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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101203T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101203T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T201734
CREATED:20231223T221138Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63622-1291354200-1291354200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indian Parliament and Sino-Indian Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prof. V P DuttDiscussant: Prof. Sumit Ganguly and Amb. Suresh Bhutani \nThe paper argued that the role of parliament in Sino-Indian relations can be assessed under following heads: debates on Addresses by President of India to joint sessions of Parliament\, ‘demands for grants’\, Annual Report of Ministries\, motions and resolutions\, statements\, questions\, etc. In addition\, the role of standing committees\, particularly on defence and external affairs\, and of the parliamentary consultative committees\, as well as exchange of parliamentary delegations and Parliamentary Friendship Groups can also be highlighted as providing a comprehensive picture of the role of the Indian Parliament so far as India-China relationship is concerned. Sino-Indian relations have figured and at times have drawn the attention of both the Houses of parliament. When we talk about Indian Parliament and Sino-Indian relations\, perhaps the role of political parties also figures automatically; after all\, parliament and political parties are intertwined. \nThe role of the Indian parliament in Sino-Indian relations predates even the Independence of the country and can be traced to the Provisional parliament called the Constituent assembly (Legislative) and that of the political parties\, particularly the Congress party\, and even prior to that when Nehru sent a medical mission led by Mohanlal Atal which included the legendary Dr. Dwarkanath Kotnis at a time when China was fighting Japan. \nDebates on foreign policy enable the government to demonstrate that Indian democracy works\, educate the electorate\, and legitimise the foreign policy. Parliamentary debates\, while often eloquent and lively\, merely serve to keep ministers vigilant\, but do not alter policy because they usually follow\, rather than precede\, governmental policy actions. However\, at times of crises\, Parliament rises to the occasion by playing a significant role in foreign policy making. As far as India’s relationship with China is concerned\, there is a degree of consensus among political parties. While the CPM has been sympathetic to China\, Socialists like George Fernandes and Mulayam Singh Yadav have been critical of China. But among major political parties there is a broad consensus. \nSecondly\, the role of parliament is minimized since the nature and structure of foreign policy making in a parliamentary polity is often characterized by a degree of secrecy considering its sensitive and strategic nature. Thirdly\, as far as Sino-Indian relationship is concerned\, South Block at times is not inclined to leave much space for other stake holders including the Parliament for the very reasons mentioned above. These are some of the inherent limitations while working on a project like assessing the role of parliament in Sino-Indian relations. Nevertheless\, parliament continues to be the fulcrum of the legislative and policy-making process and it is the pivotal institution through which omissions and commissions of the government are accounted for. \nAmb. Bhutani highlighted the procedures which parliament employs while discussing foreign policy issues. He also showed that in the initial years foreign policy had an economic dimension. For example\, when Prime Minister Nehru wanted to establish land cooperatives it was not received positively because people thought that he wanted to follow the Chinese or the Soviet model. In that sense\, economic policy was seen as intimately linked with foreign policy. \nOn the other hand\, parliamentary debates on the Tibet/China issue were resented by Beijing. It felt that New Delhi had no right to discuss matters pertaining to Chinese domestic issues and saw it as Indian interference in China’s domestic affairs. Meanwhile Nehru had to let the debates go on since they served as a safety valve when emotions were running high within India after the ‘liberation’ of Tibet by the People’s Republic. As a result of these debates China condemned India as well as the Dalai Lama. \nProf. Sumit Ganguly highlighted the fact that the paper attempts to cover a large gamut of issues and it should try and focus on one or at the maximum two time periods. As the area which is being covered is huge the debates appear to be moving from one topic to another. He also said that there is a need to show that Nehru’s understanding on China was not that nuanced and he was not clear about his stance throughout. He also asserted that the Parliament needs to take a stronger stance on current issues. He stated that Parliament needs to follow what are the outcomes of the scheduled meetings to discuss the border problem and what is the progress being made as a result of these meetings. \nSome other points that were highlighted during the discussion include the comment that paper gave the impression that only Congress members took part in active discussions. There were also suggestions that the author can simply limit his focus on the Indian parliament’s role when it comes to the Tibet issue since in any event the border issue is related to it. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Prof. Dutt stated that Parliament becomes very important in times of crises. He also said that Dalai Lama’s flight and its ramifications have not been included in the paper. He suggested that if the author refers to the Parliament papers and discussions it will add more depth to the argument of the paper. \nReport prepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-parliament-and-sino-indian-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101210T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101210T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T201734
CREATED:20231223T221138Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63619-1291959000-1291959000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Is Reintegration and Reconciliation a Way Forward in Afghanistan?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Mr. Rana BanerjiDiscussants: Professor Anwar Alam and Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva \nPresentation\nThe principle theme of the paper is that “the idea of national reconciliation and integration per se as a precursor to much desired stability in Afghanistan\, however fragile it may be\, cannot be denied”. The main conclusions of the paper are as follows: \n\nWith the level of violence at an all time high\, the Afghan war is certainly peaking and entering into a new phase.\nIn the given circumstances\, Kabul and the West are not in a position to lay down terms for negotiations with the top Taliban.\nThere is a general perception that growing demand for reconciliation with the Taliban in its current form will only work to the advantage of the Taliban and Pakistan. Any withdrawal of the Western troops at this time would almost certainly lead to a Taliban regime. \nA top down approach emphasizing on direct negotiations is not likely to work in the current scenario partly because\, 1) the top insurgent leadership is hostage or takes orders from the Pakistani establishment and 2) they believe that the West will exit soon and thus do not need to negotiate with Kabul or the West.\nThe peace process in Afghanistan at a larger scale may also be considered as a battle between neo – Islamic versus traditional Islamic ideals. \n\nExternal Discussant 1: Dr. Gulshan Sachdeva\nDr. Gulshan Sachdeva highlighted the following points with respect to the presentation: \n\nMany other issues like security\, development\, exit strategies\, aid effectiveness etc. are all going on simultaneously in Afghanistan and need to be discussed\, perhaps in a separate project or paper. \nMost people will agree that some amount of dialogue and reconciliation is needed\, be it in Afghanistan or any other country in conflict.\nThe question to be considered is: how the Reintegration and Reconciliation (R2) process is being discussed in Afghanistan; and what is the context? Furthermore\, is R2 part of an exit strategy or the larger nation building process? Dr. Sachdeva mentioned that these were the poignant questions that could be considered in detail in a separate project\, which would compliment this paper. \nIt was highlighted that the R2 is not a Kabul-led process\, and was an initiative of the West. It was suggested that the R2 has been forced on Kabul by the West. This would make the operationalization of the R2 process extremely difficult. Furthermore\, one needs to go beyond the statements of statesmen to see whether it is a Kabul-led process or not.\nDr. Sachdeva suggested that the paper could also discuss in some detail the question of whether India’s position on R2 is a tactical or a strategic shift\, and whether there is any change in the Indian position and\, if so\, then why? \n\nExternal  Discussant 2: Prof. Anwar Alam\nThe following were the suggestions given by Prof. Anwar Alam: \n\nProf. Alam stated that clarity about the objective of the R2 process is needed. He suggested that the difference in the priority with respect to R2 among various countries ought to be considered. R2 has emerged in view of the failure of NATO to tame down Taliban and in the context of US exit strategy. \nProf. Alam stated that the author is right in observing that the peace process is linked to the state building process. But the author must elaborate what he means by state building process. Dr. Alam posed the question: what is the cultural imagination of state building process\, i.e. governance centric state building process? Elaboration on this aspect was suggested for the paper.\nIn addition to the aforementioned points\, Prof. Alam also emphasized on the need to explore the role of Saudi Arabia\, Iran and Pakistan in the R2 process in Afghanistan and how Iran and Saudi Arabia are playing games. \n\nInternal Discussant 1: Col. Ali Ahmed (retd.)\n\nThe military prong was not getting the desired results. Therefore one needed to consider and strengthen the political prong and the peace process; but the peace prong may not go anywhere due to the current form and nature of the conflict. \nIt was suggested that if the US domestic factors change\, the West may have to leave soon\, and without honour.\nThe capability of President Karzai to take care of the peace process was questioned. It was noted that the Karzai government can’t take care of Kabul governance which puts a question mark on its ability to handle the Peace Process. Additionally\, if the peace process catches momentum\, India will have to be on board too and India must use its goodwill during the peace process. \n\nInternal Discussant 2: Dr. Ashok Behuria:\n\nThere are other components in addition to the US and the Taliban to the peace process and R2 such as Pakistan\, Iran\, India\, the US  – Pakistan relations\, and India – Pakistan relations. \nDr. Behuria stated that the Taliban would not come to the negotiation table when they are on the rise and the exit of US forces appears imminent. \n\nFloor discussion:\nThe following points were made by the audience: \n\nThe R2 process will not succeed if Pakistan continues to use Taliban as a strategic asset. \nThe Taliban is not keen on supporting Afghan peace process as they are under no pressure to accept this. Furthermore\, Taliban are an ideological party with specific goals which cannot be compromised.  \nIndia enjoys a tremendous amount of goodwill among the people of Afghanistan\, but India is not capitalizing on its soft power. \nIt was suggested that the West wants to exit Afghanistan and hence the peace process has been initiated\, therefore the Taliban and many Afghans consider the Kabul-led peace process to be a joke.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/is-reintegration-and-reconciliation-a-way-forward-in-afghanistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101224T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101224T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T201734
CREATED:20231223T221125Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63616-1293168600-1293168600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China’s ‘New Multilateralism’ and the Rise of BRIC: Realist Interpretation of a ‘Multi-Polar’ World Order
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Panda’s paper treats the rise of multilateralism in the context of the decline of US power. It locates itself in the larger debate on multilateralism and the rise of new powers. In this context\, it deals with three central questions: a) Is China taking the lead to formulate a ‘New World Order’? b) What is the Chinese perception of BRIC? C) How does the scope of BRIC permit both China and India to cooperate\, whether cooperation is possible or it is just a rhetorical adjustment? \nThe term BRIC (Brazil\, Russia\, India and China) was coined in 2001 and gained currency following the Goldman Sachs Report of 2003. The collective economic capacity of the BRIC countries is huge. With an average annual growth of 10.7 per cent during 2006-08\, BRIC countries have become major contributors to the world economy. By 2050\, BRIC countries will be four of the top six global economies. Similarly other numbers emerging from BRIC have been equally impressive. \nChina’s serious involvement in interest based multilateral institutions has created the debate on whether it seeks to influence\, shape or preserve the status quo in global affairs. Chinese desire of ‘new’ multilateralism with “multi-polarism” indicates a “double-track” strategy to deal with the “rising” Western opposition\, and to shape the Chinese-desired future structure of world politics. The Chinese treat BRIC as not just an economic entity but as one having a strategic component as well. Involvement in multilateral bodies might allow Beijing to deflect doubt about its intentions while continuing to increase its global power and ambitions. It can also allow China to work with mainstream developing countries to expand its clout and formulate new global rules without having to fulfil the requisites of the developed countries. \nRealistic Interpretation of Chinese Strategy\nAccording to the author\, realism would indicate that China’s increasing participation in cross-regional multilateralism is aimed at cooperating with other powers having similar interests for mutual benefit. For instance\, China is associated with BRIC primarily to design its own desired world order. This notion suggests a zero-sum dynamics rooted in a struggle for relative power\, in which countries vie for strengthened ties with rival powers like India. Seen in this light\, BRIC is a gadget of “economic” statecraft as China pursues a “multipolar” strategy. \nPost-Cold war global politics created doubt over the possibility of a unipolar world order. Many strategists relied on structural realism and balance of power to forecast that uni-polarism would not last long. Since the 1980s\, Chinese strategists have emphasized on both ‘uni-polarity’ and ‘multi-polarisation’. There is less agreement\, whether the current world order is really unipolar\, multipolar or in transition. In tandem with these thought processes\, building cooperation and accommodation has been the hallmark of Chinese strategy towards global issues. \nCoordinating policy at the level of BRIC is not easy\, given that their interests clash at the ground level. For instance\, India and Brazil have set their goal for permanent membership of the UN Security Council\, while China and Russia are opposed to it. BRIC could be a catalyst for resolving many pressing problems like the North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions\, containing the threats in Pakistan\, stability in Central Asia\, climate change\, running the world trading system\, etc.  \nChina’s perception of BRIC\nWhile it is too early to conclude that the USA is no more the supreme power\, Chinese do recognize the importance of “newly emerging powers” as a force. Chinese cooperation in the BRIC format should not necessarily be conceived as a response to US hegemony. For China\, besides reducing the over-dependence on the US on multilateral issues\, cooperating with other BRICs serves several functions like endorsing multi-polar dialogue\, links with developing countries\, economic diplomacy in areas like energy and climate change\, promote public diplomacy. The multi-polarization process is understood in China as involving a twofold scope: the rise of developing countries; and the interactions and readjustments of relations among powers. \nConclusion: China has deepened its cooperation with BRIC and would like to live with the current order of world politics till it grows to a distinctly new higher level. China remains the crucial player in BRIC. Following a “cooperative strategy” remains the key feature in Chinese diplomacy\, as China steps up its calculated steps to gain energy supplies\, reforming international financial institutions\, capturing vibrant markets and countering rising powers in the process\, etc. What China is advocating currently is to advance the global order through an improvement in the global powers’ relations and through overcoming the areas of dissatisfaction for a more transparent and vibrant world order.  \nDiscussants\nAmb. S. Bhutani\n\nIn present day international relations\, there is a meshing of economic interests along with commonalities of perceptions on trade\, energy and environment.\nCurrency reforms issue will hurt BRIC since China’s policy is well known. Its willingness to reform policies will be important but its role is also limited. If any other currency devalues then Chinese export led model will also come under threat.\nThe author should use references in a more organised manner; on occasion it is not clear whether it is the perception from the reference cited or the perception of the author himself.\n\nAmb Rajagopalan\n\nIBSA started the trend of interest based multilateral process. Who coined BRIC is irrelevant from the point of view of the present paper\, although it remains a Russian idea to begin with.\nIndia is the common member in all the interest based groups\, then the centrality of China to BRIC as the author argues is questionable. There needs to be more focus on Brazil. Lula has been one of the initiators within BRIC.\nThere is confusion between the title and content. That needs to be sorted out.\n\nInternal Discussants\n\nThere is a contradiction between title and subtitle\, there is no realist critique as such in the paper.\nThere are multiple variables which reduces clarity and diverts focus. In addition\, use of tables at times is unnecessary.\nThere is internal contradiction in the paper. This needs to be looked at more carefully.\n\nGeneral Discussion\n\nThe paper needs more stress on the Russian and Brazilian perspectives of BRIC. That will help gauge the effectiveness of BRIC. How does the MEA approach BRIC can also be factored in the discussion.\nToo many variables make the paper less effective. Some form of tightening would help.\nFuture nature of multilateralism should be discussed.\nWhy author selects BRIC as the most important case is not clear. It needs to be mentioned since BRIC has commonalities with other similar groups.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-new-multilateralism-and-the-rise-of-bric-realist-interpretation-of-a-multi-polar-world-order
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101224T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101224T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T201734
CREATED:20231224T104020Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T045100Z
UID:64141-1293168600-1293168600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Revisiting the Debate on Autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nVenue: Room No. 5\, IDSA \nChairperson: Shri Dhirendra SinghDiscussants: Ms. Sushobha Barve & Shri Iftikhar Gilani
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/revisiting-the-debate-on-autonomy-of-jammu-and-kashmir
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T201734
CREATED:20231223T221125Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63614-1293687000-1293687000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A case for Increasing FDI CAP up to 100 per cent in India's Defence Industry
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri V K MisraDiscussants: Shri Amit Kumar Singh and Shri Rahul Gangal \nThis paper revolved around two key questions: Why does India need higher FDI in defence industry? And how much the FDI limit should be increased? Highlighting the present FDI policy of India\, Mr Behera said that India has allowed FDI up to 26 per cent in its defence industry since 2001. However\, the policy has so far not succeeded in attracting any major financial or technological inflows into the country\, primarily because of the lack of incentivisation of the policy to the foreign investors. He argued in favour of increasing FDI cap up to 100 per cent and pointed out that keeping in view India’s underdeveloped R&D and production base\, and various defence industry-related policies and provisions that are contingent upon liberal flow of FDI\, an increase in foreign investment cap up to 100 per cent would be logical\, instead of adopting a fixed cap-based method\, which may be constrained in allowing some desirable inflows. \nMr Behera argued that the absence of any meaningful FDI inflows into India – both\, financial as well as technological – has led to a strong debate in the country. In response to the Ministry of Commence and Industry’s (MoC&I’s) Discussion Paper of July 2010 which argued in favour of increasing FDI cap up to 74 per cent\, a cross section of industrial stakeholders ranging from industrial associations\, labour union\, law firms\, foreign company and consultancy firm have come out with their own views. He said that the views of these stakeholders are divided along three major lines; i) FDI limit be retained at 26 per cent; ii) FDI could be allowed to a maximum of 49 per cent subject to certain conditions such as minimum financial inflows is US $100 million and compulsory inflow of technology; and iii) FDI should be increased to 74 per cent. He pointed out that the majority of the industry as represented by their big associations\, such as the ASSOCHAM\, CII\, and FICCI\, has not favoured an increase of FDI beyond 49 per cent. Moreover\, the conditions they have proposed for 49 per cent FDI is stringent and highly discouraging for any foreign company to opt for this route to enter the Indian defence industry. \nThe author was of the view that in a globalised world\, FDI has been an important vehicle for external source of finance. However\, the volume and growth of inflows notwithstanding\, FDI inflows are often fraught on political grounds\, as inflow of resources are invariably linked with controlling of assets\, which the receiving countries are often reluctant to shed for variety of reasons\, national security being the critical one. He noted that although many counties have devised detailed mechanism to filter foreign investment into strategic sector\, a very few countries have a blanket ban on inflows after a certain level. Among them\, India and UAE have a blanket ban on FDI after a certain threshold. While India does not allow more than 26 per cent FDI in defence industry\, UAE restricts all foreign investment to 49 per cent\, unless the investment falls in its Free Trade Zones. \nIn response to the question why India needs higher FDI in defence industry\, Mr Behera said that foreign investment in defence industry is a part of India’s broader FDI policy\, intended to “bring attendant advantages of technology transfer\, marketing expertise\, introduction of modern managerial techniques and new possibilities for promotion of exports.”  However\, even after nine years of its being existence\, the defence FDI policy in its present form has not been able to accrue the intended advantages in a meaningful way. Considering India’s poor R&D and production base\, and the country’s desire to enhance domestic defence production\, Mr Behera suggested that an increase in FDI cap beyond the present limit would be desirable for technology transfer and for meaningful ties between Indian and foreign companies. In addition\, an increase in FDI cap would also likely facilitate effective functioning of the offset policy and “Buy and Make (Indian)” procurement provision. He\, however\, argued that given the sensitivity attached to defence industry and national security\, all defence-related FDI could be subject to wider review by the empowered Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB). \nAt the end\, he said that although a higher FDI cap up to 100 per cent would create an enabling environment for technology transfer\, and setting up joint venture companies\, the indigenous industry\, given its size and base\, would continue to play major role in India’s defence industry. He\, therefore\, concluded by emphasising that there is a greater need for energising the indigenous industry\, both private and public sector\, so as to enable them to play a more pro-active role.  \nShri Rahul Gangal: Increasing FDI limit in defence industry is not the only issue. There are other policy dichotomies which also need to be considered while discussing about increasing the FDI limit in defence industry. He focused on some key aspects such as: the foreign investors want ownership in the JVs while making investments in vital sectors. Second\, the present FDI policy is also not generating more interest and motivation among outside investors. Third\, they also want to have insurance of their investments. Fourth\, the investors are interested only investing in those sectors where their interests are protected. They are not interested to create other new JVs if that will not yield interest. Five\, the investors also want to have their position or control over key policy decisions. In addition\, he pointed out the question of what will happen if these JVs start marketing the products to gain profit. He emphasised that these important issues need to be focused while thinking about increasing the FDI limit. \nShri Ashok Kanodia: There is a need to define the national objectives while talking about increasing FDI limit. What actually India wants to achieve by increasing FDI limit in defence industry? The US and other western countries are more concerned about creating jobs. How many jobs and skills have been created in India by FDI? The present FDI policy of India started in 2001 and nine years is a long period to assess the policy. What are the policy initiatives created for the JVs? On purchasing of technologies\, he said that one does not buy defence technologies from a single vendor. He agreed with Mr Behera that many of the policies that he recommended in his paper have already been made to the government case-by-case basis. He pointed out that protecting the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and seriousness of the JVs are the two important things which are essential for creating new JVs. Finally\, he said that what nation wants to achieve by increasing FDI limit\, for this\, we need to take a holistic approach while arguing for increasing the FDI limit and for creating new JVs.  \nDr G Balachandran: This is a very current and relevant topic. However\, the presenter needs to be very clear and careful while using some concepts and facts. He pointed out that defence technology is very different from other technologies. So the scholar needs to be clear which kind of technology that he is referring to whether it is high technology\, critical technology\, defence technology or any other technologies and what kind of technologies that India would acquire by increasing the FDI limit since there are different license procedures required for each of these technologies. In addition\, by increasing FDI cap up to 49\, 74 or 100 per cent India will not be able to obtain these technologies from foreign companies\, unless the foreign companies’ government approve them. He pointed out that defence technologies are subject to strict regulations as well as international export control laws. So far as defence trade is concerned\, it’s a government to government cooperation. Moreover\, homogenous items or products can be obtained from many countries\, but critical components cannot be obtained because these are subject to stringent export control laws. And one cannot start industry for each item or product. He suggested that first and foremost\, there is need to understand technologies and then which kind of technologies that India wants to obtain by increasing FDI cap and without knowing this one cannot give 100 per cent FDI.  \nDiscussion: \n\nIn JVs\, government investment means government control. So\, how to maintain the balance between government investment and control? \nSince last two decades\, China is rapidly modernising its defence system. How this will affect India? And\, how China is able to bring more FDI into its country? \nSo far as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is concerned\, how does it would work with India? \nHow does India’s offset policy affect the FDI inflow? How it works in technology imports in terms of defence technology?\nIndia also needs to work on other important issues such as labour laws\, centre-state coordination\, better SEZ schemes and proper institutional mechanisms to attract more FDI in future. \nFDI which is vital to India’s growth has lacked a proper policy document and has been administered primarily through a series of press notes over many years.\nIndia is lagging behind China by 20 years in terms of infrastructure development. As India’s economy is rising and able to sustain its economic growth rate despite the global economic crisis\, it needs to pay greater attention to infrastructure development. Otherwise in long term basis\, it cannot compete with other major powers.\nWhile foreign equity participation has increased in most sectors\, there are still sectors where there is huge potential for FDI inflows. Further increases in FDI ceilings in sectors such as banking\, telecom\, power generation\, civil aviation\, food retailing\, insurance\, investing companies and the real estate sector will be required to achieve this potential. \nDo political parties have any stake in FDI? \n\nChairperson’s Remarks: Shri V.K. Mishra said that India’s defence industry has not attained critical mass in R&D and manufacture sectors. Joint venture\, thus\, is an important route to develop India’s R&D and production base as well as critical infrastructures. There are massive deficiencies in these sectors. So far as the FDI limit in defence industry is concerned\, unless we increase the present limit\, we cannot compete with other countries. India’s JVs in defence sector has been lost so far. However\, there is no dearth of opportunities. He cited that India’s joint venture with Russia in Brahmos missile programme is very successful. He hoped that such JVs will open in many other sectors with other countries. Shri Mishra concluded by observing that India’s defence industry is lagging far behind\, and that’s why new JVs need to be created in this sector by following a liberal FDI policy. But he noted that there is need of greater transparency in defence department to make it more effective.  \nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-case-for-increasing-fdi-cap-up-to-100-per-cent-in-indias-defence-industry
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T201734
CREATED:20231224T104020Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T044912Z
UID:64140-1293687000-1293687000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Amb. TCA RagachariDiscussants: Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra and Prof. Manmohini Kaul
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-defence-diplomacy-in-southeast-asia
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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