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DTSTART:20140101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150508T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150508T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T155616
CREATED:20231223T133107Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250317T000341Z
UID:63076-1431063000-1431063000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:An Assessment of Organisational Change in the Indian Army
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar (Retd.)\nExternal Discussants: Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.)\, Brig. Rahul Bhonsle (Retd.)\nInternal Discussants: Gp. Capt. Ajey Lele (Retd.)\, Col. Vijai Singh Rana \nThe paper analysed military change in the context of the Indian Army\, with specific focus on organisational innovation and change. It specifically looked at two case studies – the restructuring of the army after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the drive towards mechanisation based on the 1975 expert committee recommendations. The paper then assessed the drivers for organisational change in the Indian Army\, with the further aim of deriving policy recommendations which could be apt in light of the ongoing transformation of the Indian Army. \nThe paper identified operational environment and technology as the principle drivers for change. It stated that successful change required supportive political leadership\, professional and visionary military leadership\, long-term strategic assessment\, strong institutional structures and follow up action. The author used the two case studies in relation to conventional threats. The first related to changes post 1962\, which led to an increase in the size of the army by almost 33 per cent. It also saw the raising of divisions which were tailored to the needs of mountain warfare. \nThe second case study assesses the 1975 committee recommendations which were successful in aiding the army’s drive towards mechanisation. Not only was the organisational structure transformed\, the resultant innovations had a lasting impact on the strategic thought of the army\, which continued to guide subsequent adaptations thereafter. The author also pointed to pertinent aspects related to organisational change after the 1999 Kargil conflict and Operation Parakram in 2001\, besides noting changes related to the ongoing transformation. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author\n\nIt was pointed out that political support for carrying out military change was very crucial. Top level political intervention was important to achieve unity of thought and unity of purpose. This was particularly relevant in the Indian context where turf war was a glaring feature of the armed forces and the absence of the Chief of Defence Staff affected unity of thought and action. It was noted that political leadership in India has been more than encouraging in this regard. Though lacking an institutional mechanism of interface between top political leadership and the armed forces\, many chiefs have successfully won over political support for bringing about organisational change.\nThe aim of military change should be to have a capability-based force and threat-based force existing simultaneously to deal with the challenges being posed in an era of strategic uncertainty.\nApart from operational environment and technology being drivers of change\, it was noted that post-1962\, changes were largely driven by doctrinal shift in thinking.\nA crucial area of military change related to professional military education and training. The aim of military education and training should be to train for certainty and educate for uncertainty to deal with broad military challenges and threats.\nThe absence of a national security strategy has led to the rise of service-specific doctrines\, which are linear in approach and lack a broad national outlook.\nThe sense of the house was that the Indian army fought bravely in the 1962 war. If not for some strategic miscalculations and a degree of misfortune\, Indian army would have turned the tables on the Chinese despite facing all odds. Moreover\, the engagement of Air Force would have significantly altered the course of the war. Most importantly\, the war did not shatter the morale of the Indian Army\, contrary to the common perception because our soldiers fought fearlessly and ferociously. It was largely the failure of top level military/political leadership. The Indian army would do well to look inward for its failures as this will pave the way for course correction.\nIt was suggested that the paper should look into the aspect of organisational change pertaining to staff. The teeth-to-tail ratio\, recruitment policy and restructuring of the organisation merited the attention of the author.\nThe nature of change should be analysed in order to understand whether change is reactive in nature or whether it was shaping the battlefield favourably.\nThe Kargil review committee was the first attempt at evolving a comprehensive national security system engaging all three services. The Krishna Rao report primarily dealt with the army. In an era of jointness\, efforts to bring about change in the army must find a resonance among the other services. A tri-service approach looking at change would bring far greater dividends than a service-specific approach. In this context\, post-Kargil reform process needed to be better analysed.\nThe Indian army aimed to achieve the capacity of network-enabled to network-centric warfare capability but has not been able to do so. It should be explored as to what are the reasons behind our inability to achieve this capability. Similarly\, the aspect of cyber warfare should be included in the paper to understand the phenomenon of change in its entirety.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/an-assessment-of-organisational-change-in-the-indian-army
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150515T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150515T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T155616
CREATED:20231223T133106Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130237Z
UID:63075-1431667800-1431667800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Iran Sanctions and India
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prof. Girijesh PantExternal Discussants: Prof. Gulshan Dietl\, Nidhi VermaInternal Discussants: Dr. G. Balachandran\, Shebonti Ray Dadwal \nThe paper examined the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council (UNSC)\, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) against Iran in the aftermath of the Iranian nuclear issue being referred to the UNSC in February 2006 and the responses and implications for India as a result of these measures. UNSC sanctions primarily involved asset freezes of and travel bans on entities and individuals connected with Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. India took executive actions to conform to UNSC sanctions measures and prevent possible misuse. These were however in continuation of measures it had been taking prior to 2006 as well (like the June 2005 WMD Act)\, which strengthened its regulatory and legislative mechanisms for preventing the sale of WMD-related materials and technology to wrong hands. The paper dwelt on some pertinent issues relating to the Iran-O-Hind shipping Company (IHSC)\, which was specifically targeted by UNSCR 1929 of June 2010.       \nUS and EU sanctions targeting Iran’s crude oil exports have had a significant impact on major importers like India. These measures were based on the contention that Iran was using oil revenues to fund WMD-related programmes\, a concern that was first raised in the preamble to UNSCR 1929. The foundational US sanctions legislation targeting Iran’s petroleum sector was the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996\, which became the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) in 2006. The paper gave a brief account of the legislation\, as well as changes carried out in ISA as part of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010. CISADA further imposed restrictions on the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran\, affecting Indian companies like Reliance. Section 1245 of National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) 2012 targeted the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) for the first time and called for ‘significant reductions’ of imports of Iranian crude and prescribed exemptions from sanctions if a country did so. Section 504 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA) severely curtailed Iran’s foreign exchange earnings by mandating that funds owed to Iran as a result of bilateral trade in goods and services be “credited to an account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institutions.” \nThe EU Decision of July 2010 and the subsequent EU Regulation of October 2010 (specifically Article 10) impacted payment mechanisms like the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) which India was using to pay for Iranian oil. Further\, prohibition on the provision of insurance services (Article 12) by European-based insurance providers for ships transporting Iranian crude had a negative impact on Indian refineries. The paper briefly described the impact and responses of Indian oil companies like the Chennai Petroleum Corporation Limited (CPCL) and Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited (MRPL) to these measures\, as indicated in their annual reports. \nThe US and EU sanctions measures led to a significant reduction in India’s import of Iranian crude\, which came down to less than five per cent of the total imports in 2014-15\, from 13 per cent in 2009-10. Indian policy makers have also often cited the prevailing sanctions regime as negatively affecting India’s investments in Iran’s energy sector. The paper gave a brief account of the status of the agreements signed between Indian and Iranian companies including the December 2009 agreement for the South Pars Phase-II and Farzad-B gas field\, IOCL ‘s investments in the Farsi Block\, among others. The paper closed by noting some of the pertinent developments in the post-Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) period\, including the significant role played by Indian oil companies in JPOA sanctions relief. It ended by noting that the sequencing of sanctions relief as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal would have a bearing on the nature of Iran’s oil trade with key energy partners like India. \nDiscussion and Suggestions to the Author   \n\nIndia is not the only state affected by sanctions. It will be interesting to know how other countries have coped with these measures.\nChina for instance seems to be more adept at engaging economically with Iran\, though it is also circumscribed by the same sanctions and it is also part of the P5+1. China has also apparently built a business centre and is in the process of building a petrochemical complex in Chabahar. \nAspects regarding India’s recent decision to go ahead with investing in Chabahar could be explored. What material changes if any has resulted in this decision?\nAn exploration of the context surrounding these various sanctions measures would be useful. What were the reasons underpinning the increase in the nature of sanctions targeting Iran’s petro-chemical sector from 2010 onwards? An examination of US as well as Iran’s domestic political and energy context would throw more light on the issue. \nThe author was urged to conduct interviews with retired or serving policy makers to the extent possible to get inputs on some of the aspects covered in the paper. \nSome forward-looking aspects in terms of policy recommendations could be incorporated into the paper\, including on such issues like the possible impact of an impending deal on Indian businesses and oil companies as well as on India’s balance of trade with Iran. It was pointed out that India would be dealing with a ‘different Iran’ in the aftermath of a nuclear deal.\nThe paper could explore US-EU interaction on the issue of sanctions vis-à-vis Iran and see if there were any divergences or convergences over the issue\, especially since EU countries were significant importers of Iranian oil prior to 2012.\nRegional dynamics specifically the role of Saudi Arabia and the nature of increase in its oil exports in the aftermath of sanctions targeting Iran could be highlighted.\nUS pressure on India vis-à-vis its energy trade with Iran as well as investments in Iran’s energy infrastructure and view towards projects like IPI can be included.\n\nReport prepared by Sourabhi Mukherjee\, Research Intern\, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/iran-sanctions-and-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150522T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150522T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T155616
CREATED:20231223T133106Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001818Z
UID:63074-1432272600-1432272600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India in Global Governance: Engaging the Counter-Terrorism Regime
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Mr. G. K. PillaiExternal Discussants: Dr. Suresh K. Goel and Dr. Rana BanerjiInternal Discussants: Dr. Vinod Kumar and Dr. Saurabh Mishra \nPresentation\nThe paper focuses on the counter-terrorism regime and highlights that there is a gap in the literature in demonstrating India’s evolving role in the norm building process of this regime. In the paper the author focuses on the post-Cold War period and uses the counter-terrorism regime as a case-study to assess whether India’s engagement has been substantial to the global governance of counter-terrorism. There have been studies of India’s role in the counter-terrorism regime but they all focus on the years after the 9/11 incident. However\, Dr. Anant argues that India has been very active and constructive with its engagement with counter-terrorism regime since much earlier. Some examples of India’s constructive contribution in the counter-terrorism regime were: \n\nIndia had played an important role in the drafting of the General Assembly Resolution 40/6 in 1987. India firmly believed that the underlying causes have to be mitigated in order to end the menace of terrorism. India also recognized the difference between terrorism and movements of self-determination and at the same time was wary of terrorism perpetrated by mercenaries with a view to undermining territorial integrity.\nIn 1991\, speaking on the subject of violence related to movements of national liberation\, India held on to its pre-Cold War position that it recognized the right of self defence of legitimate national liberation movements.\nWith regard to terrorism and human rights\, after the Declaration of Human Rights in 1993\, India in this context\, while referring to Pakistan’s involvement in the 1993 Mumbai attacks\, in a country report on human rights in the Third Committee of General Assembly in 1993\, said that terrorism was the greatest impediment to the realization of human rights. \nAt the plenary of the General Assembly in 1995\, India was critical of United Nations doing nothing to defend democracies from extremists and other violent threats.\nAfter the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings in 1997\, India pushed the General Assembly to fulfill the commitment made in Resolution 51/210 and set up an Ad Hoc Committee to first adopt an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and\, then a comprehensive convention on international terrorism.\n\nThe paper highlights that India played a crucial role in sponsoring and supporting many resolutions on counter-terrorism in the post-Cold War period. For example: \n\nIn 1996\, India tabled the Draft International Convention on Suppression of Terrorism in the General Assembly\, which aimed to deal with state support to terrorism. India was much ahead of developed states in pointing out the menace of state sponsored terrorism.\nIn 1997\, India co-sponsored a draft resolution on Human Rights and Terrorism\, which was adopted in 1999.\nIndia was the lone country that voted against paragraphs 10 and 11 in the debate of Draft resolution A/C.3/58/L.71: Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism in 2003\, which made no reference to violation of human rights by terrorists.\nIn 2000\, the General Assembly took up for discussion India’s Draft Comprehensive Convention of International Terrorism.\nIn 2002\, India co-sponsored the Draft Resolution on Hostage Taking and introduced the resolution on Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction in the General Assembly.\nAnd in 2006\, India supported and joined the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Adopted by the General Assembly.\n\nAlso\, India has been regular in its commitment to the counter-terrorism regime by submitting reports to the concerned UN committees regarding the action it has taken at the national and international levels to curb the menace of terrorism. India has also been vocal in pointing out the problems of non-compliance with anti-terrorism conventions and has urged that a way be found to punish states that abet terrorism. India has made suggestions to make the Counter-Terrorism Committee more effective and accountable through getting more feedback from countries\, increase in interaction between countries and seeking reports to identify violations. Based on all this\, Dr. Anant concludes that India has gone much beyond using existing systems to highlight its concerns regarding international terrorism and the evidence adduced above reiterates the fact that India has been a constructive player in the multilateral counter-terrorism regime. \nDiscussion\n\nIt is important to mention how the Indian government’s position and thinking has changed over the years on the issue of terrorism and how this has been shown through our engagement at the international level.\nHighlighting the difference in the understanding of terrorism and which definition does India support is important.\nDomestic imperative for international suggestions by India has to be mentioned. \nReceptivity to India’s responses with regards to international financing mechanisms of terrorism should be considered.\nInternational monitoring and how India is coping with it internally is of significance.\nPolitics of regime building\, partnership and structural review of the regime should be mentioned as part of the argument.\nContextualization of global and internal terrorism and a link between the two have to be established.\nA watershed event has to be mentioned to show the changes in India’s approach to terrorism at the international level.\nReasons for the failure to build coalitions on terrorism for furthering India’s national interest should be considered.\nPolicy recommendations on how India should form coalitions so it can put its view across at the international level should be analyzed.\nPolitics of compliance and the role of powerful nations should be considered and how has India contributed tobettering compliance among nations should also be included.\nIndia’s role as norm taker or norm maker should be clearly identified.\nSupport by other countries for India at the counter-terrorism regime should be mentioned and also it is important to indicate as to which group India belongs to at the international level.\n\n(This report has been prepared by Ms. Kuhoo Saxena\, Research Intern\, IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-in-global-governance-engaging-the-counter-terrorism-regime
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T155616
CREATED:20231223T133106Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001713Z
UID:63072-1432877400-1432877400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Strengthening Nuclear Security: Compliance to the Principal Legal Instruments of Nuclear Security
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr  Arvind KumarExternal  Discussants: Dr Sitakanta Mishra and Dr Manish DhabadeInternal  Discussants: Mr S Samuel C Rajiv and Ms Sourabhi  Mukherji  \nPresentation\n  Nuclear security concerns  during the Cold War era revolved around the concepts of nuclear deterrence and  nuclear proliferation. However\, in the 21st century\, due to  increased globalization\, political instability and terrorist activities around  the world\, there is a greater threat of theft\, sabotage\, unauthorized access\,  illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive  substance. In this context the author in this paper points to the urgency of  having an international consensus on building a more robust nuclear system with  legal instruments which would be put in place to prevent the misuse of  sensitive nuclear and radiological material by terrorists. Dr Kazi in her paper  highlights the gaps in the nuclear security system where there are no  substantial legal instruments that have been developed to control the transfer  of these sensitive materials to miscreants. A stronger nuclear security system  is also needed due the existence of nuclear weapons in domestically unstable  and politically volatile regions. In such places\, the nuclear facilities are  susceptible to vulnerabilities like accidents\, miscalculations\, sabotage and  pilferage. Therefore\, a nuclear security system with legal instruments would  allow more effective regulation and make individual states more accountable for  the safety of their nuclear capabilities. Hence\, the need for international  cooperation to control nuclear/radioactive sources around the world is of  paramount importance for the prevention of nuclear terrorism and ensuring  global security.\n Dr Kazi looks at three  existing critical instruments for strengthening nuclear security:  \n\nConvention  on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) of 1980\n\nIt is the only legally binding  international instrument in the area of physical protection of nuclear material\nIts primary objective is to facilitate the  safe transfer of nuclear materials.\n\nAmendment  to the CPPNM OF 2005\n\nSenior Expert Group for the Review of the  IAEA’s  Programme of Activities  recommended that a possible revision on the CPPNM should be done to address the  issues of prevention of unauthorized possession of nuclear material and access  to nuclear facilities\n2005 CPPNM amendment emphasised the  importance of sharing best practices that would be critical to developing a  stringent physical protection system. \n\nInternational  Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) of  2005  \n\nPrevention of the misuse of  nuclear/radiological materials.\nRequires State-parties to make every  effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive  material\, taking into account relevant recommendations and functions of the  agency. \n\n\nThese three legal  instruments urge cooperation for the prevention\, repression and elimination of  terrorism in all forms and calls upon states to criminalize offences related to  the misuse of nuclear/radioactive materials. However\, Dr Kazi argues that  despite all these efforts\, the legal instruments mentioned above remain  ineffective and lack universality. One of the reasons for their ineffectiveness  is complacency. Since in reality no incident of this sort has taken place\,  there is no urgency in complying with a nuclear security system to protect  nuclear/radioactive material. Second\, is the lack of universality\, as countries  that do not have stockpiles of nuclear/radioactive material do not feel the  need to implement effective controls on nuclear material. Nevertheless\, the  author argues that State-parties and non-state parties have the prime  responsibility of generating the requisite political will for an effective  implementation of these legal instruments. If need be\, incremental transparency  in nuclear matters can be effected to generate confidence about its security concerns  which could in the future help to produce a necessary political will for making  these legal instruments universal. \n    Discussion  and Suggestions\n\nThe history and evolution of terrorism and  the way it has been tackled by states have to be mentioned in the context of  nuclear/radioactive materials falling into the wrong hands. \nHistorical debates surrounding the legal  instruments for nuclear security system should be elaborated.\nThe difference between nuclear security  and nuclear safety has to be mentioned and also how the former is evolving in  comparison to the latter. \nEvolution and reforms made in the various  Nuclear Security Summits have to be included to have a more comprehensive  understanding of the evolution of nuclear security. \nThe politics behind non-compliance should  be an integral part of the argument to highlight the lack of universality for  the nuclear security system at the international level.\nThe nature of the balancing act has to be  taken into consideration in the management of nuclear terrorism and nuclear  proliferation.\nThe human element or negligence of  security of nuclear facilities domestically has to be taken into consideration.\n\n(Report  prepared by Ms. Kuhoo Saxena\, Research Intern\, IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/strengthening-nuclear-security-compliance-to-the-principal-legal-instruments-of-nuclear-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T155616
CREATED:20231223T133106Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001607Z
UID:63073-1432877400-1432877400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Decision Making on Cross Border Natural Gas Pipelines (1989-2012)
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr. Gulshan Dietl\nExternal Discussants: Ms. Lidya Powell and Mr. Ragunatha Mishra\nInternal Discussants: Dr. Smriti Pattnaik and Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha \nIn the 21st century a nation’s economy thrives on its efficient and boundless use of energy. In this context\, India holds one of the largest markets of energy consumption in the world. Therefore\, energy security has become the paramount focus of Indian Foreign policy. To achieve this goal\, India is pursuing a broad range of options to diversify its energy sources. It ranges from LNG deals\, buying oil and gas spot markets\, acquisition of oil and gas fields abroad\, etc. One of the options is sourcing of energy supplies from neighbours (immediate and distant) through pipelines because of India’s comparative advantages in transportation costs as compared to other modes such as LNG. In this frame of reference\, Government of India identified three natural gas pipeline options: IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India)\, TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) and MBI (Myanmar-Bangladesh-India). Kulkarni’s paper focuses on the decision making process involved on these natural gas pipeline projects from 1989 to 2012 and the factors that have influenced India’s decision making on cross border natural gas pipelines. \nThe paper examines the decision making process in this regard by using “Rational Actor Model Theory”\, which is based on cost benefit analysis and Masuda’s condition for Cross Border Pipelines. Kulkarni investigates the rationale behind India’s joining these projects which are costly and geopolitically controversial. The paper also attempts to understand India’s reasons for pursuing TAPI over IPI and MBI. \nKulkarni acknowledges that there is a clash between India’s need for energy security and its strategic interest. Hence\, taking this into account\, he recommends evolving a balance between the two. \nKey Points from discussion:\n\nThe paper discuss appropriate financial regime and commercial viability through cost benefit analysis. At the centre of any such decision making exercise should be the evolution of a balance between the management of geopolitical risk and commercial viability.\nThe energy demand in India is huge. However\, the demand is unmet because it cannot be transformed into purchasing power. Absence of stakeholders for using LNG to generate power is one example.\nWhy is the government reluctant to pursue gas projects as it has simultaneously pursued projects for LNG ports?\nAny analysis of decision making must include the agencies\, organisational structure and authorities involved in decision making. A critical examination of the decision making process is required.\nWhether any inter-ministerial conflict existed in the government during the course of decision making and implementation of the projects has to be taken into consideration.\nThe decision on applying the Rational Actor Theory and ‘Masuda’s’ model in the context of South Asia must be taken into consideration. A special focus is needed to understand the TAPI gas pipeline given the internal dynamics of India and Pakistan. One of the decision making models that is well suited for the conditions prevailing in South Asia is Richard Snyder’s.\nThe reasons for the government to opt for IPI\, TAPI and MBI rather that Oman–India pipeline or SAGE Pipeline should be carefully analysed. The analysis should also include the costs involved.\nAny decision making process on energy projects must include the following:\n\nProvision of providing excess to energy to every one\nSecuring energy supply\nTrying to limit carbon emissions\nImplementation of choices and alternatives of decision-making process must be in compliance with India’s fiscal and environment policies.\nGas pipeline construction must be looked at from the perspective of strategic investment. The presence of Iran and Unites States in this region should be taken into consideration.\n\n\n\n(Report prepared by Satyam Malaviya\, Research Intern\, IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-decision-making-on-cross-border-natural-gas-pipelines-1989-2012
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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