religious political parties who portrayed themselves as harbingers of Islam now appear sidelined. The new radicals are trying to define the nature of the state and society. They have coerced the state to implement Sharia in some parts of the tribal areas\, something the Islamic parties could not achieve in six decades. In the past few years radical groups have started questioning the legitimacy of Islamic political parties and their methods to usher in an Islamic revolution. It appears that the old Islamists represented mainly by the Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat’ul Ulema Islami Pakistan\, which were perceived as major political fronts for the Islamists in Pakistan\, are gradually showing signs of political decline in terms of their influence and hold on the new generation of Islamists.  \nBoth these political parties were earlier at the vanguard of the Islamic movement in Pakistan. Whether it is the discourse on the place of religion in Pakistan’s polity or the methods to achieve an Islamic state\, these two old Islamic political parties have played a major role. They have also colluded with the Pakistani political and military establishment to implement Pakistan’s policies in Kashmir and Afghanistan. These ‘old’ Islamists consider the State and its Western style democratic institutions as important instruments in achieving their objective to impose Islam. They have acted within the parameters of the state to consolidate the Islamic character of Pakistan. Despite their success in the 2002 elections\, their subsequent electoral decline has given way to a new breed of radicals who are trying to occupy the political space. This new breed of Islamists initially functioned with the blessing of the religious political parties and the Pakistani establishment. Currently\, the old Islamists have distanced themselves from the new radicals; however links between their cadres exist. Political Islam has become more contested between the new radicals and ‘old’ Islamists.  \nPoints raised by External Discussants\n\nThere is no real distinction between Old and New Islamists; means have changed and not ends. The paper has not been able to bring out sharply such a distinction.\n\nJihad is not just a 20th century phenomenon\, but served as an instrument against colonialism as well. \nTechnology is influencing Jihadi terror – means have become more lethal.\nFrom an Islamic perspective there is nothing wrong with Jihad. \nConflict is more within Islam than between non-Muslims and Muslims \nConnection between poverty and terrorism is incorrect. \nDeoband and Jamaat-i-Islami are instruments to Islamize society. \nBarelvis and Deobandis have been involved in bargaining. \nThe paper needs to contextualize the phenomenon of the new radical and the internal processes in Pakistan that have led to the emergence of new radicalism. Islam in India is subsumed within a plural culture. \nLashkar and Ahl-e-Hadees are more Salafist than Deobandi. \nAhl-e-Hadees also tried to win Saudi Arabia’s support. \nThe ideological base of Islamists is splitting. If Jamaat was once radical why is it moderate now? \nBulk of Sunni Muslims in FATA are landless as opposed to the Shias. \nThe rise of sectarian violence also coincided with the anti-Soviet Jihad in the 1980s. \nThe paper needs to better capture the fractionation of the ideological base of Islamists. \nThe paper raises too many issues. It is insufficiently focused and becomes a discourse on the Pakistani state. \nPaper fails to capture the fact that JuI also opposed democracy. \nDid the ‘new’ radicalism emerge due to the vacuum left behind at the end of the Cold War? Or is it a development indigenous to Pakistan? \nHow have global debates on Jihadi violence influenced Islamists in Pakistan? \nThe paper needs to explain how class differences generate radicalism.\nThere are different forms of new radicalism. Radicals are not a monolithic entity.\nThere are ideological differences among them. \nLack of democracy is also propelling Islamic radicalism. Greater emphasis is needed in capturing how the Pakistani state has used one radical group against another. \nIn the past Islam was used as an instrument to subsume diverse ethnic identities. \nShias had a dominant role in Pakistan until the 1970s. \nThe paper needs to capture better the role of groups such as TTP and TSNM. \nWhat is the role of minorities in Muslim dominated countries? \n\nQ&A\n\nNo timelines given on the emergence of new groups. \nAll funding is agenda driven for Madrasas. \nOld and new Islamists unify against a common enemy. New Islamists are not prepared to participate in the democratic process. \nAll revivalist movements subscribe to apostasy. \nIslamic movements are challenging the state. \nDeobandi groups are more binary than the Barelvis. \nReligious minorities were protected under the Ottomans. \nThe Taliban are trained by the JuI. \nNew radical groups such as the Deobandis have tried to capture state power. \nWithdrawal of the US is unlikely to change much within Pakistan. \nPakistani state is not going to abandon fundamentalist Islam. Sufi Mohammad does not believe in state authority. \n\nChair’s Remarks \nIn Punjab Barelvis are seeing a decline in numbers. Deobandis and Madrasas are growing. Deobandis and Barelvis continue to dispute mosque ownership. All Muslims need to be good to be Islamic. The Taliban want to kill everyone. Secularism means atheism for Pakistani Islamists. They are against women’s freedom. Ideologically they are cohesive. Islamists such as Khomeini\, Qutb and Maududi used elections to gain power\, but refused to hold them again. \nPrepared by Kartik Bommakanti\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/new-radicals-and-old-islamists-understanding-the-politics-of-religious-radicalization-in-pakistan-and-its-implications
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T235624
CREATED:20231224T104529Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061603Z
UID:64212-1245994200-1245994200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Impact of Modernisation of Police Forces Scheme on Combat Capability of the Police Forces in Naxalism-Affected States
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Kalyan K MitraDiscussants: J N Roy and G D Bakshi \nThe menace of Left Wing Extremism (LWE)\, commonly termed as Naxalism and Maoist insurgency has been a major challenge to India’s internal security. As part of its multi-pronged strategy to deal with the menace\, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has taken special steps on the security front. Emphasis is also being laid on employing local State Police Forces (SPF) with assistance from Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) for improving the security environment. However\, the security responses of various States to Naxal violence have not been effective\, barring limited success in a few States. The failure of security forces to respond rapidly is often attributed to a lack of police combat capability in Naxalism- affected States. \nIn order to address the long felt need for police capability building\, the Centre as well as State Governments have initiated numerous measures in naxalism-affected States\, like raising of special anti-Naxal forces\, specialised training to SPFs in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare\, providing better arms\, ammunition\, equipment\, communication gadgets\, bullet proof vehicles\, land-mine proof vehicles\, intelligence support\, improved infrastructural and resource supports\, etc. The Centre has also been implementing the ongoing modernisation of police forces scheme since 2000-01. The scheme has an annual budgetary allocation of Rs.1000 Crores for ten years. Almost eight financial years have passed since this scheme was launched. However\, the SPF in most of the Naxal-affected States are still deficient in combat capabilities and unable to take on the Naxalites\, as the Naxalite violence and the casualty figure of SPF are still on the rise. Accordingly this paper attempts to answer the following questions: \n\nWhat has been the essence of the ongoing MPF scheme and its impact on police capability building since 2000 in Naxal-affected States?\nWhat difficulties are being faced by State police forces while implementing this scheme?\nHas the provision/allocation under the scheme been adequate to address all the aspects of police combat capacity\, so as to make them capable enough to counter Naxalism effectively? If not\, what are the deficiencies in the existing scheme\, including in implementation?\nWhat measures could be undertaken to make the scheme more effective?\n\nThis paper attempts to assess and analyse the impact of present MPF scheme on building police combat capability in Naxal-affected States. In order to realistically assess the impact of the MPF scheme\, the paper is focuses on the ongoing MPF scheme in various Naxal-affected states in general and the States of Bihar and Jharkhand in particular which are considered to have the least developed police capability including manpower\, resources and training. \nObjective of the MPF Scheme \n\nTo meet the identified deficiencies in various aspects of police administration worked out by the BPR&D.\nTo reduce the dependence of State Governments on the Army and CPMF.\nTo control internal security and maintain law and order by equipping the State Police Forces adequately and imparting the required training.\nBalanced development of State Police Forces.\n\nThe focus of the scheme is on strengthening police infrastructure at the cutting edge level by way of construction of secure police stations\, equipping police stations with required mobility\, modern weaponry\, communication equipment\, forensic set-up and housing. \nSpecial Provisions for Naxal-Affected States through MPF \n\nStrengthening of Special Branches\nStrengthening of the police infrastructure in 76 worst-affected Naxal districts\nImproving Police Training Capability\nDeployment of CPMF\, Raising of India Reserve Battalions (IRBs) and Sanctioning of a Commando Company in each of the 44 IRBs\nEngagement of SPOs to Augment Policing\nSecurity Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme; and\nPilot Project for Development of Infrastructure in Naxal-Affected States\n\nMHA claims that MPF Scheme has made a perceptible impact in all the States and provided much needed assistance and impetus to policing in the country. It has provided proper building for police station/out posts. Construction of houses for police personnel has boosted their morale. Availability of vehicles has improved police mobility and reduced response time. Modern weapons have boosted police power and morale particularly in Naxal affected areas thereby enhancing the performance and the satisfaction level of the State Police Forces. \nThe “Police” and “law and order” are State subjects under Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. It is the prime responsibility of the State Governments to improve the functioning of their police force and to equip them adequately with the latest technology for meeting the emerging challenges to public order and internal security in the form of terrorism\, Naxalism\, insurgency\, increase in crimes. The Central Government is supplementing the efforts of the State/Union Territory Governments in this regard. The MPF scheme is a significant initiative of the Central Government towards capacity building of SPF since 1969-70. The MPF scheme has been welcomed by police officers and men in all the States. It is especially helpful in resuscitating acutely deficient policing machinery in economically backward States. The regular police budget has been meagre due to a fiscal crunch in such states. \nBut the scheme has suffered from undue delay in implementation in some of the States. Senior police officers of Bihar praise the scheme but feel that it has not been implemented properly and the State has not been able to reap the benefits of the scheme. The State still lacks basic policing infrastructure like housing\, buildings\, and vehicles since these have been neglected for long. Senior police officers of Jharkhand have however opined that the MPF scheme has enabled the State police in terms of arms/ammunition\, equipment\, communication\, mobility and special equipment like bullet proof vehicles. Chhattisgarh police officers also feel that there little noticeable impact in the satisfaction level especially in residential buildings\, family accommodation and mobility. \nDespite various problems the MPF scheme has achieved its objectives to some extent in terms of improving physical infrastructure\, but a huge gap still exists between what is available and what is optimally required. MPF needs to be more user oriented rather than being thrust upon States. It should meet State Police’s aspirations based on their specific needs. Undue secretarial procedures and bureaucratic interference is proving burdensome to smooth implementation. Hence\, the scheme needs to be given a fresh look for better implementation. \nPoints raised during the discussions: \n\nIndia’s internal security challenge is also the Army’s responsibility.\nThere is need for close coordination between the State governments and the central government in dealing with LWE.\nPolice Modernisation in Naxalism-affected States may be given priority\, or a separate MPF scheme could be launched.\nNaxalism- affected States may be given 100% central assistance.\nImplementation procedure needs to be simplified.\nThere are severe governance challenges in most naxalites-affected States.\nPolice leadership should introspect and must eliminate corruption which is the biggest challenge to effective policing.\nThere are various organisational constraints. There is need for transforming the police forces\, in terms of leadership\, structure\, recruitment\, incentives\, logistics support\, equipment and training. The Police leadership is ineffective on the ground. Attractive welfare schemes for the dependents of police personnel are needed.\n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/impact-of-modernisation-of-police-forces-scheme-on-combat-capability-of-the-police-forces-in-naxalism-affected-states
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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