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TZOFFSETTO:+0530
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DTSTART:20130101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140103T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140103T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T165827
CREATED:20231224T102515Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:64058-1388727000-1388727000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:US Factor in Sino–Indian Relations: India’s Fine Balancing
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson:  Prof. Christopher S. Raj \nExternal Discussants: Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra and Prof. Sreeram ChauliaInternal Discussants: Dr. Mahua Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Srivastava
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-factor-in-sino-indian-relations-indias-fine-balancing
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140110T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140110T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T165827
CREATED:20231224T102515Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T004944Z
UID:64057-1389331800-1389331800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Tamil Nadu Factor: Perspectives of Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\nConference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-tamil-nadu-factor-perspectives-of-tamils-and-muslims-in-sri-lanka
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140117T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140117T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T165827
CREATED:20231223T133548Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:63107-1389936600-1389936600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Military Change in India: An Appraisal of the Evolving Strategy Towards Pakistan
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen HS Lidder (Retd)External Discussants: Vice Adm Anup Singh (Retd)\, Lt Gen Prakash Menon (Retd) and Professor Rajesh RajagopalanInternal Discussant: Col PK Gautam (Retd) \nThis paper primarily made an attempt to understand India’s evolving military strategy towards Pakistan. It analyzes this evolution using the theoretical framework of mlitary change\, which can be conceived of as occurring at three levels: the goals of a military organisation\, its organisational structure\, and the strategy it adopts. The cause of military change can be traced to three sources: a voluntary or externally induced change in the cultural norms of a military organisation; changes in a state’s domestic political orientation or in its national security scenario; and the introduction of new technology.  \nThe paper seeks to examine whether military change has occurred in India at any of the three levels identified above and\, if yes\, then what has been the source of that change. With these objectives\, the paper focuses upon the third level of change\, namely strategy. Specifically\, it examines the strategies adopted by the Indian armed forces for the Pakistan front and the changes effected therein over the course of the last six decades. This examination highlights two principal trends. At the operational level of war\, India’s military strategy towards Pakistan changed from attrition to manoeuvre and back to attrition. And the objective of India’s strategy has changed from victory until the 1980s to punishing Pakistan since the 1990s. The paper argues that these changes were caused by India’s evolving security scenario vis-à-vis Pakistan and in particular by the introduction of nuclear weapons\, which have inhibited India’s response to the challenge posed by Pakistan. \nThe paper concludes that civil-military coordination is essential for bringing in sync the military and political objectives within a larger strategic narrative. While such coordination was indeed a consistent feature between independence and the 1999 Kargil conflict\, a divergence has emerged between the political and military leaderships during the last 10 years. This fraying of politico-military coordination is clearly evident in the army’s failure to win political approval for the Cold Start strategy and indeed in its attempt through such a strategy to compel the political leadership into following its timetable for military action. For its part\, the political leadership has also failed to engage with the services to ensure the crafting of a strategy that is both appropriate for a nuclear environment and is dovetailed with broader policy objectives. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nIt was pointed out that more than lack of trust or anything else\, the civil-military disconnect in India is the result of lack of expertise on military matters among the civilian leadership. This state of affairs can be attributed to the near absence of public discourse on hardcore military subjects. This scenario is\, however\, fast changing with an increasing number of retired military professionals beginning to write and generating a public debate on military issues.\nMilitary strategy in war is different from pre-war planning. The paper needs to spell out clearly which level of strategy is its focus.\nThere is a need to unbundle and elaborate upon the argument about the change in Indian strategy from victory to punishment. It was argued that India’s objective has been to deter Pakistan and the method adopted for that purpose has been punishment and not victory per se. Further\, for India\, victory has not always entailed the defeat of Pakistan or the occupation of its territory. Victory has to be judged in terms of the goals set with punishment also having been a part of victory. \nWith respect to the nuclear factor\, it was pointed out that India has been repeatedly subjected to nuclear blackmail. At the same time\, India’s propensity to up the ante against Pakistan has been severely constrained. The Cold Start has been seen as a viable option in the nuclear backdrop but the ambiguity that surrounds it has outweighed its utility as a strategy.\nWhile formulating any strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan\, India cannot ignore China. It implies that a two front war scenario is a very distinct possibility and India must retool its strategy to meet such challenge.\nThe paper needs to incorporate the role played by the Mukti Bahini in the 1971 war\, a role that was crucial in terms of providing valuable intelligence and reconnaissance support.\nIt was argued that Pakistan’s strategy toward India is one of offensive-defensive\, whereas India’s has been defensive-offensive. This has been reflected time and again in Pakistan’s misadventures against India in the past.\nRegarding Cold Start\, it was pointed out that lessons are learnt from war and that goes into doctrines. Therefore\, the Cold Start\, which is primarily a mobilizational effort\, does not hold much doctrinal value.\nIt was argued that attrition is a safe option. Contrary to attrition\, manoeuvre involves high risk and high gain. Any strategy\, therefore\, should be a combination of both attrition and manoeuvre and it cannot be a case of either or.\nIt was suggested that the paper should focus on political strategy rather than military strategy as everything else flows from the former. It is the political leadership that decides on war and peace after taking into account several factors ranging from domestic to external.\nThe paper would be enriched if it includes Pakistan’s military strategy and objectives vis-à-vis India.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/military-change-in-india-an-appraisal-of-the-evolving-strategy-towards-pakistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140124T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140124T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T165827
CREATED:20231224T102514Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:64056-1390541400-1390541400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The US Pivot/Rebalance to Asia and the Japanese Response: Implications for India’s ‘Look East’ Policy
DESCRIPTION:Chair person: Professor Sreemati ChakrabartiExternal Discussion: Professor K P Vijaylakshmi and Professor Lalima VarmaInternal Discussion: Dr R N Das and Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-us-pivot-rebalance-to-asia-and-the-japanese-response-implications-for-indias-look-east-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T165827
CREATED:20231223T133507Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:63106-1391146200-1391146200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Prospects of Cross Line of Control (LoC) Travel and Trade
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Kapil KakExternal Discussants: Professor Riyaz Punjabi and Professor K WarikooInternal Discussants: Dr Smruti S Pattanaik and Col (Retd)Vivek Chadha  \nDr Priyanka Singh\, in her presentation\, analysed the prospects of travel and trade across the LoC\, which according to her\, were of strategic significance for India. She applauded the efforts made by the respective governments to soften their stand on LoC and discussed the way in which the LoC links were activated by the two governments in the aftermath of the ceasefire of 2003 transcending constitutional barriers in both the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir and the so called ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ (AJK) under Pakistani occupation. \nShe argued that people-to-people contact\, promoting economic interdependence and making borders irrelevant were imperative for the success of cross-LoC linkage. The presentation also contained informed about the operation of bus service on two routes\, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalkote\, which were loosely modelled after Delhi-Lahore bus service. It was observed that sustaining lines of trade across the LoC was a significant step forward to soften the LoC\, an important CBM between India and Pakistan. \nShe highlighted the key recommendations of the Working Groups\, which were constituted to recommend measures for softening the LoC for transit and dwelt on the composition of cross LoC trade—comprising mainly of handicraft\, handloom and food items (agricultural and horticultural). Providing further details about cross-LoC trade Dr Singh said that it was not trade in the conventional sense of the term\, and it was duty-free and barter based trade and operates on a limited basis through 1-1.5 ton capacity trucks. \nThe scholar isolated events which catalysed the process of change which included the stakeholder’s meeting at Istanbul in November 2011\, where Jammu & Kashmir Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry was formed. This was a milestone in institutionalizing trade between the two sides. She also discussed several bottlenecks which are inhibiting process of trade and travel\, which included the never-ending security concerns\, limited scope of trade\, financial constraints\, communication gap\, logistical hurdles\, and vulnerability to misuse.  \nIn spite of such hurdles\, she argued that there was a growing demand for additional routes in the region which shows that such linkages are valued by people on both sides of the LoC. She also brought it to the notice of the audience that there was a feeling of being left-out in those regions of Jammu\, Ladakh and Gilgit-Balitstan\, where there are additional demands for cross-LoC linkages. People in these areas believe that too much focus is being laid on the Kashmir valley. The author quoted PM Manmohan Singh to prove this. The PM had in fact acknowledged recently that he was aware of the growing demand from the people in Kargil to have links restored with Gilgit and Baltistan\, as a result of which the opening up of Kargil-Skardu is under consideration. Such links would not merely yield economic dividends\, they would also address the issue of divided families in the state. \nThe author noted that the record of cross-LoC travel so far was impressive and there was surprisingly no major incident of violence\, apart from the one on the tourist facility center in Srinagar\, a day before the bus service between Srinagar-Muzaffarabad started. She mentioned various incidences which affected cross-LoC trade between\, including the 26/11\, which occurred only a month after cross-LoC trade was inaugurated\, the land controversy in Amarnath which flared communal tensions in the valley\, beheading of an Indian soldier by Pakistani border guards and the allegations of drug-smuggling by Pakistani operators resulting in stalling of the process following 47 trucks carrying goods from PoK being withheld by Indian authorities.  \nDr Singh raised a pertinent point in her paper that the initiative has remained largely insulated from the larger complexities involving India-Pakistan relations. She held that it was natural to expect India-Pakistan relations would influence the Cross-LoC trade and travel.  She mentioned various such instances when\, the bus service was suspended\, like suspension of the Delhi-Lahore bus for about two years in the aftermath of the militant attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. \nHowever\, she found through her research that there was a tremendous enthusiasm amongst people on both sides about such linkage mainly because it gives them an opportunity to unite with the divided families across the LoC on either side\, and partially due to the economic prospects it offers. The desire in the people of the region to see trade and travel flourish for a secure and better future for themselves was also highlighted.  \nHowever\, it was noted that while on the Indian side both the mainstream regional parties in J&K— National Conference (NC) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP)—expressed their faith in cross-LoC linkage the opinion was divided among the political elites of ‘AJK’ on how to approach the issue. Some of them feel emphasis on cross-LoC linkage would dilute the main issue of Kashmir. However\, the business class in AJK is keen to expand trade-ties and has been demanding that cross LoC trade must be put on the agenda at the highest level of talks between India and Pakistan. The pressure from Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) to open Kargil-Skardu route was also discussed.  \nThe popular demands were listed by the scholar well which were:—  enhance transit capacity by increasing the number of vehicles\, increase the trade basket\, promote tourism to allow greater communication amongst people from both the sides\, establish better lines of communication amongst the traders’ community\, overall easing up access to the LoC\, encourage greater participation of the people in the process\, introduce integrated banking system and efficient sales policy\, and above all carve out a well-conceived policy on security. At the same time due care must be taken\, it was argued\, to retain and preserve the quintessential Kashmiri character of the initiative.  \nIt was argued that cross LoC interactions could go a long way in managing perceptions not only within Kashmir\, but possibly beyond it in both the countries. However\, such initiatives are likely to stimulate bigger expectations\, and the challenge lies in managing such expectations\, which\, if remain unaddressed for long\, could potentially translate into cynicism\, pessimism and anger\, which is usually the case in conflict ridden areas. \nIt was observed that at the India-Pakistan bilateral level\, establishing cross-LoC linkage is probably one of the most tangible CBMs between the two. Thus\, the fundamental question arises whether cross LoC exchange is a driver of peace? The scholar was of the opinion that in terms of larger long-term gains in pursuit of peace\, both countries need to reflect upon these questions and think whether they are willing to make concessions on the larger political problems\, most importantly on territorial issues. Ultimately the success of cross-Loc exchange during the last few years depended on whether the travel and trade has created an enabling environment\, bridged the gap amongst Kashmiri people\, encouraged collective economic consciousness\, and more importantly reduced the level of frustrations and angst amongst Kashmiris during these years. \nThe author closed by offering some suggestions to boost this initiative which included enhancing the scope of trans LoC interaction\, maximising economic gains and incentives\, opening the line for people other than those belonging to divided families\, exploring additional diversified channels of exchange other than educational and medical needs\, minimize technical problems\, move on from the barter system as it is unsustainable in the long run and explore the option of transit trade by linking the route up to the Central Asian Republics. \nExternal Discussants:\nOne of the external discussants\, Prof Riyaz Punjabi applauded the author and stated that the paper did well to link cross-LoC trade and intra-J&K trade with Indo-Pak Relations. He apprised the gathering that the partition of 1947  did not take into account linguistic affinity\, compulsions of geography and other cross-regional trade interests. He noted that before partition\, Baramulla-Rawalpindi used to be an all-weather route open throughout the year and  pointed out that cross-LoC trade would hold enormous potential if we connect the regions of Jammu and Ladakh to Kashmir.  \nHe stated that the Gilgit-Baltistan region had far been neglected by the Pakistani government and it was even referred to as ‘Northern Areas’ till 2005. He also recalled an incident when a group of journalists from across the LoC came to Jammu and had a gala time with the people out there\, for which they had to face a very hostile time in Srinagar because the separatist Hurriyat Conference people were extremely displeased with their affinity with the people of Jammu.  \nHe also stated that the trade between the two parts of the region has enormous potential which has been hampered due the vested business interests of the political class who find it convenient and profitable to transfer the goods from a third destination\, preferably Dubai. He accepted that there are several challenges one of which was the illegal drugs trade starting from Afghanistan through Pakistan and India to other markets beyond in South-east Asia. Radical elements will continue to push for this through India and Pakistan\, taking advantage of the Cross-LoC and Wagah-Attari trade links. He urged that some mechanism must be found out to deal with such crucial issues in order to keep the cross LoC trade flourishing. In the end he emphasized that barter must be replaced by broader kind transaction system\, may be through banks\, to boost the process further. \nThe other discussant\, Prof K Warikoo\, compared the cross-LoC situation with the situation in the Central Asian Republics. He cautioned the Indian authorities that it was very essential for them to first safeguard the borders before opening it up for trade. He stated that China has settled huge population of Han families\, traders and officers in Kashgar area in order to fully sanitize the border before going for trade. The other border he quoted was the Tajik-Afghan border\, where Taliban had changed the proportion of tribes in furtherance of its interests as it was a very porous border. Coming to the Indian context\, he stated that till 2006\, only 17\,000 people crossed LoC\, while over 10 million people go to Vaishno Devi and over 20 lakh to Amarnath shrine every year. While the Kashmiris are quite vocal about the need for cross-LoC linkage\, they have not utilized this bus service to the extent they were expected to. He stated that it is only the Pahari speaking people from Poonch who have utilized the bus service as they have been the worst sufferers of the partition. He recalled his experience where people of Poonch showed their lands adjoining the border\, on the other side\, while they were confined to our side of the border. Their issues have never been addressed\, not even in the Shimla Agreement. He also urged the international community to change its perception of looking at Kashmir as an underbelly of Central Asia and give it its due importance. \nInternal Discussants\nDr. Smrutti Pattanaik stated that many people in the valley do not want to take the LoC route as the passport/identification verification process itself takes about 6 months to complete. She also stated that despite lot of clamour about the Kargil-Skardu route\, the reservations are more with India than Pakistan\, as majority of people in Kargil are Shia\, whose pain and agony are often overlooked by the Sunni majority dominating the politics in Kashmir. She asked the author to put the present topic in a larger context and clarify whether she is looking at the cross-LoC trade only from the Kashmiri perspective or larger Indo-Pak perspective. She also asked the author to mention whether cross-LoC trade is crucial enough to feature in India’s larger foreign policy domain. The Chairperson\, Kapil Kak noted that we all must have a grand vision for trade and commerce between Central Asia\, Afghanistan\, Pakistan\, India and China. \nCol Vivek Chaddha asked the author to be clear about the questions raised in the paper\, as to whether she was looking at the subject from Indian or Pakistani perspective\, as the security concerns of the two countries were very different. He also urged the author to visit the place and interact with people to take their views into consideration which would be of great importance for this paper. He also asked the author to clarify few topics in the paper which might not be understood by a layman\, like the term “Trade Facilitation Centres”. He also asked the author to include the suggestion of J&K CM Omar Abdullah’s in the paper\, that simple telephonic conversations should be started along with trade and commerce. \nProf Riyaz Punjabi noted additionally that whatever is produced in Kashmir has a huge market within the country\, so we do not need to explore foreign markets for the products of Kashmir. He further stated that it is a cause of concern that very few people from across the LoC visit the shrines in J&K\, particularly Hazratbal\, and Indian government must look into this issue. \nReport prepared by Abhimanyu Singh\, Research Intern\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/prospects-of-cross-line-of-control-loc-travel-and-trade
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T165827
CREATED:20231224T102428Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:64055-1391146200-1391146200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Importance of Nuclear Security: An Asian Perspectives
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor R RajaramanExternal Discussants: Shri Amandeep Singh Gill and Dr Sitakanta MishraInternal Discussants: Dr Ashok K Behuria and Shri Kapil Patil
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-importance-of-nuclear-security-an-asian-perspectives
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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