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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100903T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100903T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T203219
CREATED:20231223T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63639-1283491800-1283491800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China's Territorial Claim on Arunachal Pradesh Hostile Intentions and Local Fears
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador C DasguptaDiscussants: Professor Sujit Dutta and Dr. Srinath Raghavan \n \nThe presenter identified the more aggressive stance taken recently by China in staking territorial claims over the North Eastern parts of India as the key motivation for undertaking her study. She also expressed her desire to reach out to the people of the region through her paper. The differences in perceptions between India and China over the line of demarcation of the Sino-Indian border\, with the McMahon line denounced in China as an imperialist imposition\, was identified as a continuing problem. She then went on to examine the Chinese position on the boundary question from realist\, constructivist and neo-liberal perspectives.  \nDescribing China’s approach as “two-track”\, Dr. Goswami underscored China’s enhanced economic and diplomatic engagement with India alongside persistent territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh. Within the framework of realism\, the paper argued that China was following a “balance of power” framework vis-a-vis the India-US strategic partnership by upping the ante in Arunachal Pradesh to ensure that India remains tied down by its territorial disputes with China\, and is wary of its physical presence in the eastern border. The paper also extensively reviewed the ideational factors underlying such claims as well as their expression both in rhetoric and on the ground. Chinese perceptions of India’s strategic perspectives including its position on issues relating to Tibet – were examined. Viewed from one theoretical lens\, Chinese claims were attributed to  the neo-liberal school regarding exploitation of local mineral resources including  hydro-electric power potential. Infrastructure development sponsored by China and India’s neglect of the same were seen to foster a sense of alienation among communities in the North East. \nPossible alternative scenarios\, based on local narratives as well as on China’s evolving perception of itself as a player in the international system\, were outlined. A policy of aggressive deterrence on India’s part\, coupled with robust diplomatic action\, was advocated. “Act Local\, Think Global” was the message.     \nExternal Discussant: Dr. Srinath Raghavan\nDr. Raghavan drew attention to the intricacies of boundary demarcation processes and their implications for the case under discussion. He questioned the validity of the realist hypothesis that Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh were informed by an intent to “balance” India or the United States or both. On the theoretical front\, he also did not find any merit in the neo-liberal model as yielding an enhanced understanding of the situation .  \nIn his analysis\, China’s approach has been consistently marked by a preference for inter-sectoral bargaining and as such\, its stance on Arunachal Pradesh may not be construed as overly aggressive. He ended by projecting a scenario where the boundary dispute between India and China might at some stage be resolved despite all its apparent intractability.    \nExternal Discussant: Prof. Sujit Dutta\nProf. Dutta took the view that the contribution to enhancing the very limited understanding of local perceptions and spectrum of opinion on various key questions in the North East – was the most significant potential contribution of the paper. He cautioned against direct deployment of International Relations theories in deconstruction of Foreign Policy. Instead he favoured “Group-thinking Theory”\, “Rational Choice Theory” and such other cognitive theories that account for domestic motivations and decision-making for delivering richer analytical output.  \nIn his opinion\, the balance of power paradigm fell short of explaining Chinese behaviour as India’s partnership with the US is nowhere near as developed as to pose a threat to and elicit fearful reactions from China. On the practical side he explained the futility of attempting a bargain revolving around the settled population principle. On the question of Tibet he lamented the near-absence of diplomatic engagement by China\, characterizing its approach as self-serving.    \nInternal Discussants\nThe first internal discussant suggested that China’s stance vis-à-vis the North East and perceptions within the North East on critical issues could more usefully form the subjects of two separate papers. He contended that different theoretical perspectives were instrumental in decoding varied and separate aspects of the problem\, pointing to corresponding policy implications.  \nChina’s internal nationalist discourse and its staunchly anti-imperialist tenor were singled out by the second internal discussant as factors laden with implications for policy analysis and diplomatic engagement.       \nOpen-floor Discussion\nOne participant described the significance of shared tribal affinities across borders in the region\, asking why there have been no Chinese overtures to populations south of the McMahon line. For purposes of the study\, he recommended closer examination of the chronology and record of India’s policy pronouncements and actions in the North East over past decades. For a more balanced picture\, one participant suggested incorporation of Chinese writing on the subject.\nAccording to one intervention\, regional affinities in the North East have tended to vary across time and tribal divisions. The role of elites in the North East in playing up the Chinese threat to attract attention from the Indian centre was also mentioned. Water security and the related significance of the Bramhaputra were posited as considerations gaining in importance in China’s strategic calculus over coming decades. Threats posed to indigenous culture in the North-East by recent developments and interactions with surrounding regions were argued to be serious concerns. Addressing developmental concerns in the North East was argued as central to any sustainable resolution of on-going disputes. The gaping need for an in-depth ethnographic study of local conditions and aspirations was repeatedly raised in the house.          \nChairs Summary\nThe Chair advised sharper definition of the research question\, as the explanations for China’s original claims and its resurgent pursuit of these claims are likely to be different. He argued for paying closer attention to the growth-rate differential north and south of the McMahon line to discern implications for the future. He concluded by thanking the gathering for a fruitful discussion. \nReport prepared by Kalyani Unkule\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-territorial-claim-on-arunachal-pradesh-hostile-intentions-and-local-fears
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100910T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100910T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T203219
CREATED:20231223T221338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63638-1284096600-1284096600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Project Management in Border  Roads Organisation and related  Management Concerns
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Amiya Kumar GhoshDiscussants: Shri T P Velayudhan and Shri K K Y Mahinderkar \n \nThe infrastructure development in border areas is very important to bolster troop mobility and logistics supply. Realising the need for creation of a single entity for development of road network in far flung and backward areas of western and eastern sectors of the country Border Roads Organisation (BRO) was established in 1960 with the Director General Border Roads as the executive head. Since then the BRO has been engaged with the development of new roads\, maintenance of existing roads\, construction and maintenance of bridges\, border fencing\, snow clearance operations to keep the airfields\, passes and roads open for maximum period of the year to enable the Army to perform their role effectively and unhindered. The contribution provided by the BRO to maintain and create connectivity to keep the mobility is immense. However\, in the process of discharging the assigned role BRO faces several management challenges. Cost and time overrun has been identified by the presenter as the most persistent management concern of the BRO.  \nThe factors leading to time and cost overrun issue\, according to the speaker include line function set up for construction and supervision; diversification of the services in wide spread areas; lack of technical soundness and correct estimation\, execution methodology\, incorrect and unrealistic technical approach\, loose financial control\, underutilization of manpower resources or non utilization of technical manpower; underutilization or non utilization of the costly equipments; lack of airlift support system. Most of these factors are internal to the organization. There are some external factors as well leading to time and cost overrun\, such as land acquisition problems\, problems of payment of land compensation\, delays in wild life clearance\, forest clearance\, rising cost of construction materials\, unfavourable climatic conditions\, nature of terrain\, extent of rainfall and snowfall\, natural calamities like floods and changing course of rivers\, extremely hot climate and shifting dunes and dust storms in Rajasthan\, rarified atmosphere in high altitude areas\, limited working season\, insurgency\, inhospitable conditions\, shortages of hired labour etc. .  \nAccording to the speaker the process of preparation of works plan needs improvement. In any planning process at the time of its formulation\, the aspects of manpower planning and resource and logistics plan should be given utmost priority. Some of the internal and external factors are controllable by proper project management approach. However\, there are some factors which are beyond the control of the organisation. Therefore\, there is a need to address both types of concerns by adopting a balanced approach and through proper assessment of external factors before initiating execution of any project. Hence there is a need to review the entire system of plan preparation in BRO. Further the creation of large number of jobs needs to be avoided to devote scarce resources to priority sector job\, according to the speaker.  \nExternal Discussant\nBoth the external discussants have agreed that the time and cost overrun is a major problem of the BRO. However\, they felt that a holistic approach is required to analyse the factors leading to time and cost overrun problem. Humane and socio-economic issues involved in border road construction are discussed at length. Both the discussants have brought out the fact that agency and deposit work can not be avoided. There is a healthy match between Agency and General Staff work. Though outsourcing is recognized an essential alternative to supplement the limited departmental capability of BRO\, the inherent risk factor associated with outsourcing was discussed.  One of the external discussants has discussed the organizational complexities and labour problem in length. He has brought out the fact that due to various lucrative schemes available at the state level like NREGA\, BRO no longer attracts labour to work in the border areas under extreme condition. He feels inclusion of these complex issues would enrich the paper.  \nInternal Discussants\nCommand and control is identified as an important problem by one of the internal discussants. According to him recruitment of technically competent people and proper supervision can reduce cost overrun to a large extent. Structuring aspect of the paper was discussed by the other internal discussant.   \nGeneral Discussion\nIt came out very well at the end of the discussion that BRO is working under extreme condition. On the issue of outsourcing when one participant felt that BRO should outsource its work to giants like L&T\, another felt that outsourcing is a partial solution to the problem. The system needs be thoroughly reviewed to rectify the weaknesses. The ecological aspect was also touched upon by one participant.  \nChair’s Summary\nThe chair concluded that BRO is challenged by several problems apart from time and cost overrun. BRO regulations are outdated and they need to be re-looked and reviewed.  \nReport Prepared by Gulbin Sultana\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/project-management-in-border-roads-organisation-and-related-management-concerns
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100917T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100917T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T203219
CREATED:20231224T104117Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T045523Z
UID:64154-1284701400-1284701400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Strategic Importance of Turkmenistan for India
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell\nChairperson: Prof. R P Kaushik\nDiscussants: Prof. Sanjey Pandey and Brig (retd) Arund Sahgal
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/strategic-importance-of-turkmenistan-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100924T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100924T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T203219
CREATED:20231223T221338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63637-1285306200-1285306200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Utility of Force in the India-Pakistan Context
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Maj Gen (retd) D. Banerjee\, AVSM\nDiscussants: Col. Vivek Chadha and Shri Anit Mukherji \n \nAli Ahmed introduced the paper by saying that he is going to bring the practise out of the theory. He assessed the utility of force for India in addressing its Pakistan problem. He explained that India has been a victim of Pakistan’s proxy war for over two decades and relations between the two countries remained very adversarial with costs\, risks\, uncertainties and opportunity costs. To deal with this problem\, India has been adopting a strategy of restraint against Pakistani provocations through subconventional deterrence where option for use of force is being kept in reserve. But the continuation of Pakistan’s proxy war against India proves that subconventional deterrence is only partially effective. In recent years\, India has been attempting to strengthen its deterrence by both defence acquisitions and doctrinal evolution. He pointed out that thinking through the possibility of use of force can help addressing the Pakistan problem. He\, however\, said that any kind of use of force must be in light of India’s national aims and objectives. \nHe provided an overview of political and strategic aims for India in addressing its Pakistan problem with use of force. He also provided operational objectives that are to be provisioned by the implementation of the service doctrines\, to include Cold Start. He opined that once strategic objectives are achieved in light of political aims\, joint objectives are framed from which\, in turn\, service specific objectives are derived. He also spoke about the diplomatic and intelligence instruments for achieving the stated objectives. He emphasised that at the diplomatic level\, use of India’s soft power\, economic leverage and the influence of the Diaspora would be more useful.  \nIn the second part of his presentation\, he outlined the conflict scenarios in which military forces are likely to be used. He said that the proximate cause of conflict between the two countries is most likely to come out from a terrorist attack of the magnitude of Mumbai 26/11 and its linkage with the Pakistan establishment would compel India to take military action. He suggested that for India to see the gains\, economic consequences of such military actions need to be calculated before hand. In the light of aims\, objectives and methods\, he also outlined the three possible outcome scenarios of such military actions as benign\, benign-malign and malign scenarios.  \nHe identified that use of force can be more effective if it is melded with other instruments of national power. Besides\, sweeteners need to be offered to Pakistan; otherwise it would turn into a risky coercive exercise into one of compellence with questionable efficacy. He said that given the attendant problems of application of force\, a non-military resolution of outstanding issues must instead be pursued in right earnest. In the end\, he said that a limited war is useful in conditioning Pakistan\, but for that diplomatic and political prongs need to be worked as much as the military and intelligence prongs of strategy.  \nAnit Mukherji suggested that the paper needs to include interviews of government officials in defence services\, ministry of defence\, politicians\, experts\, etc. He opined that there is not much of discussion on military doctrine in India. So far the Cold Start doctrine has not been operationalised in India. To destroy terrorists camps\, could army really operationalise this. In case of full-fledged war\, it could not be operationalised. He suggested that the lessons learned during Operation Parakram need to be studied. \nCol Vivek Chadha said that utility of force need to be assessed taking into account three areas where international conflict still prevails i.e. i) Afghanistan\, ii) Iraq\, and iii) West Asia. He said that force is not always necessary to achieve the stated strategic objectives. For instance\, despite military mobilization during Operation Parakram\, how far those objectives were achieved. So far as Kashmir issue is concerned\, its solution lies more within than outside. The issue can be resolved within politically and through socio-economic measures. He pointed out that India needs to resolve Kashmir issue within to keep Pakistan out. He suggested that one must look at the timeframe and location of such military actions.  \nCdr. Sarabjeet Singh Parmar suggested a focus on two aspects: i) Grand strategy and ii) Use of military doctrine. He said that these two should be prepared and assessed before taking any military actions. In case of grand strategy\, national values and interests need to be clearly defined and political direction taking into account the international legal limitations should be shaped accordingly. He added that operationalisation of war doctrines and its consequences must be assessed in advance to see military gains. \nProfessor Sumit Ganguly suggested four areas of focus. First\, the presenter needs to come out clearly to describe what lessons could be learned from Bernard Brodie and Clausewitz for India-Pakistan context and how could they be useful in explaining the possible use of force in India-Pakistan conflict. Second\, he said that the deterrence strategy has failed in the context of Pakistan and it has its limitation to deter Pakistan to undo something that has already been done. Third\, citing the US strategic goal of regime change in Iraq and its ramifications\, Prof. Ganguly pointed out that no Indian would like to change the regime in Pakistan. Finally\, he suggested that the political\, strategic and military deterrence strategy that the presenter has proposed is abstract\, and that he needs to explain what exactly could be carried out through these strategies. He added that in case of India-Pakistan conflict\, diplomacy will play a crucial role than military strategy.  \nDiscussion\n\nIn the 1980s NATO had created the Air Land Battle Doctrine in Europe to fight against the USSR. However\, it used this doctrine only during Iraq war. There was a Pakistan connection in September 11\, 2001 terrorist attacks as well as in the recent Times Square plot. Mr. K. Subrahmanyam asked as to why did not the US carry out military operations against Pakistan?\nOne participant asked how the three scenarios detailed by Ali Ahmed applied to incidents like the 26/11 Mumbai attacks? Moreover\, the idea of sweetener has to be fleshed out.\nAnother participant pointed out that one does not go to war to concede. Moreover\, if the fundamental cause of using force against Pakistan is regime change\, then it would bring about the worst result. Instead\, the focus should be on changing the behaviour of the Pakistan Army.\nHow can a limited war gravely affect India’s economy? This assertion needs to be substantiated. Second\, a limited war cannot be fought to effect regime change in Pakistan\, but at best to influence the calculations and strategy of Pakistan. Moreover\, to talk about a general peace with Pakistan at the end of such a conflict is also far-fetched. Further\, instead of attempting the rather difficult task of compelling Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism\, it would be far more easier for India to exploit the internal turmoil within Pakistan as a means to influence its decision makers.\nIn view of the escalation and de-escalation of war\, de-escalation of war is a very rational choice for India while escalation of war is a rational choice for Pakistan. By escalating limited war\, Pakistan can build international pressure on India. Question is what would be Pakistan’s nuclear option during this limited war.\nSo far as giving sweeteners to Pakistan is concerned\, this has failed in the last 60 years. Whether Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Lahore diplomacy or Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s opening to Pakistan and providing money to flood victims\, everything fails. During Kargil war\, it was because of US and China’s pressure that Pakistan withdrew troops from Line of Control. Then what kind of sweeteners do you want to give to Pakistan? What is your framework? What you want to exclude and include?\nEngagement through dialogue fails against Pakistan and does not help improve the situation. Can military and intelligence strategy make Pakistan hesitant?\nMany people are worried about the Cold Start doctrine. It was prepared after Operation Parakram. India has fought four wars with Pakistan. After the incidence of 26/11 Mumbai attack\, where you could put the Cold Start doctrine against Pakistan. During chemical or biological war what could be done?\nIn the last ten years\, the international environment has changed significantly. The US fought two wars – Afghanistan and Iraq which led to geopolitical change in this region. India links Pakistan in its Central Asian strategy. India and Pakistan relations will depend on this. What can be done in this regard?\n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nMaj Gen Banerjee complimented Ali Ahmed and said that the paper can be summarized in two points i.e. i) Utility of force against Pakistan and ii) Search for a doctrine to do that which will continue. He pointed out that the use of nuclear option between India and Pakistan will be trilateral where China will be included. However\, he emphasized that nuclear exchange between the two countries during a crisis will tantamount to a policy failure. He concluded by thanking the panellists and the gathering for a constructive engagement.   \nReport prepared by Dr. Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-utility-of-force-in-the-india-pakistan-context
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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