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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241125T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241125T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20250103T033033Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250103T033033Z
UID:84142-1732512600-1732512600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Monday Morning Meeting on “Taiwan under Lai Ching-te and China’s Response”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) spoke on “Taiwan under Lai Ching-Te and China’s Response” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 25 November 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Mayuri Banerjee\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. Dr. Singh’s presentation was followed by a discussion on the evolving dynamics in the Taiwan Straits under President Lai Ching-Te.  \nExecutive Summary \nTensions in the Taiwan Straits have significantly heightened. Washington’s continued diplomatic and military support has greatly irked Beijing which has responded with increased diplomatic and military coercion vis-à-vis Taiwan. Simultaneously\, Cross-Strait relations have been strained over the Democratic Progressive Party’s calls of upholding Taiwan’s sovereignty and China’s provocative military exercises around Taiwan. \nDetailed Report\nThe session commenced with remarks by Dr. Mayuri Banerjee\, on the contemporary state of cross-strait relations. Briefly touching upon issues of ‘One China Principle and the 1992 consensus\, she observed that tensions continue over the legal and political status of Taiwan. While China considers Taiwan a renegade province and pledges reunification\, Taiwan under DPP which has been in power since 2016 has vowed to resist any attempts at reunification. Furthermore\, the current President has publicly committed to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty against Chinese incursion. \nFollowing the initial remarks Dr. Singh proceeded with underlining Tsai Ing-wen’s legacy\, which oversaw not just the sensitisation of international opinion on the cross-strait issue\, thereby garnering support over its legitimacy of existence and sustenance\, as well as diversification and growth of the Taiwanese economy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic\, but also witnessed reduction of Taiwanese outbound investments to China. However\, prominent developments were observed in the mainstreaming of DPP positions on the nature of cross-strait relations\, subsequently weakening the so-called 1992 Consensus amidst Taiwanese society\, as well as promoting Taiwan’s visibility in the international arena using COVID-19 sentiments. \nDr. Singh also\, along the same lines\, highlighted the lowering of the party’s popularity and presence within the governance system in the recent 2024 elections in comparison to the prior elections\, with DPP securing 40% of the votes in comparison to 56% earlier\, as well as the party losing majority in the Legislative Yuan with the seat count reducing to 51. In comparison\, the Kuomintang (KMT) Party’s tally observed a subsequent increment from 14 to 51\, and Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP) secured 8 seats. \nFurther\, discussion on the DPP candidate Lai Ching-Te\, the present President of Taiwan\, followed\, with a brief address about his political background within the party: as Member of the Legislative Yuan from 1999-2010\, Mayor of Tainan from 2010-17\, Chairman of DPP since 2023\, subsequently becoming the President since 20 May 2024. Lai Ching-Te\, self-proclaimed as the “Pragmatic Worker of Taiwan Independence”\, strongly believes in the DPP philosophy that the future of Taiwan would be decided by all its people. This party philosophy works in contrast to the KMT\, which observes the reunification of China and Taiwan under the ROC framework. Dr. Singh further emphasised the same by quoting Article 1 of the DPP charter (1991)\, which aims to push forward its objective of establishing a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan\, and the 2007 DPP resolution on ‘normalisation of the nation\,’ which reaffirmed Taiwan’s separate identity. However\, a lack of popular consensus and concerns about reprisal from China hindered the undertaking. \nWhile Lai Ching-Te’s Presidential win was rather devoid of much Chinese reaction\, Dr. Singh noted that the reaction came with his first inaugural speech on 20 May 2024\, which in itself was categorised as “much less restrained” than Tsai’s inaugural speech. The speech emphasised political differences between Taiwan and the PRC\, referencing ideas of democracy and sovereignty. In doing so\, the speech pushed forward ideals of equal footing with China without being limited by political subordination. Furthermore\, the speech observed Lai’s naming of Taiwan “Mother” (motherland)\, challenging PRC’s notion of Mainland China being the “ancestral motherland” of Chinese people. \nDr. Singh elaborated on the UNGA 2758 Resolution\, which considered and henceforth\, recognised the PRC to be the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and subsequently\, expelling forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the “unlawful occupation”. To this\, Taiwan’s contestation can be observed: particularly on the fact that nowhere in the said Resolution is ROC or Taiwan explicitly mentioned. As such\, the Resolution has no word for Taiwan and as such\, Taiwanese sovereignty. China’s opposition to this contestation pushes forward the idea that the Resolution supports the “One China Principle” and henceforth\, inherently accepts Taiwan as a part of China. \nWhile such debate has existed for a while\, Dr. Singh noted\, it is from 2020 onwards\, that the debate garnered international attention and support. US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell for instance\, testified to the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs in September 2024 that China was using the Resolution to falsely portray Taiwan’s status as illegitimate. Similarly\, the European Parliament adopted a resolution concerning the misinterpretation of the Resolution in October 2024. Again\, the Australian Senate passed an urgent motion refuting Chinese interpretations. Subsequent lack of domestic consensus within the Taiwanese polity on the Resolution was also discussed by Dr. Singh\, wherein the parties had moved their motions towards the said Resolution\, which subsequently failed to get passed: as the parties had differing stances regarding cross-Strait relations with China. \nDr. Singh then gave insights on the measures and counter-measures in response to the contemporary heightened stresses in cross-strait relations post-inauguration\, the focus of which was China’s 22-article long Guidelines\, Imposing Criminal Punishments for Diehard Taiwanese Independence Separatists in June 2024. Further cancellation of preferential tariff treatment for 134 products on the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) Early Harvest List was observed from the Chinese side. Further reports on harassment of Taiwanese citizens in Hong Kong were observed. At the same time\, countermeasures were observed from the Taiwanese side\, with Taiwan issuing an “orange” advisory “against unnecessary travel” to Mainland China\, Hong Kong\, and Macau due to the significant expansion of national security regulations there. Taiwan has also fine-tuned its relevant laws to prohibit citizens from holding positions in the political and military organisations affiliated to Communist Party of China and the Government. It also prohibited citizens from having household registrations in China. \nFinally\, Dr. Singh discussed aspects of deterrence\, which included signaling opposition: \n1) By sailing through the Taiwan Strait. For instance\, the US 7th Fleet destroyer USS Higgins and Canadian frigate HMCS Vancouver sailed through in October 2024 following the PLA drill that China conducted in response to Lai’s National Day Speech. Furthermore\, Australian guided missile destroyer HMAS Sydney and New Zealand’s supply ship HMNZS Endeavour navigated in Taiwan Strait on 25 September\, signaling collective deterrence. \n2) Through speaking in unison for Taiwan’s support. This included statements within the Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Defence Ministers’ Meeting Joint Statement on November 2024\, the Joint Statement of US-ROK Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) on October 2024\, as well as the first UK-US Strategic Dialogue on September 2024; each pushing forward the need for security and stability in the Taiwan Strait. \n3) Through international acceptance of Taiwan. This includes Taiwan’s signing of two MoUs on drone cooperation with Lithuania in November 2024\, a MoU with Germany on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters\, and Taiwanese involvement in reconstructing the Ukrainian city of Bucha\, among others. \n4) Through US Legislative and arms support\, which includes the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade First Agreement Implementation Act of 2023\, Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020\, Taiwan International Solidarity Act\, etc.\, as well as the backlog of more than US$20 billion worth deliveries including 66 F-16 fighter jets\, which has portrayed increased US support to Taiwan. \nConcluding\, Dr. Singh brought forth the aspects of rising anxiety on both sides and that the continuous rule of DPP poses a challenge to PRC’s One China Principle. On one hand\, such situations could push the DPP to choose between preserving the status quo or acquiring a radical position over its international presence and putting Beijing’s patience to the test. Dr. Singh further recommended monitoring international campaigns around UNGA Resolution 2758. As such\, it remains to be noted how China reacts\, in light of the US and its allies creating a new geopolitical reality in the Taiwan Strait. \nQ&A session\nThe presentation was followed by an interactive Q&A session\, addressing several key dynamics\, which included: the UN’s addressal of the UN Resolution 2758 issue\, the preparedness of the Taiwanese military\, as well as the support from the neighborhood\, primarily from Japan under the new government. \nThe Speaker provided insightful responses to the comments and questions raised. \nThis report was prepared by Mr. Abhigyan Raktim Duarah\, Intern\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-monday-morning-meeting-on-taiwan-under-lai-ching-te
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241125T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241125T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241125T054759Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250108T054900Z
UID:84226-1732512600-1732512600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Eminent Persons Lecture by Shri Sanjeev Sanyal on ‘Process Reforms: How to Make the Indian Government Efficient?’
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a lecture by Shri Sanjeev Sanyal\, Member\, Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister and Secretary to the Government of India\, under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series on 25 November 2024. The theme of his talk was “Process Reforms: How to Make the Indian Government Efficient?” The event was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute were in attendance. \nExecutive Summary\n‘Process Reforms’ remain extremely important in simplifying and streamlining the operational processes and for enhancing the efficiency of an existing system/sector or governance architecture. In recent years there has been great emphasis by the Government of India on undertaking ‘Process Reforms’ in various government and private sectors\, institutions\, departments and ministries so as to enhance their efficiency. Government of India is aiming to include process reforms as a part of training to government officials as these are an important part of the policy tool-kit.  \nDetailed Report\nThe Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy delivered his Opening Remarks and introduced Shri Sanjeev Sanyal. Amb. Chinoy also acknowledged the presence of Shri Tarun Vijay (Member\, Executive Council\, MP-IDSA) and Shri Nalin Kohli (Member and Spokesperson\, BJP) at the event. \nShri Sanjeev Sanyal started his talk by highlighting the importance of ‘Process Reforms’. He mentioned that discussions in the past about economic reforms have always tended to focus entirely on large-scale structural reforms aimed at reshaping the fundamental framework of the economy. He mentioned that ‘Structural Reforms’ in India began with economic liberalisation in 1991 and over the years various other structural reforms were undertaken. These include opening of sectors to private investment\, establishment of regulators\, introduction of GST\, an inflation-targeting framework\, implementation of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC)\, to name a few. He mentioned that though structural reforms remain important\, the Indian Government in recent years has undertaken several other types of reforms that have largely gone unnoticed. These are known as process reforms. \nShri Sanyal defined process reforms as the nuts-and-bolts reforms which are often microeconomic in nature\, with a specific focus on an individual sector or issue. He highlighted that the objective of process reforms is to simplify and streamline operational processes and to enhance efficiency of an existing system/sector or governance architecture. Such reforms if undertaken help in improving the ease of doing business\, delivery of public services and in several cases these even prove essential for the success of undertaking structural reforms. He pointed out that till now very little has been covered in academic literature or policy discussions on the government’s process reforms in India\, as well as in other parts of the world. He further discussed the importance and steps involved in undertaking process reforms in government. \nShri Sanyal\, in the second part of his presentation mentioned that there could be multiple types of process reforms but his own research has outlined 7 broad types/categories of process reforms. These include: Type I: Revisiting default “Lists” and precedents; Type II: Streamlining of the existing administrative processes; Type III: Changes in regulations within the given law; Type IV: Changes in legislation to change the law; Type V: Adding capacity in some level of government to remove bottlenecks; Type VI: Removing requirement or a state-mandated activity to remove bottlenecks; and Type VII: Merge/close/restructure outdated government agencies. \nHighlighting one such example undertaken recently through Type I process reforms\, Shri Sanyal mentioned that all organisations including the government work on the basis of some existing default lists in almost all organisations. These lists could be list of invitees\, national monuments\, vendors and so on. Typically\, a few are changed from time to time at the margin\, but a large part of the lists remain same and simply get perpetuated year after year. He pointed out that simply revisiting some of these existing ‘default lists’ can bring in important changes. He mentioned that one such example in which they have successfully undertaken process reforms has been the list of “Monuments of National Importance (MNI)”. \nShri Sanyal highlighted that India currently has 3695 MNI that are under the protection of Archaeological Survey of India (ASI). 2584 of these monuments got shifted en masse from the colonial-era list while the others were taken from the princely states. This list has hardly been revisited or scrutinised since its formulation. He mentioned that after undertaking careful assessments of these monuments mentioned in the list\, it was found that some of these are actually untraceable on ground\, while various others do not have any national (or even state) importance in present times. He mentioned that through Type 1 process reforms we have managed to remove such monuments from this list. \nSimilarly\, highlighting the reforms undertaken in the process of voluntary liquidation of companies (through Type II process reforms); in the IT-BPO sector (through Type III process reforms); reforms undertaken in Legal Metrology Act 2009 (through Type IV process reforms); reforms in the process of applying for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) (through Type V process reforms); reforming the requirement of State Mandated Requirement in mediation needed before going for commercial litigation (through Type VI process reforms); and reforms in merger/closure/restructuring of outdated government agencies (through Type VI process reforms); Shri Sanyal mentioned that he has done considerable amount of work in undertaking process reforms in India\, with the support of the current government. \nIn the final part of his presentation\, Shri Sanyal mentioned that everyone focuses on the larger picture of structural reforms whereas we need to understand that process reforms are also an important part of the policy tool-kit. He pointed out that economic literature has largely ignored these types of reforms. Shri Sanyal further mentioned that initiating process reforms in any area requires a detailed mapping out of the existing process and then removing inefficiencies at each step. He highlighted that a large part of these process reforms involve a series of small incremental changes\, which ultimately have significant impact on efficiency of the economy\, ease of doing business etc. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Shri Sanyal pointed out that there has been a concerted effort from the Government of India (GoI) to systematically look at sectors and undertake process reforms wherever necessary. He finally highlighted that the GoI is aiming to include process reforms as a part of training to government officials as these remain important for the routine part of the policy toolkit. \nComments and Questions\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, complimented Shri Sanyal for his detailed presentation. He pointed out that most of the problems within the system/institutions/departments are best known by the people who are within those systems/institutions/departments which also at times offer resistance to any kind of change to the system. He asked the speaker to comment on how he deals with internal resistance from the system/institutions/departments when he undertakes process reforms in these. \nDr. Ashish Shukla asked Shri Sanyal to comment on the issues of closure and merger of several government primary schools in some parts of rural Uttar Pradesh. In this context he asked the speaker whether the government does not really need these schools? \nMr. Arvind Khare commented on the deemed ‘NOC’ (No Objection Certificate) model highlighted by Shri Sanyal in his talk. He mentioned that there are ‘n’ number of departments in the GoI\, that regularly consult each other or take ‘n’ number of ‘NOCs’ from each other. Mr. Khare asked Shri Sanyal whether this same model (that if a required NOC is not issued by any concerned department within 15 days of the application\, it would be automatically deemed considered as ‘issued’) could be replicated or could be applied across the entire setup of the GoI? \nShri Tarun Vijay in his comments highlighted that people are mostly impacted by reforms in four areas. These include education\, judiciary\, police and internet. Referring to the use of Persian language in the writing of First-hand Information (FIR) by Indian police\, he pointed out that some words of the language which are still in use while writing these FIRs\, are not understood by police personnel themselves. He highlighted that there is a need to undertake reforms in all these sectors. \nShri Nalin Kholi referring to the National Ease of Doing Business Committee in the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) pointed out to the speaker that many of the issues that he has highlighted in his talk are looked after by Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) in the GoI. He requested Shri Tarun Vijay to comment on undertaking process reforms in Ease of Doing Business. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K Narang asked the speaker to comment on the issues of absence of ecosystems for R&D processes and atmanirbharta in the civil aviation and drone industry. He highlighted that if these aspects are not looked at seriously\, the growth rate in these sectors would slow down in the rear future. \nShri Sanjeev Sanyal gave detailed explanations to all the questions and comments raised and the lecture ended with big round of applause from the audience.  \nReport Prepared by Dr. Bipandeep Sharma\, Research Analyst\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/eminent-persons-lecture-by-shri-sanjeev-sanyal-on-process-reforms-how-to-make-the-indian-government-efficient
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241118T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241118T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241118T062135Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250828T053231Z
UID:83506-1731907800-1731907800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on Hydroelectric Power in Bhutan: The Strategic Partnership Model
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Nihar R. Nayak\, Research Fellow\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\,spoke on “Hydroelectric Power in Bhutan: The Strategic Partnership Model” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 18 November 2024. The meeting was moderated by Dr. Opangmeren Jamir\, Associate Fellow\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, MP-IDSA. The Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and the scholars of the Institute participated in the discussions. \nExecutive Summary\nBhutan in the past has always avoided any kind of strategic partnership approach in its foreign policy. This approach has recently been changed with the introduction of the ‘Strategic Partnership Model’ (SPM) in Bhutan’s foreign policy which now describes Bhutan’s new framework for its future cooperation on hydro-power development projects. This new SPM could bring both challenges and opportunities for India-Bhutan bilateral relations.  \nDetailed Report\nDr. Opangmeren Jamir gave a brief introduction on various aspects of India-Bhutan relations. He mentioned that hydro energy cooperation has been an important component of India-Bhutan relations since 1974\, when Chukha\, the first hydropower project was commissioned. Dr. Jamir mentioned that over time both India and Bhutan have significantly benefited from hydropower projects but in recent years there has also been some discontentment on the Bhutanese side about issues of rising debt and lack of revenue generation from these hydropower projects with India. Questioning the feasibility and sustainability of undertaking such hydropower projects in Bhutan in future and highlighting other possible challenges these could bring out for the India-Bhutan relationship\, Dr. Jamir invited Dr. Nihar R. Nayak to make his presentation on the subject. \nDr. Nihar R. Nayak started his presentation by highlighting some salient features of Bhutan in terms of its geographical landlocked location\, high Gross National Happiness (GNH) index\, increasing focus on developing hydro-power projects and its past isolationist foreign policy approach. Dr. Nayak highlighted that Bhutan in the past has always avoided any kind of strategic partnership approach in its foreign policy\, but this approach has recently been changed with the introduction of the ‘Strategic Partnership Model’ (SPM) in Bhutan’s foreign policy approach to describe future cooperation on its hydropower development projects. Dr. Nayak described that there are multiple reasons behind this move. He pointed out that the first reason behind this has been Bhutan’s failure in achieving its Vision-2020 of producing planned 10\,000 MW electricity. He mentioned that Bhutan’s Vision 2020 failed primarily due to delay in completion of the Punatsangchhu I & II\, Kholongchhu projects\, slow progress in the joint venture Hydropower Projects established with India through Indian Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and Bhutan in 2014\, and as a result of cost overruns in these projects. Dr. Nayak mentioned that the second reason for the adoption of the Strategic Partnership model in Bhutan’s foreign policy approach has been its rising debt to India. He pointed out that as of 2023\, hydropower debt accounted for nearly 70% of Bhutan’s external debt and over 80% of its GDP. \nDr. Nayak pointed out that in order to achieve the objectives of its new ‘Vision 2040’\, that includes massive targets of producing 20\,000 MW of electricity from hydro-electric plants\, Bhutan would require US$26 billion. Therefore\, in order to meet these massive objectives\, Bhutan’s SPM calls out to renowned private companies to make investments in Bhutan’s hydro-power projects as junior partners. Dr. Nayak mentioned that the new SPM calls for gathering funding for the new hydro-power projects via undertaking the financial model of 70 percent debt and 30 per cent equity route. For raising the equity funds\, the plan includes creation of a new company with the help of the strategic partners. Dr. Nayak highlighted that as per this model the private companies would not be entitled to have any ownership\, thereby guaranteeing Bhutan’s first ownership over these projects. Dr. Nayak emphasised that through this SPM Bhutan seeks long-term power purchase agreements with joint venture partners in these planned hydro-power projects. \nIn the second part of this presentation Dr. Nayak highlighted various benefits and challenges of implementing the new SPM model for Bhutan. Dr. Nayak mentioned that when it comes to the benefits\, the SPM model seeks to ensure secure financing for Bhutan’s new hydropower projects at competitive rates. Through this model Bhutan aims to reduce its risk of dependency over one country. Dr. Nayak pointed out that through this new SPM model Bhutan further seeks to ensure efficient project execution\, innovation and greater investment in its hydro-power projects. Finally\, SPM seeks to augment Bhutan’s greater leverage in negotiating the unit cost of electricity and enabling the country with improved technology that is both eco-friendly and capable of generating higher energy thereby enhancing Bhutan’s future energy and economic security. \nDr. Nayak stated that despite this optimism\, several challenges also remain. He pointed out that though this new document highlights multiple opportunities\, Bhutan in the near future could struggle for securing the required funds needed for the execution of its projects at low interest rates. Dr. Nayak brought out that in the near future climate change could emerge as another important factor in the smooth execution of these projects. He warned that as a result of climate change Bhutan could witness 1.4 percent drop in its GDP by 2050 which would further make securing of the required US$26 billion (for execution of its hydro-project as highlighted in its Vision 2040 document) more difficult when the current GDP of Bhutan is just around US$3 billion. \nIn the final part of his presentation\, Dr. Nayak highlighted several positive implications of Bhutan’s SPM for India-Bhutan relations. Dr. Nayak mentioned that Bhutan’s SPM would shift existing cooperation on hydro-power projects between two countries from just ‘Government to Government’ (G2G) level to ‘Public-Private Partnership’ (PPP) model. Such a model could bring efficiency and positive outcomes in the form of timely completion of projects\, more transparency etc. and would further strengthen India-Bhutan relations. Dr. Nayak finally highlighted that Indian companies increased private investment in Bhutan’s hydro sector could reduce Bhutan’s financial obligations to the Government of India and such a model could also emerge as an important tool for effectively managing the issue of surplus electricity by 2040. \nQuestions and Comments\nPost his presentation\, Dr. Opangmeren Jamir invited Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoyto make his comments on the subject. Dr. Jamirlater opened the floor to the participants for their comments and questions. \nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy complemented Dr. Nihar R. Nayak for making a detailed presentation on the subject. Amb. Chinoy asked Dr. Nayak the reasons behind Bhutan’s failure in achieving its Vision 2020 targets. He also asked the Speaker to comment on the role of states like China (if any) in influencing Bhutan’s foreign policy decision-making. Amb. Chinoy questioned Dr. Nayak about the possible options available with Bhutan to secure its funding for execution of its planned future hydro-electric projects. He called upon Dr. Nayak to undertake a small fast-track project on the subject and do a roundtable in upcoming months at MP-IDSA\, with due involvement of all the stakeholders on the subject. \nCol. (Dr.) DPK Pillay\, raised that issue of the non-involvement of Indian companies in development of Bhutan’s ‘Gelephu Mindfulness City Projects’. He asked the Speaker to comment on the reasons for that. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) Rajiv Kumar Narang asked the Speaker to comment on the possibilities of any ongoing backdoor Chinese informal activities to spread anti-India sentiments in Bhutan. He also asked the Speaker to comment on whether any informal acts of influencing decision making in Bhutan are being undertaken by Chinese business or other groups. \nDr. Uttam Kumar Sinha\, asked the Speaker to comment on the future long-term feasibility and sustainability of undertaking such massive hydro-electricity projects in the region. Highlighting impacts of climatic vulnerabilities to the region\, Dr. Sinha mentioned that there is a need to undertake holistic assessments of the region prior to undertaking such projects in the region. \nDr. Nihar R Nayak gave detailed explanations to all the questions and comments raised. \nReport prepared by Dr. Bipandeep Sharma\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/hydroelectric-power-in-bhutan-the-strategic-partnership-model
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20261120T232546
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20261120T232546
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241104T005746Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241209T011007Z
UID:83474-1795217146-1795217146@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “16th BRICS Summit: Paving the Way for a Multipolar World Order?”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Rajeesh Kumar\, Research Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “16th BRICS Summit: Paving the Way for a Multipolar World Order?” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 04 November 2024. The session was chaired by Dr. Prashant K. Singh\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. The scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session provided a comprehensive analysis of the role of BRICS\, a non-western economic group and of the BRICS Summit held in Kazan on 22-23 October 2024. This BRICS Summit was   the first summit after its expansion which marked its relevance in the current multipolar world. BRICS as an institution is attractive to many nations due to its financial alternative mechanisms that reduce dependency on the dollar. Despite its limited capacity and capabilities\, it promotes economic cooperation\, trade and investments among its members and provides a platform to interact with countries like Russia and China.  \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. Prashant K. Singh discussed the 16th BRICS summit\, its significance\, and the Kazan Declaration. The declaration acknowledged the BRICS members and partners’ efforts to create alternative financial mechanisms. It also emphasised the unacceptable use of unilateral Western sanctions for geopolitical objectives. The declaration called for comprehensive reform of the United Nations and its organs\, particularly the Security Council. The summit also successfully issued a consensus declaration on the security situation in Gaza\, Lebanon\, and Ukraine.  Dr. Singh enquired about alternative financial mechanisms and how far BRICS has evolved as a counterbalance to systems that are dominated by the West. \nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. Rajeesh Kumar contrasted the headlines of prominent newspapers over the years with those of today. To understand the relevance of BRICS currently\, he noted a change in the discourse around the group and thereby the possibility of it offering an alternative to the current world order. He then analysed the symbolic and the actual significance of the summit. Symbolically it was the first meeting after the expansion and Putin successfully hosted the summit despite sanctions against Russia. However\, the actual significance of the summit was more nuanced as it issued thirty-one documents including the Kazan Declaration. Dr. Kumar made a comparison of the themes and subthemes of the 2024 summit and the 2023 summit. Compared to the 2023 summit\, according to the Kazan Declaration\, international financial architectures\, including the International Monetary Fund need to be reformed. By preserving the current structures\, they hope to democratise them and make them more inclusive of the demands of the countries of the Global South. Other aspects mentioned in the declaration include the BRICS Grain Exchange\, BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism\, BRICS (Re)Insurance Company\, BRICS Integrated Early Warning System for preventing mass infectious diseases risks\, and BRICS Partner Country category. \nDr. Kumar discussed India’s participation in the Kazan Summit and Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. PM Modi emphasised the need for a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine conflict and emphasised the importance of diplomacy in mitigating the crises in West Asia. He advocated for collaborative efforts to tackle climate change and emphasised the need for comprehensive international regulations related to cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. He also welcomed the proposal for a new BRICS investment platform to provide financial resources for countries in the Global South. The Modi-Xi meeting agreed to use dialogues among Foreign Ministers and officials to stabilise and rebuild bilateral relations. Both leaders emphasised enhancing strategic communication and exploring cooperation for shared development goals. \nDr. Kumar discussed the concept of BRICS and the multipolar world order\, focusing on the BRICS+ as a political alternative. He argued that BRICS+ aims to reform global systems\, advocating for a multipolar world with a stronger Global South perspective. He also highlighted BRICS as an economic alternative\, driving global economic growth and demonstrating superiority over G7 economies in certain aspects. Further\, he highlighted the importance of economic independence\, building a resilient financial ecosystem\, and de-dollarization. \nDr. Kumar addressed common questions about BRICS\, including its potential solutions to global problems\, anti-Western attitudes\, potential use by China against India\, economic integration\, dispute resolution\, and its potential to be an analogue to the G7. He also discussed BRICS’s potential to promote economic cooperation\, trade\, and investments among its member states. \nDespite concerns\, Dr. Kumar concluded that BRICS remains an attractive idea\, and India’s relevance to BRICS lies in its strategic autonomy\, geopolitical balancing\, reformed multilateralism\, and leadership in terrorism and climate change policies. Despite perceived disparities\, BRICS needs to be seen as an avenue for cooperation. \nComments and Questions\nFollowing the presentation\, the scholars inquired about the significance of the partner members and what makes BRICS attractive to other countries\, such as in Southeast Asia. They also enquired about the alternative financial mechanisms in BRICS and the avenues for the BRICS currency. The discussion also touched upon India’s role and importance in BRICS and the concept of a non-Western approach as opposed to an anti-Western approach when discussing the narratives regarding BRICS. \nDr. Rajeesh Kumar responded to the comments and the questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars. \nThe report was prepared by Ms. Alvina A. Almeida\, Intern\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-16th-brics-summit-paving-the-way-for-a-multipolar-world-order
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20261120T232546
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20261120T232546
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241209T012932Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241209T012932Z
UID:83479-1795217146-1795217146@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Monday Morning Meeting on “ISIS: An Enduring Threat”
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) spoke on “ISIS: An Enduring Threat” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 28 October 2024. The session was chaired by Dr. Jason Wahlang\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nISIS has remained an enduring security threat due to its adaptability\, exploitation of regional and global instability\, and media propaganda.  \nDetailed Report\nThe session commenced with opening remarks from Dr. Jason Wahlang\, who provided an insightful overview of the persistent threat the Islamic State (IS) posed despite its waning influence in recent years. The Islamic State\, alongside its various vilayets\, continues to leverage instability in regions worldwide\, exploiting global security shifts for resurgence. \n Dr. Wahlang highlighted the worrying escalation of IS activities in previously unaffected areas\, including the attack in Azerbaijan’s Qusar district in September 2024 and the assault on a Shia Mosque in Oman. He stressed that the current complex geopolitical climate and the focus of major powers on their security imperatives\, especially with the Russia-Ukraine War and the broader West Asian instability\, has carved out space for a potential ISIS revival. \nMs. Kidwai explained that since its physical defeat in March 2019\, ISIS has effectively preserved its global threat profile through the evolution of operational tactics\, sustained ideological appeal\, and the exploitation of geopolitical conflicts. This adaptability\, combined with sophisticated media-driven propaganda\, has allowed ISIS to mobilise a diverse array of fighters\, including lone wolves\, enabled individuals\, and trained operatives\, all contributing to the perpetuation of the group’s agenda. \nMs. Kidwai also highlighted how high-profile international sporting events\, such as the Paris Olympics and Euro Games\, remain vulnerable to exploitation by ISIS\, as these “soft targets” provide terrorist groups visibility and an opportunity to inflict substantial impact. Moreover\, recent incidents\, including the Solingen knife assault and threats against the U.S. Capitol\, underscore the ongoing resilience of ISIS and its capacity to execute attacks on a global scale. These trends highlight the urgent need for a comprehensive and coordinated counterterrorism strategy to effectively address this enduring threat. \nFurthermore\, Ms. Kidwai noted that the 2024 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) reaffirms ISIS’s status as the world’s deadliest terrorist organisation\, attributing 470 attacks and 1\,636 deaths to the group in the preceding year. Ongoing regional and international conflicts\, exacerbated by socio-political disparities\, provide fertile ground for ISIS’s recruitment and radicalisation efforts. The group’s sustained strategy to inspire violence through multilingual propaganda has ensured that its influence extends beyond physical borders\, reinforcing its long-term goals as both an ideological force and a security challenge across nations. \nMs. Kidwai explained that ISIS has leveraged various networks across Africa\, such as the Maktab Al-Karrar’s global financing network\, which oversees regions including the Democratic Republic of Congo\, Mozambique\, and Somalia. This network has played a crucial role in coordinating terror financing and attacks on a global scale\, notably funding the 2021 Kabul airport attack perpetrated by Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP). \nFurthermore\, the terrorist group employs both conventional and unconventional financing methods\, including hawala networks\, cryptocurrency\, and extortion schemes through social media platforms like Tinder\, specifically targeting South African citizens. These activities have intensified in South Africa\, where established economic structures\, combined with corruption and complacency\, have facilitated ISIS’s financing and logistical operations. \nAccording to Ms. Kidwai\, globally\, ISIS has proven its capacity to strike in unexpected locations\, as demonstrated by the first ISIS-claimed assault in Oman on 15 July 2024\, where an attack on a Shia Mosque resulted in numerous casualties. In Russia\, a resurgence of ISIS activity has been observed\, with deadly attacks in Moscow and Dagestan\, along with coordinated prison break attempts. In Syria and Iraq\, where the group initially established its caliphate\, ISIS has exploited the challenges brought by the COVID-19 pandemic and governmental unrest\, enabling it to regroup and renew its attacks. \nMs. Kidwai underscored that ISIS continues to exploit destabilised and poorly regulated regions\, particularly near the Iraq-Syria border and within the Kurdish autonomous region\, to smuggle weapons\, move fighters\, and establish sleeper cells. This threat endures despite repeated joint raids by Iraqi and American forces. \nIn Syria\, detention camps like al-Hol have become breeding grounds for new extremism\, exacerbated by inadequate oversight\, where indoctrination continues unabated. \nSimultaneously\, ISIS’s global reach and propaganda mechanisms have evolved\, becoming increasingly sophisticated. ISKP has utilised major propaganda outlets like Al-Azaim Foundation to disseminate its extremist ideology and target regimes in Central Asia. ISKP’s media strategies\, which include AI-generated content and dissemination of propaganda through platforms such as TikTok and Telegram\, have significantly broadened its audience\, allowing for the creation of visually compelling propaganda. \nISIS has also employed outlets like Al-Naba to denounce other groups\, notably branding Hamas as an apostate organisation and accusing Iran of betraying Hamas leaders. Recent developments\, such as the arrest of Islamic State in Hind Province’s leader Haris Farooqi and his aide Rehan in India\, further illustrate ISIS’s attempts to extend its influence in South Asia. However\, its reach within India has been limited. \nDuring her concluding remarks\, Ms. Kidwai added that global conflicts and polarisation have hindered a unified counter-terrorism response to deal with the ISIS threat. Looking forward\, ISIS is expected to exploit emerging socio-political grievances and leverage sophisticated propaganda techniques to sustain its presence within global extremist networks. Finally\, these developments call for a robust\, multifaceted counter-terrorism approach\, addressing both the immediate and evolving threats posed by ISIS and its affiliates to ensure a comprehensive global response. \nQ&A Session\nThe presentation was followed by a Q&A Session. Several key dynamics were addressed\, revealing the multifaceted nature of contemporary terrorism\, the speculation surrounding external influences in ISIS’s formation\, its digital transition post-territorial loss and its decentralised structure. \nMs. Kidwai provided insightful responses to the comments and questions raised.  \nThis report was prepared by Ms. Dalvi Sethi\, Intern\, Europe & Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-monday-morning-meeting-on-isis-an-enduring-threat
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241021T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241021T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241021T003759Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250108T032349Z
UID:83958-1729488600-1729488600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on Imaging Kautilya: Popular and the Real
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Saurabh Mishra\, Research Fellow\, spoke on “Imaging Kautilya: Popular and the Real” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 21 October 2024. The session was moderated by Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, and was followed by insightful remarks by the Director General of MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, and other scholars. \nExecutive Summary\nDr. Saurabh Mishra offered an in-depth exploration of Kautilya’s Arthashastra by unravelling its complexities and addressing its misinterpretations. The session delved into the philosophical\, historical\, and strategic dimensions of the ancient text while examining its relevance in contemporary global discourse. \nDetailed Report:\nThe session commenced with remarks by Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.)\, who emphasised the significance of the topic. Col. Chadha reflected on the complexities surrounding ancient Indian texts\, pointing out how misconceptions\, criticism\, and oversimplifications often cloud their true essence. He noted the Western appropriation of ancient Indian ideas\, such as the reductive comparison of Kautilya to Machiavelli which fails to capture the depth of the Arthashastra. \nDr. Saurabh Mishra began the session by identifying the wide gap between the popular perception and the historical and philosophical reality of Kautilya’s Arthashastra. He emphasised that the text is often oversimplified\, reduced to a mere realist manual\, and inaccurately compared to Machiavelli’s works. These comparisons\, he argued\, fail to capture the richness of the Arthashastra’s philosophical roots\, its scientific methodology\, and its comprehensive approach to governance and strategy. \nDr. Mishra noted that popular interpretations often caricature Kautilya as a Machiavellian figure\, focused solely on deceit and manipulation. He highlighted how text like Mudrarakshasa have contributed to this image\, with their portrayal of Kautilya as a cunning strategist devoid of moral considerations. However\, such depictions neglect the ethical and philosophical dimensions of the Arthashastra. The text’s emphasis on balance between ethics\, material well-being\, and strategic interests shows Kautilya’s deep understanding of governance as a multifaceted discipline. He also critiqued Western academic stereotyping\, which tends to pigeonhole Kautilya as an amoral realist\, ignoring the broader philosophical underpinnings of his work. \nDr. Mishra outlined the two major phases in the study of the Arthashastra: \n\nFirst Phase (1905–1992): The discovery of the Arthashastra in 1905 marked the beginning of its consolidation as a foundational text in Indian thought. During this phase\, scholars focused on the nationalist dimensions of the text\, highlighting its value as evidence of India’s ancient tradition of strategic and political thinking. This period was also marked by efforts to translate and compile the text\, with major contributions by scholars like R.P. Kangle.\nSecond Phase (Post-1992): This phase saw a shift toward exploring the Arthashastra’s relevance in modern strategic studies. With the rise of global interest in indigenous knowledge systems\, the text became central to discussions on decolonising intellectual discourse. Scholars began to examine its strategic insights\, particularly in the context of international relations\, warfare\, and statecraft.\n\nMoreover\, Dr. Saurabh Mishra emphasised that the text is deeply grounded in Indian philosophical traditions\, particularly Sankhya\, Yoga\, and Lokayata (materialist) systems. These traditions inform the Arthashastra’s empirical and scientific approach\, enabling it to address the practical realities of governance while maintaining a philosophical foundation. The integration of Sankhya’s dualist perspective\, Yoga’s harmonizing practices\, and Lokayata’s materialist outlook creates a holistic framework that balances ethics\, material well-being\, and political strategy. This synthesis\, according to Dr. Mishra\, makes the Arthashastra unique in its approach to governance and statecraft. \nWhile transitioning to its strategic relevance\, Dr. Mishra highlighted several strategic insights from the Arthashastra: \n\nMandala Theory: Kautilya’s nuanced understanding of state relations categorised neighbouring states as allies\, adversaries\, or vassals based on their behaviour and interests. Contrary to popular misconceptions\, Kautilya did not see all neighbours as enemies but recognised the potential for alliances and cooperation.\nPriority of Intellect: Dr. Saurabh emphasised Kautilya’s preference for intellectual and diplomatic strategies (Mantra Shakti) over brute force (Danda). This approach underscores the value of wisdom and planning in achieving political objectives.\nEthical Governance: The Arthashastra advocates for governance that prioritises the well-being of subjects\, asserting that the happiness of the people is central to the ruler’s success. This ethical dimension challenges the notion of Kautilya as a purely utilitarian thinker.\n\nWhile explaining contemporary implications\, Dr. Mishra dwelt upon global intellectual contributions. He argued for the integration of Kautilyan thought into global academic discourse. The Arthashastra offers valuable insights into governance\, strategy\, and ethics that are relevant in today’s multipolar world. Its emphasis on balance and pragmatism provides a counterpoint to Eurocentric theories in international relations. Moreover\, he highlighted ongoing efforts by Indian scholars to position the Arthashastra within post-Western theoretical frameworks. By engaging with global intellectual history and decolonising knowledge systems\, these efforts aim to expand the text’s influence in international academic circles. \nIn terms of managing perceptions in the neighbourhood\, he elaborated that Kautilya’s principles offer practical guidance for managing relations with smaller neighbouring states. Dr. Mishra emphasised the need for India to address regional perceptions through consistent diplomacy and gestures of goodwill. By applying Kautilyan strategies\, India can reassure its neighbours of its non-expansionist intentions and foster trust. \nFinally\, while explaining the challenges and opportunities\, Dr. Mishra addressed the challenges of engaging with the Arthashastra in contemporary contexts. Decolonising strategic studies requires overcoming entrenched stereotypes and resistance from both Western and Indian academic traditions. However\, these challenges also present opportunities for India to lead in the development of inclusive and indigenous frameworks for global discourse. He concluded by emphasising the enduring relevance of Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Far from being a relic of the past\, the text offers valuable lessons for modern governance\, strategy\, and international relations. By addressing misconceptions and integrating the Arthashastra into global discourse\, India can not only reclaim its intellectual heritage but also contribute to a more inclusive and balanced understanding of global strategy. \nFollowing the Presentation\, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA\, observed that it is intriguing that the discovery of an ancient text remained unnoticed by foreign scholars\, including missionaries\, Arabs\, and Chinese\, despite their extensive explorations in India. He observed that strategic thought has been increasingly dominated by China\, with institutions like the U.S. Army War College focusing heavily on Sun Tzu\, while Indian strategic traditions remain underrepresented. He emphasised the need for India to promote its strategic heritage globally\, especially given the historical advocacy of Chinese contributions by Westerners like Edgar Snow. Lastly\, he pointed out Pakistan’s growing acknowledgment of figures like Kautilya\, suggesting that India must proactively assert its heritage to prevent appropriation\, as recently seen with Pakistan’s narrative on Buddhism. \nQ & A Session:\nDuring the Q & A session\, a range of questions were posed on various themes\, including the discovery of the Arthashastra in 1905 and its subsequent recognition\, emphasising its delayed integration into academic and public discourse. Moreover\, questions were raised about why foreign scholars overlooked this text in earlier periods despite its foundational significance. The discussion delved into how India’s neighbours perceive its strategic posture\, with references to Kautilya’s Matsya Nyaya (law of the fish) and the management of relations through diplomacy and assurances against expansionist intentions. The Arthashastra’s perspectives on neighbouring states—classified as friendly\, vassal\, or hostile—were examined in the context of modern regional dynamics. \nThe session also addressed the presence of democracy in ancient Indian texts\, noting that while the Arthashastra references oligarchies and early forms of democracy in Himalayan and Ganges regions\, it does not align with modern democratic concepts. However\, Kautilya did not oppose democratic structures but viewed centralised monarchy as more effective for building empires. Questions were also raised about India’s engagement with its own knowledge systems\, particularly in the global academic context. It was acknowledged that while American scholars actively study the Arthashastra\, India needs to further assert its intellectual heritage. The discussion also critiqued how disciplines like history and science often overshadow India’s strategic contributions. \nThe session was concluded by Col. Chadha\, with encouragement for deeper academic engagement with ancient Indian texts and their relevance to modern strategic\, political\, and cultural debates. Participants were urged to explore these works to better understand India’s historical and intellectual legacy. \nThe Report was prepared by Mr. Mohana Sakthivel J. Research Analyst\, ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-imaging-kautilya
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241023T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241023T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241023T012210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241227T005409Z
UID:83112-1729661400-1729661400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting Report on “Peace Agreements in Assam”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Pushpita Das\,  Research Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses  (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Peace Agreements in Assam” at the Monday Morning Meeting  held on 14 October 2024. The session was moderated by Col. DPK Pillay (Retd.)\,  Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. The scholars of the institute were in attendance and  participated in the discussion.  \nExecutive  Summary\nThe presentation focused on discussing various peace agreements in  Assam\, highlighting the significance of recent peace accords between the Indian  Government and various insurgent groups in the region. These agreements mark a  substantial decline in violence and indicate progress towards lasting peace.  Five major peace agreements were signed between 2020 and 2023 with different  ethnic insurgent groups in Assam\, particularly focusing on the Bodo\, Karbi\, and  Dimasa insurgencies. The agreements aim to balance tribal political aspirations  and Assam’s territorial integrity\, while also addressing socio-cultural and  developmental needs. However\, unresolved demands for separate statehood and  ethnic tensions among smaller tribes pose ongoing challenges to sustained  peace. \nDetailed Report\nCol. DPK Pillay (Retd.)  began the meeting with a brief introduction of Dr. Pushpita Das and the topic  that she was to present at the meeting. Dr. Pushpita Das began her presentation  by setting the context for the peace agreements\, which have played a pivotal  role in reducing violence in Assam. She explained that the region has long been  troubled by insurgent groups with political goals ranging from demands for  political autonomy to full secession. These groups\, formed by ethnic tribes in  Assam\, have waged armed struggles over the years\, seeking to safeguard their  customs\, traditions\, and territorial rights. She further informed the scholars  that the violence associated with these movements has placed Assam in a cycle  of despair for decades. However\, the last five years have seen a series of  peace agreements signed between the Indian Government\, both at the state and  union levels\, and various insurgent factions. Dr. Das noted that these  agreements have significantly reduced the frequency of violent incidents\, as a  growing number of militants have surrendered and chosen to negotiate with the  government\, bringing a much-needed sense of peace and hope to the people of  Assam. \nDr. Das proceeded to  discuss the timeline of the peace agreements\, highlighting five major accords  that were signed between 2020 and 2023. The first major peace agreement\, signed  on 27 January 2020\, involved four factions of the National Democratic Front of  Bodoland (NDFB). This tripartite agreement marked a critical moment in the  history of Assam’s insurgent movements. The NDFB\, one of the most prominent  insurgent groups in the region\, had been involved in violent activities for  decades\, primarily in pursuit of a separate Bodo state. Over time\, however\, the  group fractured into several factions: NDFB Progressive\, NDFB Dhirendra Bodo\,  NDFB Ranjan Daimary\, and NDFB Saoraigwra. NDFB-P had surrendered as early as  2005\, and by January 2020\, NDFB-S followed suit. The signing of the agreement  led to the disbanding of various Bodo insurgent groups\, significantly reducing  violence in the region. \nThe second peace  agreement was signed on 4 September 2021 and involved various Karbi insurgent  groups that had been active in the districts of Karbi Anglong. Dr. Das  explained that these groups\, like the Bodo factions\, had long demanded a  separate state. However\, after years of armed struggle\, over 1\,000 Karbi  insurgents surrendered following the signing of the peace agreement. This  marked another significant step toward peace in Assam\, particularly in the  Karbi Anglong region\, which had been a hotbed of insurgent activity for many  years. \nOn 15 September 2022\,  the third peace agreement was signed between the Union Government and several  Adivasi insurgent groups. Dr. Das noted that the Adivasi militants had  initially surrendered in 2012\, and peace talks with them had begun in 2016.  However\, it was not until 2022 that a comprehensive agreement was reached.  Following the signing of this agreement\, more than 1\,000 Adivasi militants  surrendered. \n  The fourth peace  agreement was signed on 23 April 2023 between the State Government\, the union  government\, and Dimasa insurgent groups\, including their political wing\, the  Dimasa People’s Supreme Council. This group had suspended its operations on 28  October 2021\, and after the agreement\, 281 Dimasa cadres surrendered\,  effectively ending the insurgency in the Dimasa-dominated areas of Assam. \nThe final peace  agreement that Dr. Das discussed was signed between the ULFA (Pro-Talk) faction  and the Union Government on 20 December 2023. The United Liberation Front of  Assam (ULFA) had been one of the most prominent and violent insurgent groups in  Assam\, with its demands centred on the creation of an independent Assam.  However\, over time\, the pro-talk faction of ULFA entered into negotiations with  the government\, and the December 2023 agreement represented a significant  achievement in resolving the ULFA insurgency. The Indian Government agreed to  consider the ULFA (Pro-Talk) demands in a time-bound manner\, and following the  agreement\, the militant group was officially disbanded on 23 January 2024. \nDr. Das highlighted that  these peace agreements\, particularly those with the Bodo\, Karbi\, and Dimasa  insurgents\, were all rooted in the long-standing demand for separate states.  She traced the origins of these movements back to the time of Indian  independence when tribal political elites expressed concerns about merging with  the Union Government. These elites feared that such a merger would jeopardize  their customs\, traditions\, and land rights. To address these concerns\, the  Indian Government agreed to establish a decentralised self-governance system\,  creating Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in undivided Assam. Two of these  councils\, Karbi Anglong (established in 1951) and North Cachar Hills  (established in 1952)\, became the focal points of the Karbi and Dimasa  movements\, respectively. \nDr. Das explained that  the demand for separate states from the Karbi and Dimasa tribes did not  initially gain momentum. However\, after the Assam Reorganisation Act was passed  in 1971\, tribal leaders began to renew their demands for statehood. In 1979\,  following the Assam Agitation\, the demand intensified. In the 1980s and 1990s\,  this discontent turned into violence\, with militant groups like the United  People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) in Karbi Anglong and the Dimasa Halam  Daogah (DHD) emerging to lead the armed struggle. In 2011\, the government  signed a peace agreement with the UPDS\, and in 2012\, a similar agreement was  reached with the DHD. These agreements upgraded the district councils into territorial  councils\, granting them greater powers and financial resources for development.  However\, dissatisfaction persisted\, and in 2021\, the remaining insurgent groups  surrendered\, leading to the peace agreements signed between 2021 and 2023. \nDr. Das further asserted  that the Bodos\, unlike the Karbi and Dimasa tribes\, had been demanding a  separate state even before India’s independence. Their demands intensified in  1967 when the Assamese language was made the official language of Assam\,  prompting the Bodos to form two organisations: the Plains Tribal Council of  Assam (PTCA) and the All Bodo Student Union (ABSU). In 1993\, a tripartite  agreement was signed between the Government and the Bodos\, granting them a  separate autonomous council called the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC).  However\, new militant groups like the National Democratic Front of Bodoland  (NDFB) and the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) emerged in the 1990s\, leading to  further violence. In 2003\, a ceasefire agreement was signed with BLT\, and the BAC  was upgraded to the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). However\, the NDFB\,  which had been excluded from the peace talks\, continued its insurgent  activities until 2020\, when all its factions surrendered\, culminating in the  peace agreement of January 2020. \nDr. Das identified  several salient features of the peace agreements. First\, they ensured the  territorial and administrative integrity of Assam\, rejecting demands for  separate states. Second\, the agreements empowered the autonomous councils by  increasing legislative seats\, transferring additional subjects from the state  list to the councils\, and providing more financial resources for infrastructure  and economic development. Third\, the agreements included provisions to protect  and promote the socio-cultural identity of the tribes\, including the  recognition of Bodo\, Karbi\, and Dimasa languages as official languages in their  respective regions. Finally\, the agreements laid out measures for the  sustainable development of council areas\, including the rehabilitation of  surrendered militants and the announcement of special economic packages. \nDespite these successes\, Dr. Das warned that several challenges  remain. Most notably\, the agreements do not address the core demand for  separate statehood\, which could lead to tensions in future. Moreover\, granting  autonomous councils to major tribes like the Bodos\, Karbis\, and Dimasas could  lead to similar demands from smaller ethnic groups like the Kukis and Hmars\,  creating new sources of conflict. Additionally\, the inclusion of villages in  council areas with predominant populations of major tribes had resulted in ethnic cleansing of  non-tribal communities earlier\, and therefore\, continues to be a source of  concern. \n  In her concluding  remarks\, Dr. Das emphasised that while the peace agreements have brought  relative peace in Assam\, future stability will depend on addressing the  unresolved demands for statehood and managing the ethnic diversity of the  region. \nQuestions  and Comments\nFollowing Dr. Das’s  presentation\, a lively discussion ensued  among the scholars\, focusing on the implications of these agreements for Assam  and the broader Northeastern region of India. The session underscored both the  progress made and the challenges that lie ahead in securing lasting peace in  Assam.  \n  Dr. Pushpita Das responded  to the comments and questions of the scholars of MP-IDSA. \nThe report was prepared by Ms. Puspa Kumari\, Intern\, South Asia  Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/83112
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241007T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20241007T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241101T052447Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241101T052447Z
UID:83171-1728279000-1728279000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting Report: ‘The Evolving Development and Security Agenda in the QUAD’
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Shruti Pandalai\, Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis\, made a presentation on “The Evolving Development and Security Agenda in the QUAD” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 07 Oct 2024. Dr.. Temjenmeren Ao\, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA\, moderated the session. The Director General and scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nDr. Temjenmeren Ao started with opening remarks and some historical briefs about the Quad. He stated that the revival of Quad in recent years has been associated with a change in its objectives. Quad which brought together four nations in response to the humanitarian crisis in 2004\, today is a platform for partnership in diverse areas which is key towards the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. He also emphasised the successive summits and the key initiatives in new areas from climate change to vaccines under its health partnership\, AI and emerging technologies\, infrastructure\, that reinforce Quad as a global force for good to other countries in the region which is capable of stepping up towards delivering public goods. He emphasised how Quad in advancing deeper bilateral and multilateral cooperation such as AUKUS\, SQUAD\, IPEF\, etc. is shaping the security cooperation network in the Indo-Pacific region. He also emphasised that Quad is not a monolithic group by any means\, and there is divergence amongst the Quad members about how they perceive security challenges. However\, their shared values\, and concerns via-vis China are anchoring the partnership. After that\, he requested Ms. Pandalai to make her presentation. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Shruti Pandalai started with an introduction of the Quad and explained why it is valuable in the plethora of key US led initiatives. She expanded on how the Quad which is an assemblage of like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region\, was anchoring cooperation in the important geography\, and how it would be worthwhile to analyse the evolution of the Quad\, its developments and rebirth\, key agendas\, prospects\, challenges\, and the relevance of the Quad.   \nNext\, she explained the importance of Quad in maintaining regional stability\, deterring economic and maritime coercion\, and balancing major power relations amidst the rise of an assertive China. \nMs. Pandalai delved into the shaping of the strategic vision of the Quad when it was revived in 2017 and up until 2019 and talked about the expansion and operationalisation of the public goods agenda between 2020 and 2022. One of her key arguments included that while the development and security agenda of the Quad go hand in hand\, it would be incorrect to dismiss the security cooperation within the Quad as insignificant. Increasingly the security agenda includes the Indo Pacific Maritime Domain awareness (IPDM)\, intelligence sharing\, joint exercises like Malabar aimed at enhancing interoperability among the Quad nations\, countering regional threats through strategic and operational coordination\, and strengthening of Quad. \nShe also mentioned the impacts of election cycles on the revival of the Quad\, and the developments in the Quad in 2023 and 2024. The Quad’s working groups spanning vaccines to climate change\, infrastructure\, security initiatives\, cybersecurity partnerships\, and health security initiatives have become the key markers for the Quad’s socialisation. \nMs. Pandalai further discussed recent developments within the Quad\, such as joint training\, capacity building\, 2+2 foreign and security dialogues\, collective maritime capacity and capability building\, cybersecurity\, cooperation on undersea cable connectivity and resilience etc. While talking about the importance of Quad for India\, she discussed how it had become the major platform for channelling India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific and outreach on key sectors and initiatives. She argued that it also reflected the transformation of India’s ties with each of the participating nations within the Quad. For India\, the agendas overlap in bilateral\, trilateral\, and multilateral forums with these partner countries and helps building relationships within bureaucracies\, military\, industries\, and technological ecosystems. \nMs Pandalai then addressed the criticism of Quad\, especially on hard security. She argued that the motivation of the four countries will remain to balance the security and development agenda of the Quad and provide viable alternatives to regional requirements focussed on cutting-edge tech collaboration. \nConcluding her presentation\, she mentioned there is no current interest among the members for the expansion of the Quad\, cooperation with other partners will continue on issue based agendas and approaches. \nQuestions and Comments\nThe Director General\, Amb. Chinoy made insightful comments on the Quad. The scholars at MP-IDSA posed a diverse range of questions\, including on the expansion of Quad membership and Quad security cooperation. Ms. Shruti Pandalai appreciated the insights from the attendees and answered the questions posed to her.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-report-the-evolving-development-and-security-agenda-in-the-quad
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240930T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240930T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241011T030916Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241011T030916Z
UID:82841-1727674200-1727674200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on India’s Evaluation by the FATF: Results and Implications
DESCRIPTION:Col. Vivek Chadha  (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and  Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, New Delhi spoke on “India’s Evaluation by the FATF: Results  and Implications” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 30 September 2024. The  session was moderated by Dr. Ashok K. Behuria\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Amb.  Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General MP-IDSA and scholars attended the meeting.  \nExecutive Summary \nThe Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international body  combating money laundering and terror financing. Its mandate has evolved over  time\, and there is a need for better regulation of new technologies\, public information dissemination\, and private sector involvement. FATF’s  mutual evaluation reports have influenced amendments in India’s anti-money  laundering and counter-terror measures.India has made strides in strengthening its Anti-Money Laundering  and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework but faces  vulnerabilities.Some key  themes under consideration include the exploitation of gaming platforms for  cyber fraud\, the relationship between global economic structures and FATF  reports\, and the role of cryptocurrencies in terror financing and money  laundering activities. \nDetailed Report \nThe session began with  the moderator\, Dr. Ashok. K. Behuria’s opening remarks\, who commented on the  historical context and the purpose behind creating the Financial Action Task  Force (FATF) as an international watchdog to monitor and assess threats and set  global standards regarding issues such as money laundering and terror  financing. He emphasised that FATF was primarily set up to reduce the  vulnerabilities of the international system\, which faces the risk of being  exploited by terrorists and criminal networks.\nCol. Chadha began his  presentation by explaining the necessity behind the creation of FATF and  highlighted how its mandate has evolved since 1989. He pointed out that it  initially began looking into terror financing in the immediate aftermath of the  9/11 attacks and more formally in 2003\, marking a shift from its narrow focus  on money laundering. Later\, the organisation weaved counter-terror measures  into its anti-money laundering guidelines and examined how to enforce them  effectively.\nCol. Chadha also distinguished  between terror financing and money laundering and highlighted how  terror-related activities are often financed through legitimate avenues. He  also underscored FATF’s mandate\, organisational structure\, the scope of its  activities\, and the impact of countries like Pakistan being placed on the grey  list. He also explored how the organisation conducts mutual evaluations\, their  relevance\, the process of publication of such reports\, the review process  following their publication\, the reasons behind some countries being placed on  grey and black lists\, and how India’s counter-terror measures and anti-money  laundering legislations have been amended based on past mutual evaluation  reports.\nHe also shed light on the  findings of the mutual evaluation report released in 2024 about India’s efforts  to counter money laundering and terror financing and provided insights on its  achievements and the vulnerabilities it continues to face. In addition\, he drew  comparisons between India\, the United States\, Australia\, Japan\, Singapore\, China\,  South Africa\, Brazil\, Türkiye\, and Pakistan in terms of their effectiveness in  curbing terror financing and money laundering.\nAt the same time\, he  also underlined the main conclusions that could be derived from the risk  assessment conducted by India before FATF’s mutual evaluation\, and the findings  of India’s National Strategy for AML/CFT\, and the critical regional threats  faced by the country. He emphasised that the challenge to India posed by  illicit financial flows can be primarily attributed to cross-border threats  from the Western front.\nAdditionally\, he assessed  the successes and limitations of India’s Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the  Financing of Terrorism strategies\, its successes since 2010\, and how they have  not been effectively implemented due to the slow pace of persecution of those indicted  on such charges. He also spoke about how virtual currencies can be exploited by  terrorists.\nFinally\, he emphasised  the need for regulating new-age technologies\, disseminating relevant information  in the public domain\, and involving the private sector in addressing the  challenges related to terror financing and money laundering.  \nQ/A Session\nThe Q/A Session  broadly delved into themes such as the exploitative use of gaming platforms to  carry out cyber fraud\, the linkage between a dollar-driven or a G-7-driven  economic order and the mutual evaluation reports\, and the potential impact of de-dollarisation  efforts on future evaluation reports released by FATF. Furthermore\, issues such  as the role of bitcoin in terror financing and money laundering-related  activities\, the link between tax evasion and money laundering\, reasons behind  the international legitimacy granted to FATF reports\, India’s involvement in  Pakistan being placed on the grey list in 2018\, the scope of FATF’s involvement  in reviewing non-state actors’ financial dealings\, and use of hawala networks  to transfer money by expatriates were also discussed.\nCol. Chadha provided insightful  responses to the questions and comments raised.\nThis report was  prepared by Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai\, Research Analyst\, Counter-Terrorism  Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-indias-evaluation-by-the-fatf-results-and-implications
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240923T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240923T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241011T030550Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241011T031016Z
UID:82839-1727069400-1727069400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on Presidential Election in Sri Lanka
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Gulbin Sultana\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar  IDSA (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Presidential Election in Sri Lanka” at the Monday  Morning Meeting held on 23 September 2024. The session was chaired by Dr.  Ashish Shukla\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, the  Director General of MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute attended the  meeting.  \nExecutive Summary \nAnura  Kumara Dissanayake won Sri Lanka’s 2024 Presidential Election after a historic  second round of counting\, marking the closest election in the country’s  history. In the first round\, no candidate secured over 50 per cent of the vote  required to win the election. Dissanayake received 42.31 per cent and his  opponent Sajith Premadasa obtained 32.7 per cent of votes. This was the first election  since the 2022 ‘Aragalaya’ –  mass  protests ousted former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa following a severe economic  crisis.  Dissanayake’s promises of good  governance and anti-corruption resonated with voters\, leading him to victory.  He also pledged to revive the economy by developing the manufacturing\,  agriculture\, and IT sectors while continuing the International Monetary Fund  bailout agreement with modification of some of the clauses to provide economic  justice to the people.  With 17 million  eligible voters\, the poll was one of the most peaceful in Sri Lankan electoral history.  \nDetailed Report \nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. Ashish Shukla provided a  concise overview of the recent political developments in Sri Lanka. He noted  Sri Lanka’s period of economic crisis and widespread protests in 2022\, which  led President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country. Dr. Shukla also  highlighted the positive role of Sri Lanka’s leadership in securing an International  Monetary Fund bailout to navigate the crisis\, and said that this move\,  nevertheless\, generated substantial public resistance. Additionally\, he  stressed the importance of the 2024 Presidential Election\, focusing on voter  turnout and the competition among three prominent candidates. He mentioned that  for the first time in Sri Lankan history\, preference votes were counted to  declare the winner. He concluded by emphasising the election’s crucial role in  shaping the nation’s future political landscape. \nDr. Gulbin Sultana began her presentation by contextualising  Sri Lanka’s 2024 Presidential Election within the nation’s ongoing economic  crisis and public dissatisfaction with traditional leadership. She  characterised this election as a pivotal moment in Sri Lankan politics\, marked  by the emergence of new political dynamics as citizens sought alternatives to the  traditional political culture and leadership\, reflecting a widespread demand  for transformative change. She highlighted the competitive nature of the  election\, where multiple prominent candidates contended for power amid economic  challenges and social unrest.  She noted  a complex interplay of opinions within the electorate\, with differing views on  the newly elected leader\, Aruna Dissanayake’s ability to lead the country  towards economic recovery. \nDr. Sultana drew attention to the contrasting  perspectives of the elites and masses regarding the leadership’s capacity to  navigate both domestic and international political landscapes. She also  examined the divided political support among minority communities\, noting that  while some candidates received their backing\, there was a concern about the  persistence of existing power structures and the potential for change. Dr.  Sultana further analysed the electoral strategies of the leading candidates\,  noting that while promises of significant policy shifts were made\, many  candidates’ historical affiliations with the existing political establishment  raised doubts about their ability to enact meaningful change. She emphasised  that the new leadership would need to manage public expectations carefully\,  particularly in relation to economic recovery and governance reforms\, to ensure  political stability in the future. \nRegarding the new President\, Anura Kumara Dissanayake\,  Dr. Sultana observed that while he is traditionally seen as aligning with leftist  ideology\, his party’s (National People’s Power) manifesto is not based on pure  Marxist-Leninist principles. Rather the manifesto takes a pragmatic approach to  deal with  political\, economic\, social  and foreign policy issues. Despite his pragmatism\, there is scepticism among a  section of electorates about his ability to deliver on election promises. \nOn the issue of devolution of power\, Dr. Sultana noted  that past administrations have been reluctant to pursue significant changes.  Dissanayake\, however\, has expressed a commitment to decentralising power and  granting local communities political and administrative authority by drafting a  new constitution. He has acknowledged the need to address Tamil issues and build  a unified Sri Lankan nation that respects diversity. She concluded by stressing  that Dissanayake’s handling of sensitive issues and projects\, particularly  relations with India\, will be critical to his ability to meet the electorate’s  expectations. \nComments and Questions \nFollowing the presentation\, Ambassador Sujan R.  Chinoy\, DG\, MP-IDSA complimented Dr. Sultana for a comprehensive presentation  and raised key questions. He inquired about the potential impact of unresolved  issues like the Tamil question on Sri Lanka’s internal dynamics and its  long-term political cycles. He also questioned how the election outcomes might  affect India-Sri Lanka relations\, noting the gap between pre-election promises  and post-election actions. Furthermore\, he sought clarity on Sri Lanka’s debt  to China\, comparing it to the situations in Bangladesh and Pakistan\, and  questioned why India’s larger financial aid has received little media  attention.  \n The scholars  inquired about the pragmatic approach needed by the new government in Sri Lanka  to maintain diplomatic and economic relations\, alongside discussions about Sri  Lanka’s sensitive stance on foreign influence and internal reforms\, including  ethnic and land rights issues. The discussion also touched upon China’s  increasing presence and Sri Lanka’s balancing act between foreign assistance  and national autonomy. \nDr.  Gulbin Sultana responded to the comments made by the Director General and the  questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars.  \nReport prepared by Ms. Sneha M\,  Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-presidential-election-in-sri-lanka
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240909T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240909T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241004T035405Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241004T035405Z
UID:82769-1725859800-1725859800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on ‘India’s Engagement With Taliban-ruled Afghanistan: Three Years On’
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Vishal Chandra\, Research Fellow\, South Asia Centre\,  MP-IDSA\,  spoke on ‘India’s Engagement With Taliban-ruled Afghanistan: Three Years On’ at  the Monday Morning Meeting held on 9 September 2024. The session was moderated  by Dr. Priyanka Singh\, Associate Fellow\,  South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary \nIndia’s approach towards Afghanistan has evolved  pragmatically in response to shifting power dynamics in the country over the  past decades. India’s commitment to developmental projects and humanitarian  assistance has remained consistent\, and its people-centric approach continues  to foster ties with Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic groups. These long-lasting  ties with the Afghan people have endured\, with India adapting to another power  shift in Kabul in August 2021. Looking ahead\, India needs to broaden its  engagement\, recognising that Afghanistan will remain a critical cog in the  broader interplay of geopolitics and geoeconomics around it.  \nDetailed Report\nThe session began with moderator Dr.  Priyanka Singh highlighting India’s historically fraught relationship with the  Taliban\, notably influenced by the execution of President Najibullah\, who was  an ally of India\, in 1996\, and the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC–814  in 1999. India had aligned itself with the Northern Alliance\, opposing the  Pakistan-backed Taliban’s rise to power in the late 1990s. Dr. Singh stated  that these events\, among others\, have shaped India’s cautious approach towards  engaging with the Taliban-led interim government. Over the past two years\, diplomatic  engagements with the Taliban have occurred\, signalling that India is open to  dialogue while ensuring that its national interests are safeguarded. \nMr. Vishal Chandra’s presentation  revolved around India’s evolving approach towards a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan  over the past three years. His presentation highlighted India’s continued  humanitarian outreach and assistance to the people of Afghanistan; reflected  upon the security landscape of Afghanistan\, the state of India’s relations with  an Islamist Kabul\, and the level of bilateral trade; and India’s approach  moving forward. The Speaker\, Mr. Chandra\, began his presentation by quoting  Prime Minister Narendra Modi from his address delivered at the inauguration of  the India-constructed Afghan Parliament building in Kabul in December 2015\,  where he emphasised the centuries-old ‘timeless relations’ between the peoples  of the two countries. Mr. Chandra was of the opinion that the Prime Minister’s  speech aptly captured the spirit of what is termed as “Indo-Afghan”.  Elaborating on the point\, he stated that “Indo-Afghan” is a much broader  historical dynamic\, and has its momentum\, than the formal state-to-state  “India–Afghanistan” relations. It has long guided India’s people-centric  approach towards Afghanistan\, particularly in times of political uncertainty  and instability in the country\, and is well-reflected in India’s current policy  pronouncements.     \nReflecting upon the state of  relations with Kabul\, Mr. Chandra noted that the Taliban regime has variously  signalled its interest in building ties with New Delhi. A working understanding  of sorts on non-interference and non-threat appears to have been attempted over  the past two years. He also referred to visits by Indian delegations to Kabul  in June 2022 and March 2024\, and the deployment of officials and staff at the  Indian mission in Kabul in June 2022 to coordinate the delivery of much-needed  humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghan people. He referred to the people  of Afghanistan as India’s longest-standing partner in the country.  \nOn the changed security landscape in  Afghanistan\, Mr. Chandra remarked that from Herat in the west to Peshawar in  the east\, one finds only Pashtun Sunni Islamist groups—the Afghan Taliban;  Haqqani network (both as a distinct entity and as part of the Taliban  ‘emirate’); the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)\, mainly comprising of  former elements from Pakistani and Afghan Taliban; and the Tehreek-e-Taliban  Pakistan (TTP) or the Pakistani Taliban—collaborating\, competing and warring to  establish their power dominance and ideological hold in the region. He further  noted that the underlying interlinkages\, and convergences and divergences among  them and their global and regional affiliates\, point to a complex maze of  resurgent Sunni Jihadist entities seeking to dominate and transform the social  and political landscape in the region. \nMr. Chandra highlighted India’s  pragmatic approach to Afghanistan\, adapting to shifts in power and priorities.  He pointed out the faultlines within the Taliban and their so-called ‘emirate’\,  which is marked by competing power centres. The Taliban chief\, Hibatullah  Akhundzada\, governs from Kandahar\, where there is an extreme concentration of  power\, while the Haqqani Network holds sway in Kabul. Additionally\, prominent  figures like Sirajuddin Haqqani (acting Taliban interior minister and leader of  the Haqqani Network) and Mullah Yaqoob (acting Taliban defence minister and son  of founder chief Mullah Omar) have questioned some of Akhundzada’s governing  policies and decisions\, including the restrictions imposed on girls’ education.  Mr. Chandra informed that the Taliban have allowed women to work in select  sectors\, particularly health and education. However\, it cannot be regarded as a  major policy shift\, for the Taliban had allowed women to work in these sectors  earlier during their first regime in the late 1990s. \nMr. Chandra underscored India’s  broad-based role in Afghanistan\, spanning two decades of developmental projects  and aid delivery. He informed that between 2002 and 2021\, India committed USD 3  billion in aid and assistance\, making India the largest regional development  partner of Afghanistan. India’s reconstruction assistance was multi-sectoral:  education\, health services\, transportation\, telecommunications\, civil aviation\,  agriculture\, irrigation\, power generation & transmission\, industry\, and  rural development. After the power shift in Kabul in August 2021\, India quickly  resumed humanitarian aid and relief assistance\, dispatching 50\,000 metric  tonnes of wheat\, 50 tonnes of essential medicine\, and 28 tonnes of disaster  relief assistance. India has also supplied 1100 units of female hygiene kits  for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime female rehabilitation centres  in Afghanistan.  \nMr. Chandra added that India  continued to annually allocate a budget of Rs. 200 crore for ‘Aid to  Afghanistan’ through the financial years 2022–23\, 2023–24\, and 2024-25. The  annual trade between the two countries stood at USD 889.85 million in 2022–23  and USD 997.74 million in 2023–24. As per the World Bank’s latest data\, India  remains the second-largest export market for Afghan products.  \nHe further informed that educational  ties continue through initiatives like the 1\,000 online annual scholarships for  Afghan students in undergraduate and postgraduate courses offered by the Indian  Council for Cultural Relations. The New Delhi-based South Asian University\,  through a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation initiative\,  continues to give admission and provide scholarships to Afghan students in  postgraduate and doctoral courses.  \nIn his concluding observations\, Mr.  Chandra stated that India must step up its people-centric engagement with  Afghanistan to deal with the long-term impact of the changed political and  security landscape in the country. He also highlighted the fact that none of  India’s projects or diplomatic properties were harmed by the Taliban\,  underscoring the Taliban’s intent to normalise relations with New Delhi. He  argued that the Taliban regime may not come across as a relatable entity or  authority\, but an independent Taliban is preferable to one exiled and under  Pakistan’s tutelage. He noted that India’s development assistance and capacity  building programmes facilitated engagement with Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic  groups\, including Tajiks\, Uzbeks\, Hazaras\, and Pashtuns. This outreach helped  counter anti-India propaganda by certain state and non-state actors. India  needs to constantly monitor and assess the evolving ground situation in  Afghanistan.  \nLooking ahead\, Mr. Chandra argued  that if the engagement is to expand\, then developments in Afghanistan will have  to be viewed in its social-political context\, which has been upended multiple  times over the past five decades\, to better deal with its layered complexities. \nQuestions and Comments\nThe presentation was followed by  comments and questions from the floor\, focussing on India’s national interests  in Afghanistan; prospects of Indian investment in Afghanistan’s mineral  resources and access to Afghan and Central Asian markets; and Taliban’s  regional diplomacy. The approach of Central Asian Republics\, particularly that  of Tajikistan\, and China’s growing engagement with the Taliban regime were also  discussed. \n  The Speaker\, Mr. Chandra\, responded  to the questions and comments from the MP-IDSA scholars. \nReport prepared by Ms Puspa Kumari\, Intern\, South Asia  Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-indias-engagement-with-taliban-ruled-afghanistan-three-years-on
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240902T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240902T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240917T113529Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240917T113529Z
UID:82557-1725255000-1725255000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on The Paradox of South Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Ranjit Kumar Dhawan\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, New Delhi spoke on “The Paradox of South Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 2 September 2024. The session was moderated by Mr. Niranjan Oak\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Korean Peninsula is of strategic importance for the United States in its efforts to balance China as well as Russia. The resurgence of the debate whether South Korea should develop its own nuclear arsenal has gained much attention in the recent times. President Yoon Suk Yeol also made a statement in favour of developing nuclear weapons in 2023\, however\, retracting the same later. This move has sparked a discussion whether South Korea should go nuclear. The session focused on various aspects regarding concerns about the nuclear development of South Korea\, providing a comprehensive analysis of the topic. \nDetailed Report\nThe session began with opening remarks by Mr. Niranjan Oak\, giving an introduction of the topic wherein he shared a brief history of South Korea’s move towards nuclear technology. Further\, he discussed drivers that led to the current contemplation of South Korea’s seeming necessity for nuclear weapons. Some of the drivers were the exponential rise in tests by North Korea and its increasing proximity towards China and Russia\, its discussion on employment of tactical nuclear weapons\, and development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with the ability to reach continental United States. The aforementioned factors have ignited the discussion on the need for owning nuclear weapons in South Korea\, wherein numerous surveys have revealed the public opinion in favour of developing the nation’s own nuclear weapons\, given its credible civil nuclear industry. \nDr. Ranjit Kumar Dhawan began his presentation by explaining that a major reason behind the requirement of nuclear warheads in South Korea is North Korea’s strengthening of its conventional and nuclear weapons capability and its cooperative alliance with Russia in the past few years. Another concern is America’s withdrawal of its armed forces from South Korea. Highlighting the history briefly and the events consequent to the Korean War\, he described how geopolitics has evolved over the decades. He focused on nuclear development in North and South Korea\, the strength and numbers of the armed forces of both the nations and the consecutive nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. \nApart from security aspects\, political considerations including government policies and public opinion regarding the development of nuclear weapons were discussed. Citing the data in the “KINU Unification Survey 2024: North Korea’s Two-State Claim/US Presidential Election Outlook and ROK-US Relations”\, published by Korea Institute for National Unification in June 2024\, Dr. Dhawan stated that it showed public demand for South Korea’s own nuclear warheads surpassing the comparative percentage of people wanting US nuclear umbrella. Consequent to the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang\, Seoul signed an agreement on the Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula with the US on 11 July 2024. Pyongyang reacted by threatening to increase its nuclear arsenal against the agreement between US and South Korea. \nFurther into his presentation\, Dr. Dhawan pointed out challenges that might impact the current situation and further policies of South Korea. He pointed out four possibilities resulting from South Korea’s nuclearisation\, on the basis of the existing literature: \n\nA domino effect in the East Asian region\, specifically in Taiwan and Japan\nWithdrawal from the Non – Proliferation Treaty\, resulting in economic sanctions\, making it a costly affair for South Korea\nSouth Korea continuing to benefit from the US nuclear umbrella\nLack of acceptability of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons program to the US\n\nExplaining each of the apprehensions\, Dr. Dhawan pointed out that South Koreans are doubtful about the reliance on US for nuclear weapons\, thereby fuelling the need for South Korea’s nuclear program. The reason behind it is the apprehension of the US needing to protect its own territories against North Korean ICBMs with nuclear capacity. US might be found at a crossroads while protecting South Korea and that could give strategic advantage to its adversaries. Furthermore\, US cannot let its control in East Asia slip away so easily\, weakening its presence against China\, as the increasing influence of the Chinese in the Peninsula has significantly impacted its diplomatic stronghold in the region. South Korea giving up US protection might prove to be the last nail in the coffin. Another impact might be the trigger effect on the nuclear arms race in the East Asian region. \nConcluding his presentation\, Dr. Dhawan also specified the potential ideas that might benefit Seoul. Having already established a thriving civil nuclear program for technological and industrial purposes\, it could be relatively easy to understand and analyse the dynamics and technicalities of the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea according to Dr. Dhawan. He added that the analyses of Project 890 shall also act as a guidebook for future endeavour\, which will imperatively arm and strengthen South Korea against North Korea. However\, regional political dynamics and the alliance with the US could prevent South Korea from going nuclear. \nScholars at MP-IDSA posed a diverse range of questions to which the speaker gave detailed answers. \nReport was prepared by Ms. Shipra Dwivedi\, Intern\, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre\, MP – IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-the-paradox-of-south-koreas-quest-for-nuclear-weapons
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240827T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240827T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240926T230335Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250828T053301Z
UID:82713-1724736600-1724736600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Fellows Seminar on "The Necessity of Military - Civil Technology Fusion (MCTF) for Making India a Global Drone Hub@2030"
DESCRIPTION:The MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar presentation by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, on “The Necessity of Military – Civil Technology Fusion (MCTF) for Making India a Global Drone Hub@2030” was held on 27 August 2024. It was chaired by Dr. V.K. Saraswat\, former Secretary\, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)\, currently Member NITI Aayog. The External Discussants for the paper were Professor Hari Babu Srivastava\, former DG DRDO\, currently Professor of Practice at IIT Delhi\, and Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.) from Newspace Research & Technologies Pvt. Ltd. The Director General\, MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, the Deputy Director General\, Gp.Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.) and scholars of the Institute participated in the Seminar. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session deliberated on making India an atmanirbhar (self-reliance) drone hub @2030\, emphasising military-civil drone technology development initiatives\, challenges and the way forward. Key challenges include reliance on imports\, lack of civil drone R&D ecosystem\, gaps in defence UAV development programs and reducing import dependence of critical systems. Recommendations by the speaker included military-civil technology fusion (MCTF)\, designating an existing ministry as a nodal ministry for drone technology\, launching civil drone R&D initiatives\, fostering design capabilities\, building testing infrastructure\, creating indigenous content certification mechanism and formulating Indian standards among others\, on which further discussion took place. \nDetailed Report\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA opened the session by introducing Dr. V.K. Saraswat\, Member of NITI Aayog\, as the Chairperson. He highlighted India’s progress towards greater self-reliance\, emphasising that this does not equate to self-sufficiency. Self-reliance\, he explained\, allows ample room for international collaboration. India has actively engaged with countries such as the United States\, the United Kingdom\, France and others. It is negotiating with global partners on the development of aero engines and other technologies. \nDr. V.K. Saraswat noted thatIndian industry’s efforts toward aatmanirbharta (self-reliance) in the field of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been limited\, particularly in the development of those with strategic value. However\, he acknowledged significant progress in civilian drone technology\, with applications ranging from entertainment and agriculture to logistics. The core technology behind drones remains consistent\, with variations primarily in payloads and command and control systems. In the civilian sector\, however\, the understanding of drone technology in India is limited\, with only a few companies excelling in this area. \nFurthermore\, Dr. Saraswat underlined that due to lack of focus\, the civilian sector has largely depended on import of critical components. There are also distinct differences in the requirements for civilian versus military applications. As future warfare is likely to involve large-scale deployment of unmanned systems\, achieving self-reliance in UAV technology requires a mission-driven approach to develop all critical components. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.) began his presentation by highlighting the critical role of the Semi-Conductor Laboratory (SCL) in Chandigarh in hand-holding of the drone startups\, aimed at exploring the feasibility of developing chips to enhance security. He noted that his presentation addresses four key areas: military-civil drone policies\, technology development\, ecosystems and military-civil technology fusion (MCTF). He emphasised the need for significant reforms in the civilian drone sector\, as well as some improvements in the defence sector. \nAccording to Gp. Capt. Narang\, while India has set the ambitious goal of becoming a global drone hub\, the definition of what this entails remains unclear. He defines it as a “technology and innovation-driven\, high-tech\, high-value civil-military drone industry\, where India is self-reliant in critical technologies\, while also being a global leader in certain niche technologies.” \nThe growth of the Indian drone industry\, he explained\, will depend on proactive R&D\, innovation and the creation of drone technologies. Additionally\, the formulation of Indian standards\, standardisation and trial-based certifications of emerging and enabling drone technologies will play a crucial role in achieving this vision. With standards for drones still evolving\, India must adopt a proactive approach to formulate Indian standards to remain competitive in this sector. \nGp. Capt. Narang further elaborated on the contribution of civil drone policy initiatives\, beginning with the Drone Rules 2021\, which significantly transformed India’s drone sector by addressing operations\, certification\, training\, and Production-Linked Incentives (PLI). He also highlighted certain gaps and limitations in the drone policies. He observed India does not have a policy on certification by a drone technician. The PLI scheme supported drone manufacturing by domestic industry while simultaneously easing the import of drone components\, which\, in turn\, made the industry reliant on imports. Although India has an airworthiness certification mechanism\, there is no indication of whether products or components are indigenous. He also called for reforms in certification of drone batteries by citing an example where an Indian company developed innovative batteries\, but the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) found it difficult to deviate from predefined standards to give them certification. \nGp. Capt. Narang pointed out that policy initiatives were focused on facilitating drone operation and not on development or the validation of indigenous drone technologies. Notably\, the Ministry of Civil Aviation lacks policies\, structures and mechanisms for atmanirbharta in civil drone technologies. Discussing development challenges\, he emphasised the lack of focus of innovation hubs on addressing the technology gaps. Furthermore\, civil drone development initiatives by the Department of Science and Technology\, MeitY and others are not focused on developing specific drone technologies. Globally\, civil aviation entities are leading development of enabling technologies and integration of drones into their national airspace; however\, similar initiatives by Ministry of Civil Aviation/Directorate General of Civil Aviation are lacking. \nGp. Capt. Narang explained that a major limitation in India is the absence of an R&D vertical within the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In the private sector\, investment in R&D is alarmingly low—that generally varies between 1 to 5 percent in most companies as compared to 10-20 % by global leaders—indicating a lack of focus on technological innovation. He stressed the need for greater demands on industry bodies and the private sector to drive meaningful technological progress. \nGp. Capt. Narang explained that India must also prioritise building an ecosystem for civilian drone test sites\, as some Indian companies are currently forced to test their drones abroad. Accreditation remains a challenge for the Indian drone industry\, and there is a pressing need to archive civil drone test data to facilitate the validation of technologies. Currently\, drone education in India is limited\, with only a few courses like the M.Tech program at IIT Kanpur and a handful of other universities offering specialised education. Strengthening higher education in the drone sector is essential to foster deep research in critical drone technologies within the country. \nFocusing on the defence UAV sector\, Gp. Capt. Narang mentioned that significant policy measures have been implemented\, such as the MAKE-1\, MAKE-2\, and Indigenously Designed\, Developed\, and Manufactured (IDDM) categories in the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP). Initiatives like iDEX and the Mehar Baba Competition have also played a key role in advancing technological development in the drone sector. Additionally\, he recommended induction of test pilots and test engineers by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)\, National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) and industry to help them in bridging the gap between drone designs and user expectations in UAV programs and the broader development of aviation technologies. \nOn the issue of indigenous content (IC)\, Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised the need for an expert body dedicated to IC certification\, which is currently lacking. India does not have a mechanism to identify indigenous content\, and he stressed the importance of creating one. He drew attention towards the need for archiving indigenous designs and content within Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the DRDO. He recommended reforming the Development Cum Production Partner (DcPP) model to a Development Production and User (DPU) model\, where the user becomes a partner in the process rather than merely a reviewer of technology. \nGp. Capt. Narang also suggested that platforms like GeM should include verticals for iDEX\, Mehar Baba\, or IDDM to promote indigenous technologies. Also\, there is a need to standardise trial methodologies that are universally accepted\, which would help reduce challenges faced by startups in the drone industry. \nGp. Capt. Narang further highlighted the long-standing lack of interest in developing drone engines\, emphasising the urgent need to address this gap. According to him\, internal combustion (IC) engines\, in particular\, remain a weak area for India\, with challenges in commercialisation\, as well as competing with global Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in terms of quality and efficiency. Another issue is the increasing acquisition of promising Indian startups and talent by foreign companies and VCs\, which calls for concerted efforts to prevent the loss of domestic talent and innovation. \nGp. Capt. Narang proposed the development of a mechanism to test the indigenous content (IC) of materials and software components for greater transparency and clarity. Moreover\, he advocated for the creation of a National MCTF initiative\, alongside a policy for aatmanirbharta in civil drone technology. He also called for designation of an existing ministry as a nodal ministry for civil UAV technology\, a National UAV Technology Mission\, and a National UAV Technology Fund to focus efforts in this critical domain. Additionally\, there is a need for a Positive Indigenisation List across all ministries and the creation of civil drone testing corridors and sites. \nLastly\, he proposed introducing an “IC 1” rating\, in addition to L1 and T1 criteria\, to recognise the highest levels of Indigenous Content in drone technology. \nProf. Hari Babu Shrivastava made several observations and recommendations\, raising key questions such as what defines a “hub” and how the MCTF initiative would benefit society\, industry\, and the economy as a whole. He referenced a report by Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry\, expressing concern that India’s indigenisation process may not keep pace with the country’s projected capabilities by 2030. He also noted that countries like Turkey and Iran have made significant advances in drone exports\, emphasising the need for India to accelerate its efforts in this sector to remain competitive on the global stage. \nCmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.) expressed concern that specific recommendations may not be effective if the mechanisms and processes for implementation remain unchanged. He also raised concerns on the draft of the Military Airworthiness Bill\, pointing out that many issues stem from deep-rooted cultural challenges\, such as a risk-averse mindset and siloed working practices. He noted that many countries are already ahead of India in drone technology\, and instead of following the same path\, India should think ahead and adopt a different approach. \nFor instance\, he suggested that India should focus on collaborative robotics rather than UAVs. He emphasised the importance of understanding business models and advised companies to prioritise customer needs over their own preferences\, highlighting the necessity of focusing on requirements engineering to align with real market demands. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Chinoy\, in his remarks\, posed the question of how drone technologies can be developed to meet the specific needs of infantry\, particularly in terms of supply delivery and stock management. He also said that regarding engine testing\, the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) already has robust facilities\, such as those used for the Kaveri engine. If India’s private sector develops its own engines\, these testing facilities can be made available to support the testing and validation of their designs\, encouraging collaboration between public and private sectors. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr. Saraswat said that in India\, the technological lag often leads organisations to import new technologies for commercial use\, rather than focusing on developing their own innovations. This approach creates challenges in increasing indigenous content\, especially in critical technologies. Indigenous content should be measured in terms of critical technology development\, not merely by the percentage of cost of local components in a product. \nAnother issue is India’s reliance on foreign designs\, which are re-engineered and manufactured locally\, highlighting the need to strengthen domestic design capabilities. Additionally\, India should aim to leapfrog technological advancements rather than merely trying to catch up with advanced technologies. \nReport prepared by Mr. Rohit Kumar Sharma\, Research Analyst\, North America & Strategic Technologies Centre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-fellows-seminar-on-the-necessity-of-military-civil-fusion-mcf-for-making-india-a-global-drone-hub2030
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240819T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240819T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20241004T035225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241004T035236Z
UID:82767-1724045400-1724045400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning on An Overview of China’s Cognitive Warfare Capabilities
DESCRIPTION:Dr.  Abhishek Kumar Darbey\, Associate Fellow\, spoke on “An Overview of China’s  Cognitive Warfare Capabilities” at the Monday Morning Meeting. The session was  chaired by Dr. M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow and was followed by insightful  remarks by the Director General MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and other  scholars.  \nExecutive Summary\nResearch about cognitive  warfare is increasing in China. Through cognitive operations\, China aims to  control brains of the target population primarily by means of digital platforms\,  thereby influencing the decision making of the target country. As China aims to  increase its diplomatic clout and geopolitical standing\, Chinese military scholars  are vigorously researching on means and ways to develop cognitive warfare  capabilities. Given the increasing applications of non-kinetic warfare in  contemporary times\, China is building its cognitive operation capabilities  considering it as the highest form of non-kinetic warfare. Taiwan and Hong Kong  remain two important testing grounds of China’s cognitive warfare capabilities.  \nDetailed Report\nThe session began with brief  introductory remarks by Dr. Prathibha. She noted that Chinese researchers and  academics for a longtime have been interested in warfare capabilities in the cognitive  domain that can be used in warfare and have been closely studying the United  States’ (US) cognitive warfare capabilities since the 1990s. Highlighting that  cognitive warfare is often confused with information warfare and psychological warfare\,  she contended that both China and the US make a distinction among these  concepts and apply them accordingly. Cognitive warfare is primarily understood  as attempts to affect the cognition of the enemy and make them take actions that  are not in their interests.  \nDr. Darbey’s presentation consisted  of two parts. In the first part he explained the concept of cognitive warfare.  He noted information\, cyber\, and psychological warfare are subsets of cognitive  warfare. For instance\, information warfare is the attack and destruction of the  adversary’s information system and gaining advantage over the enemy’s  information system. On the other hand\, cyberwarfare deals with attacks on the  physical network of a particular organization to disrupt their activities.  However\, cognitive warfare targets the brain and combines cyber\, information\,  psychological and social engineering capabilities of mind that alter the  adversary’s cognitive process and exploit their mental biases.  \nElaborating on the  difference\, Dr. Darbey noted that the key  difference between cognitive\, information and psychological warfare is that  unlike the other forms of warfare\, cognitive warfare operates on weaponisation  of neuroscience that intends to control the brain through environmental stimulation.  Also\, cyber and information technologies make cognitive warfare very fast and  powerful. He highlighted that subjects such as philosophy\, psychology\,  anthropology\, artificial intelligence\, nano technology\, biotechnology and  information technology are part of cognitive science.  \nHe observed that the  initiator decides the plan and strategy about cognitive warfare according to  the interest and goal they want to achieve. Accordingly\, there are three kinds  of cognitive warfare; First is the strategic cognitive warfare which is a long-term  systematic influence operation carried out on the cognition of the targeted group  to subvert or control the politico-economic system\, military power or  ideological orientation of a country. The second is campaign cognitive warfare which  is undertaken for a medium time period\, targeting the social cognition of the  population to primarily disrupt the social solidarity of the enemy country.  Finally\, there is tactical cognitive warfare which is a short-term attack on  the target population to mislead and manipulate political views. Further\, the  implementation of cognitive warfare is a five-step process; first is  intelligence collection\, second is target analysis\, third is decision-making\,  fourth is information design and the last is evaluation.  \nMoving to the second part of  his presentation\, that is\, China’s cognitive warfare capabilities\, Dr. Darbey contended that this is a new domain for the  People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its capabilities are at a nascent stage  compared to that of the other major powers like the US and Russia. He argued  that the PLA intends to use  cognitive  warfare as an invisible hand to control the opponent’s will as Chinese  researchers talk about four tactics to control the adversary’s mind\, that is\,  perception manipulation\, changing the historical memory and imposing new values  on the target population\, changing the line of thought and finally  deconstructing symbols and challenging identity. Also\, it is noteworthy that  while earlier writings in PLA focussed on using cognitive warfare capabilities  only to affect adversaries’ decision-making during war\, present scholarship has  turned towards discussing ways to utilise cognitive warfare capabilities in peacetime.  \nWith regard to the  theoretical basis of China’s cognitive warfare\, Dr. Darbey noted that it is  based on Sun Tzu’s Art of War and I Ching: Book of Changes. These two  texts have been the basis of the ‘Three Warfare Doctrine’ adopted by the  Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2005. Notably\, the doctrine mentions cognitive  warfare. Further\, in 2010 when the document was revisited\, the amended version  instructed that the PLA members will have to train in three warfares\, that is\,  develop a discursive power where the CCP will have the power to influence the  target audience\, control narratives and improve one’s own version of facts. \nElaborating on PLA’s approach to cognitive warfare\, he observed that Chinese  military scholars contend that PLA’s offensive potential is greater than  originally assessed. At present PLA has been using intimidation and  disinformation as part of its cognitive warfare and key PLA units directly  under the Central Military Commission including PLA Information Support Force  are responsible for cognitive warfare operations. Similarly\, within the  government\, the State Security Department\, Taiwan Affairs Office and Ministry  of Foreign Affairs are responsible for cognitive warfare.  \nDr.  Darbey concluded his presentation by stating that China’s cognitive warfare projects  are still in the initial stages as Beijing is in the process of developing its  ‘Network Information System’ by means of its newly established PLA Information  Support Force (PLA ISF) which will be able to acquire\, transmit and assess  massive amounts of data required to conduct cognitive warfare. Further\, as  Beijing aims to expand its domain of cognitive warfare\, the study of metaverse  will play a key role in strengthening China’s cognitive warfare capabilities.  \nFollowing the presentation\, Amb.  Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA\, observed that cognitive warfare has  been employed for generations and is becoming increasingly relevant in the  present era\, characterized by a world that has imploded\, globalized\, and  interconnected through unparalleled data flows. As we progress towards  artificial intelligence\, the complexity will continue to escalate. Referring to  Japan’s cognitive warfare against its own citizens\, he contended that it  remains one of the most exemplary instances of cognitive warfare\, perpetrated  not by an adversary but by one’s own system. Amb. Chinoy noted that America  also used cognitive warfare against China to bring about change in their  political system. He concluded his remarks by highlighting that currently a lot  of cognitive warfare is at play\, especially as being witnessed in the Ukraine  and Gaza War.  \nQ & A Session\nAs the floor was opened for  questions scholars queried about the possible parameters that are used to  assess the success and failure of cognitive influence operations in Hong Kong  and Taiwan; lessons China was adopting from the Ukraine war and how technology  controls could affect China’s cognitive warfare capabilities. Scholars also  queried about the difference between cognitive and psychological warfare\, means  to identify cognitive warfare and counter measures that can be used to combat  such operations.  \nReport was prepared by Dr.  Mayuri Banerjee\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-on-an-overview-of-chinas-cognitive-warfare-capabilities
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240812T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240812T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240826T184540Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240826T184540Z
UID:82349-1723440600-1723440600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Military Takeover in Bangladesh: What Next?”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Smruti Pattanaik\, Research Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Military Takeover in Bangladesh: What Next?” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 12 August 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Pushpita Das\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. The MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary \nThe session provided a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing crisis in Bangladesh\, with a focus on the military’s role\, the dynamics of the protest movement\, and the broader implications for Bangladesh’s political future. The discussion underscored the complexities of the situation and the challenges ahead as Bangladesh navigates this period of transition. The meeting concluded with reflections on the potential outcomes and the importance of monitoring the developments closely. \nDetailed Report\nIn her opening remarks\, Dr. Pushpita Das offered an overview of the recent political developments in Bangladesh\, particularly the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the formation of an interim government led by Dr. Mohammad Yunus. She highlighted the significance of the ongoing protests in Bangladesh\, which originated from discontent over the country’s quota system but soon escalated into a broader political movement demanding Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. \nDr. Smruti Pattanaik\, began her presentation by showcasing posters that were widely circulated on social media\, which became symbols of the resistance. Dr. Pattanaik informed the audience that the protests began in June 2024 in response to the decision taken by the High Court of Bangladesh reinstating a 30 percent quota for descendants of freedom fighters\, reversing the government decision made in response to the 2018 Bangladesh quota reform movement. She assessed that the order made students insecure about getting a government job based on merit. However\, these protests soon escalated into a nationwide demand for Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. She acknowledged that the situation intensified and Hasina was allegedly forced to resign and flee to India. The interim government\, led by Dr. Mohammed Yunus\, took charge amidst demands for immediate elections. Dr. Pattanaik highlighted that these protests resulted in the killing of more than 200 people including students and children. \nDr. Pattanaik highlighted the military’s preference for behind-the-scenes control rather than direct governance\, a strategy reminiscent of the 2007 crisis when the military took over in Bangladesh. She pointed out that the military’s refusal to fire on protesters and its cautious approach were significant factors in the events that have occurred. Dr. Pattanaik assessed that the protests\, initially focused on reservation reforms\, gained momentum due to the government’s inability to engage constructively with students\, civil society and the killing of Abu Saeed\, who was the only educated person in his 13 member family who aspired to get a government job and became a symbol that the protesters rallied around. She noted that the killing of student leaders and the police’s heavy-handed response further fueled public anger. The protest movement\, which saw participation from students\, teachers\, and various political factions\, led to widespread mobilisation against the government. The role of the government-backed student organisation\, Chhatra League\, in countering the protests with violence along with the police who used brutal methods was also discussed. \nDr. Pattanaik acknowledged the increased attacks on minorities\, particularly Hindus\, in the aftermath of Hasina’s ouster. These attacks\, driven by both communal and economic motives\, were reminiscent of past violence in Bangladesh. She noted that the potential for further violence\, especially against minorities\, remains a concern as the interim government and military navigate the transition. \nDr. Pattanaik drew parallels between the current crisis and previous student-led movements in Bangladesh\, such as the 1952 Language Movement\, the 1969 anti-government protests\, 2013 Shahbagh Movement\, 2018 anti-quota movement\, and safe road movement which was started by the school students. She emphasised that student activism has historically played a crucial role in Bangladesh’s political landscape. Dr. Pattanaik also compared the current situation to the events of 1971 and 2007\, highlighting the cyclical nature of political unrest in Bangladesh. \nThe interim government’s composition\, including student leaders\, BNP sympathisers\, religious party leaders and one from the minority community was discussed as a new development. However\, uncertainties remain regarding the timeline for elections and the interim government’s ability to handle the ongoing crisis in the country. Dr. Pattanaik questioned the participation of Jamaat-e-Islami leaders which remains a banned political party and the exclusion of other political parties in the swearing-in ceremony of the interim government. The circumstances surrounding Hasina’s resignation and exile to India were also debated. Dr. Pattanaik analysed the impact of Hasina’s departure on her political legacy and the perception of her as a grassroots leader. \nComments and Q&A\nFollowing the presentation\, the moderator\, Dr. Pushpita Das opened the floor for questions and comments. Scholars of MP-IDSA emphasised the need to closely monitor the role of other political parties in the evolving situation. They also inquired about the role India should play in the evolving situation\, about the upcoming elections in the country and the ability of the interim government to handle the current situation in the country. \nScholars also inquired about the role of foreign powers in the current situation that has unfolded in Bangladesh leading to the resignation of Sheikh Hasina and how the foreign media is looking at it. \nDr. Pattanaik responded to the comments and questions raised by the scholars of MP-IDSA. \nReport prepared by Ms. Puspa Kumari\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-military-takeover-in-bangladesh-what-next
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240805T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240805T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240818T183936Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240818T183936Z
UID:82304-1722835800-1722835800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Saudi Foreign Policy in the Emerging Regional Order in West Asia”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan\, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) made a presentation on “Saudi Foreign Policy in the Emerging Regional Order in West Asia\,” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 5 August 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Deepika Saraswat\, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA. Scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an important player in the West Asian region. Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has been shaped by a number of factors including its perception of national security\, regional stability\, geopolitical developments in its neighbourhood and its ambition to play a leadership role in the region. It has established strategic partnerships and alliances with important regional and global powers in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As the situation in the West Asian region continues to remain tense\, it has adopted a more pragmatic and cautious approach in its foreign policy. \nDetailed Report\nIn her introductory remarks\, Dr. Saraswat observed that the Gulf States are emerging as key power brokers in the Arab world. She reflected on Saudi Arabia’s target of achieving Vision 2030 goals and its navigating through the regional order which saw changes from a ‘militaristic turn’ of intervention against the Houthis in Yemen\, and involvement in Syria to a preference for de-escalation with key players including Turkey and Iran\, and normalisation efforts with Israel\, which have been complicated by the ongoing Israel-Palestine war. Further\, Dr. Saraswat also commented on the dynamics of Saudi Arabia’s interactions with external powers and increasing engagement of the Gulf States with China. \nIn his presentation\, Dr. Pradhan highlighted that the regional order in West Asia continues to remain fragile. The region suffered significantly during the Arab unrest with protests and regime changes. The region has always remained prone to external intervention. But recently\, the Abraham Accords and Saudi-Iran rapprochement have been positive developments with potential for further cooperation. The Israel-Hamas War and the involvement of Houthis and Hezbollah have further complicated the regional situation. The whole region has become even more volatile since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War and its spillover effect in the Red Sea\, the Strait of Hormuz\, involvement of Iran\, Lebanon and the neighbourhood along with significant involvement of Hamas\, Houthis and Hezbollah. \nDr. Pradhan noted that the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran\, the two regional powers has been a pivotal determinant in the regional order in West Asia. After decades of hostility\, both the countries signed an agreement in March 2023 that restored their diplomatic ties. However\, both states have serious differences when it comes to regional security in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia vouches for a Western security architecture in the Gulf. On the contrary\, Iran believes that the regional security framework of the region should be controlled by the regional players only and perceives the American military presence in the West Asian region as a threat. He also stated that Turkiye and Israel\, the two other major non-Arab players in the region also have a major influence in the region. \nDr. Pradhan outlined that when it came to the Israel-Palestine issue\, Riyadh’s position has undergone a significant change over the decades. The Saudi-Israeli talks to explore the normalisation of relations between them is an indication of Saudi Arabia’s changing perception towards Israel. However\, since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War\, Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel until an independent Palestinian state is established. Saudi Arabia supports the Arab Peace Initiative which proposes a two-state solution with the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. \nYemen has always been a major concern for Saudi Arabia since it has a long and porous border and the former has also mostly been a very unstable state with presence of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Houthi capture of Sana’a was a red line for the Kingdom since Riyadh believes that the group is backed by Iran. Thus\, Houthis presence on the Saudi-Yemeni border is an obvious national security threat for the Saudis. Houthis have launched several attacks on Saudi Arabia including sensitive infrastructure such as airports and oil installations. \nDr. Pradhan noted that Saudi Arabia’s position towards Bashar Al- Assad in Syria has also undergone a change. There has been a gradual course correction in recent years with the intent of engaging with the Assad regime and bringing Syria back to the Arab world. \nSaudi Arabia has adopted mediation as a foreign policy tool. The Kingdom has mediated between different factions in Palestine\, Yemen\, Lebanon\, Sudan and for prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine. \nThere has been a significant change in Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy thinking since Mohammed bin Salman became the Crown Prince. The Kingdom has been making efforts to improve its global image by undertaking a number of social reforms including improvement in the human rights situation. \nDr. Pradhan argued that when it comes to Saudi-US relations\, there have been many ups and downs. Bilateral ties have been interdependent and strategic in nature\, with defence and security being given a significant focus. But Biden Administration’s stopping of arms supply to Riyadh at a time when the Kingdom was fighting a war against the Houthis became a major irritant for Saudi Arabia. He outlined that when the oil prices were crashing\, in the middle of the Arab Spring\, Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries were severely hit by the loss of revenues. The OPEC and non-OPEC oil-producing countries came together to form the OPEC+. As a major non-OPEC oil producer\, Russia also played a big role in the oil market and forged close cooperation with Saudi Arabia.  This energy cooperation between the Russia and Saudi Arabia was perceived as having the potential to change the global oil market and growing Saudi-Russia cooperation. Saudi Arabia maintains a neutral position in the Russia-Ukraine War. \nDr. Pradhan stated that Saudi Arabia’s relationship with China is also growing significantly. Saudi-China ties are mainly propelled by bilateral trade and energy as China is a key importer of Saudi crude. There is a mutual convergence of interests between the two countries\, as Saudi Arabia has expressed its support for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China has expressed its support for Saudi Vision 2023. \nWith reference to India-Saudi Arabia bilateral relations\, Dr. Pradhan stated that both countries are strategic partners and are moving beyond the traditional buyer-seller relationship. Total bilateral trade between the two stands at approximately US$ 45 billion and Saudi Arabia is also a source of energy for India. West Asia is India’s ‘Extended Neighbourhood’ and Saudi Arabia is an important country in India’s ‘Think West’ policy. Both the countries have a convergence of interests in fighting terrorism\, extremism and piracy. The signing of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) has the potential to further enhance connectivity between the two countries. \nDr. Pradhan concluded by stating that the regional order in West Asia continues to remain fragile and tense; and thus Saudi Arabia has recalibrated its approach accordingly. It is gradually adopting a more accommodative and pragmatic foreign policy approach in recent years than ever in the past. \nQuestions and Comments\nScholars at MP-IDSA engaged in a question and answer session that focused on US-Saudi relations\, Russia’s support to the Houthis\, China-Saudi Arabia collaboration to produce military drones\, prospects of the IMEC project\, potential of India-Saudi defence cooperation and the Saudi policy towards the Syrian Crisis. Dr. Pradhan provided insightful responses to the questions and comments from the floor. \nReport was prepared by Ms. Sandra Sajeev D Costa\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-saudi-foreign-policy-in-the-emerging-regional-order-in-west-asia
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240801T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240801T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240819T190042Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240819T190131Z
UID:82308-1722490200-1722490200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Interaction with Dr. Michael Malley\, US Naval Postgraduate School
DESCRIPTION:On 1 August 2024\, Dr. Michael Malley\, Senior Lecturer\, Department of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School\, Monterey\, California\, visited MP-IDSA to deliver his remarks on multilateral maritime security cooperation. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General MP-IDSA\, chaired the meeting\, which was attended by scholars from various centres. \nAmb. Chinoy commenced the proceedings with a brief introduction of Dr. Malley and the circumstances of their acquaintance at the recently-concluded Indian Ocean Defence and Security Conference in Perth\, Australia. He then turned the floor over to the Speaker. The Speaker also gave a brief introduction of the Naval Postgraduate School and his own educational background. He cited particularly the NPS’ role in training and capacity-building of the militaries of other countries as germane to his remarks. \nThe Speaker informed the audience that his remarks would primarily revolve around the challenges of maritime cooperation in the region and how they create opportunities for allies and partners of the US to work together. He held maritime security cooperation to be the product of the immediate post-Cold War era\, when the threat of global nuclear conflict as an expression of superpower confrontation receded.  At the same time\, he argued\, maritime trade boomed as a result of the economic modernisation and integration of China and India\, which in turn led to the growing convergence of trade and security agendas on the high seas. These trends led the spotlight to fall on navies\, which were now tasked not to manage superpower conflict\, but to prevent non-traditional security threats such as pirates\, traffickers\, terrorists and fishers engaged in Illegal\, Unregulated and Unrecognised (IUU) fishing. \nDr. Malley noted that the world was now experiencing the ‘rapid proliferation of maritime security cooperation initiatives’ in which the US was involved to varying degrees. He pointed to some concrete examples in the form of initiatives mounted in the Caribbean against drug trafficking\, the Indian Ocean against piracy\, and the Southeast Asian region. All these initiatives\, he pointed out\, have been designed to be flexible in terms of membership and interoperability in light of the desires of several states in the region to preserve their sovereignty and strategic autonomy. \nGrey zone conflict challenges this model of maritime security cooperation seriously\, the Speaker noted. This is because grey zone activities may be present as classical non-traditional security threats\, but in actuality are likely to have a state actor pulling the strings in the background. An example offered by him in this regard was the Chinese Coast Guard’s recent violent clashes with Philippine law enforcement personnel\, where water cannons were used to disperse the latter\, vis-à-vis the protection offered by it to the so-called ‘maritime militia’ which often forms the spearhead of China’s intrusions into disputed waters. \nBroadly speaking\, Dr. Malley noted\, maritime security cooperation can be divided into three forms. The first form is interdiction or kinetic action cooperation\, where the US along with its allies and partners uses its ships to actually interdict vessels conducting illegal actions. The second form is that of information-sharing\, where states agree to collect\, analyse and disseminate relevant intelligence to improve maritime domain awareness. Finally\, the third type of cooperation involves capacity-building\, where states such as the US (and increasingly Japan) help smaller countries which are presently incapable of monitoring their vast maritime domains to be able to do so. He concluded his remarks by expressing an interest in understanding how India approaches these forms of security cooperation and the concerns it has relating to them. \nAmb. Chinoy thanked Dr. Malley for sharing his remarks and presented his view of India’s stance on these issues. He noted that while major power contestation is well underway in the modern era\, there is a space for like-minded countries to band together. This may involve strengthening the traditional alliance structure in some cases\, but goes beyond these to the creation of an ‘era of quasi-alliances’\, which are not predicated on close synchronicity of thought on every count to achieve cooperation. Nevertheless\, issues of sovereignty have the potential to create friction and present limits to cooperation. \nIn light of his previous remarks\, Amb. Chinoy posed a few questions to the Speaker. Firstly\, he invited the Speaker to clarify whether the US commitment to international legal instruments such as the UNCLOS could be relied upon in light of the US’ non-ratification of UNCLOS. Secondly\, on the issue of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS)\, he invited the Speaker to remark on whether friendly nations are expected to condone\, or at least tolerate\, US FONOPS conducted against them in the same manner as when they are conducted against countries such as China. Finally\, he urged the Speaker to comment on the reasons behind the US’ absence from the International Seabed Authority. \nDr. Malley answered the last question first by noting that the US’ stance on the ISA and global efforts to codify common norms on seabed mining are rooted in the peculiar worldview of 1980s US politics\, as is its stance on UNCLOS. He confessed that there should not be any expectation of a sudden change in the US position on this issue given the vagaries of US domestic politics\, though there is ample support within the US armed forces as well as sections of its defence bureaucracy for ratification. He encouraged the audience to think of statements regarding the ‘rules-based international order’ made by US officials as forms of signalling support of UNCLOS as an element of that order. \nSimilarly\, Dr. Malley characterised FONOPS as another ‘oddity’ of US foreign policy\, devised as a legalistic effort to deny any other country in the international system the right to any exclusive national claim to the maritime commons under the belief that silence on such claims-making would be construed as assent. He also argued that there were significant doubts on the deterrence potential of FONOPS in the South China Sea region\, where it acts a ‘tool with various impacts’ on the concerned countries. \nThe Chair then invited questions from the floor. Scholars from the Indian side obliged by asking the visitor a host of questions on topics ranging from particular policy stances adopted by the US government to the modalities of the India-US relationship. He answered most of them fully and frankly\, engaging the audience for their views on the issue. \nOn a question from the Indian side regarding backlash to the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) programme from certain countries in Southeast Asia\, the Speaker answered that behind such attitudes may lie a perception that existing information-sharing structures operating in Southeast Asia\, which these countries happen to host presently\, may be supplanted by a broader structure that could cause them to lose their primacy in the information supply chain. \nTo a question on the perception in many Asian countries that the US is steadily losing focus on the Indo-Pacific as it invests gargantuan amounts of aid in Ukraine and Israel\, the Speaker answered that this only seemed to be the case. He noted the coming together of the naval chiefs of the United Kingdom\, US\, Australia and Japan at Perth to set up a mechanism to host a nuclear submarine maintenance base in the region as a promising development. He also offered the analysis that the differing policy preferences of various incumbent Presidents may also be a factor in creating this impression. \nIn response to a question concerning the US Armed Forces’ preparation for combatting climate change\, the Speaker stated that the US Armed Forces\, especially the Navy\, are extremely cognisant of the dangers of climate change and have set up varying mechanisms to account for it in their strategic plans\, such as appointing an Assistant Secretary on Climate Change at the Pentagon and conducting apolitical studies on the likely impacts of climate change. \nAnother question posed to Dr. Malley concerned the US military’s assessment of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s exercises around Taiwan Strait. He replied to the question by agreeing that the US was closely monitoring such exercises\, and that its conclusion is that the PLAN’s capacity to blockade Taiwan is increasing. This is true not only of its maritime interdiction capacity\, but also the capacity to mount shore-based attacks. This has ensured that US forces concentrated in Japan and the Republic of Korea are also within range of land-based missiles. As a result\, the US military is now preparing to enact a strategy of ‘distributed lethality’\, by which these US forces are being broken up into smaller detachments and distributed across the First Island Chain so as to ensure their survivability. \nIn a second round of questions\, the Chair Amb. Chinoy inquired of the Speaker as to what he would consider as a ‘red line’ for the US military that would trigger intervention by it against China in the SCS. He noted that the lack of a red line is cause for concern on the part of several actors across the region\, as it does not encourage confidence in the US’ commitments. \nThe Speaker in his response first flagged the criticality of the question posed\, but could not reassure the audience that any such ‘red line’ could be clearly defined at present. He argued that while an attack on the Senkaku Islands would trigger Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty\, making US intervention inevitable\, it is not at all clear whether an attack on Taiwan’s offshore islands (such as Jinmen and Matsu) would constitute grounds for intervention. He hypothesised that the trigger for intervention in Taiwan would most likely be legal-political. \nAfter Amb. Chinoy delivered his closing remarks\, the meeting came to an end. \nReport was prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta\, Research Analyst\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/interaction-with-dr-michael-malley-us-naval-postgraduate-school
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240722T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240722T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240801T002320Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240801T002356Z
UID:82095-1721626200-1721626200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to Russia: Key Takeaways
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Rajorshi Roy\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, made a presentation on Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to Russia: Key Takeaways” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 22 July 2024. The session was moderated by Ms. Anandita Bhada\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. The Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and other IDSA scholars participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe meeting focussed on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Russia\, his first since the COVID-19 pandemic and the onset of the Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. The visit highlighted the relevance of India-Russia relations amidst shifting global dynamics. The economic agenda was a central focus\, with nine economic agreements signed and plans to achieve US$100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030. PM Modi’s visit highlighted India’s strategic autonomy and its ability to balance relations with major global powers. The oil trade between the two countries has been particularly beneficial for India while helping stabilise global energy markets. \nDetailed Report\nMs. Anandita Bhada initiated the discussion by highlighting various aspects of the visit including the scope of some of the agreements signed between India and Russia. \nDr. Rajorshi Roy informed the audience about Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Russia since the COVID-19 pandemic and the onset of the Russian military operation in Ukraine. This visit highlighted the relevance of India-Russia relations amidst shifting global dynamics. One of the most significant outcomes of the visit was the ambitious target set by both nations to achieve US$100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030. The economic agenda was a central focus\, with nine agreements signed. The Joint Statement outlined the commitment to unlock their economic potential through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)\, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)\, Unified Payments Interface (UPI)\, and energy initiatives. Plans were also made to open two new consulates in Kazan and Yekaterinburg and introduce e-visas in four days\, reflecting a strong commitment to enhance connectivity and people-to-people linkages. In addition to these\, joint Research & Development (R&D) and expanded military exchanges in the defence sector were discussed\, signalling a deepening of strategic ties. \nDr. Roy highlighted Russia’s grand strategy of actively seeking new global partners\, particularly the Global South\, to withstand Western pressure. Dr. Roy also informed the audience how the visit highlighted India’s strategic autonomy and its ability to balance relations with major global powers. The strengthening of India-Russia ties is seen as a way to reinforce India ’s strategic autonomy. The oil trade between the two countries has been particularly beneficial for India while also helping stabilise global energy markets. Challenges remain\, such as trade imbalance\, the payment mechanism and the overhang of Western sanctions. The “Make in India” initiative and the cost of a drift in India-Russia partnership were also discussed\, emphasising the need for adding more pillars to the bilateral relationship. \nAccording to Dr. Roy\, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Russia was both symbolic and strategically significant. The discussions and agreements have set a solid foundation for navigating ties onto the future. \nQuestions and Comments\nThe presentation was followed by comments from Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy. He stated how Prime Minister Modi’s visit was extraordinary\, highlighting India’s vision for autonomy amid global tensions. Trump’s critique of Biden’s handling of international affairs underscores the complexity of the situation\, wherein the former is suggesting that the U.S. should engage with Russia. Putin’s determination in the Ukraine conflict hints at a prolonged war. Although India’s role as a mediator seems ambitious\, given the proxy nature of the war\, its diplomatic efforts remain notable. This was followed by a lively Q&A session. \nReport was prepared by Mr. Tatsat Pati\, Intern\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-prime-minister-modis-visit-to-russia-key-takeaways
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240715T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240715T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240730T231039Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240731T000527Z
UID:82079-1721021400-1721021400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting Report: Japan’s Currency Crisis and its Implications
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Arnab Dasgupta\, Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis made a presentation on “Japan’s Currency Crisis and its Implications” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 15 July 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. R. K. Dhawan\, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA. Scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nJapan made a significant transition from exerting hard power to prioritising soft power. The Japanese model was a mix of free market and socialist system. Later on\, several Southeast Asian countries also adopted a similar approach to achieve their development goals. Countries such as Thailand\, Malaysia\, and Indonesia also adopted this economic model\, and China and Vietnam have followed the same. This Japanese economic model was referred to as the ‘flying geese’ model. In the early 1990s\, the collapse of massive assets led to a crisis in the Japanese currency. Several factors contributed to the devaluation of the Yen\, including the interest rate differential between the US and Japan\, as well as the huge selling of the yen\, resulting in a decline in its value. \nDetailed Report\nThe session started with remarks by Dr. R.K. Dhawan on how the value of the Yen degraded over a period of time. He talked about the Plaza Accord according to which Japan was pressurised to appreciate the Yen and that led to the downfall of the Japanese economy and what we call lost decades. Japan has not been yet able to recover from it. \nDr. Dasgupta commenced his presentation with an introduction to the rise of the Japanese economy after World War II. Japan from the beginning was the preminent economic power in the 1950s and 1960s. The rise was remarkable because it was risen from the ashes of the 1940s and after suffering two nuclear bombs which no country has faced. In his presentation\, Dr. Dasgupta explained it all in brief. \nIn his presentation\, he talked about the Japanese economy of the post 1940s and 50s era. After the decade when Japan surrendered\, the country put into place a revolutionary system of ‘guided capitalism’\, that would give a growth rate averaging around 8 to 10 per cent until the 1970s and 7 per cent until the 1990s which led to international economists coining the “Flying Geese” model for Asia and all over the world. \nHe emphasised the role of the US in reviving the Japanese economy during the Japanese economy’s lost decades. The accommodative policies of the US not only opened the market for its domestic manufacturers but also pegged the Yen to a fixed value against the dollar. However\, the system that guided Japan to success also contained the roots essentially of its downfall because Japan’s antitrust laws encouraged the formation of giants called keiretsu. \nHe also highlighted the significance of the keiretsu and the impact of the real estate bubble. This economic bubble collapsed between 1991 and 1995\, leading to a period of deflation in Japan. Consequently\, there was a reduction in the prices of goods and services\, accompanied by diminished cash flow and corporate profits. This downturn resulted in decreased production and a decline in employment opportunities\, leading to a significant rise in unemployment. Subsequently\, consumers began to economise on goods and services\, contributing to an overabundance of supply in the market. \nFurther\, he explained the effects of deflation in Japan. The main leading banks of Japan were on the verge of collapse. Many companies were red-listed. The wages of the employees were kept stagnant. People started saving which led to depressed consumption. \nHe talked about the Rise of Abenomics where he explained changes in the monetary and fiscal policy and some structural changes that were made. He explained the changes in the monetary policy which led to the crisis in the Japanese economy. The first target of Abenomics was setting an inflation target of 2 par cent so that the prices of goods would rise which would stimulate more production. The second was setting Yen volatility control so that the Yen became stable. Then was the negative interest rates under which banks had to pay the entity that was holding their funds. Next was the public investment by which the government would intend to invest capital directly into the economy. Finally\, the quantitative easing (QE) by which the Bank of Japan (BoJ) would buy government and non-government bonds in the open market\, and in effect\, it could use credit liquidity to buy back its own debt. Besides all these\, there was a fiscal policy that used consumption tax hikes to fund spending. They brought in structural reforms to strengthen antitrust laws\, boost women’s participation\, and increase immigration. When Haruhiko Kuroda was appointed as governor of the BoJ\, he came up with some changes and initiated Yield Curve Control (YCC) in 2016\, with rates of 0 per cent long-term\, -0.1 per cent short and medium-term. Now the Banks had to pay BoJ interest for their deposits. After the implementation of these changes\, the Abe government had some success in increasing GDP and inflationary expectations were created. \nFurther\, Dr. Dasgupta explained the failures of Abenomics. Some of them are that the real GDP growth declined\, consumption rates remained stagnant\, the government deficit grew\, and labor force participation lowered as structural reforms were never implemented. \nDr. Dasgupta explained the ramifications of Abenomics for the Japanese economy\, highlighting a fluctuating pattern in comparison to the dollar. This was accompanied by a decline in both productivity and consumption\, alongside mild inflation resulting from the aggressive quantitative easing (QE) that bolstered the value of the Yen vis-à-vis the USD. However\, with the assumption of Kazuo Ueda as the Governor of the BoJ\, the QE was terminated. Consequently\, Japan found itself designated as a currency manipulator\, rendering it susceptible to potential sanctions. Of note\, the US initiated non-cooperation with Japan during the US-Japan-South Korea meeting\, emphasising the need for close consultation. \nHe also spoke on the impact on tourism and defense modernisation\, stating that Japan has increased its defense modernisation budget\, ranking 6th in expenditure. \nQuestions and Comments\nScholars at MP-IDSA posed a diverse range of inquiries. Questions were raised about the internal pressure on Japan to strengthen the Yen\, the structural changes in the Japanese economy\, the potential impact of advancing Chinese technology\, the decline of Japanese technology\, and the role of the US in reinvigorating the Japanese economy. \nDr. Arnab Dasgupta provided insightful answers to the questions. \nReport was prepared by Mr. Rajnish Kumar\, Intern\, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-report-japans-currency-crisis-and-its-implications
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240708T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240708T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240813T031751Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240813T031751Z
UID:82253-1720416600-1720416600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Monday Morning Meeting on China’s Nuclear Arsenal: An Assessment
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Niranjan Oak\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA\, made a presentation on “China’s Nuclear Arsenal: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 8 July 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Rajiv Nayan\, Senior Research Associate\, MP-IDSA.  The scholars of the Institute were in attendance. \nExecutive Summary\nThe growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is on account of threat perception coming from the US. China is moving away from a minimum deterrence policy\, although the minimum is a subjective term; the sheer number of estimated warheads is huge and is increasing every year. The character of the stockpile is changing\, and is getting diversified which in turn is reflected in all three legs of the triad. There is a marked improvement in both conventional and nuclear capabilities in terms of precision\, mobility and technology.  \nDetailed Report\nBefore introducing the Speaker\, Dr. Rajiv Nayan introduced the topic by providing important background details about the release of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report on the nuclear stockpile in the world. \nMr. Niranjan Oak began his presentation by explaining the organisation of the Chinese nuclear force structure. Among the four services of the People’s Liberation Army\, PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) is in charge of nuclear and conventional land-based missiles\, which in turn is commanded by the Chairman of the Central Military Commission\, currently held by President Xi Jinping. Following Xi Jinping’s arrival at the helm of affairs\, the name of the Second Artillery Force was changed to PLARF. \nSubsequently\, Mr. Oak explained the expanding capacity of PLARF in terms of its increasing number of bases and brigades\, as well as the evolution of China’s land-based missiles\, the mainstay of which is the Dongfeng series of missiles. Regarding sea-based missiles\, China has fielded six Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Each of these SSBNs can carry up to 12 three-stage solid fuelled JL2 and JL3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM). In addition\, China is also developing next-generation Type 096 SSBNs with carrying capacity of up to 24 SLBMs. \nMr. Oak also explained China’s aircraft and aircraft delivered missile capabilities\, supposedly the weakest link in the Chinese nuclear triad. The H-6N is China’s first nuclear-capable bomber with the capability to be refueled in mid-air. To arm H-6N\, China has been developing two new air-launched ballistic missiles. The Chinese bombers can carry CJ-20 air launched cruise missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads. China is said to be developing its first long-range strategic bomber H-20 with an anticipated range of more than 10\,000 kilometers and a stealth design. \nMr. Oak then touched upon Chinese Hypersonic missile capabilities. There are two types of hypersonic missiles- hypersonic boost glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. China has been carrying out tests of DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicles since December 2014. It is reported to possess a range of 1600-2400 kilometers. China has deployed a DF-17 medium-range missile system equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles since 2019. According to reports\, China has conducted a successful flight test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile DF-27 with hypersonic traits\, thus\, increasing range and delivery capacity of China. Additionally\, China reportedly conducted a test of the Starry Sky 2 Xingkong-2 hypersonic cruise missile. This system is believed to have a range of 700-800 km and a top speed of Mach 6 with a specific feature of wave rider flight vehicle after the launch. \nMr. Oak detailed another important military technology\, the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). In 2021\, China conducted a test of FOBS equipped with a hypersonic boost glide vehicle. Regarding the 2021 revelation of missile silos (through satellite imageries)\, reports indicates that China has built approximately 350 silos. Considering that China has Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology\, it can store more than 1000 missiles. As SIPRI data puts it\, the Chinese nuclear stockpiles are 500 nuclear warheads. The same report claims that the number of Chinese ICBM’s is likely to reach or even exceed the number held either by Russia or US\, which is around 400 ICBMs.  \nSubsequently\, Mr. Oak talked about the changing Chinese nuclear posture.  The emergence and relevance of the Launch on Warning system in Chinese nuclear strategy was explored. The studies by both western and Chinese academia corroborate this development. The Science of Military Strategy 2020 discusses how the US and Russia maintain a state of high alert when it comes to strategic weapons\, and therefore\, even China should maintain a state of high alert. Mr. Oak\, then\, elaborated upon the drivers of China’s changing nuclear profile. \nFirst and foremost in this category is the US’s improved conventional capability. The collapse of INF Treaty along with development of more advanced missiles like land based Tomahawk missiles and SM-6 missiles is threatening to China. Secondly\, a section of experts in China believe that US conventional counter-force capabilities\, together with tactical weapons would degrade or even eliminate China’s secure second strike. The third factor is Taiwan. China wants to annex Taiwan\, if necessary\, by force. Most recently\, Xi reiterated his reunification pledge in April 2024. The fourth factor is Great Power status wherein Mr. Oak concluded that China has resources and material wherewithal to go for nuclear modernisation\, thus achieving great power status. \nAfter describing the drivers of change in China’s nuclear posture\, Mr. Oak shared his own assessment. The growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is due to the threat perception from the US. China is moving away from the minimum deterrence policy\, although minimum is a subjective term; the sheer number of estimated warheads is huge and is increasing every year. The character of the arsenal is changing in all three legs of the triad\, and is diversifying. There is a marked improvement in both conventional and nuclear capabilities in terms of precision\, mobility and technology. Technological advances are making the PLA develop and deploy hypersonic weapons\, MIRVs and FOBS. At the operational level\, nuclear forces are on high alert\, leading to compressed timelines for decision making. \nIn the end\, Mr. Oak explained what the above developments meant for India and what India could do in order to gain a competitive edge. Even if India has numerically fewer nuclear warheads than China\, India needs to disperse its nuclear warheads and launchers innovatively throughout the country to survive the first strike.  \nThe India-China nuclear dyad has already entered a classic stability-instability paradox. There is less likelihood of nuclear confrontation. But there are increasing chances of conventional confrontation. With nuclear stability at the strategic level; India needs to improve its conventional capabilities. \nBefore opening the floor for questions and comments\, Dr. Nayan made pertinent observations with respect to a range of issues related to FOBS\, China’s defence modernisation in terms of nuclear advancement\, the Chinese ‘no first use’ policy\, China-Russia collaboration and growing US-China confrontation essentially pushing up the world’s defence budget. \nThe Report is prepared by Mr. Abhishek Verma\, Research Analyst\, Internal Security Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-monday-morning-meeting-on-chinas-nuclear-arsenal-an-assessment
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240703T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240703T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240804T232149Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240804T232149Z
UID:82107-1719984600-1719984600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Lecture by Dr. Samir V. Kamat\, DRDO on Technology Vision 2047
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, organised a lecture by Dr. Samir V. Kamat\, Secretary\, Department of Defence R&D and Chairman\, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)\, under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series on 3 July 2024. The theme of his talk was “Technology Vision 2047”. The event was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute were in attendance. \nExecutive Summary\nDr. Samir V. Kamat discussed the transition driven by rapid technological advancements and disruptive technologies that are transforming warfare in the present multipolar world. He highlighted India’s strategic potential to impact the technology landscape and stressed the importance of preparedness for emerging conflicts. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) plays a pivotal role in this\, supported by academia and Micro\, Small\, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). Dr. Kamat outlined progress in various defence sectors\, including missile systems\, armoured vehicles\, and aeronautics\, while acknowledging challenges such as semiconductor production and the need for global supply chain integration. He also emphasised initiatives like Atmanirbhar Bharat and Make-in-India to boost self-reliance and technological innovation\, with a focus on next-generation platforms and advanced technologies. Despite current R&D spending challenges\, efforts are underway to increase private sector involvement and foster a risk-taking culture to drive innovation. \nDetailed Report\nThe Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy delivered his opening remarks by introducing Dr. Samir V. Kamat. \nDr. Samir V. Kamat started his lecture by highlighting the significant transformation from a unipolar to a multi-polar world order which is accompanied by an accelerating rate of technological change and the emergence of disruptive technologies\, which are reshaping the nature of warfare. Dr. Kamat emphasised that India is strategically positioned to influence the evolving technology landscape\, necessitating a focused approach to emerging technological domains. The accelerating rate of evolution of disruptive technologies\, particularly in cyber and information domain\, are reshaping modern combat\, underscoring the need for preparedness before the rise of any major conflicts. \nThe defence research and development (R&D) landscape is primarily driven by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)\, with significant support from academia and Micro\, Small\, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). Dr. Kamat highlighted the role of the DRDO and its responsibility to design and development of defence systems\, which are subsequently produced by Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) or private industries through Transfer of Technology (ToT) agreements. \nIndia’s defence sector encompasses a broad spectrum of systems\, including ballistic missiles\, armoured vehicles\, artillery\, small arms\, and advancements in aerospace and aeronautics. Significant progress has been made in various technological domains within the defence sector. In missile systems\, the development of surface-to-air and cruise missiles\, including the Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon (SAAW)\, alongside advanced anti-tank missile systems and multi-barrel rocket systems\, highlight the strides in enhancing defence capabilities. For armoured vehicles and land systems\, innovations include the creation of lightweight single-span mountain footbridges (MFB) and 46-meter MLC-70 modular bridges\, as well as lightweight advanced infantry floating footbridges and various military bridging systems and land-based platforms \nIn aeronautics\, the development of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas Mk-IA has been a key focus\, along with DRDO Netra Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEW&CS).  However\, challenges remain\, particularly in semiconductor device production and the need for investment in critical material processing facilities. Additionally\, Dr. Kamat stressed that integrating into the global supply chain is crucial for economic viability and reducing reliance on imports. The infantry weapons segment has seen the development of the JVPC 9mm machine pistol\, multi-mode hand grenades\, and 40mm Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL) grenades. Additionally\, indigenous replacement programs for existing munitions\, including anti-tank and artillery ammunition\, are being pursued to enhance self-reliance in defence supplies. \nIn alignment with Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s vision of Viksit Bharat 2047 and a leader in defence technology\, initiatives such as ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’and ‘Make in India’ are being vigorously pursued. These include enhancing technological capabilities through initiatives like the Defence Production Partner concept and fostering collaboration with industries for design\, development\, and production. Streamlining technology transfers and modifying policies to alleviate royalty burdens are part of this vision. Efforts to increase capacity through partnerships with educational institutions and promote innovation via contests and funding are underway\, with a focus on developing complex systems and disruptive technologies. \nDr. Kamat emphasised prioritising next-generation platforms like advanced combat aircraft\, high-endurance autonomous underwater vehicles\, and future-ready combat vehicles\, along with next-gen weapons and sensors such as long-range precision strike capabilities\, laser and microwave weapons\, and advanced propulsion technologies. Balancing speed and accuracy in new technologies and emphasising space and satellite technologies for defence are key future challenges and opportunities. Overall\, the lecture outlined India’s strategic direction in defence technology\, highlighting achievements\, challenges\, and plans for innovation\, collaboration\, and capacity building. \nDr. Kamat mentioned that significant progress has been made in various technological domains\, including the development of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and electric propulsion system for ships. Efforts are also focused on enhancing underwater domain awareness and networked systems to bolster maritime security. In addition\, there is a concerted push towards improving space situational awareness and Intelligence\, Surveillance\, and Reconnaissance (ISR)\, with particular emphasis on space-based ISR capabilities. Cyber capabilities and secure communication technologies\, such as quantum communication\, are also being prioritised. \nKey areas of focus in research and development include Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML)\, quantum technologies encompassing communication\, sensing\, and computing\, as well as cognitive and anti-stealth technologies. Efforts are also being directed towards hypersonic missile defence and directed energy weapons\, alongside advancements in materials and manufacturing processes\, including post-quantum cryptography. He further stated that initiatives have been undertaken to establish laboratories for young scientists to foster innovation within a start-up culture. This includes collaboration with academia and industry to develop cutting-edge technologies. Additionally\, the establishment of industry-academia centres of excellence aim to advance domain-specific technologies. Projects within these centres are reaching maturity and transitioning to the industry\, positioning them for market readiness. A notable achievement has been the significant reduction in the weight of bulletproof jackets while maintaining their protective capabilities. In addition of this\, new facilities are being developed for testing hypersonic vehicles\, drones\, and other advanced systems\, ensuring comprehensive evaluation and refinement of these technologies. \nDespite challenges such as low research and development (R&D) spending (currently at 0.65 percent of GDP) compared to other countries\, strategies are being implemented to increase private sector involvement in R&D. There is also a push to cultivate a risk-taking mindset to drive innovation and establish leadership in technology. However\, for the private sector to effectively engage in risk-taking\, improved government policies are necessary and at present\, there is a strong emphasis on shifting mindsets to embrace and learn from failures. While challenges exist\, there is an optimistic outlook towards achieving the set goals through the right strategies and support mechanisms. \nQuestions and Comments\nThe main questions posed addressed various aspects of advancing India’s defence sector. Key areas included enhancing education in defence laboratories for better implementation of advanced techniques and identifying primary focus areas for disruption in defence technology\, including understanding adversaries’ capabilities. Strategies for becoming a leading defence exporter\, like emulating successful countries\, were discussed\, along with measures to boost private sector participation and fostering investment. Emphasis was placed on offering high-quality or cost-effective solutions\, driving innovation\, and necessary mindset changes to lead in defence technology. Strategic planning to meet demands\, build global competitiveness\, and improve collaborations was deemed essential. Also that\, leveraging India’s economic status for global defence positioning and focusing on potential disruptions in defence technologies are crucial. Further\, enhancing geopolitical influence to boost exports\, addressing current production gaps\, and improving private sector participation were emphasised. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr. Samir V. Kamat spoke on issues surrounding hypersonic technology and its distinct challenges. While hypersonic glide vehicles are relatively easier to intercept due to their predictable trajectory\, hypersonic cruise missiles\, capable of manoeuvrability\, pose a greater threat. In the realm of manufacturing\, 3D printing is advancing rapidly\, with a focus on metal powders\, though limitations in component size persist. He also stated that biotechnology\, primarily applied to biodefence\, has limited relevance in this context. Engine technology has seen improvements with single crystal turbine blades\, but integration challenges remain. According to Dr. Kamat\, material science necessitates advanced materials for enhanced performance\, requiring collaborative efforts. \nDr. Kamat emphasised that government support is essential for managing the inherent risks of emerging technologies and fostering innovation within the expanding startup ecosystem. The discussion highlighted the need to advance domestic defence capabilities and emphasised the need to develop advanced platforms\, encourage innovation\, and increase private sector participation in defence research and development despite current challenges. \nThe report has been prepared by Dr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, Research Analyst\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/lecture-by-dr-samir-v-kamat-drdo-on-technology-vision-2047
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240701T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240701T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240712T051502Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240912T123516Z
UID:81871-1719811800-1719811800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Sheikh Hasina’s Visit to India and India-Bangladesh Relations”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Anand Kumar\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, made a presentation on “Sheikh Hasina’s Visit to India and India-Bangladesh Relations” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 1 July 2024. The session was chaired by Dr. Om Prakash Das\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. The Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and other IDSA scholars participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe meeting focused on Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India. The visit focused on enhancing collaboration in terms of defence cooperation\, trade and commerce\, frontier technologies including civil nuclear\, oceanography and space technology. Both nations reiterated their commitment for a free\, open\, inclusive\, secure\, and rule-based Indo-Pacific region. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Om Prakash Das convened the meeting by highlighting the significance of Sheikh Hasina’s visit on 21-22 June 2024\, which was her first bilateral visit since being re-elected in January 2024\, and also her second visit to India within a month following her attendance at Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s oath-taking ceremony. This visit was notably significant as it was the first state visit after Prime Minister Modi’s re-election for a third consecutive term. \nDr. Anand Kumar began his presentation by emphasising the importance of bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh and their mutual desire to guide the relationship into a new era of future-oriented partnership. Dr. Kumar outlined Sheikh Hasina’s visit to China in coming times\, ongoing foreign currency crisis in Bangladesh and PM Hasina’s aim to ensure the continuous supply of essential commodities which are essential for maintaining political stability in Bangladesh\, as the possible reasons for her visit. \nDr. Kumar informed the audience about the outcomes of the visit\, marked by the signing of ten Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and thirteen announcements. Economic and trade cooperation between the two countries saw significant strides\, with agreements to commence negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and Bangladesh offering two Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to India in Mongla and Mirsharai. Dr. Kumar highlighted that while trade and commerce between India and Bangladesh have seen significant improvements\, there remains limited engagement in defence industrial cooperation. India proposed defence industrial cooperation to modernise the Bangladesh Armed Forces\, and an agreement was signed to train 350 Bangladesh police officers. \nDr. Kumar pointed out that transit and connectivity were major themes\, with India expressing its intent to expand connectivity in physical\, energy\, and digital forms. MoUs were signed between the railways of both countries. According to Dr. Kumar\, an important development was India’s agreement to provide transit facilities for Bangladeshi goods to Nepal and Bhutan via Indian railways. Dr. Kumar drew attention to the agreements signed on energy and digital connectivity\, including a pact between the National Payment Corporation of India (NPCI) and Bangladesh Bank to launch Unified Payment Interface (UPI) in Bangladesh. Further collaboration in frontier technologies was agreed upon\, including civil nuclear\, oceanography\, and space technology. \nHumanitarian issues were prominently discussed\, with the renewal of an MoU between the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Ministry of Disaster Management for disaster relief. Additionally\, India introduced e-Visas for Bangladeshi medical patients seeking treatment in India. On regional and diplomatic issues\, Dr. Kumar noted the commitment of both nations for a free\, open\, inclusive\, secure\, and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. He informed about India’s commitment of continued support for resolving the Rohingya crisis. Dr. Kumar discussed the ongoing Teesta river issue and marked it as important to the extent that it can affect bilateral relations. He further informed that the Ganges Water Treaty\, signed in 1996\, is being renewed by mutual consent\, with a technical team established to conduct groundwork. \nDr. Kumar reiterated the Indian Government’s commitment to strengthen the country’s relations with its neighbours by highlighting remarks made by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on Sheikh Hasina’s visit. The presentation concluded by acknowledging the mutual efforts of both nations to strengthen bilateral ties by ensuring that their relationship remains “future ready.” \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy appreciated the detailed presentation by Dr. Kumar. He addressed several key challenges in bilateral ties by pointing out the prevailing sentiment among the Bangladeshi people regarding limited access to the Indian market. Amb. Chinoy queried the way forward to address this issue. He highlighted the complexities of dealing with smugglers in the border areas\, often armed and travelling in large numbers at night\, and the unwillingness of the Bangladeshi side to address these issues. Additionally\, he raised concerns about the illegal entry of both Bangladeshis and Rohingyas into India\, questioning the extent of India’s responsibility\, given that it is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. \nDuring the Q&A session\, Dr. Kumar responded to the question about Bangladeshi access to the Indian market by noting the interests of Indian businessmen must also be considered\, necessitating detailed groundwork for a balanced approach. Addressing the question about West Bengal’s stance on water issues\, Dr. Kumar explained the complexities surrounding the Teesta river\, citing significant water usage upstream and Chinese involvement in reservoir construction. He suggested that India could assist Bangladesh in building reservoirs to mitigate Chinese influence\, utilising the existing US$ 7 billion credit line\, majority of which is still not used. \nGp. Capt. R.K. Narang inquired about the relative ease for Bangladeshis to set up companies in India compared to the challenges faced by Indian businesses in Bangladesh and the persistence of anti-India sentiments. Dr. Kumar attributed these sentiments to historical factors and the growing influence of Gulf-based Islamist ideology. \nMr. Arvind Khare\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, inquired about West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s opposition to water discussions between India and Bangladesh without the State’s consultation\, questioning if her concerns align with national objectives. Dr. Kumar stated that while consultation with the state government is desirable\, foreign policy matters come under the central government. \nDr. Smruti S. Pattanaik\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, mentioned the strategic importance of the Chittagong-Kolkata train route and the launch of the e-Suvidha Portal for border trade\, highlighting the logistical advancements. She also said that Sheikh Hasina’s visit to China should not be seen as detrimental to India’s interests given the significant Indian investments. \nReport prepared by Puspa Kumari\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-sheikh-hasinas-visit-to-india-and-india-bangladesh-relations-2
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240624T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240624T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240912T123400Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240912T123400Z
UID:82547-1719207000-1719207000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Monday Morning Meeting on China-Russia Relationship: A Greater Alignment?
DESCRIPTION:Dr. M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) spoke on “China-Russia Relationship: A Greater Alignment?” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 24 June. The session was moderated by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting.    \nExecutive Summary\nThe growing cooperation between China and Russia visible at the international level has evoked considerable discussion regarding the extent of strategic alignment between the two countries as they perceive considerable strategic and economic pressure from the West. Dr Prathibha in her presentation underlines the factors motivating China-Russia cooperation\, the extent of cooperation between the two countries and finally the challenges to greater alignment between Russia and China. \nDetailed Report\nThe session opened with introductory remarks from Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh. Deliberating on the long history of Sino-Russia relations and its trajectory he observed that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a watershed event. Following Crimea’s annexation\, Russia’s reliance on China deepened in an unprecedented way because of US-led sanctions. Bilateral ties further advanced in 2020 and in 2022 a few days before the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis\, the two countries declared a ‘no-limits partnership’. Dr. Singh noted that although China and Russia are not treaty bound allies\, the West views them as such. However\, delving deeper\, differences over a range of issues are perceptible including Russia’s limited support to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Further\, questions remain about the depth of their partnership and the extent of their cooperation on geopolitical issues vis-à-vis the West. For instance\, China did not recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea and has been very careful in its support for Russia in order to avoid disruption of economic and diplomatic ties with Europe. Moreover\, with regard to military cooperation\, although the number of joint exercises is increasing\, there is little interoperability between the militaries of the two countries. Also\, Moscow has been reluctant to export sensitive military technology to Russia. Highlighting the differences between Russia and China’s perception of the world order\, he queried if Russia-China cooperation is driven by anti-US sentiment and whether the seeming closeness between Russia and China will have any implications for India. \nDr. M.S. Prathibha in her presentation explained the factors motivating China-Russia cooperation\, the extent of cooperation between the two countries and finally the challenges to greater alignment between Russia and China. \nDr. Prathibha noted that there is a surge of interest regarding Russia-China relations\, following the signing of the joint communique where they declared a no-limits partnership. The joint statement implying that there are no forbidden areas of cooperation between the two countries led observers in the West to conclude that Moscow and Beijing are likely to remove the previous constraints that impinged on bilateral cooperation. Apprehensions about unrestrained cooperation deepened as China aligned its position with Russia on the Ukraine crisis in the UN\, refused to condemn Moscow’s actions and Chinese media openly supported Russian narratives. Further\, increase in Russia’s exports to China\, naval exercises in South China Sea and Sea of Japan solidified the perception of growing strategic coordination between the two countries on the world stage. \nTurning to factors underpinning Russia-China cooperation\, Dr. Prathibha noted that strategic and development interests\, highlighted in the 2024 China-Russia joint talks are the two major factors driving cooperation between the two countries. She explained that strategic interests referred to limiting US primacy in international affairs to give Russia and China more manoeuvrability. Developmental interests are focused on accelerating economic development through access to modern and strategic technologies. She added that it is a strategic choice on the part of Russia and China to develop bilateral ties; first\, both countries perceive that the West is bent on denying them access to strategic technologies required for economic modernisation. Accordingly\, the two countries are looking into collaboration on sensitive and emerging technological domains. Second on the economic front\, while Russia is desperately looking for imports\, Chinese companies are also interested in tapping into the Russian market. \nWith regard to whether China and Russia are really cooperating\, Dr. Prathibha explained that there are indications of the two countries cooperating in the strategic and economic domain. For instance\, China and Russia are planning to work closely to jointly expand the influence of BRICS and the SCO as a counter to US-led organisations. Also\, China has become an economic lifeline to Russia by exporting dual use components. At the same time\, Beijing is using considerable influence to support Moscow while maintaining its neutrality. Additionally\, China and Russia are moving to cooperate in Central Asia to stabilise the region and enhance its economic potential through BRI and other Russian led initiatives. Similarly\, they are also looking into ways of implementing the pre-2030 plan which aims to modernise industrial supply chains between the two countries. In this context\, it is noteworthy that the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation in the New Era’ plan is a long-term view which extends till 2049. \nDiscussing whether the growing cooperation indicates alignment\, Dr. Prathibha noted that there are historical and structural challenges to strategic alignment between the countries. She observed that throughout history\, China and Russia have been imperial and hegemonic rivals. China holds the historical memory of losing territory to Russia and considers the latter to be an expansionist power. On the other hand\, current China-Russia cooperation is happening because of deterioration in China-US relations. Therefore\, if China and US relations improve\, the urgency from Chinese side to cooperate with Russia might reduce. She added that there is considerable mistrust on the Chinese side vis-à-vis Russia and cooperation with Moscow is dictated primarily by norms of Chinese foreign policy rather than any feeling of kinship. Furthermore\, the Chinese view is that the US is traditionally more willing to make concessions to improve bilateral ties. In contrast\, Russia is less accommodating\, making concessions only when compelled by pressure or threats\, rather than as a gesture of goodwill. \nDr. Prathibha concluded her presentation by stating that there could be greater coordination on the political and economic side to face Western pressure and formulate mutually favourable industrial policies respectively. However\, historical and structural factors will limit cooperation at least from the Chinese side. \nQ&A Session\nThe presentation was followed by a Q&A Session. Deputy Director General Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele queried about China’s reaction to Russia-North Korea cooperation and Russia’s stance in a possible conflict on Taiwan Straits. One of the scholars queried about the possibility of renewed competition between Russia-China and the US in Central Asia. Reflecting on Chinese mistrust towards Russia\, another scholar asked about Russia’s perception of Chinese expansionist tendencies and extent of Sino-Russian cooperation on military technology. \nDuring the Q&A session it was observed that Russia-China cooperation is not directed at India and Russia is unlikely to allow China to have a veto over its foreign policy. However\, it is in India’s interest to deepen India-Russia relations by adding more pillars to bilateral ties. \nReport prepared by Ms. Mayuri Banerjee\, Research Analyst\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-monday-morning-meeting-on-china-russia-relationship-a-greater-alignment
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240611T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240611T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240627T025808Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240701T225626Z
UID:81693-1718083800-1718083800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Roundtable Discussion on India-Iran Relations: Chabahar and Recent Developments in Iran
DESCRIPTION:On 11 June 2024\, a Roundtable Discussion on “India-Iran Relations: Chabahar and Recent Developments in Iran” was organised at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). The discussion was chaired by the Director General\, MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy. The Speakers were Ambassador Yashvardhan Kumar Sinha\, former Central Information Commissioner\, Ambassador Gaddam Dharmendra\, Dean\, Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service (SSIFS)\, Ministry of External Affairs\, and Dr. Deepika Saraswat\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary\nThe strategic importance of the Chabahar Port is crucial in strengthening India-Iran cooperation and enhancing regional connectivity. The Port’s development is central to India’s endeavors to establish a reliable trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)\, with Chabahar Port as a crucial link\, holds immense significance. The recent long-term contract between India’s India Port Global Ltd (IPGL) and Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organisation (PMO) underscores India’s commitment to furthering the port’s development and operations. Despite U.S. sanctions\, the Chabahar Port’s operational viability has been facilitated through sanctions waivers\, enabling the shipment of essential commodities like wheat and pulses from India to Afghanistan. Iran remains a close regional partner for India\, particularly in enhancing connectivity and economic cooperation with Afghanistan and Central Asia. \nDetailed Report\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy madeopening remarks at the roundtable discussion. He provided a comprehensive overview of the close India-Iran bilateral relations\, emphasising their importance and evolving dynamics. He highlighted the historical context\, noting Iran’s support for India at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) against Pakistan’s attempt for a resolution on human rights violations. \nAmb. Chinoy underscored the significance of the development of the Chabahar Port as a cornerstone of Indo-Iranian cooperation. He referenced the 2016 bilateral agreement worth US$ 85 million for Phase-I development of the Shahid Beheshti Port. A long-term 10-year contract signed in May 2024 between India Port Global Ltd (IPGL) and Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organisation (PMO) was highlighted. This agreement\, involving an Indian investment of approximately US$ 120 million\, aims to develop further and operate the port\, demonstrating India’s commitment to enhancing regional connectivity and economic cooperation. \nThe importance of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) was emphasised\, with Chabahar Port as a crucial link to Central Asia and Eurasia. Amb. Chinoy illustrated the Port’s operational significance by citing the shipment of 2.5 million tons of wheat and 2\,000 tons of pulses from India to Afghanistan\, facilitated by U.S. sanctions waivers. He noted that India’s position regarding connectivity with Afghanistan aligns with the U.S. vision. Amb. Chinoy also mentioned the geopolitical implications of the joint naval exercises conducted by Iran\, Russia\, and China in the Gulf of Oman in the Western Indian Ocean\, outlining potential ramifications for India’s critical interests in the region. \nAmbassador Yashvardhan Kumar Sinha provided a historical overview of India’s relations with Iran\, emphasising the deep-rooted cultural and historical ties between the two nations. Amb. Sinha noted that in 2002 when Iranian President Khatami offered Chabahar port development to India\, there were discussions in India of the strategic importance of Chabahar. The progress on India’s involvement in Chabahar gathered momentum in 2011-12. He recalled the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Iran during the 16th NAM Summit in August 2012\, when an action plan on Chabahar was discussed\, which later provided the basis for the 2016 Chabahar Agreement. \nAmb. Sinha emphasised the significant importance of the Chabahar Port for India\, particularly in light of India-Pakistan adversarial relations\, which have hindered direct overland connectivity\, one exception being India’s wheat shipment to Afghanistan under the World Food Programme going through Karachi. He also elaborated on the financial arrangements between India and Iran\, noting that the Reserve Bank of India had an arrangement with the Central Bank of Iran to open Rupee accounts with the UCO Bank\, facilitating smoother financial transactions between the two countries. \nAmb. Sinha noted that Chabahar is geographically closer to India and Central Asia than Bandar Abbas\, making it a more strategic and accessible option for reaching Afghanistan and Central Asia. Additionally\, he observed that quick development of transport infrastructure\, especially roads linking to Chabahar\, has taken place. He also mentioned India’s construction of the Zaranj-Delaram Highway connecting to the Garland Highway in Afghanistan. On a comparative note\, he noted that the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan imperils the prospects of Gwadar as a trans-shipment hub. He noted that other partners of India will have the opportunity to utilise this infrastructure\, thereby enhancing regional cooperation. \nAmbassador Gaddam Dharmendra stated that Iran has been at the centre of multiple developments\, especially following the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel. He noted that Iran has been linked to various actors\, including Hezbollah\, Hamas and the Houthis. Additionally\, he discussed the role of Egypt and the U.S. in the Israel-Hamas conflict. Amb. Dharmendra provided a detailed overview of the functioning and power dynamics of multiple power structures operating in Iran under the Supreme Leader\, specifically emphasising the increasing role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in various domains\, from politics to economy. \nAmb. Dharmendra outlined the recent progress in bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia\, highlighting efforts to bridge long-standing geopolitical divides and China’s role as a guarantor of the process. He elaborated on Iran’s forward defence strategy\, which involves using a decentralised network of non-state actors to secure its homeland. Iran has achieved significant success in training and mobilising these actors. However\, while Iran has the capability to initiate escalatory dynamics\, it lacks the power to dominate such escalations. This was exemplified in the recent attack on Israel\, where approximately 300 drones and missiles were launched. Despite this\, Iran’s influence remains substantial but not overwhelming in terms of maintaining prolonged dominance in conflict scenarios. \nAmb. Dharmendra also discussed the strained relations between Iran and the European Union\, particularly in the context of the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Following this withdrawal\, Iran has gradually undermined nearly all provisions of the JCPOA\, including dismantling surveillance cameras and limiting access to inspectors\, which has resulted in complicated relations with Europe. He also observed that Iran’s nuclear latency acts as a deterrent against potential Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. \nDr. Deepika Saraswat remarked that the 2016 Chabahar Agreement and the latest long-term contract exemplify India’s commitment to maintaining strong ties with Iran\, driven by enduring strategic logic. She argued that both countries share a common strategic and security environment in South-West Asia. She noted that Pakistan’s obstructionism gives certain inexorability to Iran’s gateway role. Dr. Saraswat noted that\, unlike the United States\, India views Iran as a regional partner with which it would seek to engage on the basis of convergence of interests. \nDr. Saraswat noted that despite significant developments in Iran-China relations\, particularly after the Iran-China 25-year agreement\, India would not like to see Iran fall into China’s geopolitical orbit. She also discussed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration-led “Look East” doctrine\, which emerged in 2005. This doctrine emphasised Iran’s pivot towards the East\, diversifying its international partnerships beyond traditional Western allies. Dr. Saraswat underscored Iran’s historical importance in fostering North-South connectivity since the completion of the Trans-Iranian railway in 1938. She specified that under the Look East doctrine\, Iran positioned itself as an ‘Asian country\,’ prioritising geoeconomic considerations over the conflict-ridden geopolitics of the Middle East. \nDr. Saraswat discussed that Iran’s geopolitical thinking had been shaped by its historical experience in the great game between Britain and Russia\, leading to a quest for independence and a nuanced understanding of imperialist geopolitics. Dr. Saraswat emphasised Iran’s self-perception as a regional power\, actively engaged in countering the U.S. in the Persian Gulf while also viewing Russia and China as strategic counterweights to the U.S. Iran’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in July 2023 has shown Iran’s approach towards multilateralism. However\, she noted that despite these alliances\, Iran maintains its identity as a civilisational state and does not consider itself a junior partner to Russia and China. Moreover\, Iran is cautious about China’s increasing dominance in Central Asia\, a sentiment shared by India as well. She also briefly spoke of the competitive dynamics between Iran and Pakistan in inter-regional connectivity between Central and South Asia. \nComments and Questions\nGp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA\, asked about Iran’s deteriorating economy and its options to navigate challenges. Dr. Ashok K. Behuria\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, shared his views on the Baloch rebellion in both Pakistan and Iran and its repercussions. He suggested that India’s anxiety about China-Pakistan nexus needs to be commensurate with India’s broader strategic vision. Dr. Rajiv Nayan\, Senior Research Associate\, MP-IDSA\, remarked on the need to study the technological progress of non-state actors and inquired about the multifaceted role of various authorities in the election of Iran’s new President. Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, posed questions regarding sector-specific investments in Iran and the Taliban’s proposal to invest in the Chabahar project. Dr. P. K. Pradhan\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, asked about evolving bilateral trade amid the potential for closer Iran-Saudi Arabia relations. \nAll three speakers comprehensively responded to these comments and questions. \nReport prepared by Mr. Abhishek Yadav\, Research Analyst\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/roundtable-discussion-on-india-iran-relations-chabahar-and-recent-developments-in-iran
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240610T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240610T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240627T230937Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240701T225701Z
UID:81715-1717997400-1717997400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on 46th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting: Key Takeaways
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Bipandeep Sharma\, Research Analyst\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA)\, made a presentation on “46th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting: Key Takeaways” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 10 June 2024. The Session was moderated by Comdt. M. Srivastava\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and other scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary:\nIndia successfully hosted the 46th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) and the 26th Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) meeting from 20-30 May\, 2024 at Kochi. Key discussions focused on Antarctic Tourism\, bio-security measures to combat avian influenza\, issues related to Emperor penguins\, and utilizing renewable energy in Antarctica. The successful hosting marks India’s growing role in Antarctic affairs and its dedication to scientific collaboration and environmental stewardship in the region. \nDetailed Report:\nComdt. M. Srivastava introduced the Speaker and set the stage by introducing the audience to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM). He mentioned that ATCM meetings consist of representatives of the Consultative parties\, the non-consultative parties\, observers such as the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR)\, Commission for Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)\, the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) and invited experts like the International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO). Comdt. Srivastava pointed out that India became a consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty in 1983.  Comdt. Srivastava noted that the ATCM serves as an important forum for exchanging information and discussions on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica. He stated that during the ATCM\, a meeting of the Committee for Environment Protection (CEP) is also conducted. India had earlier conducted the 30th ATCM and 10th CEP in 2007 at New Delhi. The 46th ATCM and 26th CEP was hosted by India at Kochi between 20 to 30 May 2024. He highlighted that the recent initiatives by India such as the Antarctic Act 2022 and its support for protecting the Antarctic Environment by designating East Antarctica and the Weddell Sea as MPAs (Marine Protected Areas) shows its active involvement in Antarctica. \nMr. Bipandeep Sharma commenced his presentation by explaining the Antarctic Treaty System. He highlighted India’s proactive diplomacy and success in hosting the ATCM-46 and CEP-26 meeting. Mr. Sharma mentioned that the participation of parties in ATCM and CEP meetings witnessed the reaffirmation of the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol\, 1991). He highlighted  ATCM and CEP to be crucial global forums for Antarctic affairs. Mr. Sharma mentioned that this year ATCM witnessed the creation of an additional working group which discussed the development of a ‘tourism framework’ for Antarctica. Mr. Sharma pointed out that CEP-26 discussed and addressed multiple issues that contributed to the implementation of the Environmental Protocol in Antarctica. He further highlighted that some of the priority issues highlighted in CEP 26 included issues of climate change and their implications for Antarctic Sea ice; environmental impact assessment of major activities in Antarctic; protection of the Emperor penguin\, and developing of an international framework for environmental monitoring in Antarctica. Mr. Sharma mentioned that as per the CEP recommendations this year\, Parties adopted 17 revised and new management plans for ASPAs (Antarctic Specially Protected Areas) and several modifications and additions to the list of Historic and Monument sites were undertaken. In his presentation\, Mr. Sharma highlighted that in ATCM-46 serious efforts to increase parties focus towards renewable energy use and to ensure robust implementation of biosecurity measures to minimise the risks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in the Antarctic were prioritised. \nCommenting on India’s part\, Mr. Sharma pointed out that the inaugural remarks at 46th ATCM were made by Shri Kiren Rijiju the then Union Minister of Earth Sciences\, who was accompanied by Ambassador Pavan Kapoor\, Secretary (West)\, Ministry of External Affairs and Dr. Shailesh Nayak\, former Secretary of MoES and Director\, National Institute of Advanced Studies\, Bengaluru. Mr. Sharma highlighted that India’s traditional philosophy of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (one Earth\, one family\, one future) resonated well in India’s inaugural remarks. He further pointed that India’s plans of setting up of a new Antarctic research station\, Maitri-II were also discussed in these initial remarks. He highlighted that India informed the parties regarding its future plans of submission of comprehensive environmental evaluations for establishing Maitri-II in Antarctica. \nIn the final part of his presentation\, Mr. Sharma highlighted the need for enhancing collaboration and cooperation between Indian and other like-minded countries in the Antarctica. He further pointed that there is need for promoting interdisciplinary research in polar regions by engaging Indian higher institutes of excellence in research from both scientific and social science domains. Mr. Sharma pointed that India needs to prioritise its efforts in fast-track construction/acquisition of polar infrastructures of which construction/acquisition of an independent Indian Polar Research vessel remains most important. Lastly\, he stressed that Indian representation in all future ATCM and CEP meetings\, needs to have polar domain experts from both scientific and policy spheres. This would further enhance India’s position in negotiating and raising India’s view point on matters of scientific and broader national interests in future ATCM and CEP platforms. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy complimented Mr. Bipandeep Sharma for providing a detailed account of ACTM-46 and CEP-26 meetings. He pointed that in the age of Anthropocene\, the Antarctic region remains vulnerable to multiple human induced transformations. Ambassador Chinoy in his remarks also questioned the basis of territorial claims of different states in the region. He further highlighted that India needs to prioritise the development of independent polar infrastructures to meet the country’s long term national interests in the region. \nMr. Tatsat Pati\, Intern\, made a query regarding the role of CCAMLR in the Antarctic region. He also asked the Speaker about the use of unmanned systems in undertaking various activities in extreme Antarctic climatic conditions. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang\, asked the Speaker to comment on the status of India’s planned Polar Research Vessel. \nMr. Bipandeep Sharma gave detailed remarks to all the questions and comments raised. \nReport prepared by Ms. Dorothy Vaanmalar C.\, Intern\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-46th-antarctic-treaty-consultative-meeting-key-takeaways
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240603T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240603T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240701T230817Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240701T230817Z
UID:81740-1717392600-1717392600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on Alignments and Realignments in Armenian Foreign Policy since the Velvet Revolution
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Wahlang noted that the current leadership’s attempts to find a long-term solution to peace\, particularly by delimitating the border\, have not been received positively by the Armenian public. Protests against the regime in Armenia have been linked to the government’s foreign and neighbourhood policy\, i.e.\, Azerbaijan. The local populace within Armenia is active and has coordinated protests in the past regarding Armenia’s policies\, particularly on Azerbaijan. Thus\, the domestic situation does relate to foreign policy and impacts the popularity of the leadership. \nDr. Jason further explained Armenia’s foreign policy in four phases. First\, the “Rise of Un-Sovietised Nationalistic Foreign Policy after 1991”\, under President Levon Ter Petrosyan. This policy was based on the first war of Nagorno-Karabakh\, wherein the leadership tried to establish Armenia’s own image by shedding its former Soviet image. However\, it still maintained strong relations with Russia. The second phase focused on “Shift in the Nature of Foreign Policy towards Multi-Vectorism”\, under President Robert Kocharyan. During this time\, there were attempts to create a feeling of diversification which also included trying to improve relations with European nations. The third phase saw “Disconnect between European Aspirations and Security-driven Russian/Eurasian Constraints”\, under President Serzh Sargsyan. During this phase Armenia joined Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) instead of furthering improved relations with Europe. The fourth phase is “Diversification due to Rising Geopolitical and Regional Complexities”\, under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Under his leadership\, Armenia tries to engage with countries of the West\, and countries like Iran and India. \nFocusing on current developments within the Armenian State\, Dr. Jason stated that the current protests against Armenia’s political leadership led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan have gained great prominence. According to Dr. Wahlang\, the domestic populace has been more active in this protest as compared to the previous demonstrations. This is because the delimitation process would transfer territory from Armenia to Azerbaijan and is being seen as a compromise on Armenian sovereignty. The Armenian leadership\, on the other hand\, is attempting to find a solution for perpetual peace in the region. The main effort is based on the Armenian leadership’s focus on the Crossroads of Peace Project\, which aims to connect the neighbourhood through various connectivity projects and\, in return\, bring about peace in the region. \nAs mentioned before\, Armenia is trying to diversify its relations with various major powers. Dr. Jason highlighted that the Armenia-Russia relationship is based on three key sectors – security\, economy\, and natural resources. Russia is the security provider and the main arms importer of Armenia and has long been Armenia’s principal supplier of weapons and ammunition. In recent times\, due to Russia’s pre-occupation in Ukraine\, there have been certain issues\, like Russia’s inability to meet the demands for the supply of arms. Moreover\, the presence of the 102nd military base in Gyumri and the presence of Russian troops protecting the borders near adversarial neighbours such as Türkiye and Azerbaijan show the relevance and importance of the security and military aspects in this relationship. Dr. Wahlang pointed out that both nations are economically linked\, with about 40 per cent of the Armenian economy being dependent on Russia. Moreover\, Russia dominates the gas distribution outlets in Armenia\, with Gazprom Armenia owning all the gas distribution infrastructure. Russia also has a monopoly over grain and petroleum products. In 2023\, the trade volume between the two nations reached a record high of USD 4.16 billion\, the highest since the Soviet collapse. \nHowever\, the two former Soviet Republics’ leaderships have been at loggerheads with one another since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war\, with the Armenians accusing Russia of not supporting and not providing assistance to them. This clash is due to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation’s (CSTO’s) inability to involve itself in both Nagorno-Karabakh and when Armenian territory was under threat. This has led to Armenia suspending its participation in CSTO and even threatening to leave the organisation altogether. Despite these disagreements\, the two leaders have maintained contact and made attempts to bring about solutions. \nDr. Wahlang noted that the European Union (EU) has sought to increase its presence and carve a space of its own in Armenia. There have been significant attempts to strengthen this partnership\, like Armenia joining the European Union Eastern Partnership and the signing of the Armenia–EU Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017. There have also been discussions in Armenia about joining the EU\, particularly after the War in Karabakh\, but these discussions have not moved forward. He also highlighted that the EU is Armenia’s second-largest trade partner after Russia. Moreover\, in the recent conflict with Azerbaijan\, the EU has been proactively trying to forge a peaceful solution. These steps have been seen positively by Armenia. \nWith regard to Armenia’s relations with France\, Dr. Wahlang pointed out that France has been Armenia’s second-largest foreign investor since 2016\, totalling €229 million. Its investments are primarily in agri-food\, water and banking sectors. In recent times\, this relationship has been further strengthened by the growing defence cooperation\, which includes the sale of air defence systems\, radars and sensors. Apart from Defence\, Armenia has gained support from France in Nagorno-Karabakh\, including aid for looking after the refugees. \nEmphasising Armenia’s relationship with Türkiye and Azerbaijan\, Dr. Wahlang noted that they have a history of conflicts and discontent. Türkiye’s constant and unwavering support for Azerbaijan since the start of the first Nagorno-Karabakh conflict till current times has been seen as further evidence of Armenia’s anti-Türkiye stance. Moreover\, Türkiye’s military and drone support for Azerbaijan became a decisive factor in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. There has\, however\, been a change in approach\, with attempts at peace-building\, including the opening of the Armenian-Türkiye border after thirty years to supply aid to Türkiye during a major earthquake in 2023. The new leadership in Armenia under Pashinyan is attempting to find permanent peace in the region through new avenues of diplomacy and connectivity. \nAccording to Dr. Wahlang\, Armenia and Iran are important allies\, with both sharing a border and common interests and threats. Iran is important for Armenia in connectivity projects\, including assisting and cooperating with India. Armenia\, Iran and India have also recently met for trilateral cooperation. Given Armenia’s landlocked status\, its terminal in Chabahar Port could help assist Armenia in connecting with the world. He emphasised that with Armenia attempting to diversify its foreign policy and resource allocation\, Iran can be a good option. However\, Iran’s fractured relationship with the West and Armenia’s diversification attempts towards the West could become a stumbling block for long-term cooperation. \nWith regard to Armenia-India relations\, Dr. Wahlang stated that the two nations share a historical relationship\, with trade being the base for it in the past. Armenia has also long supported India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty on the issue of Kashmir. The two nations share a robust defence relationship as well. In recent years\, India has decided to appoint its own defence attaché to Yerevan. When it comes to defence trade\, India has exported the Swathi weapon-locating radar system and Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers\, as well as anti-tank munitions and artillery guns. Additionally\, the two nations have scope for cooperation in the field of Information Technology and pharmaceuticals. The only deterrent in the relationship is the lack of connectivity. \nLastly\, Dr. Wahlang concluded his presentation by emphasising that Russia is still a prominent player in the region\, and it may view the Armenian attempts at diversification towards Europe negatively. He also stressed that considering the gains to both sides\, India could emerge as a long-term partner to Armenia. \nComments and Questions\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, complimented Dr. Wahlang on his comprehensive presentation highlighting the complexity surrounding Armenia’s geopolitical\, geostrategic and geoeconomic situation. He pointed out that this is the first time in the history of Azerbaijan that all the territories historically claimed by them are under their control. He stressed that Armenia finds itself in a dilemma as its traditional supporter\, Russia\, is not able to do much. This raises concerns about Armenia exploring other options and the obstacles involved in it. Regarding relations of Iran and Türkiye\, Amb. Chinoy stressed on their influence in the region. He also mentioned the memorial for the Armenian Massacre in Isfahan\, highlighting Iran’s sympathy for the Armenians. He noted that it is important to look at Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel and the US\, predicated on oil and gas pipelines\, and their traditional relations with Türkiye. \nDr. Swasti Rao\, enquired about Russia’s weapons supply to Azerbaijan\, value of connectivity with countries like Georgia and how Azerbaijan could impact the future of India-Armenia relations. \nGp Capt. (Dr.) RK Narang (Retd.)\, enquired about the payment process of the weapons trade between India and Armenia. \nDr. Wahlang responded to the comments made by the Director General and the questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars. \nReport has been prepared by Ms. Anusua Ganguly\, Intern\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-alignments-and-realignments-in-armenian-foreign-policy-since-the-velvet-revolution
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240531T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240531T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240618T021837Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240618T021837Z
UID:81514-1717133400-1717133400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Lecture by Ambassador Harsh Shringla on “Developmental Priorities and India’s Neighbourhood: View from Darjeeling”
DESCRIPTION:Under MP-IDSA’s Eminent Persons Lecture Series\, Ambassador Harsh Shringla delivered his lecture on “Developmental Priorities and India’s Neighbourhood: Views from Darjeeling” on 31 May 2024. The Session was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the MP-IDSA attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe lecture highlighted the evolving global landscape\, characterised by shifting power dynamics and the limitations of existing global institutions in addressing modern challenges effectively. It underscored India’s emerging role as an advocate for the Global South\, drawing from the Speaker’s extensive experience in the Ministry of External Affairs. The discussion emphasised the importance of adopting a comprehensive foreign policy approach that balances regional development with international diplomacy\, considering the intricate interplay between local and global factors. \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, the Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy welcomed Ambassador Harsh Shringla to MP-IDSA. He highlighted Amb. Shringla’s diplomatic career including as the Chief Coordinator for India’s G20 Presidency. He invited Amb. Shringla to share his perspectives on regional developmental challenges\, the future of India’s neighbourhood and India’s emergence as a voice for the Global South\, particularly in the context of India’s G20 Presidency.  \nAmb. Harsh Shringla began by expressing gratitude for being invited to share his insights. He acknowledged the importance of engaging in discussions on foreign policy and developmental challenges. He emphasised that the world is navigating through very uncertain times\, which necessitates a thoughtful consideration of significant shifts in global leadership and influence. He added that these shifts contribute to rebalancing of economic growth and manufacturing power\, with countries like China rising in prominence and altering the traditional global power dynamics away from the United States and Europe. \nAmb. Shringla also discussed the implications of this rebalancing on global governance\, questioning the ability of existing institutions like the United Nations and global financial organisations to effectively address the challenges of the 21st century. He highlighted the lack of effectiveness in global governance\, attributing it to a lack of diversity and equity within key institutions. For instance\, he noted the deadlock in the United Nations Security Council and the limited capabilities of the World Bank\, which lacks the resources and military backing to address issues effectively. He added that the developing countries often find themselves disproportionately affected by these global shifts\, facing high prices for essential goods\, increasing economic disparity\, and severe impacts of climate change. \nAmb. Shringla further highlighted the evolution of India’s foreign policy over the past 20-30 years. India has transitioned from primarily responding to global initiatives to leading and devising solutions based on its own ideas and traditions. He emphasised the success of UPI under the Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) initiative\, noting that 40 percent of global digital transactions take place in India. Additionally\, India administered over 2 billion COVID-19 vaccines worldwide\, starting with its neighbours\, through both grants (Vaccine Maitri) and commercial schemes. \nThe Speaker also touched upon the importance of maintaining peace and stability in global conflicts. He highlighted India’s balanced approach\, avoiding direct involvement in wars while promoting diplomatic resolutions. He cited Prime Minister Modi’s stance on global cooperation\, underscoring the principle of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (the world is one family) as a guiding philosophy for India’s foreign policy. He discussed India’s strategic approach during the recent global conflicts and crises. According to Amb. Shringla\, India has consistently preferred a multipolar world order\, projecting itself as a pole rather than aligning with any so-called bipolar or unipolar order. He underlined that purchasing discounted Russian oil helped stabilise domestic prices and contributed to global market stability. This action demonstrated India’s ability to navigate complex international situations while adhering to sanctions and maintaining economic stability\, he added. \nWhile expressing the need to move towards renewable energy\, Amb. Shringla stated that India has the potential to meet 80% of its energy requirements through renewable sources. He underscored that this shift would benefit both the economy and environment\, positioning India as a leader in global climate mitigation efforts. He stressed the importance of voluntary and individual lifestyle changes to achieve environmental sustainability\, advocating policies that promote modest and efficient utilisation of resources. Amb. Shringla highlighted that India’s proactive foreign policy has evolved to focus on global initiatives and solutions. \nThe discussion highlighted the development challenges in West Bengal due to the contested dynamics between the TMC-led State Government and the BJP-led Central Government. Despite the central government’s intentions\, state-level politics and demographic shifts hinder effective development. This scenario emphasises the need to reconcile regional aspirations for autonomy with the central goal of fostering development. He underlined that the security situation in the Northeast remains complex\, with unresolved grievances and the influence of neighbouring countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh\, directly impacting India’s border states and complicating regional stability and development. He concluded by stating that India’s Foreign Policy must address these cross-border influences\, as the conflict in Myanmar and instability in Bangladesh have significant repercussions within India. Collaborating closely with regional authorities and considering local sentiments for autonomy and development is crucial. \nQuestions and Comments\nThe Director General\, Amb. Chinoy thanked Ambassador Shringla for his remarks. \nThe Q&A session offered an in-depth look at India’s strategic priorities\, touching on the intricacies of India-US relations\, India’s firm pursuit of its national interest\, as well as regional security and economic development. He also observed that there is a systemic imbalance at the global level\, contributing to conflicts and unrest in the Middle East\, Ukraine\, and other parts of the world. Therefore\, equilibrium is required in the international system. \nAmb. Shringla provided responses to all the questions. The session emphasised the need for pragmatic diplomacy to navigate the global landscape\, uphold India’s strategic autonomy\, and promote multipolarity. The interaction concluded with a formal Vote of Thanks to the Speaker by the Director General. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Sneha M.\, Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/lecture-by-ambassador-harsh-shringla-on-developmental-priorities-and-indias-neighbourhood-view-from-darjeeling
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240529T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240529T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240618T021658Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240618T021658Z
UID:81515-1716960600-1716960600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Growing India-Denmark Ties
DESCRIPTION:Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a lecture by H.E. Ambassador Freddy Svane\, Ambassador of Denmark to India under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series on “Growing India-Denmark Ties” on29 May 2024. The interaction was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and attended by the Institute’s scholars. \nExecutive Summary\nThe event provided a comprehensive overview of the India-Denmark Green Strategic Partnership. It delved into bilateral ties of the two nations while also analysing the future prospects to further develop this strategic partnership. Ambassador Sujan Chinoy highlighted his shared diplomatic experiences with Ambassador Freddy Svane in Japan and India. He praised Amb. Svane’s understanding of India and India’s partnership with Denmark\, emphasising the significance of their bilateral ties. Amb. Svane discussed the historical relations between India and Denmark\, the 75-year milestone of their partnership\, and the importance of strategic autonomy for India. He elaborated on the 5Ss of their partnership: scale\, skills\, strength\, speed\, and sustainability\, also mentioning the potential for collaboration in areas beyond the green partnership\, such as defense and the Arctic. He also highlighted Denmark’s defense posture post-Russia-Ukraine crises and expressed willingness to collaborate with India. The Q&A session covered aspects including Denmark’s wind energy sector\, defence collaboration\, the Russia-Ukraine crises\, possibility of limestone trade\, deep-sea fishing\, and the future of data\, minerals\, and green transitions. \nDetailed Report\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA delivered the opening remarks. He began by welcoming Ambassador Freddy Svane to MP-IDSA and fondly recalled their common tenure in Tokyo from 2015-2018 as Ambassador of India to Japan and Ambassador of Denmark to Japan\, respectively. Amb. Svane is the only ambassador to have held two tenures as Danish Ambassador to India (2010-2015 and 2019- current) as well as to Japan (2005-2008 and 2015-2019). Amb. Chinoy spoke about Amb Svane’s familiarity with India. He mentioned Indian Prime Minister Modi’s 3S formula and said that skill\, scale and speed should define India- Denmark relations. \nAmb. Chinoy also highlighted the improvement witnessed in India- Denmark bilateral relations in recent years and requested him to share his views on bilateral ties\, Green Strategic Partnership\, and emerging scenarios in the Arctic region amongst others. He said that the Green Strategic Partnership has emerged as a crucial aspect in India- Denmark relations and this has been evident from various high level visits in the recent past. The trade and investment statistics seem to suggest that the full potential has yet to be realised. He expressed hope that this would pick up pace in coming times. With this he invited Amb. Svane to deliver the lecture. \n H.E. Amb. Freddy Svane commenced the lecture by mentioning the biggest diplomatic victory- the India Denmark Green Strategic Partnership. He quoted Denmark’s current demographic figures and the advent of Danish people 400 years ago to what is now called Tamil Nadu in November 1620 as traders\, not colonisers. He mentioned the historical fabric trade between the two regions and a recent event in Denmark to commemorate that. In 2024 India-Danish partnership has reached the milestone of 75 years\, which had started with building strategies to manage trade ties with India. \nAmb. Svane recalled his last posting in India when he was invited by a private company to inaugurate an industrial plant in Gujarat and how he met the then Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi in 2011. He credits that particular bilateral meeting as the starting point of India’s green partnership with Denmark. He also highlighted the west’s pattern of dictating to other countries what to do but reiterated that Denmark has no such intentions vis-a-vis India or the west. It does not want to teach or preach to others. He mentioned the increasing investments coming to India and that India is not only the largest market in terms of size but also a democratic country with its own rights and sovereignty. Giving the Danish perspective Amb. Svane said that it is best if India exercises its strategic autonomy rather than join a specific camp and tow that line. \nAmb. Svane underscored that the green strategic partnership is based on the 5Ss of scale\, skills\, strength\, speed and sustainability. India has the Scale which is reflected in its capacity and capability; Denmark has the necessary technological Skills; Strength of this partnership comes from affordability and resilience\, which are unique to the Indian developmental agenda; Speed is required in achieving the goals laid out for climate change and SDGs; and lastly\, Sustainability is crucial\, which is why Copenhagen would be willing for joint collaborations beyond the green partnership to include sectors like defence\, Arctic and critical minerals. Science is the sixth S which will be added in the next meeting as innovation is the key to Indo-Danish relations. \nAmb Svane mentioned what comprises the Kingdom of Denmark- Denmark\, Greenland\, and Faroe Islands- where foreign policy and defence is managed by the capital seat in Copenhagen. Greenland is approximately ¾ the size of the Indian subcontinent but inhabits a small population of around 60 thousand. It caught global attention when the vast ice sheets across the island began to melt\, giving rise to unexplored reserves of resources\, critical minerals\, and trade routes. Since Denmark is a founding member of the Arctic Council\, its vision is greatly defined by the values dear to Danish people. Amb. Svane went on to mention the critical role played by Denmark in ensuring India’s addition as an observer state to the Arctic Council in 2013 and how the then Deputy NSA of India discussed India’s arctic vision with him. The conversation revolved around resources and critical minerals found in Greenland but India was very much interested in scientific engagement at that time. It was involved in ice cold drilling\, R&D and other procedures. Amb. Svane emphasised that Denmark wants to give India as much role in Arctic as possible owing to the reality of climate change. \nOn the defence front Amb. Svane recognised that historically Denmark has fought many wars and lost them all. Post cold war\, it chose to close down the military installation in Greenland. The naval base there was put up for auction and its biggest bidder was an Australian company. This was very surprising as Australia is geographically distant from Greenland but it was later discovered that this firm had some Chinese connections. Similarly\, Chinese involvement has recently increased in tenders for building airports and critical infrastructure too. \nConcluding his remarks\, Amb. Svane commented on Indian interests in Denmark\, which are evident from several visits of its new Ambassador to Greenland and Faroe Islands. Deep sea fishing and mining are significant issues that India has to deal with. As of now there are no fish left in the strait separating India from Sri Lanka. Denmark has the required technology for it and Faroe Islands have the experience of dealing with issues like deep sea fishing. Cooperation in such fields could prove useful for both the parties. Democratic dialogue in India is strong. There is no yardstick to measure democracy but each country has its own set of issues and situations. \nQ&A Session\nAmb. Chinoy thanked Amb. Svane for his insightful remarks and opened the floor for questions. Scholars of MP-IDSA asked diverse questions ranging from Denmark’s promising wind energy sector\, India-Denmark defence collaboration\, the Ambassador’s views on Russia-Ukraine crises\, high limestone reserves in Denmark and its possible trade with trade\, and the kind of collaboration possible with India over deep sea fishing. \nAmb. Svane answered the questions\, commencing with the one on renewable energy. He mentioned the oil crises of 1970s and how the governments were left to fend for alternate sources of energy. Denmark had researchers and scientists working on the R&D needed for this. Denmark had the first mover’s advantage amongst the European nations\, especially in wind energy. Today 75 per cent of its electricity comes from renewables. For the critical minerals required in wind turbines\, Denmark relies on China\, which is known for mining and processing these critical minerals. The current Danish Government having stopped mining as it is environmentally degrading\, leaves the question of mineral procurement unanswered. What can be done to access certain minerals if their mining is under the monopoly of one country? In fact\, in India too most of the work related to wind turbines is being done by China and not surprisingly these installations are mostly India’s near critical infrastructure. Last 7 GW of commissioned turbines were given to Chinese companies. What most people do not realise is that those managing the software in these systems also have access to the data that the software constantly collects. This is one of the reasons why US has become vary of China’s inroads in the cyber and technology sector and has put in place certain legislations to minimise that damage. \nAnswering the question on defence procurement\, Amb. Svane said that Denmark is re-arming itself post the Russia Ukraine crises\, in accordance to the NATO norms. It would be great to collaborate with allies like India in this regard. Copenhagen is open to all kinds of possibilities to re-build its defence industry. With regard to Russia-Ukraine crises\, Amb. Svane reiterated that he does not want to preach or teach anybody. He mentioned that Denmark is sending F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine alongside helping them out in aid and other matters. India’s stand on the crises was a tough one for Amb. Svane to explain to the west but he referred to the 1962 India – China war when India was left to fend for itself as no help from the west arrived when India needed it. According to Amb. Svane\, Denmark understands the reasons for Indian dependence on Russian arms and ammunitions and would be happy to help India diversify in this sector. He even praised the recent increase in India-Russia oil trade and how this helped keep market prices of oil under control. The real threat recognised in the region was China. If India could somehow keep China under control\, Denmark would do all that it can to help India diversify its supply chains which are currently dependent on China. \nConcluding the Q&A round\, Amb. Svane responded to the query on limestone trade by mentioning that the top most traded item from Europe to India is waste. It is indeed a sad state of affairs that India buys tonnes of scrap metal and e-waste from Europe but if this can be replaced by other items including limestone\, that would be beneficial for both the parties. Lastly the issue of deep sea fishing was addressed. The Danish Ambassador said that Faroe Islands have proven capabilities and knowledge on this matter as well as on the issue of deep sea mining. The future is about data\, minerals and green transitions\, all of which are sensitive aspects of critical development\, especially for certain sectors like defence\, cyber\, and IT amongst others. \nAfter concluding the Q&A session\, Amb Chinoy thanked H.E. Amb. Freddy Svane\, Ambassador of Denmark to India and the audience for a fruitful engagement. \nReport has been prepared by Ms. Anandita Bhada\, Research Analyst\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/growing-india-denmark-ties
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240527T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240527T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240701T230136Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240701T231002Z
UID:81738-1716787800-1716787800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on Security and Defence Cooperation between India and Poland
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Patryk Kugiel\, Senior Analyst for South Asia at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)\, Warsaw\, made a presentation on “Security and Defence Cooperation between India and Poland” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 27 May 2024. The Session was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe people of India and Poland have shared cordial relations since historical times. In 1942\, Maharaja Digvijaysinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja established the Polish Children’s Camp in Jamnagar-Balachadi\, offering refuge to Polish children. During World War II\, Polish and Indian soldiers fought together in various battles\, prominent among which was the Battle of Monte Cassino. Not only do both the countries have a history in defence cooperation over the last 70 years\, but also have a shared future in the defence sector. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Patryk Kugiel commenced his presentation by highlighting the glorious past of Poland-India relations in the defence sector. During the Cold War era\, Poland was the seventh largest supplier of arms to India and India was the second largest market for Polish arms export\, showcasing very intensive cooperation between both the countries. In 1989\, Poland entered into a complex transition in political\, economic and strategic dimensions. This led to the rearrangement of Poland’s foreign policy from East to the West\, in turn bringing about change in its strategic defence partners. The Polish defence sector and heavy industries underwent remarkable restructuring and privatisation as well. These developments transitioned Poland from an arms exporter (of Soviet equipment) to arms importer (from the West). Dr. Kugiel highlighted that from 1991\, the Indian economy also started to transition and so did its defence sector. During this time India remained heavily dependent on Russia for arms supply\, but in the subsequent years\, India has also started to diversify its imports\, by opening markets to supplies from USA\, France and Israel\, among others. \nDr. Kugiel highlighted that during the last three decades there have been many attempts to revive defence cooperation. For instance\, in 1998 India bought 22 TS-11 Iskra jet trainers and 44 WZT- 3 Armoured Recovery Vehicles (ARVs); in 2002\, 88 WZT (ARVs) and fire control DRAWA-T systems. Furthermore\, in 2003 the countries signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement and in 2004 a Joint Working Group (JWG) on defence cooperation was established. Moreover\, the Defence Wing of the Indian Embassy in Warsaw was reopened on 8 May 2024\, with Brigadier Satish Trivedi’s accreditation to Poland’s Ministry of National Defence. \nDr. Kugiel emphasised that the war in Ukraine has complicated relations\, but can also be seen as a new opportunity in India-Polish cooperation in the defence sector. He highlighted the changes that have taken place in the Polish defence sector since the war i.e.\, urgent replacement of Russian military equipment\, modernisation of armed forces (through a spike in defence budget and investment in domestic industry) and increased international cooperation. There have also been changes in the political dimensions\, as Poland has now become a frontline state and is a key member of NATO. He also stressed on the Weimar Triangle between France\, Germany and Poland emerging as a new engine for European cooperation and integration. \nRegarding India’s defence sector\, Dr. Kugiel raised the following strategic questions. Is Russia a reliable supplier? Is Russian equipment the best? Is the Russia-China axis emerging? Is the overdependence on Russia in sync with India’s strategic economy? He also highlighted the following strategic implications for India i.e.\, replacement of Russian/post-Soviet equipment which might impact the modernisation and development of the domestic defence industry in India. \nDr. Kugiel emphasised that both countries have potential for cooperation in the defence sector\, mainly in three areas – modernisation of post-Soviet equipment\, experience of ready-made products (such as Krab howitzer\, Piorun and Grom man-portable air-defense systems\, Grot rifles)\, and co-development and co-production of new weapons system (Borsuk Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle). However\, according to Dr. Kugiel\, this cooperation between Poland and India faces the challenge of lack of trust and mutual understanding. There is lack of clear understanding on the requirement\, rules and procedures of procurement. Additionally\, there is uncertainty about whether the existing resources and technologies are sufficient for the mass-production of weapons required in current times. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr. Kugiel provided recommendations to meet these challenges and obstacles. For the rebuilding of mutual trust and understanding in defence cooperation he suggested that there is a great need for dialogue between the policymakers such as the National Security Advisors (NSA)\, the countries should focus on the revival of the JWG on defence\, match major arms producing companies for co-production projects and find solutions to the issues in the Bumar contract. He stressed on the need to address the existing knowledge gap between the procedures of procurement in both the countries\, suggesting detailed studies to examine the potential of joint projects. This would help in strengthening military dialogues with the exchange visits of military personnel and academicians. There is also a need to revive joint bilateral and multilateral military exercises. He emphasised on the need for maximisation of resources to address these deficiencies together and intensify partnership in major arms fairs. \nComments and Questions\nAmb. Sujan Chinoy thanked Dr. Kugiel for his recommendations on advancing the bilateral relationship and defence cooperation between India and Poland. He stressed the need to encourage Polish companies to participate in Indian trade fairs and also the Indian defence industrial corridors. He also emphasised the possibilities of investing in the Indian defence sector as it has been opened for 100 per cent foreign direct investment (FDI)\, stating the example of ‘Saab’ – becoming the first global defence company to secure an approval for a 100 per cent FDI project in the defence corridor in Uttar Pradesh to manufacture the Carl-Gustaf rocket systems. Amb. Chinoy agreed on the need for increased dialogue at different levels. Regarding overdependence on Russia\, he pointed out that Indian imports from Russia have come down from 70 per cent to about 36 per cent and that overdependence is a thing of the past. Commenting on the Russia-China axis\, Amb. Chinoy said that the two countries are coming closer against the primacy of the West in the current international order in terms of agenda setting and not against India. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, commented on the changing landscape of the Indian defence industry in the last decade and the development of niche technologies by Indian companies. \nDr. Swasti Rao\, enquired about how India could improve its exports to Poland\, and asked the Speaker to share his views on the geopolitical development of the Weimar Triangle and its role in Ukraine’s and Europe’s security at large. \nDr. Rajorshi Roy\, questioned about NATO’s overtures to India\, and Dr. Kugiel’s assessment on how India would react to these overtures. \nDr. Rajiv Nayan\, enquired about Poland’s import of military equipment from South Korea. \nDr. Samuel C. Rajiv\, enquired about Polish and European export efforts post the war in Ukraine. \nDr. Patryk Kugiel responded to the comments and the questions raised by the MP-IDSA Scholars. \nReport has been prepared by Ms. Anusua Ganguly\, Intern\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-security-and-defence-cooperation-between-india-and-poland
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240522T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240522T053000
DTSTAMP:20261120T232546
CREATED:20240712T035654Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240712T035654Z
UID:81866-1716355800-1716355800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Lecture by H. E. Dr Philipp Ackermann\, Ambassador of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany on “Challenges in Europe and Indo-German Partnership”
DESCRIPTION:On 22 May 2024\, the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a lecture by His Excellency Dr. Philipp Ackermann\, Ambassador of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany\, under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series. The topic of the lecture was “Challenges in Europe and Indo-German Partnership”. The event was chaired by the Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R Chinoy. \nExecutive Summary\nThe conflict in Ukraine has impacted the European continent including Germany. Germany has attempted to diversify its partners\, which has ensured a reduction of its dependence on Russia. When it comes to India\, Germany’s relationship with India has gained prominence\, and it will continue to grow in the long term. \nDetailed Report\nThe session began with the opening remarks from the Director General\, MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy who underscored the pivotal role of Germany as a critical player in the European Union and one of India’s most important strategic partners. He highlighted the various high-level dialogues that have taken place\, including the visits of India’s Prime Minister to Germany in 2022 and the German Chancellor’s reciprocal visit in 2023\, which have significantly bolstered bilateral ties. There has been a rise in trade and investment between the two nations. Germany’s foreign policy towards China was mentioned with a particular focus on the term de-risking\, which is the recent focal point of the policy regarding China in Europe. Amb. Chinoy said that Germany is concerned about issues such as climate change\, and illegal immigration and asked about the perspectives of the various political parties and ideologies. \nAmbassador Dr. Philipp Ackermann began his talk by proposing that he would present a few key messages and five points regarding the topic. The first key point is that Europe faces challenges but in the last couple of years has shown resolve to overcome them. On the migration challenge\, he stated that Europe is very popular among migrants\, and migration is encouraged\, but illegal migration from various nations is an issue. This has led to certain insecurities and ensured that a rise of the far right has become possible\, which would be visible in the results of the upcoming European elections. Germany has an ageing population\, so there is a need for migration. Germany has also signed a migration partnership with India and with the consent of the state and centre\, is recruiting skilled labour for Germany from India. He emphasised the need to legalise and channel legal migration while ensuring that illegal migration is brought down. \nThe second challenge is the economic shock Germany suffered in the last two years due to the war in Europe. This support has been costly but it is a price that needs to be paid to support Ukraine. Ukraine is close to Germany\, and the war has changed the texture of the European security structure and affected the cohesion of the European Union. Germany thought that any security structure in Europe could not be possible without Russia. Various avenues have been set up to deal with Russia\, including the Russia-NATO Council. Russia’s reactions at present and its approach in 2014 have changed the mindset within Europe\, and now the focus is on building a resilient security structure against Russia. The main reason for this is to ensure that Russia does not invade any other countries in Europe. Russia has a clear appetite to have more territory. \nThe second key point of concern is the Russia-Ukraine war. If Russia is not shown the limits of its actions\, it will continue. Russian President Vladimir Putin has an expansionist mentality. NATO’s eastern front is not very strong and its deeper integration into the larger security structure is required to prevent any other aggression. Putin has miscalculated the unity of Europe\, and Ukraine cannot be left alone\, and its territory allowed to be taken away by Russia. The war has impacted the world\, particularly in the energy sector. Germany paid the price since 50 per cent of its gas came from Russia\, but now\, after diversification\, no gas comes from Russia. India has felt the impact of the war on various sectors\, including fertilisers\, gas\, and oil. \nThe third key point is the India-Germany Partnership. India has gained a new weight in Germany’s foreign policy. India’s position is much higher\, and the German Government has seen a need for like-minded partners. India’s democratic ethos and non-expansionist character are similar to what Germany feels. India and Germany have a sound strategic partnership\, and the two nations can focus on all the areas of cooperation. Certain avenues include start-ups\, academic research\, and energy (hydrogen); the governments also want to intensify this cooperation. The inter-governmental consultations\, which will happen in October 2024\, would further strengthen the collaboration. Germany and India have cooperated in the sustainability of smart cities\, biodiversity and trade. Already there are 2200 Indo-German companies who have invested in both the countries and there is hope for more investments. \nThe fourth key point is based on defence cooperation. There has been evident growth and a step forward in this area. Progress has been made in delivering military equipment\, systems\, arms\, and supplying of aircraft. Joint exercises\, capacity building\, and information sharing have increased. In August 2024\, for the first time\, fighter jets would be sent by Germany to participate in Tarang Shakti Phase 1 exercise in Coimbatore. In October 2024\, a German frigate would come to Goa and exercise with the Indian Navy. The two defence ministries share a strong relationship. This was underscored by the visit of the German Defence Minister in June 2023 and the signing of various tenders during that visit. \nThe fifth key point is focused on the Indian Ocean. Protecting international borders and oceans for free navigation is essential. We must keep the lines of communication in the open seas as safe as possible. Germany wants to promote a rules-based order protecting free and open trade. Germany and India can try to minimise the security challenges in the Indian Ocean together. China’s aggressive behaviour in the Indian Ocean concerns how China is attempting to expand its influence. For Germany\, China is a partner and a competitor; when it comes to politics\, it is considered a systemic rival. \nQuestions and Comments\nDirector General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy inquired about Chinese Influence Operations in Europe\, including Germany. Secondly\, he asked whether Germany sees China as a long-term or immediate threat? Lastly\, he asked whether Germany’s understanding of the rules-based order collides with their experience with China’s approach to a rules based order. \nAmbassador Dr. Phillip Ackermann replied that China has firmly pushed its policy in academic institutions in recent years. This is done to shape and form an understanding of how China functions. In the case of a policymaker influenced by China\, he gave an example of an individual who was a Chief of Staff of a Member of Parliament. Therefore\, it shows how strongly China has influenced decision-making and policy-making. When it comes to cyberspace\, the Russians participate more actively. For Germany\, China and Russia are a threat as influence operators. \nDr. Swasti Rao asked if Germany believes in a de-risking policy vis-a-vis China and\, if so\, what steps should be taken. The Speaker answered that de-risking means encouraging and recommending the private sectors to de-risk. Germany cannot force them to not go to China; this was done with Russia\, but it was easier since Russia is not an important economy. German companies have diversified and have begun focusing on the Asian arena\, including India. Many German companies want to set up shop in India. German companies see India more as a brain than a muscle; therefore\, the focus is more on investing in Rand D\, technology and development sector. \nGrp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele asked about German investments in the technology and space arena. \nThe Speaker emphasised that Germany is lagging behind in space\, and the French are ahead. India needs to cooperate in this sector. \nDr. Rajorshi Roy asked about the European assessments of a scenario of a defeated Russia and its impact on regional security and stability. \nThe Speaker focused on the possibility that a period of frozen conflict would arise if the war did end\, and he felt it wouldn’t end very soon. They would still need to deal with Russia. Russia did attack a sovereign country\, and Russia did take 20 per cent of the land; this act cannot be accepted. The history of the First World War shows that humiliation was not a good option for better relations after the war ended. The priority is to support Ukraine in its legitimate fight to protect its territorial integrity. \nMs. Anandita Bhada enquired about how Germany plans to reduce dependence on China in the renewable energy sector. Secondly\, with Germany’s attempts at energy diversification\, whether Germany is looking at other energy partnerships soon? \nThe Speaker answered that we are much more diversified in the energy sector in the current period\, and Germany is not dependent only on one source of energy. Germany gets its gas from Norway\, the Gulf\, etc. It has become a mixed basket. \nDr. Jason Wahlang asked how Germany sees the rise of the right-wing in the European Parliament. Secondly\, how much influence does the Alternative for Germany party have in the Western side of Germany when it comes to immigration debates? \nThe Speaker stated that there will be a rise of right-wing parties in the European Parliament for many reasons. The far right is not as powerful as it seems; its percentage is about 15-16 percent. On the immigration question\, Germany does not think immigration is a bad thing; they do not want illegal immigration. Twenty percent of German individuals have at least one non-German parent. \nDr. Rajiv Nayan enquired about the different perceptions of terrorism in India and Europe. \nOn the topic of terrorism\, the Speaker explained that India has its own experience and Germany has its own. In this globalised world\, there is a need to compare whether\, for example\, the Khalistan issue is taken more seriously only in India or other nations as well. Intelligence sharing is important\, and there is a need to find ways to cooperate. \nMs. Shruti Pandalai asked whether China’s relationship with Germany limits its national policy in the Indo-Pacific. Secondly\, how could a change in the White House’s leadership impact the future of the Trans-Atlantic alliance? \nThe Speaker opined that Germany was considered the least popular country in Europe in the first tenure of the Trump leadership. With any change in leadership in the United States of America\, Germany would still find a way to work and function with this relationship. \nDr. Prashant Singh enquired about the perceived disunity between the United States and Europe regarding trade and investment with China. \nThe Speaker stated that Europe and Germany are wholly localised economies compared to the United States of America. It would appear that the de-risking has reduced German engagement with China. \nCaptain Sunil Tyagi\, Centre for Air Power Studies\, asked whether Russia would shift its attention to Georgia and Moldova after the Ukraine War. \nAmbassador Dr. Philip Ackerman stated that Russia has\, in a way\, played with Georgia and Moldova. He feels that both countries can be seen as candidates for membership in the European Union\, but their conflicts are very different. \nThe report has been prepared by Dr. Jason Wahlang\, Research Analyst\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/lecture-by-h-e-dr-philipp-ackermann-ambassador-of-the-embassy-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-on-challenges-in-europe-and-indo-german-partnership
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