BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:MP-IDSA
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Asia/Kolkata
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0530
TZOFFSETTO:+0530
TZNAME:IST
DTSTART:20100101T000000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195904
CREATED:20231223T220738Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63590-1299216600-1299216600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Evolution of Sri Lanka’s Counter Insurgency Strategy 2002-2009
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch\, SM\, VSM (Retd)Discussants: Shri N Manoharan & Shri M R Narayan Swamy \nHemantha Dayaratne’s paper focuses on the Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In his view\, the military strategy adopted by the Sri Lankan army offers an example for other countries facing similar internal challenges. He discusses the fragile peace process started in 2002 and critically analyses the role played by Norway in facilitating the process. Dayaratne argues that Norwegian facilitation could not achieve the desired result because: i) of Norway’s inability to inspire the confidence of Sri Lankan Government and its efforts to equate the government with a terrorist organization (LTTE); ii) lack of sincerity on the part of the LTTE\, which used the ceasefire to strengthen itself; iii) differences between then prime minister Ranil Wickramsinghe and then president Chandrika Kumaratunga. Moreover\, Norway was partial towards the LTTE which made the latter even more inflexible. Thus\, the peace process did not succeed.  \nAfter Rajapakse’s election as president\, the LTTE launched several attacks\, which forced the government to undertake military action. For its part\, the Sri Lankan government took advantage of the division within LTTE (Karuna’s defection) and through an innovative strategy pushed the LTTE into a small area created by the army called the “no fire zone”. This strategy helped defeat the LTTE. The US war on terror post 9/11 also provided an opportune moment for all out military action against the terrorist group\, LTTE. Dayaratne also states that in this operation preventive measures were taken by the Sri Lankan government to guard against civilian casualties and human rights abuses. He concludes that the failure of the Norwegian Peace Process\, the use of military force and the overall strategy of the Sri Lankan government was entirely judicious and led to a successful campaign  \nThe major points of discussion and suggestions to the author were: \n\nExcellent account of the COIN strategy applied by the military and of the Norwegian Peace Process\, but could have been more detailed in terms of providing an insider’s view of the whole process that led to the dismantling of the LTTE.\nThough mainly expressing  author’s personal experience \, the paper could have attempted to establish links between the actual evolution of Sri Lanka’s military and COIN Strategy and diplomatic aspects of the process.\nNorway has been singularly blamed for the failure of the peace process without taking into account intrinsic factors like LTTE’s arrogance in the political sphere\, India’s role in neutralizing LTTE camps\, and the fracture in LTTE’s top echelons. \nOne important detail that is missing in the paper is LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s role in the defeat of the outfit\, committing blunders like killing of Indian Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi which led to India’s non-intervention\nThe role of navy and air force both of which had a major contribution in the operations have been overlooked. \nDisparity of information regarding human rights abuses is evident in the paper. \nCOIN campaign can be said to have been successful only if the root causes have been addressed\, which the paper does not mention.\nNot viable to use as a lesson / example of successful COIN strategy for other battlefields like Kashmir\, Afghanistan\, etc. as these cannot be isolated like Sri Lanka.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/evolution-of-sri-lankas-counter-insurgency-strategy-2002-2009
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195904
CREATED:20231223T220738Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63591-1299216600-1299216600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Insider Threat: The New Nuclear Danger
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseDiscussants:  Dr Sitakanta Mishra and Dr Aditi Malhotra \nDr Reshmi Kazi introduced the paper by saying that the danger of insider threats is emerging as the new nuclear threat and the risk of insider threats is invariably linked with terrorists seeking fissile materials to build a nuclear device. In the present paper\, Dr Kazi aimed to analyse the severity of the danger of insider threats. She also tried to address the motivating factors that are greatly responsible for giving rise to potential insider risk to a nuclear establishment. \nDefining the insider threat\, Dr Kazi said that the risk of insider threat is present in all organisations. The potential of this threat lies in the act of a trusted employee who might betray his allegiances and obligations to his employer and cause damage or espionage against the employer or the organisation. Moreover\, access of all people without adequate identification to an organization’s critical facilities increases the chances of potential insider threat to the infrastructure.  \nShe pointed out three categories of actors from which there is the risk of insider betrayals: a) psychologically-impaired disgruntled or alienated employees; b) ideological or religious radicals; and c) criminals. She indicated that a trusted employee can develop a malicious intent due to various factors such as vengeance for a seeming wrong; radicalisation for advancement or religious or ideological objectives; and simple unlawful financial gain. Individuals are also motivated to malicious actions because of the growing\, exacerbated or unaddressed discontent with their place or value in the organisation; recruitment by hostile outside entities or groups; infiltration of a malicious actor to a trusted position on an infrastructure operator’s staff; and nuclear industry is affected by workplace trends that currently indicate there will be fewer jobs in the future\, and individuals who are employed will be required to have greater technical skills. However\, according to Dr Kazi\, insider betrayals may not necessarily be from individuals who have been directly affected by discontent or perceived injustice from within the organisation. There might also exist within the category of active insiders\, a subset of unwitting or passive insiders. \nBy highlighting the future trends and the danger of insider threats\, the presenter said that the world of nuclear weapons is expected to gradually undergo revolutionary changes in the coming decades since the nuclear world is surrounded with debates relating to nuclear disarmament\, revamp of the nuclear industry\, emergence of new nuclear states\, rising proliferation\, and spread of nuclear energy. She assumed that the world of nuclear weapons will undergo transformation that will impact issues relating to nuclear weapons in the future which might increase the risk of potential insider threats. \nOn Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and the severity of the danger of insider threats\, the author stated that in Pakistan there is a strong possibility of insider threats. Quoting David Albright\, she said\, “Pakistan tends to leak vital nuclear information. It’s the nature of the system.” She also cited the famous A Q Khan case which bears testimony to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology to several countries and also demonstrates the poor security culture of the state. In addition\, the risk of insider threats is further compounded by a rising wave of Islamist and anti-Western sympathies within Pakistan army and the ISI.  \nReferring to some of the recent incidences of insider threats like a group of peace activists’ security breach at Kleine-Brogel Airbase in Belgium in February 2010\, four armed men’s security breach into the Pelindaba nuclear facility in Pretoria in November 2007 etc.\, the presenter said that the case of AQ Khan perhaps posed the greatest insider threat when he was able to proliferate centrifuges\, nuclear technology and blueprints to Iran\, Libya\, and North Korea. She pointed out that the danger of insider threat is a global problem which has to be addressed by all the leading partners of the international community. The presenter felt that it was important for the nuclear institutions and organisations to become wiser to the tactics of potential insiders. While taking adequate steps to secure fissile materials worldwide\, substantial efforts must be made to overhaul the personal reliability programme\, which must transcend beyond merely evaluating the suitability of bodyguards to the management of expanding stockpile of nuclear materials and weapons.  \nAs part of this comprehensive effort\, she also recommended suggestions for more safety and security of nuclear reactors. Some of the important recommendations in managing the insider threats are: stabilise the economic status of the nuclear personnel in order to prevent nuclear scientists\, engineers\, workers and guards from stealing nuclear weapons and materials or selling nuclear knowledge; redirect the aging workforce into civil nuclear programmes and thereby provide them alternative employment; expand capabilities of nuclear forensics\, police force and human intelligence to intercept nuclear thieves; strengthening international nuclear emergency search and response capabilities etc. \nIn conclusion\, she said that the danger of insider threat must be managed with intelligence\, process\, and technology through a defence-in-depth strategy. If the systems are maintained according to the security configurations necessary\, duties are segregated\, accounts and passwords are controlled\, and employees are made aware that their actions are being logged and monitored\, there is less likelihood of a disgruntled employee attempting the unwanted activity.  \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nThe other aspects of insider threats could have been mentioned. \nInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identified insider threats as violent and non-violent insiders. Violent insiders are active insider threats.\nThe paper could have dealt with the case of North Korea in greater detail and linking with security threat as its nuclear programme is not indigenous.\nIslamisation of Pakistan Army and the deeply religious mindset of the nuclear scientists further compound the danger of insider threats.\nAn insider threat who works with outsiders would pose the most dangerous threat. This dander is also emerging as a new nuclear threat linked with terrorism. \nThe various insider threats should have been further researched in a greater detail and explained.\nWhat are the potential threats to nuclear reactors and what are the nuclear protection safeguard measures have been taken to protect from insider threats? \nThere are a number of international treaties which are responsible for safeguarding nuclear reactors but what the domestic laws and measures exist in this regard.\nThe author has mentioned about various insider threats who are working in different countries like Pakistan\, Iran\, North Korea etc but is there any cross connection? Instead of working on larger issues the author could have been focused on specific issues\, for instance\, the case of Pakistan could have been studied in more details. Perhaps\, the author was trying to do exactly that.\nIs there any possibility for Taliban or extremists getting access to nuclear devices? For small terrorist groups getting access to nuclear devices or weapons and exploding them are not possible. \nAn accident is not an insider threat. If one intents to use sensitive nuclear devices for sabotage\, proliferation and terrorist activity can be said as insider threat. \nIt was suggested that the author needed to clearly define insider threat in order to be able to deal with the issue in a comprehensive manner. Before writing the paper\, the author also needs to visit the places to observe and find out how various reactors are operating\, how they are safeguarded and to note where insider threats can come from.\n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/insider-threat-the-new-nuclear-danger
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195904
CREATED:20231223T220723Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250316T233241Z
UID:63586-1300426200-1300426200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Playing ‘catch up’: Japan’s foreign policy towards India – a case of delayed realism
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr Rajaram PandaDiscussants: Professor K V Kesavan and Professor Srabani Roy Choudhury \nThe author tried to demonstrate Japan’s approach to India using the three characteristics that she perceived to be the central determinants of policy: 1) the international geopolitical structure\, 2) elite perceptions and dominant norms\, and 3) commercial and economic diplomacy. Through these variables one can see a ‘creeping realism’ in Japan’s India policy\, which the paper demonstrated with two examples\, economic policy and nuclear energy policy. \nNeoclassical realism best explains Japan’s external policy since it allows for a balance between the international structure and domestic variables as against classical realism which is centred on structure alone. Both anarchy as well as domestic considerations of anti-nuclearism have guided Japanese foreign policy. \nPolicy determinants\nThe Role of the US has been central in the post-WW II Japanese policy. Since US-Japan relations were strong in the Cold War days\, India-Japan political relations remained weak. In the recent past\, among other factors\, the US’ endorsement of Indian nuclear policy through the nuclear deal has altered the Japanese policy. The changed Japanese approach to India was a by-product of the post 9/11 US policy in South Asia. \nRise of China is the other important variable in the current Japanese policy. Japan partnered in the Chinese economy because it thought that this will help ameliorate bilateral political relations. However\, recent instances have proved otherwise. Despite security assurances from the US\, the Asian power shift has Japan worried and hence Japan is looking for stronger relations with democratic countries in Asia. Even the hefty increase in the recently announced Chinese defence budget has raised a few eyebrows in Japan. \nJapan’s Policy towards India\na) Economic Interests: Japanese foreign policy has for many years been centred on economic diplomacy. It has served Japanese interests well and is the dominant determinant of Japan’s India policy. However\, economic relations have been weak due to a lot of reasons and there is much scope to improve economic ties. Japan’s economic interest began to accelerate in the mid-2000s\, following the 2003 BRIC report on India’s emerging power status. Sino-Japanese tensions at about the same time provided another impetus. The Japanese private sector for its part looked to diversify by engaging other economies and reducing its dependence on China.\nAmong other factors\, South Korea’s economic success in India following an early initiative might have also prodded Japan. The recently signed CEPA aims to accelerate India-Japan economic ties and pave the way for projects like DMRC. \nb) Nuclear Cooperation: In recent times\, Japan has been forced to play ‘catch up’ so as not to miss out on India’s nuclear energy market. Anti-nuclearism has been an integral part of Japanese policy since it is the only victim of nuclear weapons. Therefore\, Japan’s response to the 1998 tests was among the most severe. Strong domestic public opinion and domestic politics also guided Japanese policy. However\, today\, policymakers do acknowledge that their reaction might have been too harsh. \nNonetheless\, nuclear energy cooperation might be the next major development in India-Japan relations. Increasing crude prices and fears of global warming have revived the nuclear energy debate and thus Japan has been forced to rethink its approach to nuclear cooperation especially given that it has been internationalizing its nuclear industry. Also\, the lucrative energy infrastructure markets abroad might help the revival of Japanese economy. South Korea’s success in this regard might again work as a push factor for Japan. The recent belief in Japan that India’s incorporation into the non-proliferation regime might help control India through further conditions and would allow Japan to monitor Indian policy by participation rather than by abstention might be the ultimate indicator of the policy shift in Japan. There is also an economic component in terms of revenues for participating Japanese companies. Japan was\, however\, likely to draw out negotiations in order to satisfy its domestic audience which is opposed to the deal due to India’s non-membership of NPT. Despite that\, the author felt that the India-Japan nuclear energy deal could be inked as early as in the next two years. But she added the Fukushima crisis could have its impact on the process.  \nIn conclusion\, the author argued that the above mentioned factors have contributed to the increasing realist Japanese stance towards India. CEPA and the civilian nuclear energy deal are the drivers of the new Japanese policy which aims at achieving congruence through the development of ‘shared interests’ if not ‘shared values’. Japan is slowly modifying its idealistic stance on nuclear issues in the wake of geopolitical changes. The rise of China is only one of the factors of the new Japanese policy and certainly not its central feature. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nThere is a mutual appreciation of each other’s role in the new Asian order that brings India and Japan closer.\nThere is a need for some details about the history of India-Japan bilateral relations. Japan has followed an independent policy towards India and it has not necessarily been a consequence of the US policy.\nThe author should also include a discussion on the Declaration on Security Cooperation and the subsequent Action Plan along with CEPA. The former will have a bigger impact on India Japan relations.\nThe arguments can be substantiated using trade data. CEPA will open the door for smaller companies which have been absent in India Japan trade relations. However\, how CEPA unfolds post Tsunami remains to be seen.\nNuclear cooperation and competition for permanent UNSC seat are related\, how they develop will be interesting.\nNeoclassical realism needs to be fully utilized as a framework. Domestic consumption can be considered as one important factor under this framework. Timeframe would validate the argument more succinctly.\nThe author should clarify whether it’s delayed realism or reluctant realism on the part of Japan.\nThere needs to be more focus on Indian writings on the subject.\nIn 1998\, Japan was hurt more because of the Indian tests because it had more expectations from India than from Pakistan.\nBilateral maritime cooperation is equally important as nuclear cooperation\, and the author needs to include some discussion on that.\n\nReport prepared by Avinash Godbole\, RA\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/playing-catch-up-japans-foreign-policy-towards-india-a-case-of-delayed-realism
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195904
CREATED:20231224T103810Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T043244Z
UID:64124-1300426200-1300426200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Bangladesh- Northeast India- Myanmar: the connectivity corridor
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Professor Partho GhoshDiscussants: Dr Ram Upendra Das and Dr Nitya Nanda
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/bangladesh-northeast-india-myanmar-the-connectivity-corridor
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195904
CREATED:20231223T220638Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250316T235946Z
UID:63582-1301031000-1301031000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India-Japan Economic Relations: Focus on the DMIC
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor V P Dutt\nDiscussant: Professor Mohammad Badrul Alam \n \nThe broad theme of Dr. Rajaram Panda’s presentation was India-Japan economic relations\, while the key focus was on the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC). At the outset\, he made it clear that the paper would not attempt to examine India-Japan economic relations in detail\, but only examine the development of the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor project since it is “singularly going to dramatically transform the complexion of India-Japan economic ties in the coming two decades.” \nThe DMIC is a hugely ambitious development project on either side of the Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC) of the Indian Ministry of Railways with a band of 150-200 kms. It was conceptualised as a global investment and manufacturing destination with emphasis on expanding the manufacturing and services base\, and establish DMIC as the global manufacturing and trading hub. The project\, according to Dr. Panda\, “is going to catapult the bilateral relations to a level that will be the envy of other nations in Asia.” \nCalling DMIC “a unique application of the Public Private Partnership approach to infrastructural development in India\,” Dr Panda added that a holistic approach towards the bilateral relationship is required to reap the benefits of the partnership. In that regard\, materialisation of CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement) will strengthen the DMIC\, and India-Japan ties as well. \nPoints of discussion\n\nWhile considering the advantages of DMIC\, the government cannot afford to overlook issues such as land acquisition\, adequate safety measures\, and capability to save the project in case of natural disasters.\nA close examination of links between DMIC and CEPA should be included so that it helps to understand Japan’s rationale for extending support for the project.\nExplaining the role of DMIC and its contribution to overall India-Japan economic relations would add value to the paper. More attention\, therefore\, should be given to the tangible benefits the project accrues to the India-Japan economic relationship.\nRecent incidents in Japan have certainly affected the Japanese economy\, and it will be worthwhile to analyse its impact on the ambitious DMIC project.\n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-japan-economic-relations-focus-on-the-dmic
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T195904
CREATED:20231224T103810Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T044045Z
UID:64122-1301031000-1301031000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Does India have a Neighbourhood Policy?
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Shri Kanwal Sibal and Professor Sujit Dutta
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/does-india-have-a-neighbourhood-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR