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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090501T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090501T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T230156
CREATED:20231223T222222Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63705-1241155800-1241155800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Can Renewables Enhance Energy Security?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: B S MalikDiscussants: V Raghuraman and Sanjay Verma \nThough the case for incorporating renewable energy into national energy policies has been around for decades\, the growing debate on climate change has enhanced the profile and brought the issue of renewable energy to the forefront as a means of tackling global warming. However\, more than climate change issues\, it is energy security and the access to and control of fossil fuel sources that are the main drivers of the West’s policy. Given the critical place energy holds for economic growth\, retaining their positions in the global economic order is a major factor for the traditional powers\, particularly in the event of a scramble for non-renewable energy resources taking place. \nWhile it is true that the current global financial crisis and economic recession have seen the demand for energy falling substantially across the world\, it is generally believed that once the recession is over and demand picks up the price of oil and gas could once again become prohibitive. There are several reasons why this may occur\, including production cuts by OPEC\, but mainly due to depleting reserves from mature oil and gas fields. According to the US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration\, 80 out of 84 oil and gas exporting countries have reached a point where their field reserves have reached a plateau and production is decreasing. \nHence\, the Europeans took the lead in raising the issue of climate change as the most crucial national security issue\, with the European Commission publishing what is termed as the “2020 by 2020” package\, which includes proposals for not only reducing the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20 per cent by 2020\, but also to ensure that 20 per cent of their energy is obtained from renewable energy resources. \nWith Barack Obama’s election to the US Presidency\, it is generally believed that the climate change issue has received a fillip. However\, the US’ underlying concern is clearly about the country’s reliance\, indeed\, growing dependence\, on imported energy resources. As President Obama stated in his presidential memorandum on January 26\, 2009\, “America’s dependence on oil is one of the most serious threats that our nation has faced.” Yet when one looks at the future plans for energy in the US as well as other developed countries\, it is interesting to note that all of them are based on fossil fuels\, as well as nuclear power\, with renewable energy comprising only a small proportion of the energy mix.  \nDespite the hype about renewable energy\, developed countries will continue to rely on fossil fuels. It is a fact that major international oil companies such as BP\, Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil are freezing their research and investments in renewable energy\, while continuing to invest in the petroleum sector\, including carbon-intensive energy sources like tar sands and natural gas from shale.  \nAs the momentum for the negotiations on working out a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 picks up\, countries like India and China are coming under increasing pressure from the rich countries to commit to binding emissions cuts. Some of the developed countries are also raising the bogey of employing “retaliatory mechanisms” through the WTO forum against China and India if they don’t adhere to binding emission cuts.  \nHowever\, though India is not giving in to such pressures and has adopted the position that since it is the developed countries that are responsible for most of the current levels of carbon emissions they should make the requisite technology and funding available for mitigating emissions\, it is taking necessary action by putting in place projects that will allow it to further improve its energy efficiency and decrease the rate of emission increase.  \nThere is no doubt that renewable energy resources are required to deal with climate change and global warming. However\, to increase the share of renewables in national energy mixes\, particularly in the poor and developing countries\, cooperative methods will have to be employed\, not threats and trade-related pressures. Moreover\, the developed countries have to acknowledge the responsibility for the current increase in emission levels and take steps to mitigate the same. Yet\, the rich countries demand that developing countries take measures to accept binding cuts on emissions by cutting down on their fossil fuel consumption and employ renewable energy systems that are either inaccessible or too capital intensive for most poor countries to adopt without funding. However\, the developed countries are not agreeable to technology transfers or adequate funding required to deploy such technology.  \nPoints in the Discussion: \n\n\nIndia needs to develop technology for energy security and has to adopt a new approach to deal with the problem.\nNeed to look at the issue of climate change and global warming within the context of energy security.\nThe debate on climate change is only a political instrument used by developed countries.\nWhen discussing energy security\, climate change and global warming issues\, there is a need to move towards an independent global process.\nNeed to analyze the impact that the financial crisis and China’s growing energy use have on climate change.\nNeed to expand on the impact of trade issues on the climate change debate\,\nIndia’s economic policy in next five years needs to taken into account the aspect of how to preserve our resources according to the country’s necessities.\n\nPrepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/can-renewables-enhance-energy-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090508T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090508T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T230156
CREATED:20231223T222217Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130249Z
UID:63703-1241760600-1241760600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Low Intensity Conflict under Nuclear Conditions: Analysing the India-Pakistan Theatre
DESCRIPTION:India and Pakistan were again on the verge of a military confrontation following revelation of Pakistan’s complicity in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Pakistan reluctance to act against its perpetrators had forced India to plan punitive responses against terror camps\, prompting Pakistan to project a capability to repulse an Indian attack. After weeks of underdone posturing\, both realised the possibility of a stalemate and de-escalated the conflict. Such responses have been the template of the India-Pakistan dynamics\, especially after the May 1998 nuclear tests. Of all characteristics\, the most discernable element is what is perceived to be an asymmetric nuclear deterrence equation that seems skewed against India\, restricting its pro-active responses. The paper reviewed a problematic element in the India-Pakistan strategic competition – the scope for low intensity conflict under nuclear conditions. It examined whether the execution of a protracted low-intensity conflict by Pakistan is a negation of the nuclear deterrence equation between the two countries\, and the reasons why India has failed to suitably respond to this strategy. \nThe concept of Low Intensity Conflict has constantly evolved along with the transformations in the nature of warfare. When quantified by intensity and nature of conflict\, all confrontations remaining below the level of high- or mid-level conventional war could be classified as low-intensity conflicts. Generally\, LIC is a genre embracing many types of sub-conventional and asymmetric warfare including insurgency\, counter-insurgency\, and even terrorism and counter-terrorism \nThe chunk of debate on nuclear South Asia is centred on two issues: (a) has nuclear weapons caused instability\, raising potential for escalation; (b) is it a stability-instability paradox\, whereby Pakistan used the assumed stability at the nuclear level to create instability at the lower level. In this dialectical spectrum\, both schools converge on the stability-instability paradox\, which states that the stability created by nuclear weapons at the top would cause or facilitate instability at the sub or conventional levels. \nPakistan seeks to deter at all levels – nuclear\, conventional\, sub-conventional and does not want India to share the same equation. It fears Indian pre-emptive attack against nuke capability. In this regard it has two objectives (i) gain parity against India’s conventional superiority (b) existential deterrence against India’s nuclear capability. Pakistan fears the asymmetry with India in force levels and believes space for conventional war exists\, which India would exploit. India could crush insurgency at limited conventional levels and threaten second strike if Pakistan contemplates nuclear response. \nLinked with this thinking is the utility of nuclear weapons in achieving Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Kashmir. Pakistanis had always believed that its nuclear capability could neutralise the Indian conventional as well as nuclear forces while providing the umbrella to reopen the Kashmir issue. Through every opportunity of brinkmanship\, Pakistan seeks to internationalise the Kashmir dispute\, project it as a nuclear flashpoint and pressure India to initiate a dialogue. The Indo-Pakistan peace process could have in some ways validated this strategy. However\, it had mixed results as India managed to repulse the insurgency through successful counter-insurgency\, forcing Pakistan to push in foreign mercenaries to hype the theatre. \nThe paper concluded with the assertion that Pakistan is an irrational actor. It is a hub of terrorism and proliferation and a theological nuclear weapon state primarily controlled by military. It exploits global paranoia to its advantage. However it is equally apprehensive about being bombed back to Stone Age. It realizes that tactical first-strike is unfeasible and would invite massive Indian retaliation. As for India’s limited responses\, despite repeated breaches\, India never expanded theatre and instead used economic and military might. Also\, it never allowed space to internationalise Kashmir. India has yielded political gains through responsible behaviour. The moot question is- Has this approach been fruitful – political timidity and reluctance to use military power? India believes in the scope for Limited War under Nuclear Conditions. Pakistan found space for LIC without hitting Indian threshold and Pakistan’s first-use posture restricted Indian response. \nFinally\, these options will materialise only if the Indian political leadership mandates the security establishment to execute such radical responses to the three-decade old proxy war\, which has cost thousands of lives and destruction of national resources. There is need for political will and audacity to exploit the turbulence in Pakistan and signal to Pakistan the futility and failure of its LIC strategy. Pakistan should be reminded of the fact that its survival should not be at the cost of promoting subversion and instability in South Asia. This would also mean a change of mindsets in Indian security establishment and the willingness to transcend traditional security approaches to explore radical solutions to this perennial security challenge. \nThe important points raised during the discussion were \n\nWe need to now re examine our existing doctrines and get rid of prevailing flaws. IDSA could assist in the process by pro active documentation.\nSecurity of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is a big issue and Pakistan exploits this insecurity to its advantage.\nCrushing insurgency through low intensity tactics is not a feasible option. Insurgency is a socio-economic-political problem and requires a more comprehensive and sensitive approach.\nThere is no need to worry too much about the nuclear rhetoric. LIC is something which is here to stay.\nThere is need to look at the definitional aspects of LIC and distinction needs to be made between proxy war and LIC.\nDismemberment of Pakistan is not beneficial for India as it would be exposed directly to troubled areas of Afghanistan and Central Asia.\nAnti India stand and Kashmir is the single biggest adhesive for Pakistanis.\nIndia and Pakistan have to think beyond military solutions. Sabre rattling would not help in the long run. They have to look for alternatives such as political resolutions and packages.\nIn war Asymmetry is something you hope to achieve.\nIndia shouldn’t be bothered too much about Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.\nPakistan has always used Kashmir as leverage to shy away from the real issues of concern- supporting cross border terrorism and facilitating terrorist attacks on Indian Territory.\nNobody can take Kashmir away from India unless we wish to give it out. According to the Instrument of Accession\, the whole of Kashmir including Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) is integral part of Indian Territory.\nIndia’s No first use policy is good even today and is a part and parcel of our diplomatic approach.\nThere is need to launch quick reaction forces similar to the Chinese strategy.\n\nThe session was chaired by Air Marshall (retd) Vinod Patney. The two external discussants were Brig Arun Sahgal and Maroof Raza. \nPrepared by Priyanka Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/low-intensity-conflict-under-nuclear-conditions-analysing-the-india-pakistan-theatre
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090508T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090508T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T230156
CREATED:20231223T222221Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T062540Z
UID:63704-1241760600-1241760600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Trends in Thinking about Warfare
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs\nChair: M. S Chowdhury\nDiscussants: Rahul Bhonsle and Chandar S Sundaram \n“Trends in thinking about warfare” presented at the IDSA Fellow Seminar on 08 May\, 2009 at IDSA New Delhi by Col. PK Gautam( Retd) was well received and critically reviewed by external discussant and internal peer discussants. The proceedings were chaired by Brigadier MS Chowdhuri\, VSM ( Retd) Chief Instructor United Service Institute (USI) of India. External discussants were Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle\, SM (Retired)\, author and analyst\, and Dr Chandar Sundaram from the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research\, USI of India. Internal discussant were Wg Cdr Ajey Lele and S. Rajsimman. \nThe paper identifies the following areas as unexplored or absent from Indian strategic community. The paper further argues that absence of these factors from Indian discourse may have its repercussion at both the level of research and policy making. \n\nUnderstanding the various “ways” of warfare and status of the debate on strategic culture.\nInvention of Fourth Generation War (4GW) and lessons from recent military operations including how the Chinese view it.\nNeglect and trends in military history.\n\nThe protracted nature of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan compels one to think about the nature and character of war. While the nature of war continues to be enduring\, the character has changed to that of a counterinsurgency campaign. \nThe paper recommends strategic thinkers concerned with the military “use of force” in resolving “inter-state” and “intra-state” be sensitive to the available literature on the subject which debates whether modern war fighting capabilities enabled by hi-tech weaponry based on science and technology have ensured “victory”. The paper argues the importance for certain constructivist approaches to help research in this area. It begins its argument by stating that military operations in Iraq\, Afghanistan\, and Lebanon have overemphasized modern military operations while ignoring other factors that may eventually decide the result of operations. The paper also stresses the “way of fighting” and highlights the “Maratha way” to underline this point. \n\nChanging character of depth/ deep battle with hard and soft weapons (firepower and cyber power including EMP bombs). Overlap of force on force and spread of irregular warfare\nCentral role of contact battle( eye ball to eye ball) in India’s border deployment against China and Pakistan and also in counter insurgency war ( Chinese also claim : “China is strong in close warfare ; the enemy is strong in distant warfare” – Maj Gen Wang Pufeng )\nIn embryonic phases\, partially due to ignorance\, most Generals were against computerisation. Some warned against the perils of getting attracted to virtual reality at the cost of real world battle experience. Now most are for it and all know word processing and net use. Younger generation transmits culture of absorption of ICT to seniors. Wisdom of seniors under attack due to market forces and diminishing inter state wars and battle experience. Need for matching adult education.\n\nObservations by Discussants  \nBrig Bhonsle recommended more references to Indian literature. He mentioned that the US has now achieved asymmetry in Iraq. Counter insurgency is always difficult in foreign lands and he recalled the Indian experience in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. As regards 4GW\, he traced its origins to 1980s through the work of William Lind and others. Foreign literature he agreed was mostly about marketing products. As regards civil- military relations\, he mentioned that one has to introspect within the services and noted that the Chief of Defence Staff was stymied by the Air Force. Blame thus is shared by all in lack of synergy in system. \nDr Sundaram desired greater focus and suggested the replacement of warfare with warfighting. He traced how the British who were familiar with “guilds” where the concept of class had originated improvised to cement the regimental system in India based on its society\, which rather cemented the units. One new and challenging area of research over the century was via content analysis of the USI journal which needs to be done for further research by scholars. The journal has been published since 1870- being the oldest surviving journal on defence issues in India – it would give a good idea on ways of thinking on warfare in the Indian context. Observing a tendency not to look at history\, he also explained how political scientists have got the better of the topic than historians in general.. It is evident that historic lessons have been ignored – such as those of Vietnam\, or of Iraq. Societies can not be treated as water\, but as cultures. On the Chinese sources\, they need to be treated with caution as they have very strict censorship laws. He lamented that in Indian democracy\, there is excessive delay to get hold of even non classified historic papers which is counter productive. It is time that official war histories of 1962\, 1965 and 1971 are made public \nWg Cdr Lele suggested that ways of warfare are contextual – theater based\, or guerrilla war or present state of asymmetric warfare. He opined that there is nothing Western or Eastern as regards RMA. In shock and awe and effect based operations he mentioned that winning war is not enough\, but winning the peace is important . Subject is not only military\, but involves policy makers\, think tanks and academia. He noted that nanotechnology will usher in fifth generation warfare and we need to prepare. \nMr. S.Rajasimman exemplifies on this aspect by arguing that the paper captures this phenomenon at two important levels. These are at 1) operational level 2) doctrinal level. Conceptualization at these two levels differs. The paper for instance does not assume a clear distinction between the both. Both “Iraq War” and “Afghan War” have been claimed and argued to be unsuccessful. The paper argues that the “protracted-insurgency based operations” in Iraq and Afghan has proven that Shock and Awe lost its sting. Here distinction needs to be made how the concept of “shock and awe” functions at operational level and doctrinal level. Operational success need not necessarily mean doctrinal success. In other words the overwhelming fire power and high-tech weapon systems used may have been successful at the operational or tactical level by achieving the “military objectives” against “political-social objectives” as part of the next phase in the war. \nDiscussion  \nComments by E mail: Disagreeing on some issue such as 4GW\, US performance and high end warfare capability\, Colonel Peter Garretson\, USAF concluded that the paper also manifests what is the central debates in the US which is : \nWhat is the future of warfare\, and what should be our organizational emphasis \nRight now the forces to reform in favor of irregular prevail in power and noise \nBut they are strongly checked by the services and existing budget \nOther concerns of Col. Garretson were about long-range conventional missiles\, and cruise missiles\, which he thought will change high-end warfare. Trends which he thought need to be highlighted since World War II were: \nAn increase in examination of the future\, at least organizational\, from individual theorists\, to VonKarman’s New Horizons\, to AF2025… \nThe increase in capability of airpower\, and the counters by those who don’t have it \nThe de-civilization of warfare by the disadvantaged \nNamrata Goswami wrote : “that unlike what George Tanham or Ashley Tellis would have us believe\, Indian military is rather good at attrition warfare\, if you take its long drawn engagement in the North East and Jammu and Kashmir as a success story – then the rather valid question would arise: why are they still there? . Therefore\, I beg to differ with you on this aspect. I strongly argue that the growing militant violence in the North East especially Assam and Manipur is sign enough about the failure of countering insurgency effectively with devastating effect on overall way of life in these areas. Just managing violence between the security forces and the militants while turning a blind eye to extortion networks\, social violence\, and political instability tells badly on our military’s way of warfare\, if there is any at all”. \nComments by Participants  \nCommander Ranjit Rai (Retd) wanted more emphasis on strategic thinking. Dr Arvind Gupta\, from his experience noted that much more coordination and work is needed including original Indian work on the Indian way of warfare including text books. Dr Uttam Sinha felt the need to pull out military writings of Indian authors which must include culture\, history and trend analysis. Brigadier SP Sinha ( Retd) explained from his 1965 war experience on EBO as to how raw troops who were initially paralysed by artillery fire\, got used to or inoculated to it after few days of shelling. Lesson was effect based must be understood in context and for time period. It does not last permanently. . \nConcluding Remarks of Chairman  \nChair highlighted the following \n\nMore work on India and other literature is needed.\nStudy of history is important to see how only use of air power as propounded by Douhet never succeeded.\nOn the point made by Dr Namrata Goswami via e mail\, the chair said that he does not agree with her. In Nagaland the military has done an excellent job\, but other organs of the state also have a role to perform which was found lacking.\nThe situation in Iraq is due to incorrect strategic thinking. Indian policy makers have done well to resist the temptation to send Indian troops to Iraq.\nThe implementation of the Kargil Review Committee Report is held up and must be speeded up.\n\nOver all observations \nAll policy recommendations pertaining to study of war\, theory building\, nature of force employment study\, more focus on conduct of war rather than just IR\, not getting over awed by foreign literature\, doctrines based on combat experience need to retain cultural values and renew debate on civil military relations. It was generally opined that the paper in terms of its idea was important in itself and also as a guide to future research in this area. Future research could benefit from the discourse analysis that this paper has attempted to highlight. \nPrepared by S.Rajasimman\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/trends-in-thinking-about-warfare
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090515T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090515T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T230156
CREATED:20231223T222217Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T062403Z
UID:63702-1242365400-1242365400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Coastal Security Arrangement in Maharashtra: An Assessment
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Rajaram PandaDiscussants: Vijay Sakhuja \nThe paper discusses the overall coastal security arrangement in Maharashtra. The first part of the paper deals with the evolution of the coastal security mechanism in the state. Section two evaluates the deficiencies\, inadequacies and shortcomings in this mechanism. An assessment of the security measures that were announced by the central and state governments in response to the Mumbai attack is also highlighted in the paper. \nThe paper argues that awareness about the vulnerability of the country’s coasts first arose in the wake of the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts\, when it was established that the explosives used were smuggled in through the coast at Raigad in Maharashtra. This led to the launch of ‘Operation Swan’ with the aim of preventing the landing of contraband and infiltration along the Maharashtra and Gujarat coasts. Further attention to coastal security was given after the Kargil Review Committee’s recommendations for a comprehensive reform of the security set-up. It came in the form of a Task Force on Border Management\, with coastal security being a part and parcel of it. The Task Force recommended\, inter alia\, the setting up of a specialised marine police in the form of coastal police stations\, augmentation of the strength of the Coast Guard in terms of personnel and material\, the formation of fishermen watch groups\, and the establishment of an apex body for management of maritime affairs. On the recommendation of the Task Force\, the central government launched the Coastal Security Scheme in 2005-06.  \nA three-layered patrolling system is operational to secure the Maharashtra coast. At the outermost layer\, the Indian Navy patrols the high seas and carries out aerial reconnaissance with ship-based aircraft. The intermediate layer comprising of the Exclusive Economic Zone (between 12 and 200 nautical miles) is patrolled by the Coast Guard. And the territorial waters are patrolled by joint coastal patrolling teams comprising personnel drawn from the Customs\, the State Police and\, till 2006 from the Indian Navy. \n26/11 happened in spite of this multi-layered coastal security mechanism. Lack of ‘actionable’ intelligence has been widely attributed as the main reason for this failure. But there are certain inherent inadequacies in the coastal security mechanism\, making it incapable of preventing infiltration through the coast. These deficiencies are:  \n\n\nInsufficient Manpower \nPoor Training \nInadequate Infrastructure and Equipment \nInsufficient Resources \nSystemic Flaws\n\nTo address these issues\, the paper put forward some policy recommendations to the Maharashtra government. Some of these are:  \n\n\nManpower shortage could be addressed by recruiting retired Coast Guard and Navy personnel.\nPeople from the coastal villages could be enlisted in the coastal police force.\nIncentives such as special allowance and insurance could be considered for police personnel engaged in coastal security.\nSpecialised training is needed for the Coastal Police. \nFurther\, the central government needs to clearly spell out areas of jurisdiction of different agencies engaged in coastal security and ensure coordination among all agencies by establishing a central command system. \nIssues Raised in the Discussion: \n\n\nLack of governmental sensitivity to the importance of the coastal security.\nLack of coordination between state agencies and central agencies. There are too many agencies dealing with security\, and there is complete lack of coordination. There is turf war between these agencies. There is no command centre.\nThe overall responsibility of coastal security should be given to the Indian Navy.\nGreater use of technology for surveillance in sea and coast is required.\nLegislation authorizing the Indian Coast Guard and Indian Navy to arrest criminals at sea needs to be formulated.\nThe proposal for a Maritime Advisor is a welcome development.\nThere is need for improving police infrastructure.\nCorruption in the implementation of security schemes is rampant\, and their implementation needs to be closely monitored. \n\nPrepared by M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/coastal-security-arrangement-in-maharashtra-an-assessment
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090515T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090515T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T230156
CREATED:20231224T104606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130249Z
UID:64219-1242365400-1242365400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Myanmar’s Relations with Bangladesh since 1988
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ranjit GuptaDiscussants: Y. M. Bammi and C. S. Kuppuswamy \nDuring the 1980s\, when Myanmar was the largest opium producer in the world\, the basic goal behind Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral relationship was to cooperate in anti-drugs cooperation. But\, over the years\, the relationship started facing a lot of complications with the emergence of issues like maritime border demarcation\, Rohingya refugees and drug trafficking.  \nAs far as economic aspect of Myanmar-Bangladesh relationship is concerned\, the signing of the border trade agreement of May 1994 legalizing the informal border trade between the two states; the inauguration of Teknaf-Maungdaw trade in September 1995; Bangladeshi trade delegation’s visit to Myanmar in 1998; Sr. Gen Than Shwe’s visit to Bangladesh in December 2002 and consequent agreement between the parties to cooperate in road and water transportation; can be pointed out as significant developments. However\, on strategic issues\, a lot remains to be done. The very fact that Myanmar-Bangladesh border offers a safe haven to terrorist organizations in the region makes it necessary for both countries to cooperate in counter insurgency activities. But ironically\, not much has been initiated by either side in this respect. The refugee problem in Myanmar is another significant aspect which needs to be addressed adequately by both Myanmar and Bangladesh. According to a recent estimate\, even today\, around 19\,200 remain in Bangladesh. Smuggling of arms and ammunitions is considered another area in which both Myanmar and Bangladesh need to cooperate. Factors like recovering of arms and ammunition of the insurgent group Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Organization (ARSO) by the Bangladeshi Army and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) in September 2005 and the recovering of a large amount of heavy weapons from the Naikhangchari sub-district in Bangladesh in the last eleven months clearly indicate lack of cooperation between Myanmar and Bangladesh in tackling smuggling issue.  \nDespite lack of cooperation on certain strategic issues\, both Myanmar and Bangladesh have been trying to improve bilateral ties through certain regional and sub-regional forums\, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC)\, the ARF\, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum (BCIM).  \nOver the years\, besides Rohingya and smuggling\, issues like land border demarcation and maritime order demarcation have emerged as two major areas of friction. Tensions have arisen particularly over Myanmar’s planned construction of a 40 kilometre fence along the border\, ostensibly to check cross-border smuggling. Recently in October 2008\, a standoff between Myanmar and Bangladesh occurred when Myanmar not only permitted a South Korean ship to explore natural gas in the disputed area between the two countries\, but also sent its naval vessel. Claims and counterclaims of the two neighbours in the Bay of Bengal continue to occur regularly.  \nIt is quite interesting to note that in case of Myanmar-Bangladesh relations\, the demographic factor plays quite a different role. Over the years\, while flow of refugees from Bangladesh has been a source of trouble for its neighbours\, in case of its relations with Myanmar\, Bangladesh is the affected party. The burden of refugees seems to be particularly high in case of Bangladesh due to its poor economic condition and limited resources. In addition\, there are constant assessments that some of the refugees may be associated with terror groups.  \nFor India\, both Bangladesh and Myanmar have their own special significance from geopolitical as well as strategic points of view. On the Indian side\, terrorism prone states like Arunachal\, Nagaland\, Manipur and Mizoram shares border with Myanmar. The problem of insurgency and economic underdevelopment in this region cannot be addressed adequately without India’s cooperation with Myanmar on these issues. Indo-Myanmar relationship is also significant due to India’s emphasis on Look East policy. Growing Myanmar-China relations may affect India’s interest in the region until and unless we too start improving our relations with Myanmar. Besides\, an amicable relationship with resource rich Myanmar will also help India to improve its energy security in the long run. However\, it remains undeniably true that the success of New Delhi’s policy toward Myanmar would be incomplete if its objectives with regard to Bangladesh were undermined. Whether to tackle the growing insurgency problem in the region or to deal with rise of China\, India needs to have a region wide comprehensive policy\, including positive policies toward its immediate neighbours.  \nImportant points raised in the discussion: \n\n\nIt is necessary to analyze if the bilateral relationship between Myanmar and Bangladesh has undergone any tremendous change after the end of the Cold War. In this context\, China’s role\, in particular\, should be taken into account. \nEmphasis should be given on how China has been trying to develop its relationship with both Bangladesh and Myanmar on economic and strategic issues.\nThere is a need to highlight the role of China as a decision maker as well as middleman over the years in the context of both Myanmar and Bangladesh. At the same time\, the possible role of China in those two countries in the future also should be analyzed.\nThe paper needs to analyze how having China with veto power in the UN has helped in furthering Myanmar’s cause in the world affairs. \nThe paper also needs to analyze how China is playing the role of a stabilizer in the bilateral relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh.\nIt is necessary to highlight the constraints in improving the bilateral relationship between India and Myanmar.\nThe paper discusses Myanmar-Bangladesh relations from both regional as well as bilateral standpoints. However\, it has not talked much on growing Indo-Myanmar relations on various aspects\, especially on military issues. \nAs Myanmar is quite a resource rich country while Bangladesh imports most of such resources\, the paper needs to analyze how both Myanmar and Bangladesh can take advantage of that aspect in improving their bilateral relationship. \nThe paper needs to discuss China’s role in the improvement of Myanmar-Bangladesh relations\n\nRohingya refugee problem is a significant issue in Myanmar-Bangladesh relations and so\, an elaborate discussion on the issue is necessary. Indian perspective to this issue needs to be discussed as Rohingya problem offers breeding ground for Islamic terrorism.\nWhile elaborating Rohingya issue\, the paper needs to take into account Myanmar’s ruling junta’s refusal to recognize Rohingya people as an ethnic group of Myanmar. In this context\, strong hatred of most people in Myanmar toward Muslim community should be discussed. \nThe paper needs to dwell upon the obstacles in improving Bangladesh-Myanmar trade relations. This will help in studying constraints on Indo-Myanmar trade relations as well. In this context\, issues like weak working banking system\, restrictions on visas to Bangladeshis as well as Indians\, artificial exchange rate\, etc.\, should be taken into consideration.\nThe paper needs to mention the recent evolution of an idea known as the ‘growth triangle’ incorporating Myanmar\, Bangladesh and India\, which\, if implemented\, will definitely help in improving the relations among the three countries. \nThe border dispute between Myanmar and Bangladesh should be addressed as a border management problem. At the same time\, an analysis should be made on why border demarcation has not proved to be that much of a problem between India and Myanmar while the issue of border demarcation between Myanmar and Bangladesh remains a highly disputed issue.\n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/myanmars-relations-with-bangladesh-since-1988
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090529T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090529T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T230156
CREATED:20231223T222217Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T232719Z
UID:63700-1243575000-1243575000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Afghanistan
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: K Raghunath\nDiscussants: Divyabh Manchanda\, Arun Sahgal and Arun Mohanty \nThe Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) represents a major development in the strategic landscape of the Central Asian region. The inclusion of India\, Iran and Pakistan as observer states in the SCO mechanism suggests that it is gradually expanding into the wider South Asian region. In the next SCO summit meeting in Russia it is expected that Sri Lanka and Belarus will become dialogue partners of the SCO. \nThe changed attitude of the Central Asian regimes created a situation\, which provided an opportunity to the SCO for a new geopolitical role. In July 2005 (during Astana Summit) the SCO member states called the US to set a deadline for withdrawing its military presence in the region. As a result\, the US had to close down its air base in Uzbekistan in November 2005. In June 2006\, the SCO summit took place against the backdrop of the crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme and both Iran and Pakistan sought full membership in the organisation. The Bishkek Summit in 2007 was important\, where leaders from China\, Kazakhstan\, Kyrgyzstan\, Russia\, Tajikistan\, and Uzbekistan pledged to work more closely to develop energy resources and boost security efforts within the SCO framework. The Dushanbe summit in 2008 was held against the backdrop of Georgian crisis and speculations about the start of a ‘new cold war’ between Russia and the US. \nAfghanistan has always drawn special attention during the SCO summit meetings. The SCO Secretary – General Bolat Nurgaliev pointed out that cooperation among the member states should not only cover economy and trade but also anti-terrorism and other fields. The SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was formed in November 2005 for the purpose of building cooperation between the SCO and Afghanistan on issues of mutual interest. The special conference on Afghanistan under the auspices of the SCO to discuss the issues of joint counteraction against terrorism\, illegal circulation of narcotics and organized crime was proposed by the member states. \nIran\, which has an observer status and has been seeking full membership in the SCO has major interest in Afghanistan. Tehran views outside powers to be the cause of problems. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi argued that Pakistan has a central role in facilitating the stabilization process in Afghanistan and was committed to provide all needed help to reconstruct Afghanistan. \nIt can be evaluated that the SCO as an organisation will focus its activities mainly on problems of terrorism and narcotic control. At the same time\, Afghanistan directly influences security of the Central Asian states. Experts believe that hopefully the Obama administration with their newly declared desire of “engagement” would be more receptive in coordinating their efforts with the SCO or at least with member countries on a bilateral basis. Hopefully\, there will be a stabilization program jointly developed and implemented by Afghanistan and Dialogue member countries. \nThe current situation in Afghanistan is worrisome for India. Regional countries have greater stakes in Afghanistan because of their vested security interests. Today\, India’s strong economy has the potential to contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It has contributed in a major way in the past few years but its activities have been hampered due to the deteriorating security situation within Afghanistan and constant efforts of extremist groups backed by Pakistan to sabotage India’s reconstruction work. New Delhi has emphasized the importance of regional cooperation because this can help in addressing trans-border issues\, developing commercial and economic opportunity and ending cross-border infiltration and terrorism. India has contributed to the reconstruction process in Afghanistan at the bilateral level. Under the SCO mechanism India remains an observer state and thus doesn’t wield the same influence as Russia or China. \nWith the SCO’s increasing influence in the past five years within the Eurasian region\, it is likely to play an important role in the future as well. The SCO’s geographical proximity to Afghanistan particularly\, with the Central Asian countries\, will necessitate that neighboring countries engage Afghanistan bilaterally as well as through the SCO in specific areas like controlling drugs and terrorism. However\, the Russia –US and Russia-NATO and the US-Iran relations will determine future developments of the SCO. \nPoints in the Discussion: \nThe main focus of SCO in Afghanistan is in three areas: counter terrorism\, drug trafficking and provision of infrastructure to rebuild Afghanistan. \nSCO is used as a tool by big member states to maintain their geo-political status. \nChina is worried about the influence of other member states in the region particularly in the area of energy. \nChina and Russia do not want to accept the American presence in the Central Asian region because both countries have great influence and they are not ready to curtail their influence in the region. \nAt the bilateral level Russia and the Central Asian Republics try to engage more with Afghanistan. \nSCO is focusing regional countries such as India\, Iran and Pakistan to engage more on Afghanistan issues. \nRussian believes that America is not keen to resolve Afghan issues swiftly because America and NATO have military bases only in Afghanistan to protect their interest in the South Asian region. \nThe SCO is a China dominated organisation. Moreover\, China may try to limit and balance India’s influence by supporting Pakistan. \nIndia needs to take a collective approach to resolve Afghanistan’s problem\, because India is also observer state of the SCO. \nPeace and stability in Afghanistan is a crucial issue for India\, and India must be taken seriously. \nNeed to examine China’s dominance in the region and is really protecting its interest in CARs through SCO. \nNeed to examine if the SCO is really formed to counter NATO. \nWhy SCO did not offer Afghanistan observer status? \nPrepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-and-afghanistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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