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TZID:Asia/Kolkata
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0530
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DTSTART:20090101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101216T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101216T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221125Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130742Z
UID:63617-1292477400-1292477400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Seeking African Oil: Asian Oil Company Strategies in Nigeria and Angola
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Dr. Alex Vines currently Director\, Regional Security at Chatham House\, LondonChair: Ambassador R. Rajagopalan\, Member\, IDSA \n \nDr. Alex Vines\, Research Director\, Regional and Security Studies and Head of the Africa Programme at Chatham House\, presented at this roundtable\, his findings on lessons from Asian national oil company engagement in Angola and Nigeria. In analyzing the impacts of and opportunities for Asian investments in West Africa\, Dr. Vines presented conclusions based on the Asian interest in African oil\, the varying degree of successes of India and other Asian countries in Angola and Nigeria\, and recent developments for Asian National Oil Companies (ANOCs) in these regions. \nDr Vines’ research presents that the Asian interest in African oil is suggestive of their desire to lessen dependence on the Middle East for their oil supplies. Asian countries have in the past sourced oil from Nigeria and Angola through government-to-government term supply contracts\, through oil traders with lifting quotas\, and the spot market. Significantly\, between 2004 and 2005\, some Asian oil companies began to secure oil blocks in both Nigeria and Angola through direct investment\, or oil-for-infrastructure deals. In focusing on China’s activities in this sector\, it has been found that Chinese companies have had considerable freedom to operate. Nigeria and Angola have presented different fortunes for ANOCs operating there. Nigeria has been a challenge for most ANOCs; one of the main reasons has been the failure of the Obasanjo Administration to manage the oil-for-infrastructure scheme\, in addition to various leaders revoking previously administered decisions\, and the security situation particularly in the Delta region. Other obstacles for ANOCs operating in Nigeria include the lack of interest taken by these companies to understand the country’s political situation\, the lack of predictability\, lack of strategic policy decisions and mechanisms\, and institutional capacity. Dr Vines noted that Indian NOCs have been marginally more successful than other ANOCs; Nigeria was the third biggest supplier of crude to India in 2007. The reasons for this success include long-standing ties between the two Commonwealth members\, strong trade links and commercial relationships\, and regular bilateral visits. \nIn studying trends in Angola\, China has been a consistent oil importer from 2003 to 2007\, with Indian imports showing marked increase beginning only in 2006. In the Angolan case\, non-Chinese ANOCs have maintained low profiles\, while attempting to emulate China’s approach in the country\, and viewing investments in Angola as an opportunity for diversification. Dr. Vines proposed that Chinese ANOCs have shown great success\, with Angola being the third largest supplier of oil to China in 2009. Chinese companies have also been active in reconstruction projects in the country\, and in oil-for-infrastructure deals (dubbed ‘Angola-mode’ by the World Bank). The reasons for the Chinese approach are varied and include efforts to understand local politics\, adaptation of strategies and tactics to local contexts\, not being risk averse\, and initiating joint ventures in various areas (including private interests) to ‘lock-in’ success.  \nIn drawing conclusions from this study\, Dr. Vines pointed out that there are no ‘weak’ African states. It is also impossible to generalize about ANOCs in Africa\, and existing assumptions about ANOCs in Africa need revision. Understanding the local context and politics of the country in which ANOCs operate is crucial to their success\, as indicated by the case of the Chinese NOCs. A key observation is that resource-backed loans mortgage future revenues and reduce the country’s flexibility to use future revenues; this strategy has worked better in Angola though\, than in Nigeria. In implementing joint ventures (JVs)\, it is important to note that JVs in Nigeria were influenced by short-term political trends.  \nAmbassador Rajagopalan steered the following discussion – Dr. Vines’ policy recommendations for Indian NOCs included reinforcement of the Indian diplomatic mission in Angola\, and replicating in the area of oil diplomacy\, the Indian success in diamond diplomacy in Angola. Another area of debate included the limitations of China in Africa; Dr. Vines pointed out the lack of use of local resources by the Chinese\, instead bringing in their own labor because they are unsure of the variability of local labor. Africa yearns more employment\, thus the question to address is why more Angolans are not beneficiaries to the Chinese engagement in the country. India has proved more willing to engage local labor in this respect; Indian companies have done remarkably well in countries like Mozambique. Ambassador Rajagopalan indicated on the Chinese and Indian cooperation in Angola and Nigeria\, there has been a recognition that cooperation will prove to be more useful than competition. An additional area of discussion revolved around the choice of the Indian diplomatic representation in these two countries; Dr. Vines suggested that Angola would need high-level diplomacy\, but this should also not be the only route used to maintain bilateral relations. \nReport by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, IDSA\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/seeking-african-oil-asian-oil-company-strategies-in-nigeria-and-angola
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101213T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101213T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221126Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130557Z
UID:63618-1292218200-1292218200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:JINF delegation’s interactions with IDSA scholars
DESCRIPTION:On 13 December 2010\, a delegation from the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF) visited IDSA for an interaction. The delegation was led by Ms. Yoshiko Sakurai\, President of JINF\, and included an eclectic mix of academics from Japan including Prof. Yoichi Shimada (Professor of International Politics at the Fukui Prefectural University) and Mr. Yuniro Oiwa (Planning committee member of the JINF)\, among others. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Rajaram Panda\, Senior Fellow at IDSA. \nThe session lasted close to two hours\, and covered a range of issues on the political and economic future of East Asia. Scholars from both sides put forward their views on the issue of Chinese political posturing in the region\, the role of China as a vital part of the economic architecture of the region and the world\, and the need to nurture norms for conduct so that the Asian neighbourhood feels at greater ease with a rising China. Two parallel views emerged in the discussions. One spoke of efforts to form partnerships between countries adhering to common values\, with a view to countering the growing influence of China and its assertiveness. The other pointed to the need to co-opt China into the larger processes and shaping of norms in a multi-lateral sense. The viewpoints highlighted the concerns shared by both sides\, and members within each side\, reflecting a diversity that made for a balanced sharing of perspectives on this vital issue. The latest Chinese posture\, the Japanese side opined\, is that China is speaking harshly and carrying a big stick and this is a matter of concern. They saw China’s rise as “disturbing” and that China is an “irresponsible stakeholder”. \nThe two sides were very keen to improve the nature of the India-Japan relationship including at the level of political understanding and the bigger role envisaged for India as a target for Japanese investments. The Japanese side mentioned that the Japanese investment destination has clearly shifted from China and towards India. The idea of drawing on historic ties and civilizational values to further shape the future course of relations was stressed in equal measure. Initiatives to improve the flow of religious tourism\, exchange of scholars from both sides\, realization of projects such as the Nalanda University as a centre of education\, development assistance and overall increase of investments into India were discussed. \nThe key topics covered included: \n\nChina and the territorial dispute over Senkaku islands\nJapan’s need for reform of its constitution and a structured armed force to deter miscalculation by other actors \nThe need for India and Japan to develop bilateral ties further\, and particularly explore avenues of cooperation at the level of think-tanks\nThe need for understanding outstanding issues in the Japan-Russia relationship\nThe role of America in the region as a vital presence to deter miscalculation of resolve and intention by key actors. The Japanese side said that previous US administrations had pursued both engagement as well as hedging policies towards China at the same time. The Obama administration has changed that and has opted for a hedging strategy in order to strengthen US forces in East Asia.\n\nThe meeting ended on the note of further developing this partnership. The delegates\, having come to India on their maiden visit\, found the atmosphere of frank and open discussion on a range of sensitive issues to be very useful. Most poignant was the desire expressed by the Japanese side that the visit should have been coordinated in the years gone past\, and that therefore the relationship should now receive greater support to foster discussion on areas of mutual concern between vibrant democracies such as India and Japan.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/jinf-delegations-interactions-with-idsa-scholars
CATEGORIES:OTHER EVENTS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101210T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101210T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221138Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63619-1291959000-1291959000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Is Reintegration and Reconciliation a Way Forward in Afghanistan?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Mr. Rana BanerjiDiscussants: Professor Anwar Alam and Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva \nPresentation\nThe principle theme of the paper is that “the idea of national reconciliation and integration per se as a precursor to much desired stability in Afghanistan\, however fragile it may be\, cannot be denied”. The main conclusions of the paper are as follows: \n\nWith the level of violence at an all time high\, the Afghan war is certainly peaking and entering into a new phase.\nIn the given circumstances\, Kabul and the West are not in a position to lay down terms for negotiations with the top Taliban.\nThere is a general perception that growing demand for reconciliation with the Taliban in its current form will only work to the advantage of the Taliban and Pakistan. Any withdrawal of the Western troops at this time would almost certainly lead to a Taliban regime. \nA top down approach emphasizing on direct negotiations is not likely to work in the current scenario partly because\, 1) the top insurgent leadership is hostage or takes orders from the Pakistani establishment and 2) they believe that the West will exit soon and thus do not need to negotiate with Kabul or the West.\nThe peace process in Afghanistan at a larger scale may also be considered as a battle between neo – Islamic versus traditional Islamic ideals. \n\nExternal Discussant 1: Dr. Gulshan Sachdeva\nDr. Gulshan Sachdeva highlighted the following points with respect to the presentation: \n\nMany other issues like security\, development\, exit strategies\, aid effectiveness etc. are all going on simultaneously in Afghanistan and need to be discussed\, perhaps in a separate project or paper. \nMost people will agree that some amount of dialogue and reconciliation is needed\, be it in Afghanistan or any other country in conflict.\nThe question to be considered is: how the Reintegration and Reconciliation (R2) process is being discussed in Afghanistan; and what is the context? Furthermore\, is R2 part of an exit strategy or the larger nation building process? Dr. Sachdeva mentioned that these were the poignant questions that could be considered in detail in a separate project\, which would compliment this paper. \nIt was highlighted that the R2 is not a Kabul-led process\, and was an initiative of the West. It was suggested that the R2 has been forced on Kabul by the West. This would make the operationalization of the R2 process extremely difficult. Furthermore\, one needs to go beyond the statements of statesmen to see whether it is a Kabul-led process or not.\nDr. Sachdeva suggested that the paper could also discuss in some detail the question of whether India’s position on R2 is a tactical or a strategic shift\, and whether there is any change in the Indian position and\, if so\, then why? \n\nExternal  Discussant 2: Prof. Anwar Alam\nThe following were the suggestions given by Prof. Anwar Alam: \n\nProf. Alam stated that clarity about the objective of the R2 process is needed. He suggested that the difference in the priority with respect to R2 among various countries ought to be considered. R2 has emerged in view of the failure of NATO to tame down Taliban and in the context of US exit strategy. \nProf. Alam stated that the author is right in observing that the peace process is linked to the state building process. But the author must elaborate what he means by state building process. Dr. Alam posed the question: what is the cultural imagination of state building process\, i.e. governance centric state building process? Elaboration on this aspect was suggested for the paper.\nIn addition to the aforementioned points\, Prof. Alam also emphasized on the need to explore the role of Saudi Arabia\, Iran and Pakistan in the R2 process in Afghanistan and how Iran and Saudi Arabia are playing games. \n\nInternal Discussant 1: Col. Ali Ahmed (retd.)\n\nThe military prong was not getting the desired results. Therefore one needed to consider and strengthen the political prong and the peace process; but the peace prong may not go anywhere due to the current form and nature of the conflict. \nIt was suggested that if the US domestic factors change\, the West may have to leave soon\, and without honour.\nThe capability of President Karzai to take care of the peace process was questioned. It was noted that the Karzai government can’t take care of Kabul governance which puts a question mark on its ability to handle the Peace Process. Additionally\, if the peace process catches momentum\, India will have to be on board too and India must use its goodwill during the peace process. \n\nInternal Discussant 2: Dr. Ashok Behuria:\n\nThere are other components in addition to the US and the Taliban to the peace process and R2 such as Pakistan\, Iran\, India\, the US  – Pakistan relations\, and India – Pakistan relations. \nDr. Behuria stated that the Taliban would not come to the negotiation table when they are on the rise and the exit of US forces appears imminent. \n\nFloor discussion:\nThe following points were made by the audience: \n\nThe R2 process will not succeed if Pakistan continues to use Taliban as a strategic asset. \nThe Taliban is not keen on supporting Afghan peace process as they are under no pressure to accept this. Furthermore\, Taliban are an ideological party with specific goals which cannot be compromised.  \nIndia enjoys a tremendous amount of goodwill among the people of Afghanistan\, but India is not capitalizing on its soft power. \nIt was suggested that the West wants to exit Afghanistan and hence the peace process has been initiated\, therefore the Taliban and many Afghans consider the Kabul-led peace process to be a joke.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/is-reintegration-and-reconciliation-a-way-forward-in-afghanistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101207T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101207T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T204944Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250305T071358Z
UID:63266-1291699800-1291699800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Special Address - Mr. Vladimir Skosyrev on Foreign Policy of Russia under Medvedev and implications for the global world
DESCRIPTION:The run-up to the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to India has been an opportunity for IDSA to interact with eminent experts about Russia’s new domestic and foreign policy initiatives and\, on this occasion\, Mr. Vladimir Skosyrev1 addressed an informed audience on the subject of the current Russian administration’s foreign policy initiatives. His presentation at IDSA primarily focussed on the new Russia-NATO detente\, Russia’s role in Afghanistan\, the American ‘reset’ policy towards Russia\, the emphasis on ‘modernization alliances’\, Russia’s strengthening of relationship with China\, and finally on the country’s strong traditional relationship with India along with the public perception which favoured continuation of ties with India. Wing Commander V. Krishnappa of IDSA inaugurated the session by welcoming Mr. Skosyrev and lauding his long standing association and journalistic interest in India.  \nRussia-NATO\nAt the very outset Mr. Skosyrev proclaimed the improvement of Russia’s ties with NATO at the Lisbon summit as a positive development\, an event which could change the very dynamics of Russia’s relationship with the Western world. For the first time Russia and NATO had put down in writing that they no longer posed a mutual threat and called for a ‘fresh start’ to resolve their differences. However\, what was of even more significance and probably heralded the beginning of a new era was an agreement to cooperate on a ballistic missile defence system. Mr. Skosyrev also highlighted and praised the tremendous diplomatic effort on both sides to reach an amicable agreement since this was the first time the Russia-NATO council had been convened post the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008. That conflict had strained Russia’s relationship with NATO and the reconvening of the Council was an indication of both sides viewing each other as potential allies.  \nMr. Skosyrev supported the Russian President’s decision to join the alliance’s planned missile defence shield as an equal and full partner. He was of the view that talks should be universal and all encompassing in nature. Any attempt to marginalize or sidestep Russia would automatically result in Russia walking away from cooperating in the development of the missile system.  \nThe historic Lisbon summit was also an indication of Russia’s willingness to find common ground with NATO on issues of mutual concern. Laying the ground work to cooperate on anti-narcotics\, piracy\, terrorism and Afghanistan highlighted the unprecedented level of convergence of interests and cooperation between the two erstwhile foes. \nThe fact that major European countries like Germany\, France and Italy and also the United States had welcomed the new developments with open hands indicated the possibility of the beginning of a long term strategic partnership. Russia and NATO should aim to create a common space of peace\, security and stability in the region. There has also been an improvement in the image of Russia amongst the domestic audience of the European countries (8% improvement in Germany and France\, and 12% in Poland). However\, Mr. Skosyrev warned that the partnership will have to soon come up with concrete proposals to give credibility to the new bonhomie.      \nDomestic Audience\nWith elections due in 2010\, the biggest hurdle which the Russian President faces will be his ability to sell the plan to his domestic audience\, a significant percentage of whom still look upon NATO with deep scepticism and distrust. There is a strong division in Russia about the course of the foreign policy which the country should follow. One group favours fostering of strong relationship with NATO\, since Russia and NATO share more concerns today (Afghanistan\, proliferation of WMD\, terrorist networks\, etc.) than at any other point in their history. The second group advocates a cautious approach towards NATO and an improvement in ties through gradual confidence building measures including joint decision making in critical areas of concern. And then there is a group which critically views NATO as an organization which aims to weaken the power of Russia. In their arguments\, they often refer to the remarks of Brezensky (advisor to former American President Carter) who had called for Russia to be dismembered. They look upon NATO as the world’s policemen and from whom Russia will have no option but to take orders.  \nRecent disclosures through Wiki-leaks have further emboldened this group. The fact that the US and NATO had plans to defend the Baltic States from Russia’s influence in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis is vindication of their belief in NATO’s hidden agenda. It has given them much needed ammunition through which they can stir patriotic feelings of the general public.      \nFive Key Mechanisms to strengthen the bond:\na) Multilateral and multi-tiered confidence building measures.\nb) Emphasis on Conventional Armed Forces treaty.\nc) Russia’s full participation in the missile defence development.\nd) Russia-US cooperation outside Europe as well.\ne) Increased cooperation in Afghanistan and strengthening of regional institutions to fill the vacuum once NATO troops withdraw.  \nModernization Alliances\nRussia’s influence in global affairs today is restricted on account of its lack of global economic competitiveness. Its economy is still primarily a resource based one and therefore highly dependent on the prices of commodities like oil\, gas and metals. Therefore\, modernization of the economy is the primary domestic objective of Russia.  \nPresident\, Dmitri A. Medvedev has chalked out a diversification plan that would enable the economy to ride out future economic crises and has fostered enhanced technological cooperation with the developed world\, especially ‘modernization alliances’ with the United States and the European Union. The development of a robust national innovation system and a knowledge based economy with the help of the world’s smartest money has been accorded top priority in economic planning.  \nModernization will never see the light of the day unless there is active participation of the technologically developed Western world. The first step in this direction of bringing and accommodating Russia closer to the West was initiated by President Obama in his ‘reset’ policy and it has continued through the START treaty and Russia’s apology to Poland for the Kaytn massacre.2 However\, the recent detente is very fragile and a delay in ratifying the START treaty by the United States and reports of re-armament of Georgia by NATO can act as big dampeners in this new found cooperation.  \nRussia-China\nRussia’s growing relationship with China was discussed in detail. Mr. Skosyrev insisted that the relationship between the two giants can be described as cordial and the two states had cooperated with each other in various international organizations. The border issue had been finally resolved and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was gradually being developed into an effective body to combat terrorism in the region. Russia and China had signed massive energy deals and the diversification of Russia’s energy supplies from Europe would only help the two countries to further strengthen their relationship. The opening of the new Daqing pipeline is testimony of the levels of maturity with which Russia and China look at their partnership.    \nHowever\, there are problems that may act as impediments in the future. There is a perception amongst many in the elite that Russia has become a raw material appendage to China. Many states in Russia’s far eastern region are entirely dependent on China and Chinese influence is much more prominent in these states than Russian influence. Consequently residual fears about China still exist.  \nRussia-India\nRussia and India share a traditional strategic bond and there is convergence and near unanimity of their views on practically all issues of global concern. Shared values and common interests mark the ties between the two states. One of the key driving forces for the relationship to achieve its next level would be enhanced cooperation in high technology. The recent agreements on nuclear power and reactors\, cooperation in the development of fifth generation fighter jets\, and co-development and production of multi-role transport aircraft and Brahmos missiles was a clear indication that the perceived chill in their relationship was mere hearsay. However\, there is a need to diversify the relationship. Given Russia’s energy resources and India’s technological skills\, energy is an important sector that the two countries can work closely on. In fact\, Mr. Skosyrev went on to declare that India is the only true and real friend of Russia\, a friendship that has withstood the test of time. \nWg. Cdr. Krishnappa concluded by commending Mr. Skosyrev’s extremely insightful presentation on the dynamics of the foreign policy of Russia and ended on the note that India was looking forward to President Medvedev’s visit.  \nReport prepared by Rajorshi Roy\, Research Assistant\, IDSA \n\n1. Mr. Vladimir Skosyrev is the Observer of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” of Moscow and an Indophile having served as a correspondent of ‘Izvestia’ in India from 1969-74. He has also authored a couple of books on India. \n2. During the Second World War\, in 1940\, Soviet troops had invaded Poland. At that time Stalin had ordered the slaying of some of the senior most military officials of Poland. Refusal of Russia to accept culpability had strained relations between Russia and Poland. In April 2010\, the Russian Parliament formally apologized for the massacre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-mr-vladimir-skosyrev-on-foreign-policy-of-russia-under-medvedev-and-implications-for-the-global-world
CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101206T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101206T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T204944Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250305T072850Z
UID:63268-1291613400-1291613400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Special Address - Talk given by Mr Peter Jennings\, Deputy Secretary (Strategy)\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr Rajaram Panda\, Cluster Coordinator China and East Asia Cluster \nMr. Peter Jennings\, Deputy Secretary for Strategy\, Department of Defence\, Australia\, visited IDSA on 6 December for interactions with the scholars. He was accompanied by Group Captain Timothy Innes\, Defence Adviser\, Australian High Commission\, New Delhi and Ms. Susan Bodell\, Strategy Executive\, Department of Defence. \nMr. Jennings stressed that Australia was aware of the fact that in the twenty-first century\, Asia has become the center of global politics. Asia’s power and influence has arrived much faster. Today\, the US is the sole superpower with both China and India rising rapidly. All these factors put together drive Australia’s India policy.  \nClosely connected with the points mentioned is the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean which is world’s third largest Ocean and is a leading seaway for the energy supplies and flow of immense volume of trade. Security of the Indian Ocean goes to the heart of both Australia and India. It is marked by the presence of large and growing powers. This requires Australia to put security at the heart of the strategic considerations. Therefore\, Australia has listed the maritime safety and security as one of the major issues concerning its strategic considerations. As much as 70 percent of global oil shipments pass through Indian Ocean-from Middle East to the Pacific. This includes major supplies for countries like China as 85 percent of the Chinese oil imports cross the Indian Ocean. As a result\, China is showing greater interest in this Ocean. The US also has recognized the importance of maritime issues related to the Indian Ocean. In this regard\, the US-India relationship is important. Australia considers it a positive development. This was very much recognized in the 2009 Defence White Paper of Australia\, which said that the Indian Ocean is going to be much more significant by the year 2030. Clearly\, a number of major powers are competing for strategic advantage in the region. \nAll this has implications for Australia’s relations with India. Australia needs to engage India\, which\, owing to the consistent economic growth\, a huge population and rising military power\, is increasingly becoming an important nation of the world. Australia has shared interests with India\, contributing to the regional security architecture.  \nShared values of democracy\, rule of law\, people to people contacts and business interests are also bringing the two countries together. Bollywood is another interesting connection. For instance\, in 2009 the bilateral trade reached 20 billion dollar mark and India became the third largest partner of Australia\, which indeed is a positive sign.  \nHowever\, one must say that the bilateral relation has not gathered momentum as much as it should have. The Australia-India relations have not been developed fully\, the potential for which are quite good. Both Australia and India are committed to building good relations. Both are maritime powers\, and there is ample scope for naval cooperation.  A positive step in that direction was taken in November 2009\, when Australia and India signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. Australia and India are working towards establishing dialogues concerning defence issues. This is important as the strategic dynamic is shifting and issues such as piracy\, Sea Lanes of Communication\, Climate Change and resource security are becoming more and more important.  \nIn this context\, Indonesia also becomes important. Indonesia is now a robust democracy. In 2011\, it will hold the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Chair. There are prospects of more and more security cooperation and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Plus (ADMM+) is of significant importance in that respect. Another organisation of importance is the IONS\, established by India. Australia supports India in IONS.  \nMr. Jennings’ final message was that it is the strategic interest\, which is driving the two countries together\, and Australia and India are building ties on shared values and interests\, and the future of the bilateral relationship is promising.  \nThe talk was followed by a brief discussion on issues related to India-Australia relations and regional security issues. The issue of uranium export and the attack on the Indian students in Melbourne also discussed and clarification given. \nReport Prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-talk-given-by-mr-peter-jennings-deputy-secretary-strategy-australia
CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101203T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101203T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221138Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63622-1291354200-1291354200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indian Parliament and Sino-Indian Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prof. V P DuttDiscussant: Prof. Sumit Ganguly and Amb. Suresh Bhutani \nThe paper argued that the role of parliament in Sino-Indian relations can be assessed under following heads: debates on Addresses by President of India to joint sessions of Parliament\, ‘demands for grants’\, Annual Report of Ministries\, motions and resolutions\, statements\, questions\, etc. In addition\, the role of standing committees\, particularly on defence and external affairs\, and of the parliamentary consultative committees\, as well as exchange of parliamentary delegations and Parliamentary Friendship Groups can also be highlighted as providing a comprehensive picture of the role of the Indian Parliament so far as India-China relationship is concerned. Sino-Indian relations have figured and at times have drawn the attention of both the Houses of parliament. When we talk about Indian Parliament and Sino-Indian relations\, perhaps the role of political parties also figures automatically; after all\, parliament and political parties are intertwined. \nThe role of the Indian parliament in Sino-Indian relations predates even the Independence of the country and can be traced to the Provisional parliament called the Constituent assembly (Legislative) and that of the political parties\, particularly the Congress party\, and even prior to that when Nehru sent a medical mission led by Mohanlal Atal which included the legendary Dr. Dwarkanath Kotnis at a time when China was fighting Japan. \nDebates on foreign policy enable the government to demonstrate that Indian democracy works\, educate the electorate\, and legitimise the foreign policy. Parliamentary debates\, while often eloquent and lively\, merely serve to keep ministers vigilant\, but do not alter policy because they usually follow\, rather than precede\, governmental policy actions. However\, at times of crises\, Parliament rises to the occasion by playing a significant role in foreign policy making. As far as India’s relationship with China is concerned\, there is a degree of consensus among political parties. While the CPM has been sympathetic to China\, Socialists like George Fernandes and Mulayam Singh Yadav have been critical of China. But among major political parties there is a broad consensus. \nSecondly\, the role of parliament is minimized since the nature and structure of foreign policy making in a parliamentary polity is often characterized by a degree of secrecy considering its sensitive and strategic nature. Thirdly\, as far as Sino-Indian relationship is concerned\, South Block at times is not inclined to leave much space for other stake holders including the Parliament for the very reasons mentioned above. These are some of the inherent limitations while working on a project like assessing the role of parliament in Sino-Indian relations. Nevertheless\, parliament continues to be the fulcrum of the legislative and policy-making process and it is the pivotal institution through which omissions and commissions of the government are accounted for. \nAmb. Bhutani highlighted the procedures which parliament employs while discussing foreign policy issues. He also showed that in the initial years foreign policy had an economic dimension. For example\, when Prime Minister Nehru wanted to establish land cooperatives it was not received positively because people thought that he wanted to follow the Chinese or the Soviet model. In that sense\, economic policy was seen as intimately linked with foreign policy. \nOn the other hand\, parliamentary debates on the Tibet/China issue were resented by Beijing. It felt that New Delhi had no right to discuss matters pertaining to Chinese domestic issues and saw it as Indian interference in China’s domestic affairs. Meanwhile Nehru had to let the debates go on since they served as a safety valve when emotions were running high within India after the ‘liberation’ of Tibet by the People’s Republic. As a result of these debates China condemned India as well as the Dalai Lama. \nProf. Sumit Ganguly highlighted the fact that the paper attempts to cover a large gamut of issues and it should try and focus on one or at the maximum two time periods. As the area which is being covered is huge the debates appear to be moving from one topic to another. He also said that there is a need to show that Nehru’s understanding on China was not that nuanced and he was not clear about his stance throughout. He also asserted that the Parliament needs to take a stronger stance on current issues. He stated that Parliament needs to follow what are the outcomes of the scheduled meetings to discuss the border problem and what is the progress being made as a result of these meetings. \nSome other points that were highlighted during the discussion include the comment that paper gave the impression that only Congress members took part in active discussions. There were also suggestions that the author can simply limit his focus on the Indian parliament’s role when it comes to the Tibet issue since in any event the border issue is related to it. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Prof. Dutt stated that Parliament becomes very important in times of crises. He also said that Dalai Lama’s flight and its ramifications have not been included in the paper. He suggested that if the author refers to the Parliament papers and discussions it will add more depth to the argument of the paper. \nReport prepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-parliament-and-sino-indian-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101202T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101202T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221138Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130557Z
UID:63623-1291267800-1291267800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Inaugural Australian Political Exchange Council Delegation visit IDSA
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr. G. Balachandran \nThe Australian Young Political Leaders’ Delegation comprising seven members visited IDSA on December 2\, 2010. The discussion focused on “India and her neighbours including China”. This was the first Australian delegation on political exchange visiting India. It was led by Ms. Melissa Parke (MP)\, Federal Member for Fremantle\, representing the Australian Labor Party.  Accompanying her were Ms. Rita Saffioti (MLA)\, Western Australian State Member for West Swan\, Australian Labor Party\, and Parliamentary Staffers from the Liberal Party of Australia\, the Nationals and the Australian Greens. Dr. G. Balachandran chaired the session. Australian PM Kevin Rudd’s visit to New Delhi in November 2009 marked a turning point in the bilateral relationship. The signing of the Joint Statement “India-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation” suggested the evolving of a close and long term relationship. In this regard both countries are working towards developing an action plan with specific measures to advance security cooperation in a wide range of security and related areas—counter-terrorism\, transnational and organised crime\, defence\, disarmament and non-proliferation\, and maritime security.  \nThe delegation was interested to know how India perceives its relations with Pakistan in the next decade with emphasis on Kashmir. Dr. Balachandran pointed out that a problem of about 60 years cannot be resolved in a span of 10 years. The tensions within Kashmir and with Pakistan have become more skewed due to recent developments including the 26/11 Mumbai attack. Adding to this\, Dr. Upadhayay clarified that the root problem was internal. He emphasised that Kashmir is not only a political issue\, but involves religion which makes matters difficult to sort out. Moreover\, to resolve matters\, a stabilized and democratic Pakistan needs to be brought about. On India’s strategic posturing vis-à-vis China\, Dr. R N Das commented that India uses a multi-pronged strategy by involving China in bilateral and multilateral dialogues. In terms of the Tibet issue\, China reacts only when it is related to the Dalai Lama. Dr. Das pointed out that so far China has never made any request or demand for the return of Tibetan refugees. \nMs. Parke commented that China’s presence in Australia cannot be underestimated. This has led to a surge in Australia’s economy for the last five years\, for instance\, in the ferrous industry. However\, there are concerns among the general public over the Chinese dominance. On the issue of whether Australia would re-think its policy on uranium export to India\, Ms. Parke replied that the Australian position was firm in terms of not exporting uranium to non-NPT countries. Moreover\, for decades\, uranium mining has been a major part of the Australian political landscape\, with opposition groups citing environmental\, indigenous land access\, and nuclear proliferation as reasons for ceasing or restricting the industry. The debate has resulted in limitations on mining and export activities\, with Federal and State governments occasionally flip-flopping on public policy. Hence the Australian Labor Party has to regard the policies of other political parties on uranium mining.  \nIn addition to the above\, there was also a general discussion on issues related to cyber attacks\, India’s position regarding erosion of democracy in Sri Lanka\, diplomatic ties with North and South Korea\, on Japan\, Obama’s visit to India\, etc. \nReport prepared by Joyce Sabina Lobo\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/inaugural-australian-political-exchange-council-delegation-visit-idsa
CATEGORIES:OTHER EVENTS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101130T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101130T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221238Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130742Z
UID:63624-1291095000-1291095000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indo-US Strategic Partnership: A Way Ahead
DESCRIPTION:Session I\nChair:	Ambassador Lalit Mansingh \nAt the outset Amb. Lalit Mansingh stated that the word “strategic” is of a problematic nature in the Indian context because India seems to use the word “strategic” to describe friendly relations with other countries. In his view only two countries have truly had a strategic partnership with India; the USSR in the past and USA over the last ten years. He suggested that for a strategic partnership to blossom\, the presence of three factors is necessary. There must be 1) long term vision\, 2) volume of exchange\, 3) defense and security part or understanding.  \nAmbassador Shyam Saran\nAmbassador Shyam Saran believed that the Obama visit was largely successful. He mentioned how the history of Indo–US relations had evolved since President Bush’s second term which started in 2004 when there was a serious effort by the Bush administration to start looking at ways of strengthening Indo–US relations. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was interested in operationalizing the strategic partnership\, which would go beyond friendly gestures. To this end\, Condoleezza Rice wanted to pursue an energy forum which had previously not existed\, although some projects which were sector specific had been pursued. But no overarching energy forum existed. This paved the way for the Indo–US Civilian Nuclear Agreement. \nAmbassador Shyam Saran stated that there has been a convergence of interests between India and the US. He mentioned various issues like: 1) counter terrorism\, 2) intelligence sharing\, 3) defence cooperation and 4) rising economic ties\, which have brought the two countries closer to each other. However\, he qualified his statement by saying that a formal alliance between the two countries was perhaps not possible. Furthermore\, he mentioned that removing Indian entities from the entity list is a significant move.  \nIn sum\, he concluded that the Obama visit has been a successful visit\, and struck the momentum which would take the Indo–US strategic partnership forward.  \nProfessor Kanti Bajpai\nProfessor Kanti Bajpai started his presentation by identifying four principal variables that would drive Indo–US relations in the future: \n1.	China: India and the US together may not be able to match China economically in the years to come. China will be the biggest economy in the world\, and will continue to rise and be the greatest power of the century. Professor Bajpai stated that its current domestic problems will not\, in all likelihood\, thwart its rise. \n2.	Pakistan and Terrorism: Pakistan will continue to be a problem for both the US and India. He did not believe that Pakistan was likely to implode\, causing widespread chaos. He did mention that given Pakistan’s inability and/or reluctance to crack down on terrorist networks\, terrorism emanating from Pakistan will continue to be a problem and a reason for concern in India and the US. \n3.	Economics/Trade and finance: Most of the trade\, finance and technological issues are determined by private corporations and market forces\, leaving a limited role for the government\, although governments do have a role in how economic policies are formulated. Professor Bajpai believed that a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries was possible and impending. \n4.	Managing the global commons: There was ample scope for India and the US to work on issues such as global health\, climate change\, energy security\, non-proliferation\, and political emancipation and revolution of human affairs. These issues provide the opportunity to both countries to play a more proactive role on the global stage. \nThe aforementioned four drivers will provide the impetus for a very long term relationship as the interests of India and the US converge on these issues.  \nProfessor Bajpai also listed variables that would prove to be impediments to the growth of the Indo–US strategic partnership in the future. He listed factors such as:  \n\nUS domestic problems:\n\nThere seems to be an opinion that demoralisation of US forces in Afghanistan and demoralisation of the US public may possibly affect their resolve to engage proactively abroad. \nFear of China’s  rise at the cost of US power\nPolitical disunity in the US with the divide between the Republicans and Democrats widening which may possibly affect the ability of the government to take decisions.\nFears of a double dip recession may give a reason for some people to call for protectionism.\n\n\nIndia’s domestic problems: Issues such as Naxal insurgency\, corruption\, bureaucratic delays and anti-American feeling among certain sections of the Indian polity are major challenges for India.\n\nProfessor Bajpai enumerated seven areas where India and the US would find convergence of interests. Economics\, Ecology\, Epidemics\, Education\, Ethnicity and emancipation\, Energy\, and Entente (coming together in the area of defence\, space and technology). \nDr. Arvind Gupta\nDr. Arvind Gupta started his presentation by stating that after the Obama visit\, the ‘glass is a little fuller than before.’ Dr. Gupta listed eight principal areas of Indo–US cooperation: \n\nPossible support for India in UNSC: India has been warned about responsibilities on UNSC\nUS Entity List: removing entities from the US Entity List would certainly consolidate the relationship. \nEconomic aspect of the relationship will also be crucial. $10 b worth deals with various Indian corporations suggest that the US is looking for Indian investments which would create jobs in the US.\nIndia getting US support for membership in four export control regimes: what are the criteria for memberships and how other countries react and whether US can push Indian claim.\nPakistan-US relations:  US military aid to Pakistan would continue to be an area of irritation for India. \nIn the area of counter–terrorism\, some good cooperation has happened between India and the US. But this cooperation needs to be deepened further given that the US is still reluctant to share intelligence about Pakistan with India. \nIndia expects the US to advocate and support a greater role for India in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s efforts to exclude India’s role in Afghanistan has been voiced by India with the US.\nGood relations with China are important for both countries and neither country wants to offend China. \n\nThere continues to be a divergence between India and the US on Iran and Myanmar. Convergence will take time to develop. There is anti-US sentiment in India in some political quarters. Finally\, stronger Indo–US relations may alienate other countries and allies like Russia and China. \nVinod Kumar\nMr. Vinod Kumar suggested that President Obama’s visit was a largely successful visit. Strategic partnership is a long term interest in maximizing each other’s resources. While there have been issues on which progress has taken place\, certain issues remain intractable and cooperation is not in sight. He listed the positives and negatives of the Indo–US strategic partnership over the last seven years. The positive aspects of the relationship were: 1) The civil nuclear cooperation agreement\, 2) defence framework agreement\, 3) endorsement of India for a permanent UNSC seat\, 3) reduction in the number of Indian entities on the US Entities List\, 4) major defence sales/acquisitions\, 5) counter terrorism cooperation\, 6) military interoperability\, 7) investments in infrastructure\, and the economy in general\, and 8) significant people to people contact and exchange. The negatives of the Indo–US relationship were: 1) disagreements on certain issues regarding the NPT\, disarmament and the CTBT\, 2) disagreements about India’s nuclear liability bill\, 3) lack of agreement on issues regarding LSA\, CISMOA and BECA\, 4) certain disagreements regarding counter terrorism\, 5) limits to India’s role in Afghanistan\, 6) America’s inability to pressure Pakistan to act against terrorist groups targeting India\, 7) allowing a significant role for China in South Asia\, and 8) disagreements on outsourcing.  \nBased on the positives and negatives of Indo–US relations\, it was inferred that the their strategic partnership was in its formative stages and needed more time to blossom into a full-fledged strategic partnership. While there are common goals and values\, strategic goals are yet to be synchronized. \nSession II\nChair: Ambassador K.C. Singh \nThe second session was principally dedicated to the technology denial regime and to the US Entity’s List. Ambassador Singh started by saying that the technology denial regime’s deconstruction is a litmus test for the strategic partnership between India and the USA.  \nDr. R. Ramachandran\nDr. Ramachandran explained the implications of the removal of the Indian entities from the Entity List in great detail. In essence he stated that there are five product groups that are the subject of export control: 1) systems\, equipment and components\, 2) test\, inspection and production equipment\, 3) material\, 4) software\, and 5) technology. Of the five reasons for control\, four are also controlled by multilateral export control regimes:  \n\nMT by Missile technology Control Regime (MTCR)\nNP by Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG)\nCB by Australia Group (AG)\nNS by Wassenaar Agreement (WA)\n\nDr. Ramachandran mentioned that currently there are 507 items in the CCL\, of which 374 are controlled for the above four reasons. The remaining 133 are controlled unilaterally for counter-terrorism\, etc.  \nDr. Ramachandran stated that “the removal of an entity from the Entity List removes only the additional license requirements imposed by the entity’s listing on the Entity List\, and does not modify the license requirements that may be applicable under the EAR as a result of an item’s classification on the CCL and the proposed country of destination for the export\, re-export or transfer (in – country) of the item.” Therefore\, Dr. Ramachandran drew the following conclusions regarding the removal of certain Indian entities from the Entity List: \n\nThe overall impact of removing Indian entities from the Entity List is minimal.\nIt does remove the burden off the shoulders of US exporters in terms of applying for licences for exporting EAR99 goods of defence and DRDO units. \nImport of EAR99 goods by the Indian end-user becomes easier; no time delays. \nFor all items on CCL\, the normal controls of licensing requirements will continue to apply.\nBut “catch–all” provision\, “know your customer” and “red flag” for entities once on EL will continue; this is a caveat for EAR99 goods.\n\nDr. Ramachandran also stated that “an export license is required even if it would not be otherwise necessary\, if an exporter knows\, has reason to know\, or is otherwise informed by BIS that the item may be used in activities relating to WMD” – Part 744 of EAR. \nDr. Balachandran\nDr. Balachandran stated that removing the entities from Entity List may not help and may have little effect since US companies may be cautious and continue to apply for licenses as Indian entities were earlier on the EL. Therefore\, the US administration ought to educate the US industry regarding the new amendment. Only then can it have some impact on the nature of trade. He also stated that the EL is a guide to exporters\, not the licensing authority.  \nHe also said that India until recently was on the list of NRC regulatory procedures\, and needed presidential approval for exports. MTCR does not confer any licensing preference. Non-membership has penalties; US laws require a license fee for the export of MTCR item to a non-MTCR member. There is a provision in US laws which allows it to recognize a country as a MTCR adherent. Therefore any county can export goods without fear of US sanctions. So India should negotiate with US for MTCR adherent status for itself.  \nDr. Rajiv Nayan\nIf an organization is on EL that means that licensing is required. There is no guarantee that denial will not be there\, but the removal of Indian entities from the EL will be better for exports. India’s rising economy may force them to further liberalise their systems and procedures. Dr. Nayan stated that India should project its demands and create pressure on the US to further relax export controls.  \nDISCUSSION\nDiscussion during the question and answer session focused on the benefits of being a member of Wassenaar Agreement\, the Australia Group or the NSG. It was agreed upon by all the panellists and participants that the principal advantage of membership of such institutions was purely to transform India from a “rule taker” to a “rule maker.” The principal benefit is the ability to influence policies\, safeguard one’s own interests and perhaps use influence to deny others access to certain technology. These are all consensus based bodies which give members the veto power. Furthermore\, membership to Wassenaar exempts US companies of license for NS 2 items [national security\, level 2] and membership reduces time required to get such items. Additionally\, membership to such organizations would help in harmonizing India’s system to international systems and best practices. It was also suggested that given that India’s membership to the NPT is ruled out\, membership to other bodies would be desirable if India aspires to be an exporter of high technology equipment someday.  \nPrepaped by Prashant Hosur\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\,  New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indo-us-strategic-partnership-a-way-ahead
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101126T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101126T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221238Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63625-1290749400-1290749400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:GCC-Iran Rivalry and Challenges for India in the Gulf
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Air Marshall Inamdar \nDiscussants:\n      External-Prof. Ramakrishnan (JNU)\n      Internal– Brig (retd) Rumel Dahiya & Ms. Princy Marin George \nIndia has huge interests in both Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in terms of securing energy supply\, protecting interests of the Indian diaspora\, enhancing trade and investment\, fighting against piracy and more recently trying to forge strategic partnership with the region. The rising profile of China in the region is another concern for India.  \nGCC-Iran relations have been marked by competition and rivalry. Both have engaged in ideological conflicts over Shia-Sunni divide\, territorial disputes\, presence of the United States in the region\, Iranian nuclear programme and Saudi-Iranian relations which has in many ways steered the relationship. This has posed some challenges for Indian foreign policy in the Gulf region in recent times. India’s proximity to one of these players does not augur well with the other. In his paper\, Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan has argued that the political\, ideological and strategic conflicts between Iran and the GCC pose challenges for India in pursuing her interests in the region. \nHe identified five major issues of contention and discussed them in his presentation. \nIdeological rivalry:\nAfter the Islamic revolution\, Ayatollah Khomeini openly declared\, “Our revolution is not limited to the boundaries of Iran. Economic and political difficulties should not compel our officials to forgo the principal task of exporting our lofty Islamic Revolutionary goals…The true meaning of export of our revolution is to awaken the Muslims and their governments so that they can change themselves and not allow their precious resources to be plundered by anti-Muslim outsiders.” By outsiders he meant the Sunnis. The conflicting relations between Iran and the GCC have also aggravated the existing Shia-Sunni divide in the region. \nIranian Nuclear Programme:\nThe Iranian nuclear weapon programme has raised concerns in the minds of the GCC rulers. Initially they recognized Iran’s rights for a peaceful nuclear programme. When evidence emerged about a clandestine programme intended for producing nuclear weapons\, the GCC countries started to support IAEA efforts and looked at the involvement of the UN Security Council as a positive development to prevent Iran from developing nuclear capability. If Iran becomes successful in making nuclear weapons\, it would not only shift the balance of power in the region in favour of Iran but also multiply the threat perceptions of the GCC countries. The threat perception is the natural outcome of the Gulf Arab countries’ perception of Iran as a hegemonic power and the Iranian eagerness to spread their influence into the region.  \nTerritorial disputes:\nIranian occupation of three islands namely\, Abu Musa\, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb in the Gulf which are claimed by the UAE is another issue of contention between the GCC and Iran. To add to the worries of the GCC\, Iran has built a port in the Abu Musa Island. In August 2008\, Iran opened two administrative offices in Abu Musa which\, it claims\, are to help ship registration and maritime rescue. In a statement\, GCC Secretary-General Abdurrahman Al-Attiyah “strongly denounced Iran’s opening of two administrative offices on Abu Musa Island\, which belongs to the UAE and is occupied by Iran.” The GCC fears that this will give Iran greater control of shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. \nPresence of the United States:\nIran alleges the GCC countries of inviting the US to the region and has also alleged them to be the “puppets of the Great Satan”. The possibility that Iran could produce nuclear weapons is a nightmare for the USA. Apart from the nuclear programme\, the US’ threat perception of Iran is dominated by the Iranian support of terrorism\, and its WMD and missile capabilities. Iranian threat perception is understandable as Iran feels itself surrounded by US military forces. \nSaudi-Iranian relations:\nIran has called the Al Saud regime un-Islamic and openly called for its overthrow. Ideological rivalry\, Saudi allegation of Iran flaring up its Shia population in the Eastern Province\, Iranian allegation of Saudi Arabia flaring up its Sunni population\, regional power struggle between the two\, Iranian nuclear programme\, close Saudi-US relations etc. have strained Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia’s support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 further deteriorated the relationship. Saudi Arabia has also questioned the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and has supported the USA in imposing sanctions against Iran. \nIndia’s interest in GCC countries:\nFor India its relationship with GCC represents its varied interests in the economic\, political and strategic fields. The Gulf region has been the main source of India’s energy needs supplying around two- thirds of India’s total energy requirements. The Gulf region has been a lucrative market for Indian manufactured goods including textiles\, spices\, food products\, electrical goods and machineries and IT products. India’s five million strong work force in the GCC countries is also an important link. India looks at the GCC countries as partners in tackling terrorism. \nIndia’s interest in Iran:\nIran’s geopolitical and strategic location\, long coastline along the Gulf\, and its influence over the Strait of Hormuz makes it an important country in the region. Iran has the third largest proven oil reserves and second largest proven gas reserves in the world. India eyes Iranian gas for its long term energy security. India\, Iran and Afghanistan are discussing to develop the Chahbahar route through Melak\, Zaranj and Delaram which would facilitate regional trade and transit\, including Afghanistan and Central Asia. Another potential area of cooperation between India and Iran is in maritime security. India supports an Iranian nuclear programme for peaceful civilian purposes but is against the nuclearisation of the Gulf region which will have severe implications for the region in future. \nChallenges for India:\nUS presence and strategic cooperation in the Gulf and the US-Iran conflict pose a serious challenge for India. India cannot fully support US policies in the region\, nor can India completely oppose them. India would require the support of the USA in the region to further its interests. \nChina’s growing economy and thirst for energy has driven its policies in the Gulf. Bilateral trade between China and the GCC topped US $ 70 billion in 2008. China has been using the conflict between the GCC and Iran in the best possible manner. Despite voting against Iran at the IAEA over the nuclear issue\, China has managed to stabilize its relations with Iran. China is viewed by Iran as a counterweight for the USA in the region. On the other hand\, China is viewed by Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries as an important trade partner and a big power in Asia. \nGCC-Iran rivalry is deepening in Iraq. India should build its ties with Iraq but this is taking a lot of time because of the unstable political situation and the social situation. \nIndia is highly dependent on the Gulf region for its energy security as it imports about two thirds of its energy requirement from the region. As the issue of energy is directly related to the regional political conditions and the warmth of the bilateral relations between the countries\, it becomes important to take the relationship up to level of stability. India has huge interests in GCC and Iran and this makes it important for India to calibrate its policies so as to ensure supply of oil from both GCC countries and Iran. \nConclusion:\nDr. Pradhan pointed out that the conflict between Iran and the GCC countries has severe regional implications which would also affect India’s interests in the region. He suggests that the growing Indian interests and influence in the region should be complemented with a sound policy for dealing with the two major powers. For India\, dealing with the USA in the Gulf is a political and strategic challenge while China primarily remains an economic rival. A peaceful and stable Gulf region is in India’s interest and India needs to carefully nurture its policies in the region. \nDiscussion\nThe following issues were raised: It was suggested that Iraq being an important factor in the Iran-GCC conflict that aspect too needs greater analysis. Second\, the differing visions of the security of the Gulf need to be incorporated. Third\, the notion of Gulf regionalism needed attention. It was pointed out that after US military intervention in Iraq\, even Saudi Arabia was offended. India on the other hand is emerging as a balancer with China playing an important role in the region. \nIt was also pointed out that the definition of the Gulf is very conflicting as Iran would like to call it Persian Gulf while the GCC would call it Arabian Gulf. Second\, the Diaspora is extremely important and India used to have a diaspora in Iran where its treatment was not good. The importance of Israel was highlighted and democratisation of GCC was emphasised. Unlike Indian diaspora in the US who are viewed with pride\, Indian diaspora in GCC are viewed as a source of responsibility. However it is this diaspora which has acted as a catalyst in strengthening India’s relation with the GCC. \nReport prepared by Pallavi Pal\, Research Intern\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/gcc-iran-rivalry-and-challenges-for-india-in-the-gulf
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101122T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101122T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T204944Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250305T072014Z
UID:63267-1290403800-1290403800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Inaugural Y.B. Chavan Memorial Lecture - The Great Power Game: India in the New World - Professor Sunil Khilnani
DESCRIPTION:Lecture delivered by: Professor Sunil Khilnani \nTopic: The Great Power Game: India in the New World \nSpeakers: Cdr. S.S. Parmar\, Mr. R.D. Pradhan\, Mr. N.S. Sisodia\, Mr. K. Subrahmanyam \nIDSA in collaboration with Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan (Mumbai) hosted the inaugural lecture in memory of Mr. Y. B. Chavan on 22 November 2010. Professor Sunil Khilnani delivered the special lecture on The Great Power Game: India in the New World. The Institute was privileged on the occasion by the presence of Mr. K. Subrahmanyam\, Mr. R. D. Pradhan\, and Mr. Ajit Nimbalkar from the Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan at the inaugural Y. B. Chavan Memorial Lecture.\nThe Y.B. Chavan memorial lecture has special significance for the Institute keeping in view that Mr. Chavan was the founding President and patron of IDSA. \nBrief Overview\nMr. Y.B. Chavan was born in the state of Maharashtra on March 12\, 1913. He spent many years in jail as a freedom fighter and played a major role in the 1942 Quit India movement. Following India’s independence\, he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary in 1946 and rose to become Chief Minister of the bi-lingual State of Bombay. In 1960\, he became the first Chief Minister of the newly created state of Maharashtra. He was requested by the then Prime Minister Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru to become the Defence Minister in 1962. Subsequently\, he held the offices of Union Home Minister from 1966 to 1970\, Union Finance Minister from 1970 and Foreign Minister from 1974 to 1977. He was also the Chairman of the 8th Finance Commission. In memory of Mr. Chavan\, the Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishtan has given a corpus to the IDSA to hold an annual eminent persons’ lecture series. \nInaugural Remarks by Mr. N.S. Sisodia\nMr. N.S. Sisodia\, Director General IDSA\, in his opening remarks pointed out that Mr. K. Subrahmanyam’s perseverance to honour Mr. Y. B. Chavan led to the Trust granting an endowment enabling IDSA to institute the eminent persons’ lecture series\, with significant support from Mr. R. D. Pradhan and Mr. Ajit Nimbalkar who is on the Trust Board. Mr. Chavan is remembered as a multifaceted personality\, who was not only an eminent freedom fighter but also a visionary defence minister and an intellectual of a certain merit and repute. Most importantly\, the Director General observed that Mr. Chavan\, along with others who were closely associated with the founding of the Institute\, was remarkable in his awareness of the value of promoting independent thinking within a government funded institution; the primary objective of the functioning of such an institution should be to provide an alternative or critical view\, in order that the government’s policy making process is enriched and informed. A large part of the reputation that the IDSA holds today can be traced back to Mr. Chavan’s championing of the autonomy of the institute in its formative years. \nRemarks by Mr. R. D. Pradhan\nMr. R. D. Pradhan shared with the guests his interactions with Mr. Chavan and how the birth of the IDSA was initiated. He expressed his delight at the journey that IDSA has made over the past 45 years. He conveyed his best wishes to all the Trustees\, including the Chairman\, Mr. Sharad Pawar\, and also his gratitude to IDSA for organizing the lecture. He expressed the hope that IDSA would continue the tradition of holding this lecture annually\, and his appreciation to Professor Khilnani for delivering the lecture and to all those who were in attendance at this event. \nY.B. Chavan Memorial Lecture: Professor Sunil Khilnani\nProfessor Sunil Khilnani\, Starr Foundation Professor\, Director of the South Asia Studies Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies\, the Johns Hopkins University\, and author of the widely acclaimed book The Idea of India\, delivered the inaugural Y. B. Chavan memorial lecture at the IDSA on The Great Power Game: India in the New World. The primary question that Professor Khilnani proposed to address in the lecture centred on his views on a realistic future for India – Is India likely to become a major power in the next few decades? What kind of role should India aspire to in the changing power game of a globalized world? What would India’s actions mean both for India and the world? \nIn the last two decades\, India has been on a rapid economic rise\, with its relative lack of dependence on exports and a highly regulated financial system moderating the effects of the global economic recession. Professor Khilnani noted that although India’s business and political elites see economic performance as forming the core of the country’s global identity\, this growth has unevenly affected Indian society\, causing widening social and regional inequalities\, and creating political tensions. This newfound and growing self-confidence is pursuant to the fact that India’s international ambitions have always been exceptionally immodest\, and derived not only from the nation’s vast human scale and civilizational depth\, but also from a deeply held political vision that views India’s future as being shaped by the legitimacy of its choices and actions. In his analysis\, modern India has viewed itself above all as a political project that struggled to realize itself through human skill and judgment\, rather than assuring its future by entrusting itself to economic or military prowess\, to an ideology or to historical providentialism. Tagore\, Gandhi\, and Nehru’s long-term vision for India\, Professor Khilnani pointed out\, embodied the German historian Reinhart Koselleck’s idea of ‘imagined futures’ – their sense of India’s present\, and of the past causalities that had created the present\, which in turn was shaped by what they believed India’s future would look like. Even if this vision of India’s future differs from the one imagined today\, in Professor Khilnani’s belief\, there would still be elements of past conceptions on India’s future that have force and relevance. \nThe United States\, Europe and China as players in the Great Power Game\nIn analyzing the role of the United States (US) in this power game\, Professor Khilnani noted that the increasing US attention to India is reflective more of an American realization of the fragility of Western power rather than American hopes for India. Indeed\, much of the US’ current valuation of India relates mostly to the volatility of the issues faced by Pakistan\, and to China’s rise to superpower status. India is thus seen as a counter-China; being a democratic\, educated\, technologically smart and entrepreneurial country with an English speaking elite\, India is seen by the US as the more persuadable\, more amenable partner. In the larger frame of the power game\, America’s stance as a great power is unlike that of\, for example\, Britain at its imperial eminence – the US is dependent on less powerful states to sustain its economic prosperity; it imports goods\, capital and people to maintain economic momentum. Of significance here is that this interdependence (that is increasingly becoming a characteristic of modern forms of power) hinges on mutual confidence\, trust and consequently\, legitimacy – in Professor Khilnani’s words\, the capacity to sustain belief not just within but across borders. The US’ projects in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced it to delve into a damage-repair mode\, but\, he noted\, the projection of great power\, and the urge to dominate that it requires\, continues to form the core of America’s global identity. \nNo longer the central arena of the great power game\, Europe is seen as confused and uncommitted on questions of security. With its inward-focused\, conservative and protectionist stance\, Professor Khilnani predicts that\, Europe will be hampered from playing as important a role as it could have otherwise. It has been slow in realizing the changing nature of power in the rest of the world\, and how the ‘theatre of the great power game’ has moved away from Europe\, and into Asia. \nThis shift has been ensured by China’s economic rise. Professor Khilnani noted that this rise has been based on profound economic integration with the rest of the world\, and particularly with the US. Also possessing the largest military in the world\, and the second largest defence budget\, China poses a deep conundrum for the world\, especially for America. But even as the US works to maintain its engagement with China\, the American defence establishment has been attempting to coax India into acting as a buffer against China. He pointed out that with Japan’s stagnation and inability to give its enormous wealth any real meaning in the global arena\, India has acquired new importance for the US. India shares America’s uncertainty about China on the economic and military fronts; moreover\, China is also spreading its influence among India’s neighbours. Dr. Khilnani emphasized that even as India’s relationship with the US strengthens\, it is crucial for the country to ensure its capacity for independent political judgment – a feat China has already demonstrated. A possible prescription for Indian policy makers\, that Professor Khilnani identified\, is that the pattern of aligning temporarily according to shifting global and regional interests rather than forming stable and permanent alliances is likely to persist; his belief is that it would not be in India’s interests to be drafted into US contingency plans against China. \nIndia and its neighbours in the Great Power Game\nProfessor Khilnani also pointed out that India’s geographical location places it in the middle of the world’s most menacing regional environment. Internal conflicts in countries like Nepal\, Sri Lanka\, Burma and Bangladesh pervade India’s own domestic security\, threatening its political and social peace\, in addition to its economic prospects. Most importantly\, in imagining its own future\, he believes that India needs to consider Pakistan’s future as well. The results of the American response to Pakistan’s instability has been disastrous not just for Pakistan but for India as well. Professor Khilnani proposes that India will need to devise a more creative approach to engaging with Pakistan on its own terms; the alternative for India would be to suffer the vagaries of other powers’ policies. \nAfghanistan is the other front on which India needs to adopt independent action. This becomes a pressing need when taken into account that neither the US nor the Europeans have clear or deliverable plans for an exit strategy for Afghanistan. Regional stability is crucial for India to maintain its growth path; a return to the 1990s when Afghanistan became a marshalling ground for violence against India would spell an exacerbation of wider regional insecurity for India. Professor Khilnani suggested that the depth of the crises in these neighbouring societies impedes Indian intervention in resolving the crises\, but it will not be able to take a disengaged stance either (as it did\, for example\, during the power games of the Cold War). India’s mitigation of these battles will determine its own national course. \nIndia’s stakes in the Great Power Game\nProfessor Khilnani pointed out that India has more options now than it once had to decide what kind of power to pursue. In the years following India’s independence\, India devised an alternative definition of power – a negative conception\, in Nehru’s words. This definition was a stance of resistance based on Gandhi’s conviction that apparent weakness could transmute into strength. Nehru turned this strategy (with which India fought down the world’s largest empire) into a principle for international policy. Professor Khilnani believes that Nehru’s strategy was not purely idealistic (or ineffective)\, but was rooted in a realistic assessment of India’s weakness; indeed\, it enabled India to achieve a degree of autonomy and of audibility that was considerable relative to both its own meagre resources\, and to the constrained circumstances of a polarized world. Although India now has the opportunity to enhance its military power (drawing from its rising economic profile)\, he suggested that India will not be able to mimic conventional Western power in military or economic terms. India neither can nor should allow the type of military power it will need to secure itself regionally\, nor its rising economic profile\, to determine the larger power it seeks. \nProfessor Khilnani takes the view that India will be an unusual\, awkwardly shaped global actor – it will have a relatively wealthy state but that state will preside over a predominantly poor citizenry. He noted that in the past\, poor populations generally had poor states\, whose claims could be dismissed by richer\, more powerful states; with the emergence now of China and India\, very large populations are becoming significant world actors\, through their representatives (although selected in diametrically opposite ways). Professor Khilnani pointed out at least two areas where India can leverage its growing global clout – one is to inject the interests of the poor into international negotiations\, and the second\, in matters of international trade\, access to natural resources\, and the environmental effects of economic growth\, to attempt to work out a more inclusive globalization. In this respect\, India is now well positioned to disrupt the status quo. Professor Khilnani’s emphasis lies on his belief that the old approach – the negative power\, of refusal – will no longer do. The global climate change negotiations at Copenhagen was a chance\, in his view\, to demonstrate India’s ‘most prudent future formulation of power’; though India will not be a superpower very soon in terms of military or economic bulk\, its legitimacy in the eyes of the world is a form of power in itself. He stressed that if India desires to have an impact on the international system\, it must take advantage of the mixed character of its own power\, in order to combine force and legitimacy into a new conception. Does the India of today have to exert to even stay relevant\, owing to its search for historical signposts to becoming a global power? In addressing such a question\, Professor Khilnani observed that there are no examples of the kind of role India can play\, but by drawing on its experiences\, India could invent a role for itself; part of what it takes to be a great power is the capacity to redefine what power and greatness are (as Gandhi did for another era)\, rather than only conforming to existing definitions. \nProfessor Khilnani’s assessment is that confronting all the challenges facing India will require the country to develop complicated positions and flexible practices. On contemporary issues and debates\, India would find itself well placed to be a ‘bridging’ power. For example\, its position between the US and China would allow it to play not a balancing-power role but a bridging one. Also\, in addressing increasing security issues as a result of multiple terrorist attacks\, although this is a concern India shares with Western states\, it has refused to see the rhetoric of Islam as an existential threat – this is a significant position to bridge the so-called “clash of civilizations”\, helping to connect Muslim and non-Muslim societies. Most significantly\, Professor Khilnani noted that India sees democracy not as the ‘providential destiny of all human history’\, but as a complicated\, fragile experiment\, that can possibly act as a bridge through which other societies can figure out their freedom and move towards it. He hoped that the conception he left from this address is a realistic recognition of the persistence of division and conflict\, while also adopting a realist assessment of the limits to the utility of force or of economic progress in itself to resolve these; above all\, this conception trusts in human political skills\, wit and judgment. \nRemarks by Mr. K. Subrahmanyam\nIn his closing remarks\, Mr. Subrahmanyam stated that he saw this event as a thanksgiving to Mr. Y.B. Chavan. He pointed out Mr. Chavan’s role in developing the think tank culture in India\, in addition to contributing not only to the founding of the institute\, but also in defending the autonomy of the IDSA. Mr. Subrahmanyam also elaborated on the significance of Professor Khilnani’s ideas\, particularly in their application to issues that contemporary India faces. He emphasized that if India would only eliminate its poverty and its illiteracy\, and if the two legislations that are under consideration in India – the right to education and the right to food security – were implemented\, he could imagine an India that would be an example of incomparable quality to the world. He also proposed the significance of establishing strategic partnerships with countries that are of importance to India\, with Indonesia being a key example – it is the largest Islamic state which is pluralistic and secular. In pointing out that there is a need to think through strategic issues using different paradigms\, Mr. Subrahmanyam noted that the threat posed by China’s rise to the United States for example would come not from the Chinese army but from China’s growing science and technology sector. He also noted that the only reservoir of talent that the United States can realistically tap into would be the English-speaking\, democratic India; thus\, the power that lies in an educated and food-secure population cannot be overemphasized. \nVote of Thanks\nCdr. S.S. Parmar concluded this stimulating discussion by thanking all the speakers for this opportunity to share their ideas and thoughts. \nReport prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/inaugural-y-b-chavan-memorial-lecture-the-great-power-game-india-in-the-new-world-professor-sunil-khilnani
CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101119T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101119T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221327Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T045308Z
UID:63629-1290144600-1290144600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Why Transnational Energy Pipelines Remain Pipedreams in South Asia
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Prof. Sujit Dutta\nDiscussants: Shri A Karnatak & Dr. Bhupendra Kr. Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/why-transnational-energy-pipelines-remain-pipedreams-in-south-asia
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101119T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101119T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221238Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63628-1290144600-1290144600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Indian Advocacy of Internationalism in the Nehru Years
DESCRIPTION:Summary\nAs the title suggests\, the paper examines one of the significant aspects of Indian foreign policy which was greatly influenced by Nehru’s ideas on internationalism. The purpose of the paper is to explore how this idea of internationalism evolved during the freedom struggle and made a passage thereon to be a part of independent India’s foreign policy. Nehru’s aim in advocating the principles of internationalism was to realise the creation of the ideal of One World centred on the United Nations which represented the world community. Keeping this in mind\, he crafted independent India’s foreign policy composed of five elements: opposition to colonialism\, imperialism and racialism; concept of non-alignment vis-à-vis the two Cold War blocs to preserve Asia in particular as an ‘area of peace’;  prevent internationalization of conflict; disarmament; and peaceful co-existence as embodied in the Panchsheel agreement for the evolution of a peaceful and co-operative international order\, thus paving the way for realising the ideal of One World.  These elements became the framework through which the foreign policy of India was conducted\, mostly connected and identified with ‘non-alignment’. The author clearly expresses that all these elements including non-alignment were designed for the realization of the ideal of One World.  \nThe paper is composed of four sections. First the paper discusses the origins of Indian internationalism and how it emerged as an integral part of the expression of Indian nationalism\, particularly from the 1920s. This had much to do with the developments within Asia in this period. ‘Anti-imperialism’ and ‘solidarity’ with colonised states as well as the idea of ‘Asianism’ were an integral part of the views of the Congress on foreign affairs. This was entwined with the goal of attaining independence and the call for co-operation among nations fighting imperialism. Hence\, Congress and Nehru expressed a commitment to the goals of anti-imperialism and nationalism along with internationalism. Here the paper points to the Congress policy of India not becoming a party to an imperialist war or being forced into one\, thus suggesting the direction of independent India’s foreign relations. These ideas and principles became the key pillars of Indian foreign policy after independence.  \nThe second section focuses on the dilemma that Indian nationalists faced in terms of reconciling their demand for independence from British imperialism with the internationalist responsibility of opposing Nazism\, Fascism and Militarism\, and how they sought to reconcile the two\, particularly in the Quit India Resolution. The Quit India Resolution clearly expressed the Indian approach of internationalism in terms of anti-imperialism\, anti-racialism and freedom for all peoples\, particularly in Asia; the idea of free nations joining together to form the future UN; the importance of the UN serving as the mainstay of a new international order\, a world federation that would work for the common good of all humanity; and global disarmament.  \nSection three discusses the idea of Pan-Asianism\, which provided the backdrop for independent India’s emphasis on Asian solidarity vis-á-vis European imperialism. Nehru’s thoughts in this regard were articulated in his works\, proposing the formation of an “Asiatic Federation of Nations”. The outcome of these ideas\, along with those of the Congress and other Indian thinkers\, was the idea of rallying all Asian countries to promote peace and fashion a normative international order by supporting the UN. This was to lead in the direction of realising the ideal of One World. \nSection four parses through select speeches of Nehru to demonstrate the internationalist framework that guided Indian foreign policy during the Nehru years and argues that the above mentioned ideals\, ideas\, and goals were incorporated since Nehru’s incumbency as Prime Minister in the interim government. Anti-imperialism and non-alignment were a result of the expression of Indian nationalism from the 1920s. This was put to practice along with others: prevention of internationalization of conflict; disarmament; and peaceful co-existence. These elements were incorporated in the wake of developments in Asia—SEATO and CENTO alliances in Asia\, war in the Korean Peninsula\, etc.—which portended possibilities of a world war. The fact that all these elements were an integral part of a unified conception of internationalism and of the imperative of nudging the world towards the ideal of One World centred on the United Nations is clearly evident in Nehru’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 20 Dec. 1956\, wherein he emphasised the significance of UN as representing the world community and how the Cold War and arms race were impediments to realising the ideal of One World.  \nThe paper ends by noting that internationalism was replaced by national interest in subsequent years due to the security concerns faced by India. The paper gives a normative conclusion that national power should be married with the ideals of internationalism. \nExternal Discussant\nProf. Pusphesh Pant: Extolled the paper in terms of the relevance of the subject. However suggestions were made in terms of: the need to contextualize\, and on the paper being Nehru-centric. It was pointed out that the time-line dates back much before the Nehruvian period regarding internationalism. Also there were thinkers within India who had similar or contending views on internationalism. Bearing in mind the age of Nehru\, with regard to his earlier works\, the importance of periodization or framing of exact time-lines on Nehru’s advocacy was stressed upon. Thirdly\, there were movements like the Khilafat which went beyond Pan-Asianism. Fourth\, it was to be noted that Nehru was not a complete idealist. He was practical on matters like the Sino-Indian border issue\, Tibet etc. Fifth\, the need to clarify the context in which internationalism was defined in the paper; Asian solidarity or Afro-Asian solidarity or world solidarity. \nInternal Discussants\nV. Krishnappa: Commended that the author had included Nehru’s advocacy of a global order as the latter could foresee the world in terms of global networks in play. This was important from the strategic as well as the national interest perspective. With regard to the time-line of Nehru’s advocacy\, suggestions were made that it could be located within contemporary representations of Nehru. One of the comments was on how Pan-Asianism could be reconciled with internationalism when materialism had taken over Asia.  \nDr. Rajaram Panda: Reiterated the need for the timeline and contextualisation. He mentioned his reservation regarding the use of phrase -‘surrender of sovereignty’. The paper would also benefit if detailed analysis was made on the role played by India in the Korean War. Inclusion of events like the Japanese victory over China; Tagore’s dialogue with the Japanese philosopher Okakura Tenshin on Asian identity; possibilities of atomic war and Japanese annexation of Korea\, were all imperative. Stress was laid on the need to clarify the context of Pan-Asianism and also the need to categorize the regions of Asia. As it was pointed out in the paper on possibilities of a third World War with regard to Asian developments viz.\, Indo-China War and Korean War\, the significance of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis which brought the world to the brink of a world war needs to be included in this context as well. Suggestion was made on the need to mention Radha Binod Bihari Pal’s dissenting judgment at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and how this judgment boosted the morale of the Japanese after their defeat in WW-II. Lastly\, as the conclusion was abrupt\, he suggested that the paper would need more elaboration. \nGeneral Discussion\nSeveral comments were made in terms of the paper being a framework of Nehru’s ideas. Nehru\, Tagore\, Gandhi were personalities of their own. The 1920s were different from the 1930s and Nehru’s views on internationalism were not necessarily shared by his colleagues. Nevertheless\, Congress was led to a great degree by Nehru. Differentiation has to be made between Nehru the thinker and Nehru the statesman. As the world is coming close to Nehru/Gandhi ideals\, especially with Obama advocating a world without nuclear weapons\, the need for reviving these themes highlighted in the paper was significant. \nChair’s Summary\nProf. Sumit Ganguly: Noted that changes and comments suggested were vast and hence a book in the making would be a good idea. Prof. Ganguly made three organisational comments: one\, on sections being far too long and thus the need to break them further into sections\, secondly the usefulness of having clearer time-lines or historical periodization\, and finally the conclusion being compressed and abrupt. \nHe also made substantive comments: whether there was even the prospect of UN during 1942 when the Quit India Resolution was pronounced. Discussion and themes are not connected\, but descriptive. For instance\, India’s role in the Korean War needs to be more detailed. Importance to be given to India-China agreement on Tibet as it was a pivotal movement. This should lead and continue the debate on Nehru’s stand. Thirdly\, there is a highly idealized view on Pan-Asianism between pages 14 to 17 which evaporates after the war. No mention of the viciousness of Japan is made. Fourth\, one should note\, as Prof. Pant said\, that Nehru was in the Ahmednagar prison without access to material and news. Nevertheless\, he brilliantly prophesized that Britain would not stand up to Hitler. This suggests that Nehru was not an idealist as he was made out to be.     \nReport prepared by Joyce Sabina Lobo\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-indian-advocacy-of-internationalism-in-the-nehru-years
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101116T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101116T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221327Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130742Z
UID:63631-1289885400-1289885400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Lithuanian Parliamentary Delegates visit IDSA
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room 005\, IDSAChair: Ms. Smita Purushottam \nMembers of Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania visited the IDSA to engage in a discussion on a range of issues viz.\, neighbourhood relations\, regional issues\, regional organisations\, trade\, etc.  This was the first Lithuanian parliamentary delegation to India. While calling the visit to India “historical”\, the Deputy Speaker of the Lithuanian Parliament\, Mr. Algis Kaseta rightly pointed out that “economic and cultural ties between the two countries become more meaningful when political and parliamentary ties are strengthened”. \nThe members of the delegation gave their perspective on Lithuania’s positive relations with its neighbours and on the regional issues relating to Ukraine\, Georgia\, Russia\, etc. One of the issues of common interest to both India and Lithuania was Afghanistan—where the latter has stationed its special forces.  Lithuania has contributed both financial and human resources and in the civilian sector it has a provincial construction team\, while India has contributed to the development of Afghanistan. Ms. Purushottam reiterated that India believes in building institutions in the form of construction\, health\, transport\, etc. Similarly Dr. Meena Singh Roy emphasised that apart from capacity building\, Indian involvement is also in terms of imparting training to Afghan police and security forces though India does not have any military presence in Afghanistan. On a positive note\, the delegates welcomed and urged India to have a presence in the Lithuanian economy. They urged that India should participate in the transport corridor\, apart from other areas—IT and logistics. The Deputy Speaker urged that think tanks\, including IDSA\, should look into the prospects of increasing investment in the Baltics. The delegation was happy to list their approval for India’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat.  \nDuring the interactive session\, IDSA experts on South Asia\, South-East Asia and East Asia enlightened the delegates on India’s relations with its neighbours\, on the recent developments within the Asian region\, and how India positively contributes to regional security and stability. Mr. R.N. Das termed China as a challenge and not a threat to Indian foreign policy. Dr. Meena S. Roy emphasised that the Central Asian region is strategically important from the political point of view\, though India has to increase its economic interaction. India continues to have multi-dimensional relations with the Central Asian region. Dr. Roy also said that India’s relations with Iran were also strategic in terms of being country-specific\, its dependence on energy resources\, and as a gateway to the Central Asian states.  \nDr. Udai Bhanu Singh stressed that the move towards democracy by Myanmar was important as it was the only South-east Asian state to share borders with India. This gave a boost to India’s ‘look east’ policy. He also emphasised the point that India needed to pay the necessary attention to countries like Laos\, Cambodia and Vietnam. Dr. Pankaj Jha discussed developments in other South-east Asian states like Thailand\, Malaysia\, Singapore\, Indonesia\, etc. and their relations with India. Dr. Nihar Nayak spoke on the national integration process and current the state of affairs in Nepal. These developments along with border security problems due to Maoist insurgency have considerable ramifications for India.  \nGiving an overview\, Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya emphasised India’s responsible conduct of relations with its neighbours and emphasised the importance of granting the neighbours most favored nation status.  \nThe interaction was insightful\, with both the delegates and the experts from IDSA learning a lot about each other’s views on regional issues and relations. \nReport prepared by Joyce Sabina Lobo\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/lithuanian-parliamentary-delegates-visit-idsa
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101116T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101116T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T205043Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131012Z
UID:63271-1289885400-1289885400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Special Address - Role of Small countries in a Globalised World
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Seminar Hall-ISpeaker: Minister Dr. Aurelia Frick\, Minister of Justice\, Foreign Affairs and Cultural Affairs (Liechtenstein)Chair: Ms. Smita Purushottam \n \nDr. Aurelia Frick is one of the current cabinet ministers of the Liechtenstein government that was elected in the March 2009 Parliamentary elections. She currently holds the portfolio of Ministries of Justice\, Foreign Affairs and Cultural Affairs. Her presentation at the IDSA was on the role of small countries in a globalised world\, by focussing on Liechtenstein as an exemple. \nTo give a better insight into how small countries add value to the international community\, Dr. Frick began with a brief introduction about Liechtenstein. The independent principality of Liechtenstein is located in central Europe and bordered on the east by Austria and on the south\, west\, and north by Switzerland. Along with Uzbekistan in Central Asia\, Liechtenstein is one of the only two doubly landlocked countries in the world (bounded by other land-locked countries only). It is the fourth smallest country in the world\, with a total area of only 160 square kilometres\, inhabited currently by a population of 36\,000. Despite being small in area and population\, it has succeeded in political and economic spheres\, among others.  \nDr. Frick explained as to why Liechtenstein has done well. First of all\, she said\, Liechtenstein has high political stability and a continuing political system. Despite its move from a complete hereditary constitutional monarchy to a parliamentary system with a constitutional monarch (called the Prince)\, the transition has been smooth. They have struck a good balance between the constitutional monarchy and the parliamentary system\, wherein the Prince acts as a stabilising and mediating factor thus contributing to political stability. The Prince deals with foreign relations and one of the successful efforts was Liechtenstein’s successful entry as a member state of the UN in 1990.  \nApart from being only known for stamps\, castles\, and as a tax haven\, Dr. Frick highlighted that Liechtenstein has high culture and a strong industry sector. It has developed a prosperous\, highly industrialized free-enterprise economy and boasts a financial service sector as well as a living standard which compares favourably with those of the urban areas of Liechtenstein’s large European neighbours. In India itself Liechtenstein industries have created 800 jobs. They provide annually 33\,000 jobs within their country\, of whom 17\,000 are foreigners commuting into Liechtenstein. She drove home the point as to how a small country plays a significant role in the world by stating that a country with 36\,000 people provides for 60\,000 jobs worldwide.  \nDr. Frick emphasised the fact that Liechtenstein industries focus primarily on producing high-tech or niche products. Their success in this field is also due to the fact that industries invest 8 per cent in research and development. Liechtenstein has carved a niche for itself in the world economy as a small-scale producer of precision manufactures like optical lenses\, dental products\, high-vacuum pumps\, heating equipment\, electron microscopes\, electronic measuring and control devices\, steel bolts\, knitting machines\, and textiles. These industries are all export based. Other important industries are in pharmaceuticals\, electronics\, ceramics\, and metal manufacturing. The largest industrial companies in Liechtenstein are Hilti (construction services)\, Balzers (electro-optical coatings)\, Hilcona (frozen foods)\, and Ivoclar-Vivadent (dental medical technology). Around 48 per cent of the labour force is engaged in industry\, trade\, and construction. Industry contributes 39 per cent of the GDP\, with 42.2 per cent of the total workforce; financial services 31 per cent of GDP with 17 per cent of the total workforce; and general services 23 per cent of GDP with 38.9 per cent of the total workforce. \nIn terms of being an offshore financial centre\, the Liechtenstein Declaration commits to global standards as developed by the OECD and steps up its participation in international efforts to counteract non-compliance with foreign tax laws. During the recent economic crisis\, Liechtenstein did not face major problems in its economic performance. For instance\, its banks did not need state support.  Liechtenstein has very low unemployment\, i.e.\, 2.5 per cent\, which rose up to only 3.5 per cent during the recent economic crisis. Here\, Dr. Frick said that\, free trade agreements came in the way of the catastrophe. So she emphasised the need to have free trade agreements with other states. Liechtenstein has 22 agreements in this respect. Also\, as Liechtenstein has a small domestic market\, it depends on exports and relies on clients from foreign markets. Therefore it joined EFTA in 1991 and the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement in 1995 to achieve its economic objectives. \nWith regard to foreign relations\, Dr. Frick stressed that Liechtenstein aims to build good and peaceful relations with other countries\, while maintaining its sovereignty. It endeavours to enhance relations with strong and visible partners\, like India. In this regard\, Liechtenstein (as part of EFTA – European Free Trade Association) had participated in the fifth round of India-EFTA broad based Trade and Investment Agreement ministerial negotiations. It is a member of important international organizations like the UN\, OSCE\, EFTA\, WTO\, and ICC. It has always maintained friendly relations with Switzerland. In 1924\, the Customs Treaty between Liechtenstein and Switzerland entered into force wherein the Swiss franc was adopted as the official currency as it was considered a strong currency for Lichtenstein’s economy.  \nOn a multi-lateral platform Liechtenstein focuses on core areas. Dr. Frick illustrated this point by saying that Liechtenstein is a strong supporter of the International Criminal Court and thus takes a very active role in the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC. Ambassador Wenaweser served as the Chairman of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression\, which was mandated to develop proposals for a definition of the crime of aggression. Thus in this manner\, it seeks to and works for small core or niche areas in order to be visible within international platforms. And so in its small way it wants to bring equilibrium to international security.  \nMs. Smita Purushottam concluded by commending Dr. Frick’s extremely insightful presentation by explaining how small countries play significant roles in the world through the example of Liechtenstein. She ended on the note that Lichtenstein has indeed created not only a niche in manufacturing industries\, but also a niche and important link in world politics.  \nReport prepared by Joyce Sabina Lobo\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-role-of-small-countries-in-a-globalised-world
CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101115T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101115T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T205043Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131012Z
UID:63270-1289799000-1289799000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Special Address - Dr. Lora Saalman on China and India: Divergence\, Similarity and Symmetry in Security Concerns
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Lora Saalman\, a Beijing-based associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace\, has focused her research on Chinese nuclear weapon and nonproliferation policies and Sino-Indian strategic relations. Her presentation at the IDSA focused on the convergence and divergence of Chinese and Indian security concerns in land-based\, naval\, aerospace and nuclear arenas\, with findings derived from extensive textual research and interviews with the academic\, scientific and military communities in both China and India.  \nThe talk centered mainly on security concerns between India and China\, derived from both quantitative and qualitative analysis based on perceptions of India within China\, and vice versa\, and how they have changed over the period from 1991 to 2009. Dr. Saalman found that over time\, the trend line curved upwards on a quantitative scale\, peaking in 2001 during President Bill Clinton’s visit to India\, and the lifting of the 1998 nuclear-test sanctions in 2001\, and again in 2005\, on the announcement of the US-India nuclear deal. Conclusively\, there has been a definite increase in interest in India within China.  \nIn analyzing and comparing content from Chinese and Indian security journals\, there has been a strong interest in China within India\, whereas in Chinese security journals\, the focus has been mainly on two areas – naval concerns within China pertaining to India\, and on the air force. These are also the two arenas in which some Chinese specialists feel India can be comparable or even surpass China in the future. Dr. Saalman’s research separates out three distinct areas of research and analysts in both countries – the military strategists\, the scientists\, and the academics.  \nIn terms of divergence\, it was observed that military strategists in China and India tended to focus on two areas\, namely the navy and the army. Separately\, in China\, there was much more focus on Indian naval developments\, aircraft carriers\, and nuclear submarines (that may give India second strike capabilities in the future)\, whereas in India\, attention was centered on land-based systems on the borders. It was noted that on the Indian side\, there has also been much focus on Chinese cooperation on missiles and weapons technology\, mainly with Pakistan\, while Chinese concerns revolve around the ability of Indian forces to gain military training and engage in military and maritime exercises.  \nIn analyzing gathered data\, Dr Saalman applied social psychology theory to attempt to supplement her analysis of Indian and Chinese perceptions of each other. The theories and ideas used included:\n1. Social Identity – China is an army power from the Indian standpoint\, while the Chinese view India as an ocean power (with Chinese threat perceptions being based on Indian Ocean control\, and Indo-US joint exercises). \n2. Overconfidence Phenomenon and Victim Mentality – China is seen as being on the overconfident side and India in the latter category\, with respect to what it faced during the 1962 border conflict with China. \n3. Hidden and Expressed Attitudes – China’s conspicuous focus on the Indian navy is more of a hidden concern\, and not expressed as much in public\, while in India\, many military and naval officers were found to be dismissive of ideas such as the String of Pearls concept\, or future conflict. Also\, secondhand bias plays a key role in the interaction between the two countries – research work on both sides has relied to a great extent on US analyses of developments between China and India.  \n4. Fundamental Attribution Error – Actors tend to externalize their motivations for events\, while attributing others’ similar actions to innate causes. In applying this to the case at hand\, on acquiring (for example) aircraft carriers or nuclear submarines\, though both countries pursue this\, each side would attribute the others’ action to arrogance and the drive to be a regional hegemon.  \n5. Relative Deprivation – Both countries’ dependence (up until sanctions on India were lifted) on Russian and Israeli imports resulted in indigenization and reverse engineering. \n6. Realistic Group Conflict theory – This applies well to the Indian Ocean situation; with limited resources\, the chances for future conflict grow.  \nIn linking these perceptions to practice\, Dr Saalman proposed recommendations that recognize there is less asymmetry at sea than at the border\, particularly given the challenges of distance\, shipping and the U.S. role that China faces. As such\, stronger cooperation between the two countries in the naval realm may be possible. She suggested this could take many forms\, including establishing a regularized forum for security cooperation\, energy shipments\, and tsunami relief\, or greater engagement in a sea-based version of “Hand-in-Hand” military exercises to confront mutual concerns on piracy.  \nSimilarities between the two countries converge on the areas of aviation and aerospace. Some Chinese technical journals for instance were found to contain miscellaneous references to developments in Indian systems. Dr Saalman also pointed out the use of slogans by China\, such as “Great Power Dream” when referring to India – the idea that India in making pursuits towards the future in terms of military modernization is aiming towards becoming a great power.  \nIn terms of perception\, China has in the past evaluated India’s actions at the border from a very instrumental view. But increasingly\, India’s role at the border is being seen as tending towards heightened militarization\, drawing hostile rhetoric from China on what India’s future intentions are. Dr Saalman also emphasized that though it is not admitted\, both sides have regularly engaged in behaviour that has escalatory potential. But it is important to note that\, on the technical side there has been cooperation between China and India\, as seen in 2002 and 2006 in the space arena.  \nHowever\, most of this cooperation has been in the form of MOUs\, and have lacked any concrete measures. She noted that there are many other areas of potential cooperation between the two countries. Keeping in mind the sensitivities in this relationship\, Dr Saalman recommended joint studies and discussions on air power\, space power\, space policy dialogue\, space navigation\, and non-interference rules for satellites\, some of which occur between the United States and China on a regular basis.  \nOn the role of academic analysts in both countries\, Dr Saalman’s study inferred that both sides predominantly focus on nuclear issues. There is most symmetry in the overarching attention paid to nuclear issues in the two academic communities. On the Chinese side\, the US-India strategic relationship is given recurring attention. On the Indian side\, the issue of nuclear status stood out – the idea that China had conferred upon it early on that it is a nuclear power\, a status that had been denied to India\, tying into the concept of relative deprivation mentioned earlier.  \nDr Saalman also stressed the importance of interaction on definitions of technical terms relating especially to nuclear arsenals\, nuclear energy or nuclear security. She recommended the possibility of adoption of a joint glossary by China and India\, much like the one established for use by Chinese and US scientists and experts. In drawing an analogy with the US-Soviet relationship\, she pointed out that the most engagement between the two countries took place at times of increasing hostilities. Peaking tensions are fertile ground for confidence building and arms control measures to be adopted. \nThe speaker hoped that the takeaway from the talk was that “perceptions can often trump reality”. The Chinese side has for too long being dismissive of Indian threat assessments\, whereas India has had a tendency to be too dismissive of China’s legitimate interests. Also\, there is an academic\, science and military imbalance. In engaging with each other\, there tends to be a schism caused by the varied backgrounds that participants in dialogue come from\, with the Indian side usually consisting of more people from military backgrounds\, while the Chinese side is composed mainly of academics. The recommendation here is to initiate more military to military\, scientists to scientists\, and academic to academic meetings\, to facilitate better understanding.  \nWith respect to dialogue on the Track 1\, Track 1.5 and Track 2 levels\, Dr Saalman pointed out that although there is a significant amount of Track 1 negotiations between China and India\, in agreement with general perception\, the bilateral relationship can gain much more from engagements on the Track 1.5 and Track 2 levels as well (possibly in the form of multilevel\, multilateral forums and negotiation simulations\, as has been done with the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)). This can contribute largely to reducing second hand bias\, and more importantly\, initiate practice and engagement between China and India. \nMr. Sisodia concluded Dr. Saalman’s extremely insightful presentation by observing that the study is an apt example of academic research being able to deliver policy implications as well – an encouraging reminder to the IDSA research community. He noted that there is significant practical value in this study in terms of managing India’s relationship with China\, and potential future discussions could also touch upon the impact of the strengthening Indo-US partnership on Indo-Chinese relations.  \nReport prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-dr-lora-saalman-on-china-and-india-divergence-similarity-and-symmetry-in-security-concerns
CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101101T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101101T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221327Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130557Z
UID:63633-1288589400-1288589400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Member of China Reform Forum visits IDSA
DESCRIPTION:A group of senior and distinguished members of China Reform Forum\, consisting of academics\, intellectuals and senior Party Members visited IDSA on 1st November\, and held an interactive discussion session with the Director General Mr. N. S. Sisodia\, and scholars of the Institute. \nWelcoming the delegates\, Mr. Sisodia mentioned the good work being done by the China Reform Forum in the realms of the Chinese economy and polity as well. Mr. Sisodia reiterated Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s assertion that there is enough space for cooperation between India and China\, and expressed optimism that the relations between the two countries are poised to greater heights. He evinced interest for possible joint-collaboration and exchange programs between IDSA and the China Reform Forum\, and shared his perception of improving India-China relations.  \nResponding to the sentiment\, Li Jintian\, Leader of the delegation and Executive President of Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC\, endorsed the idea for joint collaboration between the China Reform and IDSA and invited Director General to Beijing to conclude a formal agreement between the two institutes. \nParticipating in the discussion was Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Deputy Director General\, and Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair who said that both India and China have successfully worked together in issues relating to climate change\, and have contributed to peace and stability in the region and the world at large.  \nThere was free and frank discussion on issues of mutual interest between India and China with the members of the China Reform Forum.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/member-of-china-reform-forum-visits-idsa
CATEGORIES:OTHER EVENTS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101029T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101029T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63635-1288330200-1288330200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Chinese Oil and Gas Pipelines and Sea Routes
DESCRIPTION:Col P. K. Gautam (Retd) Research Fellow presented his paper\, Chinese Oil and Gas Pipelines and Sea Routes\, on 29th October 2010. Dr. Arvind Gupta Chaired the session. Mr. V. Raghuraman and Cdr Agnihotri\, IN were external discussants and Miss. Shebonti Ray Dadwal and Cdr. Sarabjeet Parmar\, IN were the internal discussants. \nHighlights from the paper\nDue to its rising economy\, China’s imports of hydrocarbons are growing rapidly. Therefore\, worried with growing dependence on imports\, with a consequence on domestic policies and strategic stability\, China is pursuing policies to alleviate the increase in import dependence by diversifying the sources and routes of its overall energy imports. China’s quest for energy routes security has led to its policies on oil and gas routes and pipelines as a reflection of geopolitics and foreign policy of the country. Therefore the core focus of the paper is on the current and future developments in Chinese hydrocarbon pipelines and sea routes strategy. \nThe paper is based on two assumptions; a) oil and gas will continue to be the affordable fuels of choice b) as oil is import sensitive\, the main policy focus in China will be on oil. Col Gautam argued that oil and gas pipelines and routes define geo-economic relationship between countries and regions. The paper attempts to discern the security and strategic discourse in the unfolding of land and sea routes of oil and gas. \nWith overall increase in energy consumption\, share of imports is going to rise from 50percent to 80percent as far as China’s national oil requirement is concerned. China also plans to double the usage of gas as a source of energy by 2015 from the 2008 levels. At present 80 percent of Chinese oil is imported via sea and about 40 percent through Malacca straits. Saudi Arabia (20 percent)\, Angola (17 percent)\, Iran (12 percent)\, Oman (8 percent)\, Russia (7 percent)\, Sudan (6 percent)\, Venezuela (4 percent)\, Kuwait (3 percent)\, Kazakhstan (3percent)\, UAE (3 percent) and others (17 percent) are China’s top crude suppliers. Russia\, Australia\, Iran and Qatar are the principle suppliers of LNG.  \nAt present\, in Myanmar dual pipelines for oil and gas transfers is under construction. Gwadar might become the destination for refining imports from Iran to be sent via pipeline to China but it looks like this only remains an idea and not feasible as such due to terrain and costs. There are various other issues involved. Building the Strategic Oil Reserves  capacity of 90 days imports by 2015 is a Chinese aim as it prepares for resource wars scenarios. In addition The Chinese Navy – will become a blue water navy in the next 2 decades and also it will have national tanker fleet- over 50 percent soon due to its good shipbuilding industry. The scenario of arctic meltdown\, by which hydrocarbon energy could be sent using new routes has important implications for the future of china’s energy strategy. \nLearning from the Chinese strategy\, several policy suggestions can be made;\n1.	Energy diplomacy for diversification of sources\,\n2.	National Carrier Fleet- profit in peacetime\,\n3.	Nodal Ministry for energy security\,\n4.	Clear policy on strategic oil reserves\,\n5.	Development of Arctic capable fleet\,\n6.	Using the maritime advantage for energy trade\,\n7.	Development of efficient technologies to reduce import strain. \nDiscussion points\n\nCoal would remain one of the most important energy resources for India; therefore\, along with China and United States\, India would continue to scramble for coal resource. However\, China with its present governance structure with no political checks and balances has an upper hand in exploiting coal reserves worldwide. Africa is now under the Chinese exploitation umbrella and over 97 percent of rare earth is being made in China only to control the metallurgy industry of the world. \nChina is looking at Caspian reserves this shows not only market economics but also a strategic vision. India must strengthen is capacity not only for ensuring continuous supply of oil during peak oil requirements but also engage in oil diplomacy with a long term vision of future requirements. \nThe potential for conflict exists if sufficient and affordable alternatives to hydrocarbons are not found. In such a situation\, the lines of supply will get taut\, supply shrink and tensions will rise. Purely from conflict prevention point of view\, carbon free energy technologies need to be given a renewed priority\, not only to mitigate climate change but violent conflicts. \nIndia must also diversify its sources of oil supply and must move from the Straits of Hormuz and build stronger relations with Africa. A strong public-private partnership in India is required to enable efficacious transnational pipeline. \nRenewable energy sources like ethanol and bio diesel\, wind and solar are high on the India’s national agenda. In India\, shale deposits are found across the Gangetic plain\, Assam\, Rajasthan and many coastal areas therefore India must capitalize on this important resource. \nThere wee different viewpoints on role of surface and submarines in interdicting or securing SLOC and an  Arctic capability for Indian maritime interests in the long run\nCooperation is the key in transboundary energy pipelines and the most workable and practical option.     \nArctic route for oil supply is not feasible for India because it does not have any commercial or security links in the region. \n\n(Report prepared by Avinash Godbole and S. Sasikumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinese-oil-and-gas-pipelines-and-sea-routes
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101029T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101029T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T205143Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250305T073341Z
UID:63276-1288330200-1288330200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Special Address - Professor Stephen Cohen on Obama’s South Asia Policy
DESCRIPTION:The run-up to US President Barack Obama’s visit to India has been an opportunity for IDSA to interact with eminent experts in the super-power’s domestic and foreign policy spheres and on this occasion\, Prof. Cohen addressed an informed audience on the subject of the current administration’s involvement in South Asia. The Director General of IDSA\, Mr. N.S. Sisodia\, inaugurated the session by welcoming Professor Stephen Cohen and lauding his long-standing association with IDSA and academic interest in South Asia. Prof. Cohen’s visit to India was sponsored by the American centers\, and he also participated in a Brookings dialogue in early November. \nAt the outset\, Professor Cohen predicted continued progress of US-India relations regardless of the outcome of high-level visits. He reviewed the range of reactions elicited by the Indo-US nuclear deal – both favourable and less so – within the United States\, deeming as legitimate concerns over some of the associated proliferation implications. He went on to add\, however\, that India’s impeccable democratic credentials had gone a long way to facilitate ultimate consensus over the deal. Regarding immediate priority ranking of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy\, however\, he rated India below Afghanistan and Pakistan. Vis-à-vis China\, the US and India have both adopted a wait-and-see policy\, but this\, according to Professor Cohen\, has only further strengthened the basis for a meaningful partnership between the two democracies. \nOn the question of Afghanistan\, he came out in support of revival of the Bonn Agreement as a way to successfully combat radicalization. Given the shared stakes India and Pakistan have in a stable\, moderate Afghanistan\, he expressed hope for close cooperation between the two nations. Regarding American involvement in the region\, he identified facilitation of Indo-Pak rapprochement and better relations with Iran as deserving consistent effort. \nA member of the audience called into question the idea that India and Pakistan shared interests in Afghanistan\, in response to which Professor Cohen suggested that radicalization of Afghanistan being detrimental to both actors\, a distinction needs to be drawn between interest and policy. Responding to another question\, he characterized a Pakistan riddled with uncertainty as worrisome to the US and candidly admitted that its weaknesses sometimes played out in its favour. Professor Cohen held India partly responsible as far as the closeness of China Pakistan relations is concerned. In answer to a query related to American assistance to Pakistan\, Professor Cohen acknowledged the possibility of diversion of funds to the Taliban\, yet argued that this was an inevitable fall-out if Chinese influence over Pakistan were to be held in check. He went on to suggest that the American dilemma vis-à-vis Pakistan was not too different from the Indian one\, as the outcomes of a more aggressive stance against Pakistan were far from clear. Support to radical groups by the Pakistani ISI was seen – albeit ill-judged – as historically a widely employed instrument of statecraft. Professor Cohen’s assessment of Indo-US relations over the long-run was that the initiative lies with India on most outstanding issues. \nIn the Chair’s summary\, Mr. K. Subrahmanyam argued that the tipping point for Pakistan would be triggered by internal constituencies reacting to American intervention in tribal areas. He predicted decline in American financial support to Pakistan pending decisive action on the latter’s part to counter radical groups. He portrayed India as the default partner for a US attempting to win the “knowledge race” and maintain it’s pre-eminence. \nReport prepared by Kalyani Unkule\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-professor-stephen-cohen-on-obamas-south-asia-policy
CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101021T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101021T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63636-1287639000-1287639000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Domestic Determinants of Iran's Foreign Policy: The Illusion of  Consensus
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Cdr. (Retd) M. R. Khan and Prof. Gulshan Dietl \n \nMr Mahan Abedin\, visiting fellow\, introduced his paper by highlighting the significance of studying the foreign policy making process in Iran as it is rising as a regional power. He began by mentioning a note of caution that this academic exercise constituted a unique challenge since the Iranian foreign policy is mired in profound ideological\, political and institutional complexities. \nDescribing the Western and Iranian scholars’ approach to study Iran’s foreign policy making process\, the presenter pointed out that while the Western scholars contend that all things being equal\, Iranian policy is “rational”\, in as much as it is the product of a laborious analytical and consultative process. On the other hand\, the Iranian scholars are less concerned with the actual policies than with the ideological\, political and cultural determinants that shape foreign policy formulation in Iran. However\, both approaches yield suboptimal levels of understanding. He stated that both create a distorted panorama of the Iran’s foreign policy vision and aspirations.  \nContrary to the Western notion of “consensus”\, Mr Abedin argued that the process of foreign policy making process in Iran is considerably more complex; that consensus is either lacking or where it is achieved\, it is at an unacceptably high price. Moreover\, the actual policies often reflect the tensions and divisions bedevilling the Iranian elite\, leading foremost to inadequate implementation. However\, he stated that Iran has made huge inroads in relatively non-contentious foreign policy areas\, namely in the region where it is steadily emerging as the dominant power. But now it is faced with a hostile global climate\, an outcome that is directly tied to the Iran’s antagonistic relationship with the West. \nIn the second part of the presentation\, he spoke about the ideological\, political\, and institutional construction of Iranian foreign policy making process. Outlining the ideological context of foreign policy\, he said that the Islamic Revolution of 1979 dramatically altered the tone and rhetoric of its foreign policy and since then its foreign policy towards many of the countries remained relatively unchanged. He pointed out that faced with the ambitions of a revolutionary Islamic ideology engaged in the relentless pursuit of re-ordering Iran’s relations with the major world powers\, Iranian scholars have struggled to embed the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy within a national framework. He added that still\, a very small number of scholars have attempted a more innovative approach\, namely to weave together the competing and conflicting ideational and ideological strands of foreign policy thinking since the Islamic Revolution.  \nSo far as the efforts to re-define the pan-Islamic aspirations of the post-revolutionary Iranian state is concerned\, more than thirty years of the Islamic Revolution\, it has failed to adequately define its national interests according to a consensual set of ideological and conceptual norms. He held that the complexity is not merely about the inclusion of pan-Islamic themes that tend to complicate foreign policy thinking but it is also about the attempts to redefine the national interests along revolutionary lines\, which necessarily requires a radically new theoretical model for engaging with the major powers\, particularly the US. The confusion also prevails among its diplomatic and the wider foreign policy establishment over the nature and extent of the pan-Islamic policies to be pursued.  \nThe author said that although there are over one hundred officially registered political parties in Iran\, the party system is very weak. The majority of political parties do not represent any identifiable socio-economic interests. However\, three reformist parties i.e. a) the Islamic Iran Participation Front\, b) the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution\, and c) the National Trust Party are in particular recognised as genuine since they represent broad and identifiable political and ideological interests. He held that in the absence of a strong party-based system\, factions have filled the political vacuum in Iran. In the sphere of Iran’s foreign policy\, three factions i.e. “Principalists”\, “Practicalists” and “Reformists” have an impact on Iran’s external conduct. \nOn the role of the Iranian institutional system in foreign policy making process\, Mr Abedin said that the post-revolutionary Iranian foreign\, defence and intelligence systems are rich with institutions and these play important role in policy making\, particularly in comparison with the pre-revolutionary order. Besides\, the leadership (Valiy-e-Faqih)\, the Supreme National Security Council\, the Islamic Consultative Assembly (National Parliament)\, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps\, and the State Expediency Discernment Council are the other key institutions which play essential role in foreign policy formulation and implementation processes. He held that the existence of such an elaborate system often leads to the marginalisation of the foreign ministry as the country’s main foreign policy centre. Moreover\, the prevailing institutional complexity is partly a product of ideological confusion and the lack of a disciplined party-based political system. Therefore\, the profound philosophical and ideological contradictions that go the very heart of the Iranian system have penetrated into every institution\, the net result of which is lack of consensus on a broad range of domestic and external issues.  \nHe pointed out that Iran’s foreign policy in the region is very successful in pursuing its national interests in the context of Islamic revolutionary beliefs and values. However\, ideology has been a major constraint on its foreign policy outside the region\, as evidenced by the volatile relationship with the West. But it is enormously problematic to label Iran’s foreign policy as “Islamic” or even “Ideological”\, in the light of the profound sense of expediency and flexibility that informs the decisions of Iran’s rulers and their policy makers. Iran has chosen its ideological conflicts selectively\, basing its calculus on issues and determinants that maximise its influence and power in the region. The opposition to Israel is best seen in this context. At the end\, he said that any initiative to improve the foreign policy making process in Iran would do well to focus on the ideology\, politics and the institutional setup. Finally\, he concluded by suggesting that Iranian strategists and policy makers would benefit from the formulation of a clear and comprehensive national security doctrine. In addition\, the recognition of the role of the Civil Society in shaping foreign policy will reduce the more harmful effects in foreign policy and will also help to align the country’s political society with the national security establishment. \nCdr (Retd) M. R. Khan\, citing various articles of the Iranian constitution\, said that the very basis of Iran’s foreign policy consensus is based on its Islamic outlook. In this context\, he referred to Article 152 which deals with the rejection of all forms of domination and the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity; Article 153 which deals with “no foreign control”; Article 154 which deals with “Independence\, Support of Just Struggles” and other such constitutional provisions. This reflects Iran’s regional as well as outside regional foreign policy\, Cdr Khan said. Speaking on the geopolitical advantages of Iran and its possession of critical natural resources like Oil and Gas\, he said that in the past\, Iran faced threats from both West and North and when Soviet Union liquidated\, threats from north disappeared. However\, it still faces threats from the West. He opined that because of Iran’s demographic and geopolitical advantages\, it feels that it should get primacy not only in the region but also outside. \nProf. Gulshan Dietl suggested the presenter to improve the paper by incorporating more sources from books and documents. Prof. Dietl also suggested for using more Persian language in the paper to provide an inclusive Iranian perception of foreign policy making. She said that in a democratic country\, factions play important role in shaping foreign policy of the country and these factions should be carefully analysed in the context of Iran. She added that to assess the role of the leader (Valiy-e-Faqih) in Iran’s foreign policy making process\, the author need to better analyse and relate the role of the Supreme National Security Council.  \nWg Cdr. V. Krishnappa said that Iran is a most important player in the region and it aspiring to play the ideological role. The ideological battle between Iran and other regional actors is going on since a long time in search of playing this role. On nationalism and pursuing national interests\, he said that the factions are playing crucial role in Iran in shaping its foreign policy making. He\, however\, said that differences between various factions and political parties are inherent as the foreign policy making process is inherently a very complex process. In this context\, he cited Jawaharlal Nehru’s Non-alignment policy and said that even Nehru’s NAM policy came under criticism. He said that on many of the issues that the author presented such as role of ideology\, political actors\, institutions etc there is lack of coherence and suggested the author to improve on this. He also suggested of studying Iran’s strategic behaviour for better understanding its foreign policy in the context of its security and ideological dimension. \nMr S. Samuel C. Rajiv said that by framing the three level of analysis for studying Iran’s foreign policy making process the author have done good job. He held that consensus on policy issues always do not lead to rational decision making. However\, Iran is very successful in its regional foreign policy where general consensus is built but not at large levels. He suggested that the role of public opinion\, think tanks etc. should be involved in the foreign policy making process for more democratisation of policy making process.  \nDiscussion\n\nOne participant asked Mr Abedin that how he would differentiate between the domestic factors (religion and politics) and international factors (Nuclear\, Gulf\, and the West) which lead to the articulation of Iran’s foreign policy. \nIran views growing power and influence of Israel in the region as a security threat and there is a domestic consensus in Iran on its containment policy towards Israel. \nOne commentator asked for elaboration on how Iran defines its national interests.\nAnother participant wanted to know about the Iran’s perceptions about India’s rising power and its growing role in the West Asia.\nWhat is the domestic consensus on Iran’s nuclear energy policy? How do they view the Western perspectives on Iran’s nuclear policy? How they are going to resolve this problem?\nHow different political parties view Iran’s role as a regional actor? \nThere are different points of view in Iran on various domestic factors which influence its policy making process. What are the main domestic determinants of Iran’s foreign policy?\n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nThere is insufficient understanding outside Iran on how its foreign policy is made. He appreciated for having a stimulated and spirited discussion on this subject. He said that the author has made a good attempt to explain the political structures in Iran’s foreign policy making process. It is also a clear attempt to look at Iran as first a rationalist and then Islamist state. He stated that Iran has regional aspirations and the real issue at present is the place of Iran in the region as a regional power. After Afghanistan and Iraq war\, the West is now after Iran. On its role in Iraq and Afghanistan\, dialogue is resuming with the West\, particularly with the US. He hoped that there will be some settlement on Iran’s regional role. Finally\, he said that Islamic character of Iran is as important as the national character of it and he felt that there is need to do more research on this subject. He concluded by thanking the gatherings for having a constructive engagement.    \nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-domestic-determinants-of-irans-foreign-policy-the-illusion-of-consensus
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100924T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100924T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63637-1285306200-1285306200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Utility of Force in the India-Pakistan Context
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Maj Gen (retd) D. Banerjee\, AVSM\nDiscussants: Col. Vivek Chadha and Shri Anit Mukherji \n \nAli Ahmed introduced the paper by saying that he is going to bring the practise out of the theory. He assessed the utility of force for India in addressing its Pakistan problem. He explained that India has been a victim of Pakistan’s proxy war for over two decades and relations between the two countries remained very adversarial with costs\, risks\, uncertainties and opportunity costs. To deal with this problem\, India has been adopting a strategy of restraint against Pakistani provocations through subconventional deterrence where option for use of force is being kept in reserve. But the continuation of Pakistan’s proxy war against India proves that subconventional deterrence is only partially effective. In recent years\, India has been attempting to strengthen its deterrence by both defence acquisitions and doctrinal evolution. He pointed out that thinking through the possibility of use of force can help addressing the Pakistan problem. He\, however\, said that any kind of use of force must be in light of India’s national aims and objectives. \nHe provided an overview of political and strategic aims for India in addressing its Pakistan problem with use of force. He also provided operational objectives that are to be provisioned by the implementation of the service doctrines\, to include Cold Start. He opined that once strategic objectives are achieved in light of political aims\, joint objectives are framed from which\, in turn\, service specific objectives are derived. He also spoke about the diplomatic and intelligence instruments for achieving the stated objectives. He emphasised that at the diplomatic level\, use of India’s soft power\, economic leverage and the influence of the Diaspora would be more useful.  \nIn the second part of his presentation\, he outlined the conflict scenarios in which military forces are likely to be used. He said that the proximate cause of conflict between the two countries is most likely to come out from a terrorist attack of the magnitude of Mumbai 26/11 and its linkage with the Pakistan establishment would compel India to take military action. He suggested that for India to see the gains\, economic consequences of such military actions need to be calculated before hand. In the light of aims\, objectives and methods\, he also outlined the three possible outcome scenarios of such military actions as benign\, benign-malign and malign scenarios.  \nHe identified that use of force can be more effective if it is melded with other instruments of national power. Besides\, sweeteners need to be offered to Pakistan; otherwise it would turn into a risky coercive exercise into one of compellence with questionable efficacy. He said that given the attendant problems of application of force\, a non-military resolution of outstanding issues must instead be pursued in right earnest. In the end\, he said that a limited war is useful in conditioning Pakistan\, but for that diplomatic and political prongs need to be worked as much as the military and intelligence prongs of strategy.  \nAnit Mukherji suggested that the paper needs to include interviews of government officials in defence services\, ministry of defence\, politicians\, experts\, etc. He opined that there is not much of discussion on military doctrine in India. So far the Cold Start doctrine has not been operationalised in India. To destroy terrorists camps\, could army really operationalise this. In case of full-fledged war\, it could not be operationalised. He suggested that the lessons learned during Operation Parakram need to be studied. \nCol Vivek Chadha said that utility of force need to be assessed taking into account three areas where international conflict still prevails i.e. i) Afghanistan\, ii) Iraq\, and iii) West Asia. He said that force is not always necessary to achieve the stated strategic objectives. For instance\, despite military mobilization during Operation Parakram\, how far those objectives were achieved. So far as Kashmir issue is concerned\, its solution lies more within than outside. The issue can be resolved within politically and through socio-economic measures. He pointed out that India needs to resolve Kashmir issue within to keep Pakistan out. He suggested that one must look at the timeframe and location of such military actions.  \nCdr. Sarabjeet Singh Parmar suggested a focus on two aspects: i) Grand strategy and ii) Use of military doctrine. He said that these two should be prepared and assessed before taking any military actions. In case of grand strategy\, national values and interests need to be clearly defined and political direction taking into account the international legal limitations should be shaped accordingly. He added that operationalisation of war doctrines and its consequences must be assessed in advance to see military gains. \nProfessor Sumit Ganguly suggested four areas of focus. First\, the presenter needs to come out clearly to describe what lessons could be learned from Bernard Brodie and Clausewitz for India-Pakistan context and how could they be useful in explaining the possible use of force in India-Pakistan conflict. Second\, he said that the deterrence strategy has failed in the context of Pakistan and it has its limitation to deter Pakistan to undo something that has already been done. Third\, citing the US strategic goal of regime change in Iraq and its ramifications\, Prof. Ganguly pointed out that no Indian would like to change the regime in Pakistan. Finally\, he suggested that the political\, strategic and military deterrence strategy that the presenter has proposed is abstract\, and that he needs to explain what exactly could be carried out through these strategies. He added that in case of India-Pakistan conflict\, diplomacy will play a crucial role than military strategy.  \nDiscussion\n\nIn the 1980s NATO had created the Air Land Battle Doctrine in Europe to fight against the USSR. However\, it used this doctrine only during Iraq war. There was a Pakistan connection in September 11\, 2001 terrorist attacks as well as in the recent Times Square plot. Mr. K. Subrahmanyam asked as to why did not the US carry out military operations against Pakistan?\nOne participant asked how the three scenarios detailed by Ali Ahmed applied to incidents like the 26/11 Mumbai attacks? Moreover\, the idea of sweetener has to be fleshed out.\nAnother participant pointed out that one does not go to war to concede. Moreover\, if the fundamental cause of using force against Pakistan is regime change\, then it would bring about the worst result. Instead\, the focus should be on changing the behaviour of the Pakistan Army.\nHow can a limited war gravely affect India’s economy? This assertion needs to be substantiated. Second\, a limited war cannot be fought to effect regime change in Pakistan\, but at best to influence the calculations and strategy of Pakistan. Moreover\, to talk about a general peace with Pakistan at the end of such a conflict is also far-fetched. Further\, instead of attempting the rather difficult task of compelling Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism\, it would be far more easier for India to exploit the internal turmoil within Pakistan as a means to influence its decision makers.\nIn view of the escalation and de-escalation of war\, de-escalation of war is a very rational choice for India while escalation of war is a rational choice for Pakistan. By escalating limited war\, Pakistan can build international pressure on India. Question is what would be Pakistan’s nuclear option during this limited war.\nSo far as giving sweeteners to Pakistan is concerned\, this has failed in the last 60 years. Whether Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Lahore diplomacy or Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s opening to Pakistan and providing money to flood victims\, everything fails. During Kargil war\, it was because of US and China’s pressure that Pakistan withdrew troops from Line of Control. Then what kind of sweeteners do you want to give to Pakistan? What is your framework? What you want to exclude and include?\nEngagement through dialogue fails against Pakistan and does not help improve the situation. Can military and intelligence strategy make Pakistan hesitant?\nMany people are worried about the Cold Start doctrine. It was prepared after Operation Parakram. India has fought four wars with Pakistan. After the incidence of 26/11 Mumbai attack\, where you could put the Cold Start doctrine against Pakistan. During chemical or biological war what could be done?\nIn the last ten years\, the international environment has changed significantly. The US fought two wars – Afghanistan and Iraq which led to geopolitical change in this region. India links Pakistan in its Central Asian strategy. India and Pakistan relations will depend on this. What can be done in this regard?\n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nMaj Gen Banerjee complimented Ali Ahmed and said that the paper can be summarized in two points i.e. i) Utility of force against Pakistan and ii) Search for a doctrine to do that which will continue. He pointed out that the use of nuclear option between India and Pakistan will be trilateral where China will be included. However\, he emphasized that nuclear exchange between the two countries during a crisis will tantamount to a policy failure. He concluded by thanking the panellists and the gathering for a constructive engagement.   \nReport prepared by Dr. Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-utility-of-force-in-the-india-pakistan-context
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100910T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100910T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63638-1284096600-1284096600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Project Management in Border  Roads Organisation and related  Management Concerns
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Amiya Kumar GhoshDiscussants: Shri T P Velayudhan and Shri K K Y Mahinderkar \n \nThe infrastructure development in border areas is very important to bolster troop mobility and logistics supply. Realising the need for creation of a single entity for development of road network in far flung and backward areas of western and eastern sectors of the country Border Roads Organisation (BRO) was established in 1960 with the Director General Border Roads as the executive head. Since then the BRO has been engaged with the development of new roads\, maintenance of existing roads\, construction and maintenance of bridges\, border fencing\, snow clearance operations to keep the airfields\, passes and roads open for maximum period of the year to enable the Army to perform their role effectively and unhindered. The contribution provided by the BRO to maintain and create connectivity to keep the mobility is immense. However\, in the process of discharging the assigned role BRO faces several management challenges. Cost and time overrun has been identified by the presenter as the most persistent management concern of the BRO.  \nThe factors leading to time and cost overrun issue\, according to the speaker include line function set up for construction and supervision; diversification of the services in wide spread areas; lack of technical soundness and correct estimation\, execution methodology\, incorrect and unrealistic technical approach\, loose financial control\, underutilization of manpower resources or non utilization of technical manpower; underutilization or non utilization of the costly equipments; lack of airlift support system. Most of these factors are internal to the organization. There are some external factors as well leading to time and cost overrun\, such as land acquisition problems\, problems of payment of land compensation\, delays in wild life clearance\, forest clearance\, rising cost of construction materials\, unfavourable climatic conditions\, nature of terrain\, extent of rainfall and snowfall\, natural calamities like floods and changing course of rivers\, extremely hot climate and shifting dunes and dust storms in Rajasthan\, rarified atmosphere in high altitude areas\, limited working season\, insurgency\, inhospitable conditions\, shortages of hired labour etc. .  \nAccording to the speaker the process of preparation of works plan needs improvement. In any planning process at the time of its formulation\, the aspects of manpower planning and resource and logistics plan should be given utmost priority. Some of the internal and external factors are controllable by proper project management approach. However\, there are some factors which are beyond the control of the organisation. Therefore\, there is a need to address both types of concerns by adopting a balanced approach and through proper assessment of external factors before initiating execution of any project. Hence there is a need to review the entire system of plan preparation in BRO. Further the creation of large number of jobs needs to be avoided to devote scarce resources to priority sector job\, according to the speaker.  \nExternal Discussant\nBoth the external discussants have agreed that the time and cost overrun is a major problem of the BRO. However\, they felt that a holistic approach is required to analyse the factors leading to time and cost overrun problem. Humane and socio-economic issues involved in border road construction are discussed at length. Both the discussants have brought out the fact that agency and deposit work can not be avoided. There is a healthy match between Agency and General Staff work. Though outsourcing is recognized an essential alternative to supplement the limited departmental capability of BRO\, the inherent risk factor associated with outsourcing was discussed.  One of the external discussants has discussed the organizational complexities and labour problem in length. He has brought out the fact that due to various lucrative schemes available at the state level like NREGA\, BRO no longer attracts labour to work in the border areas under extreme condition. He feels inclusion of these complex issues would enrich the paper.  \nInternal Discussants\nCommand and control is identified as an important problem by one of the internal discussants. According to him recruitment of technically competent people and proper supervision can reduce cost overrun to a large extent. Structuring aspect of the paper was discussed by the other internal discussant.   \nGeneral Discussion\nIt came out very well at the end of the discussion that BRO is working under extreme condition. On the issue of outsourcing when one participant felt that BRO should outsource its work to giants like L&T\, another felt that outsourcing is a partial solution to the problem. The system needs be thoroughly reviewed to rectify the weaknesses. The ecological aspect was also touched upon by one participant.  \nChair’s Summary\nThe chair concluded that BRO is challenged by several problems apart from time and cost overrun. BRO regulations are outdated and they need to be re-looked and reviewed.  \nReport Prepared by Gulbin Sultana\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/project-management-in-border-roads-organisation-and-related-management-concerns
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100903T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100903T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63639-1283491800-1283491800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China's Territorial Claim on Arunachal Pradesh Hostile Intentions and Local Fears
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador C DasguptaDiscussants: Professor Sujit Dutta and Dr. Srinath Raghavan \n \nThe presenter identified the more aggressive stance taken recently by China in staking territorial claims over the North Eastern parts of India as the key motivation for undertaking her study. She also expressed her desire to reach out to the people of the region through her paper. The differences in perceptions between India and China over the line of demarcation of the Sino-Indian border\, with the McMahon line denounced in China as an imperialist imposition\, was identified as a continuing problem. She then went on to examine the Chinese position on the boundary question from realist\, constructivist and neo-liberal perspectives.  \nDescribing China’s approach as “two-track”\, Dr. Goswami underscored China’s enhanced economic and diplomatic engagement with India alongside persistent territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh. Within the framework of realism\, the paper argued that China was following a “balance of power” framework vis-a-vis the India-US strategic partnership by upping the ante in Arunachal Pradesh to ensure that India remains tied down by its territorial disputes with China\, and is wary of its physical presence in the eastern border. The paper also extensively reviewed the ideational factors underlying such claims as well as their expression both in rhetoric and on the ground. Chinese perceptions of India’s strategic perspectives including its position on issues relating to Tibet – were examined. Viewed from one theoretical lens\, Chinese claims were attributed to  the neo-liberal school regarding exploitation of local mineral resources including  hydro-electric power potential. Infrastructure development sponsored by China and India’s neglect of the same were seen to foster a sense of alienation among communities in the North East. \nPossible alternative scenarios\, based on local narratives as well as on China’s evolving perception of itself as a player in the international system\, were outlined. A policy of aggressive deterrence on India’s part\, coupled with robust diplomatic action\, was advocated. “Act Local\, Think Global” was the message.     \nExternal Discussant: Dr. Srinath Raghavan\nDr. Raghavan drew attention to the intricacies of boundary demarcation processes and their implications for the case under discussion. He questioned the validity of the realist hypothesis that Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh were informed by an intent to “balance” India or the United States or both. On the theoretical front\, he also did not find any merit in the neo-liberal model as yielding an enhanced understanding of the situation .  \nIn his analysis\, China’s approach has been consistently marked by a preference for inter-sectoral bargaining and as such\, its stance on Arunachal Pradesh may not be construed as overly aggressive. He ended by projecting a scenario where the boundary dispute between India and China might at some stage be resolved despite all its apparent intractability.    \nExternal Discussant: Prof. Sujit Dutta\nProf. Dutta took the view that the contribution to enhancing the very limited understanding of local perceptions and spectrum of opinion on various key questions in the North East – was the most significant potential contribution of the paper. He cautioned against direct deployment of International Relations theories in deconstruction of Foreign Policy. Instead he favoured “Group-thinking Theory”\, “Rational Choice Theory” and such other cognitive theories that account for domestic motivations and decision-making for delivering richer analytical output.  \nIn his opinion\, the balance of power paradigm fell short of explaining Chinese behaviour as India’s partnership with the US is nowhere near as developed as to pose a threat to and elicit fearful reactions from China. On the practical side he explained the futility of attempting a bargain revolving around the settled population principle. On the question of Tibet he lamented the near-absence of diplomatic engagement by China\, characterizing its approach as self-serving.    \nInternal Discussants\nThe first internal discussant suggested that China’s stance vis-à-vis the North East and perceptions within the North East on critical issues could more usefully form the subjects of two separate papers. He contended that different theoretical perspectives were instrumental in decoding varied and separate aspects of the problem\, pointing to corresponding policy implications.  \nChina’s internal nationalist discourse and its staunchly anti-imperialist tenor were singled out by the second internal discussant as factors laden with implications for policy analysis and diplomatic engagement.       \nOpen-floor Discussion\nOne participant described the significance of shared tribal affinities across borders in the region\, asking why there have been no Chinese overtures to populations south of the McMahon line. For purposes of the study\, he recommended closer examination of the chronology and record of India’s policy pronouncements and actions in the North East over past decades. For a more balanced picture\, one participant suggested incorporation of Chinese writing on the subject.\nAccording to one intervention\, regional affinities in the North East have tended to vary across time and tribal divisions. The role of elites in the North East in playing up the Chinese threat to attract attention from the Indian centre was also mentioned. Water security and the related significance of the Bramhaputra were posited as considerations gaining in importance in China’s strategic calculus over coming decades. Threats posed to indigenous culture in the North-East by recent developments and interactions with surrounding regions were argued to be serious concerns. Addressing developmental concerns in the North East was argued as central to any sustainable resolution of on-going disputes. The gaping need for an in-depth ethnographic study of local conditions and aspirations was repeatedly raised in the house.          \nChairs Summary\nThe Chair advised sharper definition of the research question\, as the explanations for China’s original claims and its resurgent pursuit of these claims are likely to be different. He argued for paying closer attention to the growth-rate differential north and south of the McMahon line to discern implications for the future. He concluded by thanking the gathering for a fruitful discussion. \nReport prepared by Kalyani Unkule\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-territorial-claim-on-arunachal-pradesh-hostile-intentions-and-local-fears
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100827T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100827T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63640-1282887000-1282887000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:50 years of Indus Water Treaty: Will it Survive?
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Satish ChandraDiscussants: B. G. Verghese and D.K. Mehta \n \nIn an attempt to question whether the Indus Water Treaty holds any tangible ground in today’s day and age\, this paper tracks the origins of the basic conflict\, its origins and the detailed history that eventually led to it being drafted and signed in 1960. In the light of the history of the treaty\, the authors have laid  emphasis on  the first proposal of the World Bank which was based on three very prominent principles: “The Indus basin water resources were sufficient to meet all existing and further uses of both countries; the water resources of the Indus basin should be cooperatively developed treating the Indus basin as a unit; and that the problem of Indus basin water resources should be resolved on a functional and not on a political plane.” The authors however do go on to say that the nature of the treaty did become political in due course of time\, which is why one is obliged to question its survival. \nThe paper dwells on why exactly the treaty was signed and what it meant for both India and Pakistan and what other options either country had during the time of signing. For instance\, the paper elucidates that India as the upper riparian could have chosen not to sign the treaty and use the waters of the Indus river system flowing through its territory\, but it also states rather categorically that India also had its own compulsions to sign the treaty. The building pressure from the US and the World Bank for instance. \nAs the political relationship between the two conflicting nations has seen its ups and down\, the study brings to light how the political dynamics is directly corresponding to the survival of the Indus water treaty. Especially given that now Pakistan has given a notice to India to take the Kishanganga hydroelectric proposal to a neutral expert and also sought to invoke a court of arbitration for the interpretation on the treaty.  \nAnother aspect that this paper seeks to draw attention to is the issue of Jammu and Kashmir\, which the authors feel is one that is often missed. It brings out the strong perception that India’s generosity towards Pakistan (Pakistan getting 80 per cent of the water resources)\, was at the cost of the welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Besides\, despite there being a general opinion to change the treaty in certain respects\, the paper is very clear in stating that neither side has officially communicated any desire to modify the treaty despite the increasing resentment in public opinion. \nExternal Discussant: Mr. D K Mehta\nOne fact that was brought out very coherently by Mr. Mehta was that as a matter of fact\, perception needs to be corrected. The main shortcoming from India’s side was that there has been no storage of water. At least 3 to 6 feet of water needs to be stored. He stated that it is absolutely imperative if India actually wants to make use of even the 20 per cent of the water that it does have from the Indus water treaty and a daily or a weekly balance needs to be maintained. States affected especially Jammu and Kashmir need to come up with some policies and facilities for storage. As far as the widely acknowledged generosity of India is concerned\, it could be said that India should have probably asked for more at the time of the signing of the treaty. \nExternal Discussant: Mr. B.G. Varghese\nMr. Varghese took a rather clear stand on the issue by saying that government secrecy between ministries needs to be done away with for good. And that this very problem has led to the downfall of many policy implementation programmes. Also the ideas of water storage need to be made clear\, for example\, a dead storage where water is stagnant is not a storage\, but a silt trap. According to him\, India was not being generous\, but had an acute problem of refugees post partition.  Therefore from the point of view of rehabilitation\, India needed to provide some irrigation for the land in question and as an upper riparian India has delivered on the treaty.  \nInternal Discussants \nOne of the internal discussants was of the opinion that this paper very lucidly brings out the “lie that it was a successful treaty.” Also India has not explored the opportunities of hydroelectricity and storage with the water available. The review of this paper must be driven by certain important factors. For instance\, at the time of the signing of the treaty\, short term gains were looked at\, Pakistan has had a hand in politicizing it. Also Ms. Ray asks of the authors to expand on exactly why India accepted the so called unfair terms of the treaty and also to state what “counter measures” can or may India take in the future.  \nAnother discussant raised the doubt whether India was only generous or was just a bad negotiator. \nGeneral Discussion\nIn response to some of the questions raised by the internal discussants\, one member said that contrary to popular belief\, per capita availability is not the issue in Pakistan. It is actually the mismanagement of water made available by this treaty. Emphasis was also laid on sources of information in Pakistan which has made water a very important issue in the country. It has also been instigated by non-state actors like the chief of the Jamaat-ud-Dawah Hafiz Muhammad Saeed\, whose main source of information comes from Urdu dailies that are not particularly pro-India. Furthermore\, the fact that these newspapers have a wide readership does not help matters either. \nChair’s Summary\nThe Chair concluded that what was required was effective policy implementation\, which needs to be reviewed on a regular basis. The chair also spoke at length on how both countries need to evolve and revise the treaty with the changing times. \nReport prepared by Shahana Joshi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/50-years-of-indus-water-treaty-will-it-survive
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100820T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100820T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63641-1282282200-1282282200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Institutional Origins and Strategic Determinants of India's Africa policy
DESCRIPTION:Elaborating on his approach to the paper Mr. Xavier disavowed both\, a reductionist/particularistic and an overly generalist/homogenizing prism to assessment of India’s foreign policy. He proceeded to identify a number of limitations relating to existing work on the subject of India in Africa\, including the clubbing together of China and India vis-à-vis Africa and the assumption\, rather that explicit pronouncement\, of a definitive policy posture of India in the region.  \nBriefly reviewing historical ties between India and Africa\, the presenter drew out both high and low points in the relationship. Economic drivers were identified as assuming the central role in determining the nature and direction of evolution of this relationship in the contemporary context.  \nThe key analytical contribution of the paper was identification of intra- and inter-institutional tensions and short-comings that have hindered optimization of India’s role in Africa. On the diplomatic side\, a certain image of African nations has long been responsible for a less than desired Indian presence. Relative informalisation of processes\, lack of continuity and near-absence of lateral co-operation amongst GoI Ministries and Missions in Africa were deemed serious lacunae on the practical side. \nAs far as academic work on Africa produced in India is concerned\, lack of emphasis on field work and consequent regurgitation of known facts and missing policy relevance were viewed as problematic. Business endeavour in Africa by Indian industry was also similarly described as plagued by poor background research. Co-operation between Ministries and business entities was referred to as a “constant fire-fighting exercise”\, resulting eventually in an absence of a coordinated\, concerted and coherent policy and action agenda. The relative merits of ad-hocism and a diffuse character of policy as opposed to one that is well substantiated were thrown up for discussion. \nExternal Discussant: Mr. C. Raja Mohan\nMr. Raja Mohan questioned the assumption that a lack of approximation of India’s model for foreign policy formulation with that of the United States is ipso facto suggestive of a weaker quality of expertise and intelligent input. He hypothesised that examination of certain specific historic episodes was likely to yield interesting insights – some of them departing with the idea that Non-alignment has been the dominant discourse on relations with Africa. On the question of India’s reaction to Apartheid for instance\, he raised the question as to whether this was inspired by anti-colonialism or a preference for universalism.  \nDespite public rhetoric to the contrary\, he emphasized emulation of and competition with China as an undeniably important driver of Indian policy in Africa. Methodologically\, he favoured actions and market-based decisions of business actors more closely rather than political signals as more potent conveyers of the progression of India’s role in Africa.   \nExternal Discussant: Mr. Navdeep Suri\nLauding efforts at public diplomacy by Indian actors in Africa\, Mr. Suri underscored the need for greater publicity for these measures. He emphasized the importance of boots on the ground to deliver desired policy outcomes as equally important\, if not more so\, than official policy pronouncements. He lamented the long-standing experience that the good-will accrued through India’s investment and aid involvement in Africa has failed to translate into tangible gains on the ground for India.  \nMr. Suri recommended better documentation of the “Africa in India” story for the positive ramifications this exercise is likely to yield. On the issue of competition with China he urged appreciation of India’s own unique strengths and an attempt to build on these.     \nInternal Discussants\nOne internal discussant described pan-Africanism as the cornerstone for any definition of policy on that region. She also suggested that the degree of exceptionalism of the problems identified on the institutional side by the paper as regards Africa needs to be established in light of comparative evidence. The value of incorporating views of the Indian military presence in Africa was also spoken in favour of.  \nAnother internal discussant came out in support of Democracy and Aid as crucial drivers meriting in-depth exploration. He recommended spelling out and countering of that image of Africa which gets in the way of its prioritization as a region. On the general trend in academic work on foreign policy in Africa\, he advocated a more theoretically embedded methodological approach.     \nOpen-floor Discussion\nOne participant suggested inclusion of sub-national actors on the African landscape to derive a richer analytical range. Another questioned the adequacy of a pan-African policy alone to incorporate diversity across the Continent. There was a suggestion that yardsticks against which the paper found Indian policy in Africa to come up short would do well to be explicitly set out. Concern was expressed over capacity-related inadequacies across most regions where India’s pursuit of its foreign policy objectives is concerned even as recent achievements were acknowledged.      \nChairs Summary\nThe chair portrayed the African continent as the land of the future. It was his view that India’s diplomatic presence in Africa has a number of achievements to boast of and has played a useful supporting role to India’s business enterprise in Africa. But he equally highlighted the need for recognition of Africa’s felt needs as the over-riding concern for Indian engagement. He took the opportunity to encourage the think tank community to continue making its contribution to influencing policy and educating the wider public.     \nReport prepared by Kalyani Unkule\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-institutional-origins-and-strategic-determinants-of-indias-africa-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100810T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100810T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130742Z
UID:63642-1281418200-1281418200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Round Table with Ms Michele Flournoy\, US Undersecretary of Defence for Policy
DESCRIPTION:US Undersecretary of Defence for Policy\, Michele Flournoy today delivered an address at IDSA on India-US strategic partnership and participated in the interactive session that followed with the scholars of the institute and select invitees. In her opening address\, she underlined the importance of India in solving both regional and global problems. The depth of the partnership could be gauged from the pace at which the strategic partnership has progressed she added.  \nShe reiterated that the US was committed to a long-term strategic partnership with India as the interests of both nations converged over a wide spectrum. These ranged from Afghanistan\, Pakistan\, the Indian Ocean region\, interests in the global commons\, among others. Flournoy asserted that India was an indispensable partner to realising the US’s regional and global strategic objectives. Referring to the concerns expressed in New Delhi on the commitment of the Obama administration to further strengthening the relationship\, Ms. Flournoy assured the audience that the present administration is as committed as the previous administrations in furthering the partnership.  \nSpeaking on Afghanistan\, Ms. Flournoy clarified that July 2011 was not a withdrawal point for US forces from that country but an ‘inflection point’ which indicated that the ongoing surge of US troops will end. She added that the US will continue to be heavily engaged even beyond that point. In this context\, she appreciated India’s constructive role in providing developmental assistance and acknowledged the sacrifices made by Indian personnel while carrying out their activities.  \nMs. Flournoy stated that the US was trying to build trust with the Pakistani leadership and that there has been an increased commitment from that leadership to combat extremism which has begun to haunt them as well. She added that the defence equipment the US was providing Pakistan like F-16 aircraft was being used in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns.  \nThe Indian Ocean region according to her was an important area of US strategic interest\, as noted in the Quadrennial Defence Review 2010. These were also the waterways on which India depended for her energy imports. China in recent past was also evincing a keen interest in the Indian Ocean. On China specifically\, Ms. Flournoy stated that the US was watching its rise with great interest. While seeking a positive\, cooperative relationship with China\, the US was also encouraging it to be more transparent in its strategic goals.  \nMs. Flournoy noted that in order to deal with trans-national threats like the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime security\, cooperative\, multi-lateral approaches would be useful. In this regard\, she pointed out the efficacy of such multi-lateral responses like the post-2004 Tsunami rescue efforts. She concluded by emphasising the need for India and the US to capitalise on the remarkable progress made so far in the bilateral relationship. She called for a better understanding of each other’s processes and procedure in the defence field in order to further strengthen defence cooperation. Another aspect could be for both the countries to make operational cooperation procedures to undertake high-seas patrolling for instance.  \nConcluding her remarks\, Ms. Flournoy stated that given that India and the US share a deep commitment to long-term cooperation\, both the countries can form an enduring partnership to increase peace and security both regionally and globally. \nIn the Q&A\, members of the audience raised questions about the continuing US arms supplies to Pakistan and the negative effect of such a policy on the security situation in the sub-continent. Ms. Flournoy stated that the US was mindful of such concerns. She however reiterated that US arms were primarily intended to assist that country in dealing with the menace of terrorism.  \nOn Iran\, she stated that India and the US shared the same objective on not wanting to see a nuclear-armed country but may be differed on the way to achieve that objective. She reiterated that the prospects of dialogue and negotiation with the Iranian regime were open and that the US was forced to follow the sanctions path given the Iranian intransigence in not fulfilling their international obligations.  \nShe held out the prospects of greater cooperation in the defence realm between India and the US and pointed out that over 90 per cent of license requests from India were approved. She however acknowledged that the US export control system was cumbersome\, antiquated and needed to change in order to accommodate the changing US security interests.  \nMs. Flournoy informed the audience that the US was aware of ‘seam’ issues between the Central Command and Pacific Command and India’s concerns in the matter. She added that new commanders at both these commands would address the issue actively.  \nOn Afghanistan\, Ms. Flournoy stated that the building up of capacities of Afghan security forces was of prime importance. She also reiterated the importance of more representation in governmental structures by all sections of the Afghan society in order to address the root causes of the problem in that country. \nIn reply to a question\, Ms. Flournoy reiterated that the US was concerned about both the intentions as well as capabilities of China\, specifically their anti-ship missiles\, ASAT weapons\, cyber capabilities\, among others. She pointed out that the Chinese were indulging in assertive behaviour in the South China Sea\, which was unsettling its neighbours.  \nN.S. Sisodia\, Director General\, IDSA\, introduced Ms. Flournoy and thanked her for sharing her thoughts on the India-US bilateral relations. Amb. Shyam Saran\, chaired the session.  \nReport prepared by S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Associate Fellow\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/round-table-with-ms-michele-flournoy-us-undersecretary-of-defence-for-policy
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100716T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100716T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63643-1279258200-1279258200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Foreign Policy Trends in Pakistan
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri R BanerjiDiscussants: Prof. Kalim Bahadur and Prof. Savita Pande \n \nThe paper titled “Foreign Policy Trends in Pakistan” concerns itself with the context set by 9/11\, though its key objective was to analyse the most recent trends in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. The central argument of the paper is that there is no consensus within Pakistan on the issue of relations with the United States and the rise of radical Islamist groups renders the evolution of such a consensus even more challenging.  \nKey Drivers of Pakistani Foreign Policy were identified as: \n\nIncreasing American Intrusiveness\nKarzai’s Inclination to Patch up with Pakistan\nIndia’s Impatience with Pakistan’s Response to Terrorism\nGarnering Continued Strategic Support from China\nMagnifying the India Threat by leveraging its Water Crisis\nEnsuring Adequate Energy Supplies\n\nMs. Kumar argued that within Pakistani circles\, mistrust of the US has increasingly less to do with Indo-US relations\, but about the American presence in the region. Citing examples of this\, she outlined its implications and consequent Pakistani reactions. She also examined the contradictions resulting from Pakistan’s policy objective of playing a central role in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan while simultaneously extending support to the Taliban\, the nature of which was further substantiated.  \nIn relation to India\, it was suggested that the tenor of the Pakistani attitude has been largely self–congratulatory in light of resumption of talks. It was contended moreover that the expected gains from the current round of talks must not be over-estimated. Recent co-operation between Pakistan and China was evaluated and understood as being inconsistent with international opinion and certain US policy pronouncements. Conclusion of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline deal was deemed yet another instance of safeguarding national interest despite oppositional American pressures. \nThe paper’s overall assessment was that the US is likely to remain a significant element around which foreign policy in Pakistan is shaped. The US continues to perceive Pakistan as a crucial player in the Afghan theatre\, even as the latter has redoubled efforts to minimize the scope for active Indian participation. The argument was made in conclusion that dialogue for its own sake was certainly unlikely to resolve outstanding issues that cloud the Indo-Pakistani relationship.     \nExternal Discussants:\nProf. Kalim Bahadur: On certain very important issues\, national consensus within Pakistan remains intact\, for example the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Condemnation of deployment of non-state actors as instruments of policy was near non-existent in Pakistan. In the same vein\, actions directed by these elements against India enjoyed the tacit support of the establishment. The drone strikes launched from Pakistani soil delegitimised Pakistan’s overt stance that such American actions were counter to its sovereignty. Pakistan’s continued perception of its relationship with China as a useful hedge against both India and the US was also understood as vital to its foreign policy stance. \nProf. Savita Pande: “Memory”\, “external environment” and “state’s domestic composition” are determinants of foreign policy as argued by a recent academic work on the subject. At the institutional level\, there is lack of a clear delineation of responsibilities within the Pakistani establishment vis-à-vis external relations. Such entities as Blackwater were functioning in Pakistan with\, rather that in spite of\, the consent of the Pakistani leadership. Speaking in favour of maintaining an analytical distinction between the Afgan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban\, Prof. Pande described the optimistic\, pessimistic and pragmatist positions which are all currently in vogue in Pakistan on the matter of dealing with the Pakistani Taliban. China’s pursuit of its own interests in the Af-Pak theatre was briefly examined to draw out lessons for India\, while on the Iran-Pakistan pipeline\, India’s centrality to the viability and success of this project was postulated. \nInternal Discussants\nDr. Behuria mentioned the importance of drawing an analytical distinction between objectives and drivers of foreign policy. Adding to the list of drivers on the domestic front\, he drew attention to the significance of economic decline and political clout of the military in shaping the context for foreign policy design in Pakistan.  \nOnce again separating drivers from relevant issues\, Dr. Kalyanaraman addressed important shifts in the Afghan scenario and corresponding attempts by Pakistan to reposition itself. He further identified the past year or so as the more closely relevant frame of reference for purposes of arriving at helpful conclusions about new developments in Pakistan’s foreign policy. The future of Afghanistan was singled out as a potently useful prism to anticipate Pakistan’s relationship with the US\, China\, Iran and India.  \nDiscussion\nThe need to explicitly comment on the extent to which foreign policy in Pakistan is influenced by the military was highlighted and it was suggested to consider ways in which greater civilian control over policy formulation would change its content and character. The author was suggested to give proposals on how the dialogue might be supplemented to attain key goals on the Indian side. It was advised that a considered assessment be made of greater Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan\, for reasons of achieving strategic depth\, in terms of the backlash that this would have for the Pakistani state. Pakistan’s attempts to strike a balance between its relations with the US and China was identified as meriting close observation. \nChair’s Summary\nThe chair took the view that consensus on key national issues in Pakistan has not quite broken down nor has the influence of the military sustained any erosion. He acknowledged a role for Pakistan in containing the effects of American involvement in Afghanistan while coping with the extremist blowback that this might incur. He concluded by thanking the gathering for a fruitful discussion. \nReport prepared by Kalyani Unkule\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/foreign-policy-trends-in-pakistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100715T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100715T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221701Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130743Z
UID:63644-1279171800-1279171800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Flotsam and Jetsam\, Towards Ending Somali Piracy: A South African Perspective
DESCRIPTION:In recent years Piracy off the coast of Somalia has come in the limelight. To delve deeper into this issue IDSA organized a roundtable on July 15\, 2010. Capt. (retd.) Frank Charles van Rooyen\, Senior Researcher (Security) at South Africa Institute of International Affairs\, Johannesburg and currently Visiting Fellow\, IDSA made a presentation on Flotsam and Jetsam\, Towards Ending Somali Piracy Ashore (or Addressing the Issue of the Whale in the Room): A South African Perspective. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA. The participants included\, amongst others\, Gen. (retd.) B. S Malik; Capt. Alok Bansal\, Executive Director\, National Maritime Foundation; Capt. P.K. Ghosh\, Senior Fellow\, ORF; Capt. Ajay Vinay Bhave\, IN; Brig. (retd.) Rumel Dhayia\, Senior Fellow\, IDSA ; Prof. P. Stobdan\, Senior Fellow\, IDSA; Ruchita Beri\, Senior Research Associate\, IDSA; Mr. P. K. Upadhyay\, Consultant\, IDSA; and Mehmet Ozkan\, Visiting Fellow\, IDSA.  \nPiracy has become the critical issue for the international community.  However\, attempts are being made to repress or eradicate what is now beyond a phenomenon; there appears to be recognition of its enduring nature. There is recognition and agreement that it is the lack of a government in Somalia that is the ultimate cause of piracy.  Yet\, even in the face of the fact at least 14 initiatives have been attempted to re-establish a central functional government in Somalia\, very little\, if any\, progress is being made to turn the situation in Somalia around\, so that the country can revert to being an accountable state\, able to govern its own affairs and a proud member of world society.  \nCapt. Van Rooyen proposed a way for the world-at-large to deal with not only the specific case of Somalia as a failed state\, but to address the generics of the contemporary issue of failed states generally; in order to develop a pro-active way of dealing with the issue of failing and failed states. He began with a brief analysis of the United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea\, which led to the adoption of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in 1982. The world’s reaction to this specific case of piracy will be reviewed\, politically from the perspective of the United Nations and its agencies\, continental African as well as the politically devolved states’ and regions’ military responses. The author concluded by briefly analysing the strategic advantages of adopting a pro-active approach to failed states in general and to Somalia as a ‘pilot project’ in particular. \nPiracy off Somalia continues to be a growth industry\, having rapidly shifted gear from hundreds to millions of dollars paid in ransom money.  It is often the only way for young men to secure livelihoods and enhance their social status; but this newfound power also represents a sure way to disrupt the fabric of Somalia’s tapestry of clan and tribe hierarchy – which in turn exacerbates an already tenuous state of security. During the six months’ rule by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006\, top Islamic leaders urged pirates to cease their criminal activities\, which was heeded to the extent that piracy attacks fell dramatically.  Only after Ethiopian forces\, backed by the United States – which regarded the ICU as a terrorist organisation – ousted the ICU\, did piracy re-commence; and with it went the semblance of order and governance that had prevailed.  The ideal is that this state of affairs be sustained. \nThe International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia meets regularly to discuss the situation in Somalia. Recently\, it focused on ways to help implement the Djibouti Agreement signed between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) on 19 August 2008. Since 1991\, at least 14 serious attempts have been made to resolve the issue of Somalia and restore it to its status quo ante. There are clearly high levels of frustration at the lack of progress in Somalia\, and the impression that the international community is lingering\, waiting for the issue to resolve itself is all-pervasive. \nLastly\, Capt. Van Rooyen suggested that Somalia and other failing and failed states deserve a life-line of an opportunity\, such as the one that delivered the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in 1982.  Somalia and the others in the same boat are worthy of rescue from the pirates\, through the hosting of a proposed “World conference on Somalia and other shattered states:  Long-lasting solutions”. The aim of such a Conference would be to permanently resolve the issue of Somalia and other shattered states. The action to initiate such a world conference should be taken by IBSA dialogue forum as these three states are voices of the South and valued models of liberal democracy in the world. The author proposed that the three IBSA states – India\, Brazil and South Africa – should put the proposal collectively to the United Nations General Assembly. \nDiscussion: \n\nPiracy off Somalia has become a transnational crime; it is very difficult to control it. There are chances of a coalition developing between terrorists and pirates in Somalia. If this happens it will aggravate the situation.\nIt is important to understand Somali culture before trying to find a solution for the existing crisis. It appears that the Somalis are trying to protect their marine wealth through piracy.\nWhile there are numerous task forces in the Gulf of Aden to deter the pirates\, there is actually no cooperation among them. More importantly actionable information is not shared. However\, this view was challenged by others\, who felt that cooperation exits\, though at the informal level.\nRecently there was a proposal for Turkey to mediate in the Somali issue. India under the platform of IBSA dialogue forum should join forces with Turkey to deal with this issue.\nWhile IBSA can be a platform to propose a world conference on Somalia and other shattered states\, however it is doubtful that the IBSA countries will be willing to put boots on the ground. The best solution to the problem can be found by a grouping of Indian Ocean littoral countries. \nIn the past some of the major global problems have been addressed through a world conference\, for example\, the issue of climate change or disarmament. However at first a consensus needs to be developed on whether the problem in Somalia is an issue of global concern or not?\nMoreover organizing a world conference to address the issue of “failed states” is idealistic and may have several roadblocks\, as it is a politically sensitive issue and deals with sovereignty of a nation.\nFinally\, while IBSA countries are indeed leading voices of the South\, the world conference on the Somalia issue cannot take off without getting the African Union on board.   \n\nReport compiled by Ruchita Beri and Mahtab Alam Rizvi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/flotsam-and-jetsam-towards-ending-somali-piracy-a-south-african-perspective
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100709T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100709T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221702Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63645-1278653400-1278653400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Securing Andaman and Nicobar islands
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Admiral (Retd.) P S DasDiscussants: Cmde Ashok Sawhney and Cdr Shishir Upadhyaya \n \nPaper Summary\nIndia’s forward presence in the eastern Indian Ocean is enabled by the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The location and geography of these Islands impart them with immense strategic importance. The archipelago forms India’s southeast frontier. It is also nearer to Southeast Asia than to the Indian mainland (approximately 1200 km away). The 780 km linear extension of the island gives it an extensive north-south spread in the Bay of Bengal\, ideal for generating domain awareness\, which could be utilized for countering traditional and non-traditional threats. The propinquity of these islands to the busy shipping lanes\, especially Malacca strait\, not only provides India with an opportunity to play an important role in the security of the sea lines of communication\, but also to use these islands as a transshipment hub\, a bunkering facility or a duty free port. Proximity of the archipelago to the Southeast Asian countries enables India to foster friendly relations by engaging them through joint operations. It also helps India in keeping abreast of the political and military developments in its extended neighbourhood.  \nAt the same time\, the physical distance and remoteness of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands from the Indian mainland contribute to their vulnerability to both conventional and non-conventional threats. At present\, the probability of a conventional threat to the island chain from its immediate neighbours appears remote. However\, a military threat to the islands could emanate in the form of a possible intervention in the Bay of Bengal by an extra regional power\, especially China\, given its dependence on sea borne supply lines in the Indian Ocean and the need to secure them both from non-state actors and potential adversaries such as the United States and India. Towards this end\, China has been diligently developing port and other infrastructural facilities in the Indian Ocean littoral. While China and the littoral states have maintained that the infrastructure being established is purely for commercial use\, utilization of these facilities by China during a conflict cannot be ruled out. And as part of its distant sea defence strategy\, China now seeks to project its naval supremacy as far as West Asia and to the shipping lanes of the Pacific by deploying warships as escorts for its commercial vessels. Moreover\, for tracking India’s capability and strengths in the Bay of Bengal\, China has been allegedly engaged in gathering intelligence stealthily through various means. Existence of a Chinese naval fleet in the vicinity would also greatly limit the range and extent of Indian naval operations.  \nHowever\, currently what seem to be a cause of immediate concern are non-conventional threats like poaching\, illegal settlements\, gunrunning and use of A&N’s uninhabited islands as hideaways by terrorist groups and smugglers\, and natural disasters. Poaching has emerged as the biggest problem for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Several factors have contributed to the emergence of these islands as a magnet for poachers. Firstly\, the fishing industry in the islands is underdeveloped. Secondly\, the existence of isolated and uninhabited islands scattered far and wide serves as ideal hideaways for poachers. And finally\, the existing policy of detaining the arrested poachers in a camp\, and then repatriating them to their country in conformity with international law\, has taken away the element of deterrence. Another security concern for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is the issue of illegal settlements. The trend of illegal Bangladeshi settlers has increased in the aftermath of the Tsunami Rehabilitation work. Dearth of labourers has meant that they are hired from the mainland but who continue to reside in the Island group permanently. The misuse of the Andaman Sea and various uninhabited islands of the archipelago for drug trafficking and gunrunning remains another issue of grave concern. Anti-smuggling operations have revealed that many islands of the archipelago are used as sanctuaries or trans-shipment bases by gunrunners\, terrorists and insurgents. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are also prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes and volcano eruptions. The Tsunami of 2004 bears testimony to the destruction of life and property caused by gigantic sea waves\, especially to the Nicobar Islands.  \nFollowing the India-China border in 1962 war\, the security of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was reviewed and the Indian Navy was assigned the responsibility of defending the Island territory. This led to the establishment of a forward naval base\, INS Jarawa\, at Port Blair in 1964. In 1981\, INS Jarawa was rechristened as FORTAN. In 2001\, the Group of Ministers’ Report on ‘reforming the national security system’ recommended replacing FORTAN with a joint Andaman and Nicobar Command. Broadly\, the functions of ANC can be divided into three categories – military\, diplomatic and constabulary.  The military role\, especially during peace time\, involves maintaining deterrence through Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)\, ensuring physical presence in the area of interest\, and conducting joint exercises. On the diplomatic level\, ANC has been involved in initiatives like Milan\, a biennial gathering of navies of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for the purpose of promoting regional cooperation and mutual understanding of maritime issues of common concern. Constabulary function for the ANC primarily involves enforcement of the rule of law at sea and conducting low intensity maritime operations to prevent poaching\, illegal migration\, narcotics and arms smuggling.  \nChallenges to securing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands come from a variety of factors. Prominent among them are a difficult topography\, inadequate infrastructure and manpower\, lack of coordination\, inefficient intelligence and pervasive under-development. Concerted efforts are being made by the government to plug the infrastructural gaps for enhancing surveillance\, air defence and coastal security. Assets and manpower are being strengthened. For example\, plans are afoot for building two air bases at Shibpur and Campbell Bay after the airstrips there are lengthened and night operation facilities are provided to enable them to operate all types of aircraft round the clock. A proposal for establishing additional Coast Guard stations at Havelock and Ranggat has been forwarded. The marine police have completed vulnerability gap analysis and have proposed the augmentation of manpower and assets. Besides the development of infrastructure\, grey areas that hamper the effective functioning of the security forces need to be addressed. Firstly\, better coordination between various security agencies\, especially between Coast Guard\, police and forest department has to be ensured. A MDA among them should be created and the SOP needs to be standardized at the earliest.  For the intelligence gathering process both HUMINT and TECHINT need to be made strong and fluent. Above all\, a holistic development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has to be undertaken. Tourism can act as a catalyst for the development of the islands as a tourist hub.  \nDiscussion and Suggestions\n\nThere needs to be a change in India’s attitude towards Andaman and Nicobar. Instead of defending it\, Andaman and Nicobar islands should be viewed as the first line of defence.\nThe main aim of India in Andaman and Nicobar region should be to assess the threats from China and Pakistan and build measures to counter them.\nThe importance of the trade routes surrounding the archipelago is bound to increase as India’s trade with China and ASEAN is set to increase in future.\nIndia has not fully realized the importance of the 10 Degree Channel and 6 Degree Channel\, while China is fully aware of the importance of these two important trade routes.\nThe isolated location of these islands is the major problem that India faces.\nA highly efficient surveillance network is a must to monitor non-conventional threats.\nThe communication network needs to be developed to carry out efficient surveillance and monitoring.\nMore manpower and modernization of equipment is a must.\nPeople are as vital an aspect as they can be in the region and genuine attention needs to be paid to grievances of the tribal people of Andaman and Nicobar Islands.\nThe internal political disturbances in South East Asian nations could have a spill over effect on the archipelago.\nBiological threats\, diseases like\, malaria\, SARS\, etc. should also be considered as part of non-conventional threats.\n\nReport prepared by Sana Hashmi\, an Intern at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/securing-andaman-and-nicobar-islands
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100707T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100707T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000151
CREATED:20231223T221702Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130743Z
UID:63646-1278480600-1278480600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Changing Nature of War
DESCRIPTION:Chair: K. SubrahmanyamPanel: Air Cmde. (Retd.) Jasjit Singh\, Rear Adm. (Retd.) Raja Menon\, Brig. (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal \nPresentation: Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahia \nBrig. Dahia initiated the session by summarizing key ideas contained in the recent paper entitled “The New Rules of War” by John Arquilla. Following were identified as central postulates: \n\nUS military spending is incompatible with changing nature of warfare\n“Many and Small” Beats “Few and Large”\nFinding Matters More than Flanking\nSwarming is the New Surging\n\nAs well as elaborating on their implications\, the presenter also proposed some critical counter-arguments to these postulates. \nThe Chair took a dissenting view on the proposition that globalization does not necessarily rule out the prospect of future war. He argued in favour of a debate in India on the nature of wars this country is likely to fight in the future. \nFollowing the presentation and the Chair’s opening remarks\, the panellists put forth their considered observations on the subject.  \nAir Commodore Jasjit Singh\nContextualizing Arquilla’s ideas within the American experience over the recent past\, he drew attention to the fact that America’s war effort during this time has been heavily air power-driven. He underlined the increasing critical significance of technology\, emphasizing that even non-military organizations have been demonstrating military-like tactical capabilities. Employment of force – combining technology with force strength in numbers – was singled out as the most important determinant of success in war.  \nMany global powers are catching up with the US in terms of air-power capability. India needs to work on its preparedness in the event of three kinds of war: Nuclear Exchange\, Force-on-Force Conventional War\, and sub-conventional\, low intensity conflict. At the conventional level\, the shifting strategic-tactical differential and compression of time and expansion of space in the arena of conflict have circumscribed the range of options available\, in particular\, with reference to nuclear weapons powers.  \nAdmiral Raja Menon\nHe highlighted the underlying message in Arquilla’s writing that reform of the forces is called for in light of changing requirements and specific contexts\, suggesting that there are countries already making the tough choices that this adjustment demands. He also noted the link between the structure of the armed forces and the nation’s polity. He described technology as a double-edged sword and no straight-forward substitute for boots-on the-ground. \nBrig. Gurmeet Kanwal\nOne important qualification in the Indian context is that it faces very large rival conventional forces\, which makes some of Arquilla’s prescriptions inapplicable. Continued importance of Strike Corps\, unresolved border disputes and the nuclear overhang further set the Indian case apart. He recalled that the idea of varying force concentration to match the nature of threat has been long known and employed. He argued that the experience in Kargil established the continued potency of the “many and large” approach. In the same vein the “many and small” approach\, he suggested\, has been at the heart of India’s iron-fist-in-velvet-glove counter-insurgency strategy. On the downside\, it was identified that the Indian Army remains far from fully networked and there remains scope for better synergy in operations.  \nDiscussion\nAccording to one participant\, since velocity was as much a determinant of force as mass\, speed of decision-making on all fronts needs to be addressed and improved upon as a matter of priority. Another intervention was in favour of learning from others’ experiences and in that spirit drawing conclusions for organizational reform based on contributions such as Arquilla’s.  \nA view was taken\, stemming from a review of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in 2006\, that there is need for the military mind to overcome biases that stand in the way of appropriate perception of the contemporary nature of threat. Some concrete proposals for reform in the forces were pointed out and commented on. Areas where such reform is already underway were also made mention of. Importance of preventive action against threats of terrorism and insurgency was underscored by one participant. Fundamental reform in the education system was postulated as a pre-condition for getting the “sociological aspect” of armed forces reform right.  \nConceding the need for adequate forces for conventional deterrence\, DG IDSA Mr. N. S. Sisodia took the view that the likelihood of a serious\, long-drawn out conflict should be thoroughly examined. This assessment needs then to be juxtaposed against similar projections on sub-conventional and other threats such as counter-insurgency to arrive at key recommendations for the armed forces.  \nChair’s Summary\nMr. K Subrahmanyam recognized a need to draw sharp distinctions between various types of conflict scenarios. Speaking on the matter of insurgency\, he described it as something of a card held by federal units as a bargaining chip against the central government. This allows for equilibrium between mis-governance and politics\, rendering the situation amenable to the growth of insurgency. He spoke out in favour of a deep-seated recognition of the fundamental tenet that there is no room for violence in a Parliamentary Democracy.  \nPrepared by Kalyani Unkule
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-changing-nature-of-war
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100706T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100706T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000152
CREATED:20231223T221702Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130743Z
UID:63647-1278394200-1278394200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Interaction with scholars from the Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation of Taiwan
DESCRIPTION:IDSA held an interaction with scholars from the Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation of Taiwan to discuss issues related to climate change\, especially those concerning the Indian sub-continent and China.  \nThe scholars from Taiwan included Ms. Chang Hsueh-Ping\, Mr. Liu Chin-Tsai and Mr. Lin Tzu-Chao. The team from IDSA included Col. (Retd.) P.K. Gautam\, Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha\, Dr. Jagannath Panda\, Ms. Rukmani Gupta and Mr. Avinash Godbole.  \nExtending a warm welcome to the Taiwanese visitors\, Col. Gautam began the discussion by observing that scholars of Chinese history have documented the correlation between war and climate change on Mainland China. While such a correlation may be true for China\, he noted that war and climate have not been particularly linked in India. Commenting on the role of the military in climate change\, Col. Gautam emphasized the role of the Indian Army in tackling the issue of climate change. Not only has the Indian Army endeavoured to reduce Halon use in military hardware because of its Ozone depleting properties\, it has also raised eight battalions that have come to constitute an ecological taskforce. Apart from these measures\, Col. Gautam  also pointed out that research towards Carbon-neutral technology is ongoing and that the Indian Army’s traditions of frugality ensure that energy intense facilities like air conditioning are maintained for equipment rather than for personnel.  \nOn the issue of climate change and Tibet\, Col. Gautam spoke of two processes that have contributed to the problem. The first was that of emissions by the global community and the second was the policy of rapid development followed by the Chinese government in Tibet. There is a difference of perception in Sino-Tibetan discourse over the capitalist model of economic development being undertaken by China\, which is at variance with the cultural practices of Tibetans informed and regulated as they are by the Buddhist values of oneness with nature. Nomadism is also fundamental to the preservation of   the ecology of Tibet. The Chinese policy of encouraging the influx of non-Tibetans\, greater than the sustainable carrying capacity of Tibet\, is enhancing the danger of an ecological meltdown. The demographic changes in Tibet brought about by the Chinese government’s policies have had a deleterious effect on the ecology of the Tibetan Plateau. The Dalai Lama’s Government in exile has proposed a peace plan for Tibet that suggests a reform of China’s population policy in the region which could help tackle environmental degradation in Tibet. Col. Gautam stressed the importance of Tibetan glaciers as the source of river waters in non-monsoon season and the implications of this on South Asian security. He postulated that Tibetan glaciers form the third largest water resource in the world and given that there are ten rivers that emanate from Tibet to the Indian sub continent and South East Asia\, there is no denying that Tibet is\, if not a global commons\, then certainly a regional commons.  \nDr. Uttam Kumar Sinha emphasized the hydrological profile of the region. He stated that the sub-continent is often looked at only in terms of borders and disputes but the hydrological profile is often overlooked. The fact is that all states are connected by rivers in the region\, a condition that possesses elements of both conflict and co-operation. Dr. Sinha acknowledged that due to its unique geographical position\, since major rivers to South and South East Asia flow from Tibet\, there can be no denying Tibet’s importance. At the same time\, however\, he noted that while neighbouring states may have concerns over Tibetan waters\, the Chinese themselves were within their sovereign rights to exploit the natural resources of Tibet. Dr. Sinha underlined India’s unique position as a “middle” riparian with reference to Tibetan waters. As an upper riparian\, India has many disputes with neighbouring states over river waters\, though it is its position as a “middle” riparian that India would need to emphasize with its neighbours. There exist many examples in the form of the Indus River Water Treaty and water sharing agreements between Bangladesh and India that could be useful in discussions on Tibetan waters as well. Dr. Sinha stressed that China’s rampant exploitation of Tibetan waters is a problem that needs to be discussed\, though the need is to avoid brinkmanship and facilitate greater co-operation.   \nMs. Chang suggested that India could involve the SAARC in negotiating or discussing water issues with China. It was also suggested that India could work towards a consensus with Central Asian states and Russia in discussing water issues with China. Mr. Lin enquired about India’s prospects for food security in the future and the state of China’s agricultural production was also mentioned. In response to questions on the state of India’s agriculture production\, technological innovation in the form of drip irrigation\, the under utilized resources of north eastern India and the debate on genetically modified crops were alluded to. Subsequent discussion touched upon the domestic political situation in Taiwan and the recently signed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between Taiwan and Mainland China.  \nReport prepared by Rukmani Gupta\, Associate Fellow\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/interaction-with-scholars-from-the-cross-strait-interflow-prospect-foundation-of-taiwan
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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