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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195323
CREATED:20231223T220522Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250316T235758Z
UID:63569-1305264600-1305264600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Absent Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness in India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Narendra Sisodia (DG\, IDSA)Discussants: P.S. Das\, Vice Admiral (retd.)\, Dhirendra Singh (IAS)\, Prof. Rajesh Rajgopalan (JNU) \nThis paper examines civil-military relations in India and argues that it has an adverse impact on the country’s military effectiveness. Anit Mukherjee introduced the paper by trying to situate Indian civil-military relations in the theoretical construct and argued that it most closely resembles Huntington’s “objective control”. However\, he argued\, that contrary to Huntington’s claim\, objective control does not maximize military effectiveness\, thus questioning the Huntingtonian paradigm. The author argued that the unique characteristics of Indian civil-military relations qualify it to be best described as an “absent dialogue.” In making this argument\, the paper examines four processes that shape military effectiveness – weapons procurement\, defense planning\, integration and officer education\, and promotion policies. The paper starts by posing some questions; “what are the causes and consequences of the form of civilian control in contemporary India\, in response to internal and external challenges\, how have civil-military relations evolved and what have been the major areas of contestation\, and finally why has the government undertaken episodic reforms aimed at streamlining the military and to what extent are these reforms successful?”     \nThe paper is composed of three sections. Section one\, begins by discussing the theory of civil-military relations. Next it describes the three unique characteristics of civil-military relations in India. (Lack of civilian expertise\, strong but competing bureaucratic control over the military and considerable autonomy granted to the military to compensate for the previous two factors.) According to K. Subrahmanyam the “absent dialogue” directly translates into a system where “politicians enjoy power without any responsibility\, bureaucrats wield power without any accountability and the military assumes responsibility without any direction.”  \nSection two describes the study of military effectiveness and the problems associated with defining it. It then analyzes Indian military effectiveness by examining four crucial determinants – weapons procurement\, defence planning\, integration and officer education\, and promotion policies. In doing so\, it examines how each of these determinants is influenced by civil-military relations. \nSection three argues that the Indian state has acknowledged these problems and has made some attempts at defence reforms; however\, a more forceful political intervention is required\, if the reforms have to be meaningful. The paper ends by noting that “in the absence of a crisis such sort of an intervention is unlikely”. The paper concludes that in the absence of a strong political will and leadership defense reforms have had “sub-optimal results”. \nExternal Discussants\nMr. Dhirendra Singh suggested that the paper should be restructured in a manner so as to effectively use the historical facts given in the paper about how the civil-military relationship has evolved over a period of time in the Indian context\, to buttress claims about the problem areas in civil-military relations. He also suggested that the author should come up with solutions to the problem of the bureaucracy’s control over the military. He said that the author’s approach is ambivalent on the issue of lack of expertise in the bureaucracy: if we have adopted a generalist cadre system\, then how can we blame the bureaucracy for not ‘expertly’ guiding the military\, particularly on issues where there is a lack of consensus in the armed forces themselves. Singh also made the pertinent point that the question of civil-military integration should be looked into within the constitutional arrangement of the country and here the understanding of the Articles 74 and 77 becomes very important.  \nVice-Admiral PS Das’s remarks were not so much on the paper as on the existing realities which he experienced during his various key postings. Significantly\, he said that publishing the Henderson-Brook report (on the 1962 India-China war) will not expose politicians or bureaucrats since their failure has already been established. It will\, however\, help the military in course-correction. Yet\, the political establishment is reluctant to publish the report\, much to the disillusionment of many. He cautioned against nurturing the belief that all politicians and bureaucrats are inept and cited the examples of Jagjivan Ram\, Yashwant Rao Chavan\, Arun Singh\, Ajai Vikram Singh\, and others. Das said that we need to take some corrective measures and not aim at radical changes. He made some valuable suggestions including\, the need for complete control of defence forces over their revenue matters and the expediency of higher education for the officers.  \nProf. Rajesh Rajgopalan said that Grand Strategy has two components – force and diplomacy. We never paid enough attention to the force component and hence a lot is left to be desired on this count. He pointed out that India has a huge “margin of error” in the military sphere vis-à-vis its neighbours. Prof. Rajgopalan said that what India has is “ineffective” civilian control over the military because of the former’s lack of expertise.  \nInternal Discussants\nCol. Ali Ahmed pointed out that Huntington never said that objective control will lead to military effectiveness. In fact\, Huntington has not used the term “effectiveness” anywhere in his seminal work\, The Soldier and the State. So Anit Mukherjee’s criticism of Huntington on the ground that contrary to Huntington’s claim “objective control” does not maximize India’s military effectiveness is not justified since what Huntington meant was objective control will lead to military “professionalism”\, and that has happened in India.  \nThis issue was taken further by Anit who opined that although it is true that Huntington did not use the term effectiveness\, yet he never differed with later scholars who followed his work and treated “effectiveness” as a benchmark of the professionalism of the armed forces\, since the concept of effectiveness was not developed at that point in time when Huntington wrote his book. Moreover\, the study of civil-military relations assumes that objective control would lead to professionalism and automatically an effective military.  \nCdr. SS Parmar said that any scheme of higher education for the armed forces must include the JCOs\, the backbone of the Indian Armed Forces. \nGeneral Discussion\nSeveral comments and suggestions were made in terms of the paper being a framework analysis of Civil-military relations in India. \n\nWg Cdr. V. Krishnappa – “Dialogue” part of the title should be made more pronounced. The paper will then become more policy-relevant.\nAmit Cowshish (IDAS) – differences of opinion and attitude between the civil and military is primarily due to the different sets of ethos that they adhere to. He also clarified the stance of the Ministry of Finance on revenue matters and said that substantial delegation of revenue matters of defence has already been done to it. \nBrig. Dahiya said that victories in wars should not be the final judgment on the efficacy of the military\, a point aptly made by Anit in his paper. Suggestion was to prepare the list of military failures and the reason for the failures to assess the problem areas facing the armed forces vis-à-vis the civil administration. \n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nThe Director General said that the paper will definitely bring to the centre stage the debate on “civil-military relations” in India. He\, however\, lamented that in India this debate deteriorates into a “tussle between bureaucracy and military”. Defending the bureaucracy\, he said that the Secretaries are the staff of ministers. So it logically follows that the voice of the secretary is not his own\, rather it is the wish of the minister echoed by him. He provided an insight into the functioning of civil-military relations based on his experience as a rapporteur for Cabinet meetings. His observation was that whenever there was a consensus in the military over a certain issue\, the cabinet invariably gave its nod for it. The problem arose only when there was no consensus on the issue among the armed forces themselves. He said that the political leadership agreed with the military leadership more frequently than it did so with the civilian bureaucracy\, underlining the point that the armed forces have enjoyed considerable autonomy in their functioning. He stressed the need for democratization of the educational system of the military. He concluded by saying that the generalist system which has come under scrutiny by the author is all right\, but specialization in some areas should also be encouraged to facilitate smooth functioning of the MoD. \nFurther Reading\n\n“The Absent Dialogue”\, Seminar\, July 2009. \n“Failing to Deliver: Post-Crises Defence Reforms in India\, 1998-2010″\, IDSA Occasional Paper\, March 2011.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-absent-dialogue-civil-military-relations-and-military-effectiveness-in-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195323
CREATED:20231224T103710Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042638Z
UID:64113-1305264600-1305264600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indian cyber security: Principles and Practice
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-cyber-security-principles-and-practice
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195323
CREATED:20231223T134806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63202-1305869400-1305869400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Offensive Defence: Managing deterrence and arms race in a ballistic missile defence environment
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Lt. Gen. Satish NambiarDiscussant: Admiral Raja Menon and Sheelkant Sharma  \nThe paper presented was of a conceptual nature which adopted the offence-defence theory to analyze the character of missile defences\, its impact on nuclear deterrence equations and its potential to cause security dilemma. “The paper makes two arguments: (a) Missile defences are instruments of security maximization that could accentuate offense dominance by adding to the net offensive capability of strategic forces. (b) A (mutual) defensive deterrence arrangement can emerge between BMD–possessing nuclear weapon states as a means to deterrence stability and encouraging arms control.”  \nIt was identified that mutual vulnerability was a key variable in the development of the concept of nuclear deterrence and remains the norm of strategic stability\, and ballistic missile defence (BMD) would prove to be a ‘game changer’. The traditional discourse on nuclear deterrence and second strike capabilities were discussed and the issue that was later debated was – how would BMD change the dynamics of the concept of deterrence\, if at all it does? The paper also suggests that “security dilemmas are dynamic\, uncontrollable processes being caused by offensive and even defensive postures. Competitions will\, hence continue to define strategic equations and potentially heighten arms races\, which though could progressively lead to new stability arrangements\, driven by the fact that nuclear wars are sought to be avoided by all nations.” This point was taken up during the Q&A where it was suggested that no BMD system could be 100 per cent foolproof\, and countries would try and increase their nuclear arsenal to increase the probability of a higher number of warheads penetrating the BMD systems of the opponent. \nIt was suggested that this will in turn lead to a nuclear arms race. To this end\, it was also mentioned that an arms race was not possible in the India–Pakistan context as the amount of Uranium and Plutonium produced by India was many times more than that produced by Pakistan. Therefore\, it was inferred that unless Pakistan procured highly enriched uranium (HEU) illegally\, it was not possible for Pakistan to catch up with India. This aspect was debated as some in the audience believed that an arms race between India and Pakistan was a factor that could not be discounted. To this end\, it was argued that BMD and arms reduction were on opposite ends of the spectrum as BMD would require a state to increase the number of warheads it possesses. Therefore\, it was noted that the BMD could be a destabilizing factor in South Asia. \nIt was suggested that it would be appropriate to add the specifics of each phase of missile defence evolution in the past fifty years. Such as — the early and rather desperate foray into ABM\, then the turbulent sixties and the first flush of detente and ABM treaty\, then the Reagan years when a weakening USSR was blustered into submission by MX and SDI and the humbug about Krasnoyarsk radars. Why and how Clinton came to it in late nineties and the scenario since 9/11. \nIt was highlighted that the crucial issue is whether BMD can push the threshold of a conflict below nuclear exchange higher than before\, and emphasis should not be on how many incoming nuclear missiles can be blocked by the BMD. That being said\, it was also noted that some of the defence systems that India is purchasing or considering\, are many times costlier than the attack platforms of Pakistan. It was argued by some in the audience that the cost of BMD was too high compared to the benefits it could provide. Furthermore\, it was argued that BMD is not a proven technology and thus could not be relied upon. To further develop this point\, it was argued that there already exists a threshold (for conflict without nuclear exchange) which is reasonably higher.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/offensive-defence-managing-deterrence-and-arms-race-in-a-ballistic-missile-defence-environment
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195323
CREATED:20231223T134806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63203-1305869400-1305869400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China’s Territorial Claim on the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh: Alternative Scenarios 2031
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr. Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Brig. (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle\, Col. Navneet Kumar\, Dr. Rajiv Anantaram\, Dr. Jabin Jacob \nNamrata Goswami’s paper focused on four alternative scenarios in 2031 with regard to China’s territorial claim on the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh. At the outset\, the author discussed the three drivers of uncertainty\, which could influence the Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh\, namely\, Chinese regime stability\, Chinese perception of India and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh. Based on the interactive interplay of these three independent variables\, Goswami crafted four alternative scenarios based on two futures methodology: the ‘Alternative Scenarios Axis’ and the ‘Implication Wheel’.  \nThe paper sought to answer four research questions:\n(1)	What are the four alternative scenarios in 2031 with regard to China’s territorial claim on the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh?\n(2)	What are the policy implications of each scenario?\n(3)	Which scenario is most preferred and why? What are the policy interventions necessary to be put in place between now and 2031 to ensure the unfolding of this scenario?\n(4)	Which scenario is least preferred? What are the policy interventions necessary to be put in place between now and 2031 in order to avoid this scenario? \nThe paper assessed the three drivers of uncertainty in detail. The author included several sub-drivers within the three main drivers to explain the significance of certain issues that had a direct bearing on how the future will unfold.  \nThe first driver\, Chinese regime stability\, was analyzed using five criteria which the author called ‘sub-drivers’\, namely\, principles\, norms\, rules\, decision making procedures and institutions. These sub-drivers were drawn from Stephen Krasner and Hedley Bull’s definition of regimes. With regard to principles\, the prevalence of economic reforms which was mainly visible during the Deng Xiaoping period was pointed out. In terms of norms\, the historical and civilizational past of China and also the standards of behaviour based on rights\, obligations\, and social ethnics were brought into context. With regard to decision-making\, the author highlighted the role of the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in taking most of the important foreign policy decisions. The lack of an independent judiciary in China made institutionalised accountability almost impossible. She also enumerated the role of the institutions\, mainly that of the PLA\, and how economic growth has modernized the PLA. \nThe author identified the uncertainties with regard to regime stability primarily stemming from internal fears of dissent which might impact on Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh. As the author argued\, if regime stability runs low\, China could get aggressive on Arunachal Pradesh.  \nThe next driver is the Chinese perception of India. Chinese view the Indian state as mainly aping the West. Moreover\, the Dalai Lama’s presence in India creates anxieties in China and is perceived as questioning China’s legitimacy over Tibet. While neither country is likely to go to war\, much would however depend on how India behaves towards China over the years and on whether the border issue can be resolved.  \nThe last driver is internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh in terms of governance\, riparian rights and border security. Here\, one interesting factor in particular regard to riparian rights is the existence of differences of opinion between young and old over the construction of dams. \nDr. Goswami offered four alternative scenarios along with the implications wheel crafted for each scenario based on the interaction of the three drivers of uncertainty. The first scenario is ‘backwaters’\, in which Chinese regime stability is low\, the perception of India is that of a weak actor and adverse internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh are also low. The second scenario is ‘heavy weights’ where Chinese regime stability and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh run high and the Chinese perception of India is that of a strong power. The third scenario is “Ascendant India’ where the first driver of Chinese regime stability is low\, Chinese perception of India is that of a strong power and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh run high. The fourth scenario is ‘Yellow Emperor’ which is the least favourite. In this scenario Chinese regime stability runs low\, India is perceived as a weak power and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh run low.  \nIn conclusion\, Dr. Namrata Goswami stated that she was in favour of the second scenario\, “heavyweights”\, and its positive wheel since it focuses more on interest-based bargaining. She speculated that India needs to seriously consider this scenario.  \nMajor points of discussions and suggestions: \nScenario techniques and selection of drivers should be analysed carefully. The important part is to select the right drivers. More sub-drivers can actually be introduced and a multidisciplinary technique should be adopted as a base of support. Scenarios should connect more to the drivers and the selection of the period till 2031 must be made more significant. The importance of the 3Ts i.e. Taiwan\, Tibet and Turkistan in China’s White paper is significant\, and how these play out in its strategic assessment portfolio cannot be ignored; hence\, this should be analysed. \nHow to handle Tibet in terms of policy prescription and how to link the Arunachal Pradesh boundary question to the Indian western sector with China are also important. Political conditions in the Tibet Autonomous Region can be considered as one of the drivers. Tibet is the chief concern in the India-China boundary question. \nThe Chinese perception of India in the context of differentiation between decentralization and lack of continuity were also discussed. How is India different from China in the approach to the resolution of the boundary? Both the Chinese and the Indian intentions can be looked into\, and also the involvement of external actors like the US and Pakistan could be studied. Certain sub-drivers can be selected like the Chinese polity\, economy\, military\, internal situation and Chinese comprehensive national security strategies. With regard to why 2031 is important and how international norms affect China: for the Chinese 2031 is not important; rather 2049 is more important because it will mark the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic.  \nThe paper is informative but a more rigorous exercise based on Chinese primary sources is required including language sources. In the alternative scenarios axis and the implications wheel\, the independent variables are not to be correlated but a choice should exist between the two. The author needs to polish and strengthen the drivers through inputs from and discussions with other experts.  \nReport prepared by Shristi Pukhrem\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-territorial-claim-on-the-indian-state-of-arunachal-pradesh-alternative-scenarios-2031
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110527T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110527T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195323
CREATED:20231223T134755Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63200-1306474200-1306474200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's Defence Diplomacy in the Gulf
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (Retd)Discussants: Commodore M R Khan (Retd) and Shri Gulshan Luthra	  \nDr. P.K. Pradhan’s paper focused on the topic of India’s defence diplomacy in the Gulf\, with existing relations between India and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as the basis for the study. Pradhan has illustrated in this study that although India’s defence diplomacy with the Gulf region has a long history\, it was consolidated by recent events including the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States\, the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai\, and piracy activity in the Arabian Sea. India has numerous commonalities with the GCC countries\, with both being connected by the Arabian Sea\, rendering the security of the sea and the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) significant areas for mutual cooperation. Other areas of cooperation include countering illegal activities such as smuggling of arms\, supply of narcotics and drugs\, and movement of criminal elements in the sea. Defence diplomacy initiatives have included high-level defence-related visits and dialogue on security challenges\, port calls\, and defence cooperation in the form of training exchanges\, combined exercises\, and sourcing\, development\, production and marketing of defence equipment.  \nThe Gulf region\, Pradhan argues\, is also of strategic importance for India for other reasons: \n\nIndia-GCC trade amounts to over USD 84 billion. The GCC countries are a lucrative market for Indian goods such as textiles\, spices\, other food products\, electrical goods and machineries\, and IT products.\nThe Gulf region supplies around two-thirds of India’s total energy requirements.\nThe Indian diaspora comprising around 5 million people: protecting the interests of Indian workers in the region has been an important area of focus in bilateral relations.\nIndia’s long-term energy security could be dependent on Iranian oil and gas reserves (Iran has the second and third largest proven gas and oil reserves respectively in the world). India’s trade with Iran amounted to USD 13.39 billion in 2009-2010. Possible future sectors of mutual investment include oil and gas\, steel\, fertilizers\, infrastructure and railways. Iran is also significant in terms of providing India with an access route to Afghanistan and Central Asia\, and for cooperation on maritime security.\nThe GCC countries see India as an important partner in tackling terrorism in their respective regions; defence cooperation agreements have been signed with the UAE\, Oman and Qatar.\n\nPradhan points out that India has established defence ties with several GCC states: \n\nOman: India and Oman signed a military protocol in 1972\, which led to a three- year deputation of Indian Navy personnel to man Oman’s Navy in 1973. A MoU on defence cooperation was signed between India and Oman in 2005. Areas of cooperation include joint military exercises\, military training and IT\, educational courses and programmes\, exchange of observers and formal visits. Currently\, a two-tier arrangement for defence cooperation – Joint Military Cooperation Committee (JMCC) and Air Force-to-Air Force Staff Talks (AFST) – exists with Oman.\nUAE: India signed a defence cooperation agreement with the UAE in 2003 that will focus bilateral cooperation on military training\, cooperation in military medical services and jointly combating pollution caused by the military at sea. Regular naval exercises take place between India and the UAE.   \nSaudi Arabia: India and Saudi Arabia have not yet signed any agreement on defence cooperation\, though the Delhi Declaration signed in 2006 forms the basis for security cooperation. Joint naval exercises in addition to joint exercises between the Indian Army and Royal Saudi Land Force are also being planned. \nIran: India-Iran relations have been shaped by political relations between the two countries as well as by the role of the United States in the region. India signed a MoU on defence cooperation with Iran in 2001. The New Delhi Declaration signed in 2003 laid further emphasis on defence cooperation in areas including training and mutual visits. The Declaration also laid focus on cooperation on sea-lane control and security\, joint naval exercises\, Indian assistance in upgrading Iran’s Russian-made defence systems and establishment of joint working groups on counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics.  India’s vote against Iran at the IAEA in 2005 has hindered further strengthening of defence cooperation. \nQatar: India signed defence cooperation and security and law enforcement agreements with Qatar in 2008. These agreements focus on cooperation on issues including terrorism\, piracy\, maritime security\, money laundering\, narcotics and transnational crimes. These agreements are significant also because it gives the Indian Navy access to operate in the region to ensure security of sea lanes. Qatar has also participated in courses at the National Defence College (NDC) in India\, and has expressed interest in participating in additional training courses.\n\nOn initiatives in strengthening cooperation between India and the Gulf countries\, Pradhan notes that the Indian Navy has played a significant role in the form of “Naval Diplomacy”. As defined by the Indian Ministry of Defence\, “Naval Diplomacy entails the use of naval forces in support of foreign policy objectives to build ‘bridges of friendship’ and strengthen international cooperation on one hand\, and to signal capability and intent to deter potential adversaries on the other. The larger purpose of the Navy’s diplomatic role is to favorably shape the maritime environment in the furtherance of national interests\, in consonance of the foreign policy and national security objectives.” Pradhan points out that naval cooperation is also a significant area of military-to-military cooperation in its capacity to secure SLOCs and build ties through maritime bonding. India has been very proactive in engaging with navies of the GCC countries in the form of joint exercises\, port calls\, goodwill visits to ports\, and training programmes.  \nIn his view\, specific defence diplomacy initiatives taken to achieve Indian foreign policy objectives have included: \n\nCollaborating against piracy\nSafety of SLOC\nSecuring choke points in the western Indian Ocean \nDealing with China in the Indian Ocean\nCurtailing Pakistan’s influence in the Gulf\nBuilding security cooperation with GCC countries\nStrengthening India’s strategic interests in the Gulf region\n\nPradhan concludes that India’s engagement with the Gulf countries has been driven by its security and strategic needs in the region\, including furthering its economic and political objectives. He notes that there is a need to build on existing defence ties and forge new ties with other countries in the region. Growing insecurity in India\, the Gulf region and the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea demand greater levels of engagement on crucial issues such as piracy\, terrorism\, maritime terrorism\, and safety of the SLOC.  \nThe discussion that followed focused on several different aspects of this topic.  \n\nA participant pointed out that there are limitations on the extent of India’s defence cooperation with the Gulf countries\, owing mainly to the United States’ wariness in supporting any deep and wide-ranging agreements between any other countries and the GCC states\, and the low likelihood that Gulf countries such as the UAE will buy Indian defence equipment. \nIran remains an important partner for India\, despite irritants such as gas prices and the 2005 IAEA vote; India must balance its relationship with Iran and the United States. Another country that India should initiate defence cooperation with is Iraq\, especially now that the country is focused on reconstruction following the 2003 invasion\, and with its increasing reengagement with the rest of the Gulf region. \nIt was emphasized that India has recognized the need for stronger defence cooperation with the region; it is important to note that the GCC countries have been very receptive to initiatives taken in the past to advance mutual engagement\, though Indian diplomacy in the Gulf region might be in need of more “warmth” in bilateral interactions.\nAnother participant pointed out that the study did not touch upon the crucial issue of the Indian diaspora in the Gulf region. It is important for the Indian government to establish agreements on\, for instance\, access to ports\, for evacuation purposes in the event of developments such as the recent uprisings in the region. \nOne of the questions posed was how the Gulf countries would react to a conflict between India and China – would they balance between the two\, or which side would they take? \nOne recommendation made was for the need to explore why India’s Look West policy has not been as successful as its Look East policy.    \nThe maritime dimension has to be the main factor in defence diplomacy between India and the GCC countries.\nA participant recommended that more emphasis should be placed on China’s involvement in the Gulf region and its cooperation with countries such as Saudi Arabia\, and the effects of this involvement on India’s ties with these countries. It was observed that there has been no Indian strategy to counter China’s increasing outreach in the diplomatic and military arenas in the Gulf region. \n\nReport prepared by Princy George\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-defence-diplomacy-in-the-gulf
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110527T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110527T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195323
CREATED:20231224T103615Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042431Z
UID:64112-1306474200-1306474200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Chinese Engagements with Maldives: Impact on Security Environment in the Indian Ocean Region
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nDiscussants: Ambassador Arun Banerjee and Dr P K Ghosh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinese-engagements-with-maldives-impact-on-security-environment-in-the-indian-ocean-region
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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