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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000
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DTSTAMP:20261105T002541
CREATED:20231223T222241Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
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SUMMARY:India’s Strategic Autonomy Dilemma and the Rapprochement with the United States
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and K. P. Vijayalakshmi \nThe debate on strategic autonomy makes a conceptual contribution about how India as an emerging power seeks to forge a partnership with the United States. The Indian imperative is to keep a sufficient degree of autonomy in its security and military relationship with the United States. Within the framework of India-US rapprochement the dynamics of power acquisition by India clash with its effort to maintain a reasonable degree of autonomy. Consequently\, the concept of strategic autonomy\, which is a mutation of realism and India’s traditional non-aligned posture\, can be described as a dependence control strategy aimed at safeguarding its independence in both foreign policy decision making and protecting strategic assets against American pressure. For India strategic autonomy necessitates the association between an autonomous foreign policy/security decision making capability and the preservation of material assets (both technical and economic). Strategic autonomy can only be a relative principle.  \nPragmatists and maximalists among India’s strategic elites agree that the concept must accept some compromises to advance larger foreign policy goals. Some pragmatists have argued that India’s deeply held notions of autonomy must move towards responsibility. If India is to rise as a great power there must be a greater emphasis on responsibility in its foreign policy. Others have contested this\, noting that while autonomy is malleable so is the principle of responsibility. Maximalists argue that other great powers are unwilling and incapable of advancing India’s great power aspirations. Both maximalists and pragmatists agree that the 1998 nuclear tests by India reinforced its strategic autonomy. In this respect deterrence and autonomy are intimately linked. This was most evident during the debates about the civil nuclear deal between the United States and India. The pacifists\, Indian Leftists and Nehruvians use the concept of strategic autonomy within a discursive framework characterized by an ideological anti-Americanism antagonistic to any kind of rapprochement with Washington.  \nA strategic partnership necessarily depends on the broad convergence of interest of the two partners. The potential for a strategic partnership encompassing all security and defence issues needs a convergence of interests which is lacking given both partners’ different international status in the global power hierarchy\, the security context of South Asia and the importance for India to retain its strategic autonomy. Thus despite the discourse within the United States on the transformation of the relationship\, India seems to favour and negotiate a selective partnership. The necessity for a relationship with the US is understood by all decision-makers and commentators in India who prefer an ‘issue based’ partnership configured for two countries which have ‘not permanent but temporary identity of interests’. Practically\, apart from avoiding any kind of alliance in the strictest sense\, for New Delhi it means not to be linked with any US sponsored collective or bilateral security structure constraining India to intervene in support of its own interests.  \nFrom an Indian perspective\, divergent agendas with the US suggest a double necessity: to identify those divergences and exclude them from the partnership while resisting US pressure to reintegrate them. The necessity to pursue a multifaceted foreign policy and engage all major power centres is recognized by all Indian analysts. This is the surest and best way to maintain strategic autonomy. The Indian dilemma pertains to balance: the rapprochement with the US is improving faster than the partnerships with other countries such as China and Russia. The intensity and the ‘global’ ambition of the Indo-US relations are not balanced by India’s relations with other great or medium powers. A second of asymmetry insists on parallel engagements. Given the complexity and diversity of its international and security agendas\, India needs to pursue multifaceted diplomacy especially vis-à-vis Russia\, China and Iran. Energy supply\, membership to the UN Security Council and quest to become a major player in Central Asia are among the agendas which potentially collide with US interests and require relations with alternative powers.  \nSome scholars argue that India’s emphasis on strategic autonomy will decrease with its accession to great power status and that ‘great powers don’t speak of autonomy’. This vision seems to conceive autonomy only as a power-transition imperative and sets aside the emphasis on autonomy which manifests itself when an emerging power becomes a great power. Great powers tend to strive for maximization of their influence. For instance\, the EU is today struggling to create new autonomous strategic capabilities in order to reduce its dependence on the United States. Will India become an ‘Asian France’\, as one US expert asked? The major lesson of the French experience for India is that autonomy works efficiently when combined with power. France’s autonomous posture has been built as a way to keep power\, not to create it. In the past India tried to pursue autonomy without sufficient power\, but the growth of its power gives it more latitude. \nPoints raised during Discussion: \n\nHistorically non-alignment enshrined a pragmatic approach; India wished to avoid entanglements.\nIndia’s policy in the 21st century will have to cater for the rise of China and the shift in the locus of power and international politics towards Asia.\nNon-alignment under such a circumstance when great power rivalry will rage all around India is an unviable option. Neither is the prospects for a China-India-Russia arrangement likely given deep Indian and Russian ambivalence towards China.\nIndia could follow Bismarck’s diplomatic strategy and spin a web of alliances with India holding all the strands in its hands\, though this would prove difficult given that it is not geopolitically central to Asia. An alternative is to forge partnerships with US\, Japan\, and possibly Russia to countervail the growth of Chinese power. \nOver time asymmetry between the US and India is bound to decline\, and so would fears about loss of ‘independence’.\nIndia too defensive and excessively prickly.\nTendency on the part of Indian officials to literally read/interpret every US document and policy statement.\nIndia’s involvement in the UN institutionalizes India’s participation in global institutions and thereby advances Indian and American common objectives.\nIt is important for India to create a peaceful periphery and ensure regional stability necessary before it goes on to become a major player.\nIndia cannot become aligned with the US.\nIt is too early to decide on the extent of alignment with the US.\nStrategic autonomy must be premised on national interest.\n\nRemarks made by the Chairperson Ambassador Rajiv Sikri: \n\n\nThere is a need to look into the other dimensions of the India-US relationship.\nStrategic Community in India wields little influence; politicians call the shots.\nThe US is too meddlesome in India’s relations with third countries eg.\, Iran. It does not know how to deal with Pakistan and must pay greater heed to the United Nations. \n\nPrepared by Kartik Bommakanti\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-strategic-autonomy-dilemma-and-the-rapprochement-with-the-united-states
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T002541
CREATED:20231223T222241Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63713-1237527000-1237527000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Rationale for Performance Oriented Defence Budgeting
DESCRIPTION:Chair: V. K. MisraDiscussants: Amit Cowshish and Sujeet Samaddar \nIndia’s security comes with a huge price tag. In 2009-10\, the defence budget reached Rs. 1\,41\,703 crores\, representing nearly one-seventh of total central government expenditure and 2.35 per cent of the gross domestic product. Such a huge financial outlay raises questions as to how funds are allocated and what outcomes are being achieved. Does the defence budget provide the answers? \nThe budgeting system\, in the form of Defence Services Estimates (DSE)\, follows ‘line-item’ budgeting. Total resources are provided in six demands for grants (catering to both the revenue and capital expenditures of the Defence Services)\, which in turn are subdivided into various revenue and capital items such a ‘pay and allowances’\, ‘stores’\, ‘works’\, ‘aircraft and aero engines’\, ‘naval fleet’\, ‘heavy and medium vehicles’\, among others. So the budget in essence does not provide information on expenditure on various capabilities or programmes that the country is acquiring to meet its security threats. Neither does the budget reflect the physical progress of various programmes on which massive investment is incurred. In other words\, the intended outcome of the budget vis-à-vis security threats or the defence policy cannot be deduced from the existing system of budgeting. \nTo move towards a visible and outcome-oriented budget\, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) since 2005 has issued guidelines emphasizing the link between financial budgets and actual and targeted performance of outlays. The guidelines task the central Ministries/Departments to articulate\, among others\, a list of major programmes/schemes and the goals and policy framework guiding them. The main objective of the exercise is to “establish one-to-one correspondence between the (financial) budget … and Outcome Budget…” However\, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)\, along with 30 Ministries/Departments has been ‘exempted’ from preparing outcome budget. The exempted Ministries/Departments are however ‘requested’ to prepare outcome budget for ‘internal use’ and voluntarily decide the extent to which the general public can have access to it.  \nIn the above context\, the MoD has taken the initiative of formulating Defence Services Estimates\, Vol. II (DSE\, Vol. II)\, and making it mandatory for some of its institutions to prepare the outcome budget. The DSE\, Vol. II\, which currently is meant for “internal use” falls short of the parameters laid down by the MoF for preparing the outcome budget. It merely expands the item- or head-wise allocations made in DSE and\, in addition\, provides “Budget holder-wise summary sheets.” In no way does it relate the financial outlays with the intended outcomes. The major problem with the institutions that prepare outcome budgets are that their ‘outcomes’ are organisation specific and have ‘weak linkage’ with the overall plan of the MoD. \nArvind Kadyan highlights a number of gaps plaguing the implementation of outcome budgeting in defence. Foremost is the lack of programme-orientation in defence budget. He argues that the identification of major programmes by “High Level Budget Holders and Top Level Budget Holders in Service Headquarters\, responsible for planning of budget” would go a long way in preparing outcome budget. The programme orientation however needs suitable changes in classification of heads of expenditure\, reflecting all the inputs that go into specific programmes or sub-programmes. Among others\, he argues that increased use of information technology can facilitate real-time “information required for monitoring\, evaluation” and for “decision-making purposes.” He suggests that considering the “extra work” that would be generated in the initial phase of the implementation of the outcome budget there is a need for a professional body with the necessary wherewithal to carry out the job.  \nKadyan strongly argues that Outcome budgeting is quite possible for the defence establishment\, contrary to some perceptions that outcome of defence expenditure is not measurable and even if measurable its documentation may not be in the interest of the country’s security. These issues can be tracked by what he terms “attitudinal change” of concerned authorities. He says that all the information may not be placed in the public domain\, as clearly articulated by the MoF. He suggests that “introduction of outcome budget is likely to be seen by the Services as an attempt to introduce a new mechanism to control budget utilisation.” \nFor effective implementation of outcome budgeting in defence\, Kadyan argues that the MoD needs to follow a ‘comprehensive approach’ covering the entire defence budget. He suggests that a tri-service institution like the College of Defence Managements (CDM)\, Hyderabad should ideally be entrusted with the task of developing “an overall structure” for the purpose of implementation. The ‘Budget Holders’ in the Service Headquarters (SHQs) are then required to identify outcomes against the outlays\, and prepare the outcome budget\, keeping in view the overall defence policy of India. While executing the outcome budget\, the Programme/sub-programme Directors under the Budget Holder would need enhanced delegation of financial powers. Once the outcome budgets at the stage of Budget Holders are prepared\, their consolidation could be done by the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS). Further\, an independent organisation needs to be created for monitoring and evaluation of various ongoing programmes. \nPoints raised in the discussion: \n\n\nThe experience of civil ministries in outcome budgeting is insubstantial\, and is of little use for mid-course correction.\nOutcome budgeting in defence in some countries like Australia is of “little help” to the services.\nTransparency in outcome budgeting needs to be viewed simultaneously with the security aspects.\nInformation and Communication Technology (ICT) has immense potential for preparing outcome budget in defence.\nPlanning\, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is increasingly being adopted by many counties.\n\nPrepared by Laxman Kumar Behera\, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rationale-for-performance-oriented-defence-budgeting
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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