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SUMMARY:Low Intensity Conflict under Nuclear Conditions: Analysing the India-Pakistan Theatre
DESCRIPTION:India and Pakistan were again on the verge of a military confrontation following revelation of Pakistan’s complicity in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Pakistan reluctance to act against its perpetrators had forced India to plan punitive responses against terror camps\, prompting Pakistan to project a capability to repulse an Indian attack. After weeks of underdone posturing\, both realised the possibility of a stalemate and de-escalated the conflict. Such responses have been the template of the India-Pakistan dynamics\, especially after the May 1998 nuclear tests. Of all characteristics\, the most discernable element is what is perceived to be an asymmetric nuclear deterrence equation that seems skewed against India\, restricting its pro-active responses. The paper reviewed a problematic element in the India-Pakistan strategic competition – the scope for low intensity conflict under nuclear conditions. It examined whether the execution of a protracted low-intensity conflict by Pakistan is a negation of the nuclear deterrence equation between the two countries\, and the reasons why India has failed to suitably respond to this strategy. \nThe concept of Low Intensity Conflict has constantly evolved along with the transformations in the nature of warfare. When quantified by intensity and nature of conflict\, all confrontations remaining below the level of high- or mid-level conventional war could be classified as low-intensity conflicts. Generally\, LIC is a genre embracing many types of sub-conventional and asymmetric warfare including insurgency\, counter-insurgency\, and even terrorism and counter-terrorism \nThe chunk of debate on nuclear South Asia is centred on two issues: (a) has nuclear weapons caused instability\, raising potential for escalation; (b) is it a stability-instability paradox\, whereby Pakistan used the assumed stability at the nuclear level to create instability at the lower level. In this dialectical spectrum\, both schools converge on the stability-instability paradox\, which states that the stability created by nuclear weapons at the top would cause or facilitate instability at the sub or conventional levels. \nPakistan seeks to deter at all levels – nuclear\, conventional\, sub-conventional and does not want India to share the same equation. It fears Indian pre-emptive attack against nuke capability. In this regard it has two objectives (i) gain parity against India’s conventional superiority (b) existential deterrence against India’s nuclear capability. Pakistan fears the asymmetry with India in force levels and believes space for conventional war exists\, which India would exploit. India could crush insurgency at limited conventional levels and threaten second strike if Pakistan contemplates nuclear response. \nLinked with this thinking is the utility of nuclear weapons in achieving Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Kashmir. Pakistanis had always believed that its nuclear capability could neutralise the Indian conventional as well as nuclear forces while providing the umbrella to reopen the Kashmir issue. Through every opportunity of brinkmanship\, Pakistan seeks to internationalise the Kashmir dispute\, project it as a nuclear flashpoint and pressure India to initiate a dialogue. The Indo-Pakistan peace process could have in some ways validated this strategy. However\, it had mixed results as India managed to repulse the insurgency through successful counter-insurgency\, forcing Pakistan to push in foreign mercenaries to hype the theatre. \nThe paper concluded with the assertion that Pakistan is an irrational actor. It is a hub of terrorism and proliferation and a theological nuclear weapon state primarily controlled by military. It exploits global paranoia to its advantage. However it is equally apprehensive about being bombed back to Stone Age. It realizes that tactical first-strike is unfeasible and would invite massive Indian retaliation. As for India’s limited responses\, despite repeated breaches\, India never expanded theatre and instead used economic and military might. Also\, it never allowed space to internationalise Kashmir. India has yielded political gains through responsible behaviour. The moot question is- Has this approach been fruitful – political timidity and reluctance to use military power? India believes in the scope for Limited War under Nuclear Conditions. Pakistan found space for LIC without hitting Indian threshold and Pakistan’s first-use posture restricted Indian response. \nFinally\, these options will materialise only if the Indian political leadership mandates the security establishment to execute such radical responses to the three-decade old proxy war\, which has cost thousands of lives and destruction of national resources. There is need for political will and audacity to exploit the turbulence in Pakistan and signal to Pakistan the futility and failure of its LIC strategy. Pakistan should be reminded of the fact that its survival should not be at the cost of promoting subversion and instability in South Asia. This would also mean a change of mindsets in Indian security establishment and the willingness to transcend traditional security approaches to explore radical solutions to this perennial security challenge. \nThe important points raised during the discussion were \n\nWe need to now re examine our existing doctrines and get rid of prevailing flaws. IDSA could assist in the process by pro active documentation.\nSecurity of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is a big issue and Pakistan exploits this insecurity to its advantage.\nCrushing insurgency through low intensity tactics is not a feasible option. Insurgency is a socio-economic-political problem and requires a more comprehensive and sensitive approach.\nThere is no need to worry too much about the nuclear rhetoric. LIC is something which is here to stay.\nThere is need to look at the definitional aspects of LIC and distinction needs to be made between proxy war and LIC.\nDismemberment of Pakistan is not beneficial for India as it would be exposed directly to troubled areas of Afghanistan and Central Asia.\nAnti India stand and Kashmir is the single biggest adhesive for Pakistanis.\nIndia and Pakistan have to think beyond military solutions. Sabre rattling would not help in the long run. They have to look for alternatives such as political resolutions and packages.\nIn war Asymmetry is something you hope to achieve.\nIndia shouldn’t be bothered too much about Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.\nPakistan has always used Kashmir as leverage to shy away from the real issues of concern- supporting cross border terrorism and facilitating terrorist attacks on Indian Territory.\nNobody can take Kashmir away from India unless we wish to give it out. According to the Instrument of Accession\, the whole of Kashmir including Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) is integral part of Indian Territory.\nIndia’s No first use policy is good even today and is a part and parcel of our diplomatic approach.\nThere is need to launch quick reaction forces similar to the Chinese strategy.\n\nThe session was chaired by Air Marshall (retd) Vinod Patney. The two external discussants were Brig Arun Sahgal and Maroof Raza. \nPrepared by Priyanka Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/low-intensity-conflict-under-nuclear-conditions-analysing-the-india-pakistan-theatre
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090508T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090508T053000
DTSTAMP:20261106T001155
CREATED:20231223T222221Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T062540Z
UID:63704-1241760600-1241760600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Trends in Thinking about Warfare
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs\nChair: M. S Chowdhury\nDiscussants: Rahul Bhonsle and Chandar S Sundaram \n“Trends in thinking about warfare” presented at the IDSA Fellow Seminar on 08 May\, 2009 at IDSA New Delhi by Col. PK Gautam( Retd) was well received and critically reviewed by external discussant and internal peer discussants. The proceedings were chaired by Brigadier MS Chowdhuri\, VSM ( Retd) Chief Instructor United Service Institute (USI) of India. External discussants were Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle\, SM (Retired)\, author and analyst\, and Dr Chandar Sundaram from the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research\, USI of India. Internal discussant were Wg Cdr Ajey Lele and S. Rajsimman. \nThe paper identifies the following areas as unexplored or absent from Indian strategic community. The paper further argues that absence of these factors from Indian discourse may have its repercussion at both the level of research and policy making. \n\nUnderstanding the various “ways” of warfare and status of the debate on strategic culture.\nInvention of Fourth Generation War (4GW) and lessons from recent military operations including how the Chinese view it.\nNeglect and trends in military history.\n\nThe protracted nature of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan compels one to think about the nature and character of war. While the nature of war continues to be enduring\, the character has changed to that of a counterinsurgency campaign. \nThe paper recommends strategic thinkers concerned with the military “use of force” in resolving “inter-state” and “intra-state” be sensitive to the available literature on the subject which debates whether modern war fighting capabilities enabled by hi-tech weaponry based on science and technology have ensured “victory”. The paper argues the importance for certain constructivist approaches to help research in this area. It begins its argument by stating that military operations in Iraq\, Afghanistan\, and Lebanon have overemphasized modern military operations while ignoring other factors that may eventually decide the result of operations. The paper also stresses the “way of fighting” and highlights the “Maratha way” to underline this point. \n\nChanging character of depth/ deep battle with hard and soft weapons (firepower and cyber power including EMP bombs). Overlap of force on force and spread of irregular warfare\nCentral role of contact battle( eye ball to eye ball) in India’s border deployment against China and Pakistan and also in counter insurgency war ( Chinese also claim : “China is strong in close warfare ; the enemy is strong in distant warfare” – Maj Gen Wang Pufeng )\nIn embryonic phases\, partially due to ignorance\, most Generals were against computerisation. Some warned against the perils of getting attracted to virtual reality at the cost of real world battle experience. Now most are for it and all know word processing and net use. Younger generation transmits culture of absorption of ICT to seniors. Wisdom of seniors under attack due to market forces and diminishing inter state wars and battle experience. Need for matching adult education.\n\nObservations by Discussants  \nBrig Bhonsle recommended more references to Indian literature. He mentioned that the US has now achieved asymmetry in Iraq. Counter insurgency is always difficult in foreign lands and he recalled the Indian experience in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. As regards 4GW\, he traced its origins to 1980s through the work of William Lind and others. Foreign literature he agreed was mostly about marketing products. As regards civil- military relations\, he mentioned that one has to introspect within the services and noted that the Chief of Defence Staff was stymied by the Air Force. Blame thus is shared by all in lack of synergy in system. \nDr Sundaram desired greater focus and suggested the replacement of warfare with warfighting. He traced how the British who were familiar with “guilds” where the concept of class had originated improvised to cement the regimental system in India based on its society\, which rather cemented the units. One new and challenging area of research over the century was via content analysis of the USI journal which needs to be done for further research by scholars. The journal has been published since 1870- being the oldest surviving journal on defence issues in India – it would give a good idea on ways of thinking on warfare in the Indian context. Observing a tendency not to look at history\, he also explained how political scientists have got the better of the topic than historians in general.. It is evident that historic lessons have been ignored – such as those of Vietnam\, or of Iraq. Societies can not be treated as water\, but as cultures. On the Chinese sources\, they need to be treated with caution as they have very strict censorship laws. He lamented that in Indian democracy\, there is excessive delay to get hold of even non classified historic papers which is counter productive. It is time that official war histories of 1962\, 1965 and 1971 are made public \nWg Cdr Lele suggested that ways of warfare are contextual – theater based\, or guerrilla war or present state of asymmetric warfare. He opined that there is nothing Western or Eastern as regards RMA. In shock and awe and effect based operations he mentioned that winning war is not enough\, but winning the peace is important . Subject is not only military\, but involves policy makers\, think tanks and academia. He noted that nanotechnology will usher in fifth generation warfare and we need to prepare. \nMr. S.Rajasimman exemplifies on this aspect by arguing that the paper captures this phenomenon at two important levels. These are at 1) operational level 2) doctrinal level. Conceptualization at these two levels differs. The paper for instance does not assume a clear distinction between the both. Both “Iraq War” and “Afghan War” have been claimed and argued to be unsuccessful. The paper argues that the “protracted-insurgency based operations” in Iraq and Afghan has proven that Shock and Awe lost its sting. Here distinction needs to be made how the concept of “shock and awe” functions at operational level and doctrinal level. Operational success need not necessarily mean doctrinal success. In other words the overwhelming fire power and high-tech weapon systems used may have been successful at the operational or tactical level by achieving the “military objectives” against “political-social objectives” as part of the next phase in the war. \nDiscussion  \nComments by E mail: Disagreeing on some issue such as 4GW\, US performance and high end warfare capability\, Colonel Peter Garretson\, USAF concluded that the paper also manifests what is the central debates in the US which is : \nWhat is the future of warfare\, and what should be our organizational emphasis \nRight now the forces to reform in favor of irregular prevail in power and noise \nBut they are strongly checked by the services and existing budget \nOther concerns of Col. Garretson were about long-range conventional missiles\, and cruise missiles\, which he thought will change high-end warfare. Trends which he thought need to be highlighted since World War II were: \nAn increase in examination of the future\, at least organizational\, from individual theorists\, to VonKarman’s New Horizons\, to AF2025… \nThe increase in capability of airpower\, and the counters by those who don’t have it \nThe de-civilization of warfare by the disadvantaged \nNamrata Goswami wrote : “that unlike what George Tanham or Ashley Tellis would have us believe\, Indian military is rather good at attrition warfare\, if you take its long drawn engagement in the North East and Jammu and Kashmir as a success story – then the rather valid question would arise: why are they still there? . Therefore\, I beg to differ with you on this aspect. I strongly argue that the growing militant violence in the North East especially Assam and Manipur is sign enough about the failure of countering insurgency effectively with devastating effect on overall way of life in these areas. Just managing violence between the security forces and the militants while turning a blind eye to extortion networks\, social violence\, and political instability tells badly on our military’s way of warfare\, if there is any at all”. \nComments by Participants  \nCommander Ranjit Rai (Retd) wanted more emphasis on strategic thinking. Dr Arvind Gupta\, from his experience noted that much more coordination and work is needed including original Indian work on the Indian way of warfare including text books. Dr Uttam Sinha felt the need to pull out military writings of Indian authors which must include culture\, history and trend analysis. Brigadier SP Sinha ( Retd) explained from his 1965 war experience on EBO as to how raw troops who were initially paralysed by artillery fire\, got used to or inoculated to it after few days of shelling. Lesson was effect based must be understood in context and for time period. It does not last permanently. . \nConcluding Remarks of Chairman  \nChair highlighted the following \n\nMore work on India and other literature is needed.\nStudy of history is important to see how only use of air power as propounded by Douhet never succeeded.\nOn the point made by Dr Namrata Goswami via e mail\, the chair said that he does not agree with her. In Nagaland the military has done an excellent job\, but other organs of the state also have a role to perform which was found lacking.\nThe situation in Iraq is due to incorrect strategic thinking. Indian policy makers have done well to resist the temptation to send Indian troops to Iraq.\nThe implementation of the Kargil Review Committee Report is held up and must be speeded up.\n\nOver all observations \nAll policy recommendations pertaining to study of war\, theory building\, nature of force employment study\, more focus on conduct of war rather than just IR\, not getting over awed by foreign literature\, doctrines based on combat experience need to retain cultural values and renew debate on civil military relations. It was generally opined that the paper in terms of its idea was important in itself and also as a guide to future research in this area. Future research could benefit from the discourse analysis that this paper has attempted to highlight. \nPrepared by S.Rajasimman\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/trends-in-thinking-about-warfare
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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