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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121119T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121119T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T130242Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250312T064820Z
UID:62853-1353303000-1353303000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:IDSA-PRIO Workshop on Global Governance and Resource Use: The Case of the Arctic
DESCRIPTION:Venue: IDSA\, New Delhi \n \nThe Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)\, New Delhi and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) hosted the roundtable on “Governance and Resource Use: The Case of the Arctic” on November 19\, 2012 at the IDSA campus. The day-long conference comprised of two sessions\, each with 4 speakers. Dr. Arvind Gupta\, DG IDSA and Dr. Åshild Kolås\, Research Professor\, PRIO gave the inaugural speech. \n\nSession 1\nThe opening session focused on the Arctic. Leiv Lunde\, Fridtjof Nansens Institutt\, Norway highlighted the reasons why the Arctic is attracting global interest. Reasons cited were several including growing economic interest because of climate change\, immense resource potential\, new emerging transport routes (like the Northern Sea Route) and gradually strengthening governance mechanisms. He also pointed out that the Arctic region is currently faced with low international tension. In addition he also discussed the role of Russia as a major player. Concern was expressed by him over the poor infrastructure along the Russian Arctic coast. In conclusion\, he recommended that India join the Arctic Council as an observer\, while at the same time investing political energy in other institutions. Rune Rafaelsen\, Secreatry General of the Norwegian Barents Secretariat in Kirkenes pointed out that the influence of people living in the Arctic and that the governance of the regions’ resources cannot be underestimated. He recommended that a new Secretariat be built for managing the Arctic resources. Captain (N) Gunnar Heløe\, Norwegian Ministry of Defense\, delineated that the High North will be Norway’s most important strategic priority area in the years to come. Dr Rafaelsen and Captain Heløe both pointed out that the delimitation line as per the Norwegian-Russian agreement (signed and ratified in July 2011) was the result of 40 years of negotiation. \nIn a quick response to the India’s position\, Amit Narang\, Deputy Secretary\, United Nations Division\, Ministry of External Affairs\, Government of India emphasised that the Arctic is of global rather than regional interest and India has been actively engaged in the region. He stated that India had submitted its application to Sweden for Observer Status in the Arctic Council on November 6\, 2012. Cdr Sarabjeet Parmar\, IDSA posed the question\, viz. whether the governance of the Arctic was really settled\, since the agreement between Russia and Norway on Svalbard was only a bilateral one. In his view\, Russia would rely increasingly on fossil fuels from the High North which is why it had been strengthening its cooperation with Norway. He also brought out the issue of conflicting continental shelf claims and the possibility of conflict arising due to sovereignty issues arising from the claims. The difference in opinion between the US and Canada on the issue of international waters and internal waters was highlighted as an example. Discussing the standing of the Arctic Council he brought China into the discussion. He pointed out that China’s application for a permanent status as an observer in the Arctic Council had been rejected in 2012 by Norway but reiterated that the Council should view the applications for membership from non-Arctic nations in a more holistic way. H.P. Rajan\, former Director\, Office of Legal Affairs\, UN\, and former Adviser to the Dpt of Ocean Development\, GoI\, provided technical insights about the Law of the Sea. All Arctic States with the exception of the US are parties to it and all Arctic countries including the US agree that the legal regime contained in the UNCLOS applies to the Arctic as well. With Arctic meltdown\, while new shipping routes will open up\, the rights of States for various types of passage (innocent\, transit\, archipelagic or free passage) are already set out in UNCLOS; what needs to be worked out are the practical modalities\, which could mostly be bilateral\, but needs to be applied uniformly to other States also. As for resources\, the landmass underneath Arctic is almost entirely the continental margins of 5 Arctic States\, namely\, Russia\, Norway\, Canada\, Denmark (Greenland) and the US. Of these\, Russia and Norway have already made their submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf\, and received recommendations for delineation of the outer limits. Canada and Denmark are expected to make their submissions in 2013. \nDiscussion\nOlav Schram Stokke\, Research Professor\, FNI\, remarked that the Arctic Council is not dealing with sovereignty and security\, but is rather coordinating fact-finding\, capacity advancement\, and serving as an information clearing house on priorities of decision-makers. This\, according to him\, is a good reason for non-Arctic states to become observers in the Arctic Council. Captain Heløe flagged China’s interest in Greenland. The Arctic Council according to him is limited since it does not take into account security issues. Astri Suhrke while referring to a recent article by Oran Young made the point that pursuing Observer status should not be the primary goal but this should be a springboard for a broader multilateral cooperation platform. In response to Suhrke’s comment\, Rafaelsen argued that the Arctic Council at least provided a platform to people living in the region. \nIn his chairpersons’ remarks\, Arvind Gupta asserted that two different views about the importance of the Arctic Council had emerged; one that it is an important institution\, the other that it is not. He noted that in the case of the Arctic\, the resource commons only begin outside the 200-mile economic zone of all coastal states\, which constitutes a very limited area. \n\nSession 2\nThe Chairperson Kristian Berg Harpviken\, PRIO introduced the 2nd session by stating that the expectation of new hydrocarbon findings in the Arctic is important to at least three of the priority areas highlighted at Rio+20\, namely energy\, oceans and disaster readiness. He added that global governance issues\, especially sustainability and access to resources\, will strongly define the future and will create differing views. Mukul Sanwal\, ORF emphasised that what is happening in the Arctic has implications on the rest of world and vice-versa. He claimed that the Arctic moderates circulation systems of oceans and atmosphere changes. He suggested that the United Nations should have a role to play; UNEP should formulate an ecological assessment and collaboration around\, and review of models and their critical components. P K Gautam\, IDSA expressed concern over issues of governance of the Arctic. He hoped that India would soon get observer status and would contribute to enhancing understanding among states with respect to the Arctic. Shebonti Ray Dadwal\, IDSA\, highlighted the limitations of energy governance organisations such International Energy Agency\, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries\, UNEP and UNFCCC. Countries like India\, she urged\, should have representation in governance institutions. In addition\, she recommended that there is need for all organisations to get involved in governance issues and not just the governments. Lydia Powell\, ORF primarily discussed the issues and challenges of energy availability and governance in India. \nDr Harpviken in his chairperson’s remarks summed up the discussion by saying that change in the Arctic is more rapid than anyone had expected. At the same time the willingness and ability to exploit resources seemed to be less than expected. Changes elsewhere had driven changes in the Arctic rather than vice versa. He concluded that the Arctic may not be as special as people often presumed\, which was brought out by the debate. He agreed that despite a consensus not being established\, a lot had been learned about the positions and views. \n(Report prepared by Madhavi Marwah\, Intern\, IDSA) \nWelcome speech by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, DG\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/idsa-prio-workshop-on-global-governance-and-resource-use-the-case-of-the-arctic
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121030T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121030T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134107Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130740Z
UID:63151-1351575000-1351575000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Round Table with Mr. Micheal Krepon on Space Security
DESCRIPTION:IDSA organized a Round Table Discussion on October 30\, 2012. The speaker for the Round Table was Micheal Krepon\, co-founder of Stimson Centre\, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programmes at Stimson Cenre. Dr. Arvind Gupta\, DG IDSA\, chaired the meeting and it was attended by Amb. (retd) R. Rajagopalan\, Wg Cdr Ajey Lele\, Dr. Rajeshwari Rajagopalan\, Mr. Sam Rajiv\, Mr. Kapil Patil\, Ms Nupur Brahma and Ms. Gunjan Singh.  \nMr. Krepon discussed the idea of space security in terms of norms. He argued that norms could be used to strengthen responsible behaviour among space faring nations. He said that space and cyber are very closely interlinked. However\, even though norms are being created for developments in space\, cyber security is still not being given due attention. \nAccording to Mr. Krepon\, developing a space treaty in the present day international context when China and Russia are holding different opinions vis-à-vis the United States is a very tough task. The process is also very time consuming and difficult. Thus\, it would be right to start and frame widely accepted transparency and confidence building measures. Under this framework\, the Code of Conduct (CoC) is a good and workable option. Codes are expected to be voluntary in nature and it will also help in creating increased awareness. According to the Simson Centre\, “a CoC is needed to insure the safe operation of satellites while at the same time increasing cooperation in space\, thereby reducing tensions that might lead to conflict in space”.  \nThere are three areas which need to be put in norms\, with respect to Space Security: \n\nSpace traffic management\nDebris management\nNo purposeful harmful interference with objects in space\n\nThe following points emerged during the discussion: \n\nThere is a need to work towards establishing mechanisms to ensure space security. However treaty route is difficult to follow as there are a number of hurdles. \nSpace CoC can be regarded as one option. However CoC is non-enforceable and it is an accepted fact that the CoC does not prevent arms race in space. It is a political document and is non-binding. \nIt is difficult to prevent development of military capabilities in space; it argued that CoC could be helpful in preventing another ASAT\, even though it is not perfect. \nIndia does not have a history of engaging in multilateral forums and thus it should try and work on the CoC. CoC can be helpful in containing Chinese capabilities and thus would be helpful to both India and the United States. \nThe discussion also indicated that it is difficult to keep China out of space negotiations but there can be ways and means to embarrass China by means of naming and shaming. \nThere is a need for the international community\, especially the space-faring nations to work on CBMs to ensure traffic management\, debris management and prevent purposeful interference. \nMr. Krepon stated that the negotiations scheduled for November 2012 may not take place and also that the EU has not given any indication about the future plans. \nAnother important point which emerged during discussion was regarding the Hague Code of Conduct. It was argued that even though this document has been signed by many states\, the important players in the field of ballistic missile defence technology have not signed it. Similar thing may happen with respect to the Space CoC as a number of non space-faring nations may sign it. However this would have little relevance. \n\n(report prepared by Gunjan Singh\, IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/round-table-with-mr-micheal-krepon-on-space-security
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121029T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121029T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134151Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130554Z
UID:63153-1351488600-1351488600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Interaction of IDSA scholars with media delegation from 18 IOR-ARC member countries
DESCRIPTION:A media delegation from the 18 member countries of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) visited IDSA to interact with the Director-General\, Dr. Arvind Gupta and other IDSA experts on issues pertaining to India’s role in the IOR-ARC.  \nDr. Gupta briefed the delegation on the IDSA’s mission and its research agenda. He also gave the delegation an overview of India’s Foreign Policy which is based on the following tenets – strategic autonomy in foreign policy-making\, economic reforms and opening up of markets in the early 1990s and lastly\, the changing security environment where India has to deal with both traditional and non-traditional security threats. As far as the Indian Ocean region is concerned\, Dr. Gupta stressed that in addition to being a re-discovery of India’s oceanic past\, the region is important for its security\, peace and development. Of late\, there has been an increased interest in the region\, especially on issues such as maritime security\, diaspora and climate change. India\, for its part\, is trying to find its way and is making its contribution to deal with these issues. In the process\, it is trying to arrive at a holistic response.  \nThe delegation raised numerous questions on issues related to Indian Ocean region. The overarching subject was maritime security and piracy. On the Strait of Malacca\, it was stated that the strait is very much a part of India’s security perimeter and there is a need to be more proactive and have joint patrols in the strait. Although currently there are no joint patrols\, talks are on to have them in the future. On the question of whether India can be expected to help Mauritius manage its maritime security and address piracy\, it was said that at the moment\, it depends on the request made by the host country. However\, India is exploring the option of building facilities in Seychelles and Mauritius. With regard to India’s take on the ‘string of pearls’ and dual usage of ports\, it was stated though peaceful port visits is a non-issue\, usage of ports during heightened conflict must be based on the laws of neutrality. On the question of whether India feels encircled by China\, the response was that China was not a major concern for India but would be so only during heightened conflict. As far as the American presence in the region is concerned\, it is likely to continue to remain in the region and is also essential for the security architecture of the region. The Asian countries have not yet considered a role in the region without the American presence. The IOR-ARC has not yet evolved enough to deal with hard-core security issues that still remain out of its purview. The Association is constrained by limitations such as insufficient budget capacities\, lack of institutional and national capabilities to tackle security issues. However\, if they can overcome these challenges\, then perhaps the dependency on extra-regional powers can be omitted. \nOn the issue of trying pirates legally\, it was noted that Malaysia has set a precedent and other countries that don’t have legislations on piracy should follow suit. India is in the process of getting a bill on piracy passed. Another issue that was raised was regarding the decrease in piracy on the eastern coast of Africa while it is increasing on the western coast. It was observed that there is no direct co-relation between the two and that piracy on the West coast is not a new phenomenon. As far as Chinese ‘economic incursions’ into Africa is concerned\, there is no reason why India has to compete with China in the continent; African countries welcome both the Asian giants and there is space for both their markets. India’s ties with Africa date back to the ancient times and in the recent years\, it has become more institutionalised with engagement taking place on three levels – bilateral\, regional and continental. \nThere were also questions on other issues such as the mediating role that India could play between Iran and the West. It was pointed out that at the moment there is no appetite for meditation. But if both the parties agree\, then India would be open to mediation. Similarly\, India will also not mediate between Israel and Iran unless it is requested to do so. As far as the dispute between India and Bangladesh over maritime boundary is concerned\, it was opined that it would serve the interests of both the parties to wait for the verdict from the International Tribunal. On the inclusion of Somalia and Pakistan in the IOR-ARC\, the future possibility of their membership was not excluded. With regard to India-Yemen cooperation\, it was said that the two countries share good bilateral relations and the Indian government is open to deepening trade and economic relations. \nReport prepared by Keerthi Sampath Kumar\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/interaction-of-idsa-scholars-with-media-delegation-from-18-ior-arc-member-countries
CATEGORIES:OTHER EVENTS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121029T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121029T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T125709Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T125954Z
UID:62786-1351488600-1351488600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Security Issues in Latin America: Experience of UNASUR
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador Deepak BhojwaniKeynote Address: H.E. Mr Javier Paulinich\, Ambassador of Peru to India  \nIn order to explore ways for India to strengthen its ties with the South American region and forge greater engagement at the diplomatic level\, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) organised a conference on “Security Issues in Latin America: Experience of UNASUR.” The main participants of the conference included ambassadors from various Latin American and Caribbean countries along with academic experts and former Indian diplomats. This conference aimed to understand the process of regional integration that is underway in South America through the workings of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) as well as ponder on the institutional mechanisms available at the hands of UNASUR to tackle the multiple security challenges in the region. The outcome of the conference was the important recognition amongst the participants that both India and South American countries can derive lessons from each other on democracy and social inclusion. \nThe UNASUR\, being the newest regional integration project in South America\, has displayed tremendous promise in developing mechanisms for amicable resolution of conflicts in the region. It was established in December 2004 as an intergovernmental union integrating the existing customs union MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of Nations and came into existence formally in 2008 when the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was signed in Brazil. It has set for itself an ambitious agenda of achieving a unified passport\, parliament and eventually a single currency. UNASUR is structured around four main organs\, namely the Council of Heads of State and Government\, Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs\, Council of Delegates and the General Secretariat. Apart from these organs\, it has nine Sectoral/Ministerial councils dealing with issues like social development\, health\, education\, and drug trafficking. One of the key sectoral councils of UNASUR pertains to defence and in recent years this council has realised the necessity of creating a regional military doctrine. To this end\, UNASUR created the think-tank Defence Strategic Studies Center (CEED) in May\, 2011. To further the process of integration in the defence sphere\, Peru will host a summit for Heads of State and Governments of UNASUR to discuss the “Protocol of Peace and Security Cooperation”\, on November 30\, 2012. However\, the defence council would not be a NATO-like alliance. Instead\, it will be a cooperative security arrangement with forward looking agendas such as multilateral military cooperation\, promotion of confidence and security building measures\, and fostering defence industry exchanges.  \nAs mentioned by one of the discussants\, in its short history UNASUR has attained a good deal of legitimacy as a result of some important achievements including its key role in mediating the Colombia-Venezuela diplomatic crisis in 2010\, creating a heightened UNASUR Fund of US$100 million\, limiting defence expenditures\, reducing crime\, integrating energy and financial systems\, and by handling constitutional crises in Ecuador and Paraguay. Drawing a comparison between UNASUR\, SAARC and BIMSTEC\, one panellist pointed out that the progress in forging regional integration in South Asia has been relatively slow and should draw upon the experience of UNASUR in promoting regional integration in South America. \nIt was also pointed out during the course of the conference that it was noteworthy to see countries in Latin America coming together to form overlapping regional and sub-regional alliances\, a prime example being UNASUR among others like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and MERCOSUR. There has been a tangential movement on the Pacific Coast between Chile\, Peru\, Ecuador and Mexico to form the Pacific Alliance. These trends have generated immense interest in India to understand the dynamics of Latin American integration by identifying the key drivers of the process.   \nOne of the key speakers of the conference shed light on the fact that UNASUR was the first and most holistic undertaking in the political history of South America\, with an exciting agenda of dealing with social\, political\, economic\, cultural\, and technology related issues. He highlighted some fundamental facts about the South American region\, stating that six of the South American countries belong to the Mega diverse category. He believed that the idea behind UNASUR was to come together and forge ties in the most innovative ways by drawing on the progress made by the 12 UNASUR countries and take decisions by consensus. He stated that UNASUR can be utilised to make South America a region of peace and security. For this\, the South American nations would need to approach regional issues from a non-ideological standpoint\, particularly in the economic sphere. One of its key priorities is to promote citizen participation among others in the realm of socio-economic improvement. UNASUR has already established the Centre for the Study of Democracy in Lima\, Peru to realise this objective. One of the main objectives that UNASUR countries aim to pursue on a priority basis is to achieve social inclusion and equality.  \nAnother discussant pointed out that the idea of South American integration existed even before the Cusco Declaration was signed in 2004. One of the most important aspects of South American integration\, according to the discussant\, pertains to that of physical integration – of connecting the two oceans of the Pacific and the Atlantic. Energy issues are therefore poised to play a very important role in enhancing this integration. The idea of non-ideological approach was also recognised to be essential in adding more substance to the integration process; the common willingness to work together in a pragmatic way already exists amongst the South American countries. In area of defence\, a consolidation of the Non Use of Force doctrines by South American countries is one of the main tenets as evidenced by the fact that the region has not witnessed any major conflict in recent decades. Other important elements of common ground in the sphere of defence relate to the South American region being a nuclear weapons-free zone\, its drive to deter external threats collectively\, deterrence coordination and integration of defence industries. However\, a caveat in this regard is that the defence council in UNASUR is still in its infancy and will have to be given the benefit of time to achieve maturity in order to act as a rallying force on defence issues. Further\, South American countries are still away from maintaining common military forces. \nA number of other issues were also flagged during the conference. References were made to the failure of the European Union (EU)\, usually considered the exemplar of regional integration\, as far as financial issues are concerned. It was pointed out that even though there is a definite change in the mindset of elites in South American countries\, as they are more willing to give a chance to principles of liberal democracy\, it is indeed not a dramatic change. Also\, UNASUR being a new project in regional integration will have to undergo a long process of evolution before it can claim to be successful without any degree of scepticism. The trend of hegemonic decline in the region is encouraging. But concerns were raised about indications of a new brand of Southern geopolitics brewing in the region that could turn UNASUR into a test case for Brazilian leadership.  \nWhile South American nations sometimes perceive major powers as external threats to their region\, they also recognise the need to harness comparative advantages of respective countries. The US involvement in the region is bound to persist as it continues to attract migrants from Latin America. With respect to India\, the South American countries believe there is tremendous scope for cooperation in areas such as non traditional security\, maritime security and social cohesion. The panellists recognised that though the mechanism of decision making by consensus in a region as diverse as South America is a difficult task\, the willingness to come together to forge a unified force is unmistakable. The possibility of establishing a regional peacekeeping force however was considered premature for the moment.  \n(Prepared by Sneha Bhura\, Intern at IDSA) \nProgramme \n10:00h -10:05h: Welcome Remarks\, Dr. Arvind Gupta\, DG IDSA10:05h – 10:10h: Opening Remarks\, Ambassador Deepak Bhojwani\, Chair10:10h – 10:25h:	Remarks\, H.E. Mr. Javier Paulinich\, Ambassador of Peru to India (Pro Tempore President of UNASUR)10:25h- 11:15h: Remarks\, UNASUR Ambassadors/Experts (5 Min. each)11:15h- 11:30h: Tea11:30h – 13:00h: Interactive Session13:00h: Lunch
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/security-issues-in-latin-america-experience-of-unasur
CATEGORIES:CONFERENCES,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121015T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121015T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134151Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130740Z
UID:63154-1350279000-1350279000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Round Table Interaction of IDSA Scholars with members of the Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs
DESCRIPTION:A senior level delegation from the Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs visited IDSA for a Round Table Interaction on various issues of mutual interest. The delegation included Amb. Dr. El-Sayed Amin Shalaby\, Amb. Gehad Madi\, Prof. Mostafa-Elwi Saif\, Dr. Mustapha K. El Sayyid and Amb. Khaled El Bakly. \nDr. Arvind Gupta\, DG-IDSA\, welcomed the delegation and termed the interaction extremely important on account of the monumental changes taking place in West Asia with Egypt often being the fulcrum of these changes. After giving a brief academic history of the institution\, Dr. Gupta dwelled on the enormous significance of the region to India’s own geopolitical interests as evident in the stepping up of economic and political interaction between the two long time allies. He said that the Cairo visit of External Affairs Minister Mr. S. M. Krishna and agreements signed pertaining to India’s assistance in election management and administration was a testimony of the strong ties between the two countries. \nIn his opening remarks\, the head of Egyptian delegation Amb. Dr. El-Sayed Amin Shalaby hoped that the meeting should mark the beginning of a new cooperation between the two institutions. With the primary focus of both organisations being strategic\, security and defence issues\, it should be easy to find common themes to debate and discuss.\nWhile continuing the interaction\, Dr. Mustapha K. El Sayyid elaborated on what he perceived to be seven sources of threat to human security in the Arab World: \n\nEnvironmental threat which includes water scarcity\, desertification\, pollution and a lack of bio-diversity across the region. \nForeign military occupation: as felt by Palestinians\, UAE (whose three islands are claimed by Iran) and Morocco (whose two cities are claimed by Spain). Egypt still has to face the repercussions of the erstwhile Israeli occupation of Sinai; wherein Islamist militants that had arrived in droves to fight the Israelis continue to be a nuisance to Egyptian security forces even to this date. \nInternal conflicts which are mostly related to ethnic issues or ideological differences as seen in Iraq\, Sudan and Lebanon.\nState repression as witnessed under Mubarak and in Syria at present.\nEconomic problems with issues like unemployment\, slow economic growth and general deterioration of socio economic situation of people. Economic problems were in fact one of the rallying points of the revolution.\nGeneral health of the people. \nPersonal security.\n\nMoreover\, Dr. Sayyid dwelled on the new Egyptian Government’s ‘vision of the world’. He elaborated on the perceived emergence of a multipolar world which is evident in the economic and cultural rise of different nations on the global stage even though militarily US continues to be omnipresent. The formation of BRICS and the fact that the US has not been able to impose its will in the UN on Syria is an indication of multipolarism in international affairs. Egypt stands for non intervention and non interference in other countries internal affairs\, is in favour of promotion of principle of friendly relations with all and respects international treaties\, particularly the peace treaty with Israel even though it does not always subscribe to Israeli practises in the territories occupied by it. Nations have a right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and a nuclear free Middle East would be in the interests of all. However\, the possibility of a Shia-Sunni conflict\, in the backdrop of the Iranian nuclear programme\, is highly exaggerated.  \nDr. Sayyid highlighted the security implications of the Arab Spring\, which he termed a transitional phase\, with there being real threats to national integration in the region. This is evident in Yemen wherein small groups have called for the separation/secession of the country\, in Libya where feelings of greater autonomy still persist in areas around Benghazi and in Syria where there are demands of a Kurdish and Alawite states. Therefore\, maintaining internal security is of paramount importance. \nThere is also increasing tension in inter-Arab relations. Arab world is divided between countries that have succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian regimes and the ones that are some of the most conservative in the world.  \nHowever\, the two countries which are not threatened by any kind of disintegration are Tunisia and Egypt on account of theirs populations being highly homogenous.    \nTwo important developments that can have wider implications in the region include: \n\nArab League condemning\, for the first time\, human rights violations in Libya and Syria.\nRegional actors\, on the invitation of Egypt\, have been trying to resolve the Syrian issue but it is an extremely complicated task. Egypt has invited Iran\, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to join it in search of a diplomatic solution to the crisis. But it will take a lot of deft and innovative diplomacy for Saudi Arabia and Iran to agree to a middle ground. \n\nAmb. Shalaby highlighted the thinking behind Egypt’s Syrian initiative. The present government in Cairo is interested in making the Egyptian foreign policy more proactive and this coincides with its stated policy of a regional solution and opposing foreign military intervention. The close influence of Iran in Syria cannot be underestimated and Egypt would like Iran to be a part of the solution even though Saudi Arabia is not too keen to participate in this enterprise. However the Egyptian initiative has not received due international support. \nAmb. Gehad Madi described the ‘uncertainty’ in the present day Syria as one of the key elements of the political scenario in the region. The prevalent situation in Syria is extremely complicated and has assumed an international dimension. The fact that the world’s superpowers have divergent and often contrasting views has further accentuated the problem with prospects of any solution to the issue appearing bleak at the moment. There is a civil war raging there and the possibility of a sectarian war\, with the potential to divide the country\, cannot be ruled out. The gridlock persists despite involvement of the Arab League and the UN. This has brought to light some key elements of the current crisis: \n\n  Even though many people feel that Bashar al-Assad must go\, the question is how and what comes after that? The opposition is no longer only in form of rebels carrying arms who also lack effective leadership. \nHumanitarian factor cannot be ignored for too long with an influx of refugees (majority of them being unaccompanied children) to Turkey\, Jordan and Lebanon rising by the day. However\, international community is not yet ready to deal with the human catastrophe. \nThere is a possibility of military confrontation between Syria and Turkey and flaring up of sectarian conflict within Syria. In this worst case scenario\, one has to factor in the role of Iran and Gulf countries when it comes to the Shia-Sunni equation. \n\nOn the issue of developments in Egypt\, Amb. Madi highlighted some of the positive changes in the country after the revolution. The country has a civilian regime and the army did not intervene in any way during the elections that were generally free and fair. However\, it will be crucial to analyze emerging issues like the affiliation of the new regime and provisions of the new constitution.  \nOn the issue of India-Egypt relations\, Amb. Madi observed that the overall image of India in Egypt is extremely positive. India is looked upon as a model country with its scientific\, technological and economic growth much appreciated.    \nProf. Mostafa-Elwi Saif dwelled on factors that separate Syria from Libya. Geographically Syria is 1/5th of the size of Libya while its population is five times bigger. These factors will ensure that the proposed no-fly zone will be ineffective right from the word go. The only military solution to the crisis is by sending ground troops. Moreover\, the Syrian issue is an important element in the Israeli-Arab conflict and in the Iranian-Arab and Turkey-Arab relations. It has also managed to maintain very good relations with both Russia and China. Therefore\, the issue is very complex and any conflict is expected to continue for years and not just a few months.  \nProf Saif elaborated on the possible scenarios in Syria: \n\n Division of Syria into a number of countries. This will serve the interests and policies of both US and Israel in dealing with the Arab Israeli conflict. \nEnd of Assad’s regime and emergence of Muslim Brotherhood to fill the political vacuum. In such a scenario\, Tunisia\, Egypt Syria and to an extent Libya will be governed by the same political force. This will represent a major change in the security posture and structure of the whole region.\n\nAmb. Ranjit Gupta (retd)\, highlighted the strength of India-Egypt relations during the era of Nasser and Nehru and welcomed the return of Egypt to the mainstream of the Arab world. He observed that India’s interaction with the Gulf and Arab world started at the dawn of history and dwelled on the importance of India’s relationship with the region\, especially the GCC countries\, by terming it existential to India’s interests. The GCC countries constitute India’s largest socio-economic partner anywhere in the world\, is its largest trade partner\, two thirds of the country’s oil requirements come from Gulf\, approx 6.3 million Indians reside there and Indians are the largest nationality of outside workforce in each GCC country. He hoped that the coming years will see the dawn of a new era in Indo-Egyptian relations.  \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr. Arvind Gupta re-emphasised India’s economic\, societal and security interests being deeply linked to the Arab world and said that India cannot remain a bystander to the developments in the region. India had to evacuate close to 20\,000 Indian nationals in Libya and its ships are at the forefront fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Therefore\, there is a need to re-strategise India’s policy towards the region. The positive image of India in the Arab world can be leveraged to build up contacts there. Attention should be on critical issues of security with establishment of a security dialogue being a good opportunity to understand the regional perception of India’s participation in the region. International seminars and joint academic and research work on all key areas should be taken up. After all\, a changing global order affects both India and Egypt.     \nReport prepared by Rajorshi Roy\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/round-table-interaction-of-idsa-scholars-with-members-of-the-egyptian-council-of-foreign-affairs
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121005T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121005T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134152Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013652Z
UID:63155-1349415000-1349415000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Afghan War Warrants A Paradigmatic Shift for State-Building
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Dr. Ashok K. BehuriaDiscussants: Prof. Riyaz Punjabi and Dr. D Subachandran\,  \nMajor Highlights of the Paper: The Afghan state whose security and legitimacy is warred for and which is sought rebuilt has meagre institutional remnants indicating a direction and the case is thus more or less a tabula rasa. The counterinsurgency campaign is effectively a state- (re)building endeavour as well as a military undertaking. Ms. Muska Dastageer’s paper poses two crucial questions; first\, ‘which overarching state construct is NATO\, United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) contributing to the building of?’ and second\, ‘will the institutional remnants of corroded\, yet still\, extant systems of societal organisation coalesce favourably with this nascent state?’ She wants to examine whether ‘bringing security back in’ in the area of state-building-in the foundational Hobbesian sense-within conflict-beleaguered environments could mark an optimised understanding of what it takes to engineer a state that is home grown i.e. non-Westphalian. \nMs. Dastageer identified two variables that fundamentally alter the state making equation. The first variable looks at state-as making of war and the second variable\, the colonial tautology and Pakistan. Thus\, she made an attempt to situate state-building in Afghanistan in both its temporal-spatial contingency and a regional realm. \nThe presenter argued that organisations such as NATO and USFOR-A\, their raison d’etre and conduct-underlying vision\, are shaped by the theoretical discourse of the rationalist actor based\, realist paradigm. The initial failures in Afghanistan –traversing the strategic-operation-tactical divides-can arguably be attributed to a slowness\, an inertia\, on the part of NATO to adjust to a different world. \nShe sought to demonstrate the validity of the micro-macro nexus of an intrastate war with interstate tensions attributable to colonial legacies. She argued\, state building as espoused by the Security Primacy Doctrine- an approach interlinking state-building with security setting and the security-setting corpus traversing institutional strategic-operational-tactical divides-warrants the avoidance of rigid template-following and calls for it to be commensurable with the temporal spatial contingencies. It calls for a continuously iterative modus operandi with the onus being on ANSF\, the concrete security-setters in question\, to assure the conferral of legitimacy to the Afghan Government.  \nThe presenter argues that the study is not merely pertinent for the Afghan case\, but furthers the argument that Afghanistan figures as a laboratory for future conflicts arising along the intrastate chasms that is the legacy for post-colonial states of a past of Western hegemony. \nMajor point of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nWhile the paper was appreciated by the discussants\, they suggested that the paper needed to bring out more Afghan approach to the problem. The paper should also include the non-official perceptions in Afghanistan. In other words paper needs to address the local perception.\nIt was also suggested that incorporation of an explanation of idea of Afghanistan in the paper would help the reader to understand whether Afghanistan has been studied as a nation or a state.\n\nReport prepared by Gulbin Sultana\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-afghan-war-warrants-a-paradigmatic-shift-for-state-building
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120921T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120921T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134152Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63156-1348205400-1348205400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:One Hundred Years of  Kautilya’s Arthasastra
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr S KalyanaramanExternal Discussants: Ambassador K P Fabian\, Professor Navnita Chadha Behera and Col VMB KrishnanInternal Discussants: Mr. Saurabh Mishra and Ms. Nupur Brahma \n \nThe central argument of this paper is that Kautilya\, the ancient strategic thinker of India\, has been neglected and not been given his due in the Indian strategic thinking. It seeks to revive the study of Kautilya’s Arthasastra and establish it in the contemporary security studies. The paper examines the discourse that has evolved through the last 100 years\, since the Arthasastra was first discovered and translated. The paper attempts to find out the answers of the questions raised on the strategic culture in India as some academicians even go to the extent of declaring an absence of strategic culture in India. The paper tries to document and deal with almost all the scholarly controversies related to the Arthasastra during this period and relates a whole tradition of political and strategic thinkers (makers of the kingly science) like Manu\, Brihaspati\, Sukra\, Parasara\, Vysas and Chanakya as recognised in the Panchtantra.  \nThe difficulty in studying Kautilya and his times are due to the cartographic gaps\, poor state and progression of maps and the controversies about the age and identity of the author. The contemplations about the age of the work vary between 4th century BCE and 3rd Century ACE. There are different views about the authorship of the Arathasastra as well: One holds that Kautilya was a single person who wrote it by himself and the other claims it to be a compiled “work by authors under the rubric of Kautilya.” A few scholars find the traces of all strategies and diplomacy within the Arthasastra while others allege that its importance is magnified and overstated. \nIt is interesting to note that Kautilya’s four upayas (devices)—sama\, dana\, bheda\, danda—to achieve the goals of diplomacy have a remarkable similarity with Morganthau’s sections in his realist theory about divide and rule\, compensation\, armaments\, and alliances. The paper discusses Kautilya’s theories of the seven elements of state (prakritis)\, six measures of foreign policy (sadgunya)\, the circle of states (rajamandala)\, the kinds of conquest (vijaya) and war (yudha). \nCountries of Southeast Asia have also been influenced by the Kautilyan concepts of mandala\, cakra and chakravartin. In 1929\, Herbert H. Gowen traced how in course of time niti or the old Indian rulers as embodied in treatises\, became a system coveted and adopted by foreign potentates. The spread of the Indian ideas took a long route through nitisastra\, panchtantra\, Hitopdeca\, Qalila and Dimnah and Beast Fables to pass into Persia\, Arabia\, North Africa\, Spain and Provence. \nThe paper elucidates nine reasons for the neglect of the study of Kautilya: \n\nA-historic nature of the Indian civilisation and oral tradition\,\nLack of proper battle accounts available from Indian sources and over-reliance on Greek and Graeco-Roman sources\,\nAbsence of holistic teaching and education and domination of a western discourse\,\nKautilya’s suspended status between schools of nationalists and Marxists\,\nLack of policy focus and absence of serious study in think tanks\,\nLack of language skills and preservation of texts\,\nKautilya not being a soldier like Sun Tzu\, Clausewitz\, Jomini or Liddell Hart\,\nInterpretation by antisocial elements and narrow mindedness\,\nMisunderstanding brahmin scholars\, over exaggeration of brahmanism and perception of male chauvinism.\n\nMisconceptions exist about Kautilya and his statecraft. Kautilya is looked upon as Machiavellian which distorts the correct picture. The difference between Machiavelli and Kautilya is regarding the subject matter of their works and methodology. The former was narrower limiting himself to the unification of Italy\, leaving the questions of economy aside\, while the latter had a holistic view of the vijigishu: consolidating the empire in almost the entire Indian subcontinent.   \nCondemnation of Kautilya as an unethical teacher is due to the ignorance about his work. The image of Chanakya as a cunning brahmin is stereotypical in nature. Some scholars consider Kautilya’s work as immoral and repudiated by the Indians themselves while Lankavatarasutra refers to Kautilya as rsi and Somadeva refers him as nyayavid. The reasons for such diverse image might be in the imaginations of some playwrights influenced by their contemporary contexts. The paper finds Kautilya too serious a business to be left to linguists or historians alone. Most of the work on Kautilya lies in the category where the scholar does not read the text but keenly quotes from what some commentator had said superficially.  \nMisquoting Kautilya does more harm than good. One main reason for him being misunderstood is the use of Kautilyan terms as a simplistic jargon. The paper gives instances of misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Kautilya. Blanket use of the mandala makes it the most misunderstood term as people contemplate and extrapolate it to any extent they want. It is also said that the matsya nyaya and the mandala theory of Kautilya’s Arthasastra are the two evils. \nResearching Kautilya is a level playing field for all as it is not limited to historians only. There are no classified documents or files to be consulted and unearthed. This knowledge lies scattered across the domains of archaeology\, philosophy\, linguistics\, history\, political science and religious texts. Public perception about Kautilya is based mainly on folklore\, mythology and limited on readings and research. \nThis paper suggests that the Kautilya moment has now arrived. The care and preservation of ancient archives is essential. The science\, politics and statecraft of the Arthasastra need to be preserved and practiced in ways in which Indian classical music has survived and thrived. There is a need for state patronage\, sponsorship and financial backing for the study of Arthasastra. Research and training for this purpose must be undertaken and encouraged at all the levels.  \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author:\n\nUnder the influence of Gandhian values and Nehru’s\, thought there was no space for Kautilya to make his mark.\nKautilya is also considered a part of the Indian philosophical system. As the Indian ways of knowing the reality has a non-dualistic mode of thinking\, Kautilya goes beyond matsya nyaya. He elucidates how to deal with realpolitik while actually looking at the norms and tries to give ways where anarchy can be overcome. \nIt is difficult to understand Kautilya because military history and historical sociology are not taught in the Indian universities at all. A problem of language exists in the study of Arthasastra as the strategists are disconnected from Sanskrit. We also need to maintain a critical space with regards to the Anglo-American influence while keeping in mind that we generally impose ipso facto the modern jargon and terminology on ancient contexts. \nKautilya’s work should not be taken as the Bible. Reading of original translation is must to avoid distortions and we should read Chanakya not only because we aspire to become a great power but also because the world would be a more peaceful place by understanding him.\nAs we generally restrict ourselves to the Indian heartland while digging into the history of Indian strategic culture\, the outlook (caricature) of Kautilya also inhibits his acceptability.\nWe need to know more about how the Arthasastra was followed in Kautilya’s time. Arthasastra requires a rereading in the context of modern state and democracy.\n\nReport prepared by Saurabh Mishra\, Research Assistant IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/one-hundred-years-of-kautilyas-arthasastra
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120907T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120907T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134206Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63157-1346995800-1346995800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Reframing Institutions: A Study of the Relevance of Southern African Customs Union
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb. HHS ViswanathanExternal Discussants: Dr SK MohantyInternal Discussants: Ms Ruchita Beri\, Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal \nMajor Highlights of the Paper: This paper broadly addresses the significance of the African continent in India’s foreign policy with special reference to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in India’s engagement in southern and sub Saharan Africa. A study of SACU’s relevance becomes significant in light of the increasing regional and sub-regional integration in Africa.  \nThe study traces the development pattern of southern Africa and the underlying components of economic power. It then reviews the SACU Agreement of 2002 and how it deviates from the 1969 agreement. The author also focuses on the nature of inequality among the SACU member states – South Africa\, Botswana\, Lesotho\, Namibia and Swaziland – and its bearing on inter-state relations. The possible roles that SACU can play in the future and how\, if at all\, it could contribute to redefinition of the geopolitical environment of the region are also explored. On policy considerations\, this paper addresses the implications of SACU for Indian foreign policy specifically towards Southern Africa. \nSACU’s role is seen as crucial in addressing the inequality in inter-state relations\, given that South Africa also dominated in its hinterland for decades. Among SACU member states\, inequality between South Africa and the BLNS states exists not only on economic terms but also in their respective views towards international politics. At the regional level\, SACU can represent the interests of its members in other oragnisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In a region peppered with landlocked countries\, an integrated approach becomes essential; SACU can help members coordinate policies and reconcile sovereign differences. SACU will prove to be a decisive player in formulating the equation of regional power in the years to come\, according to the author.  \nSince SACU as an organization is more homogeneous and more open to diplomatic efforts\, its relevance for India becomes imminent. One role it could play is in hedging three primary types of risks associated with engaging in a region such as southern Africa – political\, legal and financial. SACU could also assist in greater Indian engagement in the form of institutional capacity-building at the national\, regional and pan African level. In general\, SACU can help solidify India’s role in South-South cooperation and portray it as an ‘inclusive power’. It could also help facilitate stronger ties with Angola\, Mozambique or Tanzania which could further India’s engagement with the SADC. In addition\, building stronger bilateral ties with Namibia and Botswana can give India strategic access to the Atlantic Ocean and Central Africa. India could also assist Namibia and Botswana in setting up institutions in public governance\, professional banking and other tertiary sector businesses\, in order that it counters exploitative tendencies in the region and enhance its image in the development sector.  \nMajor Points of discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThe mechanism through which resources have been shared in SACU’s common reserve pool could be explored further\, since this could be relevant for other regions in the world such as South Asia where the idea of common reserve pool could be implemented.\nFurther study of SACU’s importance and implications for India could be useful for policy making bodies\, for example how India can gain from integrating with SACU (India currently cooperates with at least eight other regional economic communities in Africa)\, and vice versa. In addition\, SACU cannot be studied in isolation from Africa’s numerous other regional economic communities. Given South Africa’s dominant role in this organisation and the region\, the question of whether SACU has succeeded in addressing inequities among member states needs to be explored further. \nA review of China’s role in Africa relating to this study could be undertaken given the level of China’s engagement on the African continent. \nA comparative study could be undertaken to study the relevance for India of signing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with SACU versus the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)\, which includes all SACU member states. Also\, if SACU has succeeded as an institution\, the study could explore what lessons India could draw from this (particularly relating to the SAARC). \nWhile the study suggests that South Africa could act as a gateway to sub-Saharan Africa\, given that there is an amount of resentment regarding South Africa’s dominant role in the region\, it would be worth exploring if this is indeed useful. \n\nReport prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean and UN Centre
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/reframing-institutions-a-study-of-the-relevance-of-southern-african-customs-union
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120905T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120905T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134206Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130740Z
UID:63158-1346823000-1346823000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Implications of US Re-balancing to Asia in General and West Asia in Particular
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Dr. Jon B Alterman\, Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Director\, Middle East Program\, Center for Strategic and International Studies\, Washington DC.   \nChair: Brig (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya\, SM\, DDG\, IDSA.  \nDr. Alterman initiated his presentation by highlighting the importance of India’s relationship with the Gulf in analyzing American policy of rebalancing towards Asia. He observed that the word ‘rebalancing’\, coined by the US State Department\, is not directed against China and one needs to look at the background of this new policy to understand it nuances. For a decade\, the US had been engaged in fighting two and half wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and determining the capabilities and methods needed for the war against terror. Its pre-occupation with these wars led the US to lose its focus on Asia for a decade\, in particular after the Asian financial crisis. This decade has been characterized by a significant growth of Asia’s trade and economic capabilities and the American rebalancing policy towards Asia is a testimony of the economic prowess of the region. \nDr. Alterman emphasized that the new policy aims to play a mutually constructive role in Asia’s future and is an alternative to isolationism and a substitute for fighting wars of attrition to achieve political outcomes. There is a growing realization that the US cannot rely on military means alone to achieve its objectives. Rebalancing is not about containing China but principally looks at creating patterns of interdependence and nurturing norms of mutually beneficial interaction in Asia: there should be space for everyone to operate and nobody should be a dominant power in the region. He argued that there is a growing realization of the limited upside of Europe for the US even though for a long time it viewed international relations through the prism of a trans-Atlantic framework. This change has been further strengthened by an American President whose principal international experience was not in London or Paris but in Nairobi and Jakarta. Europe had struggled to fulfil its military obligations during the operation in Libya and there is a feeling that the upside in Asia is much more than that in Europe even though US will never abandon Europe. \nFor the rebalancing policy to succeed in Asia\, Dr. Alterman stressed on the need for US to get used to multilateralism rather than bilateralism\, a very uncomfortable concept for it to deal with as witnessed in the UN General Assembly and even the UN Security Council.  In the past the US has generally worked within the framework of knowing its adversaries and opponents. The challenge for America is to formulate a role and lay down its unique value proposition to the coalition in the absence of a clear threat in Asia since it has never been good at non-hierarchical relationships. For a country used to engaging state actors\, the real challenge for US is to figure out how to deal with different forms of state capacities which includes non state and trans-national actors.  \nOn the question of China\, Dr. Alterman emphasized that it is wrong to assume China is the principal threat in the region. Although the future of Chinese trajectory is a matter of concern yet the ultimate US goal is to make sure that it is not in an adversarial relationship with China.\nDr. Alterman observed that Asia is beginning to act more as a unit since most its energy requirement comes from the Middle East. The US will get increasingly invested in the Middle East; not through the traditional route of Transatlantic\, Mediterranean and Suez Canal but through the Pacific and Indian Oceans and into the straits of Hormuz\, if it has a stake in the security and economic growth of Asia. The Middle East continues to be a global energy market and disruptions there can have serious repercussions across the world. Consequently\, Asian energy security becomes vital to wellbeing of the US even though American dependence on the Middle East oil has declined over the years. The active US involvement in counter-piracy operations is an indication of its commitment to defend the sea lanes. One can expect the US to adopt a more mercantile approach to the Middle East due to Asia’s over-reliance on its oil. Rebalancing highlights the link between Asia and the Middle East. \nIn recent times\, there has been a lot more activity between the US Central and Pacific Naval Commands. More American ships can be expected to stay in the neighbourhood thus leading to a larger US naval presence in Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean Region.\nHowever\, Dr. Alterman highlighted several impediments to this rebalancing policy. The present Congress continues to be in a dysfunctional state and there may be a budget crisis in the future. There is also an unresolved debate about the future threat environment.  \nKey Points Raised During Discussion:\na) Energy flow from the Middle East to East Asia has an integrating effect on the continent since it has imbibed a broader sense of shared security and economic interests.\nb) It has been observed that patterns of oil usage get embedded in people’s lifestyle. It will take a long time for oil consumption patterns to shift in a radical way. In fact\, rising incomes in India and China will drive the demand for oil. The jury is still out on the usage (consumption and production patterns) of unconventional sources of energy. \nc) The US needs to figure out means to successfully engage China and partner India\, Japan and Korea in a manner that there are no prevailing tensions in the region. The US is a ‘light handed post modern imperial power’ and the idea is not to be present everywhere.  \nd) The Shia-Sunni conflict in the Middle East is likely to get worse before it gets better. Iran is concerned about its regional isolation and it may respond by reminding people about its ability to initiate sectarian conflict from Libya to Yemen encompassing Iraq\, Lebanon\, Kuwait\, Bahrain and parts of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia on its part has supported the Syrian opposition and the Iran-Saudi conflict may subsequently accentuate.  \ne) Israel is at a foundational moment in its relationship with the US. However\, Israel is changing due to a change in its demography. The possibility of having a fundamentally different US-Israeli relationship is present much more now than in any time in the last 60 years.  \nf) The US has often participated in multilateral partnerships but from a position of leadership as witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US is fundamentally committed to open commercial access to all resources as it is against locking up access to resources.  \ng) The Iranian sense of vulnerability and humiliation at the hands of US stands in the way of getting something productive out from it. Iran sees no upside in improving its relationship with the US. However\, not being able to make Iran come clean on its nuclear programme is often viewed as a failure of the US foreign policy in the Middle East. Moreover\, the Arab states of the Gulf are apprehensive of including Iran in any regional security architecture. The stated US goal is to ensure that Iran will not be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb. An Iranian nuclear bomb will be a disaster for regional security of West Asia. \nh) Regimes in the Middle East have built their political systems on the basis of food security fuelled by exploitation of aquifers. Exhaustion of these aquifers will destroy the notion of food security and can create political insecurity. However\, there is a greater possibility of materialisation of internal dissent rather than external threat. Therefore\, climate change can bring about a political change but it will not be the main driver of political transformation in the region. \ni) The threat of terrorists using nuclear devices is minimal since it is extremely difficult and sophisticated to build and the governments that possess such devices are reluctant to give it away. \nj) Republicans will not articulate their views on ‘US rebalancing policy’ till the elections get over in order to cater to their three constituencies of neo-conservatives\, realists and neo-isolationists. \nk) The future of G2 as a grouping is not very promising on account of lack of commonality of interests and methods between US and China especially due to Chinese threat of vulnerability and the notion of it being denied a rightful place in world affairs. They are more likely to cooperate within a broader multilateral cooperative framework although the challenge for US will be to tackle multilateral diplomacy.  \nl) Turkey has offered itself as bridge between the Middle East\, Europe\, Central Asia and the Gulf. Its energy corridors have the potential to link Central to West Asia and onto Europe. Therefore\, it is set to play a significant role in the region.  \nReport prepared by Rajorshi Roy\, Research Assistant\, Eurasia-West Asia Cluster\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/implications-of-us-re-balancing-to-asia-in-general-and-west-asia-in-particular
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120831T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120831T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134206Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130555Z
UID:63159-1346391000-1346391000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Talk by Amb. Carlos Duarte on "India-Brazil Relations"
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Dr. Carlos Duarte\, Ambassador of Brazil to India August 1\, 2012 \nChair: Amb. R Rajagopalan (Retd.) \nIndia’s interaction with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries\, particularly with\, has enhanced over the years. In order to give a better perspective on this developing relationship and to help India augment its capacities in Brazil\, Mr. Carlos Duarte\, Ambassador of Brazil to India delivered a talk on “India-Brazil Relations” on August 31. Ambassador R Rajagopalan chaired the proceedings.  \nAmb. Duarte gave the gathering an exhaustive picture of where India-Brazil ties stand today. He started off by sharing some important facts about Brazil which is the largest Latin American country and the 5th largest in the world. With a population of 190 million\, it is surrounded by 10 other South American countries. Amb. Duarte pointed out that recent years have seen many positive transformations in Brazil. He singled out figures of Brazil’s solid macro-economic fundamentals in his presentation. Economic elements like consistent positive average growth rate\, democratic stability\, increasing rate of employment\, decreasing fiscal deficit\, expansion of credit\, control of inflation rate targets\, decreasing real interest rate\, positive trade balance and important social policies\, have all had a profound implication for the consolidation of the new Brazilian reality. He interspersed his presentation with charts and graphs which depicted a clear representation of these points.  \nHe admitted that Brazil still remains one of the most unequal countries in the world. However\, because of the reigning in of high inflation since the 1990s\, Brazil has managed to reduce the income inequality gap. Today\, 50 percent of the Brazilian population falls into the middle class category and 12 percent is below the poverty line calculated as per the Brazilian standards. 35 percent of the country is covered with primary forests and 75 percent of the domestic electricity is produced by hydropower. In terms of output\, Itaipu is the largest hydropower dam in the world. In terms of the nature of Brazilian economy\, Agriculture contributes 5.5 percent of GDP\, almost 30 percent is industrial production and services constitute 67 percent of the GDP. Brazil received FDI inflows to the tune of $ 66.7 bn in 2011\, higher than other South American country. Brazil’s important trade partners for 2011 in order of precedence were EU\, China\, USA and MERCOSUR countries (within MERCOSUR\, Argentina constituted the largest player). Upcoming big ticket events like the Football World Cup in 2014 and the Rio de Janeiro Olympics in 2016 will contribute to further elevating Brazil’s global stature and making it a magnet for foreign investments.  Brazil is part of some major regional groupings like MERCOSUR (formed in 1991)\, UNASUR (2008)\, and CELAC (2010). However\, according to Amb. Duarte\, regional integration in South America is still an ongoing process and there is a lot which can be done to amalgamate production chains in the region. Important international groupings of which Brazil is an integral part along with India include IBSA\, BRICS\, BASIC\, G-20\, and G-4. \nAs noted by Mr Duarte\, Brazilian and Indian Heads of State usually meet frequently on the sidelines of many international events to cement bilateral ties. In 2011\, they met four times indicating that they are coordinating with a greater intensity. In the brief time-span since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1948 till the 1990s\, Brazil-India relations were relatively lacklustre\, except for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s visit to Brazil in 1968. India-Brazil relations gained momentum after Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s visit to India in 1996. This was followed by the establishment of India- Brazil Joint Commission in 2002. It was with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s visit in 2004 that India-Brazil relations received a significant fillip and in 2006\, India and Brazil established a “strategic partnership”. President Dilma Rousseff has continued this crucial partnership since coming to power in 2011.  \nOn the trade front\, there has been an almost 10-fold increase over the last decade and is expected to reach $15 bn by 2015 (The current figure stands at $ 10 bn). The rise in trade figures\, however\, conceal some of the vulnerabilities in the economic relationship\, when one notices the concentration on only few products\, particularly crude oil imports from Brazil and diesel exports from India. Amb. Duarte believes that these products do not posses a value-added component and one of the challenges in the trade relationship is to introduce greater diversification. Brazil and India\, he observed\, share similar levels of development and therefore have many complementarities in the realm of agriculture\, science\, technology\, education\, energy\, culture\, environment\, defence and social policy making. Active cooperation in these fields include a MoU with Brazil for cooperation in agriculture signed in 2008\, an agreement between Brazilian Embrappa and Indian ICAR for executing joint agricultural research projects in dairy farming and food processing. There is an ongoing collaboration in the area of science\, technology and innovation with the establishment of India-Brazil Science Council in 2005\, along with academic cooperation by charting the Science without Borders programme. In the domain of energy\, which forms an important component of India-Brazil relations\, there is in place a Memorandum of Cooperation in fuel mixture technology signed in 2006 and Petroleum and Gas in 2008. As for the Defence Sector\, there is an agreement dating back to 2003\, a bilateral strategic dialogue from 2007 and an important programme wherein Indian-built Radars are installed in a Brazilian aircraft which also works as an early warning device. Amb. Duarte concluded his talk with the view that there is tremendous scope for further cooperation between the two countries which share similar political principles and viewpoints on international issues.  \nPoints raised during discussion\n\nBrazil is very proud of its heritage of maintaining peaceful ties with neighbours for over a century.  It is in the process of consolidating this clean record by forging greater regional integration\, as manifested by multiple projects which are underway including the tapping of natural gas from Bolivia to Sao Paulo. \nTension between the competing principles of democracy promotion and non-intervention is a difficult one to resolve. Each case of conflict-torn country should be assessed on its own individual merit\, be it Libya or Paraguay. Brazil believes in resolving the conflict by following democratic principles which would entail engendering dialogue between the warring factions and causing the least possible harm to civilians.\nWith regards to the impediments faced by the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America in the context of successful regional integration in the South American region\, there are complexities being encountered in the execution of this initiative. However\, such projects do take time to develop fully and undergo a long process of evolution. \nThere were apprehensions raised about IBSA becoming a non-entity in the light of BRICS being a bigger regional organization. However\, one group  should  not seen  as challenging the other for both are essentially created for different reasons\, that is BRICS for dealing with bigger international issues and IBSA for countries sharing and learning from their own developmental problems. \nIndia and Brazil share many affinities with regard to international issues and have established robust cooperation on issues like HIV-AIDS and climate change\, little disagreements do not account for much. Therefore\, the feasibility of both the countries coordinating policies and positions at the multilateral level should not be questioned.\nWith respect to developing security cooperation among Latin American countries\, as it is practically non-existent except for a small defence committee in UNASUR\, it was noted that most of the Latin American countries have adopted a deterrent type of defence doctrine and have the shadow of one big super power looming over them\, which automatically engenders cooperation amongst them. They always strive towards decreasing all tensions\, which are indeed not very many. \nAs for the state of people-to-people contacts between India and Brazil\, there was felt a paucity of knowledge about each other since the interaction has been confined to business sectors only. However\, the fact that India-CELAC relations are surging is in itself a positive sign and it was felt that this is the right time to give more density to India- Brazil relations. \n\n(Report prepared by Sneha Bhura\, Intern at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.) \nClick here for event photographs [+]
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/talk-by-amb-carlos-duarte-on-india-brazil-relations
CATEGORIES:OTHER EVENTS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120822T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120822T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134207Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130555Z
UID:63160-1345613400-1345613400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Talk on “Future Foreign Policy and Strategic Security Challenges for Germany and Europe"
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff\, Member of German Bundestag (German Parliament) and Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU- parliamentary group in the German Bundestag for Foreign Affairs\, Affairs of the European Union and Defence Policy.  \nChair: Lt Gen (Retd.) Satish Nambiar\, Distinguished Fellow\, IDSA \nLt Gen (Retd.) Nambiar initiated the proceedings by highlighting the importance of the European Union (EU) in being a role model for international cooperation and management of economies and borders. At a time when Germany continues to be the mainstay of the 27 member Union\, he argued that India can learn many things from it especially when India wants to play a leading role in South Asia.  \nDr Andreas Schockenhoff opened his presentation by calling for India to play a more prominent role in global affairs. He emphasized that EU must harness India’s enormous global economic\, political and strategic potential through improved trade\, economic\, political and technological cooperation. Elaborating on the lessons learnt after 2 centuries of division and 2 devastating wars in the 20th Century\, Dr. Schockenhoff emphasized on the importance of European countries to strive for integration in European trans-national structures. Integration is a sign of strength and has the inherent potential to solve global crisis. Present day Europe represents 40% of global trade\, 20% of global production and by the end of this century will represent less than 5% of the global population. Therefore\, more political integration of Europe is a question of political and societal survival. Dr. Schockenhoff observed that the current Euro crisis is not just a currency but also a debt crisis of national budgets. Although there is a single market along with a common currency\, there are also numerous fiscal and social policies and different forms of public spending. The challenge is to achieve economic and political integration in Europe since growth and fiscal consolidation are complimentary to each other.\nDr. Schockenhoff argued that questions remain over the strategic role of EU in a multipolar 21st Century and whether it will have the economic and the political leverage to play a meaningful role in global affairs. Achieving this target would involve not just political but also defence and security integration across Europe. On some of the international initiatives of the European Union\, Dr. Schockenhoff highlighted its transformation partnership with Tunisia and Egypt\,? which he termed more credible than the previous EU neighbourhood policy. It aims to promote rule of law\, democracy and governance. Economic development is a pillar of this programme but there are stringent conditions to prevent its misuse. But the more significant question is how to deal with Islamist parties. He felt that the jury is still out on two pertinent issues: a) the degree of separation between state and religion and b) the nature of religious freedom enjoyed by the minorities. The onus is now on the ruling parties to prove that they have distanced themselves from religious dogmatism and people are free to practise other religions.  \nOn the developments in Syria\, Dr. Schockenhoff emphasized that the EU remains committed to the Syrian people’s struggle for freedom\, democracy and dignity. There is a need for initiating an inclusive and transparent national transition political process. This can be achieved only if Assad steps down since he is responsible for most of the killings. In addition\, the opposition groups should try to settle differences between they have. He called on Russia and China to end their support and protection of the current regime and felt that the UNSC must condemn and isolate Assad. The UNSC should also look at imposing sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN.   \nOn the Iran-Israel conflict\, Dr. Schockenhoff argued that Germany is continuing with its defence partnership of selling submarines to Israel as part of its responsibility to protect the Jewish state. The submarines are a vital part of Israel’s defence strategy though it is not known whether they are armed with nuclear weapons. However\, the prevalence of nuclear bombs on board will be vital for a second strike capability essential to the country’s survival. The submarines also act as a nuclear deterrent. Dr. Schockenhoff called upon Iran to immediately meet is international nuclear obligations. He observed that there is a need to make Iran feel the impact of stringent sanctions so that effective negotiations can take place. The red line for Israel will be Iran entering its ‘immunity zone’ when the Iranians will have stored enough enriched uranium in deep underground facilities to make a weapon. That moment could come very soon. \nOn the question of Afghanistan\, Dr. Schockenhoff emphasized that EU is committed to the completion of transition process as mentioned in the NATO Lisbon summit of 2010 and reconfirmed in the NATO summit in Chicago in 2012. The principle of ‘together in and together out’ is sacrosanct with Germany committing its troops till the end of 2014. While ISAF troops are being withdrawn\, a second mandate for the withdrawal of troops will be approved. This will include separate forces for the protection of the withdrawing troops. He said that Germany is committed to the country’s long term stability and development. \nOn the issue of the European defence\, Dr. Schockenhoff argued that Europe needs its own strong and credible defence and security policy. Given the prevailing financial crisis across the Eurozone\, the ability to take effective action in the realm of security policy can be guaranteed only through closer military cooperation and integration. Germany can aim to achieve military integration and pooling of resources with other European countries over projects like joint air and coastal defence\, joint training\, single command and control structures and information systems. However\, the Bundestag (German Parliament) must have the right of recall with reference to such decisions. \nDr. Schockenhoff concluded by highlighting the two pillars of ongoing European Reforms:  \n\nGreater political governance of European market and currency involving fiscal and budgetary discipline;\nIncreased military cooperation and integration of military capabilities. \n\nPoints raised during discussions: \n\nThere is a huge potential to develop India-Germany partnership especially in areas of education\, renewable energy\, technological research\, innovation\, space\, earth observation and climate change. \nChina has not taken responsibility in promoting international stability and security but is more interested in protecting its own interests. \nIn a multipolar world order\, India should not adopt a neutral position on key global issues. Taking decisions implies takings risks but it also involves shouldering responsibilities. \nIt is difficult to ensure balance between non interference and regime change from outside. The answer could be engagement. Civil wars and homicides are no longer regional but are international problems. \nInstability in Pakistan is a more dangerous threat to international stability than the situation in Afghanistan. There is a need to make sure that disruptive elements in Pakistan are not a threat to its neighbours and the international community. \n\nThe highlight of the interaction was the general consensus amongst the scholars and the German delegation of the need for both countries to work together on a global platform to solve problems of mutual concern. \nReport prepared by Rajorshi Roy\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/talk-on-future-foreign-policy-and-strategic-security-challenges-for-germany-and-europe
CATEGORIES:OTHER EVENTS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120801T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120801T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134207Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130555Z
UID:63161-1343799000-1343799000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Talk on “Comparative Diaspora Politics: The Cases of China and India”
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room No 005 (Ground Floor)Speaker: Dr Nikola Mirilovic\, Assistant Professor\, Department of Political Science\, University of Central FloridaChair: Ambassador J C Sharma \nThe term ‘Diaspora’ has gained tremendous currency in this age of globalization and transnational co-operation\, as countries around the world devise ways to harness their extended national population living in foreign countries as strategic assets. Dr Nikola Mirilovic\, Assistant Professor\, Department of Political Science\, University of Central Florida gave a presentation on “Comparative Diaspora Politics: The Cases of China and India”. This talk was chaired by former First Secretary and Member Secretary of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora\, Amb. J.C. Sharma.  \nDr Nikola Mirilovic’s presentation threw light on the policies of different countries with respect to engaging their diaspora across the world. The aim of his presentation was to answer the question; why do some countries institutionalize links with the Diaspora while others ignore or prosecute them? Dr. Nikola began his presentation by focussing on what constitutes a ‘Diaspora’. He defined it as “co-ethics or co-nationals who live outside the country”.  To add a more nuanced approach to this definition\, he analysed the term diaspora and its implications on the basis of parameters\, namely: \n1. Persecution and Condemnation– when nationals of a country are compelled to reside in foreign countries owing to hostility and maltreatment in their respective home countries. These hostile home countries do not have friendly policies to connect and collaborate with their own people residing in foreign countries.\n2. Indifference– when policies of a country remain relatively inactive or dormant towards their diasporic population as they are left to their own devices. \n3. Institutionalized Political and Economic Ties– when countries are actively involved in garnering the intellectual and economic resources of their nationals living in foreign countries through the establishment of provisions like dual citizenship\, facilitation of their political support via lobbying and building of other relevant organisations.  \nDr. Nikola identified three important reasons which are responsible for making the diasporic community a salient base: 1)Economic: when the diasporic community contributes by way of FDIs and remittances\, 2)Political: when it plays a major role in cementing bilateral relationships and has a decisive effect in the resolution of issues related to international cooperation and conflict and 3) Cultural: when it is perceived as agents who help in the process of propagating cultural values and ideas inherent to a particular country.  \nWhile investigating the reasons behind the existence of the parameters mentioned\, Dr. Nikola used three variables to explain the manifestation of these factors which include; regime type\, international economic strategy\, and nationalism. Illustrating the determinant of regime-type analyses\, he put forward his first hypothesis that democracy reduces the likelihood of the persecution of the diaspora and their relatives at home. The second hypothesis is related to the facilitating effect of democracy which argues that democracy multiplies the effectiveness of diaspora lobbying when the country of origin and the country of residence are both democratic. Dr Nikola opined that democracy as a regime type imparts a positive branding effect. He further illustrated this proposition with a regime time and diaspora dyad. To explain the determinant of international economic strategy\, his hypotheses stated that countries that seek international economic openness are more likely to engage their diaspora than countries that seek autarky. Further\, nationalists may seek diasporic engagement because they value national unity and seek to preserve their cultural values. However\, he cautioned that nationalists may condemn diaspora members as traitors as well.  \nDr. Nikola argued that diaspora politics remains understudied in the realm of international political economy and security studies. There are country-level studies; however there is a lack of comparative studies on the subject. The causal logic of democratic peace theory is missing and the concept of “Economic Nationalism” also remains misunderstood. Dr. Nikola argued that his research has looked at these gaps by having been focussed on the variations using cross-national and cross-temporal analyses from the period beginning in the 1940s to the present day.  \nDr Nikola highlighted the key turning points in China and India’s Diaspora engagement through the prism of regime-type variation. With reference to India\, in the post-independence scenario\, Indian officials had de-emphasized diaspora engagement but at the same time there were instances of nationalist organisations building ties with the Diaspora in a sporadic way. The turning point for the Indian Diaspora community came in the 1990s with the ushering in of economic reforms and Diaspora courting by a BJP-led government. From there on\, there was further institutionalization of Diaspora engagement with the passage of PIO card (1991)\, creation of the MOIA (2004) and so on. \nWith respect to China\, there was limited Diaspora out-reach in the early PRC period. The first turning point for the Chinese diasporic community came during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76)\, when  Diaspora outreach activities were suspended leading to the condemnation of the Diaspora community (mostly perceived as capitalists) and the persecution of their relatives at home. The second turning point came in the 1970s with the introduction of economic reforms. This was followed up with the institutionalization of diasporic engagement through the formation of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs\, Office of the State Council (1978) and the National Congress of the Returned Overseas Chinese and their relatives.  \nDr Nikola further asked if democratic dyads allow the Diaspora to play a more important role in their host country. To answer this question\, he predicates his research on the diasporic community residing in the U.S\, where both the Indian and Chinese Diaspora are relatively more educated and wealthy than average Americans. But because India is a democracy\, sharing the same political values as America\, Indian Americans are more likely to emerge as a “political powerhouse” than the Chinese Americans. The growing political influence of Indian Americans is reflected in the fact that India constitutes the largest Congressional Caucus because of the positive branding effect of democracy. India has a far greater number of India-US business councils than its Chinese counterparts. In conclusion\, the speaker reaffirmed the salience of his key determinants in measuring the variations of different countries towards Diaspora engagement. He ended on the note that Diaspora engagement for international cooperation and conflict is only more likely to grow. \nDiscussion and Questions and Answers: \n\nThe first question primarily inquired about ways to tackle nuances in the definitional aspects of Diaspora\, especially when one has to factor  issues like the drawing of colonial boundaries (with particular reference to the community of Kurds)\, historical processes of migration\, its nature and how it affects identity issues. Dr Nikola conceded that any objective outlining of the definition of Diaspora is well-nigh impossible\, although certain objective traits can be looked at. \nOn the question with regard to Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia\, Dr. Nikola referred to his democracy dyad. According to him\, the Chinese were politically marginalized because of their origin from an essentially authoritarian state which believes in the ideology of Chinese unification. He pointed out that there is a gap between the official discourse and practice of the Chinese government where officially they extol assimilation with the host countries of the Diaspora\, but in practice they still adhere to their ideology of reunification. Therefore the Chinese Diaspora usually tends to be successful economically but politically\, their relationship with the host countries always remain complicated. However Singapore is an exception in Southeast Asia\, where the Chinese Diaspora is more harmoniously active\, politically as well as economically. \nThere was also felt a need to contextualize the comparison of policies of China and India with respect to their Diaspora engagement. \nSuggestions were made to the author to include the policy of Indian government towards people of Indian origin and Indians settled abroad (NRIs) and how it has differed over the years. \nRecommendations for further research questions included a study of the attitude of the Diaspora community towards knowledge transfers\, having taken into account the fact that China has benefited immensely from transfer of knowledge by overseas Chinese. \n\nPrepared by Ms. Sneha Bhura\, Intern at IDSA\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/talk-on-comparative-diaspora-politics-the-cases-of-china-and-india
CATEGORIES:OTHER EVENTS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134306Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63162-1343367000-1343367000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Counter-Insurgency Best Practices and their Applicability in the Northeast
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: General Satish Nambiar \nDiscussants: Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain\, Military Secretary\, Integrated Headquarters (Army)\, Ministry of Defence\nProf. Rajesh Rajagopalan\, School of International Studies\, Jawaharlal Nehru University. \nDr. Namrata Goswami’s paper defines insurgencies as violent struggle against the state for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. In order to win against any insurgency\, the first core insight for any counter-insurgency force is to gain the support of the population. Coupled with population support is the criticality of efficient intelligence though these are not the ultimate required measures. Dr. Goswami’s paper discusses counter-insurgency best practices and the means to operationalize these practices on the ground by identifying nine best practices. \nThe paper selects the best practices based on a literature survey on counter-insurgency theory\, doctrines and manuals of the Indian\, British and US military and also on the field experiences of the author in Northeast India to have a more focused study. The author affirms that insurgency is unique after having conducted work on the ground in the conflict affected states in Northeast India. But\, there are certain common features of counter-insurgency that are valid across time and space as indicated by the literatures on counter-insurgency which is used as the frame of reference by the author in the paper. Based on the works on counter-insurgency which have been utilized in this paper\, the author has identified nine best practices spanning across time and space for detailed study in this paper: Primacy of Political Goals; Centre of Gravity; Population; Counter-Propaganda; Resolute Leadership; Intelligence; Unity of Effort; Appropriate Force Structures; Rule of Law; and Operational Clarity. The paper offers to test the applicability of these counter-insurgency best practices to the Northeast of India. For the purpose of the paper\, counter-insurgency is defined as “those military\, paramilitary\, political\, economic\, psychological\, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency”. \n\nPrimacy of political goals: It involves planning\, preparation and execution of counter-insurgency within political framework. The role of the military in flushing out insurgents from certain areas is considered to be a supportive role. For instance\, British\, U.S. and Indian military forces have signified the importance of military. However\, citing the cases of Mizoram and Assam\, Dr. Goswami emphasises on the importance of political goals. In the paper\, she has pointed out how the Mizo National Front (MNF) became a platform to express against the heavy response of the Indian military. It was during the strong political leadership of Pu Laldenga of MNF that the Mizo conflict was resolved in 1987 through staunch negotiations.\nCentre of gravity-population: Insurgent groups aim to persuade the population by utilizing the strategy of coercion and intimidation to generate support for their political cause. While countering these insurgency groups\, the operation of the armed forces should be carried out in a civilian landscape\, not in military camps\, and the counter-insurgency forces need to know that such operations are people-centric operation. For this\, there are certain practical ways of gaining support of the population\, namely\, having day to day contacts with the population\, organising collective work\, identify local cells of the insurgent\, prevent too much movement\, and finally provide security to the population. Besides this\, there is also a need to gather information on three different types of population in any insurgency-affected areas\, namely\, minority support base for the insurgent; a passive neutral majority; and a minority which is against the insurgency. According to this paper\, insurgency groups such as United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)\, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)\, and MNF have all garnered support from the people. But\, over the period of time\, support for these groups has dwindled down. Insurgency will continue unless security is guaranteed to the population in this region. \nCounter-propaganda:  the insurgency groups intend to impose control over the population. These groups aim to win over the people by propagating their political cause\, often by promising them better political empowerment\, better economic status\, better security etc. Such propaganda appears an easy task to the insurgency groups as they do not have to deliver any of those promised goals in the near term. However\, countering such propaganda remains an arduous task for the counter-insurgency forces. For this\, the strategy for counter-propaganda should be focused on exposing the weakness and false promises made by the insurgents. This strategy can only be materialized by ‘by obtaining the neutrality of the population\, visible presence of counter-insurgent forces to provide security\, establishing the authority of the state by providing basic needs\, propaganda directed at insurgent rank and file\, followed by an effective surrender policy’.\nResolute leadership: In order to carry out a successful operation\, the involved leader must possess a clear conceptual understanding of the mission. For this\, he or she should have a thoughtful understanding of the nature of the problem. The leadership should exhibit ‘resoluteness\, act in an ethical manner and always keep the national priorities and goals in clear perspective’. His or her leadership qualities should also be shown at all levels\, and the leader should able to synchronise with various agencies with the aim of protecting the population and instilling in them a sense of security.\nIntelligence: This is one of the most important counter-insurgency measures. The absence of thorough and specific intelligence would only make the counter-insurgency operations ineffective. For this\, the commander needs to form a sound intelligence network with the involvement of intelligent staffs possessing a ‘clear understanding of the operational environment\, physical geography\, the external influence\, role of media and internet’. Means through which intelligence can be gathered are: lines of communication\, belief systems\, values\, identity\, culture\, social norms\, grievances\, insurgent strength and vulnerabilities\, safe havens\, insurgent intelligence network\, etc. Intelligence should be used to understand the root causes of the insurgency.\nUnity of effort: There needs to be an integrated approach in counter-insurgency. This involves ‘showcasing of administrative capacities\, economic resources\, propaganda\, military superiority and the like’. Operations in such cases should be guided by a single strategic narrative that is visible across all lines of operation. This practice involves the coordination of political\, social\, economic and the military aspects of the counter-insurgency. The author specifies the roles of politicians\, bureaucrats\, army\, police\, local leaders\, NGOs and media. A successful unity of effort can be achieved if there is a single command and coordination centre. Furthermore\, civil-military relations are also important in this context. \nAppropriate ‘military’ force structures: It is important that the force is used to its minimum. This is because operations should aim to neutralise insurgents and not eliminate them. Also\, minimum force should be used in order to reduce the fear that civilian population experiences due to the heavy presence of armed forces. The force structure should be able to respond to given context even though it is a small operation team.\nRule of law: The counter-insurgent forces need to act according to certain accepted rule of law. Any operation in a given region should be within the framework of a legal mandate and conduct must meet the highest legal standards. With such rules\, the involved forces can avoid any disproportionate use of force. This will not breed alienation amongst the civilians. Forces have to be briefed about the rules of engagement with regard to arrests\, searches\, warrants\, interrogation techniques\, intelligence gathering by issuing a Standard Operating Procedure. Acts such as Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 amended in 1972 are perceived by the common people as neutralising their fundamental rights granted by the Indian Constitution. It is difficult to control population under distress and the state must offer its people ‘a good deal working within the rule of law’ in order to isolate the insurgents. \nOperational clarity: It is important to have clarity of purpose in any counter-insurgency operation. There has to be a unified command structure with only a single direction. The political aims should also be crystal clear. Further\, the armed forces should clearly map the conflict zones. Involved forces must be clear about their allocated tasks\, and short and long term targets. For all these\, the most significant clarity is that the forces should be very clear that these operations must be people friendly ones. Challenges with reference to clarity of operations arise due to prevalence of multiple levels of decision makers in the insurgency-affected states like in the North East.\n\nThe author reemphasises in the conclusion that the aim of the insurgents is not to kill but spread parallel government to establish their own legitimacy. Hence\, the aim of the counter-insurgency forces should be to root out these parallel structures of government.   \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThere are dissimilarities among insurgencies but many general practices can be applied anywhere. There has to be no uniform approach to stages of insurgency rather different approaches to conflict.\nThe success story of Sri Lanka where controlled empowerment of the security forces was utilized has to be referred.\nProper identification of current stakeholders in engagement of counter-insurgency has to be taken into consideration.\nThere has been a role of media and civil society but a larger involvement is required to have major impact on civilian population.\nThe aspect of winning hearts and minds with more emphasis on the physical\, psychological\, social and economical factors has to be utilised for defeating insurgency. Attitude within the military has to change and it has to be reiterated that they are not just for kills. Home and heart battalion has to be engaged.\nCentre of Gravity as one of the best practices consist of both strengths and weaknesses be it physical\, psychological\, philosophical and ideological.\nIt is difficult to define the best practice of resolute leadership where military leadership has been tenure based.\nThere is a need to incorporate more technical intelligence and information operation in counter-insurgency measures.\nThere has to be more operational clarity in the practices and continuity has to be maintained.\nIf the mentioned features are best practices or best principles has to be reflected on again.\nConcession is the key to strategy and the hardcore best practice has to be to wean away support and the ultimate solution has to come from political front.\nSealing of borders will be difficult to achieve instead the borders need to be secured.\n\nReport prepared by Srishti Pukhrem\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/counter-insurgency-best-practices-and-their-applicability-in-the-northeast
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120720T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120720T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134306Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63163-1342762200-1342762200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Estimating Self-Reliance in India's Defence Production
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Vinod MisraDiscussants : Dr Selvamurthy and Shri Amit Cowshish \nThis paper attempts to estimate the self-reliance index of India’s defence production. While estimating the index\, it also focuses on three important issues; the approach towards self-reliance (as understood in the Indian context)\, data problems in estimating the index and the methodology used to arrive at the index. The paper suggests that a separate budgetary classification be made in the Defence Services Estimates to facilitate computation of self-reliance in a more objective manner. This necessitates suitable changes in the classification handbook for defence that mandates the concerned officials of the Indian Defence Accounts Department to book a particular expenditure.  \nMr. Behera argued that the concept “self-sufficiency” differs from “self-reliance”\, though these have alternatively been used in the Indian context. Self-sufficiency means producing everything in-house that the armed forces need\, whereas self-reliance refers to “equipping the armed forces with a whole range of equipments that may come from foreign and domestic sources”. However\, he argues that ‘self-sufficiency’ is not an ideal path for a country like India since India’s industrial and Research and Development (R&D) base is not yet sufficiently developed. \nMr Behera describes three phases of India’s defence industrialisation process from the perspective of the aim of self-reliance; from independence to mid-1960s\, from mid-1960s to mid-1980s\, and from late 1980s till present. In the first phase\, self-sufficiency was an overall economic principle behind its industrial development as the leadership at that time felt that the state-led intervention was the best way to overcome the de-industrialisation of economy that was caused by two centuries of the British rule. However\, despite some successes\, this model had faced considerable weaknesses because of the low level of defence allocation and defence R&D\, in addition to the lack of a civil industrial base which had a major impact during this phase.  \nIn the second phase\, according to the author\, the events of 1960s\, particularly the 1962 border war with China and the 1965 Indo-Pak war\, brought a major change in India’s defence policy\, and the term self-reliance replaced self-sufficiency in defence production. Not only India’s defence budget as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased in the subsequent years but also the approach towards arms procurement policy and indigenous defence production. Moreover\, unlike in the first stage of industrialisation\, in the second stage of India’s defence industrialisation\, more attention was paid to license-production rather then indigenous production\, based on its own design and developmental efforts. However\, this led to dependency on the license-based defence production\, particularly on the Soviet Union. India’s aeronautics industry is such a case whose dependency continues till now. And\, in the third phase\, with increasingly aware of the pitfalls of the overdependence on Soviet Union\, India began to change its approach to defence industrialisation\, from license-based production to production based on indigenous design. In this regard\, India and Russia signed in 1998 an intergovernmental agreement to jointly produce a supersonic cruise missile\, BrahMos and in 2007 two more intergovernmental agreements were signed for co-development and co-production of a Multi Role Transport Aircraft and a Firth Generation Fighter Aircraft. Thus\, there has been emphasis on self-reliance and co-production with higher importance on promoting the participation of Indian private sector defence production.  \nA 10-year self-reliance plan formulated in 1992\, under the then Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister\, Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam\, defined the self-reliance in the form of an index\, reflecting the percentage share of indigenous content in total procurement expenditure. Mr Behera held that this definition serves as the only methodology for estimating the self-reliance index\, primarily because of the difficulty of putting together a log of information about what is critical and what is not\, and updating it regularly with technological development. However\, this estimation is not straightforward\, primarily because of lack of consistent data in the public domain.  \nMr Behera pointed out that India’s heavy dependence on arms import for defence preparedness defies the very objective of self-reliance that it has set for itself. The 1992 Abdul Kalam committee indicated that the share of indigenous contribution to total procurement expenditure would progressively increase from 1992-93 estimation of 30 per cent to 70 per cent by 2005. Although India has developed a vast defence industrial base over the years\, the objective of achieving 70 per cent self-reliance has not been achieved till now. He concluded by stating that the self-reliance index has barely improved from 1992-93 estimation of 30 per cent to 36.4 per cent in 2011-12 which indicates the failure of India’s defence industrialisation process and demands serious retrospection.  \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions: \n\nAt present\, India’s total defence R&D budget accounts for about six per cent of defence budget which in itself is less than two per cent of GDP. Compared to this\, other countries\, particularly the US and China spend a higher percentage of their defence budget on R&D. \nIt would be significant to look into and assess where India now stands at the global scenario on self-reliance in defence production. As the Indian economy is growing\, it is looking for the indigenisation of defence production. This is important not only to meet its own defence requirements for safeguarding its vital national security interests but also to play a larger role beyond its immediate neighbourhood. \nAlthough today India has reached 100 percent self-reliance in terms of deterrence\, it needs to minimize the dependency on foreign countries for its defence needs by further enhancing and indigenisation of its defence production sectors. \nIndia has already developed a good platform for co-production and development of defence equipment with Russia\, now it should look for such joint production with other countries. \nIndia’s private defence sector is very weak\, and it cannot take big projects. However\, it can contribute in the defence production sector by joining with public sectors. For this\, capacity building of the private sector is very important if it is to undertake future defence projects. \nThe author pointed out that Kalam Committee Report has weaknesses which needed to be addressed. In this regard it was suggested that the methodology adopted by Kalam Committee and others such as Dr. Balachandran’s can be analysed in order to find out their strengths and weaknesses\, and then the author can refine and adopt his own methodology for this study. \nThe conclusion part of the paper also needs to be moderated. As the kind of data required for estimating self-reliance index is not available in public domain\, the author needs to state it as a limitation in the paper’s conclusion. The author also needs to mention what kind of data is required to estimate the self-reliance in India’s defence production. \n\nRemarks by the Chairperson \nOutlining the present status of self-reliance in India’s defence production\, Mr Vinod Kumar Misra said that the extent of India’s arms imports hamper indigenisation of its Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). Imports of defence raw-materials and technologies have also been a problem. In addition\, it needs to sustain those imported technologies for a long time. However\, self-reliance in defence production is a log term process and it will gradually take place in India. In this context\, India’s new offset policy can be a significant game changer. However\, for its success\, it needs to identify the kind of defence technologies that it wants to manufacture and then should focus on creating capacity on those core items. Mr Misra pointed out that India’s defence production sector and R&D also suffer capability gap and the Joint Ventures with Russia and Israel for co-production and development of defence equipment can be one way of meeting this capability gap. There is also a strong case for increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the defence production sector but India has to find out the ways to give a push to it. So far as policy announcement is concerned\, Indian government has recently issued policy guidelines for engaging the private sector. Some progress has been made in this regard but still time will take in involving private enterprises in big projects.  \nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/estimating-self-reliance-in-indias-defence-production
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120710T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120710T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134306Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T040331Z
UID:63164-1341898200-1341898200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Engagement with Central Asia: Exploring Future Directions
DESCRIPTION:Event Report\nIn order to celebrate and build on the twenty years of friendship and cooperation between India and Central Asian Republics\, a roundtable on “India’s Engagement with Central Asia: Exploring Future Directions” was organized at IDSA. The event was chaired by the Director General of IDSA. Dr. Arvind Gupta\, with the Ambassadors of Kazakhstan\, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in attendance as speakers and participants along with a host of Indian and Eurasian academics\, analysts\, experts and observers. \nDr. Gupta initiated the discussion by briefly highlighting India’s new Connect Central Asia policy. He elaborated upon the opportunities and challenges that exist in the current partnership with the Central Asian countries. These include relaxation of visa regimes\, better air and land connectivity\, cooperative security framework for regional stability\, greater emphasis on people to people and cultural contacts (track 1.5 and track 2 levels of diplomacy)\, establishment of a Central Asia University\, multilateral engagements through Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and improving the current low levels of economic ties. \nDr. Irina Orolbaeva\, Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to India\, highlighted India’s historical and cultural links with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and welcomed India’s desire to strengthen ties with Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia through the new ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’. She referred to the first India-Central Asia Dialogue\, a Track-II initiative organized in June 2012 in Bishkek as a step towards building long-term partnerships with the Eurasian region. Kyrgyzstan and India share a special bond especially with the introduction of parliamentary democracy in the country. She argued that India’s active presence in the Central Asian region will help promote stability in the area especially with the 2014 deadline in Afghanistan fast approaching. Moreover\, Dr. Orolbaeva stressed on the need to revive cultural\, humanitarian\, educational and scientific exchanges (especially amongst the youth of the two countries) and felt that the proposed Indian university in Kyrgyzstan is a step in the right direction. She urged the Indian government to explore the possibility of setting up an India Cultural Center in Bishkek. Economic and financial ties could be strengthened by promoting investment and cooperation in sectors such as education\, mining\, agriculture\, pharma\, leather\, cotton\, textiles and tourism. The Ambassador emphasized on the need to improve air and land connectivity between Central Asia and India and observed that Kyrgyzstan is keen on bringing Indian technology and expertise to the country. She particularly appreciated India’s contribution towards the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) projects which will have benefits for the entire region.   \nMr. Doulat Kuanyshev\, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to India\, welcomed India’s soft power initiative in the region through the new Connect Central Asia Policy and highlighted the close ties Kazakhstan has enjoyed with India in the last two decades citing the recent high level visits. There is an institutional cooperative mechanism of dialogue on many critical sectors. The Ambassador reiterated Kazakhstan’s support for India’s bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC\, full membership within the SCO and in other international and regional fora and lauded India’s contribution in making CICA a success. Mr. Kuanyshev observed that there is an enormous potential for big Indian Corporations (synonymous with economic success) to invest in Kazakhstan and recommended the bridging of information gap amongst the business communities on both sides. Referring to the energy sector\, the Ambassador recommended that India should tap into the secondary markets since at present the Kazakhstan government has put on hold the issue of allocation of ‘rights for exploration of new blocks’. Mr. Kuanyshev outlined Kazakhstan’s initiative in the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) project\, expressed his appreciation for India’s contribution in the project and felt that its completion will help boost economic ties between the two countries.   \nMr. Saidov Saidbeg Boykhonovich\, Ambassador of Tajikistan to India\, highlighted the existence of strong ties between the two countries especially in the field of economy\, polity\, science and culture. Tajikistan and India have effective cooperative mechanisms in the IT\, hydroelectricity\, railways\, education\, health care (military hospital)\, defence and security sectors. The Ambassador observed that the two countries share common concerns over terrorism since Tajikistan is itself a victim of Taliban and Uzbek Islamic terrorism. There exists a joint working group on counter-terrorism. Tajikistan and India share similar views on many issues of mutual concern and there are no contentious issues in their bilateral relationship. Highlighting the opportunities that can be explored\, Mr. Boykhonovich felt that it was an excellent time to improve tourism between the two countries and air connectivity between India and Tajikistan is being developed with the introduction of the Delhi-Sharjah-Dushanbe flight. There is an enormous potential for Indian companies to invest and set up joint ventures in Tajikistan especially in the agriculture sector. The recently concluded agreement on agriculture will form the basis for cooperation in areas like scientific agricultural research and exchange of information. There are frequent cultural and political exchanges and President Rahmon’s visit to India later in the year will add further substance to the partnership. Elaborating upon the need for improving connectivity in the region\, the Ambassador appreciated India’s contribution towards the INSTC project. However\, he also suggested that India can explore the option of a trade route through the Karakoram highway. Observing that it has been just twenty years since the CARs were established\, Mr. Boykhonovich requested for Indian support and hoped that it will provide the same facilities to CARs as it does to SAARC countries. Citing the differences in education systems between Tajikistan and India\, the Ambassador called for relaxation in norms for Tajik students wanting to study in India. \nShri Ajay Bisaria\, Joint Secretary\, Eurasia Division\, MEA\, elaborated upon the Indian Government’s June 2012 Connect Central Asia policy. The word ‘connect’ refers to the core policy of establishing an e-network to provide medicine and education expertise to Central Asia with India as the hub\, thereby increasing the country’s engagement with its extended neighbourhood and giving substance to the existing political relationship. India will continue to maintain high-level political contact with the CARs. Mr. Bisaria observed that India is working on developing significant strategic\, security\, developmental and defence projects with Central Asia apart from intense discussions on Afghanistan with each CAR. Considering that tourism is followed by business\, there is a need to improve India’s connectivity (both land and air) with the region. The civil aviation industry has recently approved 14 flights to Central Asian countries. India is committed to the INSTC project and is also exploring alternative routes. Meanwhile\, a comprehensive economic agreement is being worked out with the CARs. TAPI can be a major game changer and if successful\, could open the doorway to several more road and rail links. India wants to be a long-term energy partner in the region. Cooperation on energy will definitely boost trade for both Central Asia and India. India hopes to be active in Central Asia with flagship projects involving medicine\, health\, IT\, energy and education (establishment of a Central Asia University) and seeks a long term profitable partnership with the CARs. There is also a need to explore multilateral cooperative mechanisms in the form of SCO\, CICA and various economic integration projects.  \nAmbassador (retd) Rajiv Sikri emphasized on the need for CARs to start working together as a group. However\, he felt that deep differences among the countries may prevent them from working as closely as they should. Referring to TAPI\, he observed that the project is relevant only to Turkmenistan and not Tajikistan; whereas Tajikistan has interests in hydropower and transmission lines. Similarly\, developments in Afghanistan are of more relevance to the bordering countries. These differences will make policy implementation very difficult. Besides\, the China factor is more relevant and influential for all Central Asian countries than India. Therefore\, there is a need to project India as a serious and big partner in the region. India can explore the option of joint science and technology projects. Moreover\, Ambassador Sikri suggested that the CARs can leverage their geographical location for being passenger and cargo hubs on the lines of the Gulf countries and focus should not be limited to trade alone. With developments in Afghanistan reaching a critical phase\, he elaborated on the need for CARs to push for India’s full membership in the SCO if they want India to have a greater presence in the region. \nProf. Gulshan Sachdeva observed that in recent years a lot of research has been done on the geopolitics and geo-economics of the region which is in line with the government’s changing policy towards the region. The main trigger to improve linkages between India and Central Asia is the current scenario in Afghanistan and the speculation over its future. The knowledge that developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan will have an impact on the entire region has spurred greater cooperation between CARs and India. Therefore\, for the future\, building of strategic cooperation\, development of economic relationship and establishment of cost effective modes of connectivity will be the main priorities for India and CARs.  \nProf. Arun Mohanty observed that it would have been easier for India to engage with CARs if they were in a politically and economically unified space. While comparing both India’s and China’s economic engagement with CARs\, he observed that India lags far behind China in practically every sphere of economic cooperation and infrastructure building. Prof. Mohanty argued that India should aim to promote educational exchanges with CARs\, provide greater access to cost effective medical facilities and explore the option of anti-terrorism information exchanges with SCO. \nKey points that were raised during discussions; \n\nIndia and CARs must discuss ways to tide over the Afghan quagmire. \nThe possibility of using the Karakoram highway as a trade route can be explored.  \nIn order to bridge the academic gap\, ICSSR can take the initiative to translate historical texts especially in the Persian language. Doordarshan too needs to be pro-active in airing cultural programmes.  \nThe possibility of sending Indian archaeologists for joint expeditions and explorations in Central Asia can be explored. \nThe existence of convergence of economic interests of all participating nations of TAPI must be fully channelised. \nIndia is building a small Hydel power plant in Central Asia as part of its developmental project initiatives in CARs. \n\nClick Here for Concept Note
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-engagement-with-central-asia-exploring-future-directions
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120629T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120629T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250315T051808Z
UID:63165-1340947800-1340947800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India-Japan-South Korea Trilateral
DESCRIPTION:The First Track II Dialogue among India\, Japan and South Korea was held in IDSA on 29 June 2012. This trilateral initiative was conceptualised in a meeting involving the Ambassador of Japan to India\, Mr Akitaka Saiki\, Ambassador of South Korea Mr. Kim Joong-Keun and Joint Secretary\, East Asia in Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Mr. Gautam Bambawale. It was also mentioned in the joint statement between India and South Korea during the visit of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Seoul in March last year. The core idea behind the trilateral initiative was that the three countries enjoy a strategic partnership based on shared values of democracy\, strong economic linkage and common strategic interests. The track-II dialogue was supported by the Ministry of External Affairs and was organized under the aegis of Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses\, IDSA. Five scholars each from Tokyo Foundation of Japan and Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) of South Korea participated in this dialogue and presented their research. \nSetting the tone of the deliberation\, Mr. Sanjay Singh\, Secretary East\, MEA said\, “We seek a peaceful and secure Asia free from the threats of terrorism\, proliferation\, piracy and conflicts between states. There is a common commitment to maintaining freedom of the seas\, combating terrorism and promoting inclusive economic growth. India\, Japan and ROK depend heavily on the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) for their energy security.” He also added that he expected the trilateral to “generate ideas that would influence the wider relationship existing amongst the partners at governmental level and at the people-to-people level and develop a shared understanding on how we view our region and the emerging Asian architecture. This impact will be good measure of the success of this process.” \nWelcoming the delegates\, Dr. Arvind Gupta\, DG\, IDSA\, stated that the three countries should come together to stimulate new ideas and thoughts to bring about better coordination and cooperation for peace and development for the region as well as the world at large. He further said that at present\, the three countries are facing challenges of rapidly changing geopolitical environment and the emergence of new security threats\, both at regional as well as global levels. He added that a sustained dialogue among the three countries is extremely important and the Track II seminar will be instrumental in stimulating some ideas to carry forward such a dialogue. H.E. Mr. Akitaka Saiki\, Japanese Ambassador to India said that the three countries\, with second\, third and fourth highest GDPs in Asia and their active membership of the G-20\, have a great responsibility\, individually and collectively\, towards the region and the world at large. H.E. Mr. Kim Joong-Keun\, South Korean Ambassador to India\, lauded the initiative to hold dialogue among the states and hoped that the Track II dialogue would soon be transformed into Track I dialogue. \nSuggestions\nSecurity Issues\nParticipants suggested various issues for future deliberation on trilateral cooperation. Maritime security cooperation\, especially piracy in Indian Ocean Region can be discussed. Japan\, India and South Korea can play a constructive role in creating a consensus on the freedom of navigation in the context of South China Sea. \nIt was opined that issues related to terrorism and cyber security can be also be discussed in future dialogue. The three countries could also share each other’s strategic view\, for example scenario-making process aimed at understanding the future developments on their respective socio-economic-political spheres. \nNon-Traditional Security\nThe general view was that issues such as energy security\, transnational crimes including drug trafficking\, arms smuggling etc could be explored. Prospects at the signing of a Trilateral Search and Rescue Agreement among India\, Japan and South Korea could also be discussed. \nMiscellaneous\nSocial security issues can be an important area of cooperation. Public health can also be an important area of cooperation. Cooperation in the field of Science and Technology including space could be an important issue of discussion. \nGlobal governance issues like reforms of the UN Security Council\, IMF and WTO can also be discussed and debated. Future dialogue should come out with some suggestions regarding how to promote trade and investment among the three countries. Conduct of joint research projects among the three institutes representing the three countries. \nReport prepared by Dr. Shamshad Khan \nInaugural address: Shri Sanjay\, Secretary (East)\, Ministry of External Affairs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-japan-south-korea-trilateral
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120622T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120622T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63166-1340343000-1340343000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: S KalyanramanDiscussants: Manoj Shrivastava and VS Raghuvanshi \nMahendra Prasad began his presentation by focusing on his ongoing research project which attempts to unfurl various aspects of quality assurance (QA) in army procurements\, an area understudied so far. He mentioned that “Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements\,” was the first paper in a series of papers encompassing the Project Work entitled “Synergising QA for Speedy Defence Procurement and Ensuring Quality.” In the next paper\, effectiveness of the QA in Army procurements plan to be critically analysed using the failure data which would be collected from the defects reported on newly acquired equipment during their warranty period. In the third paper\, case studies of few selected procurement cases would be carried out. The final paper will explore the best QA practices and how these can be applied in our context to evolve a better QA system. \nIntroducing the paper\, the author said that defence procurements are done primarily under two heads – capital and revenue. The former is guided by DPP\, and include: fifteen years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP)\, five years Services Acquisition Plan (SCAP)\, and Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP)\, which is a subset of SCAP and is a two year Roll On plan. The latter is guided by DPM and includes mainly replacement equipment and assemblies\, spares\, components for maintenance and operation of already sanctioned assets. QA checks of all the hardware procured by Army are carried out by DGQA. Further\, he elaborated upon the various stages of the evolution of DGQA. In its course of evolution\, in 1968\, Directorate of R&D (General) was bifurcated into Directorate of Inspection (General Stores) and Directorate of R&D (General Stores). Directorate General of Inspection was re-designated as Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) on 04 Jul 1987. At present\, DGQA Organisation is under the overall control of Department of Defence Production and Supplies in the Ministry of Defence. Further\, Lt Col Prasad delved on the functions of DGQA which provides QA cover to the entire range of Arms\, Ammunitions\, Equipments and Stores on procurement. He then talked about functions which are specific to procurement\, like\, vetting of response of vendors to Request for Information (RFI)\, assist in formulation of General staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs)\, assist in preparation of Requests For Proposals (RFPs) etc. \nSubsequently\, Prasad talked about Procedure of Acceptance of Capital and Revenue Procurements which is similar if not the same for both capital and revenue procurements. The first and foremost step here is that after placement of supply order an Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) incorporating all the tests and certification for acceptance of the product ordered is prepared. In his analysis Prasad observed that the conditions laid down for acceptance are extremely stringent and capital intensive for vendors participating in the bidding process. The stakes are very high as finally only one vendor is likely to get the contract. Expenditure incurred by all other vendors not winning the bid therefore becomes wasteful expenditure and discourages them from fielding their equipment. It has been observed that many vendors withdraw at this stage. Moreover\, lack of multi-skilled engineering staff with DGQA is invariably evident from the fact that the number of DGQA staff attending a meeting (especially pre-bid meetings with vendors and technical evaluation committee meetings) exceeds those from other departments/ branches/ directorates. On the draft ATP he said that it is prepared by the vendor on whom the supply order is placed. Since a vendor has a vested interest\, it may not mention some very important tests for which he does not have the facility and/or certifications\,. To improve QA in Army procurements\, Mahendra Prasad made following important recommendations:\n \n\nIn order to cut costs and time required for technical and environmental evaluation it was recommended that only those tests should be undertaken by DGQA\, which are not possible to be carried out anywhere else at various laboratories accredited by National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL) in the country.\nReputed vendors may be permitted self-certification on case to case basis taking into account their past performance.\nTo address the interaction problems of user and WE directorate with DGQA\, it is felt that a single window system for interaction with DGQA will go a long way to obviate this long-standing sore point.\nFor creation of a pool of staff possessing multiple skills\, bifurcation of staff into broad streams as mechanical\, electronics and computer science and inter directorate postings may help. \nRegarding ATP it is felt that a well-researched and stringent ATP can minimise occurrence of a number of defects due to material and manufacturing inadequacies\, after the equipment is put into service. \nThe selection process of the officer cadre needs a complete revamp. \n\nLt Col Prasad concluded by saying that for the success of any military mission\, right equipment\, at the right time\, in the hands of soldiers is as important a factor as the training and physical fitness of soldier himself. Thus\, factors causing delay in procurement of Army hardware need to be identified\, analysed and eliminated. Two most important features that equipment in the hands of soldiers must possess are high reliability and military ruggedisation. \nDiscussion Points \n\nSince the DGQA is overburdened\, the agency should divest itself of the task of promoting small scale industries.\nMany discussants shared Prasad’s point that the expenditure incurred by all other vendors not winning the bid becomes wasteful expenditure and discourages them from fielding their equipment. It was suggested that those vendors whose bid were rejected must be compensated in a suitable manner. For this suitable provisions in DPP need to be included.\nIt was argued that authorising regulatories of foreign governments to certify their countries’ product is a tricky proposition\, since in these days of cut-throat competition\, many countries would not mind promoting their own companies\, even if it compromises the quality. Moreover\, the advanced countries may give the certification with the belief that India does not have the requisite testing facilities to check the veracity of the foreign certification.\nIt was pointed out that Customer Service Directorate for single window interaction is in the anvil. It will reduce the time lag considerably.  \nSince many agencies are involved in the process of procurement\, an empowered central authority is desirable. Increasing the autonomy of the DGQA would be a welcome step.\nIt was suggested that the DPP should be elaborately dealt with in the paper to see how different agencies’ roles have been incorporated in it.  \nSignificantly\, one discussant argued that quality assurance done by DGQA merely involves checking specifications and parameters given in GSQR. It would be better to grade the product in some order of quality level to enable selection of best product within budgetary allocation.\nIt was argued by one participant that QA is an unending process and specific to particular environment. What is quality for US may not find acceptance in the Indian conditions. \nMany participants agreed with the author’s observation that the two most important benchmarks of QA are high reliability and military ruggedisation. Soviet equipments were very good on these criteria and were widely regarded as soldier-friendly.\nConsumer-interface\, which is very strong in many countries\, lacks attention in India. It remains to be seen whether the DGQA is evolving towards TQM (total quality management) or not\, since in TQM consumer is the focal point. \nAssurance level is a standard statistical tool across the world for quality analysis\, but DGQA does not have its assurance level defined. \nRegarding the lack of qualified technical officers to oversee the process of procurement\, it was pointed out that mere recruitment of technically qualified persons for QA job will not yield much\, unless periodic training aiming at updating their technical knowledge is ensured\, since technology is fast changing. Moreover\, while selecting officers for the QA job more emphasis should be on aptitude than knowledge; the later can be imparted at the time of training. High integrity and passion for the job should be the benchmark for selection of officers. \nIt was argued that Ordnance Factory’s services can be better utilized in production of defence materials\, since they have very good infrastructure facilities at their disposal.\nIt was pointed out that a product failed to meet specifications at the trial stage is accepted later subject to “rectification” without any further trial. \n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nDr. S. Kalyanaraman complimented Lt Col Prasad for a very comprehensive and detailed presentation on a topical issue concerning the Indian Army. He suggested a slight tinkering with the title to bring it in sync with the content of the paper and his research design. \n(Report prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/quality-assurance-qa-in-army-procurements
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120608T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120608T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134352Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63167-1339133400-1339133400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Does India need a grand strategy?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador Satish ChandraDiscussants: Maj General B K Sharma and Dr Happymon Jacob \n \n\nInterrogating the concept of grand strategy and whether India needs a centrally articulated design for the conduct of its statecraft constitutes the core thinking put forward by the paper. In contrast to other major states in the world\, the Government of India has so far shied away from publicly articulating a grand strategy\, thereby attracting comments that this is an anomaly that needs to be remedied. Proponents of grand strategy argue that the absence of a publicly articulated and coherent grand strategy gives rise to various concerns: armed forces acquire technologies without a strategy; government departments pursue their specific interests without reference to overarching national goals; and\, diplomats have a hard time explaining India’s behaviour to foreign interlocutors.   \nThe author identifies several benefits which flow out of formulation of a grand strategy: \n\nFirst\, it will help departments to develop short and medium term plans in accordance with the overall national intent. \nSecond\, it will help policy makers view their policy initiatives holistically and highlight crosscutting issues. \nThird\, it can provide a basis for prioritising resource allocations. \nFourth\, it will improve coordination among agencies\, increase synergies and provide direction to individual and collective actions.\n\nFifth\, it can enhance communication and cooperation with other states. \nSixth\, it will encourage policy makers to think systematically about the long term consequences of their actions. \nSeventh\, it will be useful to test the robustness of current organisational structures\, processes and resources. \nEighth\, it will help citizens to evaluate whether particular actions of the state are aligned with the nation’s core values and interests. \nNinth\, it will be useful to promote structured and focused research on core issues and areas that are identified as national priorities.\nTenth\, it would be useful for educating the strategic leadership.\n\nBesides these functional uses\, proponents also emphasise that grand strategy is a key great power status symbol\, thus making a strong case in public imagination for a centrally articulated design. While the author acknowledges the benefits and obvious usefulness which seem to be associated with a grand strategy\, he argues that there are several barriers to formulation of such a strategy.  \nThe first barrier to the making of a grand strategy is the absence of conceptual clarity. The term has come to mean different things to different thinkers depending on their vision of the world\, their conceptions about the nature of power\, their institutional affiliations\, and the interests they seek to pursue. Moreover\, in the absence of a universally accepted definition and shared meaning\, the term ‘grand strategy’ has come to exist as an ambiguous concept and as differing images\, ranging from a fully developed plan of action to subtler aspects such as individual visions and world views. The author lists out seven such images: \n\nAs a Plan: grand strategy is viewed as a plan of action articulated by the nation’s top leadership who gathers an expert group to conduct wide ranging consultations with important stake holders both within and outside the government and bring out a draft grand strategy for top leadership sanction.\nAs a Vision: grand strategy as a vision\, a representation of strategy created in the mind of the leader. Grand Strategy as a guiding idea offers flexibility to bureaucratic agents to adapt their actions according to needs of the circumstances\, however\, this image of grand strategy captures only a part of the strategy process and needs to be supplemented by institutional competence.\nAs Politics: Unlike the prescriptive nature of the previous images\, according to this image\, a grand strategy emerges out of bargaining and compromise among various stake holders within the state. This image of grand strategy runs the risk of being distorted to suit interests of particular coalitions and interest groups. Furthermore\, enduring differences among key stake holders in terms of values\, beliefs\, and interests might severely impact the success of a neatly formulated strategy by expert planners.\nAs a Paradigm: Grand strategy imagined as a paradigm is a simplified version of reality\, a general perspective of the world view widely shared among the elite. This image of grand strategy lays out the map and provides a certain conception about the nature of the world\, but fails to meaningfully capture the complexity of current realities. Realism and liberalism are two such paradigms which provide a short hand guide for interpreting specific events and developments but cannot be substituted for strategy making.\nAs Thought: According to this image\, strategic competence of a state is judged not by its material achievements but by the quality of its thought\, presented and preserved in the written form. In overemphasizing the ideational dimension of strategy\, the role of verbally articulated ideas\, and the utility of force in the international system\, this image of strategy underplays the tacit dimension of strategic cultures.\nAs Harmonisation of Ends and Means: Grand strategy in this image is all about ensuring that ends do not over step available means\, and resources are not wasted\, with the former leading to failure of strategy and the latter involving opportunity costs.  However\, matching ends and means is not a neutral process and involves more optimal employment of national resources placing a premium on ethical and political judgment. \nAs a Pattern: According to this image\, grand strategy is a pattern of the past.  The process of looking back to look ahead is seen as useful in explaining past behaviour and providing clues to future strategies.\n\nThe second barrier to the making of a grand strategy is the associated costs and risks of its benefits. Firstly\, articulation of a clear set of goals to set the nation on the right course in a turbulent internal and external environment is a self contradictory objective as it is difficult to predetermine opportunities and risks in a turbulent strategic environment. Secondly\, though grand strategy is useful in promoting coordination among agencies within the government\, tight regulation of behaviour may diminish the capacity for peripheral vision. Thirdly\, in attempting to reduce ambiguity by formulating a grand strategy\, the scope for strategic action\, which thrives in the domain of inconsistency\, could be curtailed. Fourth\, efforts to define a state and underline its uniqueness through its grand strategy might generate narrow stereotyping and runs the risk of obscuring complexity. Lastly\, a publicly articulated grand strategy may lead to further fragmentations in a politically fraught public space. \nExistence of divergent views on what constitutes India’s core interests and how best to promote them is identified as the third barrier to the formulation of a grand strategy. The paper observes that in the absence of a clear consensus on critical issues of national significance (such as settlement of border disputes\, response to terrorism\, strategy on Pakistan\, China\, etc.) among political parties\, government institutions\, and civil society groups\, a grand strategy that articulates a particular approach on any of these issues will be politically contested. Finally\, lack of resourceful and competent institutional arrangements which foster wide ranging dialogues and promote synthesis of different points of view is cited by the paper as another barrier to the making of a grand strategy. In addition to this point\, the author stressed on the necessity to undertake interdisciplinary forward looking studies and dialogues to open up critical dimensions that will bear upon long term prospects of the country. In conclusion\, the author remarked that he has attempted to problematise the concept of grand strategy in the paper and comments on the skewed and unbalanced nature of the contemporary discourse on grand strategy. \nKey Discussion Points:\n\nThe bottom-line of the images is that the leadership and the entire political elite should take ownership of the grand strategy if it is to be sustained for a long time.\nGrand strategy should be goal-oriented. At the nub of it is the question: “What’s your goal for the country?” \nNational leadership wants to operate in a state of ambiguity. Putting out a grand strategy document in the public domain would attract questions about accountability.\nThe National Security Council should be at the driving seat of any such initiative. An objective and scenario building approach should be employed.\nSuggestions for the paper included: contextualizing the discussion to focus on India; engaging with existing debates (Luttwak\, Busan\, Liddell Hart\, etc.); including illustrations to describe various typologies of grand strategy; bringing out the role of culture\, history\, and the linkage between ideology and vision in the formulation of grand strategy; indicating revisions and new pathways to the makers of grand strategy; including a working definition of grand strategy; and\, some exploration of whether elite and social consensus lead to grand strategy or vice versa?\n\nReport prepared by Bhavna Tripathy\, Project Assistant (IDSA-DRDO ST2050 Project) at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/does-india-need-a-grand-strategy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120516T053000
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DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134352Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T232436Z
UID:63168-1337146200-1337146200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Release of the IDSA report on "India's Cyber Security Challenge"
DESCRIPTION:Venue: IDSA Auditorium \nBook release by National Security Advisor\, Mr Shivshankar Menon \nProgramme\n10:15-10:30 Registration/ Tea \n10:30- 10:40 Welcome Remarks Director General\, IDSA \n10:40-10:50 Introductory Remarks Mr. Nitin Desai\, Chairman\, Cyber Security Taskforce \n10:50-11:30 Report Release and Mr. Shivshankar Menon\, NSA’s Address \n11:25-11:30 Vote of Thanks Dr. Cherian Samuel \n11:30-11:45 Tea\n \n11:45-13:15 – Panel Discussion on “India’s Cyber Security Challenge: Way Ahead”\nChair: Ms. Vijaya Latha Reddy\, Deputy NSA & Secretary\, NSCS \n\nDr. Gulshan Rai\, DG\, CERT-IN\nHarsh K. Jain\, Director (E & IT)\, MEA\nLt. Gen. Aditya Singh (Retd.)\nMaj. Gen. HJS Sachdev\, ADGM (IW)\, DGMO\nMr. Felix Mohan\, CISO\, Airtel\n\n13:15 Lunch at IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/release-of-the-idsa-report-on-indias-cyber-security-challenge
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120514T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120514T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T125710Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T231937Z
UID:62788-1336973400-1336973400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Emerging Geo-political Trends in Asia: Prospects and Challenges for India-Russia Relations
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Seminar Hall I\, IDSA \nProgramme\n1000-1040h: Inaugural Session\nWelcome Remarks by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, DG\, IDSA \nAddress by Dr. Alexander Lukin\, Vice President (for Research and International Contact)\, Diplomatic Academy\, Ministry of Foreign Affairs\, Russian Federation \nKey Note Address by Amb. Prabhat Shukla\, Jt. Director\, VIF\, (Former Ambassador to Russia) \n1040-1100h: High Tea \n1100-1300h: Session I: International Situation: Emerging Global Order\nChair: Amb. Rajiv Sikri \n\nRussia’s Foreign Policy — Sergei Chugrov\, Editor in Chief\, Political Studies (POLIS) Journal\nIndia’s Foreign Policy – Arvind Gupta\, DG\, IDSA\nRussia’s policy towards Central Asia and Afghanistan – Alexander Lukin\, Vice President (for Research and International Contact)\, Diplomatic Academy\, Ministry of Foreign Affairs\, Russian Federation\nRussia’s Policy Towards CIS Countries – Professor Ajay Patnaik\, Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies\, Jawaharlal Nehru University\, New Delhi\n\n1300-1345: Lunch \n1345-1515: Session II: Regional Situation: Central and East Asia\nChair: Lt. Gen. Ravi Sawhney\, Distinguished Fellow\, VIF \n\nRusso-Japanese Relations and International Situation in East Asia – Sergey Chugrov\, Editor in Chief\, Political Studies (POLIS) Journal\nIndian Perspective on Af-Pak Situation\, Vinod Anand\, Senior Fellow\, VIF\nChina and East Asia – Rukmani Gupta\, Associate Fellow\, IDSA\n\n1515-1530h: Tea \n1530-1700h: Session III: India-Russia Relations: Prospects and Challenges\nChair: Shri Ajay Bisaria \n\nIndia-Russia Ties – Prof. Anuradha Chenoy\, Professor\, Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies\, Jawaharlal Nehru University\, New Delhi\nInter-Religious Dialogue: Options for Russia and India – Irina Kolosova\, Research Fellow\, Institute for Contemporary International Studies\, Diplomatic Academy (Russia-Europe Relations)\nThe Russian Media and the Idea of Public Television – Olga Puzanova\, Research Fellow\, Center for East Asian Research\, Moscow Sate Institute for International Relations (MGIMO University)\, Ministry of Foreign Affairs\, Russian Federation\nThe Russian Media and Society – Boris Utekhin\, Creative Director of Krestianskaya Rus (Peasant Russia) Publishing House (Russian Media and Politics)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/emerging-geo-political-trends-in-asia-prospects-and-challenges-for-india-russia-relations
CATEGORIES:CONFERENCES,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120420T053000
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DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134353Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63170-1334899800-1334899800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:In Pursuit of a Shield:US\, Missile Defence and the Iran Imperative
DESCRIPTION:Chairman: Professor Satish KumarDiscussants: Dr. Probal K. Ghosh\, Cdr. Abhijit Singh \nThe paper dealt with US efforts to counter Iran’s missile ‘threat’ and ensure security of its allies like Israel and Turkey and safeguard its interests and the regional repercussions of such measures. The paper began by discussing the Iran threat as flagged in key US policy documents including the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)\, 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat WMD and the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Review and the solution articulated (missile defence) to deal/hedge against such a threat. Pertinent among these measures being erected in consort with allies like the NATO and GCC countries at sea as well as on land across the Bush and the Obama administration were examined. The next section examined Iran’s missile inventory and its developing capabilities.  \nThe pursuit of such ‘defensive’ measures has led to complications in US-Russia arms control efforts\, uncertainties in Iran’s relations with its neighbours like Turkey and has generated regional strategic tensions (NATO-Russia) as well. Russian contentions that the real focus of such measures is to constrain its strategic capabilities despite US officials insisting that it was directed against Iran were pointed out. NATO’s November 2010 Lisbon Summit explicitly avoided naming Iran as the intended target of Obama’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) at the instance of Turkey\, which agreed to host a X-band radar at Kurecik 700 kms from the Iranian border in September 2011 on the condition that data would not be shared with Israel. The strong US-Israel missile defence cooperation was noted\, with Arrow Block 4 version tested in February 2012. It was pointed out that the Arrow – first inducted into the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in 2000 – was the first operational theatre missile defence system in the world. The paper noted that there was the distinct possibility of Obama’s PAA being extended to the Gulf region\, with senior US policy makers expressing such a desire publicly in recent times. The UAE became the first international partner to buy the THAAD missiles from the US in December 2011. \nThe paper ended by flagging possible implications for Indian security given that these efforts relate to developments in what Indian policy makers have called its ‘proximate neighbourhood’. Among these included greater regional strategic uncertainties coupled with rising military expenditures\, energy security complications as a result of a possible incident at sea\, and possible deterrence complications given that American BMD systems provides the justification for both Russia and China to continue their nuclear modernization efforts.   \nProf. Kumar noted that the issues examined in the paper have a fundamental bearing on regional and global security. He added that the ‘reset’ in US-Russia relations has been affected by the US missile defence policy with regard to Iran.  \nDr. Ghosh began his comments by noting that the paper was ‘well-crafted’ but with certain loopholes which can be plugged to make it better. His comments dealt with the BMD architecture\, Russia-US imbroglio and Iran’s capabilities. He wanted the author to examine some of the US programmes that had been mothballed as well as programmes like the Hypersonic Glide Kill Vehicle\, which could be the future of BMD. Dr. Ghosh reminded the audience that Obama’s PAA was in many ways similar to the 1996 document Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) specifying NMD operational requirements which was scrapped because the capabilities could not mature. Dr. Ghosh noted that the Bush-era system did not cover Turkey\, Greece\, Bulgaria\, and parts of Romania. He also noted that the US had rejected the Russian suggestion to host US radars at Gabaladarya\, Azerbaijan directly overlooking Iran instead of in Poland and Czech Republic. On Russian contentions specifically\, Dr. Ghosh stated that they were a bit overblown given that Russia could potentially overwhelm US interceptors by sheer numbers at its disposal. He concluded his remarks by noting that an Iranian ICBM capability ‘was still some distance away’. \nCdr. Singh commended the effort to bring out a coherent paper by the author despite not having a military background. He gave a geo-strategic context to the issue in the light of declining Russian influence over ‘buffer’ states after the break-up of the Soviet Union\, and the genuine apprehensions of countries like Poland and Georgia over the resurgent Russia. He pointed to intra-NATO divisions over the issue\, which are being played up by Russia. In his opinion\, the technological basis of the US system was sound. He however termed the ‘threat’ from Iran as ‘over-stated’ given that Iranian IRBM capabilities have prominent North Korean/Chinese links and an Iranian ICBM capability was far away. Iranian cruise missile capabilities though are potent and are being still further developed. Cdr. Singh pointed out that Iranian threats to close the Straits of Hormuz were real\, even though it could be for a limited period. He stated that as a concept\, BMD was a ‘brilliant\, strategic idea’ equivalent to a ‘strategic tent’ rather than a ‘strategic fortress’.       \nInternal Discussant Cdr. S.S. Parmar noted that in the event of clashes\, it will not involve missile defences per se but conventional capabilities. He also noted that Iran could swarm US ships with shore-based batteries making defences against short-range missiles ineffective. Cdr. Parmar pointed to the importance of maps and tables to more clearly convey information. The other Discussant Kapil Dharaj Patil pointed out that Iranian perceptions of the US missile defence system was absent in the paper. He added that it was important to note the ‘threat construction’ by US and NATO vis-à-vis Iran’s capabilities.   \nDG\, IDSA Dr. Arvind Gupta noted that though the paper is an important update\, it could do with more analysis. He pointed out that implications for Indian security if any have to be more clearly brought out and the author’s own assessment of the US efforts has to be included in the concluding section. The paper could also benefit by incorporating maps/tables. Chinese reactions to the issue could also be pointed out. On issues like budgetary pressures being faced by the Obama administration that the paper flags\, a more focussed effort can be made to go into the pertinent details.      \nOther points of discussion that were flagged from the floor included regional responses to US BMD efforts\, specifically from countries like Saudi Arabia and the GCC\, assessment of Iranian capabilities or lack of it\, and the efficacy of the BMD systems being pursued by the US\, among others.  \nReport prepared by Shri Kiran Jai Prakash\, Research Intern\, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre\, and Sam Rajiv.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/in-pursuit-of-a-shieldus-missile-defence-and-the-iran-imperative
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120419T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120419T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134353Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130556Z
UID:63171-1334813400-1334813400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Endogenous Politico-Cultural Resources: Kautilya's Arthashastra and India's Strategic Culture
DESCRIPTION:Introduction  \nMichael Liebig\, a doctoral scholar at Frankfurt University’s  political science department\, gave a presentation on his still underway Ph.D. thesis  titled “Endogenous Politico-Cultural Resources: Kautilya’s Arthashastra and India’s  Strategic Culture” at IDSA on 19 April 2012. The session was chaired by Col. (Retd.) P.K.  Gautam and attended by IDSA scholars\, serving military officers and historians.  Germany and France have an  excellent tradition of Indology. Col. Gautam welcomed Mr. Liebig and  appreciated the enduring German interest in Indology with the stage having been  set in the past by Max Muller. Likewise in India\, the Indian Army studies  German strategic thinkers such as Otto von Clausewitz and the generalship of  combat leaders such as Erwin Rommel and Heinz Wilhelm Guderian. He noted that  all ancient theoretical works in Sanskrit including Kautilya’s Arthashastra began with a salutation to Sukra (the preceptor of demons) and Brahaspati (the preceptor of gods). The  chair referred to the observation that English poetry is a small body of verse  almost completely surrounded by scholars\, and pointed out that the case is just  the reverse in the case of the literature in Sanskrit\, Tibetan\, Pali and  Prakrit—a large body of literature frequented\, pitiably\, by few scholars.1 \n         The chair set  the stage for the talk by Liebig by giving a brief overview of the period 600 BC  to 312 BC to include Bimbisara\, Ajatasatru and Shishunag\, when the Magadh  kingdom emerged victorious over its rival kingdoms/republics of Kashi\, Kosal\,  and Vrijis. The kingdom then gave way to the usurper Mahapadma Nanda who  inaugurated a short-lived dynasty till 321 BC when Chandargupta Maurya\, a  protégé of Kautilya—his guide and mentor—acquired the throne and expanded  towards north-west India to exploit the power vacuum created by Alexander The  Great’s departure. Later\, Chandragupta Maurya became a Jain ascetic and starved  to death according to Jain tradition. His son Bindusara succeeded him in 297 BC\,  followed by Ashoka\, who later converted to Buddhism. It is significant that the  scripts of the Ashokan pillars were deciphered in 1837 and the historical  existence of the vast Ashokan empire was confirmed in 1915\, thanks to the work  of archeologists like Alexander Cunningham\, John Marshall\, and others.   \n       But what about  Chanakya\, also known as Kautilya or Vishnugupt? Who discovered him? Although  the Puranas\, Panchtantra\, Buddhist and Jain scriptures do mention Kautilya’s  Arthashastra\, there was no written compilation of the work available for the  lay public. The credit for making it available must go to the Sanskrit scholar  and librarian\, R. Shamasastry. In his preface to the 1915 English translation  of Kautilya’s Arthashastra\, Shamasastry  mentions that an unnamed pandit from the Tanjore district handed over a  manuscript with a commentary by Bhattasvamin to the Mysore Government Oriental  Library. Shamasastry translated the work from this manuscript. Later\, other manuscripts  of the Kautilya Arthashastra were discovered; besides\, Indian scholars such as  T. Ganapati Sastri and Indologists from Europe  kept adding to its editions and interpretation. An excellent edition for the  English-language reader has been done by Professor R.P. Kangle of Bombay University\,  which was published in three parts between 1961 and1965 as Kautilya Arthasastra. The first part of Kangle’s book\, in the  introduction\, provides the status and location of the various manuscripts of  the work.       \n Presentation by Michael  Liebig    \n Michael Liebig presented his preliminary findings which were  based on interviews with nearly a dozen scholars and policy-makers in Delhi over the last month.  His research question was: Is Kautilya relevant for India in contemporary times? Liebig’s  analysis approaches the question at three levels: (1) Is Kautilya an endogenous  politico-cultural resource of India  and what is his relationship to other such resources? (2) Is Kautilya a factor  of influence in India’s  strategic culture and what is the relative weight of this influence? (3) Liebig  differentiates between the latent and manifest (or “intentional”) influence of  the Kautilya Arthashastra.   \n     Liebig referred to  three books directly relevant to his research. The first is Harald Müller’s Weltmacht Indien/India as World Power\, 2007 (Müller is the Director of the Frankfurt Institute of Peace and Conflict  Research). In this book\, Müller raises the question of Kautilya’s influence on modern India’s  strategic culture. The second is Alfred Hillebrandt’s Altindische Politik/Ancient Indian Politics\, 1923\, an excellent  analysis following Kautilya’s “Seven Factors of Power”\, which provides a  comprehensive understanding of Kautilya that does not reduce him to just a “realist”  in inter-state relations. Liebig emphasized that Kautilya means a  lot more than “realism”. The third book\, and the immediate basis for his  research\, is Johann Jakob Meyer’s 1926 translation  of the Kautilya Arthashastra from  Sanskrit into German—recently made available online at www.zeno.org   \n     Liebig said that the  interviews conducted by him and the available literature show that Kautilya is present  in the Indian public mind as a “metaphor”. The metaphor has two aspects: (1)  the cunning politician getting the job done\, and (2) the historical personality  who unifies India.  What became apparent from the interviews was that India has a broad spectrum of  politico-cultural icons including Kautilya\, Buddha\, Asoka\, Akbar\, Aurobindo\,  Gandhi\, and Nehru\, to name a few. This bandwidth of endogenous  politico-cultural resources is a crucial catalyst for India’s  identity. They are simultaneously key for India’s  soft power stance\, besides her growing economic and military strength—this is  because India  has become one of the key actors in the “concert of powers” in the multipolar  world.   \n        With regard to  Kautilya’s influence on India’s  strategic culture\, Liebig places the University of Dhaka-based Rashed Uz  Zaman’s work as one which affirms the extant Kautilayan way of thinking.2 Other authors who take that position are Adda Bozeman\, Marcus Kim\, Bharat  Karnad\, Harald Müller\, and Christian Wagner.   \n In his seminal work\, Discovery  of India\, Nehru devoted five pages to Kautilya and five to the Mauryan Empire. Liebig revealed that conflicting views  emerged during the interviews on Nehru’s perception of Kautilya. One view contends  that the Indian independence movement needed Kautilya vis-à-vis the colonial  power in order to demonstrate that the ancient Arthashastra was at par with\, or  even superior to\, the ancient and medieval works of European political theory\,  for example\, Machiavelli’s The Prince.  But after Independence\,  Kautilya was discarded. The second view was that there was much ambiguity in  Nehru’s policy between 1947 and 1964—consisting of an opaque mix of idealism  and Kautilyan realpolitik. The third view  claims that there was no ambiguity: Nehru was exclusively\, or at least  predominantly\, an idealist in the Ashoka-Gandhi tradition who paid a high price  in the defeat at the hands of China  in 1962.  \n In summary\, Liebig said that his preliminary thesis is that  Kautilya is indeed a key factor influencing India’s  strategic culture and that India  since independence has been on a learning curve through which\, slowly but  steadily\, the relative weight of the “Kautilya factor” has increased in her strategic  stance.   \n Discussion   \n    Issues such as  secure borders as envisaged by Kautilya\, the conflicting views of whether the Arthasastra is a multi-author  compilation or not\, and Megasthenes’ account of the Mauryan Empire were  discussed. A key aspect of discussion was that Kautilya does not represent a simplistic  “realism”\, but that the Arthashasatra dwells on the idea of “value- based” legitimacy of the ruler—his obligations  towards the people in terms of socio-economic prosperity\, rule of law\, and  religious tolerance. It was suggested to Liebig that it would be worthwhile to find out whether Kautilya influenced Gandhi\,  and\, if so\, to what extent.   \n      Liebig criticised the work of Roger Boesche\, The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya  and His Arthashastra (2002) as ignoring the comprehensive\, holistic  character of Kautilya’s work. Instead\, Boesche selectively picks up quotes to  argue that Kautilya stands for “realism”\, thus missing the “eigenvalue”—in  Weberian terms—of the Kautilya Arthashastra. When  comparing Kautilya to Machiavelli\, it was explained that the latter was  narrower in his focus\, for example\, leaving out the question of the economy. He  wanted to unify Italy and  keep foreign powers out of Italy\,  whereas in the case of Kautilya it was the concept of a conqueror (vijigeshu) consolidating an empire in  the whole Indian subcontinent up to present-day Afghanistan.    \n  In response to a  question on the Arthashastra’s  relevance to the art of war\, it was shown that Kautilya’s work can be  conceptually relevant in modern times. Kautilya emphasiSed the need for  advanced military technologies—during his time notably war elephants\, covert  operations\, irregular warfare\, and intelligence. Today\, there are similar  conceptual issues such as cyberwar and intelligence which fit well into this  mould.    \n During the discussion\, Liebig argued that there is a near total  absence of knowledge and understanding of Kautilya in Europe.  While Indologists do know him and have done quite some research on him\, in the  social science discourse—notably political science and sociology—Kautilya is  practically non-existent. This\, despite the fact that Kautilya is an  indispensable part of world knowledge of political theory. Kautilya\, Chanakya\,  or Vishnugupt\, must  be given his  rightful place in the international social science discourse of international studies.\n Liebig emphasised that Kautilya is an important component of  India’s  wide spectrum of politico-cultural resources. India is a land of cohesiveness in  diversity\, which has not been achieved in European history. India’s  politico-cultural resources are indeed relevant for today’s world. India needs to consider how China has  popularised the study of Confucian thought and culture by opening Confucius Centres  all over the world.   \n Summing Up by  Chair    \n Col.  Gautam thanked Mr. Liebig for his presentation. He noted that in South Asia and  India  it is ironic that Kautilya is not sufficiently studied in a multidisciplinary  mode. One reason for this could be the politicisation of such work. Chanakya  belongs to the 3rd Century BC\, from an empire that covered areas in  present-day India\, Nepal\, Bangladesh\,  Afghanistan\, and Pakistan  (practically the entire Indian subcontinent). Kautilya’s thought and philosophy  needs to be studied in a contextual yet rigorous\, scientific\, and a-religious manner\, and not on the initiative  of the religious right wing. This can be compared to the communalisation of the  Urdu language post-Partition (by linking it primarily to Islam) and its decay  in northern India\, whereas  the language is based on the Khadiboli of Delhi. But this  is now changing and Kautilya too needs to be studied in that spirit.  \n     The chair also  raised the issue of (mis)quotation of Kautilya out of context in various  instances. This does more harm than good as he is misunderstood. For example\,  the historian Kaushik Roy concludes that in its counterinsurgency strategy\, India employs  Kautilyan bhedneti (divide and rule) where  it employs Hindus and Christian Nagas from Nagaland to crush Muslim Kashmiri  insurgents.3 This  information is false and the analysis is based on flawed logic. The Indian  military posts units to peace and field areas on rotation\, not on caste or communal lines. The challenge for future scholars  and scholarship is also to become aware of such spoilers and obstacles and  conduct a proper study of Kautilya and his philosophy. \n  Report prepared by Col. (Retd.)  P.K. Gautam\, Research Fellow\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis\, New Delhi. \n\n1. Ramkrishan Bhattacharya\, “Preparing and  Publishing Sanskrit Texts: Yesterday\, Today and Tomorrow”\, Journal of Asiatic Society\, Vol. LI\, No.4\, 2009\, pp.1-12.\n2. See  Rasheed Uz Zaman\, “Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic  Culture”\, Comparative Strategy\, Vol. 25\,  2006\, pp. 231-247.\n3. See  Kaushik Roy\, “Just and Unjust War in  Hindu Philosophy”\, Journal of Military  Ethics\, Vol.6\, No.3\, 2007\, pp. 232-245.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/endogenous-politico-cultural-resources-kautilyas-arthashastra-and-indias-strategic-culture
CATEGORIES:OTHER EVENTS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120413T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120413T053000
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CREATED:20231223T134406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63172-1334295000-1334295000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Understanding Africa’s position on UN Security Council Reforms
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (Retd)Discussants: Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia and Ambassador H H S Viswanathan \nReform and democratisation of the United Nations\, particularly the Security Council\, has been the focus of global attention in recent years. However\, progress on UNSC reforms has proven to be quite elusive\, mainly due to multiple and competing proposals by various groups like G-4\, Uniting for Consensus\, L-69 and S-5. Separately\, within the UN process\, through the Africa Group the African countries have tried to project their common position for permanent representation from the African continent at the Security Council.   \nIn this context\, Ms. Ruchita Beri analysed the African position on UNSC reforms and provided some historical and political context necessary to situate the Africa’s debate over Security Council reforms. She argued that the continent’s inflexibility and failure to reach a compromise on the common position while negotiating with other like-minded groups is the single most significant roadblock in the African countries’ plans to acquire permanent position on the high table. Further\, while India’s quest for African support for its UNSC candidature may have been one of the factors fuelling India’s engagement of African countries in recent years\, doubts remain on India and Africa convergence at the negotiations on UNSC reforms in future.     \nHighlighting the anachronistic structure of the UNSC\, Ms. Beri mentioned that there has been an engaging debate on the need for UNSC reforms since the end of the Cold War. Many countries\, especially from the developing world\, have expressed their dissatisfaction with the unrepresentative character of the UNSC and presented various formulae and proposals addressing three issues: \n\nThe size of the reformed Security Council\,\nLimitations on the scope and use of veto rights\, and\,\nThe UNSC’s working methods. \n\nHowever\, the new permanent membership has proven to be the most contentious issue in the debate on Security Council reforms. \nAmong different groups formed across the world to put forward the cases for permanent membership to the Security Council\, the Africa group remains the only geographical group to have reached a common position when\, after considerable deliberations\, the African countries agreed to a common position on the UNSC reforms called the Ezulwini Consensus (2005). Further\, the Sirte Summit of the African Union in July 2005 set up a follow up mechanism on the reform process and mandated to negotiate with other regions of the world and stakeholders to attain Africa’s aspiration with reference to the UNSC. However\, there was a lot of criticism of the African common position: \n\nThe Ezulwini consensus was based on the idea of regional representation\, while the current UN system focused on representation of countries on the basis of their individual merit.\nThe Ezulwini consensus was an inflexible negotiating position that was doomed to fail at the onset.\n\nOn their part\, the G-4 and the Africa group opened negotiations in London in 2005 in order to reach a consensus as they would be unable to muster the required support independently. Nevertheless\, negotiations revealed fissures in the unity of the Africa group and the leading African countries failed to convince other member states that it was practically impossible for Africa to attain a permanent representation at the UNSC without support from other players. Several factors influenced these events:  \n\nFailure to name the possible African representatives in the African common position because of intense rivalry amongst them and severe criticism of their candidature within Africa. \nOnly 36 of the 53 African countries voted in favour of the Sirte Declaration\, meaning that even if the Africa group had managed to join in a coalition with G-4\, it would still not have got the votes of all members of AU.\nIt appears some of the P-5 countries also fuelled these differences among the African countries.\n\nOn India-Africa convergence\, Ms. Beri mentioned that in recent years\, India has been engaging African countries in a big way\, at bilateral\, regional as well as pan-African levels. The need for a new paradigm encompassing diverse areas such as political\, economic\, science and technology\, human resource development\, social\, cultural and strategic was highlighted during the India-Africa Summit held in April 2008. Also\, India’s increasing engagement of Africa coupled with its involvement in UN peacekeeping in Africa can be viewed as a strategy to win support of the African countries for its candidature to the UNSC. In turn\, on various occasions\, individually or as part of a regional grouping\, African countries have gone on record to support India’s candidature to the reformed UNSC.  \nIn conclusion\, she opined that currently it seems the Africa group cannot agree on suitable candidates to fill the permanent seats allocated to the region. It is also doubtful whether other groups will negotiate with African countries without identification of the possible African candidates. At the same time\, without African support it is inconceivable that any proposal or reform package could succeed in the General Assembly. Therefore\, at the moment\, Africa seems to be holding the key to further progress on the UNSC reforms debate. \nMajor Points from Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: \n\nThe world is putting unnecessary faith in Africa and its role in the expansion of Security Council. At the same time\, amongst the P-5 only UK and France are inclined for expansion and the other three are not in favour of the same. Therefore\, Africa becomes a minor bloc in any such expansions.\nSome consider arriving at the Ezulwini Consensus was the mistake committed by Africa as it could not move freely beyond the set position. At the same time\, the question is whether Africa has the power to go back on the consensus. Hence\, Ezulwini Consensus should be considered as the starting point of the process. It is the opening position of Africa wherein it has expressed its opinion on a major issue as Africa does not have such diplomatic leverage with the world.\nUnlike Asia and Latin America\, but like Europe\, Africa does not have probable candidates as the continent is too divided. Therefore\, it is very difficult to get consensus among African countries. Of late\, there have been new cases of Kenya and Ethiopia to be considered for membership of the UNSC. \nThere is no clear strategy of Africa and India as to how to proceed on the subject of UNSC reform. The current approach fails to deliver desired results. In this situation\, the only solution is the transitional solution between permanent and non-permanent category\, i.e. creating a rotational membership.\nThere is no clear support from Africa for India’s position. They only note India’s candidature. Their position could come out clearly when there are few contenders from the continent.\nIt is also important to look at the position taken in groupings like BRICS and IBSA by its member states.\nFor some time\, the issue of reforming the UNSC is has moved to the backburner in the world dominated by economic issues and it is time to pursue the same along with other impending issues.\nPermanent seats in the Security Council are not decided on the basis of regional representation. Therefore\, it is a non-starter and this practice has to be discarded. At the same time\, deciding criteria for new members is like deciding a country’s candidature well in advance.\nThe question of veto power for new members is a non-starter for negotiations as the current P-5 is in no mood to offer it to new members. There should be some compromise on this contentious issue and final push has to come from the P-5 in this regard. Separately\, there is a debate on the use of veto power\, conditions under which it was introduced\, and the current need to retain it.\nSome critics are of the opinion that it is time India starts its candidature campaign as an individual country\, leaving behind the G-4 because the G-4 is not getting full support because of opposition to the candidature for some of its members like Japan and Germany.\nThere are doubts over Africa’s ability to reach consensus ever because of mutual suspicion and jealousy among African countries. Recently\, Senegal put forward its candidature for the UNSC membership as the only francophone African country.\nIt is natural for African countries to think that the UNSC lacks credibility and legitimacy as there is no permanent representation for Africa which is home to 54 countries.\n\nReport prepared by Babjee Pothuraju\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/understanding-africas-position-on-un-security-council-reforms
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120413T053000
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CREATED:20231223T134406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63173-1334295000-1334295000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Growing Chinese Maritime Influence: Implications for Regional Security
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Vice Admiral P S Das (Retd)Discussants: Cdr Kamlesh Agnihotri and Dr Krishnendra Meena \nIn  order to understand the strategy adopted by China in spreading its maritime  influence and implications for regional security\, the tenets espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett have been studied in this paper. \nThe  two great strategists differed from each other; whereas Mahan emphasised  establishing Command of Sea\, Corbett focused more on denial of command of sea. Mahan  advocated the Big Battle theory (requiring big Ships and Weapons); but Corbett  believed in advance indicators before big battles will occur. Whilst Mahan  looked at the sea as means to an end\, Corbett looked at a skilful combination  of maritime and continental strategies.  \nOn  comparing the two strategists it was observed that the Chinese maritime thought  process was heavily influenced by Mahan\, but there are also shades of Corbett’s  ideas. \nChina\, in order to gain power\, has consolidated the strategies of Mahan and Corbett in the present era and  its strategy is now based on three conjoined aspects—economics\, diplomacy and  military expansion. \nThe  importance of maritime strategy for China  emerges in three ways: first\,  breakaway from the coastal defence syndrome; second\, consolidation in the immediate area in the face  of the Soviet threat and the presence of the US  in Japan;  and thirdly\, break  away from the immediate area and enter into the outer areas.  \nComparisons  were drawn between China’s  wish to absorb Taiwan and the  US annexation of Hawaii Islands  and expansion in US maritime  influence post the world wars\, as these aspects hold important geostrategic indicators  for China. \nIt  was brought out that in order to expand its influence China must first gain the  advantage of sea denial tactics through Submarines and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM)\, second\, gain sea control through establishment of working  control and control in dispute\, third\, China’s naval operations outside the  first and second island chains would fall more into the category of presence  and trade protection and finally\, the strategy of overseas bases which is  followed by China in a subtle way in Myanmar\, Maldives\, Sri Lanka\, eastern  coast of Africa\, etc.\nAs  far as the future is concerned\, it was observed that with the steady increase  in China’s  defence budget\, a US-China conflict cannot be ruled out. Whereas the US will spread its assets all over the world\, China will  concentrate only in areas of interest.  \nConclusion: \n\nThe Mahan and Corbett views       could have not foreseen subsequent technological advancements.\nLaws of the sea are interpreted       by China       according to its interest.\nChina is following more of       Mahanian intent\, however capability gap still exist as compared to the US—in       terms of technology the latter has an advantage. And till this gap is not       bridged China       will follow sea denial.\nConcept of Chinese navy is moving       ahead in modernisation of manpower/capabilities\, building a professional       navy. The idea of “removing the rust” is being followed in China. Anti       Piracy law is used as a disguise for spreading its influence in the sea.\nChina was an       inward looking civilization and the maritime outlook is a recent       development\, hence Chinese naval expansion is infantile and it’s just a       beginning. According to Selby Cohen\, ”geostrategically China       since Post Cold War time has broken away from land oriented strategy to       maritime.“ \nChina is       not a sea faring society and therefore it is not re-emerging as a naval       power as it was never a sea power earlier.\nChina is       facing an expert naval force in the form of the US Navy therefore       technology should be its priority rather than numbers. China is       engaging with a vast number of nations (mostly economically weak) and       investing in their land\, so that in future they can be used during war.\nThe national strategy and       maritime strategy keep changing as capabilities increase.\nThere will be an arms race in       future and the number of assets will be important; further instability in       the maritime world will continue to exist.\n\nSuggestions for the Paper: \n\nThe title of the paper should be       revisited/ revised in order to describe the actual study undertaken in the       paper. \nThe paper should consult Chinese       writings like the 1993 ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’\, which discuss the       role of the PLA Navy\, the guidelines provided by Hu Jintao in 2004\, and       Gorshkov’s four roles for the Soviet navy must be studied.  \nHistoric missions and strategic       guidelines should be amalgamated in the paper.\nComparison between the US\, UK       and China could be       avoided as the US       perspective is more alarmist than is the actual reality.\nImplications for India and       other regions must be discussed.\nSome mention of the South China Sea       and China’s       influence in the region must be discussed.\nElaboration on the regions       involved in maritime issues is required. \n\nReport Prepared  by Soumya Tiwari\, Research Intern\, Centre for  Military Affairs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-growing-chinese-maritime-influence-implications-for-regional-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120319T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120319T053000
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CREATED:20231223T134406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130556Z
UID:63174-1332135000-1332135000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Negotiating conflict in deeply divided societies: The merits of complex and hybrid consociational power sharing systems based on the case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Radu Carciumaru\, Senior Lecturer\, South Asia Institute\, University of Heidleberg \n \nMr. Radu Carciumaru delivered a talk on the topic ‘Negotiating conflict in deeply divided societies: The merits of complex and hybrid consociational power sharing systems based on the case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe’ on 19 March\, 2012. Here\, the author categorically explained these variables such as negotiation\, conflict\, ethnic conflict\, deeply divided society\, etc.  \nHe defined conflict as a situation in which two or more actors are involved\, mostly in a deeply divided society. And\, ethnic conflict is an outcome of such conflicts. Taking the ideas of Horowitz\, he also explained the concept of ethnic group and ethnic identity which are based on colour\, language and religion depending on the tribe\, race\, nationalities or castes. To the author\, the ethnic groups are constructed over a period of time but are often found to be deconstructed.  \nIn order to explain his framework\, Mr. Radu took up the case studies of India\, Bosnia-Herzegovina\, Macedonia\, Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina) and Moldova.  \nWhile talking about power sharing\, the author picked up the consociational power sharing model. This model involves the domestic actors including the ones from the centre and state. Moreover\, four broad principles were outlined. These include grand coalition cabinets\, proportional representation\, minority/mutual veto powers\, and segment autonomy. In this context\, India as an institutionalised state has been cited as an example for the consociational arrangement.  \nFurthermore\, the scholar discussed positional and principal negotiations. Taking ideas from the works of Fisher and Ury\, Mr. Radu talked about separating people from the problem; focus on interests and not positions; generating a variety of possibilities before any actions; and finally a criteria by insisting that the result should be based on some objective standard. While discussing the interests\, the scholar was of the view that specific identity should be well protected. Also\, specific cultures\, rights and opportunities should be safeguarded too. And\, people involved should be encouraged to participate in decision making process in order to instil a sense of belonging.  \nAlongside this\, Mr. Radu also highlighted the concept of communicative negotiation. According to him\, this is more applicable to the identity-based conflicts that cannot be depended on principled negotiation. Here\, the participants are the communicators and the main goal is to reach an understanding based on respect. It also requires a mutual respect and also a need to recognise the differences. Most importantly\, one should invent options to ensure mutual respect.  \nMr Radu also focussed on the consociational power sharing model which comprises of elite cooperation\, an empirical model and a normative model. He highlighted two conditions for this model\, namely\, structure-oriented conditions and actor-oriented conditions. While the first set of conditions talk of non-majority segment\, equal-sized segments\, small population\, socio-economic equality\, overarching loyalty and geographical concentration of segments\, the second revolves around dominant elite\, external pressure\, accommodating traditions and absence of special rights of claim.   \nFurther\, the scholar stressed on the composite model for conflict-regulation in plural societies. For this\, he described segmental autonomy as symmetrical and asymmetrical autonomy. Explaining this\, Mr. Radu mentioned that Article 3 of the Indian Constitution has enabled the state to react more flexibly to the separatist demands by providing incentives for the self determination movements to struggle for a ‘homeland’ within the Indian Union. The aforementioned Kashmir conflict is one such instance\, and comes under Article 370 of the Constitution. Similarly\, Mizoram comes under Article 371. While Article 30 pertains to linguistic minorities\, there are also Articles 25 and 26 and the 8 schedules.  \nComing to the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina\, the scholar talked about the Dayton Peace Agreement which ended the conflict. Moreover\, the direct intervention by the international community as a mechanism to coordinate law and policy-making\, judicial review and arbitration was also touched upon by Mr. Radu. In the case of Macedonia\, joint committees and implementation bodies including ad hoc bodies sponsored by various international organizations are believed to be involved in power sharing systems. According to the scholar\, no extensive international involvement was seen in the case of Moldova but the conflict was solved bilaterally. Apart from this\, Mr. Radu stressed on the types of parliamentary representation\, veto tights and also the proportionality in administration. \nThe presentation was followed by discussion on the subject and a few questions were asked. One of them was over how the Kashmir issue needs to be resolved. In response to this\, the scholar talked about the Indian freedom struggle which focussed on uniting people and on avoiding making enemies. Some of the opinions were that people always talked about cultures but often failed to understand ethnicities. It was also pointed out during the discussion that the problems are manifold and dealing with them is in a divided world is difficult. To do this\, there is a need for an economic development. Some questions were over the concept of elite strategy and how the speaker defined the elites. The speaker stated that elites were primarily political in nature such as the politicians\, in all sectors\, be it local\, state or national level.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/negotiating-conflict-in-deeply-divided-societies-the-merits-of-complex-and-hybrid-consociational-power-sharing-systems-based-on-the-case-studies-from-south-asia-and-eastern-europe
CATEGORIES:OTHER EVENTS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120316T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120316T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134407Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63175-1331875800-1331875800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:External Threats and the Formulation of China’s Foreign Policy
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb. R RajagopalanDiscussants: Amb. Nalin Suri and Prof. MV Rappai \nChina’s foreign policy is geared towards securing its ‘core interests’ such as maintaining territorial integrity\, the preservation of its system of government and continued economic and social stability. Perceived threats to these core interest shape China’s external behaviour. The paper analyses important external threats as perceived by Chinese strategic thinkers.  \nChinese perceived external threats are: \n\nJapan\nKorean Peninsula\nSouth China Sea\nIndia\nThe US.\n\nChinese scholars view Japan as an emerging military threat. They believe that China’s economic growth has encouraged a sense of envy within Japan regarding China. Japan will seek to strengthen its military and political clout to balance China’s growing political and economic clout. Japan’s territorial disputes with Russia and China are seen by many Chinese scholars as providing impetus to revise the role of Japan’s Self Defense Forces. A close examination of Chinese threat perception regarding Japan suggests that they believe that Japan can be a threat for China as a key ally in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan straits\, as a facilitator of regional cooperation (among India\, Japan\, Australia and the US) that may exclude China and as a contender for political leadership of the region by increasing its stature at the international forums including the UN. Japan’s pursuit to gain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council is viewed by the Chinese scholars as being aimed at gaining political clout to countervail China. \nAs regards Korean peninsula\, the Chinese scholars perceive that an exacerbation of tensions on the Korean peninsula would have implications for China’s domestic and foreign policy. China’s failure to prevent conflict from breaking out on the Korean peninsula would adversely affect the political influence Beijing has gained in the region. In case that happens\, smaller states in the region would look at the US as the net provider of the security. Chinese scholars also believe that instability in the Korean peninsula has given an opportunity to Japan and South Korea to strengthen their military ties with the US. In case the situation aggravates further\, it will help them deepen their military relationship. \nThe issue of South China Sea and Chinese territorial and maritime claims over its sovereignty has become an issue of much concern for China in recent years. According to the Chinese scholars\, the bilateral disputes that China has with some ASEAN member states such as Vietnam\, Philippines\, Malaysia\, Brunei and Indonesia now have the potential to strain and stall the relationship with the ASEAN as a whole. American courtship of these countries neighbouring China is viewed by the Chinese scholars as an opportunistic exploitation aimed at containing China. According to the Chinese scholars\, instability in the South China Sea provides an excuse to the US and Japan to increase their military footprint in China’s immediate neighbourhood. They also fear that in the event of an escalation of dispute on South China Sea\, the US and its allies would take the opportunity to interdict Sea Lanes of Communications thereby jeopardizing China’s economy.  \nIndia has been recognized as an important regional actor by Chinese scholars because of two main factors: economic development and a proactive foreign policy following the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal. Unlike the Indian perception of an imminent military challenge from China\, India is seen as a direct threat to China. It is Tibet\, which China defines among its core interest\, that makes India a potential threat in Chinese thinking. Despite India’s adherence to the “one China policy” and repeated assurances that the Indian government will not permit dissident Tibetan to undertake anti-China activity\, Chinese scholars remain wary of India’s stand on the Tibet issue. They believe that Dalai Lama can be used by India to destabilize the Tibetan Autonomous Region. \nIndia’s look east policy and growing military relationship with the regional countries are seen by Chinese scholars as aimed at seeking strategic balance with China. New Delhi’s efforts to develop bilateral relationship with central Asian countries and prospects of greater involvement in the region are seen as enabling the encirclement of China. Growing Indo-US relationship is also seen as a strategy to contain China in the near future. China is deemed as an important factor in the close bilateral relationship that developed between the two countries following the Indo-US nuclear deal. \nIn the Chinese strategic thinking the US is viewed as the fundamental obstacle to China’s continued assent in global politics. The US arms transfer to Taiwan and the seeming centrality of the Taiwan question in the Asia calculus of the US continues to be an important threat for China. Apart from Taiwan issue\, China sees the US as a threat for many reasons. It is seen as a facilitator for the creation of China containment policy in Asia. American relations with Japan and South Korea\, its military engagement with Southeast Asia and its growing relationship with India are all seen as part of a greater strategy to reduce China’s strategic space. The US has been raising the human rights issue of China. This has been viewed in Beijing as interference in China’s internal matters and an effort to destabilize the country domestically.   \nChina has taken three important foreign policy initiatives- support for multilateralism\, promoting military diplomacy and active pursuit of economic diplomacy- to tackle various external threats mentioned above. By promoting multilateralism\, China is trying to project itself as a responsible power and a cooperative partner. Chinese participation in multilateralism is also geared towards diluting the influence of one particular power.  \nFollowing the repeated criticism of its military modernization\, China has tried to allay the “China threat thesis.” It has established defence and security consultation with 22 countries including the US\, India\, Japan\, Vietnam and Philippines. With an aim to project a more open and transparent image of the Chinese military\, it has also sought to increase military exchanges with countries across the world.  \nEconomic diplomacy has become a central theme in China’s foreign policy. In terms of management of external threats\, China has actively sought to reassure its smaller neighbours that they have a stake in China’s growth. Keeping that in mind\, China has signed various FTAs with Southeast Asian countries. China has consistently sought to deepen economic engagement while putting contentious issues on the backburner. The rational is that greater economic ties will help instill mutual trust.   \nMajor points from the discussion and suggestions to the author; \n\nThe title should be revised to reflect that the paper studies Chinese perception of external threat.\nCurrent assessment of security environment and Chinese world view may be added as a background to the paper.\nThe paper must include a section on Taiwan and an assessment on recent elections.\nThe paper should also look at Chinese threat perception with reference to Central Asia and Russia. Resource competition among the regional powers should also be factored in.\nChina’s historical grievances-the century of humiliation-should also be factored in the paper.\nThe Chinese threat perceptions mentioned in the paper should be reordered and should begin with the US.\nThe paper should lay emphasis on Chinese threat perception in Hu Jintao era.\nChina’s response to these threats may also be added if possible.\nThe scholar should undertake a field trip to further asses the Chinese perception on these threats.\nThe paper notes that some of the perceptions mentioned in the paper are based on personal interviews with the Chinese scholars. The scholar should footnote the interviews.\n\nReport prepared by Shamshad A. Khan\, Research Assistant\, East Asia Centre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/external-threats-and-the-formulation-of-chinas-foreign-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120306T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120306T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134407Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130741Z
UID:63176-1331011800-1331011800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China and the Current Crises in the Sudans
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ruchita Beri \nMr. Daniel Large\, Research Associate with the South African Institute of International Affairs\, gave a presentation on ‘China and the Current Crises in the Sudans’. He opened his presentation with a background of the current situation in Sudan and South Sudan and observed that there is a pattern of multiple inter-locking of crises in the two Sudans. He describes China’s relations with the two nations as an ‘intriguing work in progress’. A year ago\, China’s relations were restricted to Khartoum but ever since\, its relations with South Sudan have been growing. Since January 2011\, there has been a qualitative acceleration of Chinese engagement in South Sudan and the numbers of Chinese businesses have grown exponentially. This has led to a scramble for businesses which range from SMEs to independent and private entrepreneurs. China’s aid programme\, through humanitarian and development assistance to South Sudan\, is being rolled out in its ten provinces. Its political relation with South Sudan has moved from a state of war to a pragmatic friendship\, with enhanced government and inter-party interactions. Though some areas of tension remain\, the relations have significantly improved. However\, one key bottleneck for long-term Chinese investment in these countries is the lack of finances. \nThrowing some light on China’s engagement with South Sudan\, Mr. Large argued that China began its relations even before South Sudan seceded away from Sudan. According to some observers\, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was ‘sneaking in’ to initiate relations with Juba in the mid-2000s. In July 2007\, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir visited China and elaborated his country’s position on its relations with Sudan and the geographical distribution of his nation’s oil resources. A year later in September 2008\, China opened it’s Consulate in South Sudan.\nThe two Sudans had separated without settling their disputes on the oil resources. Arguing that South Sudan did not make an emotional decision on the issue of oil-sharing\, Mr. Large stated that the country began to protect its interests through negotiations with the Sudan in November\, 2011. Through a contract between the Government of South Sudan and the oil companies\, South Sudan also managed to free itself from any kind of liability in the eventuality of the companies shutting down. Following this\, China’s relationship with South Sudan soured and Juba became uncomfortable with Chinese intervention in the oil negotiations. However\, in the Addis Ababa talks between Sudan and South Sudan over oil-sharing\, the Troika (comprising the US\, Norway and the UK) were sidelined and China was expected to make a difference. \n Mr. Large concluded his presentation by stating that security is the main concern for China in the Sudans given the fact that in late January 2012\, Chinese workers were kidnapped by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (North). Chinese presence in the two countries has also raised issues of its responsibility to protect the civilians\, the practicality in mobilizing aid for the countries and if it is worth at all to be engaged in the countries given such fragile security environment. China’s relation with the two countries is characterized by what Mr. Large calls\, ‘sober realism’. In the likelihood of a change of Chinese leadership\, there could be a departure from the current stand of a favourable relationship with Sudan. Under the Chinese initiative of ensuring security and development\, there is great hope for development in South Sudan\, while in Sudan the agricultural renaissance is touted to replace the former oil economy. But given the pattern of intensifying insecurities in South Sudan\, Mr Large contended that it remains doubtful if these programmes can be realized. \nIn the discussion that ensued\, some more issues related to China’s wider engagement with the African continent were brought to the fore. Given China’s growing power status and its medium- and long-term interests in Africa\, there is an increasing deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) on the shores off the African coast. China has also been gradually developing its operational capacities in Sudan to protect its national interests. Relations between China and Sudan have been deepening\, but this pragmatic relationship is based on mistrust. However\, the South Sudanese have not been as welcoming of China and the latter are concerned about corruption in Salva Kiir’s government.  \nSudan and South Sudan are inextricably dependent on one another and their relationship is based on good neighbourliness. However\, it is extremely hard for China to balance and therefore it is ‘uncomfortably stuck’ between the two. As a result\, it is continually trying to navigate through unchartered waters. It was concluded that despite all the challenges\, there has been a pronounced improvement in China’s relationship with South Sudan both in tangible (development aid) and non-tangible (reception of South Sudanese government officials in China) terms. Given China’s engagement in the country\, it hopes for a more established\, viable South Sudanese government that is capable of better governance. \nReport prepared by Keerthi Sampath Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/china-and-the-current-crises-in-the-sudans
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120224T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120224T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134506Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63177-1330061400-1330061400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Mahinda Rajapaksa’s India Policy
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador R RajagopalanDiscussants: Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Mehta and Dr N Manoharan \nThe paper focused on Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s policy towards India and on how it has been different from that of his predecessors. In evaluating the above\, the scholars posed several questions like in what way his India policy has been different from that of other leaders\, how far has he succeeded in counter-balancing Indian influence? What are the reasons for his success or failure? The paper is broadly divided into three parts beginning with broad trends in Sri Lanka’s India Policy from cold war period to 2005\, post-cold war period and post-2005 period ever since Rajapaksa took over as the President.  \nDuring the Cold War period\, India was perceived as a potential threat and there was an effort in Sri Lanka to balance/offset India’s influence in the island country. Hence\, several Sri Lankan leaders sought to engage regional and extra-regional powers like the USA\, the UK\, Pakistan and China to countervail India through civil-military cooperation. But there was also an attempt to engage India given the perception that India had a decisive influence on the Tamil population. Indian involvement in the Tamil question towards the end of the cold war— sending of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to fight the Tamil militants\, its ultimate withdrawal before accomplishment of the mission and assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi— proved counter-productive for India and led to a policy of willful inaction in Sri Lankan affairs ever since. India maintained a distance from the issue and backed a non-military solution— “a negotiated political settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society”. However\, even if India adopted a hands-off policy\, the perception of India playing a negative role in the ethnic issue continued in Sri Lanka. \nThe authors argued that immediately after Mahinda Rajapaksa took over as the President of the country in 2005\, he adopted a proactive policy of engagement with India and evolved an innovative way of establishing a line of communication with Indian leadership. A three-member delegation comprising two of his brothers and one of his trusted lieutenants\, regularly discussed with India the issues relating to the ethnic situation in Sri Lanka and especially the inflexible and aggressive posture adopted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Thus Rajapaksa ensured that his government’s military campaign would have the blessings of India. It is because of such regular interaction that India understood the compulsions of his government and the campaign ended with complete decimation of the LTTE. Rajapaksa could also obtain Indian consent for the import of military weapons from China and Pakistan which sparked off Indian concerns on some occasions. Through regular and effective communication he sought to dispel the Indian concerns in this regard. \nThe authors argued that after the conclusive victory over the LTTE\, Rajapaksa’s handling of the ethnic issue has clearly sidestepped Indian concerns. Indian proposals of developing a solution on the basis of the 13th amendment have not been taken seriously by Rajapaksa as he has chosen to deny that he had ever assured India on a 13th amendment-plus solution and instead insisted that he would favour a homegrown solution rather than an imported one. His approach towards Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) also signifies his apathy towards India\, even if he continues to emphasise on betterment of relationship with India. Despite all this\, India has resigned itself to Sri Lanka’s attempt to strengthen its relationship with India’s traditional rivals\, China and Pakistan\, and has felt compelled to work with Rajapaksa. All this while\, India has hoped to persuade him to evolve a decent solution to the ethnic issue and further strengthen Sri Lanka’s relationship with India. In light of the arguments provided above\, the authors concluded by saying that Rajapaksa had succeeded in both engaging and countervailing India. \nThe main points of the discussion and suggestions to the authors: \n\nThe paper needs more in-depth work regarding the main eight questions it has tried to explore.\nGotabaya Rajapaksa’s role in Rajapaksa’s rise needs to be highlighted further.\nThe question of why military was used although a non military solution has been sought throughout needs to be revaluated.\nMore emphasis needs to be put on devolution and 13th amendment for better understanding of policies.\nThe title of the paper needs to be changed\, whether it was about Rajapaksa’s policy or Sri Lanka’s policy under Rajapaksa needs to come out better. \nA comparative study of the leadership nexus in both countries when studying from personality oriented approach can be undertaken within the paper.\nMaritime issues need a mention in the paper as it could be a future irritant in India-Sri Lanka relations. Also economic issues need more mention in the paper.\nRajapaksa’s idea of nation building could be put in the paper for a better overview of his personality.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mahinda-rajapaksas-india-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120222T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120222T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134506Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130741Z
UID:63178-1329888600-1329888600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Current Situation in West Asia and India’s Dilemma
DESCRIPTION:DG Dr. Arvind Gupta\nThe changes and challenges faced by the world today are enormous and daunting\, and there is a need to deal with these in an interconnected way. The dramatic unfolding of the situation in West Asia over the past year poses a challenge to India in terms of a political response. It calls for a quick rethinking of our foreign policy not just from a long term perspective but also to address the challenges in a tactical manner. The challenges did not appear on the scene without warnings. We have been dealing with nuclear issues for about a decade. Apart from this\, the post-9/11 scenario brought forth other issues that added to the dilemma and changed the situation in West Asia—the rise of Shia influence\, the Iranian nuclear issue\, tensions between Iranians and their Arab neighbours\, tensions between Iranians and Israelis\, and the Arab Spring.  \nIndia’s interests are interspersed with all these developments. These have entangled India’s policy so much so that responding and dealing with them within set parameters has become difficult. The interconnectedness of these issues makes it difficult for India to accept any side or position. Moreover\, the recent bomb blast in New Delhi targeting Israeli embassy personnel has added further to the existing dilemma as to how India should articulate its stance on the West Asia imbroglio.  \nWith this background\, the participants of the roundtable sought to answer the following research questions: \n\nWhat are the dilemmas facing India in dealing with the present crisis in West Asia?\nHow should India mitigate these dilemmas?\nDid India make the right move when it abstained on the Libyan resolution and supported the West on the Syrian resolution?\nHow should India balance its foreign policy towards Iran vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia; Iran vis-à-vis Israel; and Iran vis-à-vis the US?\n\nAmbassador S.K. Bhutani\nOur foreign policy decision in terms of East Asia\, the West\, etc.\, is set\, which is not the case when compared to the West Asian region. Amongst the three revolutions that have been witnessed within the region\, the third revolution triggered by the self-immolation of the fruit seller in Tunisia sent out a new message. It was a revolution showcasing the rising expectations and demand for participatory democracy.  However\, our response to the crisis in the region is confused.  \nIn the case of the Gulf\, a military solution to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power is not a feasible one. This is the same case with the Western solution of strangling the Iranian economy. Within Iran\, there is a fragmentation of the elite. The leadership is divided\, wherein the Ayatollah [Khamenei] and President Ahmedinejad are at loggerheads. The West’s aim is to use the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the P5+1 in order to pass a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution against Iran. India should not get involved in this debate because the Iranian interest will be taken care of by China and Russia. It is not the principles\, but our interests that should matter.  \nTherefore\, the question arises: What are India’s interests? Iran is beneficial to us for three important reasons: oil and gas\, access to Afghanistan\, and access to the Caspian Sea. The Afghanistan advantage fits into the large perspective for India\, that is\, in order to break the two fronts that we face in terms of conflict—Pakistan and China. India should not be a partner to other powers in containing Iran; rather our role should be to double our relationship with the latter. We should develop a constructive relationship with Iran and protect our country’s strategic interests. We should also work harder to develop relations with the Gulf States\, especially those states that are not in favour of India developing relations with Iran by citing our purpose as being to maintain relations with both sides.  However\, its internal developments and politics makes it difficult to predict the direction Iran might take.  \nWhat do we do with the non-Gulf Arab states? Syria is a difficult case in point. Here\, India should take a constructive humanitarian view and offer to send a non-official medical mission to both sides\, or\, at least\, make such announcements. This will take the immediate pressure off from the Indian government and give them time to think up a response. In Egypt\, the signs are positive and there are fewer contradictions to be resolved. The statement from the Muslim Brotherhood of 21 February\, assuring the US that the peace treaty with Israel will be maintained if aid continues\, and positive feedback from the US Senators’ visit to Egypt\, all point in this direction. Egypt faces a lot of internal strife between the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood along with unemployment\, dip in tourism\, and capital flight\, etc. This\, therefore\, presents India with an opportunity to go in. During the protests at Tahrir Square\, one of the demonstrators’ demands called for Egypt to adopt the Indian model. Hence\, we need a non-official level study to probe this further\, which should include the intelligentsia—academic institutions and/or the press. Moreover\, we should not choose sides but try to live with all of them.  \nAmbassador Ishrat Azziz\nAll the problems that India is facing in the region are not bilateral in nature—be they with Israel\, Iran\, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)\, etc. The root of the problem lies between the actors within the Gulf region\, and in this they want to drag India into taking sides.  The positive aspect is that India does not have a colonial relation or “cornering and controlling” relation with this region. All the countries in the West Asian region have strategic problems with each other—the Shia-Sunni divide (led to strategic gains to outside powers)\, Iran-Israel tensions\, and Shia Iran’s problem with Sunni-Saudi Arabia\, etc. However\, India has to give this region its due importance due to meeting its energy needs. Thus\, the economic factor becomes the most important factor in not hindering our relations with this region. We must note that though effective military power is regional\, economic power is global. The other aspect of great importance is the 6 million Indians that work in this region and form an area of immediate concern to India.  \nMoreover\, the GCC\, led by Saudi Arabia\, have expressed desire to develop strategic relations with India. The problem\, however\, is that developing strategic relations with the GCC will put us in a bind vis-à-vis dealing with Iran. The tension between GCC and Iran will affect Indian relations with either of them. For India\, two countries that matter above others—amongst those who possess nuclear arsenals\, share common border with it\, and are beset with internal problems—are Pakistan and China. Hence\, Iran possessing nuclear weapons does not affect us directly\, as it is our neighbour’s neighbour.  Rather\, our immediate concern should be regarding our policy and stand on the issue\, and what we should do to substantially prevent Iran’s nuclear programme. Moreover\, we have to formulate policy for both the long-  and the short term\, especially for the latter\, as it is difficult to meet contingencies that India faces now with regard to this region. Voting in the UNSC should be avoided as much as possible. However\, neutrality in certain situations is not an option as our image as an emerging power demands that take a strong\, positive stand. And this is our dilemma. \nThere will\, eventually\, be pressure on India. But we should not be seen to be taking sides because of\, for instance\, the influence/interest of the USA\, Israel\, and the West. We can justify the Syrian vote because the Arab League is the conscience keeper of the Arab world. However\, regarding Iran\, we should stand firm in stating that the IAEA should be the agency that should deal with such matters. If an anti-Iran resolution or a resolution perceived by Iran as against it comes up for vote in the UNSC\, India must abstain and avoid taking sides. If it is proved that Iran has enriched to higher percentages other than for peaceful purposes\, then India might have to take a stance.  \nDiscussion from participants \nOne of the discussants\, Dr G. Balachandran\, said that\, firstly\, the military option against Iran is not ruled out yet. Secondly\, there is going to be no diplomatic solution to this issue at all. The only solution during the negotiations is\, one\, suspension of enrichment and\, two\, to assure IAEA that there are no hidden facilities in Iran. The question is: if Iran possesses a nuclear bomb\, will it do to Israel what Pakistan is doing to India\, that is\, use the possession of a nuclear bomb for doing anything in a non-nuclear way. In this case\, Israel has to weigh the option of military solution or not. The belief that is going around is that in case the Iranian government does not change its position\, then Israel will choose a military solution. Then India\, as a bystander\, has to make arrangements to procure oil and gas from other sources if the Gulf region goes for war\, apart from evacuation arrangements for its nationals working in the region.  \nCdr. S.S. Parmar said that the Shia-Sunni divide is a factor and a strategic problem in this region that India has to take into consideration. Ms Ruchita Beri emphasised that we cannot ignore that Iran is an emerging regional leader in the light of the decline of US power in the region.  \nDr. Meena S. Roy said that Iran is a burning issue wherein the world is divided as to how to deal with it—it is also a ‘catch-22’ situation for India. India cannot afford to distance itself from Iran because of Afghanistan\, though the argument points to the fact that the USA is more important than Iran. If we are looking at a symptomatic treatment of the problem\, then the US position becomes important. However\, as part of this region\, we cannot afford to distance ourselves from Iran.  How India deals with Iran is a real question for the fact that India tries to balance its relations with Israel\, USA\, and the other regional actors\, particularly China and Russia\, who are clear about their positions. Russia and China support Iran by seeking non-intervention. In terms of military intervention in Iran\, within the USA there are divided opinions. A long-term study\, as pointed out by Ambassador Bhutani\, on the Caspian region should also be pursued as it is China’s next target. For India\, it is possible to get into this sector. At the same time\, we should explore options of cooperating with China in this region\, and not just competing with it.  \nDr. Roy also stressed that work needs to be done on internal dynamics within Iran. However\, she said that change within Iran is not likely to come soon under current the circumstances when there is increasing pressure from external forces to isolate Iran. People within Iran will resist any kind of pressure and thus such a situation is likely to strengthen the current regime.   \nMr. Samuel Rajiv  felt that there is space for a constructive role for India in the resolution of the Iranian issue\, along with other regional groupings like GCC and countries like Turkey. Currently\, powers that are intervening in the Iranian nuclear debate are the Western ones. Gp. Capt. Krishnappa suggested that India should weigh the option or assess the cost of voting for or against\, or abstaining when the UNSC vote comes on Iran. Dr. Kalyanaraman inquired about the advantages we can derive from India leaning towards the GCC and Saudi Arabia with particular reference to Afghanistan and its transition.  \nMs. Shebonti Ray Dadwal asked if there was much pressure from Saudi Arabia or from any of the GCC countries vis-à-vis India to cut-off relations with Iran. Also\, what is the need for adopting an ‘either-or’ policy? India’s relations with Iran are strategic\, apart from being related to oil\, and with the GCC the relations are largely economic in nature. So\, she suggested\, India should deal with them from these perspectives. In terms of our energy needs\, we need not depend on Iran for energy per se. Yet\, going by past experience\, Ms Dadwal cautioned that India should learn its lessons from the 2005 resolution wherein relations between Iran and India soured. The implications need to be studied. As for the spare capacity of Saudi oil\, one needs to bear in mind that its spare capacity is only 2 million barrels a day if oil from Iran is cut off. Moreover\, till the present global economic crisis comes to an end\, a military solution to Iran is not a likely option. \nThe common agreement amongst the participants at the roundtable was that relations with Iran must not be abandoned by taking sides. India’s stand should\, instead\, be guided by its national interests. Moreover\, as Ambassador Bhutani cautioned\, India’s response to the current situation cannot be merely guided by the past. According to him\, we have to clearly understand motives behind certain occurrences\, especially in terms of the recent bombings in New Delhi; it can be a person(s) or group(s) whose motive is to disrupt India’s relations not just with Israel but also with Iran. Ambassador Bhutani pointed out that India should pursue a constructive role wherever possible; where not\, it should step aside. Ambassador Azziz said that if ever  clear evidence of the compliance of any country’s/party’s involvement in the recent bombings in India is brought forth\, then India should follow the due course of law. Moreover\, he said that if India takes an anti-Iran stance at the UNSC without adequate justification\, then it can spell trouble. The discussants emphasised that thorough research on Iran should be carried to get adequate information and data so as to form an informed picture of the evolving situation.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/current-situation-in-west-asia-and-indias-dilemma
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120217T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120217T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235144
CREATED:20231223T134506Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130556Z
UID:63179-1329456600-1329456600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Security and Development Challenges in Assam
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Jishnu Barua\, Home Commissioner\, Government of Assam delivered a talk on ‘Security and Development Challenges in Assam’\, with a broad outline on Assam’s position in North East India\, social and cultural trends\, impact of colonial administration\, legacy of freedom movement in Assam\, 1920-1947\, economic situation and some of its positive pointers\, along with challenges to security and development\, the State government’s response and what could be an alternative approach to durable stability in Assam.  \nBringing out the geographical position of Assam\, the speaker highlighted the composition of Assam of colonial times which comprised of entire North East India except for the states of Manipur and Tripura which were separate entities. He emphasised that while Assam had wholeheartedly participated in the country’s freedom struggle along with rest of India\, there has always been an undercurrent of regionalism and sub-regionalism in the state. While bringing in the history of Assam to the forefront\, Nehru’s visit to Assam in 1937 was described as an eventful occasion as it conveyed to him\, the fears of the people of being swamped by migrants. The constant refrain of the Assamese during Nehru’s visit was that Assam was ‘invaded’ by migrants from East Bengal\, which had given rise to the feeling of insecurity among the Assamese. \nMr. Barua pointed out that\, in the pages of history\, North East as a concept remained as an ‘artificial construct’. He also stressed on the impact of colonial administration on Assam since the British had a prolonged presence in Assam. In the development context\, the socio-economic trend and indicators over the years have showed stagnation of development process in the North-East region as a whole\, which is highlighted by the fact that in 1951\, the state of Assam\, which then included the states of Nagaland\, Mizoram and Meghalaya\, had per capita income which was more than the national average and ranked fifth highest in the country. \nTouching upon the aspects of social and cultural trends\, the Vaishnavite cult spread in Assam in an immense manner. The Assamese caste system was quite fluid before the arrival of the British when there was mobility within castes and ethnic inclusion. In comparison\, the speaker notes\, the current trends seem to broadcast the prevalence of ethnic assertion\, ‘retribalization’ and ethnic groups taking recourse to ‘myth making’. The composite culture of Assam is narrated as showing signs of disintegration. At the same time\, however\, people of Assam are seen to be increasingly observing some pan-Indian social and religious practices\, influenced\, no doubt\, by mass media\, better communication and connectivity with rest of India. \nEconomically\, Assam has shown significant trends in terms of positive economic pointers. The per capita income in terms of GDP growth rate has also increased. Both agriculture and service sector have increased to a certain extent and its economy is moving on a higher growth trajectory. \nMr. Baruah stressed on the challenges Assam faces in various areas\, primarily in security and development sectors which includes the immigration and demographic transformations undergoing in the state. The speaker also pointed out the manner in which other neighbouring states\, especially Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland\, are claiming parts of Assam. In this aspect\, he emphasised on the perceived sense of neglect and the geographical isolation of Assam. On the security front\, militancy and low intensity conflicts have occurred due to ethno-nationalism\, tribal irredentism and exclusionary politics\, and internal displacements of population residing in the state. \nHighlighting the issue of the policies vis-à-vis the numerous insurgent groups in Assam\, the speaker discussed the relentless counterinsurgency operations and argued that these are aided by openness for dialogue and rehabilitation of surrendered militants. Proper rehabilitation program of former militants was mentioned with relevance to the Surrendered United Liberation Front of Asom (SULFA) experience. Recommending an alternative for improvement of prevailing environment in the Northeast India\, Mr. Jishnu Baruah urged for the prevalence of the 3 tier Panchayati Raj system in the tribal areas covered by the 6th schedule and further forging ties with Southeast Asia. For instance\, the Kaladan Multi Modal Project was cited as a perfect example. He said that there was a need for discouraging the demands of ethnic homelands and new states; more national projects by 2015; extra nuanced approach to CI ops and subtle encouragement of the growing cosmopolitan middle class in the task of national integration and nation building. \nSeeking more clarity on the issues pertaining to security and development in Assam\, many points were raised during discussion. In response\, Mr. Baruah stressed on the emergence of more ethnic groups; the emergence or increasing influence of Maoist in establishing a hold (increasing influence) in Assam; nexus of Maoist with NSCN (IM) and ULFA; and arms smuggling or gun running becoming more prevalent in the neighbouring Dimapur district in Nagaland\, which is the hub for arms trade. The involvement of NSCN (IM) in channelising arms supply in Northeast India from different routes rather than the traditional route to Cox Bazaar in Bangladesh was emphasised.  Further\, Mr. Baruah clarified on the aspect of AFSPA by stressing that the act can be made humane. He also stressed on the requirement of army as an institution to be improved with more accountability and proper training. Concluding the talk\, the speaker cited the set examples of surrendered militants seeking to be employed in organic farming as offering them alternative means of livelihood and called attention to engage the surrendered militants in productive activities based on skill development. \nReport by Ms. Shristi Pukhrem\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/security-and-development-challenges-in-assam
CATEGORIES:OTHER EVENTS,EVENT REPORT
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