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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
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DTSTAMP:20261104T234903
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
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SUMMARY:Dragon’s Digital Eyes beyond the Himalayas: Online Chinese Nationalism towards Pakistan And India
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: S K BhutaniDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and M. V. Rappai  \nSince China underwent a series of reforms back in the 1970s\, the world has been witnessing sporadic symptoms of its widening presence in South Asia\, particularly in the contexts of India and Pakistan. It is more so in the post-Cold War period after the ‘People’s Daily Online’ connected to the Internet on January 1\, 1997\, utilizing cyberspace as a means to involve national sentiments and general responses on international issues in a big way. Since then\, the primary focus of Chinese cyber nationalists has been to retain China’s historical status as a respected power. Today\, Chinese cyberspace is often considered by many as a responsible factor in influencing Chinese policy making in relation to these two South Asian states. In this paper\, the author makes an attempt to review issues like evolution of online Chinese nationalism towards Pakistan and India; the central views in online Chinese nationalism towards the two states; the influence\, if any\, of the nationalist expression toward India and Pakistan on the actual foreign policy-making in China.  \nThe structural change in the international system at the end of the Cold War compelled the Chinese leadership to review and reshape its foreign as well as domestic policies. Since then\, while on the one hand\, China has been trying to improve its relations with neighboring states to deal with the US’ rising power in the region and quell the growing fear of encirclement by a coalition led by Washington\, there have also been consistent efforts by the Chinese people to revitalize China’s splendid civilization on the other. In recent years\, with China having the largest netizens in the world\, a certain section of Chinese nationalists have been able to intensify the offline nationalistic rhetoric within the state through online Chinese nationalism. In fact\, according to Stephan Halper and Jonathan Clarke\, “the internet has emerged as possibly the most important influence on public opinion\, not only accelerating the communications of news and information within China but also relaying news of unfolding events from the worldwide Chinese diaspora.” The Chinese\, particularly the young generation who have much greater access to the cyber world than the elderly\, have come to realize that they no longer need to secure direct or indirect interpretations from leaders\, journalists and Chinese officials (all members of the CCP)\, when they can analyze the truth by accessing the internet.  \nHowever\, Chinese youths’ access to the internet has created a sort of cyber-nationalism within the state which may prove quite a challenge in the long run for India’s security and strategic interests. It is evident from the anti-India sentiments overwhelmingly pouring out of a number of Chinese cyber sites. According to surveys conducted so far\, most Chinese netizens attach their preference to Pakistan as a more friendly state while considering India as less friendly. In the debates within Chinese cyberspace\, strong statements like how China can use Pakistan’s ‘fatal grudge’ with India for its own national interest clearly indicate how such ‘India bashing’ can create anti-India sentiments among Chinese public.  \nIt is believed that cyberspace in China has been able to bring about critical changes in its one-party dominated society. In fact\, “the unique characteristics of the internet such as instantaneousness\, anonymity\, and lacking borders have made it a convenient and powerful vehicle for citizens to assert themselves and have their voice heard in an institutionally less liberal and democratic environment”\, as rightly put by Bo Li and Yang Zhong in the book titled “The Internet and Political Participation in China.”  \nAlthough it is argued that popular online nationalism has been able to set a standard of what may be called ‘true patriotism’ in contrast to ‘state nationalism’\, it remains undeniably true that no alternative leaders or movements are emerging from the internet and the CCP continues to be sole political power. As regards to the size of cyberspace\, although China’s internet seems to be quite open to the world\, in reality\, it still offers a tactfully closed cyberspace. What is all the more interesting to note here is that most of the leading commercial websites are based on China\, where they continue to face a lot of pressure from the CCP. Above all\, despite growing popularity of cyberspace within China\, the credibility of the news on the website still remains in question. That is why\, the impact of cyber nationalism in China on the decision-making process is very limited\, even with the state’s foreign policy formulations in relation to India and Pakistan. \nPoints raised during the discussion:\n\nWhy and how Beijing has been able to use the media\, particularly cyberspace\, to meet its national interest by promoting Chinese nationalism?\nHow has the Chinese leadership creatively managed the freedom of internet users\n\nHas there been state support to galvanize internet usage in China?\nWhat is the penetration rate of anti-India sentiments through Chinese cyberspace? \nIs the US-India strategic partnership responsible for growing anti-India sentiments in Chinese websites?\nThe author mentions that Sino-Pak relation is a by-product of the Indo-US strategic partnership. However\, while Indo-US strategic relationship is quite a recent phenomenon\, Sino-Pak relations began decades ago. \nThe paper needs to analyze the impact of cyber nationalism on the larger population\, since as a proportion of the overall population\, netizens in India\, China and Pakistan still remain quite small.\nAt present\, Chinese hacking seems to pose a much greater threat to India than cyber nationalism. \nWhat has been the methodology adopted in selecting comments from the websites?\nDigital nationalism in China is a kind of proxy war against India.\nA brief overview of the evolution of Chinese digital nationalism is necessary.\nChinese Diaspora has a great impact on Chinese nationalism\, whether online or offline. Thus\, there is a need to analyze the extent of online communication between the Chinese in mainland China and those residing in other democratic countries.\n\nAn analysis should also be made on the influence of the internet on the process of Chinese policy making. \nIn the paper\, the author elaborates on how over the years\, Sino-Indian relations have undergone three specific changes: ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai’ of 1950s to ‘Hindi-Chini Bye-Bye’ of post 1962 war\, and then\, to ‘Hindi-Chini Buy Buy’ of post 1988. These three stages seem irrelevant as far as this paper is concerned. \nThe author mentions the forty-five minute long handshake between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Chinese President Deng Xiaoping in Beijing in 1988. This is not quite correct. \nDespite its booming IT sector\, India has not been able to master the intricate details of cyberspace system. To counter the growing anti-India sentiments pouring out of Chinese websites\, India needs to develop mastery over the functioning of internet network system at a rapid pace. We also need a systematic policy in computer technology to deal with the growing threats from Chinese cyberspace.\n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/dragons-digital-eyes-beyond-the-himalayas-online-chinese-nationalism-towards-pakistan-and-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T234903
CREATED:20231223T222216Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061940Z
UID:63699-1244179800-1244179800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A new wave of Terrorism in India
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Arun BhagatDiscussants: S Y Thapliyal and Bibhu Prasad Routray \nIn India\, the word terrorism came to be officially used for the first time in 1984 to characterise the violence in Punjab. This followed the enactment of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act of 1984\, the impulse for which was the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October that year. Before this\, all armed action by the various groups in the North East or by the Naxals were referred to as extremism or militancy or Naxalism. Subsequently\, the violence unleashed by domestic as well as foreign armed groups in Jammu and Kashmir came to be characterised as cross-border terrorism. \nThe 2007-2008 Annual Report of the Ministry of Home Affairs lists 32 different armed groups as banned terrorist organisations. Among others\, these include several armed groups in the North East as well as the two Maoist groups. Yet\, in the pages devoted to detailing what the report refers to as the “Current Status of Militancy in the North East” and in the section dealing with the “Naxal Situation\,” the words terrorism and terrorist are not mentioned even once! The report also characterises the violence in Jammu and Kashmir as “terrorism/militancy”\, in a bow towards the fact that all violence in that state does not constitute terrorism. \nTo avoid confusion about the phenomenon being confronted\, it is imperative to understand what terrorism is. Moreover\, a series of events in the last few years – the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai\, the various bombings carried out by the Indian Mujahideen\, and the involvement of Hindu radical groups in bomb-throwing – points to a new wave of terrorism focused on the Indian hinterland. This necessitates a change in India’s approach towards counter-terrorism from one focused purely on cross-border aspects to domestic issues as well. \nThis paper explores what terrorism is. It analyses the new wave of terrorism buffeting the Indian hinterland\, and excludes discussion of the Maoist insurgency\, the armed activities of the various armed groups in the North East\, and “militant” violence within Jammu and Kashmir. The paper also highlights some principles that should inform India’s approach to counter terrorism. \nWhile cross-border terrorism sponsored and supported by Pakistan has been a security challenge since the late 1980s\, a new wave of terror has begun to batter the Indian hinterland in recent years. Three distinct sets of players are involved in this new phenomenon. The first set comprises of Pakistani terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)\, which have since the late 1990s begun to expand their ‘jihad’ in Kashmir into the Indian hinterland. The second set is composed of a network of rage-driven Indian Muslim youth and Indian criminal outfits\, who\, with the support of the first set\, seek vengeance for the ‘sufferings’ inflicted upon their community. And the third set is formed by radical Hindu youth\, bent on retaliating against Muslims for the terrorist attacks carried out by the other two sets of players. \nTwo events triggered this new wave. The first was the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the communal riots that followed in parts of the country. The second event was the stalling of the separatist struggle in Jammu and Kashmir in the mid-1990s. Muslim youth and criminal networks were spurred by the Babri demolition and the ensuing communal riots to seek vengeance through terrorist attacks. Ten years later\, the tragedy in Gujarat provided further fuel to their anger. \nPakistan has been providing material support to them in this enterprise. And when the Hizbul Mujahideen’s separatist struggle in Jammu and Kashmir began to wane\, Pakistan began to funnel its own citizens and other “graduates of the Afghan war” into the state\, thus transforming a local insurgency into a transnational jihad. When neither this change in actors nor the Kargil misadventure could shake the Indian hold over Jammu and Kashmir\, the jihad was extended to the Indian hinterland in the late 1990s. This in turn incensed Hindu radicals who began to plan and unleash terror against innocent Muslims. \nIndia thus has to contend with three sets of terrorist actors – one purely foreign\, the second\, domestic groups with linkages to these foreign players\, and the third wholly domestic. \nThe approach to counter each of these players has to be distinct\, though there are bound to be commonalities in measures adopted. In the case of Pakistani terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba\, domestic counter-terror measures have to be accompanied by diplomatic efforts to force Pakistan into taking stringent action against these groups and even covert intelligence campaigns to disrupt the terror infrastructure in that country. \nIndia also needs to focus on domestic counter terror measures\, which have indeed received a fillip in the wake of the Mumbai attack. States have responded to terrorism by adopting a combination of several responses\, each of course specifically crafted to suit their particular circumstances. Though it might sound pusillanimous\, “appeasement” is a most pragmatic response. Not appeasement in terms of conceding terrorist demands\, but addressing the underlying causes that triggered the resort to violence in the first place. \nA second set of responses is in the domain of intelligence and the legal framework to deal with terrorism. The development and maintenance of databases about terrorist groups is essential. This is in turn contingent upon enhanced intelligence work and capabilities\, both human and technical. Related to this are greater intelligence and surveillance efforts through a network of closed-circuit television cameras\, psychological profiling\, infiltration of terrorist groups\, etc. \nThirdly\, it is crucial to identify and harden actual and potential targets like government buildings\, corporate houses\, vital installations like airports\, power plants\, and the like through security measures like x-ray baggage screeners\, metal detectors\, more security personnel\, etc. The idea is to make it as difficult as possible for terrorists to carry out attacks\, thus increasing the chances of mistakes and consequent reduction in the actual number of attacks. \nThe creation of special counter-terrorist forces and providing them with specialised training to deal with hostage negotiations is the fourth response. This needs to go hand in hand with the modernisation of the police force. \nImportant points raised in the discussion: \n\nIndia is the biggest victim of terrorism.\nThe biggest act of Hindu terrorism was the destruction of Babri Masjid.\nMajority community needs to change its mindset towards the Muslim community.\nRevamping the intelligence structure is the need of the hour.\nThere is complete lack of coordination among various security agencies. This has to be addressed.\nThere is urgent need for police reform.\nIs Indian Mujahideen an independent terror group?\nPakistan remains a security threat to India. India’s inability to deal with Pakistan has further compounded the situation.\nIndia should not expect much from the United States in dealing with Pakistan. However\, India may consider something like the US Department of Homeland Security.\nThere is an urgent need for political consensus on terrorism.\nAbove all\, there is need for security consciousness among the people.\n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-new-wave-of-terrorism-in-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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