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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250904T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250904T170000
DTSTAMP:20261028T025545
CREATED:20260707T041159Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T054222Z
UID:98903-1756972800-1757005200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellow Seminar on “Faultlines in Pakistan: An Analysis”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Ashish Shukla\, Associate Fellow\, South Asia Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, presented his Fellow Paper on “Faultlines in Pakistan: An Analysis” on 4 September 2025 at 1500 hrs. The Seminar was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador TCA Raghavan\, Former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan and Professor Ajay Darshan Behera\, Professor at the Academy of International Studies at Jamia Milia Islamia joined as External Discussants. Dr. Ashok Behuria\, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA contributed as an Internal Discussant. Scholars of the Institute were in attendance. \nExecutive Summary\nPakistan’s internal landscape is shaped by a dense web of ideological\, ethnic\, sectarian\, economic\, and institutional fault lines that have accumulated over decades of post-colonial state-building and elite-driven governance. The country’s struggle to define a cohesive national identity\, sharpened by competing religious and civic narratives\, has fed intolerance and empowered radical groups. Ethnic grievances among Baloch\, Pashtuns\, Sindhis\, and Muhajirs stem from centralised power structures that privilege a narrow elite while side-lining regional aspirations\, producing cycles of insurgency\, protest\, and repression. Moreover\, long-standing economic fragilities\, repeated Internatiional Monetary Fund (IMF) dependence\, weak tax structures\, and a rent-seeking political culture have further eroded the state’s capacity to govern effectively. These tensions converge with institutional imbalances marked by political polarisation\, weak civilian authority\, and the military’s pervasive influence over policy and power. The discussion focussed thoroughly on these systemic crisis of identity\, governance\, and legitimacy that continues to shape Pakistan’s instability and its enduring significance for India’s foreign policy. \nDetailed Report\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy welcomed the Discussants and audience to the Fellow’s Seminar featuring Dr. Ashish Shukla’s paper\, “Fault Lines in Pakistan: An Analysis.” He highlighted the paper’s relevance given Pakistan’s enduring significance in India’s foreign policy. Ambassador Chinoy noted that while Pakistan’s ideological\, ethnic\, economic\, and sectarian divisions merit close study\, equal focus should be placed on its institutional resilience. He emphasised that analyses of this nature must align with the principles of sovereignty\, good neighbourliness\, and non-interference\, which underpin India’s foreign policy approach. \nDr. Ashish Shukla began by expressing gratitude to the Chair and Discussants. He briefly outlined his approach\, noting that Pakistan’s political\, economic\, ideological\, and social divides stem from its post-colonial formation and remain deeply embedded in its national fabric. Instead of fostering inclusive governance or long-term institutional reform\, successive civil-military elites have pursued short-term political gains\, reinforcing instability and fragmentation. \nDr.. Shukla explained that Pakistan’s ideological divide has been central to its national trajectory. Founded on the Two-Nation Theory\, the State was projected as a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. However\, right since the beginning\, it struggled to create a unifying identity. He referred to Jinnah’s contrasting speeches\, his March 1940 Lahore Address in which he emphasised on the differences between Hindus and Muslims and his August 1947 Constituent Assembly Speech in which he advocated for a presumably secular State. He highlighted that after 1971\, despite the loss of East Pakistan\, the military and political establishment continued to frame Pakistan’s identity around Islam and perceived hostility towards India. He said that this narrative persists today\, as reflected in General Asim Munir’s public remarks urging Pakistanis to view their State as founded on religious ideals. \nDr. Shukla highlighted how this ideological foundation has fostered radical and sectarian divisions. Successive political measures\, including the Objectives Resolution of 1949\, Bhutto’s declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims\, Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation\, and the blasphemy laws\, deepened intolerance and strengthened extremist forces in the country. Dr. Shukla noted that besides the Shia-Sunni tensions\, the intra-Sunni rivalries between Deobandi and Barelvi groups have further fractured society. He drew attention to increasing violence against minorities\, such as Ahmadis\, Hindus and Christians who face systemic persecution at the hands of radical forces. The State and its institutions often condone such violence which emboldens the radical outfits in the country. Quoting survey data\, he observed that nearly half of the Pakistanis disapprove of befriending people from different religions or sects\, illustrating the entrenched social divisions. \nDr. Shukla then discussed ethnic fault lines\, calling them among the most visible and enduring. Pakistan’s political and military elite\, dominated primarily by Punjabis\, have consistently failed to accommodate the country’s linguistic and regional diversity. This centralised control has provoked resentment and separatism among Baloch\, Sindhi\, Pashtun\, and Muhajir groups. While state coercion subdued Sindhi and Muhajir movements\, insurgency in Balochistan remains active. He referred to five distinct phases of Baloch resistance. The latest phase started around 2000 and continues to be alive. He also noted that the rise of the Baloch Liberation Army and its adoption of suicide tactics have rattled the security establishment in the country. What is surprising is the fact that BLA’s suicide squad includes significant number of women.  In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa\, he highlighted the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement’s peaceful campaign against human rights violations and the State’s repressive response\, including its ban in 2024. Both cases\, he noted\, show how Pakistan’s refusal to share power and resources continues to fuel alienation in its peripheries. \nTurning to the economy\, Dr. Shukla observed that Pakistan’s structural weaknesses have persisted since independence. The country has approached the IMF nearly 25 times\, reflecting chronic fiscal mismanagement and over-reliance on external aid. In 2023\, it narrowly avoided default due to an IMF bailout. This was followed by a 37-month Extended Fund Facility. He attributed Pakistan’s economic miseries to low tax compliance\, below normal tax to GDP ratio\, presence of exemptions\, and most importantly no serious attempt to introduce much needed structural reforms. Moreover\, Pakistan’s rentier mindset\, he argued\, allows its leaders to depend on international aid\, loans and strategic patronage. \nOn the political and institutional front\, he pointed to the 26th Constitutional Amendment\, which gave Parliament power to nominate the Chief Justice\, undermining judicial independence. Dr. Shukla underlined that the 2024 elections deepened political polarisation\, with Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) -backed independents emerging as the largest group but unable to form a government; Shehbaz Sharif\, strongly supported by the military establishment. In the wake of the security establishment’s micromanagement\, the PPP agreed to support PML-N Government from outside.  PTI’s attempts to mobilise public support\, seek judicial intervention\, and negotiate through backchannels failed to secure the release of Imran Khan and other senior leaders. Still\, the party retained its political relevance\, and Imran Khan remains the most popular politician in Pakistan. Dr. Shukla added that subsequent legal amendments extended the tenure of the three Service Chiefs from three to five years\, ensuring General Asim Munir’s continuation until 2027. Dr. Shukla concluded by stating that Pakistan’s multiple internal fractures\, including economic stagnation\, ethnic alienation\, ideological rigidity\, and institutional decay\, are not episodic but systemic. They represent an enduring crisis of governance and identity that continues to undermine state cohesion. \nAmbassador TCA Raghavan complimented Dr. Ashish Shukla’s paper for its analytical maturity and focus on Pakistan’s internal dynamics beyond the traditional military lens. He noted the challenge Indian scholars face in studying Pakistan due to limited access\, but observed that comparative insights from India’s own context often fill this gap. He welcomed Dr. Shukla’s structured framework for analysing Pakistan’s faultlines across ideological\, sectarian\, ethnic\, economic\, and institutional dimensions\, and suggested situating sectarian divisions within broader geopolitical shifts such as the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet-Afghan war. \nAmbassador Raghavan appreciated the nuanced discussion of Baloch and Pashtun issues but stressed the need to factor in tribal dynamics and the limited scale of insurgencies\, citing the loyalty of Pashtun soldiers as evidence of Pakistan’s enduring state cohesion. He cautioned against underestimating the consolidation of Pakistani nationalism alongside regional and sectarian identities. On the economy\, he agreed that recent stabilisation is superficial\, while institutional weaknesses\, particularly the military’s dominance\, remain central. He proposed looking beyond Indian democratic benchmarks\, suggesting comparisons with Thailand or Myanmar to grasp Pakistan’s national security state. \nProfessor Ajay Darshan Behera referring to Ambassador Raghavan’s comments\, acknowledged the challenges Indian scholars face due to limited access to Pakistan but pointed out that the extensive work of Pakistani academics already provides a solid empirical base. He suggested that Indian scholars should focus on developing new analytical frameworks rather than seeking new data\, and emphasised the value of understanding regional languages like Punjabi to grasp local realities better than Urdu-based sources allow. \nOn Dr. Ashish Shukla’s paper\, Professor Behera praised the categorisation of Pakistan’s ideological\, sectarian\, ethnic\, economic\, and political fault lines but noted that it needs greater focus on how Pakistan historically manages these divisions. He stressed on studying the intersections among fault lines and called for a theoretical framing. Highlighting elite capture as a stabilising mechanism\, he explained how bureaucratic and military elites\, rooted in land and class hierarchies\, have historically managed contradictions and maintained state stability through control over the economy and politics. He urged attention to the political fault lines\, especially the rise of Imran Khan’s educated middle-class base\, which challenges elite and military dominance. Concluding\, he suggested that Dr. Shukla’s rich data should drive analysis explaining how Pakistan navigates its internal contradictions\, offering interpretive depth beyond description. \nDr. Ashok Behuria began by appreciating the discussion and called for deeper research on Pakistan’s linguistic and ethnic dynamics. He noted the paradox of Punjabi dominance in governance alongside the marginalisation of the Punjabi language and traced historical shifts in language use among writers and newspapers. He highlighted the Saraiki community’s ongoing struggle for recognition and cultural rights as an area needing closer study. Discussing ethnic representation\, he examined the position of Hazaras\, and Pashtuns in the armed forces\, pointing to their limited inclusion and long-standing grievances. He explained how recruitment patterns in the Baloch regiment and tribal affiliations influence both loyalty and dissent\, linking the rise of movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement to historical exclusion and marginalisation in former FATA areas\, with broader regional implications tied to pan-Pashtun nationalism and Taliban networks. \nDr. Behuria also underlined the need to study inter-ethnic dynamics in urban centres\, especially among Mohajirs\, Sindhis\, and Baloch\, to understand their impact on Pakistan’s social and political cohesion. While some groups hold sway in higher administrative positions\, representation at lower levels remains uneven\, perpetuating structural inequalities. Dr. Behuria stressed that Pakistan’s management of these divisions through policy\, elite negotiation\, and historical contingencies must be examined to grasp its internal governance mechanisms. He concluded that incorporating linguistic and ethnic dimensions into research is essential for a fuller\, more nuanced understanding of Pakistan’s state and society. \nQuestion and Comments\nThe discussion focused on Pakistan’s fault lines\, including ethnic\, sectarian\, and political divisions\, and how these interact with state structures and elite capture. Key themes included the criteria for prioritising fault lines\, the role of sectarian groups like Tehreek – e – Taliban Pakistan in deepening existing divides\, and the state’s use of religion as a political tool\, creating overlapping conflicts. Questions addressed why large-scale revolts among Pashtuns and Baloch have not materialised\, with insights pointing to disciplined military and tribal structures\, early training\, and regimented socialisation as containment factors. The discussion also highlighted the impact of social media on political awareness\, the significance of elite management in controlling insurgency and ethnic tensions\, and the importance of evaluating which fault lines have interstate relevance. \nReport prepared by Ms. Sneha M\, Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.  \n 
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellow-seminar-on-faultlines-in-pakistan-an-analysis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250912T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250912T170000
DTSTAMP:20261028T025545
CREATED:20260707T040903Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T054328Z
UID:98901-1757664000-1757696400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Fellow Seminar by Dr. MS Prathibha\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA
DESCRIPTION:On 12 September 2025\, Dr. M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow at the East Asia Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, presented a paper on “Great Changes Unseen in a Century: China’s Conception of the Evolving World Order” for her Fellow Seminar. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA chaired the meeting. Two External Discussants (Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan\, Centre for International Politics\, Organisation and Disarmament\, School of International Studies\,  Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and Professor T.G. Suresh\, Associate Professor\, Centre for Political Studies\, School of Social Sciences\, JNU) as well as two Internal Discussants (Dr. Saurabh Mishra\, Research Fellow\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean and UN (ALACUN) Centre and Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey\, Associate Fellow\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA) commented on the paper. Scholars from MP-IDSA actively participated in the Q&A. \nOpening Remarks by the Chair\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Ambassador Chinoy began by praising the Speaker’s paper as one that was both timely and apposite\, given the worldwide attention being paid to China’s rise. Amb. Chinoy related his experiences during recent trips to China\, where he heard Chinese narratives of confidence in the decline of the United States of America and the commensurate pre-eminence of China\, indicating that China itself believes that its time has come to play a dominant role on the world stage. He posited that China was now prepared to not only keep the US out of its perceived area of interest\, but to replace it as the power underwriting the global order. This is in large part due to General Secretary Xi Jinping\, whose role in the formation of this narrative has been decisive. \nAmb. Chinoy went on to state his fundamental doubt of the premises of this argument. He noted that while China as a nation-state may endure into the future\, it is not a historical given that the same can be said of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Further\, it is not inevitable that Xi’s ambitious ‘China Dream’ would be the means by which that country attains ‘greatness’\, as that inevitably requires that Beijing take some form of action on the self-ruled island of Taiwan. Though there have been some Chinese successes internationally\, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic\, Amb. Chinoy suggested that this may have as much to do with the fact that the US is now showing itself uninterested in playing its role in the current global order\, leading some to view China as a ‘noble equivalent’. \nNevertheless\, the international headwinds China’s economy has faced in recent years is a key reason why it has chosen now to focus internally on developing science and technology as well as innovation as two waves of the next phase of its development. Terming it a lesson in the might of the Scientific Revolution\, Amb. Chinoy called on the Speaker to elucidate further as to how these themes would come together in her presentation. \nPresentation by Dr. M.S. Prathibha\nThanking the Chair for his trenchant remarks\, Dr. Prathibha entered into her presentation with an outline of its structure. She then described the theoretical bases of her presentation\, noting that the future of the world order is indeed uncertain and that there is growing discussion of the role played by China. Pointing out that existing scholarship on China’s role within the international order largely attempted to compare China’s past to its present (for example\, by comparing Xi Jinping’s leadership to his predecessors’)\, which is a Eurocentric perspective\, she stated that her paper would focus only on the CPC’s vision of itself at the helm of China in years to come. \nDr. Prathibha expressed the view that the CPC compares China’s rise to the rise of the West as its operating paradigm. As such\, it does not wish to deconstruct the existing world order\, but to replace key elements of it. Thus\, a key question arises: is China a revisionist world power or an integrationist world power? She proposed that in order to answer this question\, it would be important to understand some of the concepts propounded by Xi Jinping and the CPC\, namely\, the ‘Great Changes Unseen in a Century’ and the ‘New Era’. \nDr. Prathibha highlighted certain definitional aspects of the concept of ‘Great Changes Unseen in a Century’. She noted that a key element of the concept is the role played by the CPC in forming historical judgments about world events\, which it views through its own lens. The CPC argues that the current period of time should be called a ‘New Era’\, where big changes are happening that are leading China to a ‘New Historic Starting Point’. \nThis latter idea sees China at a crossroads\, where export-driven consumption patterns are changing rapidly\, driven in part by falling economic momentum globally. At the same time\, China believes that the world is undergoing a historic power transition from the global West to the global East in tandem with the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Domestically\, this leads to an internal transition whereby the development of a science and technology base in line with ‘higher aspirations of the Chinese people’ is proceeding hand-in-hand with an orientation away from the export-led economic model. \nIn this scenario\, if China can exploit the opportunity accordingly\, the CPC holds that China can become a ‘modern socialist power’ leading the ‘next science and technology revolution’. For this\, the CPC needs to take certain major strategic decisions in the coming years\, which primarily involve encouraging innovation within society so as to provide strategic support to its comprehensive national power. The deadline for these objectives is 2049\, when the CPC reaches its centenary and the ‘China Dream’ is slated to be achieved. The end goal is the completion of the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’\, which China after 2049 will notionally have achieved. If this project fails\, however\, Chinese thinkers see their country as falling victim to strategic passivity. \nDescribing the characteristics of the Great Changes\, Dr. Prathibha highlighted that the CPC\, as the entity in control of the ship of the state\, believes that it has a unique mission to seize the historical initiative and exercise strategic judgment in order to steer China through the uncertainty currently prevailing in the world order. At the same\, it is burdened with the responsibility of thinking about the bottom line\, that is\, to prepare for every eventuality\, welcome or unwelcome. She posited that China under Xi Jinping believes that wisdom itself is not enough\, and taking appropriate actions at the appropriate time is equally important. As such\, ‘Chinese-style modernisation’ and other revolutionary changes need to be taken if China is to avoid a second Century of Humiliation\, which it believes the West desires. \nAssessing these concepts in the final portion of her presentation\, the Speaker highlighted the fact that China’s actions have already invited a response and challenge from the global West\, which has resisted Chinese calls for more multipolarity in the global system. In the face of this resistance\, China has begun stressing on the need to reform global governance\, a message through which it seeks to appeal to the Global South. \nHowever\, she expressed scepticism about these moves\, which she proposed reflected an instrumental support for multipolarity as opposed to an earnest seeking of multipolarity. She contended that China at present is merely following global trends out of a desire to win supporters in its domestic quest for glory. She also contended that China at present was determined to partially reject the prevailing Western model\, especially as it impinged upon domestic affairs and internal economic governance. \nComments by External Discussants\nAmb. Chinoy called on Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan to deliver his Remarks on the paper. Prof. Rajagopalan in his review deliberated on some structural aspects of the paper and delivered a critique. He focused on the framing of certain subjects as well as the degree of accessibility for non-specialist readers. \nProf. Rajagopalan queried whether the CPC’s analysis of historical trends could be considered reliable\, as these could well be used as justification for its continued control of Chinese politics. He commented on the ‘pedestrian’ nature of the CPC’s analysis of the so-called ‘Great Changes’\, as it contains nothing ground-breaking or innovative at all. He argued that in fact\, the CPC’s reading of history may be to blame for the strategic ineptitude by which the administration of Xi Jinping has alienated broad swathes of the world. As such\, he doubted whether the reading of history espoused by Xi could significantly alter the world order in his favour. \nAnother salient point raised by Prof. Rajagopalan concerned the Speaker’s analysis of China’s emphasis on unleashing innovation through party fiat. Noting that while scientific innovation has always emerged out of a conducive environment provided by the State\, it is difficult to state that such innovation can be commanded from the top-down. As such\, while scientific progress has societal value as hypothesised by the CPC\, such value can also be used to maintain political control by the Party\, especially if it emerges out of a command economy. \nAmb. Chinoy\, praising Prof. Rajagopalan’s astute observations\, called on Professor T.G. Suresh to deliver his remarks. Prof. Suresh complimented the paper for being substantive and comprehensive\, before sharing his critique of the paper. He first discussed the necessity of characterising the Chinese Government and governance as seen in modern times. He proposed that externally-applied labels such as ‘post-socialist’ or ‘neo-Marxist’ were no longer relevant to describe China’s current rulers. \nSecondly\, he expressed his opinion that the concept of contention between China and the West may not be tenable. He cited the degree of comfort Chinese academics and officials display in talking and working with Western counterparts as proof of this. \nThirdly\, he questioned the basis of the CPC’s judgment on the factors that triggered China’s Century of Humiliation. He contended that unlike the isolationism cited by the Party as the primary cause of the decline of the Qing Empire in the mid-nineteenth century\, contact with the West\, particularly Imperialist Britain through the Opium Wars (1839-1842; 1856-1860)\, may have been the decisive factor for China’s decline. He suggested that the Party may be cherry-picking history to suit present circumstances. \nFinally\, he repeated Prof. Rajagopalan’s contention that a top-down command economy based on a ‘highly totalitarian state and culture’ may not be best placed to encourage the kind of innovation necessary to achieve dramatic advances in science and technology. He stated that China lacks the knowledge-based societal base that is necessary to produce the kind of innovation necessary to successfully navigate the Fourth Industrial Revolution. He also pointed out China currently does not possess the ‘vocabulary of hegemony’ that was a hallmark of both European and American narratives in the past. Thus\, Prof. Suresh contended that the emphasis on science and technology and innovation may be read as a way for the Party to secure a new ‘social contract’ that can justify the continued legitimacy of its rule. \nAmb. Chinoy thanked both External Discussants for their insightful comments and offered his own thoughts on the paper. Noting that China’s heavy reliance on science and technology could be traced back to the 1950s\, he recounted instances where India too played a prominent role as a supplier of advance scientific know-how to the Chinese. He informed the audience that the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1960s could partially be attributed to the Soviet Union’s denial of technology in the wake of Joseph Stalin’s demise in 1953\, which resulted in China and the US coming closer together. Terming current US policies towards China as an echo of the Soviet denial regime\, he noted that there is a continuum in Chinese worldviews. \nOffering his thoughts on various sections of Dr. Prathibha’s paper\, Amb. Chinoy pointed out the importance of distinguishing between decisions made by Xi himself and those made by the Party as an organisation in order to fix ‘responsibility’ for decisions. Addressing the point made by the two External Discussants on the relationship between political regimes and technology development\, Amb. Chinoy stated that technology\, not being as fungible as trade\, intrinsically admitted of a greater role for the sovereign to intervene. He pointed out the experience of several Western powers such as Britain\, France and Germany as illustrative in this regard. \nOn China’s interest in the world order\, he conveyed his impression that China is not interested in ‘reforming’ the current world order\, but to be at the head of it\, while creating parallel structures. He offered the examples of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as analogues of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). \nFinally\, he stated that the extent of Western sanctions on China is a moot question\, as it is clear that the global West will generally follow the lead of the US despite the European Union’s purported claims of being separate from Washington. He then invited the Internal Discussants to deliver their comments on the paper. \nComments by Internal Discussants\nDr. Abhishek Darbey urged the Speaker to consider the Four Global Initiatives launched by Xi as linked to the Great Changes and its end-goal\, the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. He also invited the Speaker to consider the clarification of the Great Changes as offered by Yuen Fung\, a commentator with a military background\, who has referred to the concept as ‘a strong political expression of the Chinese people to achieve the Chinese Dream’. \nDr. Saurabh Mishra\, praised the innovative perspective taken by the Speaker’s paper\, but offered technical critique on certain aspects\, such as the use of certain terms in the title as well as the focus placed on statements made by the CPC hierarchy rather than China’s real-world behaviour. \nAmb. Chinoy also offered further thoughts on the Speaker’s paper. He highlighted that the Great Changes concept actually refers to two centuries. The first is the Century of Humiliation from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century\, when China was the victim of predatory Western powers. The Party saw itself in this scheme as the political expression of Mao’s phrase\, ‘The Chinese people have stood up’. The end of the Maoist period with Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up era from the late 1970s to 2008 would thus conclude\, according to the Party\, with the Century of Unprecedented Changes where China would become a strong socialist power on the world stage. \nAmb. Chinoy also commented on the similarities between Chinese thinking on interstate relations and the US’ thinking\, especially under President Trump. He noted that both China and the US seem now to be running mirror versions of each other’s foreign policy\, where both instinctively do not seek multipolarity in their relations\, preferring to deal with a lone strongman or a small oligarchic elite instead. With these thoughts he invited the Speaker to respond to the Discussants’ Remarks. \nDr. Prathibha responded to some of the comments offered. Firstly\, she answered Prof. Suresh’s statement regarding the CPC’s analysis of the failure of the Qing Empire vis-à-vis imperialist Western powers. She stated that the Party’s interpretation held China’s premodern rulers\, the Qing Empire\, responsible for the Century of Humiliation (instead of the West) because they believe that the Qing failed to adequately create economies of scale despite having a technological edge over Western countries\, instead choosing to retain that technological know-how with the elites. She conveyed that the Party’s understanding of its historical background revolves firmly around the premise that the need for the state to achieve military superiority drives its accommodation of and encouragement to industrial innovation and growth\, not property or common law as theorised by Western academics. \nNext\, the Speaker replied to the ‘social contract’ lens offered by Prof. Suresh. She averred that the Party actually has very little room for serious policy mistakes as these could negatively impact regime legitimacy\, so they are very conscious of ensuring that the correct narrative and policy is followed consistently. The Great Changes concept can also be seen in this light as an attempt to rhetorically justify the continuance of CPC control over China’s governmental machinery. \nQ&A\nAmb. Chinoy invited comments and questions from the floor. Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Fellow\, offered an observation that China cannot be considered to be anti-hegemony\, only anti-Western hegemony. It is interested in propounding and propagating a ‘moral realist’ hegemony that it believes would be superior to the West. It has a strong tendency to see the world in its own view. \nThe Speaker added to this observation by noting that China believes the current world order to be rooted in Western ideas that create simplistic binaries between which conflict is unavoidable. As such\, the West is interested in maintaining the current world order in so far as it can help avoid the Thucydides Trap. China’s challenge to this world order draws on its rejection of global governance models based on such paradigms\, instead focusing on state capacity-based approaches as favoured by noted Western academics such as Samuel Huntington. \nProfessor Vijaylakshmi joined the meeting online to offer some comments on the Speaker’s paper as well. She cited the importance of analysing China’s internal debates in context\, and mentioned an internal report prepared by certain CPC-affiliated bodies working on historical issues which explicitly states that ‘liberal democracy is not the pinnacle of human evolution’\, thus drawing a clear demarcation line between the Western penchant for equating Westernisation with modernisation. \nFurther\, she proposed that area studies scholars studying China ought to focus on the formation of a knowledge-producing apparatus within the CPC as a promising field of study. She pointed out that Xi may be surrounded by a group of scholars and strategic thinkers to assist him in the formulation of concepts such as the Great Changes\, so studying these persons’ thought processes may be a fruitful way to develop Indian expertise on China’s strategic culture further. In conclusion\, she noted that the delineation of China’s behaviour alone would not suffice. An understanding of China’s\, and the CPC’s\, ideological underpinnings is necessary too. \nThe Seminar concluded with Amb. Chinoy thanking all present for their participation. \nThe Report was prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta\, Research Analyst\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fellow-seminar-by-dr-ms-prathibha-associate-fellow-mp-idsa
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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