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TZID:Asia/Kolkata
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DTSTART:20070101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081205T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081205T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T003520
CREATED:20231223T222532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63740-1228455000-1228455000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India – Iran relations: Converging Interests or Drifting Equations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ranjit GuptaDiscussants: Ishrat Aziz and Anwar Alam \nThe West Asian region is currently in a state of flux. Iraq is far from being stabilized and questions are being raised over the continued US military presence in Iraq. However\, Iraq and the US have signed a security pact known as Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which requires US to withdraw its forces by the end of 2011. But there has been protest against the provisions of the pact within Iraq and in its neighbouring countries particularly in Iran. Tension between Iran and the US over Iran’s nuclear programme continues. \nStrong historical and cultural relations between India and Iran have always played a significant role in bringing the two countries closer to each other. Religious affinity has also played an important role. Islam has been a bridge between India and Iran. India has the world’s second largest Shia population. These factors would continue to dominate relations between the two in the future as well. \nThe importance of Iran for India lies in its geographical position\, size\, energy resources and provision of access to Central Asia. Despite their different perceptions\, the Indian leadership has underlined the strategic importance of Iran for India. Earlier\, during the Shah regime\, the Iran-China-Pakistan alliance\, Western hostility and Iran’s closeness to the US and its desire to play an active role in Gulf region did not allow India-Iran relations to grow beyond a point. Iran was the first country to diplomatically recognise Pakistan. After the Islamic revolution\, India’s relations with Iran remained minimal. Iran’s stand on the Kashmir issue and the Babri Masjid led to new constraints in their relations. \nHowever\, in the post-Cold War era\, similar security threat perceptions brought about a phase of renewed engagement with a number of high level visits from both sides. The turning point was the visit of former Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao to Tehran in 1993. These ties were further strengthened by Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Tehran in 2001 when he signed the ‘Tehran Declaration’ and several other economic and trade cooperation agreements. The strategic cooperation between the two got a further boost during Mohammad Khatami’s visit in January 2003 culminating in the signing of the ‘New Delhi Declaration.’  \nRecently\, steps have been taken to enhance cooperation in economic\, energy\, political and security arenas and there have been high-level visits on both sides. The most recent one being by President Ahmadinjad to New Delhi in April 2008 and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Tehran in November 2008. During these visit\, several documents were signed to strengthen and cement existing ties. \nEnergy is the common meeting point for India and Iran. At present\, the thrust of India’s energy cooperation with Iran is on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project and the $20 billion LNG deal. However\, both projects are yet to be finalised due to pricing and security-related differences that continue to hamper any forward movement. Analysts believe that Iran backed out of the LNG deal because of India’s vote against Iran in IAEA in September 2005 and again in 2006 to refer Iran to the UN Security Council regarding its nuclear programme. It is also argued that the US has been against any deal with Iran.  \nDespite converging interests and problems between India and Iran it can be said that in the changing geopolitical environment both at the regional and international levels\, the two countries will not be able to neglect each other’s concerns.  \nPoints raised during the Discussion\nEconomic factors are more important in Indo-Iran relations. \nProblem between Iran and Israel is not ideological but strategic. \nIran denied Indian flights during 1990-1991 Kuwait crisis. \nIran has not yet decided on the type of relationship it wishes to maintain with India.  \nConvergence of interest between India and Iran should be taken seriously. \nShia population could help to maintain good relations between the two countries. \nPrepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-iran-relations-converging-interests-or-drifting-equations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081212T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081212T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T003520
CREATED:20231223T222442Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T104826Z
UID:63737-1229059800-1229059800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China in Asia: Strategic Goals & Emerging Patterns in its Periphery Policy
DESCRIPTION:Chair: V. P. DuttDiscussants: Madhu Bhalla and G. V. C. Naidu \nThe paper broadly argued that the extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy is generating political and economic waves across Asia. The peaceful rise and integration of China into the international system necessitates that it pursues a long-term peace strategy that does not fundamentally clash with the interests of the major Asian powers. The pursuit of an aggressive nationalist course would not only be highly destabilizing but would also seriously jeopardize the economic and security prospects for Asia. However\, China’s pursuit of a peace strategy is domestically challenged – by segments of its military and Party that are steeped in old style nationalism and seek territorial gains against India\, Japan and Southeast Asia; unify Taiwan and utilize its growing influence to manage the influence of the major powers – US\, India\, Japan and Russia. The tensions at the heart of China’s foreign policy and strategic establishment over both national goals and appropriate strategy has nor been resolved. Biding time indicates a tactical adjustment while the statement of harmony and peaceful rise underlines a long term peace strategy. Both domestic and external political realignments are to be expected in such a political context. India’s strategic environment and role in emerging Asia would be significantly shaped by what happens in China and what politics it pursues towards Asia’s regions. \nMajor points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nThe things which categorize China’s regional policy are driven by its security concerns. \nThe ideology of nationalism may lead to sub-nationalism and can be problematic. \nThere is a modern dimension to the periphery engagement pursued by China. \nChina is only trying to re-evolve its earlier periphery policy. What one needs to do is look at history if it can tell us where China will go. \nThe current debate within the community of Chinese historians as to what are the real boundaries has relevance to the question of Tibet as well as India. \nChina’s rise came about at a time when the Cold war was declining. \nThere has been a relative decline in the influence of the United States and Japan in South East Asia. Today China is the largest aid provider to Myanmar and Laos and the second largest to Vietnam. \nIn South East Asia no country wants to appear to be antagonistic to China. \nChina has to learn to deal with the emergence of India as an East Asian power. \nNorth Korea and Pakistan may appear to be a liability for China in the long run. \nOne cannot draw a pattern in the Chinese regional understanding. \nThere needs to be more focus on issues of military technology and military modernization of China. \nChina’s focus remains hard power. \nChina’s behaviour is guided by its nationalist goals and it makes no compromises. \nChina is gradually moving away form multilateralism to regionalism. \nChina has always projected its economic power and has not been seen to be making any compromises. \nChina’s main strategic rival is the United States even today and its major focus is the quest for resources. \nThere has been an increase in the Chinese presence in South Asia and also an increase in the efforts made by China to exclude India from the East Asian region. \nChina has gained from the decline of the USSR and will definitely take advantage of the decline of the United States. \nA number of scenarios were proposed that could have been included in the paper as future predictions. \nChina’s thinking on the periphery needs to be looked at in detail. \nCan the idea of periphery be discussed as an extended neighbourhood? \nIt needs to be highlighted that China has made compromises with Myanmar\, Russia and Japan on the territorial issues. \nChina does not have an Asia policy and a loss of territory is considered as a loss of prestige. \n\nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/china-in-asia-strategic-goals-emerging-patterns-in-its-periphery-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081219T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081219T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T003520
CREATED:20231223T222441Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63734-1229664600-1229664600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A Critical Evaluation of Andhra Pradesh’s Response to the Naxal Challenge
DESCRIPTION:Chair: G. D BakshiDiscussants: D. K. Karthikeyan and J. N. Roy \nAndhra Pradesh has been dealing with the Naxalite challenge for a long time and the way in which it has dealt with this challenge has evolved over this time. The Union Government has been suggesting to other Naxal-affected States that they should adopt the Andhra Model in responding to the Naxalite challenge. The objective of this paper is to discern the constituents of what is popularly referred to as the Andhra Model – in other words Andhra Pradesh’s experience in addressing the Naxalite challenge.  \nIn sum\, what is popularly referred to as the Andhra Model comprises of Security Response\, Political Response and Development Response.  \nSecurity Response: Some of the core elements of the Security Response are: Surrender and Rehabilitation\, Intelligence-based Operations\, Victim Reassurance Policy such as civilian rehabilitation\, and police rehabilitation\, and Development Works and Mass Mobilisation. \nPolitical Response: There exists\, now\, a consensus among the major political formations in the State on the approach to dealing with the Naxalites. They understand that the challenge is\, indeed\, real and has to be addressed. It is this realisation that has manifested in a response which comprises three essential elements\, viz. tough security response\, development response\, and conducting limited periods of peace process.  \nDevelopment Response: Twice\, development programmes have been launched in the State with the particular objective of bringing in rapid socio-economic development in Naxalite-affected areas. The first initiative was known as Remote Areas Development Programme; and the second is known as Remote and Interior Areas Development Programme. Other development programmes such as Jalayagnam and Indiramma were also initiated.  \nThe political leadership was initially not sensitive enough to the impending Naxalite challenge. This changed and a consensus had emerged among the political formations by about 1996-97 that the rebels had to be taken headlong\, in all possible ways. Thus\, the political will and commitment displayed by the leadership played a significant role in crafting Andhra Pradesh’s response to the challenge posed by the Naxalites. The other affected States have with them the advantage of the experience of the Andhra Pradesh in dealing with the Naxalite issue. They would have to clearly recognise that the Andhra Pradesh model is much more than deploying the elite Greyhounds. It involves years of painstakingly building-up the fighting capabilities of the State police\, their training\, logistics and intelligence. \nTo sum up\, it might not be appropriate to suggest a near total replication of the experiences of Andhra Pradesh in dealing with the rebels. At best\, it could serve as a relevant reference point for the other Naxalite-affected States to craft their respective strategies.  \nMajor points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nDevelopment funds are often diverted to the Naxalites. The political parties/ political leaderships too pay ‘protection money’ to the Naxalites. \nPoor governance has led to increase in Naxalites subversive activities. \nTo counter Naxalite challenge\, the root cause will have to be attended to. And\, the state’s delivery mechanism has to be revamped. The state has to penetrate into remote tribal areas. \nTalks with Naxalite should be initiated. \nAndhra Pradesh’s experience in addressing the Naxalite challenge is a unique example\, and is successful. It is important to understand the model by other Naxal -affected States. \nAndhra Pradesh Model is successful because of the ‘accessibility’\, and it evolved over a long period of time. \nAndhra Pradesh Model\, however\, has failed to implement Land Reforms. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-critical-evaluation-of-andhra-pradeshs-response-to-the-naxal-challenge
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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