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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110603T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110603T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T194709
CREATED:20231223T134754Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63198-1307079000-1307079000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Afghan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Lt Gen Ravi Sawhney (Retd) and Prof Kalim Bahadur \nDr Pattanaik’s paper critiqued India’s existing policy towards Afghanistan and offered some recommendations for Indian policy makers on how best to engage Afghanistan in the coming days\, especially in the event of the much-anticipated troop withdrawal by the United States from July this year. She dwelt on India’s objectives\, factors influencing its policy\, the challenges it is confronted with and the measures it must take to achieve its objectives. \nDr Pattanaik outlined India’s policy objectives in Afghanistan and held that India was wedded to the idea of rebuilding Afghanistan as a stable democracy. This would preclude the possibility of Afghanistan re-emerging as a hotbed of terrorism. So far India’s engagement with the conflict-ridden country had been primarily economic and development-oriented. This had earned India the goodwill of the people of Afghanistan. However\, Afghanistan is far from stable and India has to adopt the right strategy. She argued that India would need to keep investing in reconstruction work\, and find some way of working with the regionalpowers\, especially Iran\, to fulfill its strategic goals in Afghanistan.     \nShe emphasized India’s historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan and said that exceptfor the years when the Taliban ruled\, India had excellent relations with this country.  Afghan territory was used against India’s interests by Pakistan during the Taliban period and therefore a major objective of India has been to preclude the possibility of return of such fundamentalist forces in Afghanistan. This is in line with India’s policy of opposing radical Islamist forces\, even during the period of Soviet intervention. India’s objective has also been to prevent Afghanistan from becoming too dependent on Pakistan which would revive forces inimical to Indian interests in Afghanistan.  \nIndia’s policies during the post-Taliban period have been prompted by its awareness of geographical constraints and the limited role it could play in military and political spheres. Hence\, India has chosen to build infrastructure like roads\, hospitals and educational centres and engage itself in capacity-building like training the civil bureaucracy and security forces\, providing scholarship for Afghan students etc.  \nAll these have been undertaken keeping in mind India’s traditional ties with Afghanistan and it has been a prudent way of making India’s presence felt without ruffling any feathers. India has also extended its support to the reconciliation process post-London conference even if it has genuine apprehensions that such process is either likely to fail or legitimise the hold of radical elements on the Afghan State.  \nShe also held that a critical study of Indo-Pak relations was necessary to understand India’s position on Afghanistan. Pakistan suffers from Indophobia and regards the Indian presence as detrimental to its national interests. It suspects an Indian role in the Baloch insurgency and alleges that India is using Afghan territory against its interests\, despite Indian assurances to the contrary. To address the issue\, India has resumed dialogue with Pakistan and agreed to the TAPI gas line not just for energy security but also because it could contribute to a stable Afghanistan. But\, Pakistan has not been amenable to India’s offers of cooperative action and its primary objective has been to keep India away from Afghanistan.  \nDr Pattanaik argued forcefully that regional players were important in the changed circumstances and Iran was particularly important for its historical connection with Afghanistan. It shares its eastern border with Afghanistan and has links with the Hazara Shia population there. India and Afghnaistan share  concerns about the return of the Taliban to Kabul and spread of radicalism in the region.  \nTaking into consideration all the above\, the paper concludes that India’s role in Afghanistan has to be of minimal political engagement and expansion of the existing relationship. Hence\, the best deal for India is to maintain its presence through economic means and capacity building with relations going beyond state-to-state relations and promotion of goodwill amongst the population for a more stable region.  \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions:\n\nIndia’s engagement should be strategic and not apologetic as it has always been.\nToo much focus on Iran as a vital partner leaves out other regional actors like Russia and China.\nThere should have been a more robust focus on the upcoming Afghan national security forces for a better account of strategy in the longer run.\nSome mention of Russia’ growing engagement in Afghanistan through bilateral and multilateral means needs to be made as part of India’s overall strategy as many initiatives are afoot leaving India out of the picture. These are Russia’s growing engagement with NATO and the US in Afghanistan\, the Quadrilateral Tajik-Russia-Afghan-Pakistan format\, the SCO and CSTO contact/ working groups on Afghanistan\, the bilateral Russian-Afghan forum\, etc.. India enjoyes good relations with both the US and Russia and should leverage this relationship.\nChina as an important factor has been completely glossed.\nWithdrawal of western forces should have been dealt with more care and the nature of withdrawal\, whether it is going to be token or ceremonial in nature should have been discussed.\n\nAny kind of engagement with Taliban has to be evaluated critically\, as Taliban are not going to change their basic ideology and mere reconciliation will not do.\nDanger of increased Talibanisation of Pakistan and Afghanistan\, post-withdrawal has to be studied as a serious threat to India. \nAnalysis of non-Pashtun sentiments and views has to be incorporated in the paper.\nSuccess and failure of regional strategy and bilateralism does not come out well in the paper and has to be dealt with its nuances in details.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-afghan-policy-beyond-bilateralism
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T194709
CREATED:20231223T134707Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63196-1307683800-1307683800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Pakistan as a Factor in Sino –Indian Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb (retd) R. RajagopalanDiscussants: Prof. K. R. Sharma and Mr. M. V. Rappai \n \n\nThe core argument of Dr. Das’s paper was that the Sino-Pakistani strategic axis has gained salience in the context of the geo-politics of the cold war. It should be perceived as a marriage of convenience\, contrary to what both China and Pakistan claim. This relationship is based on the convergence of their mutual interests. China wants to balance India and Pakistan has always wanted to have a political shield. The Sino-Pak axis can be partially explained on the grounds of trust deficit and security dilemma between India and China. However\, the increasing Sino-Indian interaction has produced increased sensitivity on the Chinese side regarding the India concerns. Secondly\, the strengthening of the Sino-US rapprochement and strategic engagement has also produced corresponding resonance on Sino-Indian relations. Thirdly\, Chinese support to Pakistan also needs to be understood keeping in view the China’s domestic and external compulsions. \nThe major points of discussion and suggestions: \n\nPakistan can be stated as a classic example of a failed state. However\, China will not be comfortable with the idea of a failed state in Pakistan due to the fear of nuclear terrorism.\nAs India grows\, Pakistan’s fear and insecurity will also grow.\nThere is no clear perception regarding who actually controls power in Pakistan. However\, it is apparent that it is the army which is in real control and is dictating the course of action.\nPakistan should be regarded as both as a factor and a non-factor in India-China relations.\nGeography plays a very important role in defining the relationship between India\, China and Pakistan. It is geopolitics which is actually dictating the terms of this relationship.\nThere is a need to understand and revisit the nuclear collaboration between China and Pakistan. The Conference on Disarmament debates were stopped by Pakistan at the behest of China.\nIndia China economic relations are growing. On the other hand there is no development in the India Pakistan trade relations. Pakistan China trade relations are also not that huge.\nPakistan is a democratic country\, but it is owned by the military.\nThere is a need to study the nexus between the Chinese army and the Pakistani army. Consequently\, India has to be prepared to deal with both the neighbours.\nThere is need to provide a brief background of the historical relations between China and Pakistan.\nIt would not be wrong to argue that if India was in China’s position\, India would have been playing the same geopolitical game.\nBetween 1995 and 2005 China attempted to de-hyphenate its relationship between India and Pakistan.\nThere is need to understand why Pakistan has shifted its focus from the United States to China. At the same time\, China was also worried about the alliance between United States\, Australia\, Japan and India.\nChina has been blocking the Indian claim to the UNSC permanent seat because both India and Japan have been clubbed together. And China has always been against the Japanese entry.\nChina is now facing a dilemma as to how to manage its relationship both with India and Pakistan. It is difficult for China to leave Pakistan but for China\, India is also very important.\nPresident Jiang Zemin had said that there is a need for a balanced approach towards both India and Pakistan.\nThe debate around the Gwadar port has been ongoing. There is need to wait and watch as to who takes over the port after the Singaporean authority moves out. There are speculations that Gwadar port may become a naval base.\nThere is need to highlight the role which China plays in the domestic politics of Pakistan\, especially after the Lal Masjid incident. In the long run\, Operation Geronimo can prove to be a turning point in the China Pakistan relations.\nThere is need to focus on a research question and focus more on ideas of a two-front war. The debates around stapled visas should be left out of the paper.\nThere is need to also highlight the understanding of the new leadership in China and their understanding of the China Pakistan relations.\nIndia should work towards building more military to military level interaction with Pakistan.\nIndia needs to learn to manage the relationship with China and Pakistan keeping in perspective the close ties between the two. \n\nReport prepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/pakistan-as-a-factor-in-sino-indian-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T194709
CREATED:20231223T134754Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63197-1307683800-1307683800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Sea Piracy and India's Future Role
DESCRIPTION:Commander SS Parmar started his presentation by delineating the scope of the study\, which was to study the menace of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden\, areas that are severely affected by the incidents of piracy in the recent past. He argued that initially pirates were more of a nuisance than a threat\, but in the absence of organised resistance\, piracy flourished. Parmar then talked about the four pillars on which piracy thrives- geography\, political instability\, safe havens\, and economics. His paper attempted to identify the stages and reasons for the advent of modern day piracy\, examined the economic and legal factors\, the international response including India’s response and future role. It also attempted “to answer a few questions that have arisen – mainly – Why was piracy allowed to rise to the extent it has? Why was there a delayed response to combat piracy? And finally – Is land operations the only solution to stem piracy?” \nBuilding further on his “four pillars” argument\, the author said that Somalia is a classic case of instability driven piracy. Somalia is a failed state since the government collapsed in 2001. This failure led to a lack of governance and subsequent high incidence of poverty which in tandem with two activities that could be viewed as the catalysts opened the doors for the advent and rise in piracy The first activity was fishing by outsiders in Somalian waters that destroyed the livelihood of the Somalian fishermen; a community that was considered a richer sect in the nation. The second issue was the dumping of toxic waste in Somalian waters. \nCdr Parmar then discussed the three stages of piracy. The first stage was between 1995 and 2000 when the local fishermen decided to take the law into their own hands and started boarding foreign fishing vessels accusing them of fishing illegally and sought compensation. This stage could be summed up as the unorganized stage of piracy. Instability in Somalia\, following the fall of Siad Barre government in 1991\, resulted in the formation of various groups that organised themselves into pirate groups and this led to the second stage of piracy characterised by the emergence of several organised pirate groups\, out of which four main “gangs” are in the ‘business’ of piracy. The author further argued that the third stage\, when piracy would reach the status of an independent state\, has commenced as pirates in Somalia could be viewed as a state within a state having links with other non state actors\, especially terrorist groups. Linkages with state actors\, however\, cannot be ruled out. These linkages could be largely attributed to the economic factors. The economics of piracy is a complex study which is restricted by the little information available in the public domain. He said that some of the pirate groups are better armed and funded than regional authorities. Million dollar ransoms combined with a lack of accountability have encouraged this growth. He viewed this as a clear interpretation that the third stage of piracy has commenced. \nCommander Parmar then delved on the legal framework for combating piracy and the practical problems nations face in arresting\, prosecuting and incarcerating convicted pirates. “The legal issues today have become more complex as the world has more independent nations and companies with enormous investments in the maritime domain. These issues are not insolvable and require a political will and an international understanding of the magnitude of the problem of piracy. Nations require bringing anti-piracy laws into effect\, setting up fast track courts and adopting a more cogent approach towards combating piracy”. He went on to advocate equating piracy to terrorism for a variety of reasons although the objectives of the two were different. “Elevating piracy at par with terrorism could obviate the requirement to pass new laws and higher levels of cooperation and only require amendments in the existing international order. Piracy could be viewed as Economic Terrorism”\, he said. \nThe international response to piracy could\, at best\, be described as “sluggish and reactionary”. “It was only when the magnitude of the threat breached the threshold of ‘acceptability’ that action was initiated”. Parmar said that “there is a growing consensus that land operations are the solution to piracy. If the four pillars of piracy are considered as geography\, political instability\, safe havens and economics\, then land operations would eliminate political instability and safe havens and aid in addressing the economic factor”. But\, despite the mandate of the UNSC Resolutions\, very little has been done to tackle the problem from landward due to several constraints. \nThe final section of Commander Parmar’s presentation examined the effect of piracy on India\, and the steps taken by the state to counter this threat. He pointed out that “piracy is occurring in the waters in the immediate vicinity of India and whilst transit through piracy infested waters can be avoided by other nations by rerouting\, the same cannot be done by India as India’s maritime trade routes originate and terminate in the waters surrounding it. Secondly\, the maritime route through the Gulf of Aden is important for India as the Indian imports through the Gulf have been valued at $50 billion while the exports have been valued at $60 billion”. These factors have made the government realize the need to tackle the problem since piracy is affecting the maritime interests of India and is growing in magnitude. “Cognisance of this development has been reflected in the Ministry of Defence Annual Report 2010 – 2011. It proposes a proactive role under the UN Flag to tackle the maritime threat of piracy. Actions taken by agencies including the Indian Navy\, Coast Guard and Police have resulted in apprehension of a number of pirates the largest being 61 in March 2011.” Subsequent to this operation against piracy\, government has asked the Indian Navy not to arrest any more pirates and bring them to India. This would restrict the navy to a ‘hold\, disarm and leave’ policy. Indian government seems to be reeling under the pressure of the pirates who are not shying away from playing the hostage card. Parmar said\, “At a time when India is pushing the UN for more action against piracy\, this policy shift will not only dilute the progress made in the Indian fight against piracy but also reduce India’s standing as a proactive anti piracy nation”. Therefore\, he suggested two staged action plan for India– the short and immediate term and the long term. “The short term would be to firstly\, introduce effective national anti piracy laws. Secondly\, formulate a regional anti piracy cooperative group that would operate in mid ocean areas and cover the SLOCs not patrolled as of now. Thirdly and most importantly not take a soft stand against piracy by means of appeasement”. Some of the long term measures would be; revision of UNCLOS articles on piracy\, pursue and assist agendas of the working groups formulated under CGPCS\, setting up of a working group on the economic factor\, etc. Parmar concluded by saying that the world could no longer afford to ignore the threat of piracy. If the issues raised above were not addressed\, then the third stage of piracy which has already commenced\, would take hold and that would increase the stakes manifold. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions\n\nThe section on India’s role should be more detailed.\nSovereignty issues limit the scope of hot pursuit against the pirates.\nThe Asian approach to counter the menace is not collective\, but individualistic and it is not helping their cause.\nOne of the discussants cautioned the author about the usage of the terms and suggested that the terms should be defined wherever used.\nIt was pointed out that economic factor is more than a driver; an enterprise in itself –rai-son d’etre for the act of piracy.\nIt was suggested that the title could be changed to reflect the emphasis on Somalia in the study. \nIt was suggested that the author could including developments at sea as a driver alongside developments at land since the dynamics of maritime development is fast changing and has impacted the rise and growth of piracy.\nThe various dimensions of ransom money were discussed and it was noticed that the insurance companies are the biggest beneficiaries of the ransom business as they are getting very high premium from the shipping companies. One implication of this whole ransom business is that none of the stakeholders are serious about the threat as they feel it to be a win-win situation.\nGenerally\, it was felt that there is a need for unearthing the business of piracy and the big stakeholders running the whole business\, apart from the pirates who are just the tip of the iceberg.\nIt was also pointed out that UNCLOS should be reviewed and reframed to include the non-state actors within its ambit.\nIt was suggested that the author should study successful models of counter-piracy operations and then seek their applicability in other cases of piracy.\n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nVice Admiral (Retd) Pradeep Kaushiva complimented Commander Parmar and said that as India’s seafarers are targeted by the pirates\, action on the part of the government is inevitable. The recent policy of ‘hold\, disarm and leave’ is a temporary and transitional one. He also informed the gathering that the panellists of this event also constitute one of the government’s initiatives on piracy – “Oceans beyond Piracy – India Working Group”.  He pointed out that the international trade was well organized but human security was the least taken care of and most vulnerable. He also said that AL-Qaeda was well entrenched in the Gulf of Aden and it was only a matter of time before they gained complete control over the issue of piracy. Drawing attention to the practical difficulties of the victims of piracy\, he said that lack of evidence was the main cause for the pirates not being prosecuted. In response to the queries of many participants he threw light on the ransom business and said that governments do not directly get themselves involved in the ransom issues. They however\, put pressure on the parties involved for the safe release of the hostages.  Finally\, he said that we need to address Piracy and not pirates that is to look into the “agencies and institutional actors across the ‘Piracy Value Chain”\, as Parmar has suggested. He concluded by thanking the panellists and the gathering for a constructive engagement\, and the IDSA for addressing the issue of piracy.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sea-piracy-and-indias-future-role
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T194709
CREATED:20231224T103610Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042106Z
UID:64110-1308288600-1308288600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China's Infrastructure in Southeast Asia
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Professor Charan D WadhvaDiscussants: Brig Vinod Anand (Retd)\, Cdr Kamlesh Agnihotri and Shri C S Kuupuswamy
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-infrastructure-in-southeast-asia
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T194709
CREATED:20231224T103615Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042222Z
UID:64111-1308288600-1308288600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Governance in the Strategic State of Jammu and Kashmir: The Case for Securitization
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Lt Gen (retd) V G Patankar\, PVSM\, YSMDiscussants: Shri Iftikhar Gilani and Dr Amit Prakash
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/governance-in-the-strategic-state-of-jammu-and-kashmir-the-case-for-securitization
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T194709
CREATED:20231224T103610Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041946Z
UID:64108-1308893400-1308893400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China's stance on SCO Expansion: The India Factor
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-stance-on-sco-expansion-the-india-factor
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T194709
CREATED:20231224T103610Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041821Z
UID:64109-1308893400-1308893400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Unconventional Gas - Can it be a Game changer for India?
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/unconventional-gas-can-it-be-a-game-changer-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
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