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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080905T053000
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SUMMARY:Role of Biotechnology in Defence
DESCRIPTION:Chair: B S SacharDiscussants: B M Gandhi & Sachin Chaturvedi  \nIn the 21st century\, the science of biology has been found adopting various techniques from other fields of life to improve its effectiveness. Modern-day biotechnology could be regarded as a multidisciplinary field where its utility has grown beyond traditional uses like agriculture and medicine. This draft paper by Ajey Lele\, Research Fellow at IDSA\, looks at the relevance of biotechnology for modern day militaries both from offensive and defensive perspectives. Major applications of biotechnology extending for their militaristic utility mainly fall into categories like sensors; electronics and computing; materials; logistics and therapeutics. This paper is divided into four main parts. Part I looks at the relevance of biotechnology with reference to the debate on ‘germ threats’. The second part deals with the defence related medical and non-medical aspects of this technology and the third part focuses on military investments made by few important states in this field. The last part takes a macro-view of disarmament issues.  \nRelevance of biotechnology for bio weapons/ bio terrorism \nIn general\, two main types of groups/individuals could be said to be in a position to apply the advanced techniques of biotechnology for the purposes of bio-terrorism. The first category could be the state sponsored international terrorist organizations undertaking such act with the help of the sponsor state possessing covert BW programme. The second type could be the disgruntled scientists working at clinical microbiology laboratory or academic laboratory involved in some aspect of microbiological research. She/he may do it just to prove a point or as an act of defiance against her/his own organization or because of influence from any terrorist organization.  \nCurrent research in biotechnology parallels earlier research in the nuclear field in the 1940s and 1950s. The database developed for nuclear technology was applicable for both military and industrial purposes. Similarly\, the database being developed for commercial genetic engineering in the fields of agriculture\, animal husbandry\, and medicine is potentially convertible to the development of a wide range of novel pathogens that can attack plant\, animal\, and human populations. Because of these advancements in various areas related to biotechnology and genetic engineering there exists a possibility that biological warfare could gain importance as a viable option not only amongst the terrorist organizations but covertly among some state actors too. \nIn the years ahead\, the use of biotechnology to create bioweapons will become far more powerful\, more available and less expensive. Engineering\, computing\, and the capital markets will push biology forward on a rapid trajectory. What used to take a highly skilled team of scientists to accomplish can now be done in rapid fashion with automated kits within few hours. Industrial techniques allow the cheap production of pathogens or toxins to tonnage quantities in places around the world. Historically\, it has been seen that all current inventions have found suitable applicability in the business of warfare. In case of futuristic bioweapons the only dilemma could be will terrorist organizations opt for this technology?  \nBiotechnological Weapons\nHow to turn modern biotechnology to make actual weapons is still not known\, but with their capability of attacking targets accurately and producing ultramicro\, non-lethal\, and reversible damage\, such weapons might finally change the methods of “physical annihilation” or “destruction within the killing range” which have characterized war since the invention of gunpowder. Today\, scientists are of the opinion that we can use many modern biotechnologies directly as a means of defence and attack\, and with further development\, they probably will become new weapons systems.  \nTechnically speaking war is simply the human behaviour that forces enemies to lose the power of resistance. It could be possible to create biological weapons which could alter the biological features of human bodies. It could be possible to create biotechnological weapons that can cause destruction that is more powerful and more civilized than that caused by conventional killing methods like gunpowder or nuclear weapons. However\, an important thing to note is that the military utility of biotechnology is likely to grow beyond biological weapons and medical protection. It is likely to revel a character of aggression not thought of till date.  \nBiotechnology and Biodefence\nVarious techniques exist today within the field of biotechnology which have direct or indirect relevance for biodefence. Processes like the automation of sequencing in genome projects\, bioinformatics\, and advances in combinational chemistry and high throughput screening of compounds are on the forefront in this arena. They are being developed for civilian application in medicine\, pharmaceuticals\, and agriculture\, as well as for purposes that are legitimate under the BTWC\, such as defence\, detection\, protection\, and prophylaxis. Biotechnology has been vital to the development of techniques for identifying and diagnosing diseases and for medical counter-measures. Moreover the recent advances in biotechnology offer a real opportunity for the development of effective counter-measures to biological and toxin weapons agents. From a biosecurity perspective\, vaccine development and production has great strategic value. \nMedical and Non-medical Aspects of BT\nFollowing are the broad areas in various medical and non-medical categories for military where biotechnology can be used in some manner  \n\nTherapeutics: Genomics and proteomics; drugs and vaccines; drug delivery systems \nElectronics and Computing: Protein based devices; biocomputing; biomolecular hybrid devices \nMaterials: Tissue engineering; biologically inspired materials and processes; hybrid materials \nLogistics: Miniaturizations of biological devices; functional foods; biological energy sources; renewable resources \n\nMilitary investments made by few important states\nUnderstanding the need for the induction of emerging technologies\, armed forces around the world have started investing in various strategic technologies. However\, in respect of biotechnology\, the interest appears to be still in an embryonic stage. The reasons for this could be many. Today\, biotechnology is still under the process of evolution. The growth of technology offers many promises but it still does not offer substantial solutions to existing military problems. And this could be the reason for the absence of interest in most of the cases. However\, as states have slowly started realizing that juxtaposing this technology with other technologies like nanotechnology could offer many dividends to military they have started investing in it. \nApart from the US\, states like China are looking at the military applicability of this technology. Only few states are showing overt interest in this field. However\, dual-use nature of this technology demand a ‘read between the line’ approach to understand the military intentions of various nation-states in respect of this technology.  \nChina’s overall technological capabilities have increased dramatically since its reform programme began in the late 1970s. However\, no direct indications are available about their interests in using biotechnology for military purposes. At the same time China understands that biotechnology has obvious military implications as a means for developing biological weapons and also providing defence against biological weapons. The military biotechnology may found its applicability in areas like non-lethal weapons. Here a possibility exists that microbes capable of destroying the fuel supplies of the enemy could be developed. \nChina’s main sources of biotech growth are expected to be in bio-agriculture\, genomic sequencing\, biochips\, traditional medicines\, bioinformatics\, stem cell research\, and bio-manufacturing. China is also making substantial investments in Agriculture biotechnology which it considers as a strategically significant tool for improving national food security.  \nBiotechnology and Disarmament\nThere exists an apparent linkage between the growth of biotechnology and development of biological or agriculture weapons. In future non-lethal biological agents could also be used as incapacitants under certain circumstances. This exponential growth of technology demands focused attention from the disarmament regime. In the present era\, it would be a profound mistake to see genomics as simply a scientific revolution. It could have both positive as well as negative impacts on the survival of the mankind. The entire spectra of biotechnologies could likely have major impact on creation of new biological weapons. \nConclusion\nBiotechnology has shown immense potential for its utility in various facets of life and military is no exception. Scientists and military leadership are increasingly finding its utility for militaristic purposes. At the same time this technology is raising fears because of many of its potential negative consequences.  \nBiotechnology and its products have created some amazing possibilities for military particularly in the area of sensor technology\, biocomputing\, protection of C4ISR\, Bioengineered materials\, biofuels\, etc. Induction of biotechnoogy in such areas is expected to bring radical changes to a broad range of military applications and even few military tactics could have to be redefined with the induction of this technology. Looking at the potential of this technology\, there is a need to invest more in military’s biomaterials needs.  \nUnfortunately\, the growth of BT has a darker side too and that is its potential to create bioweapons. Today\, due to the competitive nature of technology business houses are also found reluctant to provide information that could compromise their economic edge. Hence\, the biggest challenge exists to allow the growth of technology without letting it into the wrong hands. It is expected that in future\, the science of biotechnology itself may come in handy to tackle the threats posed by advances in biotechnology.  \nDiscussion\nWg. Cdr. Lele presented this paper as part of the IDSA Weekly Fellows’ Seminar series. The seminar was chaired by Brig. B. S. Sachar\, Senior Fellow at IDSA. Two external discussants were invited to provide their comments on the paper: Dr. B.M. Gandhi who is a biotechnologist and CEO of NeoMed Services\, and Dr. Sachin Chaturvedi who works at the Research and Information Systems for Developing Countries. In addition\, Dr. Uttam Sinha\, Research Fellow at IDSA\, was also invited to be a discussant. Some of the points raised during the course of the discussion are as below: \n\nBiotechnology industry surpasses the Aerospace industry. \nIndia is at a nascent stage of development in the field of biotechnology. \nOne needs to be more concerned regarding the non-scientific applications of the technology. \nBiotechnology should not be seen in isolation. \nOne the most significant questions today is as to who can use a biological weapon? \nBTWC does not provide enough space to control existing developments in the field of biotechnology. \nSAARC should be used as a forum where these issues should be discussed at the regional level. \nOne needs to highlight the politics involved in biotechnology and also look at the geo-politics of biotechnology. \nBiotechnology is likely to be a lead technology in the 21st Century. \nIt is necessary to highlight how useful or dubious existing international treaties are.\nIndia today is facing a number of problems related to biotechnology. \nThere is a need to dwell upon Agro-terrorism. \nPharmaceutical companies can also indulge in the spread of a biological agent for this can help them attain high levels of profits. \nThe biotechnology threat is increasing exponentially and there is a need to analyze the threat and also to get solutions and preventions. \nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/role-of-biotechnology-in-defence
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080912T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080912T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T005330
CREATED:20231223T222539Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63752-1221197400-1221197400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India and the Non-Proliferation Regime: Looking Beyond the Nuclear Deal
DESCRIPTION:Chair: G BalachandranDiscussants: K C Singh & R R Subramanian  \nThe India-United States civil nuclear cooperation agreement\, announced through the July 18\, 2005 joint statement\, besides opening the doors for global nuclear commerce\, is seen as a means to facilitate India’s greater integration with the global non-proliferation regime. India was always credited to be an adherent of the regime’s norms\, but was deemed an outsider owing to its non-membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)\, which is seen as the cornerstone of the regime. Through the nuclear agreement\, the U.S. had volunteered to assist this assimilation process\, the latest development being the India-specific exemption at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).  \nThe emergent global nuclear order and the NPT\nAs a Cold War arrangement\, the NPT sustained one of the most established international bargains whereby states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them\, while existing nuclear weapon states committed to eventually give them up. However\, in the past four decades\, the Treaty had attained the tag of being a system with unfulfilled objectives outnumbering its achieved goals\, and failures accumulating as each of its articles were being violated with impunity. The Treaty was no longer seen to have the capability to address newer security threats arising out of a post 9/11 world\, influenced by non-state actors and an increasing number of threshold states. What looked more portentous was the imbalance a non-state actor would inflict on the non-proliferation regime and the NPT\, which were equipped only to handle the proliferation problem arising from states. Forty years later\, the Treaty might pride on its record of restricting new weapons states to three or four. But as of today\, the instances of non-compliance and likelihood of more threshold states emerging on the scene have increased\, partly due to the security deficit created by current geo-politics. \nIndia’s rendezvous with the non-proliferation regime\nFrom its early days of disarmament activism\, India had envisioned a third world leadership role for itself in the evolving non-proliferation regime\, and vociferously advocated the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons technology. In the early 1960s\, as a member of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC)\, India influenced the debate for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and argued for a credible bargain whereby weapon powers would give up their arsenals while ensuring that others refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. But when the grand bargain became discriminatory\, India decided to stay away from the NPT. India’s decision to conduct a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion experiment was seen as the first challenge to the non-proliferation regime\, which invoked new mechanisms like the NSG to add to what the Zangger Committee had already initiated. \nIndia and the NPT: Towards Convergence or Drifting Apart?\nThe genesis of India’s confrontation with the NPT can be traced to the political power play enacted during the negotiations for the Treaty. Even before Ireland submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly\, India had launched its campaign calling for steps to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and exhorted weapon states to take the initiative\, failing which non-nuclear nations would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons. India was upset that the Irish draft talked of prohibiting acquisition of nuclear weapons\, but imposed no restriction on its continued manufacture and maintenance. Later\, India joined seven nations in the ENDC to submit a resolution (GA 2028 [XX]) with five principles of which the key ones were:  \n– The Treaty should be void of any loopholes for countries to proliferate;  \n– It should embody an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations;  \n– It should be a step towards complete disarmament. \nThe Other Challenges \nThough India could be prodded to think of campaigning for reforms in the NPT\, there are other areas like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)\, on which India would have serious reservations in its current form.  \nCTBT: India had vociferously argued for a test-ban\, along with a fissile production cut-off\, as part of its campaign to stop the production and development of nuclear weapons during the initial NPT debate. This was in consonance with its 1954 proposal calling for end to nuclear weapons testing. At the 1996 Conference on Disarmament\, India\, along with members of G-21\, proposed a Programme of Action for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020. However\, during the CTBT negotiations\, weapon states refused to agree to any commitment on disarmament and pushed for a test ban while insisting on the Entry into Force clause (XIV)\, which required India along with specified countries to join the Treaty before it became operational. \nFMCT: A key element of the July 2005 joint statement was India’s cooperation in negotiations for concluding a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). India had strongly advocated a fissile production cut off in the NPT debate\, but later on resisted an FMCT owing to its potential impact on its own nuclear weapons programme. Differences over issues like time-bound disarmament had led to stalemate in negotiations. After initial opposition arguing that an FMCT would curtail its nuclear weapons programme\, India announced in 1998 its willingness to participate in the negotiations. There are some issues to be factored in India’s policy towards FMCT: (a) Does India have sufficient fissile material for its credible deterrent? (2) If not\, can it be mobilised before the Treaty is ratified? (3) Would the Treaty benefit disarmament or would it be used to curtail the strategic capability of countries like India? \nMTCR: Another commitment of similar character was compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Though India has updated its national controls lists with that of MTCR Annex\, it is still treated as an outsider by the MTCR community for its defiance in pursuing its guided missile development programme. However\, the merit in India’s case is that it had managed to develop its missile systems indigenously and also resisted transfer of missile systems to another country.  \nConclusion\nWith the nuclear deal and NSG waiver\, India is moving towards greater integration with the non-proliferation regime. By doing so\, it would join ranks with the United States in evolving a new nuclear security order. However\, the more India’s proximity with global non-proliferation objectives\, the more would be the policy challenges on crucial issues connected with anti-proliferation. Irrespective of the success and acceptability of a new order\, the instruments of the old order would continue to hold significance in nuclear politics. As an active member of the non-proliferation regime\, India would have to initiate a dialogue with these instruments to ensure that its bonding with the regime is sustained. \nThe NPT continues to be the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime\, despite its many shortcomings. Being a near-universal mechanism\, the Treaty would continue to hold its primacy in global nuclear affairs. Though India managed to resist calls for membership all these years\, its stakes and responsibilities would increase with its weapon power status and greater access to nuclear commerce. On the other hand\, India has to realise that the driving spirit that motivated it to advocate the NPT and CTBT are still relevant. For decades\, Indians have seen NPT as discriminatory so much so that even a rethink is now seen as blasphemous. \nDiscussion\nA. Vinod Kumar presented this paper as part of the IDSA Weekly Fellows’ Seminar series. The seminar was chaired by Dr. G. Balachandran\, Visiting Fellow at IDSA. Discussants in this seminar were Dr. R. R. Subramanian\, former Senior Research Associate at IDSA and a renowned strategic analyst and Mr. K. C. Singh\, IFS (Retd.). Mr. Sujit Dutta\, Senior Fellow at IDSA and Dr. Rajiv Nayan\, Research Officer at IDSA\, also offered special comments as Discussants. Important points flagged during the discussion were: \n\nA favourable balance has to be struck between pragmatism and idealism on issues related to non-proliferation. \nIdeological and practical aspects are an important dimension of the debate on NPT. \nThere should be a degree of caution in the way the nuclear deal is looked at. US posturing may be different from action and the idea might be to target India’s strategic programme. US is no longer a superpower but a hyper power; and it has no friends but only allies. Therefore there should be an element of scepticism in the way the nuclear agreement is perceived. One has to keep in mid the ‘trade offs’ in such arrangements. \nThere is a debate on moralism versus pragmatism as India has been an over-moralising country in the past due to the Gandhian and Nehruvian legacy. Moralising kept India away from realpolitik for a long time. However\, the moral strategy also helped in some ways and India introduced the concept of ‘Atomic Apartheid.’ There is a dichotomy between moralism and practicality. India is shedding its moralistic stand and taking a more holistic view of the nuclear agreement. \nThe best thing about the deal is that India can trade with France and Russia\nIndia is the largest supplier of thorium (almost 60% of the total supplies).\nIndia is already a Nuclear Weapon State. There is no need therefore for enshrining this by India joining the NPT as a weapon state which is not likely in the near term.\nIndia is closer to signing CTBT than before. \nThe signing of an FMCT will take time. \nThe India-US nuclear deal is part of an American attempt to balance the strategic interest of making India a stakeholder to strengthen the international order and the American commitment to non-proliferation goals. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Priyanka Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-and-the-non-proliferation-regime-looking-beyond-the-nuclear-deal
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T005330
CREATED:20231223T222539Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63750-1221802200-1221802200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Geopolitics of Climate Change and India’s Position
DESCRIPTION:Chair: R RajagopalanDiscussants: Ashutosh Varshney & Sunil Chauhan  \nClimate change and security as a subject of enquiry is now being pursued by the IDSA in a comprehensive manner. Scholars from the non-traditional security cluster\, since 2008\, have been presenting papers and delivering talks on the topic. In April 2008 a run-up workshop was held on the security implications of climate change for India. A national workshop on security implications of climate change for India is planned on October 30\, 2008. A working group under Dr Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair\, IDSA comprising nine IDSA scholars and three outside members (a climatologist\, a disaster expert and an economist) has been formed for the purpose. It is intended that the draft report will be presented in the roundtable discussion. There has also been interaction with MEA officials on the various aspects of climate change. \nUttam Kumar Sinha who is working on the bilateral aspects of the climate change and also on international negotiations has recently authored a chapter in the re-launched IDSA Asian Strategic Review 2008 titled “Asia and Climate Change”. His paper “Geopolitics of Climate Change and India’s Position” in the fellows’ seminar was a logical movement from regional analysis to a global one.  \nThe seminar was chaired by Ambassador R. Rajagopalan\, who is a member of the IDSA Executive Council. The two external discussants were Prof C.K. Varshney\, former Dean of School of Environmental Science\, JNU\, and former Chairman Environmental Research and Wetland Research Committee\, Ministry of Environment and Forests\, and Commander Sunil Chauhan\, from the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation\, United Service Institution of India. The internal discussants were Vinod Kumar and Medha Bisht. The participant-level was high reflecting the interest in the topic and the growing concern over climate change. Over 20 scholars and members of IDSA attended the proceedings.  \nThe paper by referring to the debate in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in April 2007 explained how the issue of climate change is being “securitised” and how a counter argument is being built up to “desecuritise” it. India strongly criticized the “catastrophic scenarios” posited by the Stern Report and articulated a more “immediate and quantifiable threat from possible conflicts arising out of inadequate resources for development and poverty eradication as well as competition for energy.” The author identified loosely structured blocks of states with their own mix of concerns and actions on climate change. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) with concerns and fears of rising sea levels and large submergence of the coastlines think from an “ecological effectiveness” and finds a willing partner in EU. The second group is of OPEC and various industrialized countries that look at climate change from an economic angle. Such groups are seeking “economic effectiveness”. The third group is the developing countries echoing the north-south divide and articulating concerns from a “social justice and equity”. There is also the G5 (Brazil\, China\, India\, Mexico and South Africa) which in the recently concluded G-8 summit challenged the economic dominance of the West and pivoted mostly around south-south cooperation.  \nAt the heart of India’s position on climate change is the notion that it must be allowed to pollute on a per capita basis equally with the West. India has thus been propounding the “per capita emission” line. It is a strong unconditional position that immediately shifts the responsibility on to the shoulder of the developed countries to drastically cut emissions. It also allows India the space and time to grow at a sustained pace and strengthen its poverty alleviation and developmental programmes. But even more significant is the assurance that its per capita emissions will never exceed that of developing countries. It is a position of confidence and self belief in its economic policies\, a challenge and a message to the developed world that it will not be pressurized in the negotiation process. While the per capita argument is quite justified for India\, it also suggests a dogged resistance in its approach\, a grandstanding of its newly acquired international status. But to be a serious player in global politics requires finely balancing self interest with certain global responsibilities and commitment (at least to be seen doing). This is not a moralistic position that India so pitifully pursued in the 1960s and suffered so seriously.  \nWhile the ‘per capita emission’ is being largely accepted including the UN\, there is a certain perception that India’s position is one of extreme rigidity with no allowance for even a self determined gradual carbon emission reduction quota. India here is missing out on a positive leadership role. Another critical element of this leadership is to dehyphenate itself from China. India’s approach to climate change is based on energy security and sustainable development while the Chinese plan focused on emission reduction. China has overtaken the US in total emission\, though its per capita pollution is lower than that of the US.  \nIndia’s other position on climate change is that it does not considers it a “threat” and particularly not in the sense of considering military options as a response. India’s stress on “collaborative action at the global level both through mitigation and adaptation in accordance with the common and differentiated responsibilities of the different countries” points to its faith in the UNFCCC as the agency for carrying out negotiations. So clearly for India an effective climate regime with equitable burden sharing can help tackle the adverse impacts and linking climate change with security is far-fetched and unnecessarily alarmist. Climate change is a concern but India would rather be worried about freer and fairer trade particularly of agricultural products and correcting the distorted trade practices of powerful countries.  \nThe geopolitics and domestic political considerations will remain critical determinants to the negotiation process leading to 2012. The changing power equation and a predominant shift towards Asia will see new groupings and alignments that will impact the existing climate change regimes. In the coming years\, the spotlight will increasingly fall on India\, China and also the US\, the chief protagonists in the emission targets. Since the new agreement needs to be concluded by the end of 2009 (Copenhagen Summit) so as to give countries adequate time for ratification\, the politics will intensify. For India\, however much it digs to its position\, pressures will come from different directions on different interlinked issues. Before the G8 summit\, India braced itself from the US on imposition of tariff barriers against exported goods from India that are seen as products with large carbon footprints\, such as iron and steel. The Japanese at the recently concluded Accra Climate Change Summit took the issue of “sectoral approaches” with India\, in order to establish “international energy efficiency standards” for polluting industries across the world. Has India given itself limited space for negotiations thereby constricting its ability to manoeuvre? If India is interested in world emissions\, its own emissions are important. There lies the challenge and the dilemma. India has long experience in negotiation on climate change and has been at the forefront of the debate ever since Mahatma Gandhi made the ‘greed and need’ connection. India will have to reconfigure its position. ‘Greed’ and ‘poverty’ are powerful arguments in the climate change debate but will not help clinch the emission issue. It has to be seen whether India will reconfigure its position. Of equal interest will be to observe whether other regimes\, groupings and alliances will challenge the Kyoto Protocol. At the end it is not about the sacrosanct nature of the Kyoto Protocol or which other regime should come into existence. The challenge is to be proactive\, innovative and find solutions to the problems.  \nProfessor C.K. Varshney commented the real issue was that of the extra carbon in the natural cycle due to fossil fuel use. Much more scientific work needs to be done. As far as India’s position\, he felt that it only served the purpose of short- term. In the long- term we need to focus more on issues of energy intensity and efficiency. He reminded that we often are too much human centric and neglect loss of biodiversity\, which in any case will not permit the current lifestyles. There was a discussion on the geopolitics and security aspect. Some members from the audience felt that it is the “politics” and not “geopolitics”. Cdr Sunil Chauhan mentioned that in a globalised world contiguous borders are not relevant any longer and thus the term “geopolitics” is in order. Medha Bisht mentioned that we need to take into account the environmental\, human and social costs of big infrastructure projects such as dams as they can be counter productive.  \nThere was also an exciting discussion on the referent object. While the author had taken it as climate\, Vinod Kumar felt that it should be survival. While others felt that the nation-state is the ultimate referent even from the human security perspective.  \nProfessor C.K. Varshney also elaborated on the uncertainties and dangers of geological sequestration of carbon. He mentioned that land-to-plant forests are also limited and too much reliance on aforestation thus has its own limits. Elaborating on Gandhian thought\, he mentioned that it in no way\, means to go backward in the past\, but instead to find alternative solution\, which necessarily may not be technology driven. What economic model India is following was also discussed. Some felt that we are blindly aping the West and we need to see how vulnerable we are internally due to the weather beaten economic path we are opting for. Enormous ecological challenges and social stresses are evident in the future.  \nThe paper generated considerable discussion and well overshot the defined time. Importantly it did not drift from the core feature of the paper. The chairman in agreement with the speaker summed up the proceedings by mentioning how important the topic is and how critically important it is for India to be proactive and not only posturing and grandstanding.  \nPrepared by P.K. Gautam\, Research Fellow at IDSA and Co-ordinator of Non-Traditional Security cluster.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/geopolitics-of-climate-change-and-indias-position
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T005330
CREATED:20231223T222539Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63751-1221802200-1221802200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The United National Front in Afghan Politics: An Explorative Study
DESCRIPTION:Chair: P StobdanDiscussant: Kalim Bahadur  \nThere remains an element of ambiguity as to when the United National Front formally came into being. It is generally believed to have been formed either in March or early April (April 3?) 2007. According to Pajhwok Afghan News\, the UNF was formed in Kabul on March 12\, 2007. Interestingly\, according to the Strategic Forecasting Inc.\, better known as Stratfor\, a well-known Texas-based private intelligence agency\, it was founded a year earlier on April 3\, 2006. Whatever might have been the exact date of its formation\, the conditions that led to its creation continues to haunt the Afghan polity. \nThe roots of the pronounced tribal-ethnic character of the present Afghan politics can be traced back to the formation of the modern Afghan state during 18th and 19th centuries. It is important to bear in mind the way ethnic and tribal dynamics played out in the face of externalization of the Afghan civil war through the 1980s and 1990s. Until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 and the 1978 coup by the Afghan communists\, the modern Afghan state was strongly dominated by the Pashtuns belonging to a certain tribe/clan considered as one of royal origin or high in the Pashtun social hierarchy. The minority ethnic groups from the north and parts of western and central Afghanistan – especially Tajiks\, Hazaras\, Uzbeks and Turkmen – had very limited participation in the Afghan national/state politics which remained a Pashtun bastion. Historically\, the ruling elites of the minority ethnic groups were allowed to retain their autonomous or semi-independent status provided they accepted the suzerainty\, often nominal\, of the Pashtun dynasties ruling from Kabul and agreed to pay revenue to the state treasury or provide with men and resources in times of war. The above political understanding not only defined/institutionalised the relationship between the power structure in Kabul and the ruling elites in the far-flung provinces\, but also between Pashtuns and the non-Pashtuns. Such traditional mechanisms of power-distribution and resource-sharing\, however asymmetric\, ensured peace and stability in the country for decades until the beginning of the civil war in the late 1970s. The traditional balance of power in the Afghan politics finally withered away as the ideologically adversarial proxy politics of the Cold War era militarized and internationalized the Afghan civil war. Soviet Union’s armed intervention in Afghanistan beginning December 1979 in support of the communist government in Kabul\, led to a further polarization between the state and the people. As part of its strategy to counter the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan\, the United States (US) along with China\, Pakistan\, Iran and a host of West Asian and West European countries began sponsoring and arming the fragmented but popular anti-Soviet resistance building up in the Afghan countryside. This led to intense weaponisation and subsequent jihadisation of the civil war. Interestingly\, it also led to the empowerment of the hitherto marginalised Tajik\, Uzbek and Hazara anti-Soviet resistance groups who later came to have stakes in the national politics of Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal by early 1989\, they were among the key players in the struggle for control over Kabul. \nEnd of Taliban Interregnum\nThe emergence of a Taliban movement with full backing from the Pakistan state in mid-1990s had a strong Pashtun dimension to it. The minority ethnic factions responded to the rapidly expanding Pashtun Taliban by forming a loose anti-Taliban alliance called the United Front (better known as the Northern Alliance\, NA) in late 1990s which in turn was backed by Russia\, Central Asian republics\, Iran and India. Being new and relatively well-organised\, the Taliban movement was often viewed by the Pashtuns as the return of Pashtun rule over Kabul; and an effective counter force to the Tajik militia.  \nHowever\, the events of 9-11 and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan on October 7\, 2001 proved to be a yet another turning point in the Afghan civil war. It led to the ouster of a Pashtun force from power\, re-establishment of Tajik dominance in Kabul\, re-emergence of factional politics\, and West’s return to Afghanistan. Interestingly\, it had also led to the US re-engagement with the former anti-Soviet mujahideen factions\, especially with the NA. \nReturn of Factional Politics\nSoon confronted with the huge challenge of raising a non-Taliban multi-ethnic Afghan leadership\, a conference involving diverse Afghan factions (minus Taliban and Hezb-e Islami) was held at Bonn\, Germany. The dramatic Bonn Conference (November 27-December 5\, 2001) was a prelude to a new round of factional politics. The nine-day long gruelling negotiations had all the trappings of the factional politics of the early 1990s. It can be best summed up in the words of former US Secretary of State Colin Powell who while reacting to the possible collapse of the Bonn Conference had stated\, “Do not let them break up. Keep them there. Lock them up if you have to. We do not want this to go anywhere else. We’re almost there\, and this is the time to grind it out on this line. If they go off\, I don’t know when I’ll get them all back together.” The signing of the Bonn Agreement (December 5\, 2001) which laid out a road map for stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan thus facilitated and legitimized the role of mujahideen factions in the new political process. \nHardening of Pashtun-NA Divide\nThe hardening ethno-political divides and competing agendas of the diverse constituents of the Karzai-led provisional governments was best reflected during the proceedings of the Constitutional Loya Jirga (December 14\, 2003 – January 4\, 2004) and the presidential election (October 9\, 2004). The 502-member Jirga\, which was called for the approval of the new draft constitution\, was marred by severe differences among delegates from diverse factions on issues concerning nature of the Afghan state\, the form of government\, status and role of Islam\, centre-province relations\, double citizenship\, status of minorities\, human rights and the linguistic rights. The idea of a highly centralised presidential form of government with overriding powers over the bicameral legislature came to be strongly contested by the non-Pashtun delegates.  \nMarginalising NA\nIt is noteworthy that since the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 and the subsequent formation of the Afghan transitional administration\, Karzai had been trying to deal with the strong influence of the NA leaders and commanders in his government. Karzai’s assertive tone against the NA reached a new pitch in July 2004 when he declared that the private militia of the warlords constituted a bigger threat to Afghanistan than the Taliban insurgency. Karzai’s frustration over lack of direct control in areas outside Kabul has since been a constant feature. Despite all rhetoric and attempts to marginalise NA\, Karzai at the same time kept the option of dealing with them open. It is noteworthy that prior to the presidential election\, at a time when Karzai was easing out powerful Tajik ministers from his transitional government\, he was also trying to woo the Taliban and the Hezb-e Islami cadres to join the electoral process. \nThe National Understanding Front\nThough much of the NA leadership was out or on the margins of the governing structure in Kabul by end of 2005\, it failed to augment the position of Karzai in the Afghan politics in any substantive manner. With their presence in the government diminished\, Tajik leader Yunus Qanuni on March 31\, 2005 announced the formation of National Understanding Front or Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli (JTM) as the main opposition group to the central government\, which was welcomed by President Hamid Karzai. The Front\, comprising about 12-14 political parties\, was also formed in view of the September 2005 parliamentary elections.  \nThe UNF: Composition and Agenda\nThe UNF is said to be an agglomeration of about 15-18 political parties. Though there is not much information available on its exact size in terms of membership\, the Front claims to have the backing of 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s Parliament. It reportedly has two governing councils with Mohammad Naim Farahi\, a parliamentarian from Farah\, currently leading the executive council. Many of the members of the UNF are either parliamentarians or former ministers from the Karzai-led interim and transitional governments. Few of them are still occupying senior positions in the central government which lends certain legitimacy to their “government-cum- opposition” status. Interestingly\, the UNF argues against being an opposition coalition or bloc though its members constantly refer to the weaknesses in Karzai’s leadership. In view of the strong presence of the former NA members\, the Pashtuns are by and large suspicious of the political agenda of the UNF\, especially over the idea of strengthening the powers of the provincial governors. \nReactions to the Emergence of ‘Rainbow Alliance’\nThe emergence of the UNF had elicited reactions from the entire political spectrum of Afghanistan. Most of the Afghan political observers and analysts believe that the UNF would not survive long due to the extreme diversity of its constituents (jihadis\, ex-khalqis\, ex-parchamites\, royalists\, Tajiks\, Hazaras\, Uzbeks\, shias and sunnis) and the ideological contradictions flowing from it. The Front is said to lack in common ideology and that its members have conflicting interests. The UNF is often believed to have been formed by former NA along with some ex-communists to legitimize their political existence in view of alleged war crimes and gross human rights violations committed by them in the past. Though they are covered under general amnesty made from time to time\, nevertheless\, the fear of Kabul coming under international pressure to conduct war trials in future remains. Otherwise\, the only factor which is said to unite such diverse constituents of the Front is their shared opposition to Karzai’s leadership.  \nUNF Woos the Taliban\nIn March 2008\, the UNF announced that it had been secretly talking to the Taliban at least since last five months as part of its efforts for national reconciliation. UNF spokesperson had revealed to the Associated Press that Chairman Burhanuddin Rabbani and Mohammad Qasim Fahim had been meeting “important people” from Taliban and other anti-government groups to seek reconciliation. It is interesting to note here that within days of the launching of UNF\, Karzai for the first time admitted on April 6\, 2007 (according to some sources April 7) that he had been talking to the Taliban. With UNF trying to woo the Taliban\, a new dimension has been added to the ongoing politics of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. Taliban are more likely to use divisions between Karzai and UNF to their advantage. It would strengthen their bargaining capacity in case of any serious negotiations with Kabul or the UNF. It is also indicative of the growing fragmentation of reconciliation process in the country. Interestingly\, purported Taliban spokespersons have constantly denied talking to either the Afghan government or the UNF.  \nPerspectives\nThe UNF is a typical Afghan political experiment. It has all the trappings of Afghanistan’s ethno-regional dynamics and factional power politics\, obviously interspersed with the interests of external powers. The UNF may be a recent entity\, but it is also a manifestation of tendencies with a long and a varied past to it. Like any other grouping it draws its characteristics from both historical and prevailing socio-political tendencies in the space in which it originated and is fighting for survival. At a more nuanced level\, it may be said that the UNF is struggling to legitimize and mainstream itself in the Afghan politics. It is striving to raise its profile both at the regional and international level by being an effective and a relevant force in the domestic politics. The key objective seems to be to evolve as a viable alternative to the faltering political structure in Kabul. The outcome of the 2009 elections\, provided it is held\, would be a major challenge to its growth and survival. As regards its alleged foreign backers\, they would be far more interested in its peace initiatives for national reconciliation. Since the limitations of the military option against the Taliban have come to be realized\, some of the neighbouring or even Western countries might be backing UNF’s efforts to engage the Taliban. The UNF may have also been formed in response to growing Taliban challenge. The impetus might have come from the weak position of Kabul and the growing divide in the trans-Atlantic coalition. As political discontentment and insecurity grows\, the UNF is likely to gain ground despite its limitations and contradictions. It is also likely to be challenged by other mini-fronts that might be sponsored by groups inimical to its existence. As for its future prospects\, the UNF is not meant to be a long-term venture.  \n*** \nThe seminar was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair\, IDSA. Amb. Ugendra Kumar\, Joint Secretary\, and currently with NDC\, and Professor Kalim Bahadur were the two external discussants. Comments on the paper were also provided by the two internal discussants – Dr. Ashok Behuria\, Research Fellow IDSA and Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza\, Associate Fellow IDSA. \nMajor points that were highlighted in the discussion were: \n\nThe UNF is limited to ethnic politics and did not put forward economic and social policy. \nLike elsewhere\, as in Iraq for example\, it is the minority community that rules over the larger society. \nPashtuns have been dominant only for a short time in Afghan politics. \nTwo contrasting views were expressed about the UNF. One view was that the UNF has no social power and mandate and therefore the possibility of its coming into power is less. The other view was that the UNF has a multi-ethnic forum which may enable it to gain power and provide stability.\nThe future political structure in Afghanistan will essentially depend on the America-Taliban-Pakistan triangle.\nUNF has not taken political shape. \nPakistan is now alienated in the process and India’s future role is far too delicate. \nIt was suggested that the paper should include a debate on the movement from Presidential to Parliamentary type of government in Afghan politics. \n\nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-united-national-front-in-afghan-politics-an-explorative-study
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080926T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080926T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T005330
CREATED:20231223T222539Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63749-1222407000-1222407000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Storming of Lal Masjid in Pakistan: An Analysis
DESCRIPTION:Chair: S K BhutaniDiscussants: Ved Marwah & Sudhir Sharma  \nConversion of a religious place by terrorists into a heavily fortified safe sanctuary over a protracted period of time is a tactic largely restricted to Asia. Entrenched in this meticulously defended complex\, terrorists challenge the might of the state.  \nThis terrorist fortress is characterized by the presence of a large number of their followers. Such a situation is distinct from other scenarios where terrorists use religious places to take refuge while being chased by security forces\, forcibly take innocent pilgrims as hostages or launch an attack on the assembled devotees. \nLal Masjid\, a mosque complex\, located in Islamabad\, was being used by radical Islamist clerics and their supporters\, to defy the Pakistani government and impose Islamist edicts. When the situation deteriorated\, a siege was established around the Lal Masjid for over a week and finally on July 10\, 2007\, Pakistani army stormed it\, after talks with the clergy failed. The operation was marked by fierce fighting and heavy loss of life\, during which militants responded with rockets\, machine gun fire and petrol bombs.  \nWhile militants occupying such hallowed precincts are in violation of international humanitarian law\, security forces tasked to clear them out need to exercise utmost restraint\, use minimum force\, avoid collateral damage and uphold religious sentiments. Military operations launched to flush out terrorists from places of worship have far reaching political\, social and religious ramifications. \nWhile the Lal Masjid attracted its share of media coverage during the crisis\, inexplicably a detailed analytical study of the episode is still awaited. This paper attempts to identify lessons at the macro level to deal with similar situations by using the storming of Lal Masjid as a case study. \nEvents Leading to the Siege \nFollowing the September 11 attacks in the United States\, Pakistan’s support to the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) was strongly opposed by the leadership of the Lal Masjid. In July 2005\, Pakistani authorities attempted to raid the mosque in connection with the investigation into the London bombings\, but the police were blocked by baton-wielding female students. Subsequently\, the authorities apologized for the behaviour of the police. During 2006 and the first half of 2007\, the mosque’s increasingly aggressive students and leadership\, supported by militants continued to challenge the authority of the government in Islamabad. They also launched an anti-vice campaign and instigated incidents such as kidnappings of alleged prostitutes\, including Chinese\, and burning films\, following the example of the Taliban in Afghanistan. By early April 2007\, the mosque had set up a sharia court. \nTalks reportedly broke down on the morning of July 10\, 2007 over the militants’ demand for an amnesty\, leading to orders being issued to the army to flush them out. What pushed the government to undertake precipitous action was China’s angry response to the killing of three Chinese workers on July 8 in Peshawar. Military intelligence reported that the militants who had carried out the killings were linked to the group in the Islamabad mosque. This coupled with the break-down of direct negotiations led to the final assault on July 10. \nAnalysis of Lal Masjid Episode\nReportedly\, on July 8 Musharraf was presented with three options: launch an air strike\, gas the compound to render the inmates unconscious or launch ground assault. The decision whether to assault a place of worship or continue with its siege\, forcing the inmates into surrender is always a difficult one. Protagonists of the offensive option argue that such a siege may last a long time\, even several months\, as terrorists would have stocked adequate quantities of food material\, water and other items of sustenance\, inflaming religious passions and resulting in a mass uprising across the country. An assault on a religious place may be a relatively quicker alternative\, but invariably leads to heavy loss of life and public alienation with attendant ramifications.  \nThe Pakistan government was criticised for allowing the situation to deteriorate and being a mute spectator to the excesses committed by the Lal Masjid vigilantes. Each new episode was met with feeble government response or appeasement. There were also differences within the government about the approach to be followed in dealing with the issue.  \nUsually such a situation is misjudged in the initial stages due to an overwhelming desire to avoid taking firm action for fear of inflaming religious passions. Militarily\, the best chances of success with minimum damage are right at the beginning\, before the terrorists have had time to prepare extensive bunkers and stock up weapons and supplies. With operations of this kind\, the battle is as much in the mind as on the ground. The more the operation drags on\, the worse it is\, as the initiative passes to the terrorists.  \nFears of a public backlash kept the Pakistani government from acting earlier against the radicals within Lal Masjid. Reportedly\, intelligence agencies indicated that it could get help from Taliban in Waziristan and other madrassas in the vicinity\, leading to large scale turbulence. While the siege of the mosque led to anti-government sentiment to fester in militant and fundamentalist communities throughout Pakistan\, the response of other terrorist groups was subdued. Overall\, there was widespread opinion within Pakistan that firm action should have been taken against Lal Masjid extremists at an early stage. \nThe assault on the Lal Masjid by the army was launched within 72 hours of the situation being handed over to it. Once the army has been requisitioned to deal with the situation\, there is a tendency to expect it to launch the operation at the earliest\, largely premised on the assumption that any further delay will be indicative of a weak response. Deployment of the army is an escalatory step\, bringing additional pressure on terrorists and should be given time to influence the negotiations’ process. Moreover\, such an operation not only requires detailed and meticulous military planning but also extensive coordination with a host of agencies\, including paramilitary forces\, civil police and local administrative machinery. Since the situation has already been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that the army has to be called out\, it is imperative that adequate time is allowed for planning and preparation to the army. \nOfficials hastily revised their assessment of clearing the Lal Masjid which they initially predicted would take just four hours. The militants continued to resist for over 30 hours and inflicted heavy casualties on the security forces. It has been experienced that the army always complains about lack of information to plan operations against such targets. The situation was no different in the case of Lal Masjid.  \nUse of Minimum Force \nAfter the Lal Masjid military action\, concerns have been expressed that the army did not comply with the principle of use of minimum force. The number of casualties suffered by the Pakistani SSG is indicative of their intent to ensure compliance with the principles of use of minimum force and avoiding collateral damage. More the number of civilian casualties during military action on a religious place\, more vehement is the criticism. While Lal Masjid operation was a fairly successful operation from the military’s perspective\, there was muted appreciation of the military’s role\, fearing a backlash in glorifying the army after assault on a mosque.  \nIn such situations\, totally different from normal law and order problems of mob control or violent demonstrations\, it needs to be appreciated that the army is called out to act against highly motivated\, lethally armed and well entrenched group of terrorists who have made elaborate preparations to ward off entry by the security forces into the complex. Minimum force has to be related to the terrorists’ numbers\, weaponry and strength/layout of field fortifications. However\, the army has to prevent or limit damage to the religious and historically important buildings by strictly controlling the application of fire power. Fire fighting teams need to be standby in case of fire incidents occurring due to exchange of fire or attempted arson by terrorists. It requires a very high degree of discipline\, leadership\, motivation and moral courage on the part of troops involved in the operation to exercise restraint in the face of danger and extreme provocation\, with their colleagues dying around them.  \nConclusion\nIt is apparent that terrorists are increasingly focusing on religious places to carry out their nefarious activities and will continue to do so. Therefore\, it is imperative that rather than knee jerk reactions after a terrorist incident\, long term measures are taken to deter the terrorists. The Indian security establishment could study the French system of keeping the places of worship under surveillance. \nIn situations where fundamentalists and terrorists take control of a religious place and challenge the authority of the state\, the government needs to act decisively before the pot boils over. From the military perspective\, tiring out terrorists to make them surrender by besieging the place of worship is a preferred option than direct assault in certain circumstances. Storming of religious places by the security forces invariably leads to collateral damage and loss of life\, despite adhering to the principle of minimum use of force. This provides an opportunity to the terrorists to exploit the situation further\, which can have grave religious and political ramifications.  \nThe seminar was chaired by Ambassador S.K. Bhutani. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sudhir Sharma and Ved Marwah were the two external discussants. Comments on the paper were also provided by the two internal discussants – Colonel Arvind Dutta and Dr. Pankaj Kumar Jha. \nMajor points highlighted in the discussion were: \n\nAir strike is unthinkable in such a situation. However\, air power can be used to provide real time information to the security forces. \nTimely action is required in dealing with such situations\, as storming religious places normally hurt the sentiments of the locals. \nThe Pakistan government was fully aware of the situation\, but it failed to take timely action. \nRather than using the army in such operations\, the police force trained to handle such situations should be employed. \nAssessment of public opinion is needed before carrying out such massive military operations against religious places. \nTheory of the relation between state and religion needs to be thoroughly analysed. \n\nPrepared by M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/storming-of-lal-masjid-in-pakistan-an-analysis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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