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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140502T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140502T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T164059
CREATED:20231223T133406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z
UID:63098-1399008600-1399008600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The ULFA\, the PLA\, and the UNLF: Will negotiations Work?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Shri E N Ram MohanExternal Discussants: Dr M Amarjeet Singh and Mr Bidhan S LaishramInternal Discussants: Ms Shruti Pandalai and Ms Gulbin Sultana \nThe paper aims to understand whether the peace negotiations with the armed groups\, i.e.\, the UNLF and the PLA of Manipur\, are viable\, and also underlines the debates generated in Assam as a result of the peace negotiations with the ULFA.  \nThe author argues that within the framework of peace negotiations\, it is important to understand the discourse that exists in these societies before negotiating with the armed groups. This is because protracted conflicts play a very significant role in determining the kind of debates that take place in the public sphere. The process of identity formation\, for instance\, would depend on the conflict that an individual has witnessed over time. Taking the Naga peace process into consideration\, a major reason for its efficacy was due to the discourse that existed in the civil society\, i.e.\, one in which the people were demanding that the armed groups should go for peace talks to end the restrictions of the AFSPA in the state. Along with this\, the NSCN (IM) felt that the status quo was not in their favour\, and for its leaders\, projecting the peace process at a high level of visibility was itself an achievement. \nThe situation in Manipur and Assam is very different as compared to this. One reason why the peace process is so problematic is because of existing categorizations of friend and enemy that have been the basis of identity of an individual from the beginning\, which consequently are very difficult to counter. The public discourses in these societies are very narrow and full of assumptions that result in the use of a particular kind of language to describe the other. Let us take a few examples of these existing discourses: \n\nThe Meitei public discourse is energized by a language of seeing themselves as different and alienated\, such that their rights are threatened by other communities and also by the Indian state. This identity and discourse is projected in the two armed groups of Manipur\, the UNLF and PLA. \nThe ULFA discourse also projects the discourse of Assam\, i.e.\, the resources of Assam are not used for purposes that will benefit its people. Additionally\, it questions the basis of Assamese annexation given that the Treaty of Yandaboo of 1826 did not include the Ahom king and was only signed between the Burmese and the British army. \nThe Tangkhul discourse focuses on maintaining their uniqueness and denies the existence of pluralism in its society vis-à-vis the Meiteis. This discourse of difference is evident\, such that an acceptance of the Meiteis would question their demand of a separate state. \n\nTherefore\, given these existing discourses it becomes very disorienting for the armed groups to have peace talks with the government. A ceasefire with the state would pose a question to their authenticity and would mean changing their entire frame of reference. In order to deal with this problem\, it becomes important to begin by challenging these existing discourses of difference. And to counter these exclusivist categorizations\, new frames have to come into existence. \nAlong with these there are other specific challenges that need to be considered. In the ULFA case\, the group has been involved in peace talks with the Government of India since 2011. However\, the legitimacy of these talks has been questioned as most of the leaders who were brought to the table were arrested\, and hence ‘coerced’ into the peace process. Another challenge to the peace talks is the anti-talk faction of Paresh Barua who is not willing to join the negotiations. While looking at the UNLF and PLA’s contention for peace talks\, the most important challenge is an embedded belief that the peace negotiation process is not about conflict transformation or about dealing with the root causes of the problem\, but only a counter-insurgency strategy. They feel it is to ensure the group gets divided\, weakened and militarily dominated. \nTo counter these challenges\, it is important to ensure a significant pre-negotiations stage. Such a stage would involve:  \n\nA common understanding of the problem between the government and the armed group\nIdentifying leaders or cadres who would be willing to talk or might influence the top leader\nUse of back channel negotiations\, i.e.\, use of government negotiators to talk actively with the armed group without much of media coverage. This is a significant tool for conflict resolution\, however\, a drawback of this is that the groups that may not be involved might act as spoilers to the process. \n\nIt is also important to remember that negotiations are complex and susceptible to transformation. Four things that are important for the success of a negotiation process are – leadership; the right kind of incentive structures and a common vision; institutional structures that enable the negotiations to succeed; and finally the right kind of implementation.  \nKey points that were raised during the discussion:\n\nIn Manipur\, there are various overarching factors that hinder the negotiations between the government and the armed groups. This includes a lack of seriousness on both the sides as both consider status quo as beneficial to them. \nWhile it is true that ethnic identities are being proliferated in the North East\, one must also carefully consider the reasons behind this proliferation – structural as well as political. \nPeace processes are empowering and disorienting. In order to know the reason why the armed groups are not ready for peace talks\, it would be crucial to look into the question as to why is the disorienting part of the peace process more deterring than the empowering part. \nThere is a need to address issues of narrow political discourses within the North East and the absence of informed debate/consciousness on these issues in the rest of the country. \nNarratives that have become the base of grievances of armed groups need to be counter challenged. \nThere exists a need to challenge the lack of response of the Indian state and the issue of racist administrative behaviour that has been a cornerstone in terms of the way Indian establishment behaves with the people in the North East. \nOver time\, there has been a shift of the focus of the armed groups from the ideologies they were formed with\, towards increasing criminal activities. \nIt is important to create more employment opportunities and encourage people to people contact between the population in the North East and the rest of the country. \nReport prepared by Ms. Husanjot Chahal
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-ulfa-the-pla-and-the-unlf-will-negotiations-work
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140502T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140502T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T164059
CREATED:20231223T133406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z
UID:63099-1399008600-1399008600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Egypt’s Faltering Transition: Domestic and Regional Dynamics and Challenges for India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseExternal Discussants: Shri Sanjay Singh and Professor Gulshan DietlInternal Discussants: Dr P K Pradhan and Ms Ruchita Beri \nThe paper is an attempt to analytically examine the intricacies of Egypt’s transition\, its domestic-regional dynamics and nature of Indo-Egyptian relations. In the introductory remarks\, author briefly discussed Egypt’s geographic\, demographic\, civilizational and geo-political significance and highlighted Egypt’s centrality in West Asia-North Africa (WANA) region’s strategic landscape.  \nAuthor raised four concise research questions which form the major premise of this study; Factors responsible for faltering transition\, Major domestic stake-holders in Egypt’s transition\, External factors influencing the Egyptian transition and reverberations of transition on the region\, and India’s key interests in Egypt.   \nIn the first section\, author identified four factors responsible for the flawed transition of Egypt. As per author’s contentions\, SCAF in its short political existence of sixteen months failed to address the popular demands of Egyptians and thus its political miscalculation proved to be an obstruction in Egypt’s democratic ambitions. Author further elaborated how multiple elections and constitutional referenda post-2011 created an element of ambiguity and frustration\, and led to a directionless transition. The third factor responsible for transition’s failure was Muslim Brotherhood’s confusion\, contradiction and hurry in managing the new democratic Egypt. Lastly\, with reference to certain important economic variables\, author affirmed that deplorable economic conditions and inability to revive the Egyptian economy further impeded the transitional movement.  \nIn the next section\, author dealt with the major domestic players involved in writing the script of Egypt’s transition. Role played by Egyptian Armed forces\, Political parties (Muslim Brotherhood\, Islamic and secular political parties) and Youth Movements (April 6 movement\, Revolutionary Youth Coalition\, Tamarod) was analytically elaborated by the author. \nThird section of the paper was centered on external dynamics of the transition. Author classified the influences under two major sub-heads; Regional and extra-regional camps. Based on ideological differences and state of diplomatic relations\, author established that Saudi-UAE-Kuwait formed the Anti-Muslim brotherhood lobby\, and Turkey-Iran-Qatar group was labelled as the Pro Muslim Brotherhood camp. Under Extra-regional stake holders\, the case of Russia and U.S. was studied in greater detail. To evaluate Egypt’s impact on the region\, author studied the spread of Political Islam emanating from Egyptian territory\, reaction of neighbours such as Iran and Turkey\, probable trade-effects along Suez Canal and changing US policies.  \nLast section of the paper focused on Indo-Egyptian relations by examining the cultural\, civilizational\, diplomatic\, and economic-trade linkages. Special emphasis was laid on nature of bilateral ties in face of the Arab Spring. In conclusion\, author emphatically articulated Egypt’s importance for India and deliberated upon challenges facing New Delhi while dealing with changing regimes in Cairo. \nShri Sanjay Singh congratulated the author for producing a well-structured and analytically sound paper. He stated that developments in WANA region deserve a more detailed mention in the introduction section of the paper to place Egypt in the regional context. He further suggested the author to examine the impact of Iran P5+1 talks and Iraq elections on Egypt. He appreciated author’s detailed analysis of Muslim Brotherhood’s role in Egyptian transition and asked the author to further address intra Muslim Brotherhood clefts. Furthermore\, Shri Sanjay Singh highlighted the centrality of domestic economic forces in shaping the transition. Lastly\, it was stated that even though Egypt is important to India\, GCC remains the centre of attention and thus labelling Egypt as the “vital cog” in India’s foreign policy matrix seemed to be an exaggeration.  \nProf. Gulshan Dietl appreciated the cogent and focused study undertaken by the author. She opined that the three years of turbulence have changed the status quo in Egypt and thus the argument that “Egypt is back to square one” remains contestable. While commenting on Egypt’s contemporary relevance\, Prof Dietl mentioned that Cairo as headquarters of Arab league exemplifies Egypt’s centrality to the West Asian region. Additionally\, author was urged to examine the role of Egyptian films and TV in evoking and influencing the public sentiment\, in order to catch the pulse of Egyptian revolution.  \nMs. Ruchita Beri acknowledged author’s efforts. She mentioned that though Egypt geographically falls under the African continent\, Egyptians generally alienate themselves from their African identity. She suggested that the author accommodate the issue of Egypt’s participation in the African Union within the subject-matter of this paper\, and also briefly examine Sino-Egypt trade relations.  \nDr. P.K. Pradhan complimented the author. A succinct reference to Elie Kedourie’s work on Arab political culture was made to suggest that reminiscence of Mubarak still echoes across Egypt\, even after his ouster from Egyptian political theatre. Sharing his insights on military dominance in Egypt\, Dr. Pradhan asserted that even though the military leader has been removed\, the institutional structures remain intact. He agreed with the author’s contention that military will dominate the domestic politics\, and civilian misrule will not be tolerated by military in Egypt.  \nAmb. Arundhati Ghose: The neutral\, non-judgmental and objective approach of the paper was highly appreciated by Amb Ghose. The author was advised to include “people or masses” as another major internal player in Egyptian transition. Demographic profiling of protestors while examining the youth movements was strongly recommended. Amb Ghose emphatically stated that jihadis have contributed to the failure of transition\, and thus the role of Jihadi elements in shaping the transition deserves a mention\, if not detailed scrutiny.  \nThe discussion was followed by comments and questions from the floor. The need to examine the future of Egypt was underlined; in order to extrapolate whether Egypt will deteriorate into a failed state or will it bounce back and retain its influence on the region. Questions were raised on US policy towards Egypt post-Mubarak and Israeli view of Arab Spring and Egyptian transition. The issue of Egypt’s excessive dependence on foreign funds was debated and the need to study economic dynamics of Egyptian transition was duly acknowledged.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/egypts-faltering-transition-domestic-and-regional-dynamics-and-challenges-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140509T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140509T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T164059
CREATED:20231223T133406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z
UID:63097-1399613400-1399613400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indian Army: Evolving to Adapt Military Change in CI Operations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal (Retd.)External Discussants: Lt Gen D S Hooda and Maj Gen Umong Sethi (Retd)Internal Discussants: Gp. Capt. Naval Jgota and Col. Vijai Singh Rana \nWhile presenting the paper the author at the outset made it clear that this paper is part of a project that seeks to explain how the Indian army adapts to change in different arenas. The focus of this paper is to understand military change in the context of Counterinsurgency (CI) operations. The paper argues that military change in conventional wars is brought about when armies adopt an approach which is often revolutionary\, driven by cutting edge technology. Its implementation is directed from the highest level\, making it essentially top-down. In contrast\, in CI operations\, this process is evolutionary\, with limited influence of technology. More often than not this is based on bottom-up adaptation\, even if in some cases it manifests in top-down implementation. \nThe paper argues that change is resisted in every organization\, particularly bureaucratic organizations. Moreover\, the nature of resistance is almost similar. It stands true for the military set up also. However\, the Indian army is faced with a paradoxical situation of resistance to change and the utmost need thereof. In this struggle of the opposites\, the later seems to be guiding the army at present and counterinsurgency (CI) operations are a clear manifestation of army’s willingness to change. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: \n\nIt was pointed out by many discussants that LC fence was part of the wider goal of border management and checking counterinsurgency (CI) was just one part of it.\nIndia’s counterinsurgency (CI) Ops model is its own derived out of its unique circumstances.\nIt was shared by many discussants that stress management is quite good in the counterinsurgency (CI) Ops areas. Given the size of armed forces personnel presence in the troubled areas\, no. of untoward incidents like fratricidal killings and suicides etc. are not very alarming.\nIt was argued that there is no tactical level in the counterinsurgency (CI) operations. Every act has got strategic implications. For example\, even one civilian casualty could turn out to be a huge embarrassment for the govt. at the highest level and may bring the army’s action under serious scrutiny.\nIt was pointed out that the North East template was applied in the case of CI operations in J&K. However\, it was realized later that the modus operandi of the insurgent outfits was different in J&K from North East. The army had to adjust its counterinsurgency strategy accordingly.\nThe Indian Military Academy devotes the entire third year to CI and therefore the army has good no. of trained officers at lower level to deal with counterinsurgency operations.\nIt was argued that since insurgency is rebellion against the state and its policies; a counter to it cannot be a wholly militaristic approach. It must be a holistic approach.\nCI is manpower intensive job and hence human resource management should be the focus along with technological innovation.\nThe author was suggested to analyze the role of failures in military operations as one of the important drivers for change; since lessons learnt could also be important drivers for change as is evident in the new US CI doctrine which is based on its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.\nThe author was advised to explore the role of Special Forces in CI Ops. The role of US.S Special Forces in similar operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated the effectiveness of such forces.\nThe paper discusses change primarily in military context\, whereas CI operates in politico-military environment.\nThe role of intelligence is very important in CI Ops and hence the paper must come out with recommendations to improve our intelligence mechanism.\nCultural factor is an important element of CI Ops. A thorough understanding of the local populace is important for the conduct of a successful operation.\nThe role of neighboring countries in CI must be explored. Though\, soliciting their support should be primarily a diplomatic endeavor\, the scope for military to military cooperation can also be explored simultaneously and the paper should suggest ways and means to do this.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-army-evolving-to-adapt-military-change-in-ci-operations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140509T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140509T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T164059
CREATED:20231224T102420Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z
UID:64049-1399613400-1399613400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Changing Patterns in Nepal-China Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (Retd)External Discussants: Capt (IN) Alok Bansal and Dr Abanti BhattacharyaInternal Discussants: Dr Nihar Nayak and Dr Prashant Kumar Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/changing-patterns-in-nepal-china-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140516T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140516T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T164059
CREATED:20231223T133348Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z
UID:63096-1400218200-1400218200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indian Maritime Strategy: Drivers and Imperatives
DESCRIPTION:Chair: R Adm (Retd) K RajamenonExternal Discussants:  R Adm SY Srikhande\, Dr. Vijay Sakhuja and Cdr R MishraInternal Discussants:   Commodore Ajay Chhabra \nThe author argues that as the world looks towards Indian Navy to deliver more it is time to take a stock of where India’s maritime strategy stands. The paper traces the evolution of India’s maritime strategy from the pre-natal days of independence and examines if the present day strategy has aided its quest to be seen as a responsible stable provider of security in the IOR and as a reliable partner in its other areas of interest. It also looks at imperatives that require re-examining. The paper also identifies imperatives that require to be included to enable a cogent maritime strategy and place India in its rightful place in the comity of nations as a responsible and stable actor.  \nThe paper tries to explain India’s maritime strategy in terms of drivers and imperatives of strategy. It defines driver as an aspect that has a long term effect; is the raison d’etre and has a direct bearing on the strategy. By imperative it means an aspect that could be temporary; impinge on the strategy and would require a solution so that the drivers are not affected. Therefore\, the roles envisaged by the doctrines have been broadly acknowledged as the drivers since they have more or less remained permanent especially since 1998. \nThe author concludes that Indian Maritime Strategy which has been based on a consistent thought process since independence could be viewed as a cognitive articulation of India’s maritime outlook limited by funding\, lack of an enforceable higher directive and inherent internal dynamics of governance. The advantage bestowed by geography and the relative intra-regional balance of power equation that has weighed in India’s favour since 1947 could be lost due to the ingress of external powers like China and their ability to exert influence directly or indirectly both on land and sea. It could also be affected by reluctance of nations like the US in maintaining a safe and stable maritime environment. Either way\, as India is looked upon by most of its neighbours and other IOR nations as a stability and balancing factor with reasonable capacity and capabilities there is a need to: \n\nBolster the maritime strategy with a modern balanced naval force with adequate numbers and a smoother flowing perspective plan that would meet the cardinal dates of upgradation and replacement. This would entail a relook at funding and more importantly timely approval of acquisition plans.     \nConnect the Indian Naval outlook with the central thought of the government. This would ensure a continued success of naval diplomacy in consonance with India’s foreign policy.\nEnsure a common\, and when required strong\, stance on issues that are both inimical and beneficial to India’s interests.  This would ensure the sanctity of not only the maritime strategy but also indicate stronger internal dynamics within the various elements of the government.    \n\nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: \n\nStrategy\, drivers and imperatives was discussed at length. It was argued that strategy and doctrine are not the same. Strategy should be dynamic and flexible in order to absorb emerging challenges and developments. Securing peace is the ultimate aim of any military. But it must also keep itself ready for war as a last measure to secure peace. So any strategy must have these two pillars as its basis.\nWhile benign role is an important aspect of multiple roles that the Indian navy is supposed to play; it must not lost sight of the fact that it is primarily a war fighting machine and hence must keep itself combat ready.\nIt was pointed out that Indian navy is a hybrid navy. Its software part is British whereas Russia is the major source of its hardware needs. This is both our strength and weakness. On one hand it shows our flexibility and ability to adapt\, to the other makes it difficult for a hybrid navy to strategize.\nPrime minister’s and Defence minister’s speeches\, particularly at commanders’ conferences provide important inputs to the services and it is reflected in their preparation. Since\, the source of inputs flows from the highest authority\, it gives legitimacy to the forces’ actions. However\, these speeches can at best be valuable in policy making; they can’t substitute strategy which is about ends\, ways and means.\nIt was argued that navy can’t develop its strategy in isolation with other two services. Synergy among the services is a sine qua non for a robust and credible strategy.\nIt is a common refrain of other countries that Indian navy should be more responsible. But the question arises that responsible from whose perspective — inimical countries or allies from India’s own perspective. If later is the case then Indian navy has definitely displayed immense maturity and responsibility as is evident in its counter-piracy efforts. \nIt was pointed out that India must keep a tab on Chinese navy which is replicating US strategy of having a strong navy to become a world power. The recent focus of china on maritime security is quite evident.\nIndia must strike a balance between threat and capability approach in strategy making. The capability approach is politically more correct since it refrains from talking about enemy. However\, real threats can’t be ignored and in this regard India must take into account Chinese game plans.\nThe author was advised to elaborate the financial aspect of naval strategy. It needs to be explored that how budgetary side has facilitated or acted as a constraint on strategy.\nThe paper would enrich if it provides a theoretical framework for understanding strategy. Since\, India’s conditions are unique\, a strategy that suits India can be chalked out only if one has in mind the unique set of problems and opportunities India faces.  \nSince\, the focus of the paper is on drivers and imperatives\, the historical part of evolution of strategy should be condensed to allow more space to drivers and imperatives; the key part of research.\nThe author could also explore how delays in procurements affect Indian navy’s strategy. Since any strategy is for a particular time frame\, it is worthwhile to see whether delays warrant revisit of strategy or not.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-maritime-strategy-drivers-and-imperatives
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T164059
CREATED:20231224T102415Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T003431Z
UID:64046-1400823000-1400823000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Rebooting Democracy: An Analysis of Nepal’s Second CA Elections
DESCRIPTION:Media person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rebooting-democracy-an-analysis-of-nepals-second-ca-elections
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T164059
CREATED:20231224T102415Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z
UID:64047-1400823000-1400823000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Rebooting Democracy: An Analysis of Nepal’s Second CA Elections
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rebooting-democracy-an-analysis-of-nepals-second-ca-elections-2
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T164059
CREATED:20231224T102415Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z
UID:64048-1400823000-1400823000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Nanotechnology: Current Global Trends and Future Military Applications for “Soldier as a System”
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr W SelvamurthyExternal Discussants: Rear Admiral (Retd) S Kulshrestha and Col Deepak KohliInternal Discussants: Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) and Dr Cherian Samuel
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/nanotechnology-current-global-trends-and-future-military-applications-for-soldier-as-a-system
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140530T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140530T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T164059
CREATED:20231224T102414Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002834Z
UID:64045-1401427800-1401427800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Sectarianism\, Arab Spring and Saudi Foreign Policy
DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sectarianism-arab-spring-and-saudi-foreign-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
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END:VCALENDAR