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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T225316
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
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SUMMARY:Dragon’s Digital Eyes beyond the Himalayas: Online Chinese Nationalism towards Pakistan And India
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: S K BhutaniDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and M. V. Rappai  \nSince China underwent a series of reforms back in the 1970s\, the world has been witnessing sporadic symptoms of its widening presence in South Asia\, particularly in the contexts of India and Pakistan. It is more so in the post-Cold War period after the ‘People’s Daily Online’ connected to the Internet on January 1\, 1997\, utilizing cyberspace as a means to involve national sentiments and general responses on international issues in a big way. Since then\, the primary focus of Chinese cyber nationalists has been to retain China’s historical status as a respected power. Today\, Chinese cyberspace is often considered by many as a responsible factor in influencing Chinese policy making in relation to these two South Asian states. In this paper\, the author makes an attempt to review issues like evolution of online Chinese nationalism towards Pakistan and India; the central views in online Chinese nationalism towards the two states; the influence\, if any\, of the nationalist expression toward India and Pakistan on the actual foreign policy-making in China.  \nThe structural change in the international system at the end of the Cold War compelled the Chinese leadership to review and reshape its foreign as well as domestic policies. Since then\, while on the one hand\, China has been trying to improve its relations with neighboring states to deal with the US’ rising power in the region and quell the growing fear of encirclement by a coalition led by Washington\, there have also been consistent efforts by the Chinese people to revitalize China’s splendid civilization on the other. In recent years\, with China having the largest netizens in the world\, a certain section of Chinese nationalists have been able to intensify the offline nationalistic rhetoric within the state through online Chinese nationalism. In fact\, according to Stephan Halper and Jonathan Clarke\, “the internet has emerged as possibly the most important influence on public opinion\, not only accelerating the communications of news and information within China but also relaying news of unfolding events from the worldwide Chinese diaspora.” The Chinese\, particularly the young generation who have much greater access to the cyber world than the elderly\, have come to realize that they no longer need to secure direct or indirect interpretations from leaders\, journalists and Chinese officials (all members of the CCP)\, when they can analyze the truth by accessing the internet.  \nHowever\, Chinese youths’ access to the internet has created a sort of cyber-nationalism within the state which may prove quite a challenge in the long run for India’s security and strategic interests. It is evident from the anti-India sentiments overwhelmingly pouring out of a number of Chinese cyber sites. According to surveys conducted so far\, most Chinese netizens attach their preference to Pakistan as a more friendly state while considering India as less friendly. In the debates within Chinese cyberspace\, strong statements like how China can use Pakistan’s ‘fatal grudge’ with India for its own national interest clearly indicate how such ‘India bashing’ can create anti-India sentiments among Chinese public.  \nIt is believed that cyberspace in China has been able to bring about critical changes in its one-party dominated society. In fact\, “the unique characteristics of the internet such as instantaneousness\, anonymity\, and lacking borders have made it a convenient and powerful vehicle for citizens to assert themselves and have their voice heard in an institutionally less liberal and democratic environment”\, as rightly put by Bo Li and Yang Zhong in the book titled “The Internet and Political Participation in China.”  \nAlthough it is argued that popular online nationalism has been able to set a standard of what may be called ‘true patriotism’ in contrast to ‘state nationalism’\, it remains undeniably true that no alternative leaders or movements are emerging from the internet and the CCP continues to be sole political power. As regards to the size of cyberspace\, although China’s internet seems to be quite open to the world\, in reality\, it still offers a tactfully closed cyberspace. What is all the more interesting to note here is that most of the leading commercial websites are based on China\, where they continue to face a lot of pressure from the CCP. Above all\, despite growing popularity of cyberspace within China\, the credibility of the news on the website still remains in question. That is why\, the impact of cyber nationalism in China on the decision-making process is very limited\, even with the state’s foreign policy formulations in relation to India and Pakistan. \nPoints raised during the discussion:\n\nWhy and how Beijing has been able to use the media\, particularly cyberspace\, to meet its national interest by promoting Chinese nationalism?\nHow has the Chinese leadership creatively managed the freedom of internet users\n\nHas there been state support to galvanize internet usage in China?\nWhat is the penetration rate of anti-India sentiments through Chinese cyberspace? \nIs the US-India strategic partnership responsible for growing anti-India sentiments in Chinese websites?\nThe author mentions that Sino-Pak relation is a by-product of the Indo-US strategic partnership. However\, while Indo-US strategic relationship is quite a recent phenomenon\, Sino-Pak relations began decades ago. \nThe paper needs to analyze the impact of cyber nationalism on the larger population\, since as a proportion of the overall population\, netizens in India\, China and Pakistan still remain quite small.\nAt present\, Chinese hacking seems to pose a much greater threat to India than cyber nationalism. \nWhat has been the methodology adopted in selecting comments from the websites?\nDigital nationalism in China is a kind of proxy war against India.\nA brief overview of the evolution of Chinese digital nationalism is necessary.\nChinese Diaspora has a great impact on Chinese nationalism\, whether online or offline. Thus\, there is a need to analyze the extent of online communication between the Chinese in mainland China and those residing in other democratic countries.\n\nAn analysis should also be made on the influence of the internet on the process of Chinese policy making. \nIn the paper\, the author elaborates on how over the years\, Sino-Indian relations have undergone three specific changes: ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai’ of 1950s to ‘Hindi-Chini Bye-Bye’ of post 1962 war\, and then\, to ‘Hindi-Chini Buy Buy’ of post 1988. These three stages seem irrelevant as far as this paper is concerned. \nThe author mentions the forty-five minute long handshake between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Chinese President Deng Xiaoping in Beijing in 1988. This is not quite correct. \nDespite its booming IT sector\, India has not been able to master the intricate details of cyberspace system. To counter the growing anti-India sentiments pouring out of Chinese websites\, India needs to develop mastery over the functioning of internet network system at a rapid pace. We also need a systematic policy in computer technology to deal with the growing threats from Chinese cyberspace.\n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/dragons-digital-eyes-beyond-the-himalayas-online-chinese-nationalism-towards-pakistan-and-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T225316
CREATED:20231223T222216Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061940Z
UID:63699-1244179800-1244179800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A new wave of Terrorism in India
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Arun BhagatDiscussants: S Y Thapliyal and Bibhu Prasad Routray \nIn India\, the word terrorism came to be officially used for the first time in 1984 to characterise the violence in Punjab. This followed the enactment of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act of 1984\, the impulse for which was the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October that year. Before this\, all armed action by the various groups in the North East or by the Naxals were referred to as extremism or militancy or Naxalism. Subsequently\, the violence unleashed by domestic as well as foreign armed groups in Jammu and Kashmir came to be characterised as cross-border terrorism. \nThe 2007-2008 Annual Report of the Ministry of Home Affairs lists 32 different armed groups as banned terrorist organisations. Among others\, these include several armed groups in the North East as well as the two Maoist groups. Yet\, in the pages devoted to detailing what the report refers to as the “Current Status of Militancy in the North East” and in the section dealing with the “Naxal Situation\,” the words terrorism and terrorist are not mentioned even once! The report also characterises the violence in Jammu and Kashmir as “terrorism/militancy”\, in a bow towards the fact that all violence in that state does not constitute terrorism. \nTo avoid confusion about the phenomenon being confronted\, it is imperative to understand what terrorism is. Moreover\, a series of events in the last few years – the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai\, the various bombings carried out by the Indian Mujahideen\, and the involvement of Hindu radical groups in bomb-throwing – points to a new wave of terrorism focused on the Indian hinterland. This necessitates a change in India’s approach towards counter-terrorism from one focused purely on cross-border aspects to domestic issues as well. \nThis paper explores what terrorism is. It analyses the new wave of terrorism buffeting the Indian hinterland\, and excludes discussion of the Maoist insurgency\, the armed activities of the various armed groups in the North East\, and “militant” violence within Jammu and Kashmir. The paper also highlights some principles that should inform India’s approach to counter terrorism. \nWhile cross-border terrorism sponsored and supported by Pakistan has been a security challenge since the late 1980s\, a new wave of terror has begun to batter the Indian hinterland in recent years. Three distinct sets of players are involved in this new phenomenon. The first set comprises of Pakistani terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)\, which have since the late 1990s begun to expand their ‘jihad’ in Kashmir into the Indian hinterland. The second set is composed of a network of rage-driven Indian Muslim youth and Indian criminal outfits\, who\, with the support of the first set\, seek vengeance for the ‘sufferings’ inflicted upon their community. And the third set is formed by radical Hindu youth\, bent on retaliating against Muslims for the terrorist attacks carried out by the other two sets of players. \nTwo events triggered this new wave. The first was the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the communal riots that followed in parts of the country. The second event was the stalling of the separatist struggle in Jammu and Kashmir in the mid-1990s. Muslim youth and criminal networks were spurred by the Babri demolition and the ensuing communal riots to seek vengeance through terrorist attacks. Ten years later\, the tragedy in Gujarat provided further fuel to their anger. \nPakistan has been providing material support to them in this enterprise. And when the Hizbul Mujahideen’s separatist struggle in Jammu and Kashmir began to wane\, Pakistan began to funnel its own citizens and other “graduates of the Afghan war” into the state\, thus transforming a local insurgency into a transnational jihad. When neither this change in actors nor the Kargil misadventure could shake the Indian hold over Jammu and Kashmir\, the jihad was extended to the Indian hinterland in the late 1990s. This in turn incensed Hindu radicals who began to plan and unleash terror against innocent Muslims. \nIndia thus has to contend with three sets of terrorist actors – one purely foreign\, the second\, domestic groups with linkages to these foreign players\, and the third wholly domestic. \nThe approach to counter each of these players has to be distinct\, though there are bound to be commonalities in measures adopted. In the case of Pakistani terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba\, domestic counter-terror measures have to be accompanied by diplomatic efforts to force Pakistan into taking stringent action against these groups and even covert intelligence campaigns to disrupt the terror infrastructure in that country. \nIndia also needs to focus on domestic counter terror measures\, which have indeed received a fillip in the wake of the Mumbai attack. States have responded to terrorism by adopting a combination of several responses\, each of course specifically crafted to suit their particular circumstances. Though it might sound pusillanimous\, “appeasement” is a most pragmatic response. Not appeasement in terms of conceding terrorist demands\, but addressing the underlying causes that triggered the resort to violence in the first place. \nA second set of responses is in the domain of intelligence and the legal framework to deal with terrorism. The development and maintenance of databases about terrorist groups is essential. This is in turn contingent upon enhanced intelligence work and capabilities\, both human and technical. Related to this are greater intelligence and surveillance efforts through a network of closed-circuit television cameras\, psychological profiling\, infiltration of terrorist groups\, etc. \nThirdly\, it is crucial to identify and harden actual and potential targets like government buildings\, corporate houses\, vital installations like airports\, power plants\, and the like through security measures like x-ray baggage screeners\, metal detectors\, more security personnel\, etc. The idea is to make it as difficult as possible for terrorists to carry out attacks\, thus increasing the chances of mistakes and consequent reduction in the actual number of attacks. \nThe creation of special counter-terrorist forces and providing them with specialised training to deal with hostage negotiations is the fourth response. This needs to go hand in hand with the modernisation of the police force. \nImportant points raised in the discussion: \n\nIndia is the biggest victim of terrorism.\nThe biggest act of Hindu terrorism was the destruction of Babri Masjid.\nMajority community needs to change its mindset towards the Muslim community.\nRevamping the intelligence structure is the need of the hour.\nThere is complete lack of coordination among various security agencies. This has to be addressed.\nThere is urgent need for police reform.\nIs Indian Mujahideen an independent terror group?\nPakistan remains a security threat to India. India’s inability to deal with Pakistan has further compounded the situation.\nIndia should not expect much from the United States in dealing with Pakistan. However\, India may consider something like the US Department of Homeland Security.\nThere is an urgent need for political consensus on terrorism.\nAbove all\, there is need for security consciousness among the people.\n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-new-wave-of-terrorism-in-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090612T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090612T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T225316
CREATED:20231224T104529Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061831Z
UID:64214-1244784600-1244784600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Evaluating the "Hybrid" Character of China's Communist Regime
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: V P DuttDiscussants: Sreemati Chakravarti and Srikant Kondapalli \nThe presentation began on the assertive note that the Communist regime in China is now hybrid in nature. According to Dr. Panda\, the current ongoing transformation in China is clearly visible. The paper begins with conceptual formulations of ‘Hybrid regime’\, ‘democracy’ and ‘authoritarianism’ and then proposes a typology for the current Chinese communist regime and concludes with attempts to highlight the progressive trends in China’s state-society transformational politics. The paper attempts to analyse the nature of the present Chinese Communist regime and outlines the quantitative measurement of democratisation in China. \nConceptually categorizing various regimes\, the paper utilises the regime typology presented by Larry Diamond which was published in ‘Journal of Democracy’ as a research paper titled as “Election without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes” in 2002. While applying the Diamond’s regime categorisation to China\, Dr. Panda has placed the Communist regime in China close to the ‘hybrid category of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism’ than placing it in the politically closed authoritarian regime category. He however pointed out that the concept of hybrid regime is not a new one and it got popularised gradually. \nChanges in socio-political and legal conditions in China provide tangible evidence that the incumbent communist regime is no more authoritarian than it used to be earlier. It is a noticeable development in China that state-civil society relationship has been rationalised. Change has taken place because of reforms and electoral politics. 7\, 30\,000 villages elect their local leaders\, though the nature of elections is semi-competitive. With increased trend of semi competitive elections since the 1980s\, public participation level has been going upward. However beyond the village level\, elections are not at all competitive. \nAnalysing the democratic reforms in China\, Dr. Panda applied ‘Demand and Supply Model’ and noted that in a society where public demand for democratic reforms is low\, the system of governance turns into an authoritarian one. He pointed out that though doubts prevail over China’s future path to democracy\, the Communist Party’s urge to nurture the ‘sprouts of democracy’ indicates its future intention of more democratic reforms. The present Chinese Communist system is facing inherent contradictions. ‘Ideological-Institutional’ progress in China remains the deciding factor in the structure of one party democracy. However Dr. Panda pointed out that new ideas such as ‘people centered principle\, (yi ren wei ben)\, human rights (renquan)\, private property (siyou caichan) and harmonious society (hexie shehui) etc. have emerged in political ideology of Chinese Communist regime\, which indicates the ideological-institutional progress in China. He stated that democracy in China will be very much Chinese in nature. \nPoints raised during the discussions:\n\nIt is true that during the 1960’s and 1970’s\, American scholars viewed that economic liberalization leads to political liberalization then it leads to democracy. But this has not happened in many countries.\nElections do take place in China but how fair it is\, is the question. A research done by Sun Yat-sen University shows that people vote for only personal qualities of candidates.\nElection results in China are often pre-decided. With the elections taking place under the party’s guidance\, it is questionable whether the Chinese Communist party accepts any challenge to its authority? What evidence do we have for increased accountability?\nSemi-competitive elections in China do not seem to be leading Chinese society towards democracy. Democratic parties in China exist only on paper.\nThough the public participation level in elections in China has gone up over the years but question is how much it is voluntary and how much mobilized.\nThere are thousands of people in China who have been displaced and their lives have been severely affected because of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). There are no avenues for them to express themselves.\nThe term ‘Democracy’ is not alien to China. Mao talked about ‘New Democracy’ and differentiated it from ‘Old Democracy’. He described the period of 1949-59 as the period of ‘New Democracy’.\nCivil society organizations such as NGO’s cannot question the Communist party. All these mass organizations are appended to Chinese Communist party.\nCivil Society organizations\, with their activities\, do the groundwork for shaping the future members of the Chinese Communist party. All the political returns from their actions are designed to help the communist party and not to promote democracy.\nFor a successful democracy\, besides multiparty democracy\, it is also required to have freedom of press; independent judiciary; and freedom of dissent. These elements are still lacking.\nChinese regime fears democratic reforms. Internet is state controlled in China.\nThere is a need to study the discourse on democracy in China and how the Communist party is adjusting to the change in China.\nA comparison could have been apt on what distinguishes Chinese democracy from Mao’s ‘New Democracy’ and from ‘Hundred Flowers Movement’?\nChinese politics is in transition. Economic reforms have taken place. Freedoms other than the political are being enjoyed by the people. Internet is booming in China.\nIn fact sprouts of democracy came up in the form of sprouts of capitalism in the 1950s.\nThere is a transition even in the discourse of Chinese political system. How would you allow market reforms with Communist party system? How do you continue the legitimacy of Communist party? These are widely debated questions.\nSocial welfare measures are being withdrawn and pensions are being cut. These are negative declining trends of economic reforms.\nFocus on just one scholar\, Larry Diamond to analyse the democratic reforms in China is not appropriate.\nThe paper should have focused on Chinese society particularly its ethnic communities and their role in the democratization process.\nApart from civil society organizations\, this paper should have focused on independent media and pressure groups as well.\nAnalysing democracy in terms of demand and supply is not adequate. Democracy is not a commodity. Democratic states do adopt coercive measures when their authority is challenged. Supply-demand model does explain this phenomenon.\nThere should also be deliberations on role of local bodies in China as Panchayats in India.\nA democratic China may be more nationalistic than what it is today and this will lead to more friction with India.\nWe have to look at where China might go. There is a need to explore a theoretical model to understand the future.\nThere is a difference between formulation and reality. Reality could be very different. Even legislations and intents could be very different. Pronouncements can hide actual realities.\nChinese regime has become flexible and open to debate and discussion. China will not adopt the same measures if another Tiananmen takes place.\n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/evaluating-the-hybrid-character-of-chinas-communist-regime
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090619T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090619T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T225316
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061728Z
UID:63696-1245389400-1245389400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Locating Priorities in India-US Strategic Economic Engagement
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Santosh KumarDiscussants: G Balachandran and Jayshree Sengupta \nThe objective of this paper is to analyse the economic relations between India and United States. Dr. Samuel advocates taking a strategic approach to current economic relations between the two countries. This approach is necessary because of somewhat unique nature of India-US economic relations which is increasingly being built on synergies in knowledge based industries and services. The paper attempts to analyse the various components that make up overall India-US economic relations and locate priorities that can be taken up for dialogue under the bilateral engagement process. \nAccording to Dr. Samuel currently both countries are going through a transition process to emerge as knowledge based economies. The ongoing transition process results into trade in goods and services based on intellectual property. Therefore it necessitates the governments to take more pro-active role since the rules of a global economy based on transaction in services are still being worked out. The new economy industries need support in terms of infrastructure\, government policies and availability of capital to enable a viable ecosystem to develop. \nHighlighting India’s emergence as a global economic player\, Dr. Samuel pointed out that trade with the US\, both export and imports\, have been on an upward trajectory since 2002. The United States remained India’s largest trading partner on combined trade in goods and services\, totaling $61 billion in 2007. While imports came to $27 billion\, exports totaled $34 billion. The good and services trade deficit was $7 billion in India’s favour in 2007. While exports to the US stood at $12 billion in 2002\, it had doubled to $26 billion (12.7 per cent of India’s total exports) by 2008. Against this\, imports from the US went up by four times from $4 billion in 2002 to $18 billion (8.4 per cent of total imports) in 2008. \nDr. Samuel identifies future growth areas which includes defence equipment and technologies\, and nuclear equipment and technologies. However\, trade in both these areas is contingent on the easing of restraints on high technology and dual-use items which were imposed during the cold war era. Despite the existing restrictions on the export of dual use technologies and items to India\, imports of high technology goods from the US rose from $1.2 billion in 2002 to $8 billion (45.8 per cent of total imports from the US) in 2007. Similarly exports of high technology goods from India also rose from $198 million to $708 million in 2007 before crossing the billion dollar-marks in 2008.  \nDr. Samuel points out that mechanisms such as the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) have met with only little success and the promised boost to bilateral trade is yet to materialize even after the civil nuclear agreement. Now there are clouds of suspicion over Obama administration’s continued commitment to the nuclear agreement. However as expected\, defence trade between the two countries has gone up. Two defence deals have been concluded that for six Lockheed Martin Corp C-130J Super Hercules military transport planes and eight Boeing P-8I maritime patrol aircraft\, worth in excess of $3 billion. Lockheed Martin and Boeing are also vying for the contract for multi-role fighter aircraft\, estimated at $11 billion. India estimates that its military modernisation plans will entail the purchase of over $120 billion worth of defence equipment. Dr. Samuel points out a major obstacle that is the restraints imposed on technology transfer. It is in the interest of both India and United States to remove the obstacles inhibiting strategic trade. \nTrade in services has the most potential for growth. Imports of services from the US totalled $9.3 billion in 2007 while exports totalled $9 billion. Of this\, exports of software services from India were in the region of $4 billion while imports of software services from the US stood at $193 million. However there are hindrances such as severe criticism of the provision of software services to US companies by Indian companies and complaints about rampant misuse of the H1B specialty visas. According to Dr. Samuel legislations such as Grassley and Durbin proposal in the Senate on visa reforms and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act signed by President Obama soon after assuming the presidency\, effectively bar companies from recruiting workers through the H1B programme unless they fulfill stringent conditions. The recent bills have been construed as protectionist measures\, which might lead to counter-measures. Even at a time of economic recession\, Indian economy is expected to continue growing at a minimum of 5%. Markets such as India and China have provided as much as 75% of growth even if that translates only into 25% of sales at the moment. US companies have been major beneficiaries of the opening up of the Indian markets and the liberalization of the economy. At this juncture tit-for-tat approach would hurt both countries immeasurably. He opines the misuse of H1B visas can be countered through closer supervision. Outsourcing is an integral part of globalisation and denial of it may have harmful effects on mutual as well as global economic growth.  \nWhile discussing investment positions in the two countries\, Dr. Samuel pointed out that cumulative US investment in various sectors in India stood in the region of $13 billion at the end of 2007 of which 30% was in information technology services\, and 21% in manufacturing. Finance and depository institutions together made up 24 % of the investment. However\, Indian investment in the US has been more through the mechanism of mergers and acquisitions\, with Indian companies acquiring over 83 companies in the US with a cumulative value of over $10 billion. The major deals of 2007 were Hindalco’s acquisition of Novelis for $6 billion\, Rain Calcining’s acquisition of CII Carbon for $595 million\, Wipro’s acquisition of Infocrossing for $568 million and FirstSource’s acquisition of MedAssist for $330 million.  \nDr. Samuel opines that the US and Indian economies are poised to help each other through the creation of an eco-system that transcends geographical boundaries through available technological means and promotes innovation and creativity\, ultimately leading to wealth creation. The promotion of a culture of enterprise and innovation must be encouraged in India which would lead to the creation of intellectual property rather than merely using the IP created by others.  \nDr. Samuel suggested that to deal with the lack of venture capital investment currently\, the two governments can adopt BIRD Foundation model of encouraging innovation as between Israel and the US where a bi-national fund has invested over $245 million in 740 projects\, which have produced sales of over $8 billion. According to him this model can be replicated in other areas as well \nDr. Samuel concluded that the unfolding strategic environment would play a large part in deciding the direction of India-US strategic trade despite insufficient strategic underpinnings to provide it a fillip. Policy actions are required to provide the conditions necessary for the creation of an eco-system conducive for the growth of an innovation-led economy.  \nIt would be a good strategy on the part of India to focus on removing the impediments to its services trade with the United States\, which is relatively neglected despite its sizeable contribution to the bilateral trade pie. It should be impressed upon the US that the current moves towards protectionism are a detrimental step. There should be greater dialogue on easing the difficulties faced by entrepreneurs and service providers in travelling between the two countries as well as starting and sustaining businesses. A part of stimulus package in both the countries can be used to create public private venture capital funds to provide seed capital to start-ups in the new economy. In India returning professionals from the United States should be considered a resource\, and a publicly accessible database should be created to enable greater networking. Government schemes to encourage entrepreneurship should be given greater publicity and lesser bureaucratic formalities. Dr. Samuel stated that the present time provides opportunity to turn the liberal-humanist rhetoric in the relationship into reality\, given the similar ethos of the two ruling parties in both these democracies.  \nPoints raised during discussions \n\nDespite much talk about the India-US strategic partnership\, why are there so many hurdles in India-United States economic relations?\nIndia ranks 17th among US trading partners with trade amount only US $ 44 billion.\nUS is closely watching India’s economic reforms. Reforms are required in other sectors as well. For example there are many obstacles in the labor sector. United States wants India to open its agriculture market. India is not ready to open it.\nThere is talk of free trade between the two countries but this idea is politically charged.\nIndia-US Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture (AKI)\, which was signed by the Bush administration\, is based on public-private partnership. Since India has population surge so Bio technology revolution is needed to enhance production. It is essential and helpful for India. It faced a lot of opposition in India because of the issues such as Bt cotton which was seen as the corporatisation of agriculture.\nCompanies in India and United States need to identify areas where they can invest. India has internal security requirements and US needs reforms in energy and health care sectors. It would be helpful if private sector companies focus on these identified areas.\nThere is cross-cultural communication gap between India and United States. India should focus on strategies to attract more businesses from United States.\nStates in India should open trade promotion offices. \nOn the H1B Visa issue\, actually numbers do not mean much. What is more important is principles and what goes beyond it. The issue of H1B Visa should be looked in the broader context. The new bill introduced by Obama administration on H1B does not violate earlier rules but only tightens existing rules.\nIndian companies need to be proactive. There are a lot of companies in the United States either looking for help or filing for bankruptcy. Indian companies should go for mergers and acquisitions in the United States. An information database should be created for failing US companies as research institutes such as Institute for Business and Finance (IBFR) do carry out such studies.\nIn high technology trade\, there has been one way traffic. Indian companies are not in high technology development sector. It will take some time. Americans are very much methodological in their approach especially while dealing with high technology trade.\nIn service sector\, India can play important role in R&D. Signing MoU between the two countries is easy but the important question is how it will be converted in to reality.\nUS is the biggest buyer of defence equipments. There are opportunities for Indian companies to invest in the US defence sector.\nThe contribution made by Indian diaspora in the United States should not be ignored. The role of Indian migrants should also be factored in while studying India-US economic engagement.\nIt is useful to create a common market in climate change and healthcare sectors if India wants to create a favorable environment to attract more companies.\nWhen companies go for investment\, they want to ensure IP protection.\nThere are problems in getting Indian Visas for US citizens as well.\nService sector covers 53% of the Indian business and 81% in the United States.\nH1B Visa is important for the software sector. 45% professionals aspire for this Visa.\nHigh Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) is a very important mechanism for high technology trade. It is matter of analysis whether it has contributed for enhancing India-US trade relations.\nThe paper needs to clearly distinguish between what the government should be doing and what the corporate sector should be doing.\nThe importance of the Indo-US relationship can only be properly understood if it is considered in the context of the future\, as well as in terms of comparative growth\, market size\, and market potential\, which forms a fundamental motivation for US interest.\nThe United States has security interest in investing in a vibrant Indian economy. \nIndia has the potential to balance economic order in Asia.\n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/locating-priorities-in-india-us-strategic-economic-engagement
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T225316
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061104Z
UID:63695-1245994200-1245994200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:‘New’ Radicals and ‘Old’ Islamists: Understanding the Politics of Religious Radicalization in Pakistan and its Implications
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Kalim BahadurDiscussants: Ashok Behuria and Anwar Alam \nPakistan has witnessed a significant shift in the politics of religion. Islam in the initial years after the creation of Pakistan was confined to constructing a national identity by defining the role of the state on religious grounds. However\, the politics of religion now permeates society and shapes mass opinion. The religious political parties who portrayed themselves as harbingers of Islam now appear sidelined. The new radicals are trying to define the nature of the state and society. They have coerced the state to implement Sharia in some parts of the tribal areas\, something the Islamic parties could not achieve in six decades. In the past few years radical groups have started questioning the legitimacy of Islamic political parties and their methods to usher in an Islamic revolution. It appears that the old Islamists represented mainly by the Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat’ul Ulema Islami Pakistan\, which were perceived as major political fronts for the Islamists in Pakistan\, are gradually showing signs of political decline in terms of their influence and hold on the new generation of Islamists.  \nBoth these political parties were earlier at the vanguard of the Islamic movement in Pakistan. Whether it is the discourse on the place of religion in Pakistan’s polity or the methods to achieve an Islamic state\, these two old Islamic political parties have played a major role. They have also colluded with the Pakistani political and military establishment to implement Pakistan’s policies in Kashmir and Afghanistan. These ‘old’ Islamists consider the State and its Western style democratic institutions as important instruments in achieving their objective to impose Islam. They have acted within the parameters of the state to consolidate the Islamic character of Pakistan. Despite their success in the 2002 elections\, their subsequent electoral decline has given way to a new breed of radicals who are trying to occupy the political space. This new breed of Islamists initially functioned with the blessing of the religious political parties and the Pakistani establishment. Currently\, the old Islamists have distanced themselves from the new radicals; however links between their cadres exist. Political Islam has become more contested between the new radicals and ‘old’ Islamists.  \nPoints raised by External Discussants\n\nThere is no real distinction between Old and New Islamists; means have changed and not ends. The paper has not been able to bring out sharply such a distinction.\n\nJihad is not just a 20th century phenomenon\, but served as an instrument against colonialism as well. \nTechnology is influencing Jihadi terror – means have become more lethal.\nFrom an Islamic perspective there is nothing wrong with Jihad. \nConflict is more within Islam than between non-Muslims and Muslims \nConnection between poverty and terrorism is incorrect. \nDeoband and Jamaat-i-Islami are instruments to Islamize society. \nBarelvis and Deobandis have been involved in bargaining. \nThe paper needs to contextualize the phenomenon of the new radical and the internal processes in Pakistan that have led to the emergence of new radicalism. Islam in India is subsumed within a plural culture. \nLashkar and Ahl-e-Hadees are more Salafist than Deobandi. \nAhl-e-Hadees also tried to win Saudi Arabia’s support. \nThe ideological base of Islamists is splitting. If Jamaat was once radical why is it moderate now? \nBulk of Sunni Muslims in FATA are landless as opposed to the Shias. \nThe rise of sectarian violence also coincided with the anti-Soviet Jihad in the 1980s. \nThe paper needs to better capture the fractionation of the ideological base of Islamists. \nThe paper raises too many issues. It is insufficiently focused and becomes a discourse on the Pakistani state. \nPaper fails to capture the fact that JuI also opposed democracy. \nDid the ‘new’ radicalism emerge due to the vacuum left behind at the end of the Cold War? Or is it a development indigenous to Pakistan? \nHow have global debates on Jihadi violence influenced Islamists in Pakistan? \nThe paper needs to explain how class differences generate radicalism.\nThere are different forms of new radicalism. Radicals are not a monolithic entity.\nThere are ideological differences among them. \nLack of democracy is also propelling Islamic radicalism. Greater emphasis is needed in capturing how the Pakistani state has used one radical group against another. \nIn the past Islam was used as an instrument to subsume diverse ethnic identities. \nShias had a dominant role in Pakistan until the 1970s. \nThe paper needs to capture better the role of groups such as TTP and TSNM. \nWhat is the role of minorities in Muslim dominated countries? \n\nQ&A\n\nNo timelines given on the emergence of new groups. \nAll funding is agenda driven for Madrasas. \nOld and new Islamists unify against a common enemy. New Islamists are not prepared to participate in the democratic process. \nAll revivalist movements subscribe to apostasy. \nIslamic movements are challenging the state. \nDeobandi groups are more binary than the Barelvis. \nReligious minorities were protected under the Ottomans. \nThe Taliban are trained by the JuI. \nNew radical groups such as the Deobandis have tried to capture state power. \nWithdrawal of the US is unlikely to change much within Pakistan. \nPakistani state is not going to abandon fundamentalist Islam. Sufi Mohammad does not believe in state authority. \n\nChair’s Remarks \nIn Punjab Barelvis are seeing a decline in numbers. Deobandis and Madrasas are growing. Deobandis and Barelvis continue to dispute mosque ownership. All Muslims need to be good to be Islamic. The Taliban want to kill everyone. Secularism means atheism for Pakistani Islamists. They are against women’s freedom. Ideologically they are cohesive. Islamists such as Khomeini\, Qutb and Maududi used elections to gain power\, but refused to hold them again. \nPrepared by Kartik Bommakanti\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/new-radicals-and-old-islamists-understanding-the-politics-of-religious-radicalization-in-pakistan-and-its-implications
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T225316
CREATED:20231224T104529Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061603Z
UID:64212-1245994200-1245994200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Impact of Modernisation of Police Forces Scheme on Combat Capability of the Police Forces in Naxalism-Affected States
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Kalyan K MitraDiscussants: J N Roy and G D Bakshi \nThe menace of Left Wing Extremism (LWE)\, commonly termed as Naxalism and Maoist insurgency has been a major challenge to India’s internal security. As part of its multi-pronged strategy to deal with the menace\, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has taken special steps on the security front. Emphasis is also being laid on employing local State Police Forces (SPF) with assistance from Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) for improving the security environment. However\, the security responses of various States to Naxal violence have not been effective\, barring limited success in a few States. The failure of security forces to respond rapidly is often attributed to a lack of police combat capability in Naxalism- affected States. \nIn order to address the long felt need for police capability building\, the Centre as well as State Governments have initiated numerous measures in naxalism-affected States\, like raising of special anti-Naxal forces\, specialised training to SPFs in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare\, providing better arms\, ammunition\, equipment\, communication gadgets\, bullet proof vehicles\, land-mine proof vehicles\, intelligence support\, improved infrastructural and resource supports\, etc. The Centre has also been implementing the ongoing modernisation of police forces scheme since 2000-01. The scheme has an annual budgetary allocation of Rs.1000 Crores for ten years. Almost eight financial years have passed since this scheme was launched. However\, the SPF in most of the Naxal-affected States are still deficient in combat capabilities and unable to take on the Naxalites\, as the Naxalite violence and the casualty figure of SPF are still on the rise. Accordingly this paper attempts to answer the following questions: \n\nWhat has been the essence of the ongoing MPF scheme and its impact on police capability building since 2000 in Naxal-affected States?\nWhat difficulties are being faced by State police forces while implementing this scheme?\nHas the provision/allocation under the scheme been adequate to address all the aspects of police combat capacity\, so as to make them capable enough to counter Naxalism effectively? If not\, what are the deficiencies in the existing scheme\, including in implementation?\nWhat measures could be undertaken to make the scheme more effective?\n\nThis paper attempts to assess and analyse the impact of present MPF scheme on building police combat capability in Naxal-affected States. In order to realistically assess the impact of the MPF scheme\, the paper is focuses on the ongoing MPF scheme in various Naxal-affected states in general and the States of Bihar and Jharkhand in particular which are considered to have the least developed police capability including manpower\, resources and training. \nObjective of the MPF Scheme \n\nTo meet the identified deficiencies in various aspects of police administration worked out by the BPR&D.\nTo reduce the dependence of State Governments on the Army and CPMF.\nTo control internal security and maintain law and order by equipping the State Police Forces adequately and imparting the required training.\nBalanced development of State Police Forces.\n\nThe focus of the scheme is on strengthening police infrastructure at the cutting edge level by way of construction of secure police stations\, equipping police stations with required mobility\, modern weaponry\, communication equipment\, forensic set-up and housing. \nSpecial Provisions for Naxal-Affected States through MPF \n\nStrengthening of Special Branches\nStrengthening of the police infrastructure in 76 worst-affected Naxal districts\nImproving Police Training Capability\nDeployment of CPMF\, Raising of India Reserve Battalions (IRBs) and Sanctioning of a Commando Company in each of the 44 IRBs\nEngagement of SPOs to Augment Policing\nSecurity Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme; and\nPilot Project for Development of Infrastructure in Naxal-Affected States\n\nMHA claims that MPF Scheme has made a perceptible impact in all the States and provided much needed assistance and impetus to policing in the country. It has provided proper building for police station/out posts. Construction of houses for police personnel has boosted their morale. Availability of vehicles has improved police mobility and reduced response time. Modern weapons have boosted police power and morale particularly in Naxal affected areas thereby enhancing the performance and the satisfaction level of the State Police Forces. \nThe “Police” and “law and order” are State subjects under Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. It is the prime responsibility of the State Governments to improve the functioning of their police force and to equip them adequately with the latest technology for meeting the emerging challenges to public order and internal security in the form of terrorism\, Naxalism\, insurgency\, increase in crimes. The Central Government is supplementing the efforts of the State/Union Territory Governments in this regard. The MPF scheme is a significant initiative of the Central Government towards capacity building of SPF since 1969-70. The MPF scheme has been welcomed by police officers and men in all the States. It is especially helpful in resuscitating acutely deficient policing machinery in economically backward States. The regular police budget has been meagre due to a fiscal crunch in such states. \nBut the scheme has suffered from undue delay in implementation in some of the States. Senior police officers of Bihar praise the scheme but feel that it has not been implemented properly and the State has not been able to reap the benefits of the scheme. The State still lacks basic policing infrastructure like housing\, buildings\, and vehicles since these have been neglected for long. Senior police officers of Jharkhand have however opined that the MPF scheme has enabled the State police in terms of arms/ammunition\, equipment\, communication\, mobility and special equipment like bullet proof vehicles. Chhattisgarh police officers also feel that there little noticeable impact in the satisfaction level especially in residential buildings\, family accommodation and mobility. \nDespite various problems the MPF scheme has achieved its objectives to some extent in terms of improving physical infrastructure\, but a huge gap still exists between what is available and what is optimally required. MPF needs to be more user oriented rather than being thrust upon States. It should meet State Police’s aspirations based on their specific needs. Undue secretarial procedures and bureaucratic interference is proving burdensome to smooth implementation. Hence\, the scheme needs to be given a fresh look for better implementation. \nPoints raised during the discussions: \n\nIndia’s internal security challenge is also the Army’s responsibility.\nThere is need for close coordination between the State governments and the central government in dealing with LWE.\nPolice Modernisation in Naxalism-affected States may be given priority\, or a separate MPF scheme could be launched.\nNaxalism- affected States may be given 100% central assistance.\nImplementation procedure needs to be simplified.\nThere are severe governance challenges in most naxalites-affected States.\nPolice leadership should introspect and must eliminate corruption which is the biggest challenge to effective policing.\nThere are various organisational constraints. There is need for transforming the police forces\, in terms of leadership\, structure\, recruitment\, incentives\, logistics support\, equipment and training. The Police leadership is ineffective on the ground. Attractive welfare schemes for the dependents of police personnel are needed.\n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/impact-of-modernisation-of-police-forces-scheme-on-combat-capability-of-the-police-forces-in-naxalism-affected-states
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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