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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000
DTSTAMP:20261106T015604
CREATED:20231223T134553Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:63183-1325827800-1325827800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's Naval Shipbuilding Industry: Key Gaps and Policy Options
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri V K MisraDiscussants: Commodore (Dr) R K Rana and Commodore (Retd) Sujeet Samaddar \nDeliberations on Mr. Laxman Behera’s paper commenced with Chairperson V K Mishra’s opening remarks. Highlighting the performance of Indian naval shipbuilding industry in the past several years\, he argued that shipbuilding industry has to acquire more strength. This is important given the kind of order book existing at the moment; as of now there is a yearning gap between the requirements and capabilities acquired by India’s shipbuilding industry. He further argued that time had come for India to go beyond the Indian Ocean; it has to acquire more naval capabilities to emerge as a superpower. \nLaxman Behera started his presentation with the point that ever since the first major shipbuilding programme- the Leander Class frigate INS Nilgiri was launched at Mazgaon Dock Ltd in late 1960s\, this industry has grown significantly\, contributing much of the warship requirements of the Indian navy. For Indian naval shipbuilding industry\, self- sufficiency has been a goal for a long-time. However\, for a number of years\, it has been a matter of compulsion rather than choice. Nevertheless\, over the years the Indigenous ship building industry has emerged as the ‘builder’s navy’. \nMr. Behera opined that notwithstanding the establishment of defence shipyards and key procedural framework\, the naval shipbuilding industry has not been able to meet the growing requirement of the naval forces\, resulting in a huge gap in force level. Listing out the details of naval shipbuilding industrial units\, Mr Behera mentioned that India’s overall shipbuilding industry comprises of twenty-seven shipyards\, of which six are under Central Public Sector\, two under State Government and nineteen in the Private Sector domain. However\, not all of these shipyards are involved in naval shipbuilding. Of the six shipyards under the Central Public Sector\, four are under the administration control of Ministry of Defence (MoD) and known as Defence Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shipyards. Although these four shipyards are primarily responsible for constructive naval ships\, some others\, both in the public and private sector are also involved in the naval shipbuilding.  \nMr. Behera further pointed out that public and private sector shipyards enjoy a unique set of advantages and disadvantages. For the MoD owned shipyards\, their biggest advantage lies in long exposure to shipbuilding\, enabling them to acquire certain construction skills\, design capability and technology. These aspects are crucial for naval shipbuilding\, which unlike the commercial shipbuilding is a difficult task given the complex nature of marrying a vast amount of weapons and sensors into warships\, which are increasingly required to be stealthier and more durable. \nBecause of their lack of experience in building major warships\, the private sector is way behind in these aspects and needs exposure along with technological and design assistance in order to be at par with their public sector counterparts. The biggest disadvantage the public sector shipyards face is the decision-making constraints. The operational and financial autonomy of the PSU shipyards is limited.  It depends on the government for approval of key decisions\, which are often taken at a slower pace. Compared to this\, the private sector has complete autonomy in decision making which facilitates them to meet necessary infrastructural needs at a faster pace. The stark contrast in autonomy of decision-making is evident from the efforts by both private and public sector shipyards in forming strategic partnership. While the former has been able to tie up with major global companies\, the public sector is yet to take off. Examples in this regard are Pipavav and GRSE. \nKey gaps in Indian naval shipbuilding industry\, according to Mr. Behera\, are as under:  \n\nInefficiency and constraints of the Public Sector Shipyards.\nLack of level- playing field to private shipyards.\nLack of design capability of shipyards.\nLack of a strong commercial shipbuilding industry.\nAbsence of a strong ancillary industry.\nLack of synergy between public and private yards.\n\nMr. Behera suggested a number of measures to tackle the prevailing problems. These include; \n\nIncreasing competitiveness- bring in competition within the PSU shipyards by promoting them to compete with the private sector for all kinds of warship projects.\nEmpowering shipyards to take their own decisions\, including design etc\, and allowing them to function in a competitive environment.\nBringing in a transparent policy to facilitate partnership between public and the private sector.\n\nPoints of Discussion: \n\nOther countries of the world including the US\, UK\, Italy etc also have faced similar problems. So\, it would do well for India to learn from those countries.\nPoor R&D is the biggest challenge facing the Indian shipbuilding industry. India has to take the R&D head-on\, in order to overcome the problems faced by the industry. \nSynergy amongst private sector participants is as important as between private and the public sector.\nAbsence of a comprehensive policy or understanding on defence exports is hurting India’s defence industry. \nIt is beyond debate that without the entry of private sector at all levels\, Indian naval shipbuilding industry will not thrive. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-naval-shipbuilding-industry-key-gaps-and-policy-options
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000
DTSTAMP:20261106T015604
CREATED:20231223T134554Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63184-1325827800-1325827800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India-Saudi Arabia Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador (Retd) Ishrat AzizExternal Discussants: Professor Gulshan Dietl\, Professor Qamar AghaInternal Discussants: Dr Shebonti Ray Dadwal\, Dr Meena Singh Roy \nDr Pradhan’s paper addresses India’s relations with Saudi Arabia\, arguing that India must look beyond oil and trade in order to engage Saudi Arabia in a strategic partnership. This study also explores Indian interests in cultivating strategic ties with Saudi Arabia and explores the obstacles to building a partnership of this nature. In the past\, India’s relations with Saudi Arabia have been impacted by the Cold War\, regional political dynamics and divergent interests of both countries. India’s relations with Israel\, the Kashmir issue and Indian support for Arab nationalist regimes in Egypt\, Iraq and Syria are other aspects that have created misunderstandings between the two countries. The author sees a shift in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy following the September 11\, 2011 attacks as since then\, it has been marked by an attempt to look beyond its traditional allies and to build closer relations with other countries\, especially with major Asian powers such as India. \nAn important characteristic of the India-Saudi Arabia relationship is the dominance of trade and business. Saudi Arabia ranks as India’s fourth largest trading partner with a bilateral trade amounting to US$ 25.6 billion in 2010-11\, dominated by crude oil imports. Joint ventures and investments form an important part of commercial relations. The Indian labour force in the Kingdom and Saudi Arabia’s petroleum reserves have constituted the most important part of the bilateral relationship.  \nOfficial visits by leaders of both countries have built on the existing partnership. The Delhi Declaration signed in 2006 aimed to strengthen ties in areas of energy\, trade\, science and technology\, education\, health\, and political cooperation on regional and international issues. The 2010 Riyadh Declaration furthered on this agreement and focuses on enhancing cooperation on counterterrorism\, money laundering\, narcotics\, arms and human trafficking\, and defence and economic cooperation. \nIn forging strategic ties with Saudi Arabia\, the author points out several advantages: \n\nSaudi Arabia’s growing regional profile: Saudi Arabia has been an important regional player in the Gulf and West Asia region owing to its huge petroleum reserves\, the presence of the two holy mosques\, and its growing military power among other factors. It has substantial influence on the regional politics\, especially on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process\, and has cultivated ties with major powers such as the US\, Russia\, China and the EU. Saudi Arabia has also emerged as an influential player in the ongoing Arab Spring. This increasing profile of the country is a call for India to engage further with Saudi Arabia in areas beyond bilateral trade an energy supply.\nSaudi Arabia as a gateway to the Arab and Islamic world: Saudi Arabia enjoys considerable clout in the Arab and Islamic worlds owing to the presence of the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. It also enjoys influence in organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)\, the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The author notes that strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia will provide a unique platform for India to promote its interest and to enable greater access to other countries in the region.\nDefence cooperation: Although India and Saudi Arabia have not signed a defence cooperation agreement\, both countries have conducted joint military exercises and are exploring enhanced military cooperation that includes training to Saudi Arabian forces on tackling terrorism in the mountainous areas bordering Yemen. \nIndia’s stakes in the security of the Gulf region: India sees the Gulf region as falling within its security parameter and has shown readiness to contribute to the security and stability of the region through sharing its own experiences in the areas of counter-terrorism\, maritime security and military training.\nCooperation against terrorism: Although both countries have been victims of terrorism in the past\, Saudi Arabia has faced questions over its alleged funding of religious extremists and the spread of the Sunni Wahhabi brand of Islam. India has indicated its concern on this issue. Following the 9/11 attacks\, Saudi Arabia has taken steps to check the flow of money and disrupting terrorist networks. It has condemned extremism and has been preaching moderation including through religious leaders. Strengthening India’s relations with Saudi Arabia will allow new avenues for India to manage relations within its own neighbourhood and also contribute to the security of the Gulf region.\nFighting piracy: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding regions remains a threat to Sea Lines of Communication and thus to the security of the transshipment of goods. Deepening the Indian Navy’s cooperation with its Saudi counterpart will contribute significantly to the fight against piracy.\nEnergy security: India ranks as the fourth largest oil consuming country in the world after the US\, China and Japan. Securing long term energy supplies has been a dominant objective for India in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia is currently the largest supplier of crude oil to India. With particular reference to the ‘Strategic Petroleum Reserve’\, India needs to move beyond mere commodity trade and engage with Saudi Arabia through energy interdependence. \nSoft power diplomacy: The author notes that the approximately two million strong Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia have acted as a medium through which the Saudis have shaped their perception of India and its people. The Delhi Declaration of 2006 has aimed to promote exchange of faculty\, students and delegations\, and encourage direct scientific and educational communications between institutions. India has also recently pledged to assist Saudi Arabia in setting up an ICT Centre of Excellence\, as well as institutions of higher learning. India needs to build on portraying itself as a major education hub in Asia that can provide quality education. \n\nIn building his study\, the author looks at both sides of the coin. Saudi Arabia’s perceptions of India have undergone changes following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of India as a stable democracy. Its shift in focus to major Asian countries following 9/11 has aimed at broadening its engagement particularly with India\, China and Japan. The author notes that Saudi Arabia’s ‘Look East’ policy would give it the two distinct advantages of exploring new markets for oil and trade\, and diversifying its diplomatic engagement with the world. However\, Saudi Arabia does harbor certain concerns with respect to India’s engagements in the West Asian region\, particularly with reference to India’s defence cooperation with Iran\, and the supply of arms to India from Israel. These two concerns also pose challenges to furthering India’s interests in the region. \nThe Pakistan factor has also been an important element of the India-Saudi Arabia relationship. The author observes that India’s undue emphasis on the religious factor (that it attributed to close Saudi-Pakistani ties) made it view Saudi Arabia as a ‘lost cause’ for a long period of time. In spite of this\, India’s deepening engagements with Saudi Arabia over the recent past has resulted in building a stronger bilateral relationship. The author also points out that Pakistan’s influence over Saudi Arabia in hindering a stronger Indo-Saudi relationship will have more diminished impact than in the past.  \nThe study concludes by saying that it is imperative for both countries to move beyond ‘buyer-seller relations’. The recent high level visits and agreements are an indication of deepened trust building that will be essential for a long term strategic partnership. The author emphasises the need for both countries to engage with mutual cooperation in multiple fronts of engagement\, with India taking the lead in engaging with Saudi Arabia\, especially in this opportune time when India is looking west and Saudi Arabia is looking east. This will help translate the existing economic ties into a strong strategic partnership. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the author: \n\nThere is a need to explore the use of the term ‘strategic partnership’ to define India-Saudi Arabia relations as they currently exist. A number of panelists disagreed on the assumption that such a partnership already exists between the two countries. Also\, it was observed that this may not be the right time to deepen ties with countries in the region\, taking into account the unforeseen consequences of the ongoing Arab Spring. \nA discussant suggested deeper exploration of the benefits of a strengthened strategic partnership for both India and Saudi Arabia and the impacts of this on regional actors in India’s neighbourhood\, such as China and Pakistan; the balancing acts that both countries have to manage (for the Saudis\, between India and Pakistan\, and for the Indians\, between Saudi Arabia and Iran). \nIt was suggested that the study also explore the problems relating to succession in the Kingdom. King Abdullah has played a fine balancing act between the Islamists and the liberals in the country and it is uncertain if another future ruler will be able to do the same. \nIt was noted that India must strive to engage with countries in the region in such a manner that developments such as the Arab Spring do not impact the fundamental basis of its relations with those countries. People-to-people relations need to be consolidated so that bilateral relations are not overly influenced by regime changes. \nThe discussion also focused on Saudi Arabia’s strong military and religious ties with Pakistan\, and its varied and continuing engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. One of the panelists stressed the significance of self-interests in the forging of bilateral relations. In the context of India-Saudi Arabia relations\, both sides have much to gain from economic and defence cooperation. \nPanelists affirmed that despite recent shifts\, the bilateral relationship would remain dominated by economic factors\, with energy trade being the most important element of this. \n\nReport prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, West Asia and Africa Cluster\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-saudi-arabia-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTSTAMP:20261106T015604
CREATED:20231223T134507Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63181-1326432600-1326432600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Escalation and De-escalation of Violence in Insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri G K PillaiDiscussants: Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch and Shri Sanjoy Hazarika \n \nDr. Namrata Goswami’s paper defines insurgencies as irregular warfare which engages in non-frontal attacks against the adversary with small groups of fighters and which is marked by the absence of fixed battlefields. Insurgencies\, therefore\, involve a complex mix of political legitimisation\, support base\, emotional category\, symbolic gestures and historical narratives buttressed by the elements of time and space. Escalation of violence\, as defined in Dr. Goswami’s paper\, implies increases in the level of conflict over a period of time and de-escalation signifies decreases in the level of conflict over a period of time. \nThe paper\, however\, analyses the escalation and de-escalation process in insurgencies with regard to the National Socialist Council of Nagalim Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)\, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)\, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its political front\, the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) of Manipur. While the first two insurgency movements have witnessed stages of escalation and de-escalation of violence spreading across decades\, the PLA offers an intriguing example of an insurgent group that continues to remain hostile to peace negotiations. \nThe paper further offers an analysis of the factors leading to the escalation of violence taking into account the three cases mentioned above. Political motivation plays a vital role through which the insurgents garner support from the people for their violent activities. Hence\, political mobilisation is the first vital step in any armed movement in order to acquire critical mass and to create space for conflict escalation. In case of NSCN-IM\, political objective of Naga territorial unification and sovereignty based on the historical narrative of Naga independent status before the British occupation plays a vital role. The ULFA also utilises the politics of Assamese exploitation at the hands of New Delhi in order to vindicate its demand for a separate Assamese homeland. \nThe availability of arms is one of the important factors leading to the escalation of violence level in an insurgency. The easy availability of arms in Northeast India enables the NSCN-IM\, the ULFA and the PLA to sustain their armed movements. Of the United Nation’s estimated 640 million illegal arms in the world\, 40 million small arms are in India alone\, with Manipur accounting 32 percent of small arms. \nState response plays an important role in deciding the escalation or de-escalation of violence in an insurgency. For example\, the state of India responded with massive use of force in response to the insurgent groups in Northeast at their initial stage. As a consequence\, militant groups escalated their violence which resulted in non-combatant deaths. \nPopular support base is one of the important factors which help escalating the violence level of an insurgency. The local support for the insurgent groups of the Northeast of India mentioned above depends on their ability to reflect the grievances of the people in the affected areas like alienation and deprivation\, political marginalisation\, etc. Similarly\, the insurgent groups use violence as a tool to get support from their target population. For example\, ULFA is known for its violence tactics of killing non-Assamese Hindi-speaking people. \nLegitimacy of a particular insurgency movement escalates the violence level. Insurgents use various methods to enjoy legitimacy from a targeted population. These groups engage in violence in order to provoke the regular army to escalate its use of force\, thereby creating enormous hardship for the local population. Disproportionate counter-measures by the state forces only provide these groups an opportunity to act as the security provider for the people. \nExternal support also helps escalating the violence level in a conflict. In the case of Northeast of India\, it shares a 4500 Kilometer highly porous border with China\, Bhutan\, Myanmar and Bangladesh.  Both the NSCN-IM and ULFA have/had their training camps in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Moreover\, both the armed groups had strong connections with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) of Myanmar. There are lots of instances on how these groups used the bordering countries as their safe heavens. \nTime and space are important factors for the escalation of violence. Time enables irregular groups to wage a protracted war aiming to gradually reduce the political and psychological will of the stronger power. Taking advantage of the strategic dimension of time\, the NSCN-IM has established constituencies for the purposes of recruitment and resource generation. Similarly\, ULFA has taken advantage of time to generate resources for their fight\, recruit new cadres\, establish base areas\, create support networks amongst the local population and spread their ideas. \nThe geography and terrain of a particular place is critical for the continuation of insurgent movements. Without supportive terrain\, lightly armed\, highly mobile insurgents stand little chance to offset the technological superiority of the stronger power.  \nThe organisational structure of an insurgent group plays a very vital role in the escalation of conflict level. A cohesive organization with a strong leadership helps an insurgent group act better. For example the NSCN-IM has a highly centralized political structure known as Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN). Similarly\, both the PLA and the ULFA are highly centralized outfits with radical sense of loyalty. Intra-group conflicts or factionalism with on a group escalates the violence level. This happens because the rival factions adopt an escalated violence means in order to establish social and political dominance. The leadership differences between Muivah and Khaplang in 1988 and the escalated violence level can be a case in point. \nDe-escalation in violence\, according to Dr. Goswami\, is dependant upon the state response to insurgencies\, political motivation\, and absence of popular support\, lack of legitimacy and loss of external support. De-escalation can occur also when the insurgent group identifies an opportunity to resolve the conflict in a positive sum manner if it believes that the state is willing to concede to most of its demands. \nState response to the insurgency movements plays an important role in de-escalating the violence level. The state of India’s response to the insurgency movements can be located with in three conceptual parameters. The proportionate use of force has been the key determining factor of a responsive state in the post 1970s. The significance of proportionality of means and non-combatant immunity are absolutely critical for the Indian state’s response to the insurgencies in the Northeast. Because\, since ULFA\, NSCN-IM and PLA project a certain degree of society support\, the disproportionate use of force by the Indian state can be counter-productive. \nUse of dialogue and negotiation is one of the important responses of the state of India in bringing down the violence level in the Northeast. The ongoing peace talks between the Government of India and the ULFA and NSCN-IM can be a case in point. Similarly\, the grant of greater autonomy and the statehood to some of the areas where the insurgent groups are active can bring down the conflict level. \nLack of legitimacy of an insurgent group may bring down the conflict level. The NSCN-IM is under constant pressure from the civil societies to bring down the violence level. For example\, in 2007 the Naga Hoho (Apex Council) in a strongly worded statement demanded that all Naga factions abstain from violence and give peace a chance. Similarly\, in recent years ULFA’s claim of legitimate representation of Assamese aspiration for political sovereignty has also come under deep critical scrutiny since the outfit is seen as non-transparent and run by a handful of men and women.  \nLack of external support is a major factor in de-escalating the violence level of an insurgency movement. Nearly 30 under-ground ULFA camps were destroyed in Bhutan in 2003 which forced the ULFA to shift its base to Bangladesh. After the crackdown on the militant outfits in Bangladesh by Sheikh Hasina Government in 2009 many of the ULFA leaders were arrested and handed over to India.  \nDr. Goswami’s paper concludes that when the insurgent groups are fighting for the establishment of separate independent statehood\, violent responses by the state is counter-productive and leads to a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence. The paper finds three key variables with regard to escalation and de-escalation i.e. popular support\, loss of legitimacy and state response. \nMajor points of Discussion and Suggestions\n\nThere is a need to understand the background of all insurgency movements. There is also a need to study various insurgent groups in the northeast separately.\nThere has been abrogation of the constitutional norms by the political party in power in Assam. Hence\, ULFA is a created problem.\nThe deployment of Security Forces as a state response has to be changed. There is a need to find out the sources of funding for these groups since the local funding for them is not sufficient for them to sustain.\nThe time factor has always been with the Government. The time has come not to see the insurgency as simply a military problem. There is a need to take governance issues into consideration.\nThe role of political parties in escalating the violence level should have been discussed.\nThere has been a shift of Insurgents activities i.e. from legitimate demands to criminal activities.\nIt is difficult to decide as when is the perfect situation for conflict resolution.\nThere is a need to address the governance issues because more people have died in governance failure than because of insurgencies.\nInsurgencies in Northeast will be difficult to resolve since there are many stakeholders. It can only be controlled to a point.\nGiving statehood to Nagaland was an end of the bargaining power of state of India\n\nReport prepared by Dr. Anshuman Behera\, Research Assistant\, Internal Security Centre\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/escalation-and-de-escalation-of-violence-in-insurgencies-insights-from-northeast-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTSTAMP:20261106T015604
CREATED:20231223T134553Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63182-1326432600-1326432600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The CBMs in Sino-Indian Relations: Need for Revamping and Enlarging the Structural and Institutional Mechanisms
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Gautam H BambewalaDiscussants: Professor Sreeram Sunder Chaulia and Professor Alka Acharya \nThe fellow paper of Dr. R. N. Das focussed on how the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) play a critical role in India-China relations. According to him their importance is due to the persistence of ‘security dilemma’ in the India- China context. Factors that have led to security dilemma include among others baggage of the 1962 War\, differences in the system of governance\, competition in acquiring greater space at the international arena and the scramble for resources.  \nDr Das opined that India’s threat perception of China is not baseless and\, therefore\, the need for India to establish CBMs with China arises. After the 1962 India- China war\, the bilateral relationship was restored in 1976. The 1979 visit by the then minister of external affairs\, A. B. Vajpayee was a good gesture but it failed to bring warmth in the relationship. During his visit\, China attacked Vietnam\, India considered it undiplomatic and Vajpayee prematurely ended his visit to return to New Delhi in protest. \nThe turning point in the India- China relationship was former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit of 1988\, which led to the formation of important CBMs in India- China relations. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s landmark visit in 1993 gave a real boost to the CBMs\, which materialised\, according to Dr Das\, due to the visionary leadership of Rao. India and China signed the agreement on troop reduction along the border\, which was followed by arms reduction agreement in 1996. Avoidance of large-scale military exercise and air intrusions was also agreed upon\, among other things. Since 2003\, a number of bilateral visits have taken place; these include the 2003 Vajpayee visit\, 2005 Wen Jiabao visit\, and Pranab Mukherjee’s 2006 visit.  \nIn the context of military CBMs one of the biggest steps taken was to cnduct the ‘Hand in hand 2008’ India- China joint military exercise. The two sides have been taking numerous slow yet steady moves on that count.  \nSince 2006\, India- US relationship started strengthening and that\, according to Dr. Das\, led to rise in Chinese suspicions of India’s intentions to some extent. On the other hand\, India has been wary of Chinese intentions\, as China has been issuing stapled visa to Indian citizens hailing from Jammu & Kashmir\, and Arunanchal Pradesh on several occasions since 2006.  \nDr. Das made several recommendations for strengthening the India- China relations. Checking border transgression and bringing the relationship on an equal footing and on reciprocal basis are prominent among his recommendations. He also recommended that India take its diplomatic steps carefully to avoid any miscommunication with China.  \nThe Chairperson\, Gautam Bambawale\, concurred with Dr. Das that border transgression by Chinese troops and stapled visa are concerns for India. In order to improve relations with India\, China must understand and handle Indian sensitivities carefully.  \nPoints of Discussion:  \n\nSino- Indian boundary question cannot be seen as a purely boundary issue. It is far bigger and complicated. \nChina’s vision of a uni-polar Asia and its position on India’s candidature for UNSC are at cross-purposes with India. \nChina does not want to discuss the nuclear CBMs with India\, as that would automatically approve India’s nuclear power status\, which China doesn’t want. \nResponses from the Chinese side on India’s rise have not been very positive in the past. However\, one must keep in mind that China does have its own insecurities and China’s responses to India’s relations with the US and Japan indication these. \nChina’s cooperation with India on the UNSC issue will help strengthening the relationship. \nThus far\, CBMs have not been able to remove the persistent security dilemma in the India- China context. They have been effective only in managing the relationship. Nevertheless\, contribution of CBMs in maintaining India- China relations has been significant. \nIt is important to assess the effectiveness of CBMs in India- China context\, as that would help in planning further CBMs that could be put in place. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-cbms-in-sino-indian-relations-need-for-revamping-and-enlarging-the-structural-and-institutional-mechanisms
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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