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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090213T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090213T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222327Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63723-1234503000-1234503000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Terror Financing in Bangladesh
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Bhaskar Roy and Sanjay Bharadwaj \n“Terror Financing in Bangladesh” by Dr. Anand Kumar outlined key factors that contribute to terror financing in Bangladesh. Dr. Kumar’s primary argument was that sustenance and maintenance of terror organizations is often built on the edifice of a strong financial base and that terror cannot make much headway without finance.  \nThe author at the outset drew attention to the issue of state accountability in dealing with terrorism as terrorist activities often emanated from domestic territorial space. He emphasized that intelligence gathering\, law enforcement\, and imposition of new financial controls were important levers to curb the functioning of terrorist groups. In this context\, he argued that the Government of Bangladesh has made only half hearted attempts to contain terrorist activities in its soil.  \nThe presentation focused on three aspects: the Beneficiary Groups and Institutions involved in terrorism; the sources of terror finance in Bangladesh; and\, the responses of the Bangladesh Government and international institutions. Finally\, the paper briefly touched upon the policy relevance of the findings.  \nMain Beneficiary Groups and Institutions\nDr. Kumar argued that the main beneficiaries of terror finance in Bangladesh have been Jamaat-e-Islami and Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB). Both organizations have maintained links with Islamic groups like Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh\, Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh\, Alhikma\, Harkat ul Jihad etc. Money is used for recruitment and training purposes. Funding is also being channelled to build a large number of mosques and madarsas\, which are playing an instrumental role in radicalizing society at the district and village levels.  \nSources of Terror Financing \nSome sources listed as potential feeders for financing terrorist activities\, as argued by Dr. Kumar\, were Islamic NGOs\, Saudi charities\, individuals\, money laundering\, fake currency\, drugs and underworld. Dr. Kumar asserted that post 9/11\, Islamic NGOs have increasingly become important in the fight against terrorism. In order to support the argument\, he cited the steps taken by United States to halt the flow of funds to terrorist organizations through Executive Order 13224 and related elements of the USA Patriot act. He argued that as oversight mechanisms were absent\, no financial scrutiny of the Islamic charities is undertaken\, which further complicates the problem of tackling terror financing. The Saudi Government’s patronage of charities such as International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was also brought to attention. He cited the example of Al Haramain\, a Riyadh based Muslim Charity\, which was opened in Cox Bazar in 1992 to help Rohingya refugees but continued to operate in Bangladesh uninterrupted despite it being banned by the United Sates and Saudi Arabia. The connection between Al Haramain and terrorism was revealed in 2002\, when linkages were made between Al Haramain and its suspected links to terror funding and trafficking of women and children under the garb of providing Islamic education. As far as individual support is concerned\, links to Bin Laden were cited. Dr. Kumar argued that funds were flowing into Bangladesh in the form of Hundi through Jessore\, Chittagong and Dhaka. He added that Bangladesh in recent years has also become a major source of fake currency. Fake currency was being printed in Chapai Nawabgunj and then being dumped into India. The nexus between drugs and terror finance also became evident when in 2005\, the National board of Revenue found that business companies in Bangladesh were smuggling heroine to U.K. and that profits accrued form trafficking in narcotics often went for funding Islamist groups.  \nResponses of Bangladesh Government and International Institutions \nPolicy to tackle terror financing was expedited after the series of bomb blasts in 2005. The BNP enacted the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation (Amendment Act\, 2004). However\, political motivations have often been an impediment for sustained political action and an overt emphasis on NGOs let the real culprits go scot-free. The enactment of Money Laundering Prevention Act\, 2002 also proved ineffective as it was full of operational loopholes. Similarly the dismal record of Bangladeshi Banks in checking terror finance was also brought to attention. The author argued that Bangladeshi banks have received approximately 236 suspicious transitions since the MLPA was enacted in 2002\, but till date there has been no progress on the issue due to procedural problems.  \nThe author further argued that pressure from the United States has proved ineffective in triggering a behavioural change within Bangladesh. However\, he also noted the renewed interest of the United Nations in dealing with the problem of terror financing in Bangladesh since 2001. In 2005\, Government of Bangladesh became a party to the UN International Convention for the suppression for the financing of terrorism. The Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering is another key forum where Bangladesh is engaging to get transparency into the system of terror finance.  \nThe author concluded by stating that the issue of terror finance was a daunting challenge facing the government and political will needed to be strengthened in order to tackle the issue in a holistic manner.  \nSome of the points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nOne should be careful of classifying all charities as sources for terror finance. Classification of Madarsas is also needed. \nDomestic\, regional and international issues responsible for terror financing should also be analysed. \nCauses of terrorism are generally found in the lack of development in Bangladesh\, which is perhaps becoming an important catalyst for recruiting people. \nOne needs to revisit pre 1971 years of undivided Pakistan to seek linkages between Pakistan and terrorism in Bangladesh. ISI links to terror financing should also be explored. \nSources on linkages between terror financing and their sources should be more diversified. \n\nThe seminar was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, LBSC Chair\, IDSA. Mr. Bhaskar Roy and Prof. Sanjay Bharadwaj were the external discussants; and Dr. Uttam Sinha and Capt. Alok Bansal were internal discussants  \nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/terror-financing-in-bangladesh
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090212T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090212T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222331Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130743Z
UID:63724-1234416600-1234416600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Defence Doctrine in the Indo-Pak Context
DESCRIPTION:On 12 February 2009\, the Military Affairs Cluster organised a Round Table to discuss Defence Doctrines. The aim was to reflect on implications of inter-relatedness of conventional and nuclear doctrines in the India-Pakistan context. A presentation was made by Ali Ahmed\, Research Fellow\, IDSA\, to flag the issues and elicit views of the participants. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V. Patankar and Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V.K. Kapoor participated in the discussion along with representatives of service HQs and members of the Cluster. The Military Cluster Coordinator\, Dr Thomas Mathew\, Deputy Director General\, chaired the three hours long session. \nThe issues reflected on included the doctrines of the three services and the joint doctrine\, the nuclear doctrine and the interrelatedness of doctrines at the conventional and nuclear levels. Implications of Pakistan’s nuclear threshold for conventional doctrine and the impact on India’s nuclear doctrine were also discussed. Alternative nuclear doctrines such as ‘flexible’ nuclear retaliation options and the Sundarji nuclear doctrine were reflected upon. Credibility issues centred on India’s nuclear doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation against first strike/first use were also dwelt on. India’s possible responses to future terrorist attacks like the Mumbai carnage were discussed in the context of the escalatory ladder that would attend resort to the military option. Pakistan’s resort to Asymmetric War strategies in the face of India’s conventional operations and its counter were also covered. The discussion was stimulating and fresh perspectives were offered by participants. \nThe following points\, among others\, emerged: \n\nA degree of ambiguity attending nuclear doctrine is essential for its credibility.\nThe military option cannot be ruled out in face of future provocative terrorist attacks originating in Pakistan. The military means will have to be calibrated against political objectives required to be achieved.\nSince India regards nuclear weapons as political weapons meant for deterrence\, limitation to conflict before it reaches the nuclear level has been accepted in India’s Limited War doctrine. This would entail communication to the adversary and keeping communication channels open in conflict.\nJointness in military operations would be essential in any future military conflict.\nThe emerging instability in Pakistan would require close monitoring on India’s part and a strategy has to be evolved in conjunction with the international community to respond to it. The objective of terrorists and their backers in the Pakistan establishment to initiate a conflict between India and Pakistan so as to derail the GWOT would require to be guarded against.\n\nPrepared by Ali Ahmed\, Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/defence-doctrine-in-the-indo-pak-context
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090206T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090206T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222331Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T050755Z
UID:63725-1233898200-1233898200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Bioterrorism led by Professor Dean Wilkening
DESCRIPTION:IDSA organized a round table on the subject of bioterrorism on February 6\, 2009. The main speaker at the event was Prof. Dean Wilkening\, Director\, Science Programme at Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)\, Stanford University. \n    In his presentation Prof. Dean pointed out that biological weapons would be suitable for the new brand of terrorism\, which comprises mostly of religious\, nihilist\, and millenarian groups.\n     These groups were less constrained than their predecessors in terms of means and ends.\n      Certain biological agents could be more lethal than chemical agents.\n       The use of highly effective aerial methods of disseminating biological agents results\n        in a high psychological impact.  \n\n\n    Some of the factors influencing the consequences of air- borne release of biological agents were delineated — deposition in lower respiratory tract\, atmospheric transport\, agent characteristics and protection measures. \n    Past incidents of bioterrorism\, in particular the case of Aum Shinrikiyo\, were discussed at length. It was also mentioned that while non-state actors might encounter hurdles in acquiring and using biological agents\, state sponsored acts of biological terrorism are more possible. \n    Prof. Wilkening shared the information gathered after a simulation exercise that was conducted to ascertain the number of people who would be affected by exposure to biological agents. It was found out that the spectrum of biological threat is very broad. With a band of possibility of attacks\, the number of people affected might range from 100 to one million (contingent on the infectious dosage and the agent characteristics\, etc). One of the important findings of this study was that uncertainty with regards to biological agents\, their use\, and effects is far greater than that of any other weapon. This makes them most suitable weapons of terror. \n    While discussing the various strategies of coping with bioterrorism\, four major elements were brought out. These were diplomacy\, deterrence\, pre-emption/counterforce\, and defence. The element of defence was further divided into active and passive components\, with elements of safety for covert delivery of biological agents forming part of active defence and measures for civil defence a part of passive defense. The various stages of biodefense that were outlined included pre-attack vaccination\, agent detection and identification\, post-attack medical response and post-attack decontamination. It was brought out that the guiding philosophy for US biodefence is to focus on programmes and activities with public health benefits. The biodefence timeline in US policy comprises of various stages. Detection and identification within 24 hours of the outbreak of disease\, providing medical logistics in the first 48 hours\, prophylaxis campaign spread over the next 2 days and finally the last stage of decontamination comprising of 4 to 6 days. \n    The problem of differentiating between deliberate and natural outbreak of disease was discussed in detail. Prof. Wilkening talked about bioforensics. This is an upcoming science\, used extensively by centres like NBACC’s National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC). Bioforensic analysis of evidence is conducted from a biocrime or terrorist attack to attain a “biological fingerprint” to help investigators identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack. \n    Towards the end of the meeting the need to develop simulation models that pertains to the Indian context was articulated. For institutes that focus on security and strategic studies\, there would be significant interest in exploring the non-public health aspects related to bioterrorism. In addition\, the necessity to enhance inter-agency cooperation in India and tap existing talent in the field of biological weaponry and related issues to develop a better understanding of the subject was highlighted. \n    Prepared by Dr. Monalisa Joshi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/bioterrorism-led-by-professor-dean-wilkening
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090116T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090116T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222431Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63729-1232083800-1232083800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:An Exploratory Framework for India’s relationship with ‘New Nepal’
DESCRIPTION:Chair: P. StobdanDiscussants: Ashok Mehta and Sangeeta Thapliyal \nThe paper\, An Exploratory Framework for India’s Relationship with New Nepal\, was presented by Dr. Nihar Nayak. Professor P. Stobdan was the Chair. Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Ashok Mehta and Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal were the external discussants; and Dr Smruti Pattanaik and Dr. Pushpita Das were the internal discussants.  \nThe paper brought out the complexities associated with the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on July 31\, 1950. It identified some key elements which should be incorporated to make the Treaty more acceptable to both sides. At the outset\, the presentation briefly focused on the important Articles of the Treaty\, highlighting that the key objective of the agreement was to promote peace and friendship between the two states. Mutual politico-economic\, socio-cultural linkages and security requirements were underlined as common concerns. Highlighting the element of reciprocity\, the paper argued that one key element of the treaty was that it offered economic opportunities in India for Nepalese nationals against Nepalese assurances that India’s security concerns would be respected. The external political environment in the form of the shadow of the Cold War was one of the overwhelming factors shaping concerns and perceptions on both sides. Chinese adventurism in Tibet and apprehensions over Communist influence in Nepal were some of the factors that drove the two countries towards a settlement of issues.  \nDr. Nayak argued that over the years\, the treaty has emerged as a nationalistic issue and is considered a major constraint on Nepal’s independent foreign policy. In fact\, during his official visit to India in 2008\, the Nepalese Premier emphasized that there should be a “clear revision” of the treaty. Highlighting the Nepalese and Indian perspectives\, the paper brought out the key irritants associated with the treaty. While Nepal was overwhelmingly concerned with issues relating to security and the unilateral imposition of restrictions on the free movement of people across the border; India was conversely concerned with the number of Nepali immigrants and the presence of ISI in Nepal\, who could be working in tandem with Chinese intelligence. \nDr. Nihar Nayak pointed out that despite irritants and opposition from both sides\, especially Nepal\, the treaty has not been abrogated by either side\, an issue which he considered curiously serious\, because Clause 10 provides for abrogation as a viable option. The paper also highlighted the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. On trade\, Dr. Nayak argued that India is Nepal’s largest trading partner. Seventy per cent of total Nepalese trade is with India. Also\, bilateral trade and investments have greatly improved between the two countries. India’s share in Nepal’s total trade made a quantum jump form 26 per cent in 1996-97 to almost 41 per cent in 2000-01. In fact amongst the SAARC countries\, India’s trade growth has been the fastest with Nepal and total trade stands at half a billion dollars accounting for around 25 per cent of total India-SAARC trade. However\, hydro-projects\, transit and employment benefits to Nepalese migrants in India are possible areas of cooperation between the two countries. Notwithstanding the mutual benefits\, the relationship between the two countries remains strained. New Nepal\, Dr. Nayak argued\, provides an opportunity towards strengthening bilateral ties between the two countries. He suggested that the treaty needs adjustment\, review and updating\, keeping in view changing security and economic realities. Both governments\, he emphasized\, also need to agree not to allow the use of their respective territories for activities harmful to the national security interests of the other. Also\, both countries should not enter into any kind of military alliance with third countries. \nMaj. Gen. Ashok Mehta argued that the concept of New Nepal is questionable\, as it is an ongoing process. He pointed out that the fact that there was no earlier call for abrogation of the treaty was incorrect as the call for change had come from Manmohan Adhikari. He noted that the main problem with the 1950 treaty was that all provisions of the treaty were in breach in themselves and none of them were operational. He also pointed out that one of the main problems with the 1950 treaty was that the implications of the treaty had not been studied in detail\, engendering parochial politics for vested interests. Gen. Mehta underlined the importance of identifying new concerns in Nepal\, pointing out that Nepal and Pakistan were two factors which ought to be taken into account while discussing India-Nepal relations.  \nProf. Sangeeta Thapliyal noted that the paper needs to revisit the underlying context of its title. She argued that it was important to identify the groups and political actors in Nepal opposed to the treaty. She also noted that Nepal’s fears need to be taken into account and consequent ramifications for the treaty. It was also important to discuss what kind of a relationship India wanted with Nepal. \nDr. Smruti Pattanaik pointed out that the issue of abrogation is directly linked with political posturing. The 1950 treaty needed to be seen in the context of identity politics. She pointed out that domestic politics in Nepal was primarily responsible for the failure of the 1950 treaty and that there was a need to bring out the Indian perspective on the treaty more clearly. Dr Pushpita Das pointed out that it was important to argue why India should opt for a revision of the treaty.  \nSome of the points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nThe issue of remittances going to Nepal was important. \nIssue of perceptional factors regarding the image of Nepali workers in India should be considered. Also\, identification cards and certificates need to be issued to Nepali migrants in India. \nIt was important to outline the status of Indian business interests in Nepal. \nDomestic concerns are far more important to Maoists in Nepal than the 1950 treaty. \nThe 1950 treaty could offer a broader framework for a better Indo-Nepal bilateral relationship. \n\nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/an-exploratory-framework-for-indias-relationship-with-new-nepal
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090112T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090112T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222431Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130743Z
UID:63730-1231738200-1231738200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Interaction with a Delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of Swedish Parliament
DESCRIPTION:A delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament visited IDSA on January 12\, 2009. Ms. Carina Hägg of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden led the delegation. The focus of the interactive session was regional security in South Asia. Dr. Arvind Gupta\, the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at the institute\, chaired the interactive session. Members of the South Asia cluster at IDSA as well as the members of the other clusters participated in the discussion. \nDr. Arvind Gupta gave an overview of the political and economic situation in the South Asia region including Pakistan\, Afghanistan\, Sri Lanka\, Nepal and Maldives. He said that while there is democratic change in the region and the environment for regional cooperation was good\, the recent terror attacks in Mumbai represent a setback for India- Pakistan relations and regional peace. He noted that Pakistan was in a denial-mode about the Mumbai attacks. Islamabad’s reluctance to come to terms with the fact that Pakistan’s soil was being used for terrorist attacks was not helping matters. In India there was deep anguish and despair about Pakistan’s denial and its diversionary tactics. The Indian government has acted with great restraint and relied on diplomacy. The international community must appreciate the gravity of the terror threat emanating from Pakistan and take effective steps curb to it. \nCaptain Alok Bansal\, Research Fellow at IDSA\, gave a brief overview of the security situation in Pakistan. He indicated that the Pakistan government’s control over its territory was rather tenuous. Besides the economic crisis\, the state was beset with a resurgence of ethnic aspirations and various ethnic groups are seeking a greater share of Pakistan’s economic resources. However\, the gravest threat to Pakistan is the progressive Talibanisation of its North-Western territories. Taliban had established firm control over North and South Waziristan and Orakzai agency and they are active in Mohmand agency. Large parts of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) including Swat valley had come under the influence of the Taliban. Talibanisation has also led to sectarianism. Sectarian violence has become endemic to Kurram agency and parts of NWFP. Currently Pakistani forces are not undertaking any operations against the Taliban. They are instead pursuing isolated and limited action in Mohmand and Khyber agencies. In the past six months major operations have only been confined to Bajaur agency and Swat valley. \nThe Swedish delegation raised a number of issues during the interaction. They wanted to know about Sino-Indian relations\, India’s role in UN peacekeeping missions\, and the security implications of climate change. Suitable briefings were given to the visitors on these issues. It was emphasized that although India faces a number of security challenges\, India’s approach in dealing with these problems was rooted in its democratic and multi-cultural ethos. The visiting delegation was also briefed on various issues relating to Sino-Indian relations. They were informed that though Sino-Indian engagement increased considerably in recent years such as in trade\, tourism and students’ exchange programme\, but there are still unresolved issues like the border dispute and Tibetan refugees. The capability and future aspirations of the Chinese Navy\, its manoeuvrings in the Indian Ocean\, bases in neighbouring countries of India and the strategic implications of its naval expansion for the region were also discussed. \nPrepared by Alok Mukhopadhyay\, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/interaction-with-a-delegation-of-the-committee-on-foreign-affairs-of-swedish-parliament
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090109T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090109T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222432Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63731-1231479000-1231479000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Spreading Tentacles of Left-Wing Extremism: Are we Failing in Police Training: A case study of Chhattisgarh
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ved MarwahDiscussants: G. D. Bakshi and K. M. Madhusudhanan \nVarious case studies of Naxalite-related incidents have revealed that one of the prime reasons for recurring security forces casualties has been the inadequacy in training imparted to them. While the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) have well developed integral infrastructure and resources for training\, the police forces in most of the States are generally lagging behind. Police forces are generally capacity-deficient to fight the Naxalites effectively and need to be transformed into a combat-oriented force in Naxal-affected States. However\, police training has been less than satisfactory. An adequate and efficient police training system\, infrastructure and resources are required to be built up in the States to meet current training requirements. \nThe vital question is whether the present police training facilities\, resources and infrastructure available in the States are adequate to train personnel\, including new recruits\, within a short span of time. This paper attempts to assess the present police training system\, infrastructure and resources in Naxal-affected States\, discusses the role of the Central Government in general\, and examines Chhattisgarh in particular. The paper also identifies corrective measures and makes relevant policy recommendations. \nLaw and order being a state subject\, the primary responsibility of building police training system\, infrastructure and resources lies with State governments. However\, the Central Government has been rendering support to States in the formulation of training policy\, research\, improving law enforcement\, standardisation and modernisation through exchange of knowledge\, coordination and budgetary allocation. The Centre as part of the Seventh Plan has recently taken the initiative and decided to set up 20 Counter insurgency and Anti-Terrorism training Centres in Bihar\, Jharkhand\, Assam\, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Also adequate funds have been allocated to Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) in the 7th plan for development of the police training system throughout the country. Modernisation of police forces has not brought about any visible improvement in the police training system so far in most of the States. A few States like Andhra Pradesh have however taken the lead. \nPresently\, a huge gap exists between requirements and availability of police training infrastructure and resources in most of the States. Select numbers of police personnel are being trained in Army and CPMF training establishments. However\, these establishments have their own commitments and cannot afford to regularly train State police personnel unless their infrastructure and resources are enhanced.  \nChhattisgarh State police personnel lack adequate training to effectively fight the Naxalites. The police training infrastructure and resources in this State are not commensurate with ground requirements. Also\, the lack of coordination between CPMF and state police forces is evident given the absence of an operational ethos and gap in training.  \nChhattisgarh inherited a depleted police force and infrastructure when it was formed in the year 2001. A large number of reluctant officers and men from Madhya Pradesh were allotted Chhattisgarh State. Besides\, many personnel\, trained in instructional duties\, managed to remain in Madhya Pradesh. The state inherited the worst Naxalite-hit areas\, and the Chhattisgarh Police\, at its inception\, was capacity deficient. Given the state’s limited infrastructure\, it also suffers from deficiency in training. Finances are a major constraint faced by the State police and are far below what is necessary to meet the requirements of manpower\, mobility\, infrastructure\, communication\, land\, residential accommodation\, etc. \nThe state police has identified some key areas and steps are being taken to improve police training. These include: commando training; intelligence training; basic induction training; specialist training; improvement of training infrastructure and facilities; joint training with CPMF; joint/collective training with CPMF; and redressing resource deficiency. Also\, the State has taken an initiative to establish a Counter Insurgency and Jungle warfare Training College which can train 3\,600 police personnel each year. With limited training infrastructure\, Chattisgarh will take at least 10 years to train its entire police manpower in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare.  \nA positive environment and culture is lacking in the police set up in most of the States. Posting to a training institution is considered as punishment. Also there is little interest in undergoing training. There is no motivation and incentive for the trainers. Hence police forces lack good quality of instructors. Training is also not strictly linked with promotion. Training is therefore a neglected activity in the police. Excess commitment of police personnel is another reason for training to be neglected. \nHolistic development of the training system is required in the police set-up. The essence of police human resource development lies in training\, and it cannot be neglected any longer. There is an urgent need to prioritise training at all levels including special pilot projects like dedicated allocation of budget for development of training infrastructure and resources to States. The Army and the CPMF have a large number of well-trained instructors whose services can be utilised in the police training academies of naxal-affected States. \nThe paper’s recommendations were: \n\nPrioritising police training at all levels especially in Naxalism- affected States. \nAddressing budgetary constraints. \nAddressing manpower and leadership problems. \nDevelopment of instructional staff. \nDeveloping training infrastructure. \nDeveloping a healthy training culture. \nImproving operational understanding between State Police Forces and CPMF through joint training and inducting CPMF instructors and leadership in armed police battalions and police training institutions. Also utilisation of retired army personnel and officers in police training can be explored. \n\nPoints raised during the Discussion: \n\nThe menace of Left Wing Extremism constitutes a considerable security threat for India’s internal peace and development. \nLeft Wing Extremism has socioeconomic roots. \nLeft Wing Extremism is a heartland insurgency; so the government relies on police and paramilitary forces. \nThe Andhra Pradesh model of tackling Left Wing Extremism has worked\, and should be replicated elsewhere with adequate modifications to suit local conditions. \nLeft-wing extremism ultimately requires a political solution. \nPolice leadership have to change their attitude especially towards training\, which needs to be prioritised. \nThe Army’s short-service officers may be reemployed for police training. \nArmy/paramilitary forces personnel may be deputed to the training Institutes and armed police battalions of States affected by Left Wing Extremism. \nHuman rights must be included in the police training curricula. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/spreading-tentacles-of-left-wing-extremism-are-we-failing-in-police-training-a-case-study-of-chhattisgarh
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090109T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090109T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222432Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63732-1231479000-1231479000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Tibet: Connectivity\, Capabilities and Consequences
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Ravi Sawhney and Rahul K Bhonsle \nSince 1951\, China had fueled massive economic investment in Tibet. In recent decades\, infrastructure assumed the salience in China’s Tibet strategy\, especially under its ‘Go West’ policy\, launched by Jiang Zemin in 2000. The stated goal was to usher Tibet into an era of modernity and prosperity. The policy gained more urgent priority since 2003 when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao showed greater commitment to make Tibet a part of China’s economic miracle. The 1\,100 kilometer railway to Lhasa that cost $4.2 billion has symbolized China’s success in Tibet. Even the Indian Defence Minister Mr. A K Antony accepted the fact that there was no comparison of such development on the Indian side\, when he visited a forward location in December 2007. \nIn 2007\, China’s State Council had approved 180 projects for Tibet that would cost over 770 billion yuan ($10.2) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan. Reports suggest that more than 77 percent projects have already commenced. According to the Tibet Autonomous Regional Development and Reform Commission\, over 200 billion Yuan were spent during the year 2008.  \nOn October 14\, 2008\, Chinese military engineers and workers began digging a tunnel in Tibet’s Galung La Mountain in Nyingchi Prefecture to build the most difficult highway to China’s last road-less Medog County that borders Arunachal Pradesh. China’s state media prominently highlighted the significance of the 141 km long road connecting Medog with Tibet’s main East-West highway. The project will be completed by 2010.  \nThe great concern for India is the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP)\, also known as the ‘Great Western Line’. The project is worth China’s $60 billion that aims to divert more than 40 billion cubic meters of water annually from China’s longest river\, the Yangtze\, and its tributaries through a tunnel under the Yellow River to northern China. The initial phase is expected to be ready by 2010. But a section of the route has already been used for meeting the water requirements during the Beijing Olympics. The initial two routes of the project will take water from the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze basin through the Yellow River to Beijing\, Tianjin\, and other booming cities in the north. The third route plans to divert waters from Tibet’s Yalong\, Dadu and Jinsha rivers to the northern plains. The Brahmaputra project forms the second phase of the third route. The project was envisaged on the assumption that by 2030 the Yangtze basin will not have sufficient water for transfer to the north. The major concern here is: why is China going ahead with the SNWTP if there is inadequate water available for rerouting? \nThe project’s aim is to divert the Tsangpo at the Shoumatan Point (the ‘Big U-turn’) for constructing the world’s largest hydroelectric plant at the knick-zone to generate 40\,000 Megawatts of electricity\, and for diverting 200 billion cubic meters of water annually to the arid north. The project will involve enormous engineering complexity on the scale of the Tibet railway system and the Three Gorges dam. Media reports also suggest China’s proposal to use nuclear explosives to blast a 15 kilometer tunnel at the U-turn. \nThe great challenge for India regarding the project is that India has no water sharing treaty with China. China has rarely bothered to share information prior to flood situations. As a result India often becomes vulnerable to environmental threats. Also\, there is no record of China consulting the lower riparian states before undertaking construction of dams upstream. \nAs the economies of India and China grow\, both are going to compete not only for oil and gas but also for water resources. One can conclude that China as the upstream state would treat water as a strategic commodity.  \nPoints raised during the Discussion \n\nChina is unwilling to discuss the issue with India at the bilateral level. \nThere is a need to discuss water diversion by China at the United Nations and the issue also needs to be brought before the International Court of Justice. \nThe potential impact on India of China blocking the Brahmaputra river needs to be examined. \n\nPrepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/tibet-connectivity-capabilities-and-consequences
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090102T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090102T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222432Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63733-1230874200-1230874200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Economic Engagement of Africa: Partnering Africa
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Dilip Lahiri and Shipra Tripathi \nHistorically\, the principal tenet of India’s policy towards Africa has been support for the struggle for decolonization and racial discrimination in South Africa. Economic engagement between India and Africa is increasing like never before though it is not new. During the colonial period\, India played a significant role in terms of supplying personnel for middle level services such as duka. At present the scale and swiftness of India’s economic engagement with Africa is expanding. This has been facilitated by the changing African outlook in recent years. On the political side there has been an end in sight for some of the debilitating conflicts that have ravaged the continent. At the same time there is a move by Africans to take charge of their own destiny. For its part\, the Indian government laid out its broad economic cooperation frame work during the India-Africa Forum Summit in April 2008. This conference gained significance because of an attempt to forge a closer partnership between India and African countries and address the common goals and challenges they face. An important element of India’s approach towards Africa is the growing presence of the private sector in African countries. \nIndia does not have the financial capacity to match the grants in aid by China and the West to Africa. However\, India recognizes the African countries’ focus on capacity building and human resources development. As a result\, Africa today is the largest recipient of India’s technical cooperation programme. India’s growing synergy with Africa is quite visible in the recent trade trends. Bilateral trade has increased from US $967 million in 1990-91 to $25 billion in 2006-07. India has institutionalized its relationship with African countries by launching the India-Africa Forum in April 2008. During the summit\, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a number of initiatives including a duty-free trade preference scheme for 34 African countries. India has also enhanced its relations with African countries in the energy sector. Currently around 24 per cent of India’s crude oil imports are sourced from Africa. Indian national oil companies like the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (OVL) has invested in equity assets in African countries. \nHowever\, China’s booming investment in Africa has provoked a heated debate on the continent and around the world. One of the challenges that India faces is the penchant among the Western media and intellectual to mention in the same breath both the Indian model of engagement with Africa and the very different Chinese economic approach to Africa. African countries have acknowledged the growth of Indian economy and have expressed a desire to emulate the Indian model. \nPoints raised during the Discussion \n\n\nThe India-Africa economic engagement needs to be examined carefully with specific data. \nThere is a need to create a centre or an institution to study India-Africa engagement. \nThere is a need to check where India should be focused and to know what when and where Africans really want to engage us. \nPrivate sector involvement in Africa is very important. \nPeople to people contact should be enhanced. \nNon-Alignment is important for maintaining good relations between India and Africa.\nThere isn’t much Indian scholarship on Africa and this needs to be rectified. \nIndia’s engagement in Africa’s social domain must be looked into. \nIndia should identify areas in which more positive relations with African countries can be developed such as health\, medicine\, etc. \nIndia should understand the sensibility of Africans. \nIn terms of investment competition between India and China\, Africa welcomes both of them. \nAfrican countries believe that their problems can be better understood by Asian countries than others. \nThere is a need to promulgate a new policy towards Africa along the lines of the ‘look east policy’. \nThere is no need to compare China’s influence in Africa with that of India. \n\nPrepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-economic-engagement-of-africa-partnering-africa
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081219T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081219T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222441Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63734-1229664600-1229664600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A Critical Evaluation of Andhra Pradesh’s Response to the Naxal Challenge
DESCRIPTION:Chair: G. D BakshiDiscussants: D. K. Karthikeyan and J. N. Roy \nAndhra Pradesh has been dealing with the Naxalite challenge for a long time and the way in which it has dealt with this challenge has evolved over this time. The Union Government has been suggesting to other Naxal-affected States that they should adopt the Andhra Model in responding to the Naxalite challenge. The objective of this paper is to discern the constituents of what is popularly referred to as the Andhra Model – in other words Andhra Pradesh’s experience in addressing the Naxalite challenge.  \nIn sum\, what is popularly referred to as the Andhra Model comprises of Security Response\, Political Response and Development Response.  \nSecurity Response: Some of the core elements of the Security Response are: Surrender and Rehabilitation\, Intelligence-based Operations\, Victim Reassurance Policy such as civilian rehabilitation\, and police rehabilitation\, and Development Works and Mass Mobilisation. \nPolitical Response: There exists\, now\, a consensus among the major political formations in the State on the approach to dealing with the Naxalites. They understand that the challenge is\, indeed\, real and has to be addressed. It is this realisation that has manifested in a response which comprises three essential elements\, viz. tough security response\, development response\, and conducting limited periods of peace process.  \nDevelopment Response: Twice\, development programmes have been launched in the State with the particular objective of bringing in rapid socio-economic development in Naxalite-affected areas. The first initiative was known as Remote Areas Development Programme; and the second is known as Remote and Interior Areas Development Programme. Other development programmes such as Jalayagnam and Indiramma were also initiated.  \nThe political leadership was initially not sensitive enough to the impending Naxalite challenge. This changed and a consensus had emerged among the political formations by about 1996-97 that the rebels had to be taken headlong\, in all possible ways. Thus\, the political will and commitment displayed by the leadership played a significant role in crafting Andhra Pradesh’s response to the challenge posed by the Naxalites. The other affected States have with them the advantage of the experience of the Andhra Pradesh in dealing with the Naxalite issue. They would have to clearly recognise that the Andhra Pradesh model is much more than deploying the elite Greyhounds. It involves years of painstakingly building-up the fighting capabilities of the State police\, their training\, logistics and intelligence. \nTo sum up\, it might not be appropriate to suggest a near total replication of the experiences of Andhra Pradesh in dealing with the rebels. At best\, it could serve as a relevant reference point for the other Naxalite-affected States to craft their respective strategies.  \nMajor points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nDevelopment funds are often diverted to the Naxalites. The political parties/ political leaderships too pay ‘protection money’ to the Naxalites. \nPoor governance has led to increase in Naxalites subversive activities. \nTo counter Naxalite challenge\, the root cause will have to be attended to. And\, the state’s delivery mechanism has to be revamped. The state has to penetrate into remote tribal areas. \nTalks with Naxalite should be initiated. \nAndhra Pradesh’s experience in addressing the Naxalite challenge is a unique example\, and is successful. It is important to understand the model by other Naxal -affected States. \nAndhra Pradesh Model is successful because of the ‘accessibility’\, and it evolved over a long period of time. \nAndhra Pradesh Model\, however\, has failed to implement Land Reforms. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-critical-evaluation-of-andhra-pradeshs-response-to-the-naxal-challenge
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081218T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081218T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222441Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130743Z
UID:63735-1229578200-1229578200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:His Excellency Mr. Lulzim Basha\, the Foreign Minister of Albania
DESCRIPTION:His Excellency Mr. Lulzim Basha\, the Foreign Minister of Albania led a high-level delegation to the IDSA on December 18\, 2008 for an interaction with scholars on Indo-Albanian relations and the priorities of Albanian foreign policy. Mr. Basha was in India for the first time as the Foreign Minister of Albania on the occasion of inaugurating the Albanian embassy in New Delhi. Dr. Arvind Gupta who holds the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA chaired the interactive session.  \nWelcoming H.E. Lulzim Basha\, Dr. Gupta highlighted the historic importance of Albania in the context of regional pace and stability. He referred to the deep respect every Indian has for Mother Teresa. He said that though diplomatic relations between the two countries are at a nascent stage\, the first-ever visit by an Albanian Foreign Minister would pave the way of a long-lasting relationship.  \nMr. Basha\, in his introductory remarks\, gave a brief overview of Albanian foreign policy\, its role in South East Europe and the future of Indo-Albanian relations. He described Albania as a small country\, a recent democracy but with a long history. The primary objective of Albanian foreign policy is to integrate with NATO as well as the European Union. While Albania would gain NATO membership in April 2009\, when the alliance is going to observe its 60th year of existence\, the process of full membership of the EU is also underway. Given that NATO is extremely important for Albanian security\, Mr. Basha stated that Albanian forces have already been posted in Afghanistan along with NATO forces. On the modernisation and reform process of the Albanian armed forces\, he stated that Albania strives for light\, expeditionary forces which can be posted in different global theatres of conflict like Afghanistan and Iraq. Interoperability of Albanian armed forces is therefore an important objective. However beyond interoperability\, Albania also wants to collectively address global challenges like piracy\, nuclear proliferation\, safety of energy supply routes\, cyber security and most importantly terrorism. \nExpressing his sympathy and solidarity with the people of India in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on November 26th\, Minister Basha underlined that both India and Albania face common challenges. On the issue of the independence of Kosovo\, he stated that so far 53 nations have recognised Kosovo as an independent nation. The minister said that the instance of Kosovo is a unique one and cannot be equated with other regions. Albania supports the independence of Kosovo and wants to integrate the whole Balkan region into the Euro-Atlantic architecture.  \nOn Indo-Albanian relations\, the Minister affirmed that his visit is aimed at building a strategic component to the bilateral relationship. Though Albania wants increased trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) from India\, it is also willing to build partnership with Indian academia\, research institutions\, think tanks and strategic community.  \nOn nuclear proliferation\, the Minister stated that Albania strongly supports the US position and it does not want more countries with nuclear aspirations. On Sino-Albanian relations\, Mr. Basha said that this relationship has traditionally been very strong and economic relations are continuously being strengthened. Though Albania supports the One-China policy\, it strongly believes in democracy\, human rights and multi-party system. On Albanian membership of NATO\, the Minister underscored that besides its military nature\, the alliance also represents values like democracy\, human rights\, etc. Countries who want to be NATO members have to ensure that these values are protected. For Albania\, membership of NATO is a win-win situation. About the possible threat of radicalisation of younger Muslims in the Western Balkans in general and in Albania in particular\, the Minister assured that the Muslim community in the European region had so far not been influenced by any extraneous global movements and the Albanian experience had been very successful.  \nThe Minister concluded that his delegation\, which had representatives of Albanian trade and commerce\, would be able to contribute to Indo-Albanian economic relations whose potential has so far remained unexploited.  \nPrepared by Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay\, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/his-excellency-mr-lulzim-basha-the-foreign-minister-of-albania
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081211T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081211T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222442Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130743Z
UID:63738-1228973400-1228973400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Exploring India – Kazakhstan Transport Linkages
DESCRIPTION:A Roundtable was held on December 11\, 2008 against the backdrop of increasing demand for transport connectivity between India and Central Asia. Among the many points discussed the following stand out as important. \n\nEconomic growth in the Asian region and emerging opportunities for interregional trade are creating a demand for viable transport connectivity\, land-linking arrangements\, and important transit services.\nDue to geographical and geopolitical attributes\, India and Central Asia are confronted with a range of constraints that have hitherto inhabited a full realization of two-way trade and commerce. The problems of distance were substantially compounded by the instability factor in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The situation was unlikely to change in the near and medium term.\nThe discussion focused on the importance of restoring the ancient Silk Route that traditionally linked Central Asia and India through China’s Xinjiang province\, while it also emphasized on the need for developing the North-South Corridor or road connectivity through Iran and Afghanistan.\nIt was realized that any viable future long-distance transport grids\, including energy pipelines from resource rich Siberia and Central Asia to India were not possible without them transiting through Western China. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) becomes the hub for any mode of transportation to be developed in the future.\nParticipants underscored the point that China and Central Asian countries have facilitated various transit transport systems to overcome their interregional trade problems. A web of transport connectivity has been developed by XUAR\, which has 16 Class A ports and 11 Class B ports connecting with eight countries.\nAccording to experts\, different variants of transport connectivity are realistically attainable while adopting a schematic approach. Among the several inchoate thoughts\, the route that directly followed an alignment in a north-south direction along the existing railway lines and roads in Kazakhstan\, Western China and India included: Almaty\, Korgas\, Yinning\, Kuqa\, Aksu\, Kashgar\, Yarkand\, Yecheng (along the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway No. 219) Mazar\, Shahidulla\, Sumxi\, Derub\, Resum\, Shiquanhe\, Gar\, Kailash\, Burang\, Lepu-lekh. The total distance would be less than 3\,000 kilometres. Importantly\, the route under consideration already existed and it is only a matter of cross-border connectivity.\nA linkage through Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir is arguably the shortest\, but China’s sensitivity to any engagement in Jammu & Kashmir may rule out the option.\nFrom India’s perspective while considering the topographical factor\, Lipu-Lekh Pass in Uttarakhand (opened for border trade with China since 1992) is considered a feasible entry point. Refurbishing of the road connecting to Shipkila in Himachal Pradesh and Lipu-Lekh in Uttarakhand are already in progress under the Special Accelerated Road Development Project (SARDP). \n\nOn the positive side\, the experts cited\, inter alia\, the following points: \n\nThe proposed route involved only one country (China) as a land-link between India and Central Asia\, as compared to the longer western routes traversing through Iran and Afghanistan.\nThe proposed route was seasonal\, but its reactivation had a symbolic significance\, essentially for reviving the traditional Silk Route that was vibrant until 1947.\nImportantly\, the route passed through relatively stable Xinjiang as compared to the turbulent areas of Pakistan\, Afghanistan\, and South Central Asia. Additionally\, India is not viewed as a factor of instability and therefore posed no threat to Xinjiang in terms of religion or ideology.\nSignificant trade volumes existed for markets in India\, China\, and Central Asia. India-Kazakhstan trade value has increased to US $370 million this year. Kazakhstan’s annual trade with Western China was over $10 billion.\nIf implemented\, the route will cut down transportation costs of food/fuel supplied to India’s forward areas. Similarly\, it would reduce the delivered costs of imports in Western China. Besides\, China could earn considerable revenue from transit fees. Conceivably\, arrangements for swap deals with China could also be worked out.\nThe above route was viewed as an important counterpoise for Pakistan’s plan for an 800 kilometre long railway from Gawadar to Kashgar. \nAdditionally\, India was to gain an alternative access to the transcontinental transport corridors Western Europe – Western China being developed by Eurasian countries under various facilitation agreements.\nAny resulting gains and prosperity could only trigger major development actions in the pockets of discontentment i.e. Tibet\, Xinjiang\, Kashmir.\n\nOn the negative side\, participants expressed the following apprehensions:\n\nThe feasibility of the above route in terms of geopolitics\, especially China’s willingness to co-operate\, was viewed as a major factor. The issue of territorial disputes between India and China as a factor was also discussed at length\n.  \nNotably\, the Kazakh Ambassador welcomed the proposed route and had agreed to take up the matter with the Chinese authorities on a priority basis. The Ambassador also indicated Kazakhstan’s willingness to exercise its leverages vis-à-vis China should it become necessary.\n\nRecommendation and Action Plan\n\nThe proposed route could possibly be the shortest as economically feasible and steps should be taken to materialize it. \nA regional rather than a country-specific linkage approach should be adopted to enhance the viability. Russia and other Central Asian states must be involved in the co-operation efforts. \nParticipants also embellished the idea of widening its scope to include strategic commodities such as oil\, gas\, uranium\, and minerals to enhance the volume movements. But\, to start with\, the route should only be opened for transit trade. \nLipu-Lekh and Shipkila border trade should be upgraded to transit trade\, apart from improving the infrastructure. \nKazakhstan should consider taking up the matter with the Chinese government.\n\nKazakhstan\, China\, and India should consider using existing facilitation agreements for transit transport at the multilateral\, bilateral\, trilateral\, and sub-regional levels. \nThe proposal could be perused within the Shanghai Organization Cooperation (SCO) framework\, as well as under the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) mechanism. Several inter-governmental agreements on the Asian Highway Network already exist under the UN-ESCAP programme. \nIndia\, China and Central Asian republics should develop a sub-regional framework agreement designed to facilitate cross-border transit trade along the measures adopted by ASEAN\, Greater Mekong Sub-region\, TRACECA\, ECO\, BIMSTEC\, and others.\nThe existing Kazakhstan-India Joint Working Group on Transport should be activated to include the above proposal so that exploration process and implementation could be initiated early.\nThe participants strongly recommended that a trilateral (India\, Kazakhstan\, China) joint study group be set up urgently for undertaking a feasibility study.\n\nPrepared by Professor P. Stobdan\, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/exploring-india-kazakhstan-transport-linkages
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081208T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081208T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130743Z
UID:63739-1228714200-1228714200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Brazilian Foreign policy and IBSA
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Marco Antonio Vieira\, a Brazilian academician\, currently Visiting Lecturer at Kings College London\, visited IDSA on Monday\, December 8\, 2008 for a round table on “Brazilian foreign policy and IBSA.” Dr. Vieira spoke on current Brazilian foreign policy trends. He opined that Brazil would like to be perceived as a responsible emerging power. Under President Lula\, Brazil has focused on a policy of regional engagement. It has followed a strategy often dubbed as “policy of generosity” to win over its neighbours. As a regional power Brazil has sought to increase its influence through soft power as opposed to hard power. This is visible in its efforts towards peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region. Brazil’s relations with the United States are an important part of its strategy of regional engagement. While there has been growing co-operation between Brazil and the US particularly in the area of bio fuels\, there has also been concern in Brasila over increasing US presence in Colombia as it threatens Brazil’s sovereignty over the Amazon region. Brazil has appreciated Russian’s increasing presence in Latin America. However\, the recent moves by Russia to intervene in the Colombian conflict and its growing military ties with Venezuela might exacerbate regional tensions. In the multilateral arena\, Brazil is investing in South-South Co-operation. The IBSA trilateral dialogue forum forms an important part of Brazil’s foreign policy. Nevertheless\, at present there is lack of support for Brazil’s leadership within the region. Recognition of this trilateral cooperation at the global and regional levels will go a long way in legitimizing Brazil’s leadership role. \nIn the ensuing discussion the following issues were highlighted: \n\n In recent years India–Brazil relations have been enhanced. The trilateral IBSA partnership has helped in giving the boost to this relationship. The growing volume of bilateral trade (around $ 2.5 billion in 2007) is an indicator of this change. Both India and Brazil have a lot of similarities that have brought them together. They are emerging powers\, have an agenda of reform of global governance institutions and South–South cooperation as a distinct foreign policy agenda. Further they have suffered from the problem of “gigantism” in their respective neighbourhoods.\nThere was concern over emerging defence ties between Pakistan and Brazil. Particularly\, the recent news of Brazil supplying anti-radar missiles to Pakistan. Such incidents negate the efforts towards building a strategic partnership with Brazil. It was suggested that Brazil should understand India’s regional security concerns and efforts should be made to speed up Indo-Brazil defence co-operation.\nCo-operation in the energy sector\, given Brazil’s dominance in biofuels\, was proposed.\nConcern was also expressed over the growing Chinese presence in South America. Current trade figures surpass those of China-Africa trade\, another region where China has been making inroads. In particular\, Brazil-China trade has tripled in recent years. But Dr. Vieira perceived that South American nations are not worried about the Chinese presence and have welcomed its interest in the region.\nFinally\, it was proposed that not only a top down approach but also a bottom up approach was needed in order to augment co-operation between India and Brazil. This entailed encouraging people to people contact and supporting academic exchanges among think tanks of the two countries.\n\nPrepared by Ruchita Beri\, Research Officer at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/brazilian-foreign-policy-and-ibsa
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081205T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081205T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63740-1228455000-1228455000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India – Iran relations: Converging Interests or Drifting Equations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ranjit GuptaDiscussants: Ishrat Aziz and Anwar Alam \nThe West Asian region is currently in a state of flux. Iraq is far from being stabilized and questions are being raised over the continued US military presence in Iraq. However\, Iraq and the US have signed a security pact known as Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which requires US to withdraw its forces by the end of 2011. But there has been protest against the provisions of the pact within Iraq and in its neighbouring countries particularly in Iran. Tension between Iran and the US over Iran’s nuclear programme continues. \nStrong historical and cultural relations between India and Iran have always played a significant role in bringing the two countries closer to each other. Religious affinity has also played an important role. Islam has been a bridge between India and Iran. India has the world’s second largest Shia population. These factors would continue to dominate relations between the two in the future as well. \nThe importance of Iran for India lies in its geographical position\, size\, energy resources and provision of access to Central Asia. Despite their different perceptions\, the Indian leadership has underlined the strategic importance of Iran for India. Earlier\, during the Shah regime\, the Iran-China-Pakistan alliance\, Western hostility and Iran’s closeness to the US and its desire to play an active role in Gulf region did not allow India-Iran relations to grow beyond a point. Iran was the first country to diplomatically recognise Pakistan. After the Islamic revolution\, India’s relations with Iran remained minimal. Iran’s stand on the Kashmir issue and the Babri Masjid led to new constraints in their relations. \nHowever\, in the post-Cold War era\, similar security threat perceptions brought about a phase of renewed engagement with a number of high level visits from both sides. The turning point was the visit of former Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao to Tehran in 1993. These ties were further strengthened by Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Tehran in 2001 when he signed the ‘Tehran Declaration’ and several other economic and trade cooperation agreements. The strategic cooperation between the two got a further boost during Mohammad Khatami’s visit in January 2003 culminating in the signing of the ‘New Delhi Declaration.’  \nRecently\, steps have been taken to enhance cooperation in economic\, energy\, political and security arenas and there have been high-level visits on both sides. The most recent one being by President Ahmadinjad to New Delhi in April 2008 and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Tehran in November 2008. During these visit\, several documents were signed to strengthen and cement existing ties. \nEnergy is the common meeting point for India and Iran. At present\, the thrust of India’s energy cooperation with Iran is on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project and the $20 billion LNG deal. However\, both projects are yet to be finalised due to pricing and security-related differences that continue to hamper any forward movement. Analysts believe that Iran backed out of the LNG deal because of India’s vote against Iran in IAEA in September 2005 and again in 2006 to refer Iran to the UN Security Council regarding its nuclear programme. It is also argued that the US has been against any deal with Iran.  \nDespite converging interests and problems between India and Iran it can be said that in the changing geopolitical environment both at the regional and international levels\, the two countries will not be able to neglect each other’s concerns.  \nPoints raised during the Discussion\nEconomic factors are more important in Indo-Iran relations. \nProblem between Iran and Israel is not ideological but strategic. \nIran denied Indian flights during 1990-1991 Kuwait crisis. \nIran has not yet decided on the type of relationship it wishes to maintain with India.  \nConvergence of interest between India and Iran should be taken seriously. \nShia population could help to maintain good relations between the two countries. \nPrepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-iran-relations-converging-interests-or-drifting-equations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081128T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081128T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63741-1227850200-1227850200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Securing the Northern Coast of Gujarat: Challenges and Responses
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Nalin DewanDiscussants: K. C. Pandey\, M. L. Batham and J. S. Bhalla \nThe Northern coast of Gujarat (the Kutch and Saurashtra coast adjoining the Gulf of Kutch) is fast emerging as an industrial and energy hub of the country. This process of industrialisation has been further boosted by the proximity of the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Kutch\, which has emerged as a major corridor for importing crude oil. Nearly 70 per cent of India’s crude oil is imported through this corridor. \nHowever\, there are growing worries about non-conventional threats as well as terrorist attacks and sabotage\, which could potentially inflict massive damage. This paper seeks to highlight issues which could pose a potential security threat to the Gujarat coast. The paper also evaluates the measures undertaken by the government to address them\, and suggest steps to improve coastal security. \nSecuring the Creek Area\nThe Northern coast of Gujarat is indented with several creeks. These creeks are all inter-connected by smaller water bodies and together they create an intricate maze of shallow and deep channels. The creek area has remained vulnerable to cross-border infiltration\, smuggling\, and arms and drugs trafficking. Interconnectivity of the creeks has made the border porous for infiltrators\, smugglers\, and militants\, who have been using these routes to sneak into India. Mangroves and sand bars in the creeks also provide hideaways during low tide. The situation is made worse by the non-availability of any approach channels from Indian side to many of these smaller channels. \nTo secure the creek area\, besides the deployment of Border Security Force (BSF)\, floating Border Out Posts (BOPs) have been set up. Aerial reconnaissance by unmanned aerial vehicles is also undertaken every fortnight for tracking infiltrators. \nDespite all these measures\, the creek area remains susceptible to cross-border infiltration and other illegal activities. This is primarily due to two reasons: firstly\, patrolling in the creek areas is dependent on the timings of the tide as well as on weather conditions\, and secondly\, during the monsoon when the sea becomes rough\, the BOPs are withdrawn from the creek area. They return to the creeks after nearly six months when the weather becomes better. During this intervening period\, there is no means of keeping a strict vigil over the creek area. \nCoastal Security Scheme\nDotted by numerous inlets\, rivulets\, small creeks and uninhabited islands\, the coastline along the Gulf of Kutch remains vulnerable to infiltration and other illegal activities. While the small creeks and inlets facilitate clandestine landings\, the islands are ideal hideaways for infiltrators\, and criminals. The vulnerability is further accentuated by the lack of effective patrolling and surveillance. \nThe misuse of the coast by anti-national elements had compelled the government to take counter measures. Following the 1993 Mumbai bombings\, ‘Operation Swan’ was launched to check infiltration and arms trafficking. The operation has been ongoing for more than fifteen years now and is hailed by the government as a success. However\, there are no reports of any seizure of contraband or arrest of any infiltrator or criminal. The primary reason for such a dismal performance is the lack of interest shown by the central and state governments. The joint patrolling unit does not possess either proper equipment or the necessary manpower to carry out its duty effectively. For many years\, trawlers hired by the state governments were used for patrolling. But it proved ineffective for several reasons. Firstly\, the state government did not release adequate funds for hiring sufficient numbers of trawlers or for buying fuel. Secondly\, the trawlers were no match to the speed boats used by the criminals.  \nDespite the coasts remaining highly vulnerable\, very little attention has been paid to tighten coastal security all these years. It was only in the year 2006 that the government embarked upon a plan to secure the country’s coasts under the Coastal Security Scheme. The aim was to strengthen infrastructure for patrolling and surveillance of the country’s coastal areas\, particularly the shallow areas close to coast. Sine then\, the Coast Guard was entrusted with the responsibility of patrolling the entire coastline of the State. \nUnfortunately\, the coastal police stations lack proper infrastructure\, equipment and manpower. Apart from these problems\, coastal security is also contingent upon other factors such as: (a) the security of the ports\, (b) the effective management of the maritime traffic; and (c) the movement of fishermen in the territorial waters. \nOne of the major draw backs of the coastal security scheme is the absence of any plan to strengthen port security. Given that these ports together handle a great bulk of India’s cargo coming into the country and are located close to the international border\, the security of these ports cannot be neglected. There is a need to promptly review the security arrangement of these ports and formulate a plan to deploy a mix of Central industrial Security Force (CISF) as well as trained private security guards to secure and protect the ports. \nOne of the major issues in the management of the India-Pakistan maritime boundary is the crossing over of fishermen in to each other’s waters. This has not only led to tensions in bilateral relations with Pakistan\, but also raised security concerns. Due to the non-resolution of the Sir Creek dispute\, the international maritime boundary between the two countries is not delineated. Absence of a well demarcated boundary has not only made the task of guarding it difficult but has also created confusion in the minds of many fishermen regarding the extent of India’s territorial waters. Numerous cases of both Indian and Pakistani fishermen straying into each others territories are routinely reported. \nWhile the government has initiated a number of schemes to safeguard the creek and coastal areas\, many areas of concern still remain. A major challenge for the border guarding forces is the widening gap between the sanctioned and existing infrastructure and manpower. Delays in the release of funds by the government hinder their efforts to strengthen their capabilities. The lack of interest shown by the state police in pursuing cases of offenders at sea or in the border areas is another issue that is hampering the prevention of crimes in a major way. There is also laxity in the security arrangement of the ports. And finally the issue of Indian and Pakistani fishermen straying into each other’s territorial waters raises concerns about the possibility of Pakistan sending operatives into India. \nThe paper contains several recommendations\, some of which are listed below: \n\n\nTo make patrolling along the coast more effective\, both the BSF and the Coast Guard should be provided with adequate infrastructure. \nAdditional hovercraft and patrol boats with well protected mooring grounds should be provided to enable the BSF to better patrol and guard the creeks. \nA separate recruitment scheme for the CSPF should be formulated to attract young and agile persons. \nBorder guarding forces along with the Coast Guard should be given powers of investigation and prosecution to more effectively curtail criminal activities along the borders and coasts. \nMore costal police stations need to be established. \nAll ports along the Gulf of Kutch should be made ISPS compliant\, and should be guarded by a mix of government and private security personnel. \n\nPoints raised during the Discussion were: \n\n\nUnresolved boundary in the Creek areas is the core security concern.\nPakistan has put up a large number of security posts along the Creek areas. \nThere is increase in the activities of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Pakistani Marine in these areas to push infiltrators. \nBangladeshi nationals always attempt to sneak into Pakistan through the northern coast of Gujarat. \nThere is no centralised agency in India to look after the coastal security. And\, too many agencies lead to coordination problem. A United Headquarters may be created. \nThe topography is very difficult\, and is advantageous for the Pakistani.\nBSF is not mandated to guard the coastal areas\, but the land borders. \nMore BOPs need to be established in these areas.\nIntelligence need to be strengthened. \nPakistani and Indian fisherman should be allowed to fish in both the waters. \n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/securing-the-northern-coast-of-gujarat-challenges-and-responses
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081107T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081107T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63742-1226035800-1226035800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Looking “East” through India’s North East: Identifying Policy “Challenges” and Outlining the “Responses”
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Sujit DuttaDiscussants: Bhagat Oinam and Archana Upadhyay \nThe “Look East” policy was envisioned by the Narasimha Rao government in 1991 to outline a focused foreign policy approach towards South East Asia\, a region of high economic prosperity at that time. It was also propelled during a period of economic liberalization within India itself. Further\, in the present context\, the “Look East” policy is being utilized to forge deeper ties with China\, Japan\, South Korea\, Australia\, New Zealand\, Papua New Guinea\, and Pacific Island states.  \nUnlike nearer home initiatives like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)\, heavily influenced by an India-Pakistan historical distrust coupled with the insecurities of smaller neighbours\, India enjoys an advantage with the South East Asian countries with regard to greater regional cooperation. Most of these countries view India as upholding a strong democratic ethos and a benign foreign policy of mutual co-existence based on the ideas of Gandhi and Nehru. As a result\, India has benefited from the Look East policy as it has boosted defence cooperation with Myanmar\, Indonesia\, Vietnam and Thailand.  \nIt is but inevitable that India’s North Eastern region would be drawn into the overall “Look East” policy given its geographic proximity to South East Asia. Indeed\, the North East shares borders with China\, Nepal\, Bhutan\, Myanmar\, and Bangladesh. According to Pranab Mukherjee\, India’s External Affairs Minister\, North East India is poised to benefit from India’s growing relations with South East Asia as the process of globalization has shown how cross-border market access can uplift people from poverty\, economic backwardness and bring in prosperity.  \nThe idea of “cross border markets” put forth by Mukherjee in bringing about upliftment of people suffering from poverty\, armed conflict\, lack of employment opportunities\, and insecurity is interesting. Indeed\, it is all the more likely that statements such as these from top Indian policy makers indicates that the “Look East” market driven policy has been crafted within the framework of neo-liberalism wherein it is proposed that “human well being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights\, free markets\, and free trade”. In this approach\, the role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework attuned to such practices.  \nThe Look East policy presupposes that heightened trade relations and free markets with South East Asia will uplift the North East out of the shackles of insurgency\, poverty\, and economic backwardness as maximizing the reach and frequency of market economies will result in political\, economic and social freedom. But is it really so? \nThis paper is primarily geared towards filling this critical policy gap: to identify and list out the challenges as well as outline the plausibly best policy response.  \nThe paper is divided into three sections. The first section highlights the measures undertaken under the Look East policy for the North East. The second section highlights the policy challenges with regard to the implementation process of the “Look East” policy. The third section offers certain policy responses to these challenges.  \nAt present\, the impediments to increased relations between South East Asia and North Eastern states are:- \n\nIssues of Infrastructure and Lack of Local Support \nThe Crisis of Insurgency \nElite Consensus and the Social Disjuncture \nThe States’ Incapacities \nThe easy availability of arms and weapons from across the international border to utilze in armed movements and criminal activities. \n\nPolicy suggestions to better prepare the North Eastern region for a smooth opening towards South East Asia include:  \n\nBuild up the population skill base. \nThe literacy rate of most North Eastern states except Mizoram is below the national average of 65 per cent. In order to increase the literacy rate and ensure that the rate of college drop outs decrease\, the education system must be made vocation centric. The level of English education must also be improved. \nThe roadways suffer due to precarious weather conditions. Given the nature of the terrain\, roads are also hard to maintain on a monthly basis. What could be done is to set up small village level bodies\, which utilize local labour to keep roads functioning. \nState authorities need to crack down on parallel governments run by the insurgent groups by activating state institutions and ensuring basic security. \nBorder areas have to be made safe from violence\, extortion\, smuggling rackets\, drugs and arms transfers. \nThe present trade between South East Asia and North East is on the decline. The Union government needs to do a realistic assessment of the goods to be traded\, especially those that are required across the border like locally made textiles and woven tribal items. \nIn order to facilitate easy movement of people\, the Inner Line Regulation of 1873 and the Restricted Area Permit (RAP) required for foreigners to gain entry to states like Arunachal Pradesh\, Manipur\, Nagaland\, etc\, must be revoked. \n\nPoints raised in the Discussion: \n\nThe North East region needs to be politically stabilised. The issue of migration from across the borders has become a cause of considerable concern.\nEconomic interests and security concerns are the drivers of the Look East Policy. Just becoming a gateway to South East Asia will not help the North East region. \nThe Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (DONER) has a limited role in Look East Policy. \nThere is need for developing the region with dignity. \nSmall-time investments will be beneficial for the region; and hence development model must cater to the need of the region. \nInner Line Permit system applicable to some states of the region is becoming a barrier to local development.\nThe region’s problems need separate solutions. \nBorders states must be encouraged to open trade with Myanmar\, Bangladesh\, China\, Bhutan and Myanmar. \n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/looking-east-through-indias-north-east-identifying-policy-challenges-and-outlining-the-responses
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081030T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081030T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222534Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T043946Z
UID:63744-1225344600-1225344600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Global Strategic Trends: Global Perspectives
DESCRIPTION:A strategic affairs workshop “Global Strategic Trends out to 2040” was held at The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) organized jointly by IDSA and DCDC (Developments\, Concepts and Doctrine Center) of the Ministry of Defence (DoD)\, UK on 30-31 October 2008. The aim was to gain a firm understanding of global and regional defence and security issues up to 2040. The DCDC\, in particular\, is interested in gaining insight into the views of a region which will be a major global power within the timescale of the study. About 30 representatives of service HQs\, think tanks\, the business community and IDSA participated. The inaugural session was addressed by Mr. K. Subrahmanyam\, IAS (Retd). It was conducted over five sessions in which the changing global power structures\, resources\, identity and interests\, security challenges and implications and the future nature of conflicts were discussed. \nAs part of the UK MoD\, the DCDC is engaged in updating its publication ‘Global Strategic Trends’\, through a series of workshops held in the Middle East\, South and East Asia. These workshops build on the seminars and studies already held in the UK and in South Africa. The aim of these workshops for the DCDC\, UK\, was to gather views and perspectives on the regional and global environments from a non-UK perspective. The review of DCDC Global Strategic Trends 2007-2036 applies the programme’s global analysis process to identify the key themes and drivers that are likely to have an impact on global defence and security during the next 30 years. It is available at www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk. \nThe DCDC team comprised Commodore Sloan accompanied by Mr. Mark Ronald\, a senior civil servant employed by the MoD\, UK; Wing Commander Andy Burton\, Staff Officer responsible for Geo-Economics; Mr Jess Odedra\, Senior Scientist with responsibility for global science and technology issues and Commander Aiken\, Staff Officer responsible for Geopolitics\, currently the Royal Navy’s Senior Research Fellow at the University of Cambridge. Brig. Elderton\, DA\, UK High Commission\, was also present. \nFirst\, the DCDC introduced their work in a short presentation on results and findings so far of their study. There was a lecture by Mr. K. Subrahmanyam\, on Indian thoughts on strategic issues. The audio of the lecture is available for download here. Mr. Subrahmanyam complimented the DCDC on taking out a commendable publication and went on to suggest areas that the workshop could focus on. He also covered the global implications of the economic crisis underway. The workshop was conducted in two syndicates over two days. \nClick on the Play button to listen to Mr.Subrahmanyam’s lecture
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/global-strategic-trends-global-perspectives
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081024T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081024T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T125907Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T125955Z
UID:62809-1224826200-1224826200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Defence Offsets
DESCRIPTION:National Seminar
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/defence-offsets
CATEGORIES:CONFERENCES,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081015T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081015T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222534Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130744Z
UID:63746-1224048600-1224048600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Does India Need a Federal Agency to Deal Effectively with Terrorism and Inter-State Crimes?
DESCRIPTION:The spate of terror attacks in various towns and cities across the country and the subsequent debate on combating such acts of terror have brought to fore the need for a co-ordinated pan-Indian response. In this context\, the IDSA’s Internal Security cluster organised a Round Table titled ‘Do we Need a Federal Agency to Deal Effectively with Terrorism and Inter-State Crimes?’\, on October 15\, 2008. A brief backgrounder was forwarded to all the participants prior to the discussion to set the tone for the discussion. The Roundtable was attended by eminent security analysts and former senior officials – Mr. B Raman\, former Additional Secretary in the Research and Analyses Wing (R&AW)\, Mr. Prakash Singh\, former Director General of the Border Security Force (BSF)\, Mr. D. C. Nath\, former Special Director in the Intelligence Bureau (IB)\, Mr. Joginder Singh\, former Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Mr. P. P. Shrivastav\, member of the North East Council (NEC). \nIn his introductory remarks\, Mr. N. S. Sisodia\, Director General IDSA\, said that the repeated acts of terror across the country indicated that the phenomenon has not only acquired a wide geographical spread but it also appears to be much more home grown than before. There is also evidence of lack of co-ordination among investigative agencies along with considerable amount of confusion about the facts\, the likely perpetrators and the masterminds. This clearly highlighted the need to take a detailed look at existing laws and agencies and configure them to combat terrorism effectively. In the last few years many committees\, task forces and commissions had recommended the setting up of a federal investigative agency\, but this has not been implemented. \nInitiating the discussion\, Brig. B. S. Sachar noted that the series of attacks in recent times has exposed the Indian state’s vulnerability to terrorist strikes and its utter inability to prevent them. The ‘Indianisation’ of jihad with the aim of destroying India’s secular and democratic ethos was a dangerous trend and needed an early and effective response. If the terrorist bombings continue in this manner\, with the Indian state considered by foreign governments and investors as helpless\, the inflow of FDI would dry up and travel advisories against visiting India would be issued\, impacting the economy adversely. He argued that given the all India reach of the home grown terrorists and their control centre outside India\, it was essential to have an all India perspective on their modus operandi\, ideology\, linkages and support base\, to successfully prevent such attacks. A pan-Indian threat\, he said\, required a pan-Indian response both at the political and professional levels. He also advocated an inescapable need for the police to be given special powers. \nWhile agreeing with the need for establishing a separate agency for investigation and prosecution of federal offences\, Mr. B. Raman expressed the need to first lay down the federal offences. According to him\, terrorism and white collar crimes can be considered as federal offences\, but there is a need to separate the two as the latter is prone to political interference. He felt that in the wake of terrorism assuming a new gravity\, there was a need to have centralised co-ordinated investigation of these cases. The establishment of a federal agency should be based on the assessment of the duration of the terrorist threat. If there is a long term threat then a new agency could be set up\, but if it is considered short term then an existing agency could be invested with special powers to investigate terror related crimes. He cited several ‘best cases’ from the Indian experience as well as from experiences of law and order institutions of other countries. In the Indian milieu\, the working of Tamil Nadu’s Special Task Force in investigating Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination and the Mumbai Blasts investigations were cited as models that were worth emulating. As good examples of strong and therefore effective institutions\, mention was made of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police\, which enjoyed overriding powers\, authority and sanction to take the lead in investigating federal crimes. Mr. Raman also recommended special powers for interrogation and collection of technical intelligence. He highlighted the need for successful prosecution to act as a strong deterrent for terrorists. In the end he recommended that special powers should be incorporated in general laws (ordinary law of the land) instead of enacting new laws. This would allay fear in the minds of people\, especially among the minority community. \nMr. D. C. Nath stated that terrorism has grown from individual acts of violence to group acts\, organisational activity to a movement. He argued that unless the need for a centralised response is realised by all political parties\, the creation of a federal investigative agency would not be possible. He\, however\, suggested that instead of creating a new agency either the IB or the CBI should be empowered to tackle the problem suitably. He also emphasised the need for a non-governmental approach to tackle terrorism through public education programmes of\, for example\, Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) to make the public aware of its responsibilities. He also recommended that the concept of ‘good citizen’ should be propagated by educating the people about their fundamental duties. He also said that in the absence of a declared national terrorism doctrine\, India will be handicapped in tackling the menace of terrorism head-on. Finally\, he stressed on the need for enabling the police to respond effectively by filling up the vacancies in various police organisations and providing them better infrastructure and equipment. \nMr. Prakash Singh said that terrorism had become a pan-Indian phenomenon and had developed linkages with global Islamic Jihad. He brought out the dangerous manifestation of organised crimes like arms smuggling\, drug trafficking\, counterfeit currency\, etc. and recommended the need to enact special laws to deal with such crimes. The Indian Penal Code\, which was enacted in the 19th century\, cannot deal with present day crimes. He then gave details of the Public Interest Litigations he had filed in the Supreme Court on police reforms. He advocated that incidents of terrorist violence and organised crimes should be treated as an act of aggression and any law passed to tackle these crimes should be described as a law ‘in defence of the country’. Supporting the idea of setting up a federal agency\, he said that it is necessary to have an institutional framework to deal with terrorism. In his view\, the setting up of a federal agency did not need an amendment but a correct interpretation of the constitution. He also clarified that the states will not lose their jurisdiction over federal crimes with the setting up of a new agency\, given that both the centre and the states would have concurrent responsibility. He opined that the charter of the CBI should be enlarged to include suo moto investigation of terrorist and organised crimes and there was no need to have a separate agency to deal with such offences. He also advocated the need to enhance the capacity of the police instead of raising more paramilitary battalions. \nMr. P. P. Shrivastav said that the need for a federal agency is very well accepted by all right thinking people. He argued that the country’s internal security problems have international linkages. Hence\, instead of a national response\, a united international response to tackle this problem should be undertaken. Establishing a link between organised crime and terrorism\, he said that wherever there is illegal accumulation of money\, it would eventually lead to terrorism. He described both terrorism and white collar crime as multi-dimensional aggression perpetrated not only by non-state players but also by states. He highlighted the need for creating public awareness to fight such aggression. He recommended that the National Security Council Secretariat be entrusted with the responsibility of formulating a centralised response to terrorism. He backed Mr. Prakash Singh’s efforts of approaching the judiciary to formulate a response strategy against terrorism and organised crime. \nMr. Joginder Singh also supported the establishment of a federal investigative agency. He\, however\, said that unless it is backed with requisite sanctions\, constitutional status and infrastructure\, it would remain ineffective. He highlighted the lack of proper infrastructure and equipment with the police\, due to which it could not respond effectively. He said that a federal investigative agency should not be treated as a panacea and states should also build expertise to investigate and prosecute cases of federal law violations. The fear among states that once the investigation is taken over by the federal agency it will move at a pace the central government wants it to move\, is somewhat justified. He recommended that only terrorism\, counterfeit currency and narcotics should be included in the list of federal crimes\, which he felt would be agreed to by the states. He emphasised the need to build trust between state agencies and minority communities. To improve the quality of human intelligence he recommended that more Muslims should be recruited into intelligence agencies. \nDr. Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA\, said that India is faced with the terrorism problem because the state has ignored governance and police reforms. He felt that unless ground level policing\, physical infrastructure of police stations and intelligence gathering are strengthened\, a federal agency might not be able to deliver. He said that it is also important to create public awareness and publicise success stories of police investigation and prosecution. He concluded by saying that at the heart of things\, it is a political issue. \nDiffering from the general view\, Col. S. K. Saini argued that a holistic approach should be taken to tackle terrorism. He argued that state government agencies should be strengthened rather than centralising such crimes due to the peculiar federal nature of our polity. Mr. Ali Ahmed viewed the whole debate of increasing terrorist threats with international linkages as an exercise to justify the need to have a federal agency and tougher laws. He considered it important to trace the causes of the internal security problems facing the country. He recommended that the federal agencies should investigate all such groups that are subverting the state’s authority. \nIn the final analysis\, it can be said that there was a consensus on the need to have a centrally co-ordinated investigative response to terrorism. However\, the consensus was not in favour of setting up a separate structure\, but to empower existing agencies like the CBI to carry out investigation and prosecution of identified federal crimes. To achieve a consensus among the states for centrally co-ordinated investigation\, it was recommended that to begin with only willing states should be co-opted. When the investigative agency becomes successful\, more states would be keen to join such an arrangement. It was also felt that police reforms should be implemented without any further delay. Last but not least\, the public should be made aware of its responsibilities through NGOs and trust should be built among various communities of the country\, thus paving the way for harmony. \nCompiled by Dr Pushpita Das\, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/does-india-need-a-federal-agency-to-deal-effectively-with-terrorism-and-inter-state-crimes
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081015T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081015T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222534Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130744Z
UID:63747-1224048600-1224048600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:IBSA Dialogue Forum: Problems and Prospects
DESCRIPTION:India will be hosting the third IBSA Summit on October 15\, 2008 at New Delhi. Inaugurated in June 2003\, the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Dialogue Forum is a unique model of trans-national co-operation\, as the three countries come from three different continents and yet share similar worldviews and aspirations. Five meetings of the Trilateral Ministerial Commission have already taken place\, the last one in May 2008 at Pretoria. The first historic IBSA summit was held in September 2006 at Brasilia and the second in October 2007 at Tshwane\, South Africa. Around sixteen working groups have been set up to cover diverse areas like agriculture\, climate change\, environment\, education\, energy\, health\, science and technology\, tourism\, trade\, transport\, culture and defence\, amongst others. \nThe IDSA organised a round table on September 15\, 2008 to discuss the problems and prospects of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. The objective of the roundtable was to generate a fresh perspective on the issue prior to the forthcoming IBSA summit.  \nAround twenty experts from the diplomatic corps and academia participated\, including Shri Shashank\, Former Foreign Secretary\, Ambassador R. Rajagopalan\, IDSA EC Member\, Shri Amit Dasgupta\, Joint Secretary\, MEA\, Mr. Ashok Tomar\, Joint Secretary\, MEA\, Prof. Varun Sahni\, Prof. Abdul Nafey\, Prof. Hussein Solomon from JNU\, Dr. Ash Narain Roy\, the Institute for Social Sciences\, Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA\, Ms. Ruchita Beri\, Research Officer at IDSA\, Sujit Dutta\, Senior Fellow at IDSA\, Prof. P. Stobdan\, Senior Fellow at IDSA\, and others. \nThe discussion focused on several issues like possibility of long term existence and functioning of the forum\, its importance and role in the international arena\, the relevance of IBSA Dialogue Forum for India in the present international context and in future\, as well as the challenges and limitations facing the forum.  \nStrategic Partnership\nIs IBSA dialogue forum only a vehicle for South-South Cooperation or does it serves a larger purpose? There was a consensus that the forum is not merely a grouping for South-South Cooperation\, but that it is a strategic partnership between the three countries. The contours of the partnership are being defined in respect to the changing international and regional environment. A number of factors contribute to the strategic partnership between the three countries. First\, all the three member countries\, India\, Brazil and South Africa\, are emerging powers that are also dominant in their respective regions. At the same time\, for all three partners IBSA is an important tool of foreign policy. Moreover\, the forum has helped fructify common positions on various strategic issues like UN reforms\, climate change\, fairer trade regimes etc.\, by the three countries. They have been able to coordinate some of their positions in the WTO. Most importantly for India\, South Africa and Brazil’s backing has played a great role in the Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement passing through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). \nIt was also felt that the dialogue forum is aimed at improving understanding among each other and the fact that its leaders meet at regular intervals and feel the need to talk to each other is a pointer towards the importance of the forum in the years to come.  \nRelevance for India\nThe IBSA forum is very important from India’s point of view. Both Brazil and South Africa are important for India\, economically and strategically. India has a bilateral trade of around US$ 4.5 billion with South Africa and it is about $2.5 billion with Brazil. Indian companies are acquiring presence in Brazil and South Africa. Participants agreed that diversification of India’s foreign policy is extremely important at this moment. It is very much in India’s interest to give priority to a forum like IBSA. It was felt that\, unlike India\, the other two countries are regionally united and function in a cohesive regional environment. In that sense\, it remains a challenge for India to deal with these two countries.  \nThe world is changing fast and diverse interests are emerging every day. India must learn to grow in an environment of varieties of regional cooperation\, global impacts\, etc. IBSA provides the forum for India to interact with important countries in different regions of the world. As an emerging global power\, India must understand other countries. India should deal not only with the big powers but also with other regional powers and explore opportunities in every region. For that\, India needs to significantly increase its manpower and establishment. In clear strategic terms\, it is important for India to build relationships/partnerships around the world. \nLimitations and Challenges\nParticipants felt that there were some limitations and challenges that the forum is facing at the moment. There is a visible lack of coordination among the three member countries. The three countries have to synergise their efforts and build upon mutual complementarities. The conference also felt that all three countries of the forum face severe challenges and competition from other countries of their respective regions for the leadership role. For instance\, India faces challenges from Pakistan\, Indonesia and Malaysia; South Africa from Nigeria and Egypt; and Brazil from Argentina and Mexico. Also\, the agreements individual members have signed with other international organisations/entities can have an impact on the coordination and functioning of the forum. The forum can grow effectively only if it functions without any hindrances. There are several internal issues that haunt the three member countries – corruption\, increasing crime rates\, political violence\, economic inequality\, etc.\, which need to be addressed properly by the individual countries for the forum to be successful. \nApart from the usual channels of political and economic cooperation and development\, participants felt that the involvement of civil society and business enterprises should be strengthened to make the dialogue forum more successful. Some were of the view that civil society participation should not be independent of the government. Rather\, it should be a public-private partnership to be more effective. Participants also felt that further cooperation in the fields of energy\, food security\, transport\, health\, security and information technology can be mooted in the coming days and that member countries should learn from each other’s best practices in various fields. \nFinally\, a consensus emerged around the table that the potential of the IBSA forum as a strategic partnership between three regional powers from three different continents remains beyond doubt. Compared to other multilateral fora of which India is a member (e.g. IOR-ARC\, BIMSTEC) IBSA’s record is quite creditable. However\, the grouping should move in due course from being a forum for dialogue to becoming a vehicle for concrete socio-economic cooperation so that its benefits are shared by the common man as well. Awareness about IBSA is low and needs to be increased. Member countries need to address the limitations and challenges the forum faces\, urgently. It remains to be seen how the forum plays a role in the international arena and influences multilateral entities like WTO and the UN.  \nRecommendations\nThe Round Table felt that given the growing importance of the IBSA dialogue forum as a vehicle of cooperation between India\, Brazil and South African\, IDSA jointly with the Ministry of External Affairs should establish an IBSA Strategic Dialogue\, bringing together experts from these three countries to brainstorm on the path of the IBSA strategic partnership. This could be organised as a part of the larger IBSA summit outreach events\, with IDSA as the nodal point in India. Further\, academic exchanges amongst the universities and ‘think tanks’ of the three countries should be enhanced. This will help generate knowledge about each other and also strengthen trilateral ties. \nPrepared by Ruchita Beri and Prasanta Kumar Pradhan.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/ibsa-dialogue-forum-problems-and-prospects
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080929T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080929T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222534Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130744Z
UID:63748-1222666200-1222666200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Interaction with RCDS Delegation
DESCRIPTION:IDSA organised a strategic affairs workshop for members of the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) UK\, on September 29\, 2008.  \nThe RCDS group consisted of 13 officers from the UK and other countries such as Australia\, Finland\, Lithuania\, Japan\, Rumania\, France and Lebanon\, and was led by Air Vice Marshal Andrew Walton who is a Senior Directing Staff at RCDS. The RCDS is over eighty years old. Its mission is to prepare senior officers and officials of the United Kingdom and other countries and future leaders from the private and public sectors for high responsibilities in their respective organisations\, by developing their analytical powers\, knowledge of defence and international security\, and strategic vision. In fulfilment of its mission\, the College runs one course a year from January to December. An optional Master of Arts degree course in International Studies at King’s College\, London\, based on the RCDS curriculum and open to all\, is run in parallel with the full course. The curriculum consists of: international stability\, security and prosperity in the 21st century; the strategic perspective of the UK; contemporary international issues; leadership in the strategic environment. \nThe seminar was chaired by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. B.S. Malik. Director General IDSA familiarised the RCDS delegation about the IDSA. Three presentations were given – on India’s strategic situation\, internal security\, and developments in the Indian military by Brig B.S. Sachar\, Ali Ahmed and Col. Arvind Dutta\, respectively. Brig. Sachar provided a broad overview of the situation and India’s policy response. He also dealt with each neighbouring country separately highlighting the various issues. Ali Ahmed provided the delegation with an insight into the Indian Way of tackling insurgency and terrorism and gave an overview of each of the internal security problems besetting India. Col. Dutta dealt with the military issues by going over the structure and role of each service in detail. Vice Admiral Contractor\, DG Coast Guard\, who was also in attendance being an RCDS alumni\, gave a short brief on the Coast Guard and its interface with the Navy and national security structure. \nThe Q&A session saw some focused questions and comments. The first was on the Indian policy on internal security of containment of violence. Containment indefinitely into the future is under the threat of being overtaken by events and could lead to a problematic situation in the future. The questioner wanted to know how India would cope with such an eventuality. The second question dealt with India’s interest and involvement in military uses of space. The third was on India’s approach to China in terms of balance of power in the region. \nThe attending IDSA scholars participated in informing the delegation on India’s position on the various issues raised. It was pointed out that if allowed to extend indefinitely conflicts could become exacerbated. India’s higher defence structure and its antecedents were outlined and the benefits of the committee-based structure highlighted. It was also brought out that there is an ongoing rethinking of geopolitics in China. On the question of space\, it was highlighted that a cell has been established in the service headquarters and it has been tasked to look into the issue of India’s interest and involvement in space. So far\, India has limited itself to looking at space only for peaceful purposes. \nPrepared by Ali Ahmed\, Research Fellow at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/interaction-with-rcds-delegation
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080926T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080926T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222539Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63749-1222407000-1222407000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Storming of Lal Masjid in Pakistan: An Analysis
DESCRIPTION:Chair: S K BhutaniDiscussants: Ved Marwah & Sudhir Sharma  \nConversion of a religious place by terrorists into a heavily fortified safe sanctuary over a protracted period of time is a tactic largely restricted to Asia. Entrenched in this meticulously defended complex\, terrorists challenge the might of the state.  \nThis terrorist fortress is characterized by the presence of a large number of their followers. Such a situation is distinct from other scenarios where terrorists use religious places to take refuge while being chased by security forces\, forcibly take innocent pilgrims as hostages or launch an attack on the assembled devotees. \nLal Masjid\, a mosque complex\, located in Islamabad\, was being used by radical Islamist clerics and their supporters\, to defy the Pakistani government and impose Islamist edicts. When the situation deteriorated\, a siege was established around the Lal Masjid for over a week and finally on July 10\, 2007\, Pakistani army stormed it\, after talks with the clergy failed. The operation was marked by fierce fighting and heavy loss of life\, during which militants responded with rockets\, machine gun fire and petrol bombs.  \nWhile militants occupying such hallowed precincts are in violation of international humanitarian law\, security forces tasked to clear them out need to exercise utmost restraint\, use minimum force\, avoid collateral damage and uphold religious sentiments. Military operations launched to flush out terrorists from places of worship have far reaching political\, social and religious ramifications. \nWhile the Lal Masjid attracted its share of media coverage during the crisis\, inexplicably a detailed analytical study of the episode is still awaited. This paper attempts to identify lessons at the macro level to deal with similar situations by using the storming of Lal Masjid as a case study. \nEvents Leading to the Siege \nFollowing the September 11 attacks in the United States\, Pakistan’s support to the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) was strongly opposed by the leadership of the Lal Masjid. In July 2005\, Pakistani authorities attempted to raid the mosque in connection with the investigation into the London bombings\, but the police were blocked by baton-wielding female students. Subsequently\, the authorities apologized for the behaviour of the police. During 2006 and the first half of 2007\, the mosque’s increasingly aggressive students and leadership\, supported by militants continued to challenge the authority of the government in Islamabad. They also launched an anti-vice campaign and instigated incidents such as kidnappings of alleged prostitutes\, including Chinese\, and burning films\, following the example of the Taliban in Afghanistan. By early April 2007\, the mosque had set up a sharia court. \nTalks reportedly broke down on the morning of July 10\, 2007 over the militants’ demand for an amnesty\, leading to orders being issued to the army to flush them out. What pushed the government to undertake precipitous action was China’s angry response to the killing of three Chinese workers on July 8 in Peshawar. Military intelligence reported that the militants who had carried out the killings were linked to the group in the Islamabad mosque. This coupled with the break-down of direct negotiations led to the final assault on July 10. \nAnalysis of Lal Masjid Episode\nReportedly\, on July 8 Musharraf was presented with three options: launch an air strike\, gas the compound to render the inmates unconscious or launch ground assault. The decision whether to assault a place of worship or continue with its siege\, forcing the inmates into surrender is always a difficult one. Protagonists of the offensive option argue that such a siege may last a long time\, even several months\, as terrorists would have stocked adequate quantities of food material\, water and other items of sustenance\, inflaming religious passions and resulting in a mass uprising across the country. An assault on a religious place may be a relatively quicker alternative\, but invariably leads to heavy loss of life and public alienation with attendant ramifications.  \nThe Pakistan government was criticised for allowing the situation to deteriorate and being a mute spectator to the excesses committed by the Lal Masjid vigilantes. Each new episode was met with feeble government response or appeasement. There were also differences within the government about the approach to be followed in dealing with the issue.  \nUsually such a situation is misjudged in the initial stages due to an overwhelming desire to avoid taking firm action for fear of inflaming religious passions. Militarily\, the best chances of success with minimum damage are right at the beginning\, before the terrorists have had time to prepare extensive bunkers and stock up weapons and supplies. With operations of this kind\, the battle is as much in the mind as on the ground. The more the operation drags on\, the worse it is\, as the initiative passes to the terrorists.  \nFears of a public backlash kept the Pakistani government from acting earlier against the radicals within Lal Masjid. Reportedly\, intelligence agencies indicated that it could get help from Taliban in Waziristan and other madrassas in the vicinity\, leading to large scale turbulence. While the siege of the mosque led to anti-government sentiment to fester in militant and fundamentalist communities throughout Pakistan\, the response of other terrorist groups was subdued. Overall\, there was widespread opinion within Pakistan that firm action should have been taken against Lal Masjid extremists at an early stage. \nThe assault on the Lal Masjid by the army was launched within 72 hours of the situation being handed over to it. Once the army has been requisitioned to deal with the situation\, there is a tendency to expect it to launch the operation at the earliest\, largely premised on the assumption that any further delay will be indicative of a weak response. Deployment of the army is an escalatory step\, bringing additional pressure on terrorists and should be given time to influence the negotiations’ process. Moreover\, such an operation not only requires detailed and meticulous military planning but also extensive coordination with a host of agencies\, including paramilitary forces\, civil police and local administrative machinery. Since the situation has already been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that the army has to be called out\, it is imperative that adequate time is allowed for planning and preparation to the army. \nOfficials hastily revised their assessment of clearing the Lal Masjid which they initially predicted would take just four hours. The militants continued to resist for over 30 hours and inflicted heavy casualties on the security forces. It has been experienced that the army always complains about lack of information to plan operations against such targets. The situation was no different in the case of Lal Masjid.  \nUse of Minimum Force \nAfter the Lal Masjid military action\, concerns have been expressed that the army did not comply with the principle of use of minimum force. The number of casualties suffered by the Pakistani SSG is indicative of their intent to ensure compliance with the principles of use of minimum force and avoiding collateral damage. More the number of civilian casualties during military action on a religious place\, more vehement is the criticism. While Lal Masjid operation was a fairly successful operation from the military’s perspective\, there was muted appreciation of the military’s role\, fearing a backlash in glorifying the army after assault on a mosque.  \nIn such situations\, totally different from normal law and order problems of mob control or violent demonstrations\, it needs to be appreciated that the army is called out to act against highly motivated\, lethally armed and well entrenched group of terrorists who have made elaborate preparations to ward off entry by the security forces into the complex. Minimum force has to be related to the terrorists’ numbers\, weaponry and strength/layout of field fortifications. However\, the army has to prevent or limit damage to the religious and historically important buildings by strictly controlling the application of fire power. Fire fighting teams need to be standby in case of fire incidents occurring due to exchange of fire or attempted arson by terrorists. It requires a very high degree of discipline\, leadership\, motivation and moral courage on the part of troops involved in the operation to exercise restraint in the face of danger and extreme provocation\, with their colleagues dying around them.  \nConclusion\nIt is apparent that terrorists are increasingly focusing on religious places to carry out their nefarious activities and will continue to do so. Therefore\, it is imperative that rather than knee jerk reactions after a terrorist incident\, long term measures are taken to deter the terrorists. The Indian security establishment could study the French system of keeping the places of worship under surveillance. \nIn situations where fundamentalists and terrorists take control of a religious place and challenge the authority of the state\, the government needs to act decisively before the pot boils over. From the military perspective\, tiring out terrorists to make them surrender by besieging the place of worship is a preferred option than direct assault in certain circumstances. Storming of religious places by the security forces invariably leads to collateral damage and loss of life\, despite adhering to the principle of minimum use of force. This provides an opportunity to the terrorists to exploit the situation further\, which can have grave religious and political ramifications.  \nThe seminar was chaired by Ambassador S.K. Bhutani. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sudhir Sharma and Ved Marwah were the two external discussants. Comments on the paper were also provided by the two internal discussants – Colonel Arvind Dutta and Dr. Pankaj Kumar Jha. \nMajor points highlighted in the discussion were: \n\nAir strike is unthinkable in such a situation. However\, air power can be used to provide real time information to the security forces. \nTimely action is required in dealing with such situations\, as storming religious places normally hurt the sentiments of the locals. \nThe Pakistan government was fully aware of the situation\, but it failed to take timely action. \nRather than using the army in such operations\, the police force trained to handle such situations should be employed. \nAssessment of public opinion is needed before carrying out such massive military operations against religious places. \nTheory of the relation between state and religion needs to be thoroughly analysed. \n\nPrepared by M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/storming-of-lal-masjid-in-pakistan-an-analysis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222539Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63750-1221802200-1221802200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Geopolitics of Climate Change and India’s Position
DESCRIPTION:Chair: R RajagopalanDiscussants: Ashutosh Varshney & Sunil Chauhan  \nClimate change and security as a subject of enquiry is now being pursued by the IDSA in a comprehensive manner. Scholars from the non-traditional security cluster\, since 2008\, have been presenting papers and delivering talks on the topic. In April 2008 a run-up workshop was held on the security implications of climate change for India. A national workshop on security implications of climate change for India is planned on October 30\, 2008. A working group under Dr Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair\, IDSA comprising nine IDSA scholars and three outside members (a climatologist\, a disaster expert and an economist) has been formed for the purpose. It is intended that the draft report will be presented in the roundtable discussion. There has also been interaction with MEA officials on the various aspects of climate change. \nUttam Kumar Sinha who is working on the bilateral aspects of the climate change and also on international negotiations has recently authored a chapter in the re-launched IDSA Asian Strategic Review 2008 titled “Asia and Climate Change”. His paper “Geopolitics of Climate Change and India’s Position” in the fellows’ seminar was a logical movement from regional analysis to a global one.  \nThe seminar was chaired by Ambassador R. Rajagopalan\, who is a member of the IDSA Executive Council. The two external discussants were Prof C.K. Varshney\, former Dean of School of Environmental Science\, JNU\, and former Chairman Environmental Research and Wetland Research Committee\, Ministry of Environment and Forests\, and Commander Sunil Chauhan\, from the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation\, United Service Institution of India. The internal discussants were Vinod Kumar and Medha Bisht. The participant-level was high reflecting the interest in the topic and the growing concern over climate change. Over 20 scholars and members of IDSA attended the proceedings.  \nThe paper by referring to the debate in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in April 2007 explained how the issue of climate change is being “securitised” and how a counter argument is being built up to “desecuritise” it. India strongly criticized the “catastrophic scenarios” posited by the Stern Report and articulated a more “immediate and quantifiable threat from possible conflicts arising out of inadequate resources for development and poverty eradication as well as competition for energy.” The author identified loosely structured blocks of states with their own mix of concerns and actions on climate change. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) with concerns and fears of rising sea levels and large submergence of the coastlines think from an “ecological effectiveness” and finds a willing partner in EU. The second group is of OPEC and various industrialized countries that look at climate change from an economic angle. Such groups are seeking “economic effectiveness”. The third group is the developing countries echoing the north-south divide and articulating concerns from a “social justice and equity”. There is also the G5 (Brazil\, China\, India\, Mexico and South Africa) which in the recently concluded G-8 summit challenged the economic dominance of the West and pivoted mostly around south-south cooperation.  \nAt the heart of India’s position on climate change is the notion that it must be allowed to pollute on a per capita basis equally with the West. India has thus been propounding the “per capita emission” line. It is a strong unconditional position that immediately shifts the responsibility on to the shoulder of the developed countries to drastically cut emissions. It also allows India the space and time to grow at a sustained pace and strengthen its poverty alleviation and developmental programmes. But even more significant is the assurance that its per capita emissions will never exceed that of developing countries. It is a position of confidence and self belief in its economic policies\, a challenge and a message to the developed world that it will not be pressurized in the negotiation process. While the per capita argument is quite justified for India\, it also suggests a dogged resistance in its approach\, a grandstanding of its newly acquired international status. But to be a serious player in global politics requires finely balancing self interest with certain global responsibilities and commitment (at least to be seen doing). This is not a moralistic position that India so pitifully pursued in the 1960s and suffered so seriously.  \nWhile the ‘per capita emission’ is being largely accepted including the UN\, there is a certain perception that India’s position is one of extreme rigidity with no allowance for even a self determined gradual carbon emission reduction quota. India here is missing out on a positive leadership role. Another critical element of this leadership is to dehyphenate itself from China. India’s approach to climate change is based on energy security and sustainable development while the Chinese plan focused on emission reduction. China has overtaken the US in total emission\, though its per capita pollution is lower than that of the US.  \nIndia’s other position on climate change is that it does not considers it a “threat” and particularly not in the sense of considering military options as a response. India’s stress on “collaborative action at the global level both through mitigation and adaptation in accordance with the common and differentiated responsibilities of the different countries” points to its faith in the UNFCCC as the agency for carrying out negotiations. So clearly for India an effective climate regime with equitable burden sharing can help tackle the adverse impacts and linking climate change with security is far-fetched and unnecessarily alarmist. Climate change is a concern but India would rather be worried about freer and fairer trade particularly of agricultural products and correcting the distorted trade practices of powerful countries.  \nThe geopolitics and domestic political considerations will remain critical determinants to the negotiation process leading to 2012. The changing power equation and a predominant shift towards Asia will see new groupings and alignments that will impact the existing climate change regimes. In the coming years\, the spotlight will increasingly fall on India\, China and also the US\, the chief protagonists in the emission targets. Since the new agreement needs to be concluded by the end of 2009 (Copenhagen Summit) so as to give countries adequate time for ratification\, the politics will intensify. For India\, however much it digs to its position\, pressures will come from different directions on different interlinked issues. Before the G8 summit\, India braced itself from the US on imposition of tariff barriers against exported goods from India that are seen as products with large carbon footprints\, such as iron and steel. The Japanese at the recently concluded Accra Climate Change Summit took the issue of “sectoral approaches” with India\, in order to establish “international energy efficiency standards” for polluting industries across the world. Has India given itself limited space for negotiations thereby constricting its ability to manoeuvre? If India is interested in world emissions\, its own emissions are important. There lies the challenge and the dilemma. India has long experience in negotiation on climate change and has been at the forefront of the debate ever since Mahatma Gandhi made the ‘greed and need’ connection. India will have to reconfigure its position. ‘Greed’ and ‘poverty’ are powerful arguments in the climate change debate but will not help clinch the emission issue. It has to be seen whether India will reconfigure its position. Of equal interest will be to observe whether other regimes\, groupings and alliances will challenge the Kyoto Protocol. At the end it is not about the sacrosanct nature of the Kyoto Protocol or which other regime should come into existence. The challenge is to be proactive\, innovative and find solutions to the problems.  \nProfessor C.K. Varshney commented the real issue was that of the extra carbon in the natural cycle due to fossil fuel use. Much more scientific work needs to be done. As far as India’s position\, he felt that it only served the purpose of short- term. In the long- term we need to focus more on issues of energy intensity and efficiency. He reminded that we often are too much human centric and neglect loss of biodiversity\, which in any case will not permit the current lifestyles. There was a discussion on the geopolitics and security aspect. Some members from the audience felt that it is the “politics” and not “geopolitics”. Cdr Sunil Chauhan mentioned that in a globalised world contiguous borders are not relevant any longer and thus the term “geopolitics” is in order. Medha Bisht mentioned that we need to take into account the environmental\, human and social costs of big infrastructure projects such as dams as they can be counter productive.  \nThere was also an exciting discussion on the referent object. While the author had taken it as climate\, Vinod Kumar felt that it should be survival. While others felt that the nation-state is the ultimate referent even from the human security perspective.  \nProfessor C.K. Varshney also elaborated on the uncertainties and dangers of geological sequestration of carbon. He mentioned that land-to-plant forests are also limited and too much reliance on aforestation thus has its own limits. Elaborating on Gandhian thought\, he mentioned that it in no way\, means to go backward in the past\, but instead to find alternative solution\, which necessarily may not be technology driven. What economic model India is following was also discussed. Some felt that we are blindly aping the West and we need to see how vulnerable we are internally due to the weather beaten economic path we are opting for. Enormous ecological challenges and social stresses are evident in the future.  \nThe paper generated considerable discussion and well overshot the defined time. Importantly it did not drift from the core feature of the paper. The chairman in agreement with the speaker summed up the proceedings by mentioning how important the topic is and how critically important it is for India to be proactive and not only posturing and grandstanding.  \nPrepared by P.K. Gautam\, Research Fellow at IDSA and Co-ordinator of Non-Traditional Security cluster.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/geopolitics-of-climate-change-and-indias-position
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222539Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63751-1221802200-1221802200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The United National Front in Afghan Politics: An Explorative Study
DESCRIPTION:Chair: P StobdanDiscussant: Kalim Bahadur  \nThere remains an element of ambiguity as to when the United National Front formally came into being. It is generally believed to have been formed either in March or early April (April 3?) 2007. According to Pajhwok Afghan News\, the UNF was formed in Kabul on March 12\, 2007. Interestingly\, according to the Strategic Forecasting Inc.\, better known as Stratfor\, a well-known Texas-based private intelligence agency\, it was founded a year earlier on April 3\, 2006. Whatever might have been the exact date of its formation\, the conditions that led to its creation continues to haunt the Afghan polity. \nThe roots of the pronounced tribal-ethnic character of the present Afghan politics can be traced back to the formation of the modern Afghan state during 18th and 19th centuries. It is important to bear in mind the way ethnic and tribal dynamics played out in the face of externalization of the Afghan civil war through the 1980s and 1990s. Until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 and the 1978 coup by the Afghan communists\, the modern Afghan state was strongly dominated by the Pashtuns belonging to a certain tribe/clan considered as one of royal origin or high in the Pashtun social hierarchy. The minority ethnic groups from the north and parts of western and central Afghanistan – especially Tajiks\, Hazaras\, Uzbeks and Turkmen – had very limited participation in the Afghan national/state politics which remained a Pashtun bastion. Historically\, the ruling elites of the minority ethnic groups were allowed to retain their autonomous or semi-independent status provided they accepted the suzerainty\, often nominal\, of the Pashtun dynasties ruling from Kabul and agreed to pay revenue to the state treasury or provide with men and resources in times of war. The above political understanding not only defined/institutionalised the relationship between the power structure in Kabul and the ruling elites in the far-flung provinces\, but also between Pashtuns and the non-Pashtuns. Such traditional mechanisms of power-distribution and resource-sharing\, however asymmetric\, ensured peace and stability in the country for decades until the beginning of the civil war in the late 1970s. The traditional balance of power in the Afghan politics finally withered away as the ideologically adversarial proxy politics of the Cold War era militarized and internationalized the Afghan civil war. Soviet Union’s armed intervention in Afghanistan beginning December 1979 in support of the communist government in Kabul\, led to a further polarization between the state and the people. As part of its strategy to counter the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan\, the United States (US) along with China\, Pakistan\, Iran and a host of West Asian and West European countries began sponsoring and arming the fragmented but popular anti-Soviet resistance building up in the Afghan countryside. This led to intense weaponisation and subsequent jihadisation of the civil war. Interestingly\, it also led to the empowerment of the hitherto marginalised Tajik\, Uzbek and Hazara anti-Soviet resistance groups who later came to have stakes in the national politics of Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal by early 1989\, they were among the key players in the struggle for control over Kabul. \nEnd of Taliban Interregnum\nThe emergence of a Taliban movement with full backing from the Pakistan state in mid-1990s had a strong Pashtun dimension to it. The minority ethnic factions responded to the rapidly expanding Pashtun Taliban by forming a loose anti-Taliban alliance called the United Front (better known as the Northern Alliance\, NA) in late 1990s which in turn was backed by Russia\, Central Asian republics\, Iran and India. Being new and relatively well-organised\, the Taliban movement was often viewed by the Pashtuns as the return of Pashtun rule over Kabul; and an effective counter force to the Tajik militia.  \nHowever\, the events of 9-11 and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan on October 7\, 2001 proved to be a yet another turning point in the Afghan civil war. It led to the ouster of a Pashtun force from power\, re-establishment of Tajik dominance in Kabul\, re-emergence of factional politics\, and West’s return to Afghanistan. Interestingly\, it had also led to the US re-engagement with the former anti-Soviet mujahideen factions\, especially with the NA. \nReturn of Factional Politics\nSoon confronted with the huge challenge of raising a non-Taliban multi-ethnic Afghan leadership\, a conference involving diverse Afghan factions (minus Taliban and Hezb-e Islami) was held at Bonn\, Germany. The dramatic Bonn Conference (November 27-December 5\, 2001) was a prelude to a new round of factional politics. The nine-day long gruelling negotiations had all the trappings of the factional politics of the early 1990s. It can be best summed up in the words of former US Secretary of State Colin Powell who while reacting to the possible collapse of the Bonn Conference had stated\, “Do not let them break up. Keep them there. Lock them up if you have to. We do not want this to go anywhere else. We’re almost there\, and this is the time to grind it out on this line. If they go off\, I don’t know when I’ll get them all back together.” The signing of the Bonn Agreement (December 5\, 2001) which laid out a road map for stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan thus facilitated and legitimized the role of mujahideen factions in the new political process. \nHardening of Pashtun-NA Divide\nThe hardening ethno-political divides and competing agendas of the diverse constituents of the Karzai-led provisional governments was best reflected during the proceedings of the Constitutional Loya Jirga (December 14\, 2003 – January 4\, 2004) and the presidential election (October 9\, 2004). The 502-member Jirga\, which was called for the approval of the new draft constitution\, was marred by severe differences among delegates from diverse factions on issues concerning nature of the Afghan state\, the form of government\, status and role of Islam\, centre-province relations\, double citizenship\, status of minorities\, human rights and the linguistic rights. The idea of a highly centralised presidential form of government with overriding powers over the bicameral legislature came to be strongly contested by the non-Pashtun delegates.  \nMarginalising NA\nIt is noteworthy that since the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 and the subsequent formation of the Afghan transitional administration\, Karzai had been trying to deal with the strong influence of the NA leaders and commanders in his government. Karzai’s assertive tone against the NA reached a new pitch in July 2004 when he declared that the private militia of the warlords constituted a bigger threat to Afghanistan than the Taliban insurgency. Karzai’s frustration over lack of direct control in areas outside Kabul has since been a constant feature. Despite all rhetoric and attempts to marginalise NA\, Karzai at the same time kept the option of dealing with them open. It is noteworthy that prior to the presidential election\, at a time when Karzai was easing out powerful Tajik ministers from his transitional government\, he was also trying to woo the Taliban and the Hezb-e Islami cadres to join the electoral process. \nThe National Understanding Front\nThough much of the NA leadership was out or on the margins of the governing structure in Kabul by end of 2005\, it failed to augment the position of Karzai in the Afghan politics in any substantive manner. With their presence in the government diminished\, Tajik leader Yunus Qanuni on March 31\, 2005 announced the formation of National Understanding Front or Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli (JTM) as the main opposition group to the central government\, which was welcomed by President Hamid Karzai. The Front\, comprising about 12-14 political parties\, was also formed in view of the September 2005 parliamentary elections.  \nThe UNF: Composition and Agenda\nThe UNF is said to be an agglomeration of about 15-18 political parties. Though there is not much information available on its exact size in terms of membership\, the Front claims to have the backing of 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s Parliament. It reportedly has two governing councils with Mohammad Naim Farahi\, a parliamentarian from Farah\, currently leading the executive council. Many of the members of the UNF are either parliamentarians or former ministers from the Karzai-led interim and transitional governments. Few of them are still occupying senior positions in the central government which lends certain legitimacy to their “government-cum- opposition” status. Interestingly\, the UNF argues against being an opposition coalition or bloc though its members constantly refer to the weaknesses in Karzai’s leadership. In view of the strong presence of the former NA members\, the Pashtuns are by and large suspicious of the political agenda of the UNF\, especially over the idea of strengthening the powers of the provincial governors. \nReactions to the Emergence of ‘Rainbow Alliance’\nThe emergence of the UNF had elicited reactions from the entire political spectrum of Afghanistan. Most of the Afghan political observers and analysts believe that the UNF would not survive long due to the extreme diversity of its constituents (jihadis\, ex-khalqis\, ex-parchamites\, royalists\, Tajiks\, Hazaras\, Uzbeks\, shias and sunnis) and the ideological contradictions flowing from it. The Front is said to lack in common ideology and that its members have conflicting interests. The UNF is often believed to have been formed by former NA along with some ex-communists to legitimize their political existence in view of alleged war crimes and gross human rights violations committed by them in the past. Though they are covered under general amnesty made from time to time\, nevertheless\, the fear of Kabul coming under international pressure to conduct war trials in future remains. Otherwise\, the only factor which is said to unite such diverse constituents of the Front is their shared opposition to Karzai’s leadership.  \nUNF Woos the Taliban\nIn March 2008\, the UNF announced that it had been secretly talking to the Taliban at least since last five months as part of its efforts for national reconciliation. UNF spokesperson had revealed to the Associated Press that Chairman Burhanuddin Rabbani and Mohammad Qasim Fahim had been meeting “important people” from Taliban and other anti-government groups to seek reconciliation. It is interesting to note here that within days of the launching of UNF\, Karzai for the first time admitted on April 6\, 2007 (according to some sources April 7) that he had been talking to the Taliban. With UNF trying to woo the Taliban\, a new dimension has been added to the ongoing politics of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. Taliban are more likely to use divisions between Karzai and UNF to their advantage. It would strengthen their bargaining capacity in case of any serious negotiations with Kabul or the UNF. It is also indicative of the growing fragmentation of reconciliation process in the country. Interestingly\, purported Taliban spokespersons have constantly denied talking to either the Afghan government or the UNF.  \nPerspectives\nThe UNF is a typical Afghan political experiment. It has all the trappings of Afghanistan’s ethno-regional dynamics and factional power politics\, obviously interspersed with the interests of external powers. The UNF may be a recent entity\, but it is also a manifestation of tendencies with a long and a varied past to it. Like any other grouping it draws its characteristics from both historical and prevailing socio-political tendencies in the space in which it originated and is fighting for survival. At a more nuanced level\, it may be said that the UNF is struggling to legitimize and mainstream itself in the Afghan politics. It is striving to raise its profile both at the regional and international level by being an effective and a relevant force in the domestic politics. The key objective seems to be to evolve as a viable alternative to the faltering political structure in Kabul. The outcome of the 2009 elections\, provided it is held\, would be a major challenge to its growth and survival. As regards its alleged foreign backers\, they would be far more interested in its peace initiatives for national reconciliation. Since the limitations of the military option against the Taliban have come to be realized\, some of the neighbouring or even Western countries might be backing UNF’s efforts to engage the Taliban. The UNF may have also been formed in response to growing Taliban challenge. The impetus might have come from the weak position of Kabul and the growing divide in the trans-Atlantic coalition. As political discontentment and insecurity grows\, the UNF is likely to gain ground despite its limitations and contradictions. It is also likely to be challenged by other mini-fronts that might be sponsored by groups inimical to its existence. As for its future prospects\, the UNF is not meant to be a long-term venture.  \n*** \nThe seminar was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair\, IDSA. Amb. Ugendra Kumar\, Joint Secretary\, and currently with NDC\, and Professor Kalim Bahadur were the two external discussants. Comments on the paper were also provided by the two internal discussants – Dr. Ashok Behuria\, Research Fellow IDSA and Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza\, Associate Fellow IDSA. \nMajor points that were highlighted in the discussion were: \n\nThe UNF is limited to ethnic politics and did not put forward economic and social policy. \nLike elsewhere\, as in Iraq for example\, it is the minority community that rules over the larger society. \nPashtuns have been dominant only for a short time in Afghan politics. \nTwo contrasting views were expressed about the UNF. One view was that the UNF has no social power and mandate and therefore the possibility of its coming into power is less. The other view was that the UNF has a multi-ethnic forum which may enable it to gain power and provide stability.\nThe future political structure in Afghanistan will essentially depend on the America-Taliban-Pakistan triangle.\nUNF has not taken political shape. \nPakistan is now alienated in the process and India’s future role is far too delicate. \nIt was suggested that the paper should include a debate on the movement from Presidential to Parliamentary type of government in Afghan politics. \n\nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-united-national-front-in-afghan-politics-an-explorative-study
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080912T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080912T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222539Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63752-1221197400-1221197400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India and the Non-Proliferation Regime: Looking Beyond the Nuclear Deal
DESCRIPTION:Chair: G BalachandranDiscussants: K C Singh & R R Subramanian  \nThe India-United States civil nuclear cooperation agreement\, announced through the July 18\, 2005 joint statement\, besides opening the doors for global nuclear commerce\, is seen as a means to facilitate India’s greater integration with the global non-proliferation regime. India was always credited to be an adherent of the regime’s norms\, but was deemed an outsider owing to its non-membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)\, which is seen as the cornerstone of the regime. Through the nuclear agreement\, the U.S. had volunteered to assist this assimilation process\, the latest development being the India-specific exemption at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).  \nThe emergent global nuclear order and the NPT\nAs a Cold War arrangement\, the NPT sustained one of the most established international bargains whereby states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them\, while existing nuclear weapon states committed to eventually give them up. However\, in the past four decades\, the Treaty had attained the tag of being a system with unfulfilled objectives outnumbering its achieved goals\, and failures accumulating as each of its articles were being violated with impunity. The Treaty was no longer seen to have the capability to address newer security threats arising out of a post 9/11 world\, influenced by non-state actors and an increasing number of threshold states. What looked more portentous was the imbalance a non-state actor would inflict on the non-proliferation regime and the NPT\, which were equipped only to handle the proliferation problem arising from states. Forty years later\, the Treaty might pride on its record of restricting new weapons states to three or four. But as of today\, the instances of non-compliance and likelihood of more threshold states emerging on the scene have increased\, partly due to the security deficit created by current geo-politics. \nIndia’s rendezvous with the non-proliferation regime\nFrom its early days of disarmament activism\, India had envisioned a third world leadership role for itself in the evolving non-proliferation regime\, and vociferously advocated the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons technology. In the early 1960s\, as a member of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC)\, India influenced the debate for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and argued for a credible bargain whereby weapon powers would give up their arsenals while ensuring that others refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. But when the grand bargain became discriminatory\, India decided to stay away from the NPT. India’s decision to conduct a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion experiment was seen as the first challenge to the non-proliferation regime\, which invoked new mechanisms like the NSG to add to what the Zangger Committee had already initiated. \nIndia and the NPT: Towards Convergence or Drifting Apart?\nThe genesis of India’s confrontation with the NPT can be traced to the political power play enacted during the negotiations for the Treaty. Even before Ireland submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly\, India had launched its campaign calling for steps to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and exhorted weapon states to take the initiative\, failing which non-nuclear nations would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons. India was upset that the Irish draft talked of prohibiting acquisition of nuclear weapons\, but imposed no restriction on its continued manufacture and maintenance. Later\, India joined seven nations in the ENDC to submit a resolution (GA 2028 [XX]) with five principles of which the key ones were:  \n– The Treaty should be void of any loopholes for countries to proliferate;  \n– It should embody an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations;  \n– It should be a step towards complete disarmament. \nThe Other Challenges \nThough India could be prodded to think of campaigning for reforms in the NPT\, there are other areas like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)\, on which India would have serious reservations in its current form.  \nCTBT: India had vociferously argued for a test-ban\, along with a fissile production cut-off\, as part of its campaign to stop the production and development of nuclear weapons during the initial NPT debate. This was in consonance with its 1954 proposal calling for end to nuclear weapons testing. At the 1996 Conference on Disarmament\, India\, along with members of G-21\, proposed a Programme of Action for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020. However\, during the CTBT negotiations\, weapon states refused to agree to any commitment on disarmament and pushed for a test ban while insisting on the Entry into Force clause (XIV)\, which required India along with specified countries to join the Treaty before it became operational. \nFMCT: A key element of the July 2005 joint statement was India’s cooperation in negotiations for concluding a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). India had strongly advocated a fissile production cut off in the NPT debate\, but later on resisted an FMCT owing to its potential impact on its own nuclear weapons programme. Differences over issues like time-bound disarmament had led to stalemate in negotiations. After initial opposition arguing that an FMCT would curtail its nuclear weapons programme\, India announced in 1998 its willingness to participate in the negotiations. There are some issues to be factored in India’s policy towards FMCT: (a) Does India have sufficient fissile material for its credible deterrent? (2) If not\, can it be mobilised before the Treaty is ratified? (3) Would the Treaty benefit disarmament or would it be used to curtail the strategic capability of countries like India? \nMTCR: Another commitment of similar character was compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Though India has updated its national controls lists with that of MTCR Annex\, it is still treated as an outsider by the MTCR community for its defiance in pursuing its guided missile development programme. However\, the merit in India’s case is that it had managed to develop its missile systems indigenously and also resisted transfer of missile systems to another country.  \nConclusion\nWith the nuclear deal and NSG waiver\, India is moving towards greater integration with the non-proliferation regime. By doing so\, it would join ranks with the United States in evolving a new nuclear security order. However\, the more India’s proximity with global non-proliferation objectives\, the more would be the policy challenges on crucial issues connected with anti-proliferation. Irrespective of the success and acceptability of a new order\, the instruments of the old order would continue to hold significance in nuclear politics. As an active member of the non-proliferation regime\, India would have to initiate a dialogue with these instruments to ensure that its bonding with the regime is sustained. \nThe NPT continues to be the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime\, despite its many shortcomings. Being a near-universal mechanism\, the Treaty would continue to hold its primacy in global nuclear affairs. Though India managed to resist calls for membership all these years\, its stakes and responsibilities would increase with its weapon power status and greater access to nuclear commerce. On the other hand\, India has to realise that the driving spirit that motivated it to advocate the NPT and CTBT are still relevant. For decades\, Indians have seen NPT as discriminatory so much so that even a rethink is now seen as blasphemous. \nDiscussion\nA. Vinod Kumar presented this paper as part of the IDSA Weekly Fellows’ Seminar series. The seminar was chaired by Dr. G. Balachandran\, Visiting Fellow at IDSA. Discussants in this seminar were Dr. R. R. Subramanian\, former Senior Research Associate at IDSA and a renowned strategic analyst and Mr. K. C. Singh\, IFS (Retd.). Mr. Sujit Dutta\, Senior Fellow at IDSA and Dr. Rajiv Nayan\, Research Officer at IDSA\, also offered special comments as Discussants. Important points flagged during the discussion were: \n\nA favourable balance has to be struck between pragmatism and idealism on issues related to non-proliferation. \nIdeological and practical aspects are an important dimension of the debate on NPT. \nThere should be a degree of caution in the way the nuclear deal is looked at. US posturing may be different from action and the idea might be to target India’s strategic programme. US is no longer a superpower but a hyper power; and it has no friends but only allies. Therefore there should be an element of scepticism in the way the nuclear agreement is perceived. One has to keep in mid the ‘trade offs’ in such arrangements. \nThere is a debate on moralism versus pragmatism as India has been an over-moralising country in the past due to the Gandhian and Nehruvian legacy. Moralising kept India away from realpolitik for a long time. However\, the moral strategy also helped in some ways and India introduced the concept of ‘Atomic Apartheid.’ There is a dichotomy between moralism and practicality. India is shedding its moralistic stand and taking a more holistic view of the nuclear agreement. \nThe best thing about the deal is that India can trade with France and Russia\nIndia is the largest supplier of thorium (almost 60% of the total supplies).\nIndia is already a Nuclear Weapon State. There is no need therefore for enshrining this by India joining the NPT as a weapon state which is not likely in the near term.\nIndia is closer to signing CTBT than before. \nThe signing of an FMCT will take time. \nThe India-US nuclear deal is part of an American attempt to balance the strategic interest of making India a stakeholder to strengthen the international order and the American commitment to non-proliferation goals. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Priyanka Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-and-the-non-proliferation-regime-looking-beyond-the-nuclear-deal
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080910T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080910T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T130417Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130744Z
UID:62865-1221024600-1221024600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Interaction With Norwegian Parliamentary Delegation
DESCRIPTION:A delegation of the International Committee of the Labour Party of Norway visited IDSA on September 10\, 2008. The visiting delegation was headed by Mr. Olav Akselsen\, Member and Speaker of the Committee on Foreign Affairs\, the Parliament of Norway. The focus of the interactive session was India’s Foreign Policy\, India’s stance on Climate Change and India’s relations with Africa. \nIn his brief introduction\, the Chair\, Mr. Sujit Dutta\, Senior Fellow\, IDSA described the history of IDSA and its unique role in shaping the strategic\, security and foreign policy discourse in India. Mr. Akselsen on his part gave a brief history of the Labour Party and presented an overview of Norwegian foreign policy\, particularly its International Development programme. He said NATO is extremely important for Norwegian security. On global issues\, Mr. Akselsen highlighted that global warming is a major Norwegian concern. Norway supports the Post-Kyoto agreement and looks forward to the outcome of the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change in May 2009. However\, he also said that the richest countries must bear the maximum burden of global warming. In this regard\, he suggested that an International Joint Mechanism Plan may be worked upon. On the reform of the United Nations\, he mentioned that the UN and specifically the UN Security Council do not reflect the present reality and India must play a major role in the UN. \nMr. Sujit Dutta gave a presentation on Indian foreign policy. He said that after the Cold War India’s foreign relations have been diversified and its foreign policy agenda has taken on board new issues such as energy\, climate change\, terrorism\, UN reform\, etc. He described the evolution of Indian foreign policy after the Cold War and depicted it as multi-directional. On the Indian neighbourhood\, he said that most of the country’s neighbours have been going through political turmoil\, be it Pakistan\, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. It is a serious challenge for Indian foreign policy makers and strategic community to actualise the goal of a stable neighbourhood. On India-China relations\, he said that there are unresolved issues in the bilateral relations such as the Tibetan refugees in India\, unresolved border and China’s role in the Indian neighbourhood. However\, China has begun to take into account the rise of India and also wishes to engage India constructively in many areas. \nDr. Arvind Gupta\, the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA\, dealt with the issue of India’s stance on Climate Change. He underscored that India aims at an inclusive growth pattern and follows the distributive model. As a developing country\, India needs an annual growth of 8 to 10 per cent to pull its vast masses out of poverty. Sustained economic growth requires energy supplies at affordable prices. Therefore\, India should not be equated with the industrialised nations. He also highlighted that India’s contribution to the global per capita carbon emission is the lowest and India’s energy efficiency is almost at par with rich countries like Germany. Dr. Gupta pointed out that India cannot accept legally binding emission cut quotas\, but reiterated the commitment given by the Indian Prime Minister that the country’s per capita emission would never go beyond the per capita average emission of developed countries. \nMs. Ruchita Beri\, Research Officer at IDSA\, provided a historical background of India’s relations with Africa. She informed the delegation that India’s relations with Africa dates back to the pre-independence years and the civil disobedience movement started by Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa. Till date\, African leaders like Sam Nujoma and Nelson Mandela remember and respect the Indian model of non-violence. At present\, Ms. Beri\, added\, there is a two million-strong Indian Diaspora in the African continent and this contributes to the strong bonds between India and Africa. In recent years economic considerations have assumed high priority in India’s Africa policy. India’s relations with Africa are not exploitative\, but based on mutual benefit and understanding. Energy is emerging as an important component of co-operation. India is trying its best to provide technical-economic assistance to African countries and build a mutually beneficial relationship. Developing human resources and other capacities in Africa\, she concluded\, is a focus of India’s foreign policy. \nQ & A Session\nQuestions to Mr. Akselsen  \n\nWhat is the Norwegian position on South Ossetia and its perspective on the rearmament of Russia?\nChina is becoming an important player in international politics. What is the Norwegian take on the integration of China into the international system?\nHow does Norway see developments in the Caucasus regarding the US-EU sponsored Albanian Macedonian Bulgarian Oil (AMBO) pipeline? Is there a tension between Russia and Norway on this issue?\n\nAnswers \n\nNorway has been concerned about the recent developments in Russia. However\, it believes in engaging Russia through institutions like the EU and NATO. South Ossetia dispute should be solved according to international law.\nChina is important for international development. While Norway is increasingly open towards fostering civil society tie ups\, it is also working towards initiating a human rights dialogue with China.\nNorway has better technology than Russia to explore oil in the Arctic and other offshore areas.\n\nQuestions to IDSA panellists \n\nWhat is the Indian position on WTO trade negotiations and the possibility of future agreements?\nThere have been a lot of talk in the Western media on the resistance of the South to the linkage of labour standards and the social clause with trade issues in the WTO. What is the Indian stand?\nIndia’s policy in Myanmar has been criticised for its pro-active diplomacy. What is the Indian policy?\nWould the general elections in 2009 in any way affect the broad contours of Indian foreign policy?\n\nAnswers \n\nThe issue concerning India in WTO essentially revolves around questions regarding agricultural subsidies. India needs the world market for exports\, and if agriculture is subsidised in the West\, it is detrimental to the interests of developing countries. A working solution towards opening world markets must be worked upon.\nThe social clause issue is important to India because of the growing concerns on child labour issues\, which is linked to the livelihood of millions. India’s policy shifts are contingent upon internal constraints\, which are distinct to developing countries.\nThough the government is implementing progressive policies like providing training and education\, developed countries should understand that the labour realities in developing countries are a complicated mix. Issues relating to child labour are survival issues for many in India. India’s position therefore on the social clause would be driven by certain ground realities that it confronts.\nIndia is not in favour of isolating Myanmar and believes that it can bring about change through proactive engagement. Though Western countries have taken a stand of isolating the Myanmar regime\, India is not in favour of such an approach since Myanmar is strategically important for India. India aims to engage Myanmar not only bilaterally but also through regional institutions.\n\nPrepared by Dr. Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at IDSA\, and Alok Mukhopadhyay\, Associate Fellow at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/interaction-with-norwegian-parliamentary-delegation
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080905T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080905T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222619Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63754-1220592600-1220592600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Role of Biotechnology in Defence
DESCRIPTION:Chair: B S SacharDiscussants: B M Gandhi & Sachin Chaturvedi  \nIn the 21st century\, the science of biology has been found adopting various techniques from other fields of life to improve its effectiveness. Modern-day biotechnology could be regarded as a multidisciplinary field where its utility has grown beyond traditional uses like agriculture and medicine. This draft paper by Ajey Lele\, Research Fellow at IDSA\, looks at the relevance of biotechnology for modern day militaries both from offensive and defensive perspectives. Major applications of biotechnology extending for their militaristic utility mainly fall into categories like sensors; electronics and computing; materials; logistics and therapeutics. This paper is divided into four main parts. Part I looks at the relevance of biotechnology with reference to the debate on ‘germ threats’. The second part deals with the defence related medical and non-medical aspects of this technology and the third part focuses on military investments made by few important states in this field. The last part takes a macro-view of disarmament issues.  \nRelevance of biotechnology for bio weapons/ bio terrorism \nIn general\, two main types of groups/individuals could be said to be in a position to apply the advanced techniques of biotechnology for the purposes of bio-terrorism. The first category could be the state sponsored international terrorist organizations undertaking such act with the help of the sponsor state possessing covert BW programme. The second type could be the disgruntled scientists working at clinical microbiology laboratory or academic laboratory involved in some aspect of microbiological research. She/he may do it just to prove a point or as an act of defiance against her/his own organization or because of influence from any terrorist organization.  \nCurrent research in biotechnology parallels earlier research in the nuclear field in the 1940s and 1950s. The database developed for nuclear technology was applicable for both military and industrial purposes. Similarly\, the database being developed for commercial genetic engineering in the fields of agriculture\, animal husbandry\, and medicine is potentially convertible to the development of a wide range of novel pathogens that can attack plant\, animal\, and human populations. Because of these advancements in various areas related to biotechnology and genetic engineering there exists a possibility that biological warfare could gain importance as a viable option not only amongst the terrorist organizations but covertly among some state actors too. \nIn the years ahead\, the use of biotechnology to create bioweapons will become far more powerful\, more available and less expensive. Engineering\, computing\, and the capital markets will push biology forward on a rapid trajectory. What used to take a highly skilled team of scientists to accomplish can now be done in rapid fashion with automated kits within few hours. Industrial techniques allow the cheap production of pathogens or toxins to tonnage quantities in places around the world. Historically\, it has been seen that all current inventions have found suitable applicability in the business of warfare. In case of futuristic bioweapons the only dilemma could be will terrorist organizations opt for this technology?  \nBiotechnological Weapons\nHow to turn modern biotechnology to make actual weapons is still not known\, but with their capability of attacking targets accurately and producing ultramicro\, non-lethal\, and reversible damage\, such weapons might finally change the methods of “physical annihilation” or “destruction within the killing range” which have characterized war since the invention of gunpowder. Today\, scientists are of the opinion that we can use many modern biotechnologies directly as a means of defence and attack\, and with further development\, they probably will become new weapons systems.  \nTechnically speaking war is simply the human behaviour that forces enemies to lose the power of resistance. It could be possible to create biological weapons which could alter the biological features of human bodies. It could be possible to create biotechnological weapons that can cause destruction that is more powerful and more civilized than that caused by conventional killing methods like gunpowder or nuclear weapons. However\, an important thing to note is that the military utility of biotechnology is likely to grow beyond biological weapons and medical protection. It is likely to revel a character of aggression not thought of till date.  \nBiotechnology and Biodefence\nVarious techniques exist today within the field of biotechnology which have direct or indirect relevance for biodefence. Processes like the automation of sequencing in genome projects\, bioinformatics\, and advances in combinational chemistry and high throughput screening of compounds are on the forefront in this arena. They are being developed for civilian application in medicine\, pharmaceuticals\, and agriculture\, as well as for purposes that are legitimate under the BTWC\, such as defence\, detection\, protection\, and prophylaxis. Biotechnology has been vital to the development of techniques for identifying and diagnosing diseases and for medical counter-measures. Moreover the recent advances in biotechnology offer a real opportunity for the development of effective counter-measures to biological and toxin weapons agents. From a biosecurity perspective\, vaccine development and production has great strategic value. \nMedical and Non-medical Aspects of BT\nFollowing are the broad areas in various medical and non-medical categories for military where biotechnology can be used in some manner  \n\nTherapeutics: Genomics and proteomics; drugs and vaccines; drug delivery systems \nElectronics and Computing: Protein based devices; biocomputing; biomolecular hybrid devices \nMaterials: Tissue engineering; biologically inspired materials and processes; hybrid materials \nLogistics: Miniaturizations of biological devices; functional foods; biological energy sources; renewable resources \n\nMilitary investments made by few important states\nUnderstanding the need for the induction of emerging technologies\, armed forces around the world have started investing in various strategic technologies. However\, in respect of biotechnology\, the interest appears to be still in an embryonic stage. The reasons for this could be many. Today\, biotechnology is still under the process of evolution. The growth of technology offers many promises but it still does not offer substantial solutions to existing military problems. And this could be the reason for the absence of interest in most of the cases. However\, as states have slowly started realizing that juxtaposing this technology with other technologies like nanotechnology could offer many dividends to military they have started investing in it. \nApart from the US\, states like China are looking at the military applicability of this technology. Only few states are showing overt interest in this field. However\, dual-use nature of this technology demand a ‘read between the line’ approach to understand the military intentions of various nation-states in respect of this technology.  \nChina’s overall technological capabilities have increased dramatically since its reform programme began in the late 1970s. However\, no direct indications are available about their interests in using biotechnology for military purposes. At the same time China understands that biotechnology has obvious military implications as a means for developing biological weapons and also providing defence against biological weapons. The military biotechnology may found its applicability in areas like non-lethal weapons. Here a possibility exists that microbes capable of destroying the fuel supplies of the enemy could be developed. \nChina’s main sources of biotech growth are expected to be in bio-agriculture\, genomic sequencing\, biochips\, traditional medicines\, bioinformatics\, stem cell research\, and bio-manufacturing. China is also making substantial investments in Agriculture biotechnology which it considers as a strategically significant tool for improving national food security.  \nBiotechnology and Disarmament\nThere exists an apparent linkage between the growth of biotechnology and development of biological or agriculture weapons. In future non-lethal biological agents could also be used as incapacitants under certain circumstances. This exponential growth of technology demands focused attention from the disarmament regime. In the present era\, it would be a profound mistake to see genomics as simply a scientific revolution. It could have both positive as well as negative impacts on the survival of the mankind. The entire spectra of biotechnologies could likely have major impact on creation of new biological weapons. \nConclusion\nBiotechnology has shown immense potential for its utility in various facets of life and military is no exception. Scientists and military leadership are increasingly finding its utility for militaristic purposes. At the same time this technology is raising fears because of many of its potential negative consequences.  \nBiotechnology and its products have created some amazing possibilities for military particularly in the area of sensor technology\, biocomputing\, protection of C4ISR\, Bioengineered materials\, biofuels\, etc. Induction of biotechnoogy in such areas is expected to bring radical changes to a broad range of military applications and even few military tactics could have to be redefined with the induction of this technology. Looking at the potential of this technology\, there is a need to invest more in military’s biomaterials needs.  \nUnfortunately\, the growth of BT has a darker side too and that is its potential to create bioweapons. Today\, due to the competitive nature of technology business houses are also found reluctant to provide information that could compromise their economic edge. Hence\, the biggest challenge exists to allow the growth of technology without letting it into the wrong hands. It is expected that in future\, the science of biotechnology itself may come in handy to tackle the threats posed by advances in biotechnology.  \nDiscussion\nWg. Cdr. Lele presented this paper as part of the IDSA Weekly Fellows’ Seminar series. The seminar was chaired by Brig. B. S. Sachar\, Senior Fellow at IDSA. Two external discussants were invited to provide their comments on the paper: Dr. B.M. Gandhi who is a biotechnologist and CEO of NeoMed Services\, and Dr. Sachin Chaturvedi who works at the Research and Information Systems for Developing Countries. In addition\, Dr. Uttam Sinha\, Research Fellow at IDSA\, was also invited to be a discussant. Some of the points raised during the course of the discussion are as below: \n\nBiotechnology industry surpasses the Aerospace industry. \nIndia is at a nascent stage of development in the field of biotechnology. \nOne needs to be more concerned regarding the non-scientific applications of the technology. \nBiotechnology should not be seen in isolation. \nOne the most significant questions today is as to who can use a biological weapon? \nBTWC does not provide enough space to control existing developments in the field of biotechnology. \nSAARC should be used as a forum where these issues should be discussed at the regional level. \nOne needs to highlight the politics involved in biotechnology and also look at the geo-politics of biotechnology. \nBiotechnology is likely to be a lead technology in the 21st Century. \nIt is necessary to highlight how useful or dubious existing international treaties are.\nIndia today is facing a number of problems related to biotechnology. \nThere is a need to dwell upon Agro-terrorism. \nPharmaceutical companies can also indulge in the spread of a biological agent for this can help them attain high levels of profits. \nThe biotechnology threat is increasing exponentially and there is a need to analyze the threat and also to get solutions and preventions. \nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/role-of-biotechnology-in-defence
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080829T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080829T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222619Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63755-1219987800-1219987800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Confronting the Threat in Cyberspace
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Thomas MathewDiscussants: Prem Chand & Subimal Bhattacharjee  \nThe central premises of the paper presenter were that governements were neglecting the current threats on the Internet not out negligance but because these threats were too diffuse and inchoate. This prevented a appropriate and timely response from the state to this threat. There was a tendency to approach these threats as law and order problem \, or technology problem\, whereas they are of a much higher order\, and could impact on national security. \nThere were two parts to the equation of securing cyberspace. One was premised on the definition that “Cyberspace is composed of hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers\, servers\, routers\, switches\, and fiber optic cables that allow our critical infrastructures to work.”. Over the years\, ensuring the security and integrity of the networks that connect critical infrastructure has become of paramount importance since crucial sectors such as the financial\, energy\, transportation and telecommunications sectors are connected through cyber networks. This applies to India as well with core areas of the Indian economy\, from the financial markets to the banking sector\, to telecommunications are networked\, and other areas such as energy distribution and transportation are headed in that direction. \nA second part of the equation\, but one that has proved to be problematic when it comes to implementation\, has been securing the Internet\, the vast network of networks\, which has now become synonymous with cyberspace. Users of the Internet\, an estimated 1.5 billion of the world’s population\, vary from individuals to corporations to governments\, all of whom use the same pipes for the transmission of some or all of their data and communications. \nThe rise in the Internet population has meant that while the threats and vulnerabilities inherent to the Internet and Cyberspace might have remained more or less the same as before\, the probability of disruption has grown apace with the rise in the number of users. At the same time\, the nature of the Internet\, with all the characteristics of a “global commons” means that no nation can unilaterally take on the responsibility of defending or policing networks owned variously by nation states\, commercial companies and individuals. In fact\, cyberspace is characterised by blurred boundaries; there are no clear demarcations between civilian and military\, state and non-state\, and foreign and domestic as in other domains. It is those same characteristics that make it an ideal medium for committing malafide activities which can have repercussions for national and international security. \nCharacteristics of the Internet\nIt is akin to a Global Commons where no nation can unilaterally take on the responsibility of defending or policing networks owned variously by nation states\, commercial companies and individuals; it has blurred boundaries where there are no clear demarcations between civilian and military\, state and non-state\, and foreign and domestic and: the architecture of the Internetas it has evolved is that of an open all-inclusive\, decentralised environment. Part of the problem is that the Internet’s organic evolution meant that security was not a consideration and trying to bring ina secure internet environment is like bolting the stable door after the horses have bolted. \nInternet War\nThis has led to Internet War or I-War which can be described as a low-intensity war where actors unkown are exploiting “the ubiquitous low security” internet infrastructure to target users with malware that compromises their systems and networks. These attacks take advantages of the bugs and vulnerabilities in software\, systems and networks and are perpetrated though the machinations of a hacker-criminal network-state nexus. \nThe Hacker-Criminal Network-State nexus\nCriminal networks have\, over the years\, professionalised the business of discovering and exploiting weaknesses in software that allow them to undertake a variety of actions ranging from taking control of those computers\, accessing information on those computers or rendering them unusable. Whilst hackers provide the technical expertise\, existing international criminal networks have learnt how to squeeze the maximum out of these compromised computers\, and have turnovers estimated in the billions of dollars. Whilst this would remain at the level of criminal activity\, it has acquired dangerous proportions and impinges on national security when a state-criminal network-hacker nexus builds up. There is enough circumstantial evidence to show that some states have turned a blind eye to cyber-space centred criminal and illegal activities\, perceiving certain advantages to be had from building up such a capacity. The means\, motivation and objectives and approaches to I-War are examined in greater detail in two case studies. \nInternational Responses to I-War\nWhile I-War might seem to be blown out of proportion when compared to the actual disruption it causes at present\, it provides sufficient indication that the threats of the future are vastly different from that envisioned by national security planners. The blurred boundaries and the anonymity provided by cyber-space make it difficult to pin responsibility for such attacks\, which\, going by current trends\, will be perpetrated by individuals\, networks\, communities and organisations\, with the state acting as facilitator\, and nationalistic fervour providing the motivation. \nGovernments have found it hard put to grapple with the complex issues of I-War\, though some are increasingly cognizant of its implications for national security. Among the possible measures that can be taken are the following: i)international treaties and agreements that clearly spell out what constitutes legal and illegal activities on the Internet should be worked out; ii)states such as Russia and China should be encouraged to ensure that international norms of behaviour are followed and iii) The CERT mechanism that provides a useful interface between government\, private sector and individuals should be implemented in countries where they don’t yet exist\, and there should be better co-ordination and sharing of information among existing CERTs . \nConclusion\nWhilst analysts have been tom-tomming the impending arrival of cyberwar with vivid imagery of the collapse of critical infrastructure\, the ongoing battle in the Internet space is much less noticeable but has equally important ramifications for national security. The means\, the motivation and the actors have come together in a combination that presages ever increasing I-War. It is for those at the receiving end to take urgent remedial action which does not mean responding in kind\, but by addressing the technical and legal lacunae in cyberspace that allows criminal elements to flourish\, and illegal activities to go unpunished. This should be done in consultation with all stake holders including national governments\, private sector companies and information infrastructure providers. While this would not end the problem completely\, it would mitigate it somewhat\, and might prevent other countries from going down the route of I-War. \nDiscussion\nAmong the points that came up in the discussion that followed the presentation were the following: \n\nEnsuring Information Security is a 21st century nightmare.\nFailure of the defences and the increasing profits from such practices has led to an increase in cyber crime.\nNetwork Security id dead. The need is to address Applications security…only 9% of software vulnerabilities are being addressed\nThe need is to divert focus on the question as to what the next level of security should be. More research is required in the domain of information warfare weapons and the issue of leakages in the war room.\nEconomic security is as important as national security.\nIt is premature to link the subject of cyber threat to nationalism.\nAs a country India has a fair lead in the realm of information technology.\nEMP or the electro magnetic pulse is an alternative to nuclear capability.\nThe information structures both at the national and global level should be studied.\nTen years back the American literature dominated the subject of cyber security. Gradually however other countries have also shown interest in the same.\nThere is practically no international mechanism for cooperation in this area except for the World Summit of UN Secretary General.\nIndividual is increasingly getting linked with national security.\nA great deal of academic work needs to be done in the field of cyber security to facilitate better understanding and comprehend the threat.\nCyber threat would be a potent one in the twenty first century be it national security\, education or health.\nIndia’s security domains are attacked by China on an everyday basis.\nTreaties and multinational forums should be fostered to reduce and ultimately eliminate the threat.\nIn this regard the IT Act of the year 2007 had many deficiencies which require attention.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/confronting-the-threat-in-cyberspace
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080827T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080827T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222619Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130744Z
UID:63757-1219815000-1219815000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Resurgence of Russia
DESCRIPTION:The discussion at IDSA on August 27\, 2008 was part of the Institute’s ongoing research activities and was aimed at encouraging interactive dialogue among experts available on specific fields. The objective of the Round Table was to discuss the underlying and most compelling factors contributing to the resurgence of Russia and its implications. The Round Table was held against the backdrop of recent developments in Russia and its conflict with Georgia over the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  \nSome twenty scholars including international affairs specialists participated in the half-day working session. Those who joined the discussion included\, Shri Rajiv Sikri\, former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs\, Shri Nandan Unnikrishnan\, Russia expert at the Observer Research Foundation\, Dr. Gulshan Sachdeva\, Russia expert at Jawaharlal Nehru University\, Dr. Subhas Kapila\, Russia Expert\, Shri N.S. Sisodia\, DG\, IDSA\, Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA\, Dr. Thomas Mathew\, DDG\, IDSA\, Shri Sujit Datta\, Senior Fellow at IDSA\, Brig. B.S. Sachar\, Senior Fellow at IDSA\, Prof. P. Stobdan\, Senior Fellow at IDSA and others. \nThe discussion mainly centred around three broad themes covering a range of issues relating to internal trends in Russia\, strategic issues and the cast of international players impacting Russia’s course\, and finally aspects of Indo-Russian relations. Among the many points discussed the following stand out as important. \nRussia’s Resurgence \nRussia’s resurgence has been underway since 2004 when Vladimir Putin\, through his tough domestic policy measures\, put an end to several ambiguities and misgivings about Russia’s ability to stage a comeback as a power of consequence. Putin’s military successes in Chechnya provided Russia the latitude and sense of self confidence for restoring the country’s lost strength and international prestige.  \nWhether or not such assessments indicate full resurgence of Russia\, there was no doubting the optimism expressed in the discussion about Russia’s remarkable economic comeback. The country has emerged as the world’s biggest energy producer\, pumping more oil than Saudi Arabia and making Europe dependent on the export of its natural gas. The growing commodity items exports have swelled the Kremlin’s coffers\, which now possesses the third largest reserve of foreign currency in the world. It has a Stabilization Fund worth over $160 billion dollars. There was no doubt among the participants that with the current 7 to 8 per cent growth rate\, Russia could emerge as a powerful economy; with Europe’s biggest market. Such being the current trend\, it became clear from the discussion that Russia cannot be wished away so easily by the world. \nHowever\, there was a great deal of deliberation on how Russia remains a nation fraught with problems and uncertainty. For example\, its current internal stability and economic situation conceals as much as it reveals. The economy is still largely based on export of natural resources that entails policies for diversification process in other areas. Russia has lost its capabilities\, especially technical skills for handling large project management. Georgia’s ability to bring down six Russian aircraft indicated chinks in the Russian armoury. \nThe current surge in Russian economy is linked to a power struggle within – redistribution of wealth (centralisation and re-privatisation) – especially in the energy sector and even in military industrial complexes. Corruption is rife with little transparency in decision making system. Judicial system is weak and requires urgent reforms. It was noted that the Russian leadership is adopting autocratic tendencies\, backsliding on democracy\, curbing free press\, encouraging nationalism and xenophobia while using energy as a powerful weapon of foreign policy. \nAlso on the downside\, the country is facing a widening gap between rich and poor. The social sector i.e.\, education\, health and transport systems suffer from acute underinvestment. The country is also mired in a dangerous demographic crisis – its population is declining by 800\,000 people every year that could curtail future economic growth. It is difficult to imagine how merely 100 million people in the decades ahead would be able to defend a vast nation of 11 time zones. Russians are already worried about the Chinese increasingly creeping into their territory\, but are not able to deal with the problem. Many felt that the potential of Indian workers immigrating to Russia could be taken up as a serious option. \nStrategic Perception\nThe discussion reflected a view that Russia is subtly seeking strategic autonomy as against the earlier partnership strategy with the West. This could be indicative of Russians getting emboldened by the windfall from oil revenues\, as such determined to reassert on the regional and global stages. However\, participants who had experience of directly handling Russian affairs in the past felt that the Russian people have suffered enough national humiliation and would now stand up against the host of international scenarios being drawn up by the West. Interestingly\, some experts perceptibly put forth the argument that the Cold War\, in fact\, has never ended. The West never dismantled the NATO and instead chose to expand beyond Eastern Europe into the traditional Russian strategic sphere i.e.\, Ukraine and Georgia. \nSome experts expressed the view that the ideological basis for the resumption of a new Cold War did not exist\, as Russia too now adheres to democratic values\, free market and globalization. However\, they expressed the view that as long as the US plan for further dismemberment of Russia persists\, tension between Russia and the West will continue unabated. The current Georgian crisis is a fallout of Kosovo\, as Moscow was preparing for a showdown for months. The objective was to draw a strategic line beyond which Moscow would not tolerate Western poaching. The Russians had a history of strong national pride and there would be an obvious tendency for Russia to counter the repudiation of its great power status. It is seeking to reinvigorate nationalism and international assertiveness to regain its lost national pride. There were\, however\, questions about the sustainability of Russia’s emerging geo-strategic policy orientation.  \nWhile rejecting the resumption of a Cold War theory\, experts recognised that Russia faces inherent technological limitations and military wherewithal vis-à-vis the 10 times stronger USA. Russia\, they felt\, may have to play a more nuanced game especially in the Caucasus\, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. China’s entrenched influence and the West’s ability to use its economic leverages could drive a further wedge between the former Soviet Republics and Russia. The crisis in Georgia was a case in point. \nWhile the tensions between Russia and unrelenting neighbours have been growing for years\, the US’ exuberant support for Georgia’s leadership clearly emboldened the latter to enter into full confrontation with Moscow. The US\, according to some experts\, was a ‘paper tiger’ and would not be able to defend Russia’s neighbours\, should the confrontation develop full scale. Russia\, they felt\, feels seriously threatened about its security\, and therefore its future actions would be security driven even if it means going for another war. Importantly\, there would be a split inside Georgia and Ukraine before they finally join NATO. As Russia’s stake in the global energy market grows\, Russia would be seeking a global strategic balance even if this meant a return to bipolarity. By any means\, the US would be unable to force Russia out in an arms race. \nThe discussion also brought up the issue that China might negatively react to Russia’s reassertion. In a scenario of a wider strategic competition\, experts felt that China\, because of the nature of its relations with the West\, will swing in favour of the US. Most participants did not take an optimistic view of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. Suspicions between the two are greater than co-operation. The broad view that emerged finally was that Russia would threaten the West up to a point. It will withdraw once it is able to draw its red lines. A full confrontation is unlikely\, but Russia would retain the right to disrupt or contain the American agenda in Russia’s strategic neighbourhood. \nImplications for Indo-Russian Relations\nThere was a great deal of discussion on how Russia was still politically\, diplomatically and militarily important for India. A country with large stockpiles of strategic bombers with a veto power in the UNSC acts as a useful counterweight against global hegemony. A view was expressed that Russia could refurbish its strategic assets\, and has strong scientific and technological base that can be taken advantage of by India. A view was expressed that Russian weapons were still the best bet for India’s requirements. It was felt that India cannot afford to ignore its old and time-tested strategic partner\, as the traditionally strong US-Pakistan relationship and China-Pakistan nexus still persisted. Also\, India had to develop sufficient confidence in alternative source of support in the area of defence. Further\, Russia’s diplomatic support to India in the context of the issue of Kashmir cannot be lost sight of. \nHowever\, another view expressed was that India needs to shed its old nostalgia and instead seek a more realistic relationship with Russia based on current realities. There has been a tendency to overestimate the importance of Russia especially among Indian academia\, foreign policy circles and the defence establishment. Critics viewed diversification as a major challenge\, especially when a linkage is yet to be established between engines of growth in India and Russia. Some experts felt that defence cooperation with Russia is not going to be same and it would be wise to speed up the diversification process. Similarly\, on energy\, nothing big is happening. An alternative assessment put forward was that Russia and India had substantially moved away from each other\, as can be seen from the divergent foreign and defence policies pursued by both countries. The existing dispensation had a utility for India only for a single-window clearance. But\, clearly\, the lack of a transport corridor and banking system could inhibit any meaningful commerce between the two countries in the future. Russia’s recent action against Georgia had questioned the sanctity of the existing state boundaries. The unravelling situation in the Caucasus would have implications for India\, especially when a position is required to be taken by India on the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This would require a carefully calibrated response. \nConclusion\nWhile some experts expressed optimism about Russia’s future\, others saw it to be less strong than it perceived itself to be. A revival of the Cold War seemed unlikely\, but Russia protecting its vital security interests while acquiring strength to thwart US moves in areas where Russia had got a hold came out clearly in the discussion. Russia was likely to remain important for both the European and Chinese economies.  \nOn its road to regaining domestic and international stature\, the participants saw several challenges in Russia’s way. The most serious issues related to social indicators and demographic trends. The establishment of a democratic and plural political system\, which was at a nascent stage\, was also noted as a constraint. \nWhile Russia’s potential to emerge as a major power centre and a countervailing influence to the US in global affairs was not in doubt\, it would still require a positive and sustained engagement with major powers like the US\, Europe\, China and India to achieve the desired status. An equally important factor would be how others\, while keeping pace with the changing reality\, approach Russia’s resurgence as a phenomenon and gain from its endowments. The US\, however\, seems unprepared to reconcile to a resurgent Russia and will need to take initiatives for a deeper engagement with it to avoid a repeat of the Cold War-like confrontations. \nFinally\, the participants felt that there remained a serious gap in the research being done on Russia in India and urged a fresh impetus for scholarship on the emerging Indo-Russian relations in a realistic manner. A proposal for a research programme in cooperation with the government could be mooted to bridge the gap in knowledge\, as well as\, for preparing analytical papers needed by the Government. \nPrepared by Professor P. Stobdan\, Senior Fellow at IDSA and Co-ordinator of the Russia and Central Asia cluster.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/resurgence-of-russia
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080822T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080822T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222624Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63759-1219383000-1219383000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Talking to the Taliban: Will it Ensure 'Peace' in Afghanistan?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: V G Patankar\nDiscussants: Shakti Sinha & Gurmeet Kanwal
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/talking-to-the-taliban-will-it-ensure-peace-in-afghanistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080822T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080822T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001315
CREATED:20231223T222619Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z
UID:63758-1219383000-1219383000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China's Discourse on Regionalism
DESCRIPTION:Chair: V P Dutt\nDiscussants: S K Bhutani & Baladas Ghoshal
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-discourse-on-regionalism
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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