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TZOFFSETFROM:+0530
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DTSTART:20110101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120706T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120706T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T184814
CREATED:20231224T103514Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:64086-1341552600-1341552600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Defense Planning in India: Role of Civil-Military Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Vice Admiral (retd) PS DasDiscussants: Shri Amit Cowshish\, Air Marshal M. Matheswaran and Lt Gen (retd) JP Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/defense-planning-in-india-role-of-civil-military-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120720T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120720T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T184814
CREATED:20231223T134306Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63163-1342762200-1342762200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Estimating Self-Reliance in India's Defence Production
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Vinod MisraDiscussants : Dr Selvamurthy and Shri Amit Cowshish \nThis paper attempts to estimate the self-reliance index of India’s defence production. While estimating the index\, it also focuses on three important issues; the approach towards self-reliance (as understood in the Indian context)\, data problems in estimating the index and the methodology used to arrive at the index. The paper suggests that a separate budgetary classification be made in the Defence Services Estimates to facilitate computation of self-reliance in a more objective manner. This necessitates suitable changes in the classification handbook for defence that mandates the concerned officials of the Indian Defence Accounts Department to book a particular expenditure.  \nMr. Behera argued that the concept “self-sufficiency” differs from “self-reliance”\, though these have alternatively been used in the Indian context. Self-sufficiency means producing everything in-house that the armed forces need\, whereas self-reliance refers to “equipping the armed forces with a whole range of equipments that may come from foreign and domestic sources”. However\, he argues that ‘self-sufficiency’ is not an ideal path for a country like India since India’s industrial and Research and Development (R&D) base is not yet sufficiently developed. \nMr Behera describes three phases of India’s defence industrialisation process from the perspective of the aim of self-reliance; from independence to mid-1960s\, from mid-1960s to mid-1980s\, and from late 1980s till present. In the first phase\, self-sufficiency was an overall economic principle behind its industrial development as the leadership at that time felt that the state-led intervention was the best way to overcome the de-industrialisation of economy that was caused by two centuries of the British rule. However\, despite some successes\, this model had faced considerable weaknesses because of the low level of defence allocation and defence R&D\, in addition to the lack of a civil industrial base which had a major impact during this phase.  \nIn the second phase\, according to the author\, the events of 1960s\, particularly the 1962 border war with China and the 1965 Indo-Pak war\, brought a major change in India’s defence policy\, and the term self-reliance replaced self-sufficiency in defence production. Not only India’s defence budget as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased in the subsequent years but also the approach towards arms procurement policy and indigenous defence production. Moreover\, unlike in the first stage of industrialisation\, in the second stage of India’s defence industrialisation\, more attention was paid to license-production rather then indigenous production\, based on its own design and developmental efforts. However\, this led to dependency on the license-based defence production\, particularly on the Soviet Union. India’s aeronautics industry is such a case whose dependency continues till now. And\, in the third phase\, with increasingly aware of the pitfalls of the overdependence on Soviet Union\, India began to change its approach to defence industrialisation\, from license-based production to production based on indigenous design. In this regard\, India and Russia signed in 1998 an intergovernmental agreement to jointly produce a supersonic cruise missile\, BrahMos and in 2007 two more intergovernmental agreements were signed for co-development and co-production of a Multi Role Transport Aircraft and a Firth Generation Fighter Aircraft. Thus\, there has been emphasis on self-reliance and co-production with higher importance on promoting the participation of Indian private sector defence production.  \nA 10-year self-reliance plan formulated in 1992\, under the then Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister\, Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam\, defined the self-reliance in the form of an index\, reflecting the percentage share of indigenous content in total procurement expenditure. Mr Behera held that this definition serves as the only methodology for estimating the self-reliance index\, primarily because of the difficulty of putting together a log of information about what is critical and what is not\, and updating it regularly with technological development. However\, this estimation is not straightforward\, primarily because of lack of consistent data in the public domain.  \nMr Behera pointed out that India’s heavy dependence on arms import for defence preparedness defies the very objective of self-reliance that it has set for itself. The 1992 Abdul Kalam committee indicated that the share of indigenous contribution to total procurement expenditure would progressively increase from 1992-93 estimation of 30 per cent to 70 per cent by 2005. Although India has developed a vast defence industrial base over the years\, the objective of achieving 70 per cent self-reliance has not been achieved till now. He concluded by stating that the self-reliance index has barely improved from 1992-93 estimation of 30 per cent to 36.4 per cent in 2011-12 which indicates the failure of India’s defence industrialisation process and demands serious retrospection.  \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions: \n\nAt present\, India’s total defence R&D budget accounts for about six per cent of defence budget which in itself is less than two per cent of GDP. Compared to this\, other countries\, particularly the US and China spend a higher percentage of their defence budget on R&D. \nIt would be significant to look into and assess where India now stands at the global scenario on self-reliance in defence production. As the Indian economy is growing\, it is looking for the indigenisation of defence production. This is important not only to meet its own defence requirements for safeguarding its vital national security interests but also to play a larger role beyond its immediate neighbourhood. \nAlthough today India has reached 100 percent self-reliance in terms of deterrence\, it needs to minimize the dependency on foreign countries for its defence needs by further enhancing and indigenisation of its defence production sectors. \nIndia has already developed a good platform for co-production and development of defence equipment with Russia\, now it should look for such joint production with other countries. \nIndia’s private defence sector is very weak\, and it cannot take big projects. However\, it can contribute in the defence production sector by joining with public sectors. For this\, capacity building of the private sector is very important if it is to undertake future defence projects. \nThe author pointed out that Kalam Committee Report has weaknesses which needed to be addressed. In this regard it was suggested that the methodology adopted by Kalam Committee and others such as Dr. Balachandran’s can be analysed in order to find out their strengths and weaknesses\, and then the author can refine and adopt his own methodology for this study. \nThe conclusion part of the paper also needs to be moderated. As the kind of data required for estimating self-reliance index is not available in public domain\, the author needs to state it as a limitation in the paper’s conclusion. The author also needs to mention what kind of data is required to estimate the self-reliance in India’s defence production. \n\nRemarks by the Chairperson \nOutlining the present status of self-reliance in India’s defence production\, Mr Vinod Kumar Misra said that the extent of India’s arms imports hamper indigenisation of its Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). Imports of defence raw-materials and technologies have also been a problem. In addition\, it needs to sustain those imported technologies for a long time. However\, self-reliance in defence production is a log term process and it will gradually take place in India. In this context\, India’s new offset policy can be a significant game changer. However\, for its success\, it needs to identify the kind of defence technologies that it wants to manufacture and then should focus on creating capacity on those core items. Mr Misra pointed out that India’s defence production sector and R&D also suffer capability gap and the Joint Ventures with Russia and Israel for co-production and development of defence equipment can be one way of meeting this capability gap. There is also a strong case for increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the defence production sector but India has to find out the ways to give a push to it. So far as policy announcement is concerned\, Indian government has recently issued policy guidelines for engaging the private sector. Some progress has been made in this regard but still time will take in involving private enterprises in big projects.  \nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/estimating-self-reliance-in-indias-defence-production
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T184814
CREATED:20231223T134306Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63162-1343367000-1343367000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Counter-Insurgency Best Practices and their Applicability in the Northeast
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: General Satish Nambiar \nDiscussants: Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain\, Military Secretary\, Integrated Headquarters (Army)\, Ministry of Defence\nProf. Rajesh Rajagopalan\, School of International Studies\, Jawaharlal Nehru University. \nDr. Namrata Goswami’s paper defines insurgencies as violent struggle against the state for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. In order to win against any insurgency\, the first core insight for any counter-insurgency force is to gain the support of the population. Coupled with population support is the criticality of efficient intelligence though these are not the ultimate required measures. Dr. Goswami’s paper discusses counter-insurgency best practices and the means to operationalize these practices on the ground by identifying nine best practices. \nThe paper selects the best practices based on a literature survey on counter-insurgency theory\, doctrines and manuals of the Indian\, British and US military and also on the field experiences of the author in Northeast India to have a more focused study. The author affirms that insurgency is unique after having conducted work on the ground in the conflict affected states in Northeast India. But\, there are certain common features of counter-insurgency that are valid across time and space as indicated by the literatures on counter-insurgency which is used as the frame of reference by the author in the paper. Based on the works on counter-insurgency which have been utilized in this paper\, the author has identified nine best practices spanning across time and space for detailed study in this paper: Primacy of Political Goals; Centre of Gravity; Population; Counter-Propaganda; Resolute Leadership; Intelligence; Unity of Effort; Appropriate Force Structures; Rule of Law; and Operational Clarity. The paper offers to test the applicability of these counter-insurgency best practices to the Northeast of India. For the purpose of the paper\, counter-insurgency is defined as “those military\, paramilitary\, political\, economic\, psychological\, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency”. \n\nPrimacy of political goals: It involves planning\, preparation and execution of counter-insurgency within political framework. The role of the military in flushing out insurgents from certain areas is considered to be a supportive role. For instance\, British\, U.S. and Indian military forces have signified the importance of military. However\, citing the cases of Mizoram and Assam\, Dr. Goswami emphasises on the importance of political goals. In the paper\, she has pointed out how the Mizo National Front (MNF) became a platform to express against the heavy response of the Indian military. It was during the strong political leadership of Pu Laldenga of MNF that the Mizo conflict was resolved in 1987 through staunch negotiations.\nCentre of gravity-population: Insurgent groups aim to persuade the population by utilizing the strategy of coercion and intimidation to generate support for their political cause. While countering these insurgency groups\, the operation of the armed forces should be carried out in a civilian landscape\, not in military camps\, and the counter-insurgency forces need to know that such operations are people-centric operation. For this\, there are certain practical ways of gaining support of the population\, namely\, having day to day contacts with the population\, organising collective work\, identify local cells of the insurgent\, prevent too much movement\, and finally provide security to the population. Besides this\, there is also a need to gather information on three different types of population in any insurgency-affected areas\, namely\, minority support base for the insurgent; a passive neutral majority; and a minority which is against the insurgency. According to this paper\, insurgency groups such as United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)\, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)\, and MNF have all garnered support from the people. But\, over the period of time\, support for these groups has dwindled down. Insurgency will continue unless security is guaranteed to the population in this region. \nCounter-propaganda:  the insurgency groups intend to impose control over the population. These groups aim to win over the people by propagating their political cause\, often by promising them better political empowerment\, better economic status\, better security etc. Such propaganda appears an easy task to the insurgency groups as they do not have to deliver any of those promised goals in the near term. However\, countering such propaganda remains an arduous task for the counter-insurgency forces. For this\, the strategy for counter-propaganda should be focused on exposing the weakness and false promises made by the insurgents. This strategy can only be materialized by ‘by obtaining the neutrality of the population\, visible presence of counter-insurgent forces to provide security\, establishing the authority of the state by providing basic needs\, propaganda directed at insurgent rank and file\, followed by an effective surrender policy’.\nResolute leadership: In order to carry out a successful operation\, the involved leader must possess a clear conceptual understanding of the mission. For this\, he or she should have a thoughtful understanding of the nature of the problem. The leadership should exhibit ‘resoluteness\, act in an ethical manner and always keep the national priorities and goals in clear perspective’. His or her leadership qualities should also be shown at all levels\, and the leader should able to synchronise with various agencies with the aim of protecting the population and instilling in them a sense of security.\nIntelligence: This is one of the most important counter-insurgency measures. The absence of thorough and specific intelligence would only make the counter-insurgency operations ineffective. For this\, the commander needs to form a sound intelligence network with the involvement of intelligent staffs possessing a ‘clear understanding of the operational environment\, physical geography\, the external influence\, role of media and internet’. Means through which intelligence can be gathered are: lines of communication\, belief systems\, values\, identity\, culture\, social norms\, grievances\, insurgent strength and vulnerabilities\, safe havens\, insurgent intelligence network\, etc. Intelligence should be used to understand the root causes of the insurgency.\nUnity of effort: There needs to be an integrated approach in counter-insurgency. This involves ‘showcasing of administrative capacities\, economic resources\, propaganda\, military superiority and the like’. Operations in such cases should be guided by a single strategic narrative that is visible across all lines of operation. This practice involves the coordination of political\, social\, economic and the military aspects of the counter-insurgency. The author specifies the roles of politicians\, bureaucrats\, army\, police\, local leaders\, NGOs and media. A successful unity of effort can be achieved if there is a single command and coordination centre. Furthermore\, civil-military relations are also important in this context. \nAppropriate ‘military’ force structures: It is important that the force is used to its minimum. This is because operations should aim to neutralise insurgents and not eliminate them. Also\, minimum force should be used in order to reduce the fear that civilian population experiences due to the heavy presence of armed forces. The force structure should be able to respond to given context even though it is a small operation team.\nRule of law: The counter-insurgent forces need to act according to certain accepted rule of law. Any operation in a given region should be within the framework of a legal mandate and conduct must meet the highest legal standards. With such rules\, the involved forces can avoid any disproportionate use of force. This will not breed alienation amongst the civilians. Forces have to be briefed about the rules of engagement with regard to arrests\, searches\, warrants\, interrogation techniques\, intelligence gathering by issuing a Standard Operating Procedure. Acts such as Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 amended in 1972 are perceived by the common people as neutralising their fundamental rights granted by the Indian Constitution. It is difficult to control population under distress and the state must offer its people ‘a good deal working within the rule of law’ in order to isolate the insurgents. \nOperational clarity: It is important to have clarity of purpose in any counter-insurgency operation. There has to be a unified command structure with only a single direction. The political aims should also be crystal clear. Further\, the armed forces should clearly map the conflict zones. Involved forces must be clear about their allocated tasks\, and short and long term targets. For all these\, the most significant clarity is that the forces should be very clear that these operations must be people friendly ones. Challenges with reference to clarity of operations arise due to prevalence of multiple levels of decision makers in the insurgency-affected states like in the North East.\n\nThe author reemphasises in the conclusion that the aim of the insurgents is not to kill but spread parallel government to establish their own legitimacy. Hence\, the aim of the counter-insurgency forces should be to root out these parallel structures of government.   \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThere are dissimilarities among insurgencies but many general practices can be applied anywhere. There has to be no uniform approach to stages of insurgency rather different approaches to conflict.\nThe success story of Sri Lanka where controlled empowerment of the security forces was utilized has to be referred.\nProper identification of current stakeholders in engagement of counter-insurgency has to be taken into consideration.\nThere has been a role of media and civil society but a larger involvement is required to have major impact on civilian population.\nThe aspect of winning hearts and minds with more emphasis on the physical\, psychological\, social and economical factors has to be utilised for defeating insurgency. Attitude within the military has to change and it has to be reiterated that they are not just for kills. Home and heart battalion has to be engaged.\nCentre of Gravity as one of the best practices consist of both strengths and weaknesses be it physical\, psychological\, philosophical and ideological.\nIt is difficult to define the best practice of resolute leadership where military leadership has been tenure based.\nThere is a need to incorporate more technical intelligence and information operation in counter-insurgency measures.\nThere has to be more operational clarity in the practices and continuity has to be maintained.\nIf the mentioned features are best practices or best principles has to be reflected on again.\nConcession is the key to strategy and the hardcore best practice has to be to wean away support and the ultimate solution has to come from political front.\nSealing of borders will be difficult to achieve instead the borders need to be secured.\n\nReport prepared by Srishti Pukhrem\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/counter-insurgency-best-practices-and-their-applicability-in-the-northeast
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T184814
CREATED:20231224T103115Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:64085-1343367000-1343367000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Challenges Expected for IAF till 2030
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/challenges-expected-for-iaf-till-2030
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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