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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090807T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090807T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T224048
CREATED:20231223T222039Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63686-1249623000-1249623000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Evaluating EU’s role in the Af-Pak Region
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Shantanu ChowdhuryDiscussants: Gulshan Sachdeva and Peter Garretson \nThe paper attempts to analyse the role of European Union in the Afghan-Pak region. Strategy in Af-Pak region has been widely debated since the U.S. President Barack Obama outlined a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on March 27\, 2009. European Union is a significant player in Afghanistan and the major member countries of the EU have been engaged in various programs in Afghanistan relating to security\, police training\, democratic institution-building\, counter-narcotics\, judicial reform apart from making their combined military contribution to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). However it is to be highlighted that the numbers do not actually reflect the combat-readiness\, interoperability\, stating power and the mandate dictated by national parliaments of the contributing member countries of the European Union. \nMukhopadhyay attempts to curve the role of EU in the Pak-Afghan region as a security actor. Initially the paper deals with the present European perception of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region and how it evolved since 2001. Instances from the major EU member countries e.g. Germany and the UK have been taken into account. According to the author\, it is a widespread belief in Europe that the EU always plays a secondary role to the US in conflict zones and in particular the success of their forces in Afghanistan would solely depend on the success of the ISAF. The EU aspiration is however apparent when the ‘low-profile’ Union wants to come out from the shadow of the US and attempts to project itself as a ‘credible’ global actor. The author points out that there has been a silent surge of European forces in Afghanistan while the total number of European troops in November 2006 was approximately 17\, 400\, it reached almost 27\, 400 in March 2009. As in July 2009 the number of European forces is approximately 29\,100 which is almost 45 per cent of the 64\,500-strong ISAF. On the eve of the Afghan presidential election on August 20th\, it is likely that the additional European forces would also be provided to conduct the elections. \nThe author discusses the outcome of the recently held first EU-Pakistan summit on June 17\, 2009 in Brussels. He emphasizes that by taking the decision to hold the summit with Pakistan\, the EU has accepted the obvious that Pakistan is no more the solution as a frontline state against terror but on the contrary the growing threat emanating from there is severally threatening the European security. The author suggests that the summit should be seen as a collective recognition by the European states that Pakistan is crucial to tackle the quick phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation process in the EU as whole. \nMukhopadhyay critically analyses the role of European media in augmenting the general awareness but also exaggeration of threats linked with Pakistan. A recent British instance in this regard has been analysed where a Sunday Times (July 4\, 2009) news report warned of an imminent overthrow of Pakistani state by British militants specifically the radical Islamist group\, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) by adopting means such as infiltrating the Pakistani Army as well as to persuade students in Pakistani institutes of higher education to establish a Caliphate based on stringent Sharia Laws. The author suggests that the British media should be more circumspect to publish such sensational reports which rather help the Radical Islamists of different hue to get more media coverage for which they always attempt hard. \nIn the subsequent section\, Mukhopadhyay analyses the divergence of approach which is observable between the US and its European counterparts particularly the United Kingdom. The US approach is an archetypal pillar-based counter-terrorism concept where President Obama underlines that the American aim stands on three Ds\, Disrupt\, Dismantle and Defeat Al Qaeda in the region in order to ‘prevent’ their return. According to the author\, it is apparent from the text where the US objective is to provide and preserve ‘international security\, on the other hand the European objective is more to secure their homeland as it is apparent in European policy documents. As a matter of fact\, following the US instance the UK also came out with its own policy document titled as “UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: The way forward”. The author points out that divergence in approach may also be identified in a post-9/11 scenario where most of the European countries have honed their counter-terrorism skills\, revamped their own security apparatus\, put in place a stricter visa regime and finally enhanced pan-European and even international intelligence cooperation\, rather than solely depending on combating Taliban forces in Afghanistan for which their forces are neither equipped nor ready. \nMukhopadhyay concludes his presentation by pointing out that initially the European forces were sent to Afghanistan mainly as a gesture of solidarity since NATO for the first time had invoked the Article 5 of collective self-defence. It should be noted that both the EU and NATO primarily worked on consensus and member countries were at liberty to undertake individual\, bilateral or an exclusive group-based approach. However repeated reminders by the NATO leadership have not been able to increase the European force level required to have a decisive turn to stabilise Afghanistan in a post-Taliban scenario. The European analysts have been emphasising on a coherent EU approach\, however still individual and bilateral approaches are continued as rules of the day. According to the author as the developments gets murkier in Afghanistan which is evident in insurgency reaching the Punjabi heartland of Pakistan\, terrorist attacks claiming lives of European nationals as well as diplomats and security at European homeland is threatened from the Afghan-Pak region\, it is high time to have a careful evaluation of European Union’s approach towards Af-Pak region. \nPoints raised during discussions\n\nIn fact Durand line is the real genesis of Af-Pak. Afghanistan is not prepared to renew it.\nBecause of 9/11\, there has been complete paradigm shift in international relations.\n\nSecurity contributions by European Union members are essential. Without it the US forces may be suffering fatigue factor.\nPakistan’s role has been very diabolical while dealing with the Taliban. Till 2001 they were openly supporting Taliban. After 9/11\, they tactically changed their role. In a statement Special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke said that Pakistan is concerned about eliminating Taliban in Pakistan but not in Afghanistan.\nIt should be understood that United States and NATO forces are fighting a war for us. Taliban is injurious to India.\nIt needs to be analysed what relevance Europeans have for India. Europeans are capable of shaping the forces in Afghanistan. The European number of troops have gone up from 17\, 000 to 29\,000.\nEuropeans are over represented in many institutions in Afghanistan.\n\nIt can be observed that in last two years\, Europe is now focusing on Pakistan simultaneously with Afghanistan.\nDiscussing about ‘European Union’ is confusing. It is better to discuss ‘Europe’ and its role in the Af-Pak Region.\nWhile analyzing the role of EU in the Af-Pak region\, it should be analysed that what is the overall utility of this analysis for the Indian policy makers and also what can Indian policy makers do to shape EU’s actions.\nIt should also be analyzed in the paper that what are the population size\, GDP and actual size of European forces and how much contributions these EU member countries have made to ISAF.\nThe paper should also discuss why is it important to have an extra- regional actor in the Af-Pak region.\nEuropean Union supports war but simultaneously they facilitate Islamic organizations as well.\nThe paper appears to be focusing more on Pakistan than Afghanistan.\nThe paper should also highlight how the Af-Pak region is a threat to European multiculturalism.\nEurope has an important role to play in counter narcotics operations in Afghanistan.\nPan-European proposition is problematic in nature.\nThe author should mention the relevance and importance of this subject. For that purpose a backgrounder would be worth incorporating. The focus of this paper needs to be sharper.\nTo deal with the crisis in the Af-Pak region\, regional approach would not be proper. Instead collective approach would be helpful.\nThere are roughly 10\,000 to 15\,000 thousand insurgents fighting in Afghanistan. A RAND study of all the insurgency in last 45 years around the world reveals that every insurgency takes on an average 14-15 years to die. But Afghanistan insurgency may take longer time\, about 15-20 years\, because of its topography and natural location.\nIn history insurgents have never negotiated. At this time it is not possible to have negotiated settlement because at present\, insurgents are having upper hand. It may happen two-three years later but not now. Taliban is loosing the battle but not the war.\nIf European forces withdraw form the region\, it will have direct implications for Afghanistan. It will have implications for India as well.\nIndia can not intervene in Afghanistan because it will not be acceptable to Pakistan.\nThe main question to be examined is what can lead to strategic success in Afghanistan.\nUnited States can not talk to Taliban without the help of India.\nEuropean counter terrorism structures are very recent. To resolve the Afghanistan problem\, support of Pakistan in essential.\nIt is interesting to observe that post Xinxiang riots whether China will start rethinking about its role in Af-Pak region.\nIran has a major role to play in stabilizing Afghanistan.\n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/evaluating-eus-role-in-the-af-pak-region
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090807T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090807T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T224048
CREATED:20231224T104500Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054930Z
UID:64201-1249623000-1249623000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Future of the Peace Process in Nepal
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300  \nChair: K V RajanDiscussants: Ashok Mehta and Siddarth Varadarajan
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-future-of-the-peace-process-in-nepal
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T224048
CREATED:20231223T222039Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63684-1251437400-1251437400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Revitalising the Ordnance Factories
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Vinod Kumar MisraDiscussants: V. K Chopra and G Balachandran \nThe aim of this paper is to analyse the reasons behind the poor performance of the ordnance factories (OFs) and recommend measures to revitalize them. To achieve this\, the author\, Laxman Kumar Behera\, identifies six core areas pertaining to OFs. After identifying the problems in these areas he goes on to suggest measures so that the functioning of the Ordnance Factories can be improved. \nStructure and Functioning of Ordnance Factories\nThe author is of the view that the structure of Ordnance factories has several weaknesses\, impacting the functioning of the Board\, and the performance of the factories. \nUnder the current dispensation\, the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) has limited functional autonomy. Unlike the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs)\, the OFB is mostly controlled by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in critical areas such as product development\, research and development (R&D)\, formation of Joint Ventures and in making commercial decisions. These restrictions have not allowed the OFB to graduate into an independent industrial enterprise. \nSecond\, the Board Members\, especially those responsible for the operating divisions and staff functions\, are not geared to take full responsibility in their areas of functioning. It is primarily because the members have neither time nor power under the current setup. Members of the Board are appointed at the verge of their retirement\, providing them very little time to oversee their job. \nThird\, members are considered ‘rubber-heads’\, since most of the production related decisions are taken in the Board meeting and executed through the heads of the concerned factories\, with little central monitoring by the Members who are supposed to head a certain group of factories. \nVarious committees have been constituted from time to time to recommend measures to energize the management of these factories. Despite repeated recommendations by various committees to corporatize the OFB\, the government has not done so\, apparently because of strong opposition from labour unions associated with these factories. The author recommends making these factories autonomous so as to make them independent in their areas of operations. However\, he notes that this autonomy should come with greater responsibility on the part of OFB. And as for making OFB more efficient the MoD needs to outline a time frame by which all the contracts are awarded to OFs on a competitive basis. \nRange and Depth of Ordnance Factories’ Production\nAccording to the author\, OFs have a wide range of products. But these are not enough to meet the requirements of the armed forces\, thus forcing the government to resort to direct import from others. These imports are from various countries such as Israel (towed gun and mortar)\, Italy (naval gun)\, USSR/Russia (naval gun\, towed gun\, SSM launcher and MRL\, Mobile AD system\, tank\, APC\, IFV)\, Sweden (towed gun)\, Poland (ARV)\, Slovakia (ARV)\, South Africa (APC/ISV) and UK (AEW). In addition to direct imports\, some of the items are also license-produced or assembled from SKDs and CKDs\, based on technical assistance from importing countries. \nThe author ascribes the lack of an advanced defence R & D base in India and within the organization in particular as the reason for the import of such a wide range of products. He stresses that the government needs to strengthen the in-house R&D facility of the ordnance factories to overcome this problem. \nExecution of Orders\nThe author views the timely execution of orders by the ordnance factories is often a source of acrimony between the OFB and the Armed Forces. The armed forces officials say that the factories are ‘simply unable’ to meet the production requirements\, affecting their operational readiness. They further say that the shortfall in OF production is often behind schedule\, even after the target for production is lowered from the original requirements. On the other hand\, OFs officials maintain that the shortfall is on account of factors remotely related to their production capabilities. They accuse the army of late finalization and placement of orders\, resulting in delay in the production programme. \nTo resolve this problem the author suggests that since the production could not be augmented in a short span of one year\, the armed forces could consider giving firm orders for 2 to 3 years. It would also be appropriate for the armed forces to engage the OFB more proactively during the stage of the finalization of services’ long-term perspective plan (LTPP)\, especially the part which pertains to factories. \nPricing of OF Products\nThe OFs operate on ‘no loss no profit’ basis. That is to say that the products are supplied to the Armed Forces at a price\, taking into account only the actual cost of production\, which include the costs of material and labour consumed and the overhead charges. However\, according to the author\, this cost plus mechanism of pricing is widely believed to be inefficient on three counts \nFirst\, the new system of determining and fixing the price of major items supplied to the defence forces is not working optimally because of delays in finalising and reporting the cost estimates at the time of price negotiations. \nThe second reason is related to efficiency in the usage of both labour and materials. Officials conversant with the functioning of factories state that the organization has a very high input usage rate\, due to lack of process improvement and skill up-gradation of the labour force. \nThe third factor is the issue of ‘surge capacity’. The surge capacity carries a minimum cost in terms of overhead charges. The only way the cost on this account could be reduced is through better utilisation of labour\, plants\, machinery and stores. Although the factories as a whole have been able to reduce the percentage of overhead charges to total cost of production over the years\, the reduction is hardly due to any efficiency gain. Moreover\, the reduction in overhead charges is not uniform across the group of factories\, which suggests an absence of systematic efforts to curb overhead charges. \nQuality of OFB Products\nThe poor quality of products is yet another area for concern for OFBs. It has been confirmed both in the Parliament and in the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) Report. Army officials\, both present and retired\, interviewed by the author said that most of the OF products are below mark\, and often the cause of loss of life to service personnel. To make the quality better the MoD of late has asked OFBs to move towards the process of self-certification\, a norm widely practiced globally. Though OFB has started self-certification of their products\, the items as of now are restricted to low-tech items like clothing and general stores. At present there is no time-frame for covering the entire product range. The author asserts that the MoD in consultation with the OFB should lay down the precise time frame\, by which all the items supplied\, including those overhauled by them\, would be self-certified. \nExports\nDespite giving OFBs some incentives exports have not really gone up over the years. At present\, only a fraction of their sales come from exports. Besides\, not all the factories are in the export business. There are several factors behind OFB’s poor export performance\, some of which are not in its direct control. For instance\, the OFB’s exports are limited to only those countries which do not figure in the ‘negative-list’\, as maintained and conveyed by the Ministry of External Affairs. Similarly\, the OFB cannot export some of its high-value systems such as tanks\, some ammunition and infantry fighting vehicles because they are based on foreign technology\, and require permission from its overseas collaborator for sale to third parties. The export potential is further constrained due to some of the OFB products’ non-compatibility with NATO specifications. \nAlthough the OFB of late has taken a few measures – such as procedural simplification\, hosting an “international generic” and product demonstration in major arms exhibitions – they have not resulted in any significant dividend. The author states that the lack of enthusiasm of customers is primarily because of two factors. First\, international customers are not yet convinced about the competitiveness of OFB products\, in terms of both quality and price. Second\, the OFB has so far not taken a corporate approach in establishing a brand image for its products. \nThe author concludes by saying that unless the foregoing aspects are taken care of\, there is little hope of revitalizing the ordnance factories. \nPoints raised during discussion\n\nInstead of increasing the range and depth of existing products there is a need to improve existing products.\nIs corporatisation the only viable solution to end deficiencies of OFs?\nOFs should give importance to core areas of specialisation and leave other parts to the corporate sector.\nDelays take place in the delivery of new products as it takes some time to prepare prototypes.\nTo increase the efficiency of OFBs the lead time of 42 months can be reduced to 24 months.\nThe credibility of Self Certification needs to be ascertained.\nThere should be a mechanism of Checks and Balances so as to increase the productivity of OFs.\nTechnological absorption is extremely low in OFs.\nThere is no reliable system to access the performance of OFs.\nThe export targets in OFs are set without estimating capacity and hence targets are never met.\nOFs should be run like businesses and should be incentivised.\nStudying OFs and OFBs is considered “unglamorous”. So very few studies are conducted on their way of functioning.\nThere exists a structural problem in the very set up in which OFs operate so the synergy among the Armed Forces\, DRDO and OFs is not present.\nThere is a lack of transparency\, accountability and inadequacy in terms of Information Technology in OFs.\n\nPrepared by Sandeep Anand\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/revitalising-the-ordnance-factories
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T224048
CREATED:20231224T104458Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054727Z
UID:64199-1251437400-1251437400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's Nuclear Command and Control: Perspectives from Organization Theory
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: K SanthanamDiscussants: Gurmeet Kanwal and Manpreet Sethi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-nuclear-command-and-control-perspectives-from-organization-theory
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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