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SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar : Influence Operations: Winning Without Waging Wars in the 21st Century
DESCRIPTION:An MP-IDSA Fellows  Seminar presentation by Dr. Adil Rasheed\, Research Fellow\, on “Influence  Operations: Winning Without Waging Wars in the 21st Century” was  held on 20 July 2023. It was chaired by Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.)\,  Member\, Executive Council\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and  Analyses (MP-IDSA). The External Discussants were Maj. Gen. Roopesh Mehta\, ADG  CD (B) IHQ\, and Mr. Vinit Goenka\, Secretary\, Centre for Knowledge Sovereignty  (CKS). Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA; Lt.  Gen. Akshat Upadhyay\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA; and Ms. Shruti Pandalai\,  Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA were Internal Discussants.  \nExecutive Summary \nInfluence Operations  (IO)\, a battle of narratives\, is considered a new and rapidly-evolving field of  study. Russia\, China\, the US\, and Pakistan have been at the forefront of using  their strategy. It pertains to clandestine operations that can manipulate and  influence individuals’ and governments’ perceptions\, decisions\, and cognition  of individuals and governments. IO includes active measures carried out by the erstwhile  Soviet Union and is a non-kinetic form of warfare. It also gives each country  relying on this strategy plausible deniability while conducting its activities.  Social media\, big tech\, and artificial intelligence are crucial in this regard.  \nDetailed Report \nIn his opening  remarks\, the Chair\, Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.) stated that  Information Warfare (IW) is the future warfare strategy. He further stated that  besides India’s victory in 1971\, no wars have genuinely been won in the 21st  century.  \nDr. Adil Rasheed began  by introducing the topic of his paper\, Influence Operations (IO)\, a form of  high-tech and hybrid warfare. One of the key definitions provided by the  speaker was borrowed from Facebook\, according to which IO refers to coordinated  efforts to manipulate or corrupt public debate for a strategic goal. It was initially  defined by RAND Corporation in 2009. IO could also be divided into three  categories\, i.e.\, political and economic\, information\, and psychological.  \nDr. Rasheed clarified  that his study encompasses the assessment of IO carried out by Russia\, China\,  the United States (US)\, and Pakistan. He added that wars are now fought in the  virtual space and cognitive domain. These operations include offline and online  measures to infiltrate political institutions and processes of other countries\,  making them incapable of going to war. He elaborated on IO benefits\, such as being  highly adaptive and effective\, low-cost\, and sustainable in peacetime. Today\,  it is associated with a foreign and maligned sharp power technique\, including  subversive public diplomacy\, crowd manipulations\, engineering colour  revolutions and agitations\, and election meddling. In addition\, social media  has amplified IO’s impact through trolling\, flaming\, doxing\, posting dark  advertisements\, presenting Potemkin villages of evidence\, and participating in  cognitive hacking.  \nHe said that countries  like China have relied on their diaspora based in foreign countries\, such as the  US\, to act as spies and carry out industrial espionage. As per the Mueller  Report\, Russia was involved in elected meddling in the US in 2016\, resulting in  President Trump’s victory.   \nAt the same time\, the US\,  despite referring to IO as a threat to democracy\, has intervened in  approximately 81 foreign elections\, often accused by Russia and China of  instigating colour revolutions and the Arab Spring. The speaker delved into ISI  and ISPR’s (PR wing of ISI) role in spearheading and sustaining Pakistan’s IO\,  articulating that ISI engages in Soviet-styled active measures. Simultaneously\,  the role of diaspora and radicalisation through madrassas based in Jammu and  Kashmir\, Bangladesh\, and Nepal have been essential to Pakistan’s IO strategy.  \nThe speaker suggested  that therefore\, some key counter-measures India can adopt to address such  threats include censorship of programmes aired on online streaming platforms\, formulating  a coherent and regulated social media policy and guidelines for protests and  agitations\, and reforming madrassas.   \nDr. Rasheed stated  that digital and online tactics and techniques are associated with IO strategy\,  and some of the counter-measures involve capacity building\, implementing  effective and regulatory legal frameworks\, and deterrence. \nMaj. Gen. Roopesh Mehta spoke about the need  to simplify IO as a term to counter these operations effectively. He also  explained that Information Warfare (IW)/IO timeline is immaterial\, regardless  of whether it occurs in peacetime or war.  \nIO is a long-term  strategy involving a battle of narratives. IO has two fundamental aims: turning  a rival power into a modern vassal state or weakening it sufficiently to ensure  it is neutralised as a threat. There are multiple layers of intervention  concerning IO\, which is not amenable to positive control. He also underscored how  high-quality and appealing content must be disseminated swiftly in the IO/IW  space as an antidote to misinformation and disinformation.  \nFurthermore\, he  presented his perspective on the Indian Army’s role in Kashmir and how ISI has  been exploiting social media since 2014. Between 2015 and 2017\, i.e.\, when  Burhan Wani was active\, there was immense synergy between the local media in  the Kashmir Valley and developments in Pakistan. Therefore\, India must draw  lessons from this example. As far as China is concerned\, its IO has proven more  effective internally\, while its impact externally remains debatable. Nevertheless\,  Indian leaders cannot rely on examples of authoritarian states such as Pakistan  and China to establish IO-related institutions in the country. The US\, however\,  has struggled to be effective in this domain and is a soft target since it has  mainly relied on brute force to implement its agendas.  \nHe talked about some  key issues to be considered while discussing IO/OW. Firstly\, ISIS successfully  exploited social media to convince people worldwide to join its caliphate since  2014. Secondly\, social media is an unfair terrain. Thirdly\, India’s geography  and diversity make the establishment of centralised control a challenging task.  Fourthly\, developments in IO are multiplying faster than legislative actions  can be introduced to address them. Fifthly\, information space is a reality. He  said that therefore\, these trends require a robust Indian response\, an improved  fact check and tech ban eco-system\, collaboration with agencies such as Tech  Against Terror\, and sensitising the citizens towards challenges such as fake  news and propaganda.  \nMr. Vinit Goenka explained how colonisation  by might in the erstwhile times has transformed into colonisation by big data  today. Additionally\, IO\, a non-kinetic form of warfare\, is not a time-bound  strategy. He further presented three cases about IO potency. As per one of them\,  India’s western neighbour had used the local Marathi dialect online to stir up  agitation against the development of a metro station near the Aarey colony in  Mumbai. One of the other examples was a BBC documentary (1998) aired over 83  times in one year about AIDS-afflicted Indian truck drivers as a form of  psychological warfare.  \nHe recommended that  the speaker examine the role of lone wolves who seek to gain notoriety through  IO and are not beholden to an ideology or a country.  \nMaj. Gen (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) expounded on the multiple terminologies being used  in this context\, which he felt\, need to be simplified\, to make the paper more  comprehensible. He went on to trace the terminology’s evolution over the past  decades. \nIn the World War era\, he explained that the  only terms in use were psychological warfare and deception. With the advent of electronic  and digital media\, he mentioned the evolving terminologies of perception  management\, cyber warfare\, information operations\, and strategic communication.  He further delved into the linkages between Arthashastra and IW and how the  latter has always been a part of Chinese military strategy in Sun Tzu’s  writings\, therefore the concepts are actually age-old. Moreover\, he explained  that information operations had been broadly segregated by the US military into  two components\, i.e.\, information technical operations and information and  influence operations\, an error according to him\, given the Russian and Chinese  integrated approach in this domain.  \nThe discussant also spoke about how\, in recent  times\, unverified bulk transmissions have been occurring with no editorial  oversight\, while assessing the differing components of perception management  (PM) and the correlation between IW and PM. Additionally\, the US Military Cyber  Command Team’s role in training Ukrainians since 2014 against Russian IO\, the  inauguration of Singapore’s fourth military branch – Digital and Intelligence  Service –\, Chinese and Russian IO\, the need to secure information space\,  India’s 2010 IW doctrine\, and the November 2020 regulation about monitoring  online streaming platforms was also discussed. In addition\, he underlined the  need for states to flood the information space with timely\, credible data to  avoid conjecture by uncontrolled media in an information vacuum.   \nRegarding the disclaimer in the the paper  wherein Non- State actors and terrorist organisations were not being covered\,  he suggested a greater focus on state response to this challenge\, with particular  reference to India. He outlined the various organisations working in this space  in India and recommended the establishment of an HR vertical in IO/ IW  domain.  He also underlined the need to synergise organisations working separately in Cyber\,  Cognitive and Physical dimensions\, with a nominated lead agency to better  coordinate the state response in the Information domain. He further recommended that we must generate an All  of Nation response to this challenge\, and integrate at two levels; Firstly the  physical\, cyber\, and technical dimensions\, and Secondly\, Government\, Military\,  Industry\, Academia\, and Civil Society. \nFinally he suggested that the speaker may  review if IO is actually a new constituent of hybrid warfare\, and whether the  cognitive domain is the sixth domain of warfare\, as mentioned in the paper\, or  actually a part of the fifth domain- Information Domain\, the first four being  land\, sea\, air and space.  \nLt. Col. Akshat Upadhyay stated that the  speaker must introduce more clarity into his paper\, modify its title and scope\,  and provide contextualisation for various terminologies mentioned. He also emphasised  the need to expand the IO ambit as part of his research and expound on relevant  statistical and anecdotal examples. There is also a need to examine the  relationship between IO and truth\, list sharp techniques associated with IO\,  and provide a more nuanced understanding of cognitive warfare.  \nAt the same time\, the  speaker must account for how IO is not inherently malicious or positive and is  merely a tool that state and non-state actors can use. It is also a battle of  narratives. The discussant presented examples from the Gulf of Tonkin incident  (Vietnam War) and humane treatment meted out by Indian officers to dead  Pakistani soldiers during the Kargil War to support his argument. Lt. Col.  Upadhyay delved into how the paper presented must re-orient from a West-centric  approach and assess how Western countries have carried out IO elsewhere. Moreover\,  concrete examples are required to support assertions regarding US’ involvement  in IO abroad.  \nHe also suggested that  Dr. Rasheed analyse how the Soviet Union (now Russia) earlier used active  measures to weaken NATO and establish continuity between its cold war strategies  and contemporary tactics in Ukraine. Furthermore\, India must institutionalise  IO instead of relying on reactive counter-measures since the recommendations  suggested in the paper will increase countries’ vulnerabilities instead of  reducing them.  \nMs. Shruti Pandalai lauded that Dr.  Rasheed has attempted to simplify a complex and evolving field\, and it is  improbable that one can distinguish between IW and IO. She said that there are  divergences\, convergences\, and collaboration between Russian and Chinese IO\, as  visible in Hong Kong\, Taiwan\, and Ukraine. An assertive China has increasingly  adopted Russian tactics\, which have ranged from controlling the diaspora and external  and internal narratives in China’s favour.  \nAccording to her\, the  events in Ukraine demonstrate big tech and the West’s role in controlling and  strengthening the narrative in Ukraine’s favour. She also pointed out that US’s  Global Engagement Council\, run by the US State Department\, a grouping focused  on combating disinformation\, is inward-looking in its outlook.   \nShe pointed out that Dr.  Rasheed needs to examine contemporary debates about IO\, including artificial  intelligence and big data\, while being more cognisant of Western IO. At the  same time\, she emphasised that censorship of online streaming platforms\, as  suggested by the speaker\, will be an ineffective deterrent in India. Finally\, she  believes it is necessary to focus on lessons learned.  \nLt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma  (Retd.) suggested modifications to the paper’s title to adequately capture the core  arguments and for Dr. Rasheed to account for how states use non-state actors in  the IO/IW domain and refrain from using disclaimers. At the same time\, he urged  caution in using terms such as hybrid warfare while he elaborated on Chinese IO  in the US\, the United Nations Human Rights Council and India\, and Russia’s IO  in the United Kingdom during the Brexit vote and differing interpretations  about war. Furthermore\, he emphasised the need to establish a national  cognitive agency in India.  \nHe also recommended  that the speaker provide clarification about actors in India empowered to  conduct cognitive warfare\, India’s endgame regarding IO against China\, and  simplify terminologies used in the paper.  \nQ/A Session\nDirector General\, Ambassador  Sujan R. Chinoy affirmed  the need to examine all narratives concerning IO\, including the insidious  attempts by the West or current adversaries like Pakistan and China to prepare  for the future adequately. He suggested that the paper look deeper into the  role of IO/IW within India and the transboundary civil society actors’  involvement in these domains since their potency rivals big tech. At the same  time\, there is a requirement to assess if proposed Indian narratives are based  on consensus and where challenges lie. Finally\, an agnostic approach to values  in IO/IW domain must be practiced.  \nSome of the other  themes discussed in the Q/A session included strategic relevance behind IO/IW in  fields of health and disease\, for example\, the anti-vaccine campaign in the  West\, the scope of visibility of Indian IO\, the need to analyse vulnerabilities  in each segment of the population for antidotes to be forged\, lack of domestic consensus  on responding to IO threats against India\, the synergy between state and  non-state actors\, and quantification of influence.  \nDr. Rasheed responded  to the comments and questions raised.  \nThis report was  prepared by Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai\, Research Analyst\, Counter-Terrorism  Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-influence-operations-winning-without-waging-wars-in-the-21st-century
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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