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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090306T053000
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DTSTAMP:20261105T001510
CREATED:20231223T222322Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63715-1236317400-1236317400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Benefits of India’s Defence Cooperation Initiatives towards the Foreign Policy Goals
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Anuradha Reddy and Sunil Kumar \nAfter the Cold War\, India’s foreign relations have become multi-directional and diversified. Growing realisation that international defence cooperation can supplement diplomatic initiatives towards issues of common interests is increasingly being acknowledged the world over. New geo-strategic realities necessitate improvement of relations with the major powers\, such as the US\, EU\, Russia\, Japan and China and pursuance of an active ‘Look East’ policy in the extended neighbourhood\, especially ASEAN countries.  \nAn important part of ‘Defence Diplomacy’ is defence cooperation. Defence cooperation\, as an important tool of foreign policy\, can be gainfully utilized to build bridges of friendship\, prevent conflict\, build capacity of friendly foreign nations\, strengthen mutual trust and enhance security and stability in the region.  \nConsidering the intensive range of defence cooperation activities\, it is considered prudent to analyse the role being played by defence cooperation activities\, especially military related\, towards pursuance of our overall foreign policy goals. The paper is an attempt to do this and is laid out in three parts as follows:- \n\n\nPerspective on Defence Cooperation. \nBenefits of Defence Cooperation. \nRecommendations for the future.\n\nIndia is now engaged in a wide range of activities with other friendly countries\, ranging from Chile and Brazil in the Far-West to Japan and Korea in the Far-East and has concluded suitable defence cooperation agreements with over 30 countries. Defence cooperation activities are not structured and conducted in isolation but as part of a larger process. The range of defence cooperation activities comprise of strategic security dialogues that enable understanding of the participant concerns and establishing areas of common interest. Also included are goodwill visits at the level of the Service Chiefs\, professional defence and military expert exchanges\, military training\, combined exercises\, reciprocal visits of warships\, observers for exercises\, sports and adventure activities\, disaster management and humanitarian assistance; and cooperation in UN Peace Keeping Operations.  \nThe recent period has seen increased instability and turbulence in India’s neighbourhood. With growing assertion of ‘non-state’ actors\, Pakistan is passing through yet another defining phase in its history. India’s other neighbours\, specifically Nepal\, Bangladesh\, Myanmar and Sri Lanka\, appear to be going through periods of instability\, which could have spillover effects on our security. Radicalisation of domestic environment in Bangladesh\, continuous inflow of illegal immigrants to North East India\, cross border movement of Indian insurgent groups from Bangladesh and Myanmar\, escalation of violence in Sri Lanka and effects of actions against LTTE in southern India are issues having ramifications on India’s security. While Nepal may be on the path to normalcy\, possibility of collusion between the Nepal Maoists and the Indian Naxalites has serious implications on India’s security.  \nTo ensure a peaceful periphery\, India has remained focused on security of sea lanes in the IOR\, responding to natural disasters\, stability in neighbourhood and\, where feasible\, capacity building of neighbouring countries to meet their internal challenges as also to contribute towards meeting common security challenges in the region. Towards this end\, defence cooperation activities are facilitating regional security (through material assistance\, training\, building ability to operate alongside and maritime bonding); building bridges of friendship with countries in the extended neighbourhood\, building bridges of friendship with key powers\, projection of India as a responsible player in the global security architecture\, Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief\, Peacekeeping Operations\, combating sea piracy\, capacity building of own armed forces\, extending dividends to Defence Industry\, joint R&D projects\, confidence building and deterrence  \nSome of the recommendations to make it more effective and valuable are: Formulation of Policy Guidelines\, Integrated Planning\, Requirement of Specialists\, Improvement of Relations with West Asian Countries\, Military Interaction with Pakistan  \nPoints in the Discussion\n\nDefence cooperation is one part of India’s foreign policy. It is increasingly becoming an important component of India’s foreign policy. \nDefence cooperation is a component of our national security strategy. India needs to have clear national security strategy.\nDefence cooperation provides supporting role in building partnership with other countries. It also helps ensure regional security.\nIndia’s defence cooperation must also looks at meeting the needs of the friendly countries. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/benefits-of-indias-defence-cooperation-initiatives-towards-the-foreign-policy-goals
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090306T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090306T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T001510
CREATED:20231223T222322Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63716-1236317400-1236317400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:US Counter Insurgency Approach in Afghanistan Under Obama Administration: Does It Portend 'Change'?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: G. BalachandranDiscussants: Shakti Sinha\, K. C. Singh and Rahul Bhonsle \nAfghanistan today appears to be teetering on the brink of failure and unending chaos. Despite the military endeavour by the United States (US) and its allies\, under Operation Enduring Freedom for the last eight years\, violence in 2008 increased by 40 per cent over 2007 and almost 543 percent over 2005. The Taliban-led insurgency has spread and according to an estimate almost 70 per cent of the country have become “no-go areas for security forces\, government officials and aid workers” depicting a rapidly shrinking political and humanitarian space. In this context\, the paper reviewed the past US counter-insurgency approaches in Afghanistan and analysed the possible impact of a new Afghan strategy. Given India’s interest in long-term stabilization of Afghanistan\, this policy analysis is relevant in terms of preparing responses to the evolving scenario in that country. The central thesis of the paper was that the present initiatives in designing a new COIN (Counter Insurgency) approach for Afghanistan to usher in ‘change’ are inadequate to turn the tide.  \nUS COIN Approach under Bush administration \nThe inability of the international community to stabilise Afghanistan is clearly an outcome of the inadequate and short sighted policies of George W. Bush\, who embarked on the military campaign in Afghanistan with the objective of dislodging the Taliban and winning the war. The resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan depicts that the US policy under President Bush of establishing security with a ‘light footprint’ and lack of focus on ‘nation-building’ has proved to be counter productive. Moreover\, at a critical juncture of Afghan stabilization efforts\, the already limited resources and manpower devoted to Afghanistan were shifted to Iraq. Despite the successful completion of the Bonn process and conducting successful presidential and parliamentary elections\, the political structures and the Parliament in Afghanistan are wracked by disruptive forces. \nInitiatives of the Obama administration: Break from the past\nWill they work?\nObama’s promise of ‘change’ from the previous administration’s unilateral policies\, his preference to replace blunt force with ‘diplomacy’ and ‘smart power’ is projected to have ramifications not only on Afghanistan but also for the entire South Asia.  \n(i) Establishing Security – The debate in the present administration on the need to establish security in Afghanistan has revolved around three policy options: (a) Troop Surge (b) Arming the tribal militia (c) Talks/Negotiations with the Taliban. \n(ii) Diplomacy and ‘Smart Power’ approach – Obama has promised a change by ending the war on terror. One of the first Presidential actions after taking office was ordering the closure of the controversial detention centre at Guantanomo Bay. This has been viewed positively at home and abroad. \n(iii) Pakistan- Issue of Sanctuary– Obama has maintained that the future US efforts “must refocus” on “Afghanistan and Pakistan — the central front in our war against Al Qaeda”. Sanctuaries on the Pakistan side of the Afghan-Pakistan border supply and train the assault on Afghanistan and the allied forces there. Moreover\, the Pakistani Taliban\, have expanded their sweep over a vast area of the country. \n(iv) Pressure tactics on Karzai – Members of the Obama administration have provided enough indications of backing an alternative candidate in the upcoming Afghan national elections. The decision is just not based on the fact that Karzai was a choice of the Bush administration\, but because of his inability to rein in rampant corruption\, the flourishing drug trade\, and the inability of his government to deliver basic services.  \n(v) Regional Strategy – The Obama administration has favoured a ‘comprehensive strategy’ that looks at the problem of Afghanistan regionally\, and that goes even beyond Pakistan and India but in some way takes into consideration the interests of Russia\, Iran\, and even China. \nThe paper assessed that there is not much change with the ushering of the new administration and most likely it would be a continuation of earlier policy. There are no bench marks and timeline for the ‘Exit strategy’ either. \nPolicy options for India\nIndia’s interests in Afghanistan are long term stability and building a ‘land bridge\,’ mentoring-ANA\, ANP\, COIN grid and fostering Capacity building-community projects. Obama administration’s policy of ‘troop surge’ or ‘negotiating with the Taliban’ would be viewed with greater interest by Indian policy makers in the post 26/11 Mumbai scenario. Unless troop surge is accompanied by ‘civilian surge’ the Afghans would resent the foreign troop presence. India needs to emphasise on an Afghan-led process of long-term institution building both in the security and governance sectors. India could contribute to capacity building and training of personnel (Afghan Army and police) but needs to steer clear from any direct military involvement in that country. The post 26/11 scenario calls for a better regional strategy to address the threat emanating from non-state actors operating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. \nIssues raised in the discussion:  \n\nThere are two dimensions to the problem in Afghanistan- strategic depth and nation building. The situation is grim in that country but as far as nation building is concerned\, Afghans would themselves have to work towards it as no outsider would do it.\nMilitarism was dominant in George Bush’s policy and it was not a comprehensive approach.\nPresident Obama’s policy talks about a regional approach and India and China are important parts of this regional concept.\nThe primary reason for the unpopularity of the government in Afghanistan is lack of social development activities.\nVery often despondency is the tone when we talk about Afghanistan. The strategy of winning hearts and minds needs to be pursued. \nAfghanistan has become a competing space for great powers. There is lack of understanding of local cultures and absence of a social code.\nNATO’s presence in Afghanistan is in body and not in soul. The member countries of NATO come with a set of caveats and therefore there is lack of fruitful coordination.\nAs far as India’s role is concerned\, the larger question is how India would fit within the NATO framework.\nIndia should in fact adopt a more forward looking and proactive posture. However\, any decision by India to send troops to Afghanistan as part of a more proactive role should be properly assessed and its ramifications should be studied carefully. \nAs Afghanistan is also a member of SAARC\, India could offer it a larger bouquet of choices.\nPakistan is both a part of the Afghanistan problem and a solution to the problem.\nAfghanistan needs to have a force which is sustainable in its own budget.\nGreat nations and narrow minds do not work.\nAfghanistan problem cannot be solved in isolation and there is need for comprehensive engagement.\nThe role of SCO in the context of Afghanistan should also be considered while studying this problem.\nThe proposal regarding implementation of the Panchayati Raj system in Afghanistan may not be a feasible option.\n\nThe session was chaired by Dr. G. Balachandran. There were three external discussants: Shri K.C. Singh\, Shri Shakti Sinha and Brigadier (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle. Dr. Rajiv Nayan and Captain Alok Bansal were the internal discussants.  \nPrepared by Dr. Priyanka Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-counter-insurgency-approach-in-afghanistan-under-obama-administration-does-it-portend-change
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T001510
CREATED:20231223T222241Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63712-1237527000-1237527000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Strategic Autonomy Dilemma and the Rapprochement with the United States
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and K. P. Vijayalakshmi \nThe debate on strategic autonomy makes a conceptual contribution about how India as an emerging power seeks to forge a partnership with the United States. The Indian imperative is to keep a sufficient degree of autonomy in its security and military relationship with the United States. Within the framework of India-US rapprochement the dynamics of power acquisition by India clash with its effort to maintain a reasonable degree of autonomy. Consequently\, the concept of strategic autonomy\, which is a mutation of realism and India’s traditional non-aligned posture\, can be described as a dependence control strategy aimed at safeguarding its independence in both foreign policy decision making and protecting strategic assets against American pressure. For India strategic autonomy necessitates the association between an autonomous foreign policy/security decision making capability and the preservation of material assets (both technical and economic). Strategic autonomy can only be a relative principle.  \nPragmatists and maximalists among India’s strategic elites agree that the concept must accept some compromises to advance larger foreign policy goals. Some pragmatists have argued that India’s deeply held notions of autonomy must move towards responsibility. If India is to rise as a great power there must be a greater emphasis on responsibility in its foreign policy. Others have contested this\, noting that while autonomy is malleable so is the principle of responsibility. Maximalists argue that other great powers are unwilling and incapable of advancing India’s great power aspirations. Both maximalists and pragmatists agree that the 1998 nuclear tests by India reinforced its strategic autonomy. In this respect deterrence and autonomy are intimately linked. This was most evident during the debates about the civil nuclear deal between the United States and India. The pacifists\, Indian Leftists and Nehruvians use the concept of strategic autonomy within a discursive framework characterized by an ideological anti-Americanism antagonistic to any kind of rapprochement with Washington.  \nA strategic partnership necessarily depends on the broad convergence of interest of the two partners. The potential for a strategic partnership encompassing all security and defence issues needs a convergence of interests which is lacking given both partners’ different international status in the global power hierarchy\, the security context of South Asia and the importance for India to retain its strategic autonomy. Thus despite the discourse within the United States on the transformation of the relationship\, India seems to favour and negotiate a selective partnership. The necessity for a relationship with the US is understood by all decision-makers and commentators in India who prefer an ‘issue based’ partnership configured for two countries which have ‘not permanent but temporary identity of interests’. Practically\, apart from avoiding any kind of alliance in the strictest sense\, for New Delhi it means not to be linked with any US sponsored collective or bilateral security structure constraining India to intervene in support of its own interests.  \nFrom an Indian perspective\, divergent agendas with the US suggest a double necessity: to identify those divergences and exclude them from the partnership while resisting US pressure to reintegrate them. The necessity to pursue a multifaceted foreign policy and engage all major power centres is recognized by all Indian analysts. This is the surest and best way to maintain strategic autonomy. The Indian dilemma pertains to balance: the rapprochement with the US is improving faster than the partnerships with other countries such as China and Russia. The intensity and the ‘global’ ambition of the Indo-US relations are not balanced by India’s relations with other great or medium powers. A second of asymmetry insists on parallel engagements. Given the complexity and diversity of its international and security agendas\, India needs to pursue multifaceted diplomacy especially vis-à-vis Russia\, China and Iran. Energy supply\, membership to the UN Security Council and quest to become a major player in Central Asia are among the agendas which potentially collide with US interests and require relations with alternative powers.  \nSome scholars argue that India’s emphasis on strategic autonomy will decrease with its accession to great power status and that ‘great powers don’t speak of autonomy’. This vision seems to conceive autonomy only as a power-transition imperative and sets aside the emphasis on autonomy which manifests itself when an emerging power becomes a great power. Great powers tend to strive for maximization of their influence. For instance\, the EU is today struggling to create new autonomous strategic capabilities in order to reduce its dependence on the United States. Will India become an ‘Asian France’\, as one US expert asked? The major lesson of the French experience for India is that autonomy works efficiently when combined with power. France’s autonomous posture has been built as a way to keep power\, not to create it. In the past India tried to pursue autonomy without sufficient power\, but the growth of its power gives it more latitude. \nPoints raised during Discussion: \n\nHistorically non-alignment enshrined a pragmatic approach; India wished to avoid entanglements.\nIndia’s policy in the 21st century will have to cater for the rise of China and the shift in the locus of power and international politics towards Asia.\nNon-alignment under such a circumstance when great power rivalry will rage all around India is an unviable option. Neither is the prospects for a China-India-Russia arrangement likely given deep Indian and Russian ambivalence towards China.\nIndia could follow Bismarck’s diplomatic strategy and spin a web of alliances with India holding all the strands in its hands\, though this would prove difficult given that it is not geopolitically central to Asia. An alternative is to forge partnerships with US\, Japan\, and possibly Russia to countervail the growth of Chinese power. \nOver time asymmetry between the US and India is bound to decline\, and so would fears about loss of ‘independence’.\nIndia too defensive and excessively prickly.\nTendency on the part of Indian officials to literally read/interpret every US document and policy statement.\nIndia’s involvement in the UN institutionalizes India’s participation in global institutions and thereby advances Indian and American common objectives.\nIt is important for India to create a peaceful periphery and ensure regional stability necessary before it goes on to become a major player.\nIndia cannot become aligned with the US.\nIt is too early to decide on the extent of alignment with the US.\nStrategic autonomy must be premised on national interest.\n\nRemarks made by the Chairperson Ambassador Rajiv Sikri: \n\n\nThere is a need to look into the other dimensions of the India-US relationship.\nStrategic Community in India wields little influence; politicians call the shots.\nThe US is too meddlesome in India’s relations with third countries eg.\, Iran. It does not know how to deal with Pakistan and must pay greater heed to the United Nations. \n\nPrepared by Kartik Bommakanti\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-strategic-autonomy-dilemma-and-the-rapprochement-with-the-united-states
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T001510
CREATED:20231223T222241Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63713-1237527000-1237527000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Rationale for Performance Oriented Defence Budgeting
DESCRIPTION:Chair: V. K. MisraDiscussants: Amit Cowshish and Sujeet Samaddar \nIndia’s security comes with a huge price tag. In 2009-10\, the defence budget reached Rs. 1\,41\,703 crores\, representing nearly one-seventh of total central government expenditure and 2.35 per cent of the gross domestic product. Such a huge financial outlay raises questions as to how funds are allocated and what outcomes are being achieved. Does the defence budget provide the answers? \nThe budgeting system\, in the form of Defence Services Estimates (DSE)\, follows ‘line-item’ budgeting. Total resources are provided in six demands for grants (catering to both the revenue and capital expenditures of the Defence Services)\, which in turn are subdivided into various revenue and capital items such a ‘pay and allowances’\, ‘stores’\, ‘works’\, ‘aircraft and aero engines’\, ‘naval fleet’\, ‘heavy and medium vehicles’\, among others. So the budget in essence does not provide information on expenditure on various capabilities or programmes that the country is acquiring to meet its security threats. Neither does the budget reflect the physical progress of various programmes on which massive investment is incurred. In other words\, the intended outcome of the budget vis-à-vis security threats or the defence policy cannot be deduced from the existing system of budgeting. \nTo move towards a visible and outcome-oriented budget\, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) since 2005 has issued guidelines emphasizing the link between financial budgets and actual and targeted performance of outlays. The guidelines task the central Ministries/Departments to articulate\, among others\, a list of major programmes/schemes and the goals and policy framework guiding them. The main objective of the exercise is to “establish one-to-one correspondence between the (financial) budget … and Outcome Budget…” However\, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)\, along with 30 Ministries/Departments has been ‘exempted’ from preparing outcome budget. The exempted Ministries/Departments are however ‘requested’ to prepare outcome budget for ‘internal use’ and voluntarily decide the extent to which the general public can have access to it.  \nIn the above context\, the MoD has taken the initiative of formulating Defence Services Estimates\, Vol. II (DSE\, Vol. II)\, and making it mandatory for some of its institutions to prepare the outcome budget. The DSE\, Vol. II\, which currently is meant for “internal use” falls short of the parameters laid down by the MoF for preparing the outcome budget. It merely expands the item- or head-wise allocations made in DSE and\, in addition\, provides “Budget holder-wise summary sheets.” In no way does it relate the financial outlays with the intended outcomes. The major problem with the institutions that prepare outcome budgets are that their ‘outcomes’ are organisation specific and have ‘weak linkage’ with the overall plan of the MoD. \nArvind Kadyan highlights a number of gaps plaguing the implementation of outcome budgeting in defence. Foremost is the lack of programme-orientation in defence budget. He argues that the identification of major programmes by “High Level Budget Holders and Top Level Budget Holders in Service Headquarters\, responsible for planning of budget” would go a long way in preparing outcome budget. The programme orientation however needs suitable changes in classification of heads of expenditure\, reflecting all the inputs that go into specific programmes or sub-programmes. Among others\, he argues that increased use of information technology can facilitate real-time “information required for monitoring\, evaluation” and for “decision-making purposes.” He suggests that considering the “extra work” that would be generated in the initial phase of the implementation of the outcome budget there is a need for a professional body with the necessary wherewithal to carry out the job.  \nKadyan strongly argues that Outcome budgeting is quite possible for the defence establishment\, contrary to some perceptions that outcome of defence expenditure is not measurable and even if measurable its documentation may not be in the interest of the country’s security. These issues can be tracked by what he terms “attitudinal change” of concerned authorities. He says that all the information may not be placed in the public domain\, as clearly articulated by the MoF. He suggests that “introduction of outcome budget is likely to be seen by the Services as an attempt to introduce a new mechanism to control budget utilisation.” \nFor effective implementation of outcome budgeting in defence\, Kadyan argues that the MoD needs to follow a ‘comprehensive approach’ covering the entire defence budget. He suggests that a tri-service institution like the College of Defence Managements (CDM)\, Hyderabad should ideally be entrusted with the task of developing “an overall structure” for the purpose of implementation. The ‘Budget Holders’ in the Service Headquarters (SHQs) are then required to identify outcomes against the outlays\, and prepare the outcome budget\, keeping in view the overall defence policy of India. While executing the outcome budget\, the Programme/sub-programme Directors under the Budget Holder would need enhanced delegation of financial powers. Once the outcome budgets at the stage of Budget Holders are prepared\, their consolidation could be done by the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS). Further\, an independent organisation needs to be created for monitoring and evaluation of various ongoing programmes. \nPoints raised in the discussion: \n\n\nThe experience of civil ministries in outcome budgeting is insubstantial\, and is of little use for mid-course correction.\nOutcome budgeting in defence in some countries like Australia is of “little help” to the services.\nTransparency in outcome budgeting needs to be viewed simultaneously with the security aspects.\nInformation and Communication Technology (ICT) has immense potential for preparing outcome budget in defence.\nPlanning\, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is increasingly being adopted by many counties.\n\nPrepared by Laxman Kumar Behera\, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rationale-for-performance-oriented-defence-budgeting
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090327T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090327T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T001510
CREATED:20231223T222240Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63710-1238131800-1238131800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A Scenario-Building Method on India’s North East: Time Horizon 2015
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prakash SinghDiscussants: G. D. Bakshi and Arun Sahgal \nIn her presentation titled ‘A Scenario-Building Method on India’s North East’\, Dr. Namrata Goswami projected the vision of a peaceful and prosperous North East India by 2015. Identifying terrorism\, left-wing extremism and insurgencies as the three great internal security threats of India\, she repeated Manmohan Singh’s earlier statement that growing insurgencies in the North East are caused by lack of development and externally funded terrorism. Dr. Goswami has utilized the scenario building method pioneered by Herman Kahn of RAND. She identifies the key factors/drivers which can be utilized to perceive and describe\, if not predict\, four future scenarios in the Northeast by 2015. Before explaining the four scenarios\, Dr Goswami points out the advantages as well as disadvantages of the scenario building method. According to her\, despite the fact that scenario-building is one of the most widely accepted method of bringing about some true sense of a possible future\, the future based on such method still remains imagined and fictitious.  \nWhile explaining the future scenario of North East India on the basis of scenario building method\, Dr. Goswami offers a list of positive and negative drivers which can either lead the region on the path of prosperity or can prove as impediments in its progress. On the positive side\, she points to factors like the region’s richness in natural resources\, cultural heritage\, the growing number of youthful population\, higher level of education\, influence of local communities and music in life\, governance\, etc. Factors like backward condition of transportation and communication\, perceived feelings of neglect by New Delhi\, cultural differences\, rising ethnic violence\, negative political culture\, militarization of political culture\, rampant extortion network\, economic backwardness\, porous international border\, etc.\, are pointed out as negative drivers.  \nOn the basis of the above mentioned drivers\, Dr. Goswami has put forward four possible scenarios of North East India by 2015. They are: Destination North East: A Touristic Paradise (a scenario based on tourism development); Island North East: Beware imagined ‘others’ (a scenario based on fear of domination and ethnic violence); Multi-Cultural North East: Liberal and Progressive (a scenario based on the success of democracy); Global North East: Looking ‘East’ with Hope (a scenario based on the success of India’s ‘Look East’ policy). Among the four\, Dr. Goswami considers the first\, third and the fourth scenarios as ‘ideal’ to improve the conflict ridden states of the Northeast.  \nPoints raised during the discussion of the Paper: \n\n\nThe paper should be based more on certain pattern based prediction rather than single event prediction. \nIn scenario construction\, more than eight possible scenarios should be taken up. After discarding some of those scenarios due to their consistent inconsistency\, four to five scenarios should be finally taken up for scenario building. \nInstead of making the scenario building method so much RAND centric\, the scenarios should be based on the method adopted by certain private companies.\nAn explanation of the process of scenario building in the paper will be helpful.\nAs a choice of tool for scenario building method\, net assessment technique is ideal\, as it helps crystallize the scenario.\nAlong with internal factors\, geo-political factors too should be taken into account. As part of the geo-political factors\, Chinese arms supply to insurgent groups in the Northeast\, growing security threat from HUJI\, etc. should be incorporated.\nIt is necessary to have an in depth study of growing Islamic fundamentalism as part of insurgency situation within Northeast.\nSince many of the positive drivers mentioned in the paper can be negative drivers in other contexts (e.g.\, governance)\, a clear stance on the matter is necessary. \nThe status quo will probably persist for some time in the Northeast.\nAs long as extortion in Northeast India continues\, achieving the desirable goal of disarmament\, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) will not be possible. As a result\, trade and tourism\, the two sectors which constitute a significant part of the paper\, will suffer.\nPolitical resolutions\, so far\, have not been very successful in bringing down the insurgency problem in the North East region. Under the circumstance\, if armed forces are pulled out from the region\, insurgency will\, once again\, increase.\nGreater academic emphasis should be put on the strong historical linkages between the Northeast and the rest of India. \nFocus on factors like what exactly is the subject for whom the scenario is built; identification of key decisive factors; identification of drivers and their classification\, will make the paper all the more interesting.\nBoth actors as well as issues can be treated as drivers. \nAs far as Northeast India is concerned\, factors like scale of insurgency\, cross border support for insurgency\, cross border migration\, transport and communication\, state of economy\, etc.\, can be treated as potential drivers. \nLocal cottage industry\, progress of Northeastern youths in sports and positive governance in Sikkim should be incorporated as positive drivers.\nProgressive change in politics\, such as through bringing about changes in labour laws\, opening for outside work force\, enhancement of education\, increase in resource base\, etc.\, can be quite helpful in improving the situation of the Northeast. \nIndian government’s future approach to its so called ‘Look East policy’ will depend on factors like degree of economic and social integration through communication revolution and softening of borders\, lack of infrastructural developments coupled with political and economic concerns. \nThe possibility of a peaceful and prosperous Northeast within the short timeframe of five years is unrealistic. Instead\, the timeframe should be extended to 2050. \nThe possibility of enduring peace in the region will depend upon the insurgency situation. The level of insurgency has already reduced in the region. Influence of Naga insurgency\, which used to be considered as mother of all other insurgencies in the Northeast is no longer evident. Insurgent groups seem to be still working in this region\, particularly for monetary benefits rather than demand for autonomy. \nWith good governance\, backed by insistence on accountability\, peace can be brought to Northeast region. \n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-scenario-building-method-on-indias-north-east-time-horizon-2015
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090327T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090327T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T001510
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SUMMARY:The Indo-US Relationship: Is Diplomatic Style Important?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Kanwal SibalDiscussants: K. C. Singh and Christopher S Raj \nThe presentation of Professor Steven Hoffman began by examining the question “Is diplomatic style important and what impact does it have as far as Indo-US diplomatic negotiations are concerned? Professor Hoffman began by noting that diplomatic style is important enough to deserve careful attention. During the period between 1997 and 2007\, he interviewed diplomats on both sides. According to him\, some practitioners pointed out that tone or style naturally ranks below substance in importance\, but not always. An experienced Indian diplomat called style a “force multiplier” in Indo-US relations. When the two sides engage\, they do deal with the matter of ‘how do we talk to each other?’ A former American diplomat said that diplomatic style and substance intertwine. To separate style from substance for the purpose of analysis can prove useful\, but is not easy and real care must be taken in doing so. His presentation puts forward some results produced by such an effort. Professor Hoffman adopts a historical narrative that analyses change and convergence in Indian and American diplomatic practices. Change in style accordingly began in June 1998\, and is still taking place today.  \nProfessor Hoffman divided his presentation into five parts. First\, he described problematic practices on both sides. For instance\, Americans could be overbearing\, demanding\, arrogant and deadline imposing\, etc. and similarly the Indian side could be self-righteous and arrogant as well. Professor Hoffman got this sense after examining published sources and interviews. \nSecondly\, he provides two historical illustrations on diplomatic style. The first being Indian foreign secretary J.N. Dixit’s diplomatic negotiations with George Bush Sr’s. administration in 1992\, and second the dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott during the period 1998 to 2000. Professor Hoffman says that in diplomatic style\, there is a learning process underway. In every negotiation\, substance comes first and when basic parameters set in well then style matters. In the last ten years\, India and the United States sustained a momentum but episodically there were problems during the negotiations on the Indo-US nuclear deal. He noted that the Obama administration is sending the right signals to carry forward the momentum built by the Bush Administration.  \nThirdly\, Professor Hoffman describes US diplomatic practices during the George W. Bush administration and refers to US ambassador India Robert Blackwill’s statement about the adoption of a radically new diplomatic style. Blackwill had said that “America will not be a nagging nanny” and that the Bush administration does not intend to lecture India on its national interests. According to Professor Hoffman\, the Ambassador’s public comments and phraseology did reflect a real ideological and policy change in Washington.  \nFourthly\, Professor Hoffman points out that in fact India and the United States were developing a set of mutually accepted practices that may also be called rules that came into existence in the mid-2000s. Professor Hoffman pointed out the developing shared rules of engagement in Indo-US relations: No Naggy Nanny\, India to be treated with respect\, recognition of India’s major power status\, avoidance of vitriol\, and developing rules to maintain momentum in the US-India relationship\, avoiding surprises from either side\, shaping issues jointly\, deepening and broadening the range of interaction\, establishing personal relationships and institutionalizing the relationship.  \nIn the last part\, Professor Hoffman puts forward his interim conclusions. Shared or common diplomatic practices make communication of substance easier\, increases mutual understanding\, allows each side to educate the other\, enhances trust\, acts as a force multiplier\, and helps ease if not eliminate historical resentments paving the way for substantive mutual gains. He emphasizes that no matter how bilateral ties between India and the United States evolve during the next few years\, this study makes a case that diplomatic style is important\, in this particular relationship. What has been learned and gained should be maintained\, and even built upon further. One may hope that a reasonably common set of guiding diplomatic practices will characterize the full range of US-India ties in the future. \nPoints raised during the discussion \n\n\nIt is important to understand whether style reflects substance. If practitioners are frank and enjoy a level of trust and also do not question the other’s fundamentals\, then style matters.\nOne cannot have different style while dealing with different countries. It is substance and issues which make the difference\, not style. If the United States and China can develop without changing their diplomatic style\, then why should India change its diplomatic style. The substantive nature of India-United States relations began with the Indian nuclear tests in 1998. It was not change of style but in substance. \nSystemic differences between India and the United States also lead to differences in negotiating style. \nDifferences in negotiating style between India and the United States is also the result of systemic differences; an Indian Foreign Minister is invariably a politician whereas in the United States Secretaries of State are frequently drawn from academia\, business\, armed forces\, etc.\nIn the United States behavioral sciences have taken a major lead in shaping policies. Style reflects behaviour and in this process selection of words used during negotiations plays an important role.\nDiplomacy carries historical baggage. Personalities like Henry Kissinger played a crucial role. Their personality and diplomatic style prove influential as Kissinger was successful in United States-China rapprochement process in 1971.\nDiplomatic style matters and works so long as diplomats are sensitive to substance. \nDiplomats respond to the leaders. Leaders set the substance and diplomatic style works accordingly.\nFor success in negotiations\, parties need to understand the bottomline well.\nWhile understanding the change in Indo-US relations\, it is important to note that India’s economic progress and new found prosperity have played a major role in this process.\nIndia is a major power and it is interesting to analyse where the United States places India in its ‘Grand Strategy’.\nSometimes diplomatic behaviour or style only works as a lubricant.\nFactors like culture\, personalities and national identity should be kept in mind and engagement should be in terms of principles.\nStyle certainly matters in Indo-US Relations as in any relationship. But it has been observed that when core issues are discussed\, style takes a back seat. Style becomes different when contentious issues are discussed. \nDiplomatic style works in negotiations if it is carried out with a certain degree of caution and care.\nIt is important for Indian diplomats to have a good knowledge about the United States\, and a good way is to gain exposure in American universities. \nCharisma of personalities involved in diplomatic negotiations works because it builds trust and enhances confidence\, as happened in the case of the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott dialogue. \n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-indo-us-relationship-is-diplomatic-style-important
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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