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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120608T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120608T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T185855
CREATED:20231223T134352Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63167-1339133400-1339133400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Does India need a grand strategy?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador Satish ChandraDiscussants: Maj General B K Sharma and Dr Happymon Jacob \n \n\nInterrogating the concept of grand strategy and whether India needs a centrally articulated design for the conduct of its statecraft constitutes the core thinking put forward by the paper. In contrast to other major states in the world\, the Government of India has so far shied away from publicly articulating a grand strategy\, thereby attracting comments that this is an anomaly that needs to be remedied. Proponents of grand strategy argue that the absence of a publicly articulated and coherent grand strategy gives rise to various concerns: armed forces acquire technologies without a strategy; government departments pursue their specific interests without reference to overarching national goals; and\, diplomats have a hard time explaining India’s behaviour to foreign interlocutors.   \nThe author identifies several benefits which flow out of formulation of a grand strategy: \n\nFirst\, it will help departments to develop short and medium term plans in accordance with the overall national intent. \nSecond\, it will help policy makers view their policy initiatives holistically and highlight crosscutting issues. \nThird\, it can provide a basis for prioritising resource allocations. \nFourth\, it will improve coordination among agencies\, increase synergies and provide direction to individual and collective actions.\n\nFifth\, it can enhance communication and cooperation with other states. \nSixth\, it will encourage policy makers to think systematically about the long term consequences of their actions. \nSeventh\, it will be useful to test the robustness of current organisational structures\, processes and resources. \nEighth\, it will help citizens to evaluate whether particular actions of the state are aligned with the nation’s core values and interests. \nNinth\, it will be useful to promote structured and focused research on core issues and areas that are identified as national priorities.\nTenth\, it would be useful for educating the strategic leadership.\n\nBesides these functional uses\, proponents also emphasise that grand strategy is a key great power status symbol\, thus making a strong case in public imagination for a centrally articulated design. While the author acknowledges the benefits and obvious usefulness which seem to be associated with a grand strategy\, he argues that there are several barriers to formulation of such a strategy.  \nThe first barrier to the making of a grand strategy is the absence of conceptual clarity. The term has come to mean different things to different thinkers depending on their vision of the world\, their conceptions about the nature of power\, their institutional affiliations\, and the interests they seek to pursue. Moreover\, in the absence of a universally accepted definition and shared meaning\, the term ‘grand strategy’ has come to exist as an ambiguous concept and as differing images\, ranging from a fully developed plan of action to subtler aspects such as individual visions and world views. The author lists out seven such images: \n\nAs a Plan: grand strategy is viewed as a plan of action articulated by the nation’s top leadership who gathers an expert group to conduct wide ranging consultations with important stake holders both within and outside the government and bring out a draft grand strategy for top leadership sanction.\nAs a Vision: grand strategy as a vision\, a representation of strategy created in the mind of the leader. Grand Strategy as a guiding idea offers flexibility to bureaucratic agents to adapt their actions according to needs of the circumstances\, however\, this image of grand strategy captures only a part of the strategy process and needs to be supplemented by institutional competence.\nAs Politics: Unlike the prescriptive nature of the previous images\, according to this image\, a grand strategy emerges out of bargaining and compromise among various stake holders within the state. This image of grand strategy runs the risk of being distorted to suit interests of particular coalitions and interest groups. Furthermore\, enduring differences among key stake holders in terms of values\, beliefs\, and interests might severely impact the success of a neatly formulated strategy by expert planners.\nAs a Paradigm: Grand strategy imagined as a paradigm is a simplified version of reality\, a general perspective of the world view widely shared among the elite. This image of grand strategy lays out the map and provides a certain conception about the nature of the world\, but fails to meaningfully capture the complexity of current realities. Realism and liberalism are two such paradigms which provide a short hand guide for interpreting specific events and developments but cannot be substituted for strategy making.\nAs Thought: According to this image\, strategic competence of a state is judged not by its material achievements but by the quality of its thought\, presented and preserved in the written form. In overemphasizing the ideational dimension of strategy\, the role of verbally articulated ideas\, and the utility of force in the international system\, this image of strategy underplays the tacit dimension of strategic cultures.\nAs Harmonisation of Ends and Means: Grand strategy in this image is all about ensuring that ends do not over step available means\, and resources are not wasted\, with the former leading to failure of strategy and the latter involving opportunity costs.  However\, matching ends and means is not a neutral process and involves more optimal employment of national resources placing a premium on ethical and political judgment. \nAs a Pattern: According to this image\, grand strategy is a pattern of the past.  The process of looking back to look ahead is seen as useful in explaining past behaviour and providing clues to future strategies.\n\nThe second barrier to the making of a grand strategy is the associated costs and risks of its benefits. Firstly\, articulation of a clear set of goals to set the nation on the right course in a turbulent internal and external environment is a self contradictory objective as it is difficult to predetermine opportunities and risks in a turbulent strategic environment. Secondly\, though grand strategy is useful in promoting coordination among agencies within the government\, tight regulation of behaviour may diminish the capacity for peripheral vision. Thirdly\, in attempting to reduce ambiguity by formulating a grand strategy\, the scope for strategic action\, which thrives in the domain of inconsistency\, could be curtailed. Fourth\, efforts to define a state and underline its uniqueness through its grand strategy might generate narrow stereotyping and runs the risk of obscuring complexity. Lastly\, a publicly articulated grand strategy may lead to further fragmentations in a politically fraught public space. \nExistence of divergent views on what constitutes India’s core interests and how best to promote them is identified as the third barrier to the formulation of a grand strategy. The paper observes that in the absence of a clear consensus on critical issues of national significance (such as settlement of border disputes\, response to terrorism\, strategy on Pakistan\, China\, etc.) among political parties\, government institutions\, and civil society groups\, a grand strategy that articulates a particular approach on any of these issues will be politically contested. Finally\, lack of resourceful and competent institutional arrangements which foster wide ranging dialogues and promote synthesis of different points of view is cited by the paper as another barrier to the making of a grand strategy. In addition to this point\, the author stressed on the necessity to undertake interdisciplinary forward looking studies and dialogues to open up critical dimensions that will bear upon long term prospects of the country. In conclusion\, the author remarked that he has attempted to problematise the concept of grand strategy in the paper and comments on the skewed and unbalanced nature of the contemporary discourse on grand strategy. \nKey Discussion Points:\n\nThe bottom-line of the images is that the leadership and the entire political elite should take ownership of the grand strategy if it is to be sustained for a long time.\nGrand strategy should be goal-oriented. At the nub of it is the question: “What’s your goal for the country?” \nNational leadership wants to operate in a state of ambiguity. Putting out a grand strategy document in the public domain would attract questions about accountability.\nThe National Security Council should be at the driving seat of any such initiative. An objective and scenario building approach should be employed.\nSuggestions for the paper included: contextualizing the discussion to focus on India; engaging with existing debates (Luttwak\, Busan\, Liddell Hart\, etc.); including illustrations to describe various typologies of grand strategy; bringing out the role of culture\, history\, and the linkage between ideology and vision in the formulation of grand strategy; indicating revisions and new pathways to the makers of grand strategy; including a working definition of grand strategy; and\, some exploration of whether elite and social consensus lead to grand strategy or vice versa?\n\nReport prepared by Bhavna Tripathy\, Project Assistant (IDSA-DRDO ST2050 Project) at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/does-india-need-a-grand-strategy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120622T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120622T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T185855
CREATED:20231223T134307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63166-1340343000-1340343000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: S KalyanramanDiscussants: Manoj Shrivastava and VS Raghuvanshi \nMahendra Prasad began his presentation by focusing on his ongoing research project which attempts to unfurl various aspects of quality assurance (QA) in army procurements\, an area understudied so far. He mentioned that “Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements\,” was the first paper in a series of papers encompassing the Project Work entitled “Synergising QA for Speedy Defence Procurement and Ensuring Quality.” In the next paper\, effectiveness of the QA in Army procurements plan to be critically analysed using the failure data which would be collected from the defects reported on newly acquired equipment during their warranty period. In the third paper\, case studies of few selected procurement cases would be carried out. The final paper will explore the best QA practices and how these can be applied in our context to evolve a better QA system. \nIntroducing the paper\, the author said that defence procurements are done primarily under two heads – capital and revenue. The former is guided by DPP\, and include: fifteen years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP)\, five years Services Acquisition Plan (SCAP)\, and Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP)\, which is a subset of SCAP and is a two year Roll On plan. The latter is guided by DPM and includes mainly replacement equipment and assemblies\, spares\, components for maintenance and operation of already sanctioned assets. QA checks of all the hardware procured by Army are carried out by DGQA. Further\, he elaborated upon the various stages of the evolution of DGQA. In its course of evolution\, in 1968\, Directorate of R&D (General) was bifurcated into Directorate of Inspection (General Stores) and Directorate of R&D (General Stores). Directorate General of Inspection was re-designated as Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) on 04 Jul 1987. At present\, DGQA Organisation is under the overall control of Department of Defence Production and Supplies in the Ministry of Defence. Further\, Lt Col Prasad delved on the functions of DGQA which provides QA cover to the entire range of Arms\, Ammunitions\, Equipments and Stores on procurement. He then talked about functions which are specific to procurement\, like\, vetting of response of vendors to Request for Information (RFI)\, assist in formulation of General staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs)\, assist in preparation of Requests For Proposals (RFPs) etc. \nSubsequently\, Prasad talked about Procedure of Acceptance of Capital and Revenue Procurements which is similar if not the same for both capital and revenue procurements. The first and foremost step here is that after placement of supply order an Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) incorporating all the tests and certification for acceptance of the product ordered is prepared. In his analysis Prasad observed that the conditions laid down for acceptance are extremely stringent and capital intensive for vendors participating in the bidding process. The stakes are very high as finally only one vendor is likely to get the contract. Expenditure incurred by all other vendors not winning the bid therefore becomes wasteful expenditure and discourages them from fielding their equipment. It has been observed that many vendors withdraw at this stage. Moreover\, lack of multi-skilled engineering staff with DGQA is invariably evident from the fact that the number of DGQA staff attending a meeting (especially pre-bid meetings with vendors and technical evaluation committee meetings) exceeds those from other departments/ branches/ directorates. On the draft ATP he said that it is prepared by the vendor on whom the supply order is placed. Since a vendor has a vested interest\, it may not mention some very important tests for which he does not have the facility and/or certifications\,. To improve QA in Army procurements\, Mahendra Prasad made following important recommendations:\n \n\nIn order to cut costs and time required for technical and environmental evaluation it was recommended that only those tests should be undertaken by DGQA\, which are not possible to be carried out anywhere else at various laboratories accredited by National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL) in the country.\nReputed vendors may be permitted self-certification on case to case basis taking into account their past performance.\nTo address the interaction problems of user and WE directorate with DGQA\, it is felt that a single window system for interaction with DGQA will go a long way to obviate this long-standing sore point.\nFor creation of a pool of staff possessing multiple skills\, bifurcation of staff into broad streams as mechanical\, electronics and computer science and inter directorate postings may help. \nRegarding ATP it is felt that a well-researched and stringent ATP can minimise occurrence of a number of defects due to material and manufacturing inadequacies\, after the equipment is put into service. \nThe selection process of the officer cadre needs a complete revamp. \n\nLt Col Prasad concluded by saying that for the success of any military mission\, right equipment\, at the right time\, in the hands of soldiers is as important a factor as the training and physical fitness of soldier himself. Thus\, factors causing delay in procurement of Army hardware need to be identified\, analysed and eliminated. Two most important features that equipment in the hands of soldiers must possess are high reliability and military ruggedisation. \nDiscussion Points \n\nSince the DGQA is overburdened\, the agency should divest itself of the task of promoting small scale industries.\nMany discussants shared Prasad’s point that the expenditure incurred by all other vendors not winning the bid becomes wasteful expenditure and discourages them from fielding their equipment. It was suggested that those vendors whose bid were rejected must be compensated in a suitable manner. For this suitable provisions in DPP need to be included.\nIt was argued that authorising regulatories of foreign governments to certify their countries’ product is a tricky proposition\, since in these days of cut-throat competition\, many countries would not mind promoting their own companies\, even if it compromises the quality. Moreover\, the advanced countries may give the certification with the belief that India does not have the requisite testing facilities to check the veracity of the foreign certification.\nIt was pointed out that Customer Service Directorate for single window interaction is in the anvil. It will reduce the time lag considerably.  \nSince many agencies are involved in the process of procurement\, an empowered central authority is desirable. Increasing the autonomy of the DGQA would be a welcome step.\nIt was suggested that the DPP should be elaborately dealt with in the paper to see how different agencies’ roles have been incorporated in it.  \nSignificantly\, one discussant argued that quality assurance done by DGQA merely involves checking specifications and parameters given in GSQR. It would be better to grade the product in some order of quality level to enable selection of best product within budgetary allocation.\nIt was argued by one participant that QA is an unending process and specific to particular environment. What is quality for US may not find acceptance in the Indian conditions. \nMany participants agreed with the author’s observation that the two most important benchmarks of QA are high reliability and military ruggedisation. Soviet equipments were very good on these criteria and were widely regarded as soldier-friendly.\nConsumer-interface\, which is very strong in many countries\, lacks attention in India. It remains to be seen whether the DGQA is evolving towards TQM (total quality management) or not\, since in TQM consumer is the focal point. \nAssurance level is a standard statistical tool across the world for quality analysis\, but DGQA does not have its assurance level defined. \nRegarding the lack of qualified technical officers to oversee the process of procurement\, it was pointed out that mere recruitment of technically qualified persons for QA job will not yield much\, unless periodic training aiming at updating their technical knowledge is ensured\, since technology is fast changing. Moreover\, while selecting officers for the QA job more emphasis should be on aptitude than knowledge; the later can be imparted at the time of training. High integrity and passion for the job should be the benchmark for selection of officers. \nIt was argued that Ordnance Factory’s services can be better utilized in production of defence materials\, since they have very good infrastructure facilities at their disposal.\nIt was pointed out that a product failed to meet specifications at the trial stage is accepted later subject to “rectification” without any further trial. \n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nDr. S. Kalyanaraman complimented Lt Col Prasad for a very comprehensive and detailed presentation on a topical issue concerning the Indian Army. He suggested a slight tinkering with the title to bring it in sync with the content of the paper and his research design. \n(Report prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/quality-assurance-qa-in-army-procurements
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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