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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260803T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260803T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260814T120730Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260814T120915Z
UID:99388-1785744000-1785776400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defence: Evolution and Imperatives in the European Context”
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting on 03 August 2026\, featuring a presentation by Gp. Capt. Sukhbir Kaur Minhas\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA on “Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defence: Evolution and Imperatives in the European Context”. The Session was moderated by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker discussed collaborative ballistic missile defence (BMD) within the context of the recently-announced Integrated Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition declared by nine European partners and Ukraine on 13 July 2026. The discussion traced the historical evolution of BMD systems and concepts\, highlighting how European thinking on ABMs was shaped by the German V-1 and V-2 rocket campaigns of the closing years of the Second World War\, and by subsequent Cold War doctrinal divergence between the United States and Western Europe. \nDetailed Report\nThe Speaker argued that the NATO framework remains the only genuinely collaborative air defence (AD)/BMD arrangement in existence today\, distinguished by its shared command and control (C2)\, unlike bilateral arrangements such as the US-Japan or US-Israel cooperation efforts\, which retain sovereign C2. The discussion further explored modern imperatives in light of renewed threats and European efforts for sovereign interceptors and systems\, including the shift towards deterrence by denial\, the integration of new systems such as Freyja\, and the recurring doctrinal fork between British and French approaches to European missile defence. It was highlighted that Ukraine is a prominent member of the ten-nation coalition that declared an Integrated Anti-Ballistic Missile (IABM) Coalition on 13 July 2026. \nThe Speaker noted that European approaches to BMD have diverged along broadly two lines – nations such as Britain and Germany prioritising rapid capability through existing (largely non-European) systems\, and France favouring sovereign\, indigenous capacity – with systems like Freyja designed to help bridge that gap. \nAccording to the Speaker\, the Russia-Ukraine conflict since 2022\, along with demonstrated Iranian capabilities\, has sharpened discourse on continental European AD\, prompting several national and multinational initiatives. This includes the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)\, launched in October 2022 as a framework for the procurement and early operationalisation of dedicated ground-based AD systems\, and now comprising around 24 states. Four years later\, the IABM Coalition was declared. The Speaker emphasised that the distinguishing feature of the NATO framework’s joint AD/BMD architecture is shared C2 while the US-Japan or US-Israel ones retain independent responsibility of C2 by each partner. \nGp. Capt. Minhas explained that the July 2026 Coalition was necessary primarily to address the gap in indigenous European endo- and exo-atmospheric interceptor capability and to develop and mature systems such as Ukraine’s Freyja against a live battlefield backdrop. A persistent shortage of interceptor stocks – the Raytheon SM-3 (Standard Missile-3)\, the Lockheed Martin PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3) and the Israel-US\, Israel Aerospace Industries Arrow 3 – accentuated by the US-Iran War was cited as a further driver alongside industrial cooperation involving Thales\, Safran\, MBDA\, Airbus Defence & Space and MBDA Deutschland. The Freyja system\, developed by the Ukrainian firm Fire Point and supported by German radars and Norwegian command-and-control systems with Link 16 integration\, is built on an open architecture in which source code and key technical solutions are held collectively by coalition states. Its FP-7x interceptor costs approximately US$700\,000 per unit against the far more expensive Patriot interceptors. \nThe Speaker described the July declaration as a framework – common requirements\, working groups and a roadmap but no binding capability commitment – with a Letter of Intent (LoI) for an exo-atmospheric interceptor signed between major European manufacturers the following day\, on 14 July 2026. She noted the Ankara Summit earlier in the year and the NATO posture review announced on 28 July 2026 as relevant markers to watch\, alongside roughly €50 million already committed by the EU towards collective defence\, including Integrated Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence (IAMD) systems. \nIn her concluding remarks\, the Speaker characterised the 80-year doctrinal arc as moving from passive defence and left-of-launch tactics in 1944\, through reliance on offensive nuclear deterrence and US-supplied systems through the 2010s\, to a 2026 coalition in which Europe is\, for the first time\, co-developing its own interceptor. \nShe noted a recurring divergence in the European doctrine – Britain’s consistent instinct to rationalise threats through collaboration with larger partners (from the 1985 Strategic Defense Initiative Memorandum of Understanding to the ESSI)\, against France’s consistent instinct to indigenise (from the 1985 EUREKA programme to its refusal to join ESSI over the MBDA question) – with the 2026 Coalition marking the first time both camps have converged on a single architecture. \nQ & A Session\nThe Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, emphasised that the European Union has already experienced these threats firsthand\, advocating for deterrence through both denial and punishment. Addressing arguments that deterrence is dead\, Amb. Chinoy stated that deterrence needs to be offensive\, concluding that India’s Sudarshan Chakra must be both defensive and offensive. He advised that one must always contextualise threats by assessing their quantity and quality before identifying vulnerable points. He commented that it was interesting to see Germany playing a lead role in the ESSI\, given its role with the V1 and V2 rockets in the Second World War against Europe. Amb. Chinoy further outlined two aspects of the EU’s BMD architecture. One\, Europe is attempting to unite as a common defence and security alliance by connecting the military ecosystems of its member-states. And two\, France’s proclivity to always take its own path continues. \nQueries were raised from the floor regarding the overall BMD architecture for countering hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs)\, cost-sharing of the ESSI\, and a future Indian BMD alliance. The Speaker elaborated on the three space-based capabilities of BMDs and ground-based systems\, clarifying that ESSI is not fully operational but is designed to feed into NATO’s Arrow and Patriot systems to ensure sufficient EU interceptor availability. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Siddhant Hira\, Research Analyst\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-cooperative-ballistic-missile-defence-evolution-and-imperatives-in-the-european-context
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260730T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260730T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260812T035512Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260812T035548Z
UID:99371-1785398400-1785430800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Lt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma\, PVSM\, UYSM\, AVSM\, VSM\, PhD (Retd) discusses his book “War is a True Chameleon: Strategising for Future Wars in Indian Context”
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a discussion on Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma’s latest book\, War is a True Chameleon: Strategising for Future Wars in Indian Context (Sabre and Quill\, 2026) on 30 July 2026. The discussion brought together MP-IDSA scholars to reflect on the modernisation transformation needed within India’s Armed Forces\, capability development\, and politico-military dialogue. The discussion was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary\nThe discussion explored the evolving\, multispectral nature of modern global conflict and the necessity of strategising for future wars within the Indian context. Emphasising an administrative and capabilities-driven perspective\, the discussion highlighted that the traditional grammar of war is highly contested. With warfare now expanding to encompass non-military and non-violent domains\, the concept of victory has shifted from a zero-sum military outcome to one that is largely perceptional. Sustaining national security in this environment requires India to move beyond platform-centric approaches\, develop distinct asymmetric capabilities and ensure that military modernisation is tightly aligned with clear politico-military objectives. \nDetailed Report\nThe Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy delivered the Opening Remarks. Welcoming the Author\, Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd)\, former MP-IDSA Executive Council Member and Distinguished Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation. Amb. Chinoy highlighted Lt. Gen. Sharma’s extensive operational experience\, including his command of the Indian Army’s 14 Corps (Fire and Fury Corps)\, and noted that his role brought a vital administrative and force-modernisation perspective to the analysis of future wars. Introducing the theme\, Amb. Chinoy observed that warfare today is changing kaleidoscopically\, driven by multi-domain operations\, the increasing role of the private sector and the critical importance of narrative warfare. \nLt. Gen\, (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.) noted the increasing frequency of global conflicts\, citing ongoing crises in Ukraine\, Gaza\, the South Caucasus and tensions around Taiwan. He explained that his book seeks to challenge prevailing orthodoxies regarding how wars are fought and won. He structured his presentation around the three core themes of his book: the blurring lines between war and peace\, the evolution from old to new wars and strategic recommendations for India. \nThe author explained that the only point of agreement between his book and classical military theorist Carl von Clausewitz is the concept of war as a ‘chameleon’: an entity that constantly changes its nature. He argued that the traditional grammar of war requires expansion as modern conflicts span a full spectrum of military and non-military\, as well as violent and non-violent actions. Discussing the concept of victory\, the author noted that while traditionally viewed as a zero-sum game\, modern outcomes tell a different story. He cited Russia’s inability to achieve rapid regime change in Ukraine and the United States’ protracted challenges with Iran as examples of how traditional metrics of victory no longer apply. Today\, victory is largely perceptional and fought in the information domain. This perceptional shift explains why adversaries leverage third-party channels – such as Pakistan broadcasting via Chinese networks during Operation Sindoor – to shape narratives. \nOn Deterrence\, the author argued that the traditional concept is effectively dead\, questioning what actually deters India’s adversaries today. While conventional deterrence has gained focus in recent decades\, he pointed out its complete inadequacy in countering sub-conventional threats like terrorism. Regarding India’s developmental vision of a ‘Viksit Bharat’ (developed India) with a US$30 trillion economy\, he cautioned that these economic ambitions rest on fragile security foundations. He warned against assuming a near-term resolution of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). He noted that Pakistan is unlikely to collapse without an internal revolution and China will continue to deepen its footprint in South Asia. Given these factors\, the author questioned whether escalation control can truly be guaranteed in the region. \nTransitioning to the nature of current conflicts\, the author observed that ‘old wars’ and border conflicts – characterised by narrow frontages like the early phases of the Russia-Ukraine War – remain a persistent reality. However\, he urged a shift away from platform-centric warfare towards outcome-oriented capability development. Noting India’s budget constraints\, he  emphasised that military capabilities must be strictly tailored to politico-military objectives. Among the critical capabilities needed\, he highlighted battlefield transparency\, institutional resilience\, integrated air defence systems and asymmetric warfare. Using Iran’s extensive subterranean military infrastructure as an example of resilience\, the author pointed out a vulnerability in India’s borderlands which lack comparable underground bunkers and fuel depots. To gain a strategic advantage\, he argued that India must develop its own ‘kill webs’ and ‘asymmetric structures’. \nFocusing on strategic planning for India\, the author lamented the absence of a dedicated cognitive institution for long-term strategic thought. He recalled the erstwhile Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff\, which served as a vital bridge between political and military establishments\, noting that a disconnect often exists today between political objectives and military preparedness. Stressing the need for continuous politico-military dialogue to shape future war scenarios and fighting doctrines\, he asked whether India is currently ‘arming without aiming’. He advocated for an outcome-oriented approach to military transformation\, where modernisation plans clearly outline the specific methods required to achieve defined strategic goals. \nQ & A Session\nThe interactive session that followed witnessed an exchange of views on the boundary question\, wargaming\, the expanding nature of war\, an Indian definition of war\, asymmetric warfare\, and strategic communications. \nThe Director General\, Amb. Chinoy\, summarised the discussion by stating that while India is modernising\, it is not yet fully transforming. He echoed the need for annual transformation goals driven by constant dialogue between political and military leaderships. He agreed that subterranean warfare allows a state to conserve its capabilities\, and while it worked for Iran\, India must find its own tailored solutions. Amb. Chinoy also noted that India requires directed focus on improving its communications and satellite surveillance capabilities. \nOn the boundary question\, the author surmised that a comprehensive resolution is unlikely in the near term due to broader geopolitical factors\, though localised resolutions might be possible. Noting India’s position of strength in Doklam over the past two years\, it was suggested by Gen. Sharma that this could be an opportune time to engage China in dialogue. \nThe discussion also addressed the lack of formal politico-military wargaming mechanisms in India\, highlighting that wargaming has the potential to serve as a highly effective dialogue tool. The author debated whether structures\, technology\, or strategy should come first\, ultimately concluding that a clear strategy must lead the way. The need for a dedicated government department for grey-zone warfare and cognitive operations\, separate from the Armed Forces\, was also underlined. \nAddressing a question on whether the author’s strategic assumptions had been adequately stress-tested against historical experiences like the 1962 War or the 2020 Galwan Valley clash\, it was noted that India possesses five decades of military stress-testing. However\, questions remained regarding India’s preparedness to fight adversaries other than China or Pakistan. Amb. Chinoy noted the cardinal rule of warfare: one must never underestimate the enemy\, but rather\, consistently overestimate them to ensure adequate preparedness. \nFinally\, regarding an Indian definition of war\, the room agreed that with victory now based on perception\, strategic communication must be strengthened and wielded as a primary tool of deterrence. \nAmb. Chinoy thanked the author and the audience before concluding the session. \nThe report has been prepared by Mr. Siddhant Hira\, Research Analyst\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/lt-gen-rakesh-sharma-pvsm-uysm-avsm-vsm-phd-retd-discusses-his-book
CATEGORIES:BOOK DISCUSSION FORUM,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260727T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260727T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260812T042557Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260812T042557Z
UID:99373-1785139200-1785171600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Recent Political and Foreign Policy Developments in Nepal”
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting on 27 July 2026\, featuring a presentation by Ms. Sneha M.\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA on “Recent Political and Foreign Policy Developments in Nepal.” The Session was moderated by Dr. Ashish Shukla\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nUnder Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s leadership\, Nepal has undergone significant political and institutional transformation following the 2025 Gen Z movement and the March 2026 parliamentary elections. During its first four months in office\, the government has prioritised anti-corruption measures\, institutional restructuring\, administrative reforms\, and economic liberalisation as part of a broader governance reform agenda. While these initiatives reflect a strong commitment to institutional reform\, their implementation has remained uneven owing to governance bottlenecks and limited administrative capacity. Externally\, Nepal appears to be pursuing a balanced and independent foreign policy centred on developmental diplomacy; however\, intensifying strategic competition among India\, China\, and the United States has made the pursuit of strategic equilibrium increasingly complex\, particularly as Nepal prepares for its graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in November 2026. \nDetailed Discussion\nThe moderator\, Dr. Ashish Shukla situated recent developments within Nepal’s broader democratic trajectory since 2008\, observing that prolonged political instability\, institutional weaknesses\, and persistent corruption culminated in the September 2025 Gen Z movement. He described the movement as marking a generational shift in Nepal’s politics\, noting that the Rastriya Swatantra Party’s (RSP’s) electoral victory in the March 2026 parliamentary elections represented the first single-party mandate of its kind since 1959. \nHighlighting the government’s initial policy orientation\, Dr. Shukla explained that Prime Minister Balendra Shah had adopted a zero-tolerance approach to corruption\, citing the dismissal of ministers facing corruption allegations and the Prime Minister’s increasingly central role in decision-making as defining features of the new administration. He further observed that\, despite the government’s ambitious reform agenda\, implementation of its proposed 100-day action plan has remained uneven\, with a substantial number of commitments yet to be fully realised. Referring to Nepal’s external engagement\, he noted that the government has sought to maintain balanced relations with both India and China while pursuing a foreign policy guided primarily by domestic priorities and national interests. He also underlined that Balendra Shah has been making an attempt to introduce new political and governance culture in the country. \nMs. Sneha M. began her presentation by tracing Nepal’s democratic transition since 2008. She observed that recurring political instability\, institutional fragility\, entrenched political leadership\, and systemic corruption collectively generated widespread public dissatisfaction\, ultimately contributing to the Gen Z protests of September 2025. She explained that the parliamentary elections conducted on 5 March 2026 resulted in a decisive electoral mandate for the RSP\, leading to the appointment of Mr. Balendra Shah as Prime Minister. \nDiscussing the government’s domestic reform agenda\, the Ms. Sneha organised policy initiatives under three principal pillars comprising anti-corruption and accountability\, institutional and administrative reforms\, and economic reforms. She noted the high-profile arrests of former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and former Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak\, the reduction in the number of federal ministries\, the introduction of e-governance initiatives such as expansion of the Government Integrated Office Management System (GIOMS) and the Nagarik App\, However\, she noted that challenges remain. Many of those arrested have been released due to insufficient evidence\, exposing weaknesses in the government’s prosecution capacity. She observed that major reforms\, including the Civil Service Bill and proposed constitutional amendments\, are likely to face political resistance\, particularly as the RSP lacks the two-thirds majority required in both Houses of Parliament. She added that opposition from Madhesh-based parties\, which view the provincial system as essential for political representation\, inclusion\, and regional autonomy\, could further impede these reforms. \nExamining Nepal’s economic conditions\, she outlined the country’s largest-ever national budget for FY 2026–27\, highlighting its emphasis on privatisation\, urban infrastructure development and 7 per cent annual growth in GDP. She assessed that Nepal continues to function as a lower-middle-income economy with average annual GDP growth of around 4–5 per cent\, while a weak manufacturing base has sustained import dependence despite the services sector remaining the main driver of economic activity. She noted that the government has adopted an ambitious market-oriented reform agenda to attract investment and accelerate growth. However\, declining foreign direct investment\, Nepal’s grey-listing by the Financial Action Task Force and the World Bank’s growth projection of 3.9 per cent against the government’s seven per cent target underscore the gap between policy ambitions and economic realities\, making effective implementation the key challenge. \nAssessing governance performance\, she observed that the government continues to face criticism over cabinet coordination\, administrative effectiveness\, land governance disputes\, and policy implementation. She noted that the Prime Minister’s relatively low cabinet attendance\, the appointment of party-affiliated individuals to ministerial positions\, and the incomplete implementation of the government’s 100-day governance roadmap have raised concerns regarding administrative capacity and the effective translation of policy commitments into measurable outcomes. \nTurning to Nepal’s external engagement\, she noted that the RSP government has articulated a balanced and independent foreign policy centred on development diplomacy\, so far. She observed that while these principles continue to shape Nepal’s external engagement\, evolving regional strategic dynamics have increased the complexity of maintaining equilibrium among major external partners. \nDiscussing Nepal’s relations with India\, she observed that India has remained Nepal’s largest trade and investment partner despite initial frictions following the RSP government’s policy changes\, including customs duties on Indian imports and the postponement of a planned visit by India’s Foreign Secretary. She noted that subsequent diplomatic outreach\, including visits by RSP Chairman Rabi Lamichhane and Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal to India\, together with continued cooperation in the energy sector and other high-level bilateral engagements\, reflected both governments’ commitment to preserving the traditionally close bilateral relationship. \nReferring to Nepal’s relations with China\, she observed that Beijing has traditionally enjoyed closer political relations with Communist-led governments\, which initially resulted in cautious engagement with the RSP government. She explained that Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal during his mid-June 2026 visit to China reaffirmed Nepal’s commitment to the One China Principle and support for the Belt and Road Initiative\, while both sides reiterated their commitment to strengthening cooperation in infrastructure\, energy\, trade\, and investment. She further noted that although Chinese-funded infrastructure projects remain central to bilateral cooperation\, controversies surrounding projects such as the Pokhara International Airport have highlighted implementation and operational challenges amid Nepal’s evolving political landscape. She added that the visit underscored China’s interest in safeguarding its long-term strategic and economic interests in Nepal. Remarks by Foreign Minister Wang Yi reflected Beijing’s preference for prioritising relations with neighbouring countries amid evolving regional geopolitical dynamics. \nOn Nepal’s engagement with the United States\, she emphasised the increase in working-level diplomatic engagement during the early months of the RSP government. Discussions focused on the implementation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact\, investment promotion\, trade\, digital infrastructure\, and telecommunications cooperation\, including Starlink. She observed that these developments reflected Washington’s growing economic and strategic interest in Nepal\, particularly in areas extending beyond traditional development cooperation. At the same time\, she noted that Nepal has sought to engage the United States pragmatically while carefully balancing its relations with India and China\, as initiatives such as Starlink have generated geopolitical sensitivities and the relationship has yet to progress to sustained high-level political engagement. \nConcluding\, she argued that Nepal’s foreign policy has gradually evolved from diplomatic idealism towards greater pragmatism. While the traditional balancing strategy remains central to Nepal’s external engagement\, intensifying strategic competition among India\, China\, and the United States has narrowed the country’s diplomatic space. She further observed that Nepal’s scheduled graduation from Least Developed Country status in November 2026 is likely to reduce concessional financing\, preferential trade access\, and technical assistance\, thereby increasing the importance of maintaining constructive engagement with all major development partners. These developments\, she concluded\, demonstrate the growing interdependence between Nepal’s economic priorities and its foreign policy choices. \nQ&A Session\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy noted Nepal’s continuing interest in participating in Indian-led developmental initiatives. He further observed that Nepal’s appeal for UK’s involvement in the Kalapani issue does not align with India’s longstanding position that boundary disputes should be addressed exclusively through established bilateral mechanisms. \nAddressing broader regional strategic developments\, Ambassador Chinoy situated India–Nepal relations within the evolving strategic competition among India\, China\, and the United States\, observing that the United States is increasingly emerging as an important strategic factor influencing bilateral dynamics. He also highlighted persistent trust deficits and declining people-to-people engagement between the younger populations of India and Nepal\, citing the reduction in the number of Nepali students pursuing higher education in India alongside China’s expanding engagement with Nepal’s youth. Responding to these observations\, Ms. Sneha noted that although Nepal has sought to strengthen youth-led exchanges\, India’s engagement through youth-focused initiatives appears to have declined in recent years when compared to China and the US. She added\, however\, India’s cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance\, energy\, and development continues to remain robust. \nSubsequently\, MP-IDSA scholars raised questions regarding public perceptions of Prime Minister Balendra Shah\, the nature of United States engagement in Nepal\, governance constraints affecting the RSP administration\, the implications of the Nepal–China counter-terrorism exercise\, the party’s approach towards Madhesi politics\, the evolving role of traditional political parties\, and the government’s handling of India–Nepal border issues. \nResponding to the discussion\, Ms. Sneha stated that the present government has not downplayed border disputes\, noting that established bilateral mechanisms continue to provide the primary institutional framework for addressing such issues through sustained diplomatic engagement. She further observed that left-oriented political parties appear to be moving towards greater unity in preparation for the forthcoming provincial elections. With regard to Madhesi representation\, she highlighted continuing concerns regarding limited participation within state institutions\, as reflected in cabinet composition and engagement with region-specific priorities. Discussing Nepal–China counter-terrorism exercises\, she assessed that the initiative was unlikely to evolve into broader military cooperation between the two countries. \nIn conclusion\, she observed that the RSP government’s first 100 days reflect an ambitious commitment to strengthening governance\, transparency\, and institutional accountability\, although significant implementation challenges persist owing to administrative centralisation and weak interinstitutional coordination. She noted that sustained political stability and stronger coordination across government institutions will be essential for translating reform commitments into effective policy outcomes. On foreign policy\, she argued that the government’s initial emphasis on strategic autonomy has gradually evolved into a more pragmatic approach towards neighbouring states\, reflecting the enduring influence of geography\, economic interdependence\, and regional geopolitical constraints. Overall\, she concluded that while the RSP leadership may reshape the style of governance and diplomacy\, the scope for lasting policy change will continue to be determined by Nepal’s institutional capacity and broader structural realities. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Cyrus Ghosh\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-recent-political-and-foreign-policy-developments-in-nepal
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260720T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260720T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260812T045644Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260812T045733Z
UID:99375-1784534400-1784566800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “The Role of Artificial Intelligence in China’s Military Modernisation: Implications for India”
DESCRIPTION:Col. Nestor D’Souza\, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) spoke on “The Role of Artificial Intelligence in China’s Military Modernisation: Implications for India” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 20 July 2026. Dr M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the discussion. The meeting was attended by the Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker examined the footprint of Artificial Intelligence (AI) across the theory\, practice and means of the military modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)\, arguing that its influence is visible at every stage from the framing of Military Strategic Guidelines to the development of operational concepts\, force structuring and capability acquisition and that the relationship is iterative rather than linear. He highlighted that intelligentisation\, notwithstanding its prominence in Chinese discourse\, has not yet displaced informatisation as the Military Strategic Guideline\, and that at present it is being used to enhance informatised warfighting rather than to replace it. Tracing the concepts of systems-of-systems warfare\, multi-domain integrated joint operations\, multi-domain precision warfare and kill webs\, the Speaker assessed that full mission autonomy remains a distant prospect\, constrained as much by the Party’s reluctance to cede control as by the maturity of technology. The presentation concluded with implications for India\, including operating under persistent surveillance\, the risk of a widening and potentially generational capability gap\, and the case for indigenous and asymmetric capability development. \nDetailed Report\nDr. M.S. Prathibha\, the moderator\, set the context by situating the discussion within the intensifying technological competition between the United States and China\, noting that announcements as recent as June 2026 of investments of the order of US$ 260 billion in data-centre strategies underline that the race between the two most consequential players in the international system is firmly underway. While such investment is largely commercial in character\, its military significance is considerable. She observed that the United States continues to lead in the development of frontier AI models\, and that several debates are underway within the PLA on how AI will reshape warfare. Chinese writings\, she noted\, underscore that science and technology constitute a link that cannot be bypassed in building a world-class military\, with improvements to radar systems among the earliest concrete claims of AI-derived military benefit. Chinese discourse\, she added\, identifies three defining features of future intelligentised warfare: machines as principal combatants\, the interconnection of all things\, and algorithmic dominance. \nThe Speaker\, Col. Nestor D’Souza\, opened with two caveats. Since military modernisation is a classified subject in any country\, and particularly so in China\, the arguments advanced were largely inferential\, drawn from Chinese publications and from Western and Japanese scholarship that follows the PLA closely; the presentation therefore dealt in the realm of possibilities rather than certainties. Second\, it confined itself deliberately to the military dimension of modernisation\, setting aside the political drivers of reforms such as theaterisation\, on the premise that such decisions are taken at a level above the military leadership. The presentation was structured around the strategic bridge of ends\, ways and means. Theory\, the Speaker argued\, is drawn from a nation’s values and historical experience- a particularly significant consideration in the case of a civilisational state such as China -which shape national interests and\, in turn\, national objectives or ends. These inform national policy and strategy across the diplomatic\, informational\, military and economic instruments\, and within the military instrument produce the Military Strategic Guidelines\, which shape doctrine\, operational concepts\, the design of operations and force structures. The means follow: weapon systems\, support systems\, logistics and training. \nLocating the ends\, the Speaker noted that China’s national strategy is framed by the China Dream of great national rejuvenation and the restoration of China to what it regards as its rightful place in the comity of nations after a century of humiliation. From this flows the grand strategy of building the PLA into a world-class military by 2049\, with the tasks of protecting economic growth and territorial sovereignty and\, above all\, of being prepared to fight and win wars\, pursued under the guiding strategy of active defence\, in which the qualifier “active” carries a distinctly offensive connotation. \nTracing the evolution of the Military Strategic Guidelines from People’s War in 1949 through People’s War under Modern Conditions\, Local War under Modern Conditions and Local War under High-Technology Conditions in the 1980s\, to Informatisation in 2014\, the Speaker observed that the early emphasis on protracted guerrilla warfare became untenable as industrial and agricultural capacity improved and the requirement shifted to halting an adversary at or before the border\, with the 1980s bringing a conscious move away from a peasant-army self-image towards mechanisation. The 1991 Gulf War proved decisive\, as the PLA leadership was deeply impressed by the coalition’s use of information to link sensors and shooters into network-centric operations. Each of these stages\, he emphasised\, was defined by human analysis; intelligentisation\, which entered the discourse in the second decade of this century\, envisages machine analysis substituting for or augmenting it – less creative\, perhaps\, but more accurate\, more resilient and immune to fatigue. Crucially\, however\, intelligentisation does not yet enjoy the status of a Military Strategic Guideline. Citing the PLA scholar Li Minghai\, the Speaker summarised the logic in a single line – that the dominant means of production shapes the Military Strategic Guideline – and noted that because the field is still evolving\, informatisation continues to be the guideline in force. \nExplaining that a Military Strategic Guideline in PLA construct answers six questions\, the Speaker identified the opponent as the reigning hegemon\, the United States; the primary strategic direction as having shifted from a ground-centric to a maritime orientation; the basis of preparation as systems-of-systems warfare; the basic form of operations as Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations\, as designated in the 2020 edition of The Science of Military Strategy; the style of fighting as Multi-Domain Precision Warfare; and the strategic guiding thought as securing military advantage through information superiority. Informatisation\, he noted\, rests on three pillars – systems warfare\, integrated joint operations\, and cross-domain coordination extending beyond land\, sea\, air and space to the electromagnetic spectrum\, cyber and the cognitive domain- each of which intelligentisation seeks to enhance through autonomous hardware\, human–machine teaming and machine-speed decision support. \nTurning to systems-of-systems warfare\, the Speaker noted that discussion of information systems-based systems-of-systems operations began around 2005\, during the Hu Jintao era. Integrated joint operations had been spoken of earlier but could not be operationalised\, largely because the PLA’s older structure of general departments and military regions\, dominated by the ground forces\, made it unworkable; the reforms and theaterisation of 2015–16 created joint structures and\, with them\, the space for such concepts to succeed. The premise of systems warfare is that an integrated aggregation of systems should project greater power than the arithmetic sum of its parts\, its aim being to strike the adversary’s vulnerabilities while protecting one’s own\, and its objective being paralysis rather than annihilation – leaving the enemy’s faculties intact but preventing him from applying them coherently. The operational system comprises five principal components – firepower\, ISR\, information networks\, command and control\, and support – each disaggregating into successive layers of subsystems\, so that the military is viewed not as army\, navy and air force\, nor even by domain\, but as a set of systems defined by function. The adversary is correspondingly viewed as a target set of four kinds: information links and nodes\, whose destruction produces paralysis; the five elements of his operational system; his operational structures and organisations; and\, once these have been struck\, his operational momentum\, that is\, the speed at which he observes and decides. \nExecuting systems warfare\, the Speaker explained\, requires subordinate concepts that tell forces how to interact. Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations\, designated the basic form of operations in 2020 and formalised through a joint operations outline\, or gangyao\, issued in November 2020\, is an upgrade on the 1999 formulation\, whose structures could not effectively integrate the fruits of cyber\, space and cognitive-domain operations into warfighting. In 2021 the PLA articulated Multi-Domain Precision Warfare as its new core operational concept\, drawing on well-established Chinese structures for extracting lessons from contemporary conflicts\, in which non-contact precision warfare had become increasingly prominent. The Speaker stressed why such terminological precision matters: once a concept is specified in this manner it enters planning\, and force structuring organises itself around it\, whereas concepts that remain nebulous are not implemented. AI-enabled capabilities are envisaged to enhance the networks required for precision strike\, executed through kill webs – the practical manifestation of the entire chain of concepts. A kill web is modular\, flexible and mission-oriented; such structures do not exist in peacetime\, and it is AI and machine-based decision support that permit one to be assembled in preparation for\, or during\, an operation\, aggregating capabilities across domains at machine speed\, with hybrid intelligence determining the attachment and detachment of constituent systems as the target picture changes. \nTurning to means\, the Speaker outlined the broad heads under which PLA combat capabilities are being developed – autonomous vehicles\, autonomous weapons and intelligent munitions; ISR; command\, control and communications; decision support; sensor fusion and targeting; and information and electronic warfare\, which together constitute C5ISR&T – to which are added predictive maintenance and logistics\, simulation and training\, and cognitive domain operations\, an upgrade on the earlier Three Warfares that seeks to use algorithms to design cognitive effects. These heads\, he cautioned\, were separated only for clarity; to imagine them working in silos would defeat the very concept of systems warfare\, since an unmanned aerial vehicle is simultaneously a weapon and an ISR platform. \nSummarising his inferences\, the Speaker observed that the footprint of AI is visible at every stage of military modernisation and that the relationship is iterative\, with AI shaping concepts and concepts in turn directing AI research. At present\, intelligentisation is powering informatised warfare rather than replacing it: it is proceeding at the level of tactical equipment\, where ethical questions do not arise and fully autonomous systems are therefore envisaged\, but technology has not matured to a point where the killing of a human being can be delegated to it higher up the hierarchy. Full mission autonomy\, he assessed\, is not imminent\, since the PLA does not consider that it has achieved the requisite levels of informatisation or jointness\, its joint structures are still being consolidated\, and its operational commanders are not assessed as sufficiently competent to execute joint operations. More fundamentally\, the ceding of control runs against the grain of the Party\, which is unwilling to cede authority even to its own generals\, making the surrender of control to machines a distant prospect. Consequently\, lower-level systems are being intelligentised wherever this does not threaten the PLA’s way of functioning\, while supervisory systems are simply becoming better informatised. \nIn his concluding remarks\, the Speaker identified the implications for the Indian armed forces. India will have to operate in an environment of persistent technical and cognitive surveillance\, with data being gathered in peacetime to feed databases and algorithms that seek to predict Indian responses\, the more dangerous prospect being the sharing of such information with inimical neighbours; there is consequently considerable scope for improving efforts at information denial and deception. Any adversary that persists with domain-oriented or siloed approaches may be in for a surprise\, since systems warfare permits considerable flexibility in the application of power. The machine-versus-human contest is already a reality\, as videos of FPV drones pursuing soldiers demonstrate\, and extends beyond hardware such as robotic platforms and humanoids to decision-making itself\, where creativity may remain a human advantage but speed and resilience will favour the machine. A growing number of Indian observers assess that the qualitative and quantitative gap is widening and must be mitigated before it becomes generational. Finally\, the approach to imbibing technology into warfighting should preferably be unique and indigenous\, so that India retains the element of surprise in seeking military advantage. \nQ & A Session\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, complimented the Speaker on the choice of a subject of considerable relevance to India’s security. AI\, he observed\, is a field in which even marking time means falling behind. Roughly 85 per cent of global work in the field is attributable to the United States and about 15 per cent to the People’s Republic of China\, with the rest accounting for very little\, which raises the central question of where that leaves India. \nPointing to the World Artificial Intelligence Conference held in Shanghai from 17 to 20 July 2026\, the Director General drew attention to the establishment of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO)\, the agreement for which was signed by 29 countries on 16 July 2026\, on the eve of the Conference. This is not China’s first such initiative: the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation similarly competes with the Japan-led Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum\, of which India is a member while remaining outside the Chinese platform. The WAICO signatories are drawn from Asia\, Africa\, Europe and elsewhere\, and include Russia; no major Western state is among them\, but several countries of consequence to India in its neighbourhood\, notably Pakistan\, and in Southeast Asia\, are closely aligned with China and have joined. India\, by contrast\, is part of the US-led Pax Silica initiative on semiconductors and allied critical technologies. \nBeyond the question of funding India’s own research\, the Director General asked what India’s plugging points globally are for keeping abreast of progress elsewhere. India has been active in the AI summit process\, having hosted one summit with another hosted by France\, and has argued at the level of the Prime Minister that AI should be open and accessible\, that data should be protected\, that ethical considerations should be observed and that the interests of the Global South should be safeguarded. This position\, he noted\, is not far removed from what was articulated at the Shanghai Conference – including the striking assertion\, which drew headlines\, that man should not cede control to the machine\, an ethical formulation that bears directly on the future of lethal autonomous weapon systems. Whether this reflects an appeal to the Global South\, or a realistic Chinese assessment that others are ahead and an attempt to make a virtue of necessity\, remains an open question. What is clear is that AI governance has not yet been put together and that the contest will continue. \nTurning to implications\, the Director General noted that Indian platforms will increasingly depend on AI and on intelligentised warfare systems\, raising questions of system integrity and protection against intrusion\, from simple systems being compromised to larger ones. His central question was whether India needs to take a fresh look at whom it cooperates with\, and whether it should be plurilateral across all the emerging contending camps rather than committing to a single grouping in a fractured landscape – since no one grouping may meet all of India’s requirements in the future\, and capabilities may yet be denied. \nDr. M.S. Prathibha\, the moderator\, observed that international assessments of AI power increasingly turn on the ability to build AI models\, an area in which the United States leads on the strength of its data centres\, which explains China’s data-centre strategy and investments reported at around US$ 295 billion. She also noted that Chinese analysts regard new-energy and hypersonic weapons as principal threats to intelligentised systems\, and concluded the session by observing that Chinese thinking appears to envisage command shifting between the centre and forward troops depending on the state of battlefield awareness\, rather than a straightforward move towards centralisation or decentralisation. \nA participant raised the question of India’s own AI and digital foundations\, noting that policy focus has rested on subsidies and on encouraging research\, yet a majority of the GPU capacity available in the country belongs to foreign providers rather than Indian entities\, and argued that sovereign AI must be examined in terms of investment\, intellectual property\, and whether Indian models are built from the ground up or layered on open-source foundations. He further asked about the role of the PLA and its research institutions in China’s AI development\, the vulnerabilities that arise if Indian scholars and innovators build on Chinese models offered to the world\, and the risk of embedded components or hidden functions proliferating into government and military systems. Another participant offered three illustrations of how Chinese effort has translated into implementable capability over roughly two decades: the prominence given in the official Chinese press to the death of a PLA Colonel in a road accident in July 2023\, a graduate of the National University of Defence Technology who had studied statistics abroad before returning to work on an AI decision-support system\, now in its third iteration\, which reportedly generates draft plans\, conducts risk assessment and provides contingency options on the basis of incomplete data; a 2023 study finding that of 340 articles on military theory in a year’s output of the PLA’s official newspaper\, 132 dealt with AI\, concentrated in decision-making\, unmanned systems\, cognitive warfare and situational awareness; and displays at the Zhuhai air show in which a Chinese defence major demonstrated fused sensors tracking a target\, passing instructions to shooters and conducting post-strike damage assessment. Further interventions related to the realignment of Indian manpower and training policies for the future battlefield – a ten-minute decision cycle being of little value if reporting takes twenty minutes – the retention of technically skilled personnel in service\, a clarification on whether informatisation is primarily about disrupting an adversary’s decision-making or about sharing information within one’s own system\, and a question on how far these Chinese concepts were visible in Pakistani operations during Operation Sindoor. \nResponding\, the Speaker agreed that dependence on foreign-origin technology remains a vulnerability across critical technologies\, not AI alone\, as experience shows such dependencies are leveraged in times of conflict\, and that this can be addressed only through foundational research and capacity. On the PLA’s role in AI development\, he pointed to military-civil fusion as the germane framework\, a subject deliberately left out of the presentation as it is driven by the national leadership rather than the military; most of the technologies listed are dual-use\, sensor fusion in space using the Internet of Things and laser inter-satellite communication being presented as a means of measuring ocean temperature even as the same capability can track a ship — a framing that affords both flexibility and deniability. Recalling the AlphaGo–Lee Sedol match and the celebrated “Move 37”\, he acknowledged that machines have a demonstrable role in decision-making\, but assessed that neither the technology nor the confidence exists at present to hand decision-making over to them\, with the existential dimension weighing heavily since no one knows what artificial general or superintelligence will look like. He noted that Chinese authorities have used facial recognition and cognitive AI in social engineering applications\, and affirmed that fusing sensors and coupling them to kinetic elements is the entire principle of systems-of-systems warfare. He agreed that the widening gap must first be mitigated\, with overtaking being a much later question\, and that the human remains central\, noting that the PLA has itself revised its training curriculum to develop officers with better joint operational skills as a precursor to employing technology. Elaborating on paralysis\, he offered the analogy of the enemy as a human being whose brain is his command and control and whose spine is his network of nodes and connections: with these removed\, his limbs and organs may function perfectly well but he cannot fight back coherently. This may be achieved through hard kill\, cyber or electromagnetic means\, selective jamming\, or selective decapitation – not by killing the commander but by keeping him out of touch – the choice being determined by the operational effect sought. The ambition of systems warfare\, he concluded\, is that anyone should be able to communicate with anyone\, an infantry soldier being able to reach a satellite to call in a hypersonic missile or naval fires from a destroyer at sea\, what matters being not the chain but the effect brought to bear on the target. On Operation Sindoor the Speaker declined to comment\, noting only that commercial satellite imagery providers had made detailed imagery openly available on the internet\, an arrangement that remains deniable and cannot be firmly attributed. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Khyati Singh\, Research Analyst\, North America & Strategic Technologies Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-the-role-of-artificial-intelligence
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260713T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260713T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260730T113401Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260730T113401Z
UID:99296-1783929600-1783962000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “The 11th NPT Review Conference:  An Assessment”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Hina Pandey\, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) spoke on “The 11th NPT Review Conference: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 13 July 2026. Mr. Niranjan Oak\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the discussion\, attended by scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker  in her  assessment of the 11th Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference\, which concluded on 22 May 2026\, highlighted that the conclusion of the Review Conference  without a consensus outcome document was expected as it took  place  amidst geopolitical challenges such as  the Iranian nuclear crisis\, suspension of cooperation between the US and Russia\, withering away of nuclear norms of nuclear restraint and a growing deep divide between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) on the disarmament accountability on Article VI of the NPT. The estrangement in US-Russia relations as one of the factors contributing to the failure of the Conference was also highlighted in addition to the shifting of language in the drafts of the outcome documents. The discussion concluded with an assessment of future implications as well as key takeaways for India. \nDetailed Report\nThe moderator\, Mr. Niranjan Oak\, set the context of the discussion by putting forward relevant   questions such as the significance of the NPT\, in preventing nuclear proliferation vis-à-vis US extended deterrence nuclear guarantees and NPTs relevance for India\, as it had rejected the NPT for creating nuclear haves and have nots. \nDr. Hina Pandey argued that while India remains outside of the Treaty and thus\, cannot accept any obligations arising out of it\, stocktaking of the issues within and surrounding the Treaty remains crucial from the standpoint of nuclear diplomacy. Further she noted\, that NPT exists as a reality of the global nuclear order and has also often figured in India’s domestic debates and that while India rejects the Treaty\, its non-proliferation record is consistent with the key provisions of the Treaty. Further\, she noted that since India regularly holds disarmament dialogues and consultations with both NNWS and NWS State parties of the NPT such as Australia\, Japan\, UK\, RoK\, more recently New Zealand and Norway\, stocktaking of the NPT Review Conference and the issues dominating it thus remains important. Furthermore\, the assessment of the Review Conference in general remains important as it is the only formal multilateral platform where the NNWS and Civil societies assess the compliance of the NWS. Over the years\, the NNWS have become more vocal in demanding accountability and reporting requirements. The 11th NPT Review Conference too brought forward these concerns by the NNWS on slow pace of disarmament\, nuclear modernisation programs by the NWS contradicting the spirit of the Treaty\, lack of arms control and escalating nuclear rhetoric. \nDr. Pandey presented the assessment of the Rev Con on three parameters i.e. purpose of the Treaty\, the status of the grand bargain vis-a-vis article VI and the expectations from the Rev Con versus the reality. Article VIII of the NPT requires a Conference every five years to examine the implementation and compliance of the Treaty obligations by the State Parties. This has often translated as reaffirmation of support\, wherein the delivery of a consensus manifests as further actionable steps to advance the Treaty’s objective\, making it theoretically action oriented.  Since the NPT is a contract Treaty designed to deliver on the grand bargain\, a part of the grand bargain implies a quid pro quo wherein the NNWS have voluntary forgone the will to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for peaceful nuclear energy benefits. The Speaker observed that while NNWS have held their part of the bargain\, nuclear weapon states have avoided accountability. A point on successful outcomes of the previous Review Conferences\, for example: “Thirteen Practical Steps” – a historic consensus document that identified practical steps in the sixth NPT Review Conference (2000) was also highlighted.  In addition\, the Speaker also noted that the discussion on the 64-item action plan\, put forward in the 2010- NPT Review Conference (as a landmark\, comprehensive consensus framework) advancing specific actions on three pillars of the Grand Bargain repeatedly highlighted in this year’s Rev Con Agenda\, too remain stalled.  The run-up to the final document was marred by a significant shifting and weakening of language on disarmament\, removal of critique of nuclear arsenal modernisation\, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety principles. North Korea\, which found a mention in the previous (10th NPT Review Conference) draft final document too was removed in the final most version in 2026. The Speaker also highlighted dichotomy between negotiating and achieving disarmament as a perpetual irritant to disarmament and also pointed out the weak link between non-proliferation and disarmament as structural inadequacy. She raised a question on newer geopolitical issues as diluting the Treaty’s foundational spirit and noted that towards the next Review cycle\, that will resume in 2028 to 2031 much is left to be discussed in the absence of a final consensus outcome document. \nDr. Pandey also made a point on  a frequently overlooked reason for the failure of the Rev Con as the collapse of the US-Russia strategic stability dialogue and argued breakdown of bilateral talks by early 2022\, and the subsequent  failure to renew the New START Treaty in February 2026\, the suspended\, withdrawn agreements/treaties between the US and Russia including the previously concluded Plutonium Management and Disposition Act\,  Intermediate – Range Nuclear Forces Treaty\, and Open Skies Treaty had ended traditional management of the global nuclear order by the two countries\, also contributed to the failure of the NPT’s 11th Review Conference. On Iran\, the Speaker highlighted\, that while considerable onus was also placed on the Iranian issue in derailing the consensus\, however\, it is not this straightforward as at the most fundamental level\, the Iranian issue is tied to the unresolved ‘inalienable right to nuclear energy’ within the NPT-which the State Parties too failed to address in the recent Review Conference \nIn her concluding remarks Dr. Pandey suggested takeaways for India including – keeping a note on the continuation of the unresolved discussions of the NPT at various forums\, as most likely the civil societies would take forward these conversations in alternative forums. Recommendations for India included the continued expansion of disarmament dialogues\, consultations and conversations with other countries and to observe the P-5 discussions on multilateral arms control. \nQ & A Session\nThe Q &A session included questions on NPT being a low-cost method devised during the Cold War by the P-5 to constrain NNWS and the possibility of change of the ‘grand bargain’. The discussion further highlighted the inherent structural inadequacies and limitations of the NPT- such as addressing of only horizontal proliferation\, and limitation in addressing the supply side of proliferation. The speaker also cautioned about taking an extreme compartmentalised view of the NPT and stated that the global nuclear order heavily relies on a network of norms\, treaties\, transparency mechanisms\, and confidence-building measures tied directly to the NPT. \nOn IAEA safeguards effectiveness\, the Speaker explained inherent limits exist\, including jurisdictional boundaries\, financial constraints\, and the absolute requirement for state cooperation\, which can be sabotaged by political dynamics. On Artificial Intelligence (AI)\, the Speaker argued that the NPT may not be the appropriate forum to discuss as it leaves out countries outside of the Treaty. Addressing the comment on nuclear-sharing arrangements\, the Speaker concurred that it remains in conflict with the spirit and core principles of the NPT. \nThe Report was prepared by Ms. Nisarga G R\, Intern\, Internal Security Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-the-11th-npt-review-conference-an-assessment
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260706T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260706T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260708T115308Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260709T034249Z
UID:99005-1783324800-1783357200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting On “Turkish Defence Exports: An Assessment”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Abhishek Yadav\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Turkish Defence Exports: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 6 July 2026. Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the meeting. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute attended the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker examined the rise of Türkiye as a major arms exporter by tracing the evolution of its defence industry from import dependence to indigenous production\, analysing its export figures and destinations\, and assessing the drivers of its success alongside its structural vulnerabilities. Dr. Yadav highlighted the implications for India arising from Türkiye’s deepening defence cooperation with Pakistan and its growing strategic footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. \nDetailed Report\nDr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, the moderator\, laid out the context by tracing the widening geography of Turkish defence exports. As per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)\, Türkiye exported defence items to 55 countries during 2016 to 2025\, up from 24 in the previous decade\, 12 during 1996 to 2005\, and only one country\, Pakistan\, during 1986 to 1995. As per Türkiye’s Secretariat of Defence Industries (SSB)\, the value of its defence and aerospace exports in 2025 stood at over US$ 10 billion\, against a turnover of about US$ 20 billion. Five Turkish companies figured in the Defense News Top 100 Defence Companies for 2025 (Aselsan\, TUSAŞ\, Roketsan\, ASFAT and MKE)\, as against two Indian companies (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Bharat Electronics Limited). Pakistan accounted for 14 per cent of Turkish defence exports over 2016-25\, as per SIPRI figures. He then invited Dr. Abhishek Yadav to present his assessment. \nDr. Abhishek Yadav structured his presentation in three sections covering the evolution of the Turkish defence industry\, its export figures and destinations\, and a critical assessment with implications for India. Citing SIPRI’s March 2026 Report\, he noted that Türkiye now ranks among the world’s top 11 arms suppliers\, its share of global arms exports having risen from 0.9 per cent during 2016 to 2020 to 1.8 per cent during 2021 to 2025\, the second-highest growth rate after Italy. He brought up the 1964 letter from US President Lyndon B. Johnson\, which stated that American-supplied equipment could not be used for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus\, and the US arms embargo after the 1974 Cyprus operation\, episodes that set in motion a sustained policy of indigenisation. \nThe Speaker described a transformation unfolding across five decades: direct procurement before 1990\, co-production during the 1990s\, partial design capability between 2000 and 2010\, full indigenous design between 2010 and 2020\, and the current decade to achieve complete localisation. The ecosystem now comprises over 4\,000 companies and more than one lakh direct employees. \nDr. Yadav attributed this growth to seven structural reforms\, including the restructuring of the procurement agency SSM into the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) under President Erdoğan\, the National Technology Initiative of 2017 linking TÜBİTAK (the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye)\, the State agency responsible for funding and conducting scientific and defence-related research\, with universities and industry\, a domestic supply chain for armour materials\, radars and rocket propellants\, and substantial investment in space and satellite technology through the Türksat and Göktürk programmes. Türkiye’s defence localisation rate rose from about 20 per cent in 2002 to 80 per cent at present\, and in 2025 alone the SSB organised 485 international activities across 94 countries. \nAccording to Dr. Yadav\, Turkish defence and aerospace exports grew from about US$ 1.95 billion in 2016 to over US$ 10 billion in 2025\, roughly doubling every two years after 2021. Pakistan is currently Türkiye’s largest arms export market with 16 per cent of the total\, followed by the UAE at 12 per cent and Ukraine at 8.4 per cent. \nDr. Yadav then turned to a region-wise breakdown of these exports. In Europe\, Ukraine has received Bayraktar TB2 drones and has MILGEM-class vessels on order. Spain signed an agreement in 2025 for Hürjet trainers; Poland became the first NATO and EU country to operate the TB2; and Romania took delivery of a Hisar-class vessel in June 2026\, Türkiye’s first warship export to a NATO and EU member state. Major customers in Africa include Algeria\, Tunisia\, Morocco\, Ethiopia and Libya. In West Asia\, the UAE has procured Turkish systems for over two decades\, Qatar has bought patrol boats and hundreds of armoured vehicles\, and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in July 2023 for Akıncı drones with technology transfer and licence production. Ankara has also given armoured vehicles as military aid to post-Assad Syria. In Southeast Asia\, Indonesia signed a contract in July 2025 for 48 fifth-generation KAAN fighters alongside earlier purchases of light tanks and drones\, Malaysia has received many infantry vehicles of Turkish design\, and the Philippines has taken attack helicopters and Cirit missiles. \nThe Speaker stated that closest to India’s concerns in South Asia\, Pakistan maintains an extensive and expanding defence relationship with Türkiye encompassing Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones\, targeting pods and MILGEM-based Babur class frigates\, two of them under licenced production at Pakistan’s shipyard. Bangladesh has received armoured personnel carriers\, guided bombs\, rocket launchers\, TB2 drones and howitzers\, and the Maldives has received armoured vehicles\, TB2 drones and a patrol boat. Türkiye thus maintains meaningful defence relationships with three of India’s neighbours. \nThe Speaker attributed Türkiye’s success against established suppliers to six factors: combat proven systems; willingness to offer technology transfer\, co-production and localisation; a pragmatic export policy with fewer end user restrictions; conformity with NATO standards; rapid delivery timelines; and flexible financing terms. Dr. Yadav then set out the vulnerabilities. Critical platforms still rely on foreign engines\, which exposes exports to licensing restrictions imposed by engine supplier nations\, while imported semiconductors\, sensors and precision electronics create supply chain risks. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions and tensions over the S-400 acquisition from Russia affect Western technology approvals\, and Turkish lira volatility raises production costs. \nDr. Yadav also noted that President Erdoğan\, during the 2023 Election\, presented the indigenous defence industry as a symbol of strategic autonomy\, national prestige and domestic political messaging. For India\, he identified three implications. First\, Türkiye’s defence cooperation with Islamabad is strengthening Pakistan’s military capability and industrial base\, a dynamic visible during Operation Sindoor in May 2025\, when Türkiye stood with Pakistan in condemning India’s military operations\, while Indian authorities found evidence of usage of Turkish Songar and YIHA drones by Pakistan. Second\, Bangladesh’s new government has signalled Ankara’s growing importance to Dhaka\, with Foreign Minister Dr. Khalilur Rahman choosing Türkiye for his first major bilateral visit in March 2026\, ahead of his April visit to India. Third\, Türkiye is combining arms exports with training\, flexible financing and industrial partnerships to expand its footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral\, where India seeks to maintain influence. \nQ&A Session\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, observed that Türkiye’s journey from procurement to co-production\, partial design and finally indigenous design mirrors India’s own aspirations\, and that much of its recent success was built on the wars of the past decade\, with the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict that brought the Bayraktar drones to prominence. Noting that Türkiye wears many hats as a member of both the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)\, he suggested studying whether this dual identity has enabled or inhibited its defence exports. Amb. Chinoy also asked the Speaker to explore how Türkiye’s flexible export policy would sit with the European Union’s Readiness 2030 agenda of integrated procurement\, supply chains and research. \nThe Director General remarked that the threat from Turkish weapons in the region should be viewed in context\, as they are no more insidious than Chinese or American ones\, since the contradiction between India and Türkiye is not a fundamental bilateral one; the deeper concern lies in Ankara’s aspirations of leadership in the Islamic world and the overall support it extends to Pakistan. Amb. Chinoy suggested that the theme of India-Türkiye cooperation should also be explored. \nOther participants also raised questions regarding the strategic dependence created by the sale of complete system of systems\, the risks and absorption limits of technology transfer to Saudi Arabia\, the public-private split in production and exports\, and the role of TÜBİTAK and state funding in research and startups. Questions were also raised regarding sanctions navigation\, Türkiye’s outreach to the Maldives\, capacity building with Bangladesh\, and Türkiye’s prioritisation of Pakistan in its defence supplies. Dr. Yadav provided comprehensive responses to all comments and questions raised during the session. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Aquib Mohd. Khan\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-turkish-defence-exports-an-assessment
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260630T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260630T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260730T114535Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260730T114719Z
UID:99298-1782806400-1782838800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Book Discussion on The Durian Flavour: India and ASEAN After a Decade of the Act East Policy at MP-IDSA
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a discussion on Ambassador Gurjit Singh’s latest book\, The Durian Flavour: India and ASEAN After a Decade of the Act East Policy\, Rupa Publications\, 2026 on 30 June 2026. The discussion brought together MP-IDSA scholars to reflect on the evolution of India’s engagement with Southeast Asia over the past decade under the Act East Policy and to deliberate on the emerging strategic\, economic and geopolitical dynamics shaping India-ASEAN relations. The discussion was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. Dr. Om Prakash Das\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, was the Internal Discussant. \nExecutive Summary\nThe discussion on The Durian Flavour: India and ASEAN After a Decade of the Act East Policy examined the evolution\, achievements and limitations of India’s Act East Policy\, highlighting the growing strategic importance of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific and the need to strengthen connectivity\, defence cooperation and regional partnerships. It also underscored that sustaining ASEAN centrality and advancing a rules-based\, inclusive Indo-Pacific will require deeper India-ASEAN engagement\, faster implementation of key initiatives and greater strategic convergence amidst intensifying great-power competition.  \nDetailed Report\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy gave a brief introduction about the book during his Opening Remarks and emphasised the innovative title of the book by highlighting the Durian fruit dichotomy and also focused on how the book rightly explains the transformation from India’s Look-East Policy to the Act-East Policy. \nOpening the discussion\, Ambassador Gurjit Singh provided an overview of the central arguments presented in his book. He explained that the title\, The Durian Flavour\, symbolises the complex yet rewarding nature of India’s engagement with ASEAN. Much like the tropical fruit\, whose distinctive characteristics often evoke mixed reactions\, India-ASEAN relations have evolved through phases of adaptation and eventual appreciation. He argued that while the Act East Policy has significantly expanded India’s engagement with Southeast Asia since its launch in 2014\, the relationship has reached a stage where both sides need to move beyond symbolism towards more substantive and result-oriented cooperation. \nAmbassador Singh observed that the transformation from the earlier Look East Policy to the Act East Policy reflected India’s recognition of Southeast Asia’s growing strategic importance within the wider Indo-Pacific and also gave insights into the time when he was serving as Ambassador. He noted that over the last decade\, India has broadened cooperation with ASEAN across political\, economic\, security\, connectivity\, digital\, maritime and people-to-people domains. At the same time\, he cautioned that expectations have risen on both sides\, making it necessary to assess whether existing institutional mechanisms and policy instruments are sufficient to meet the demands of a rapidly evolving regional order. \nAmb. Gurjit Singh also discussed ASEAN’s enduring centrality in the Indo-Pacific architecture. Ambassador Singh argued that despite intensifying strategic competition among major powers\, ASEAN continues to provide an indispensable platform for regional dialogue and confidence-building and that it was in 2018 when Indonesia formed the ‘ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ (AOIP).  He emphasised that India’s Indo-Pacific vision remains firmly anchored in ASEAN centrality and the principles of inclusivity\, openness and adherence to international law. However\, he suggested that maintaining ASEAN centrality would require greater unity within the organisation as well as stronger partnerships with countries such as India that support a rules-based regional order. \nReflecting on the achievements of the Act East Policy\, Ambassador Singh highlighted progress in maritime cooperation\, defence engagement\, digital connectivity\, infrastructure development and educational exchanges. He pointed to growing defence interactions\, naval exercises and capacity-building initiatives as indicators of increasing strategic convergence between India and ASEAN member states. Nevertheless\, he acknowledged that several connectivity projects have progressed more slowly than anticipated and emphasised the need to expedite their implementation to strengthen India’s economic integration with Southeast Asia. \nThe strategic implications of an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific also formed an important component of the discussion. Ambassador Singh noted that geopolitical competition has created both opportunities and challenges for India and ASEAN. While strategic competition has increased the importance of regional partnerships\, it has also complicated the diplomatic environment in which ASEAN operates. He argued that India should continue to pursue an independent and inclusive regional approach that complements ASEAN’s own efforts to preserve strategic autonomy while promoting regional stability. Amb. Singh also emphasised that it is important to keep engaging ASEAN and also focus on fostering more trilateral frameworks involving ASEAN and other like-minded countries. \nDr. Om Prakash Das\, Internal Discussant\, commended the book for providing a comprehensive assessment of India’s engagement with ASEAN during a transformative period in regional geopolitics and pointed out how Amb. Gurjit Singh has given on-the-ground experiences of his time as an Ambassador in the book. He noted that the book effectively combines diplomatic experience with strategic analysis\, making it valuable for policymakers\, scholars and students alike. Dr. Das observed that the work highlights both the achievements and limitations of the Act East Policy\, encouraging readers to critically evaluate India’s progress beyond official narratives. Dr. Das further emphasised that the book contributes to understanding the changing nature of ASEAN amid intensifying great-power competition and the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as the principal strategic theatre. \nChairing the discussion\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy appreciated Ambassador Gurjit Singh’s extensive diplomatic experience\, which lends both credibility and practical insight to the book. He observed that India’s engagement with ASEAN has acquired increasing strategic significance in light of evolving regional security dynamics and the growing salience of the Indo-Pacific. Ambassador Chinoy further underlined that India’s partnership with ASEAN extends beyond conventional diplomacy and increasingly encompasses defence cooperation\, maritime security\, resilient supply chains\, emerging technologies and sustainable development. \nThe interactive session that followed witnessed an exchange of views and questions between the author and scholars.  Questions related to ASEAN’s future role in the Indo-Pacific\, India’s connectivity initiatives\, and the potential of trilateral frameworks amidst great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific. \nThe report has been  prepared by Ms. Simran Walia\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA).
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/book-discussion-on-the-durian-flavour-india-and-asean
CATEGORIES:BOOK DISCUSSION FORUM,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260629T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260629T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260709T114924Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260709T115004Z
UID:99024-1782720000-1782752400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “China’s Security Capabilities in the Domain of Cognitive Warfare”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Abhishek K. Darbey\, Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, made his presentation on “China’s Security Capabilities in the Domain of Cognitive Warfare” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 June 2026. Col. Nester Derrick D’Souza\, Research Fellow at MP-IDSA\, moderated the session. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director – General\, MP-IDSA\, and Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker primarily looked at China’s security in the cognitive domain that covered themes such as the concept of cognitive security\, correlation of emerging technologies and cognitive security\, methods and mechanism of cognitive security\, significance of the cognitive security system\, China’s cognitive security system involving legislative and technological tools etc. He explained that the cognitive security system\, is a machine based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies primarily\, natural language processing\, machine learning\, and generative AI. He noted that by means of these technologies the system can automatically access\, store\, and assess the data available on cyberspace enabling the system to understand the psychological patterns of individual or group or community to manipulate them according to the attacker’s set objectives. The Speaker discussed China’s institutional framework for cognitive domain security that includes the Ministry of State Security and concerned services of the People’s Liberation Army. He elaborated on legislative tools to secure cognitive security involving agencies such as Cyberspace Administration of China and various laws and regulations. The discussion explored the challenges cognitive warfare poses for democratic societies\, and India’s preparedness against cognitive domain threats.   \nDetailed Report\nIn his introductory remarks\, the moderator observed that the character of warfare has undergone significant transformation with the rapid advancement of digital technologies. Modern conflicts are no longer confined to conventional military operations but increasingly involve competition in cyberspace\, the information domain and the cognitive sphere. He noted that cognitive warfare seeks to influence the perceptions\, beliefs\, and decision-making processes of individuals and societies\, thereby weakening an adversary’s political resolve without necessarily resorting to kinetic force. Against this backdrop\, he introduced the presentation as an examination of China’s growing capabilities in the domain of cognitive warfare and its implications for contemporary security studies. \nDr. Abhishek K. Darbey began by explaining that China conceptualises cognitive security as the protection of the cognitive space of its population against internal and external attempts to manipulate public opinion\, undermine ideological unity\, or challenge the authority of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Unlike traditional military operations that focus on physical destruction\, cognitive warfare targets human cognition by shaping narratives\, influencing perceptions\, and altering behaviour through sophisticated information operations. In China’s strategic thinking\, safeguarding public cognition has become an essential component of national security. \nDr. Darbey emphasised that AI constitutes the technological foundation of China’s cognitive security architecture. AI\, particularly machine learning\, deep learning and generative AI\, enables the collection\, processing and analysis of enormous volumes of structured and unstructured data. These technologies assist in identifying misinformation\, detecting hostile narratives\, predicting cognitive threats\, and generating tailored responses in real time. Machine learning models continuously improve through adaptive learning\, enabling the system to respond more effectively to evolving information threats. \nDr. Darbey explained that China’s AI-enabled cognitive security system performs several interconnected functions. It rapidly detects content considered harmful to national interests\, analyses patterns of information dissemination and supports automated decision-making regarding the removal or restriction of sensitive material. Human analysts work alongside AI systems\, allowing faster identification of emerging threats while ensuring oversight over critical decisions. Such integration of artificial intelligence with cybersecurity has significantly strengthened China’s ability to regulate its domestic information environment. \nThe Speaker elaborated on two principal dimensions of China’s cognitive security framework. The first concerns cyber and data security\, where AI supports threat detection\, intelligence analysis\, and protection of digital infrastructure. The second relates directly to the cognitive domain by preventing manipulation of public opinion\, protecting ideological stability\, and ensuring that citizens receive information consistent with state narratives. According to Dr. Darbey\, China considers security in the cognitive domain as important as the other areas of national security. \nDr. Darbey explained the Institutional mechanisms supporting China’s cognitive security strategy. Among the Institutions\, the Ministry of State Security (MoSS) is the principal agency responsible for security against cognitive domain attacks in China. Other agencies include the United Front Work Department\, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Cyberspace Force\, PLA Information Support Force\, Cyberspace Administration of China etc. The MoSS protects the public and establishment from perceived foreign ideological subversion by aggressively tracking disinformation\, algorithm manipulation\, and deep-fake attacks. The United Front Work Department\, an organ of the CPC\, is given the task to create a positive narrative and perception about the Party and China across the world by means of their long-term associations with foreign political elites\, academic institutions\, and the Chinese diaspora. \nWithin the military establishment\, the People’s Liberation Army has integrated cognitive warfare into its doctrine of “intelligentised warfare”. The PLA Cyberspace Force and the PLA Information Support Force are two specialised services of the PLA set up in 2024 for cyber and information domains warfare\, which are key components of Cognitive Warfare. Network Information System is the key system built under PLA Information Support Force to store and secure data by means of AI-based applications. \nThe Speaker noted the central role of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) in regulating China’s digital ecosystem. The CAC administers and regulates all internet platforms in China\, and its key tasks include: checking and maintaining a clean and healthy cyberspace ecosystem\, and regulating all AI algorithms and machine learning models etc. The CAC conducts ‘Operation Qinglang’\, a campaign to clear all anti-China/anti-government content from their cyberspace thereby preventing their citizens from exposure to such content. These measures\, according to the speaker\, illustrate China’s comprehensive approach to managing both technological infrastructure and public discourse. \nThe Speaker discussed the legal framework underpinning China’s cognitive security strategy. Laws such as the Cybersecurity Law\, Data Security Law\, and Personal Information Protection Law regulate data governance\, information flows\, and cybersecurity practices. Additional regulations governing generative AI services\, deep synthesis technologies\, and AI-generated content require developers to ensure that training data and AI applications remain consistent with state regulations. Together\, these legal instruments provide an institutional basis for China’s broader objective of protecting cognitive security. \nDr. Darbey observed that China’s approach combines technological capability with ideological governance. Domestically\, the State exercises extensive control over cyberspace by restricting access to undesirable information\, maintaining strict narrative management\, and promoting ideological unity. Dr. Darbey argued that China’s ability to regulate its digital environment has enabled it to respond rapidly to misinformation campaigns and minimise the influence of anti-state narratives within the country. \nDr. Darbey noted certain limitations in China’s cognitive warfare capabilities in foreign social cognition. China has been building and improving its cognitive security system to safeguard and regulate the cognition of its population against malicious disinformation and influence operations. However\, it lacks dominant platforms in digital space to influence the international population in their favour. Consequently\, Beijing continues to rely on its mass-media\, foreign missions\, United Front Work Department to carry out its influence operations in foreign lands to promote favourable narratives globally. \nIn his concluding remarks\, the Speaker highlighted that China has developed a strong security system and resilience against cognitive attacks waged on its domestic population. By controlling the flow of information\, the Government of People’s Republic of China can maintain a pro-regime perception among its domestic population. However\, it has great limitations to do so outside of China\, because it cannot control the flow of information in other countries’ cyberspaces. Nevertheless\, the country has built effective mechanisms to counter-anti-China narrative which is already propagated in foreign lands. \nQ&A Session\nThe interactive discussion focused on several conceptual\, technological\, and strategic dimensions of cognitive warfare. \nThe Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, reflected on the evolution of China’s methods of narrative control since the Mao-era. Whereas the earlier campaigns relied on political mobilisation of the masses by the Party cadres\, now with AI-based technologies these campaigns are easier\, faster and more intense. He noted that democratic societies face more complex challenges of security in balancing freedom of expression with the need to safeguard national security against hostile information operations. He emphasised that India must strengthen its technological capabilities while preserving democratic openness. \nParticipants questioned whether algorithmic censorship could reliably distinguish between legitimate criticism and threats to national security\, particularly in democratic societies where freedom of expression remains a fundamental value. Concerns were also raised regarding the ethical implications of allowing AI systems to influence decisions affecting public discourse. \nResponding to these observations\, Dr. Darbey agreed that AI has significantly enhanced the State’s capacity to regulate information compared with earlier methods of narrative control. He also acknowledged the importance of examining India’s preparedness in this domain and noted that understanding cognitive warfare requires continuous engagement with evolving digital ecosystems and social media platforms. \nOn the question of China’s lessons on cognitive domain capabilities drawn from the Russia-Ukraine War and 2026 Iran War\, Dr. Darbey emphasised that this is probably the first time in war with substantial practice of cognitive domain operations\, and not only China\, but militaries around the world are drawing lessons on cognitive domain operations from the ongoing wars. He argued that large-scale use of emerging technologies such as AI-based technologies has led to massive malicious disinformation and misinformation campaigns through digital platforms that has influenced the social cognition in shaping perceptions about the wars. \nThe discussion also examined the broader implications for India’s digital security and the importance of developing indigenous technological capabilities to enhance national resilience against cognitive domain operations. The Speaker suggested building indigenous infrastructures in digital domains such as social media platforms\, digital communication apps\, search engines\, and robust infrastructures in cyber and information domains for the future inteligentized warfare. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Pushpendra Singh\, Intern\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.  \n 
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-chinas-security-capabilities-in-the-domain-of-cognitive-warfare
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260622T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260622T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260707T094411Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T094411Z
UID:98990-1782115200-1782147600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Dr. Gulbin Sultana’s Monday Morning Presentation on "The Sri Lankan Economy: Recent Challenges"
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting on 22 June 2026\, featuring a presentation by Dr. Gulbin Sultana\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA on “The Sri Lankan Economy: Recent Challenges.” The Session was moderated by Dr. Smruti S Pattnaik\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session examined the ongoing recovery of the Sri Lankan economy following the 2022 economic crisis and the measures undertaken by the governments of President Ranil Wickremesinghe and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to facilitate this recovery. The Speaker discussed the short-term and medium-to-long-term measures employed\, along with the policy reforms that helped the economy recover from a negative GDP growth rate of -7.3 percent to a positive 5 percent between 2022 and 2025. The Speaker assessed the monetary and policy reforms implemented by the Sri Lankan Government during this period\, as well as their impact on the country’s working class. She concluded with an assessment of the impact of the West Asian conflict and Cyclone Ditwah on the country\, while providing projections for monitoring Sri Lanka’s contemporary vulnerabilities. \nDetailed Discussion\nIn her Opening Remarks\, Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik\, introduced the topic by providing a brief overview of Sri Lanka’s recovery following the economic crisis of 2022 amid the adverse effects of Cyclone Ditwah and the West Asian conflict on the economy. Referring to the country’s economic growth\, she explained how Sri Lanka exceeded the projections made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The tourism industry\, however\, continued to show a bearish trend compared to the previous year. \nDr. Gulbin Sultana began with an overview of Sri Lanka’s economic trajectory from 2022 to 2025. She highlighted the improvement in GDP growth\, which transitioned from a negative -7.3 percent to a positive 5 percent. Additionally\, she pointed to a decline in public debt\, and increase in gross official reserves to US$6.8 billion during this period. She provided the context for the 2022 economic crisis\, emphasising how government corruption and mismanagement\, alongside widespread public discontent\, ultimately led to a regime change. The newly formed administration of President Dissanayake prioritised economic stability\, restoration\, and recovery as its primary objectives. \nTo address its economic vulnerabilities\, Sri Lanka adopted a combination of policy shifts and monetary adjustments categorised into short-term measures (implemented primarily in 2022 to address immediate challenges) and medium-to-long-term strategies\, as detailed by Dr. Gulbin Sultana. Sri Lanka initially suspended debt servicing and imposed trade restrictions on the import of non-essential items. The debt moratorium discouraged multilateral organisations from aiding Sri Lanka. Consequently\, the country relied on bilateral support\, including a US$400 million currency swap facility from India and an arrangement with Iran under which US$5 million worth of Ceylon tea per month over a multi-year period was used to settle the US$251 million legacy oil debt. Sri Lanka also completed a debt restructuring that suspended repayments on official bilateral loans and restructured international sovereign bonds until 2028. \nAccording to the Speaker\, for medium-to-long-term stability\, Sri Lanka engaged with the IMF\, securing financing through its Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Programme. This engagement proved pivotal in encouraging other multilateral institutions to provide financial assistance to the country. \nDr. Sultana talked about several policy reforms that were introduced under the IMF’s EFF\, including the Public Debt Management Act and the Public Financial Management Act. Tax reforms\, such as the IMF-backed expansion of the Value Added Tax (VAT)\, were also introduced. Although the implementation of the IMF-backed VAT expansion has been postponed\, it continues to face public opposition because of its inherently regressive nature. Furthermore\, structural reforms were proposed to make State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) more cost-effective\, alongside the introduction of the Aswesuma Programme for targeted low-income communities. However\, SOE restructuring remains in its nascent stages\, and the Aswesuma Programme continues to face implementation bottlenecks and systemic corruption. These challenges are further compounded by the IMF’s expenditure ceiling\, which restricts investment in these programmes\, thereby limiting their effectiveness. \nDr. Sultana explained that the public remained largely dissatisfied with the nature of the reforms undertaken by the Government. This resentment was reflected in the Local Council Election results. The Government\, however\, remained optimistic\, with former President Wickremesinghe describing the period as one of “short-term pain for long-term gain.” The IMF and ADB nevertheless continue to identify key vulnerabilities\, including natural disasters\, susceptibility to external shocks due to import dependence\, and US tariffs on Sri Lanka. In addition\, Sri Lanka’s preferential access to the European Union (EU) market under the GSP+ scheme remains under scrutiny. Its continuation depends on compliance with 27 international conventions\, with the EU specifically requiring that counter-terrorism legislation be brought fully in line with international human rights standards. \nDr. Sultana focused on the impact of Cyclone Ditwah and the West Asian conflict on Sri Lanka. Striking Sri Lanka in late 2025\, Cyclone Ditwah triggered the island nation’s worst weather disaster in recent history. It caused over 600 deaths\, affected 2.3 million people\, and inflicted an estimated US$4.1 billion in direct physical damage. The IMF subsequently approved US$206 million in emergency financial assistance for Sri Lanka under the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) to help the country address immediate balance-of-payments and fiscal pressures resulting from the cyclone. Meanwhile\, the ongoing West Asian conflict has adversely affected the country’s tourism\, energy\, and apparel sectors. Fertiliser prices also increased\, while inflation reached 5.5 percent\, exceeding the IMF’s projection of 5 percent. \nDr. Gulbin Sultana concluded by outlining the priorities that the island nation should focus on in the coming years. Diversifying exports\, strengthening climate resilience\, and attracting greater foreign investment should remain Sri Lanka’s primary priorities. Given the country’s heavy reliance on exports and its vulnerability to adverse climatic conditions\, these measures would help mitigate current economic challenges while strengthening resilience against future shocks. Despite the end of the immediate crisis\, structural vulnerabilities persist. While economic growth has resumed\, greater emphasis must now be placed on sustaining the growth momentum. \n  \nQ&A Session\nThe discussion began with Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy’s remarks on the presentation. He emphasised India’s role in promoting the growth and development of the neighbourhood. About Sri Lanka\, he noted that India should expand investment initiatives and absorb a larger share of Sri Lankan exports. Referring to India’s multi-pronged financial and humanitarian assistance package worth over US$4 billion\, he also enquired about the conditions India places on Sri Lanka while extending such significant assistance. In response\, Dr. Gulbin Sultana explained that the US$400 million currency swap facility would be repaid to India\, while agreements in the oil and energy sectors would prove mutually beneficial for both countries. However\, she also noted that legacy issues\, Rajapaksa-era geopolitics\, and the high cost of investment have historically discouraged Indian investment in Sri Lanka. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang\, Dr. Mayuri Banerjee\, Dr. Ashish Shukla and Dr. Deepika Saraswat raised questions and made observations. They focused on Sri Lankan public perceptions of India\, the nature of current Chinese investments in Sri Lanka\, India’s defence ties with Sri Lanka\, and the limited presence of Indian private-sector investment in the country. \nDr. Gulbin Sultana noted that Sri Lankan public opinion towards India remains largely favourable\, particularly considering India’s timely nationwide economic assistance and humanitarian support since the 2022 economic crisis. She observed that China’s investment sin large infrastructure projects have declined since the crisis. However\, China’s proactive engagements in the northern province were noted by the Speaker. On defence cooperation\, she highlighted India’s investments in the maritime sector. For instance\, at the Port of Colombo\, India’s warship and submarine builder\, Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL)\, acquired a controlling 51 percent stake in Colombo Dockyard. In addition\, India continues to provide technical cooperation and capacity building to Sri Lanka. Private investment\, however\, has remained limited. Some of the Indian companies including Adani Group and the real estate firm Krrish Group have faced significant corruption and financial controversies related to their operations in the country. Indian companies continue to remain cautious because of these challenges. However\, this reluctance is not unique to Indian firms\, as the overall investment environment in Sri Lanka remains challenging. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Cyrus Ghosh\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/dr-gulbin-sultanas-monday-morning-presentation-on-the-sri-lankan-economy-recent-challenges
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260615T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260615T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260703T113740Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T052532Z
UID:98829-1781510400-1781542800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of The Monday Morning Meeting On "President Putin’s Visit to China: An Assessment”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Rajorshi Roy\, Research Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “President Putin’s Visit to China: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 15 June 2026. Dr. Mayuri Banerjee\, Associate Fellow\, moderated the meeting. The scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker assessed the evolving Russia-China strategic partnership in the context of President Putin’s visit to Beijing in May 2026\, coinciding with the thirtieth anniversary of bilateral  \ntrategic coordination. He examined the historical trajectory of the relationship\, the economic\, defence\, and diplomatic drivers for both countries\, structural asymmetries and limitations\, and the implications for India. He argued that while significant convergence of interests exists\, a formal military alliance remains unlikely\, and the partnership is best characterised by the formula: never against each other\, but not always with each other. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Mayuri Banerjee\, the moderator\, provided the contextual backdrop to the meeting\, noting that President Putin’s two-day visit to China from 20-22 May 2026 coincided with the thirtieth anniversary of strategic coordination between Russia and China\, and was widely celebrated in the Chinese media as marking their twenty-fifth bilateral summit. She further noted that the visit \nwas interpreted as a significant diplomatic achievement for Xi Jinping as China was seen courted by both US and Russia. Against this backdrop\, she posed three questions to the Speaker: whether the relationship is evolving towards a “no-limits partnership”; how strategic trust between the two countries should be assessed; and what a closer Russia and China relationship implies for India\, particularly in the context of the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle. \nDr. Rajorshi Roy began by situating the visit within the longer arc of the Russia-China relationship\, which has traversed the full spectrum from friendship and alliance to adversarial rivalry and back to what he described as a “historic high.” He traced the key inflection points in this trajectory\, noting that it was from 1989 onwards that a deliberate effort was made to reset ties\, culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness in 2001. He identified Ukraine 1.0 in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022\, followed by the joint declaration of a “no-limits partnership”\, as the critical accelerants that deepened the relationship to its present level. He also highlighted the qualitative and quantitative improvement in the partnership over the last decade\, characterised by extensive cooperation across trade\, energy\, defence\, and diplomacy\, as well as a new pattern of interaction that has seen a growing Chinese footprint in areas traditionally considered Russia’s sphere of influence\, including Central Asia\, the Arctic\, and the Russian Far East. \nDr. Roy then outlined the drivers behind the partnership for each side. For Russia\, he argued that a strategic embrace of China has become a necessity to withstand Western geopolitical and geoeconomic pressure\, particularly in the context of sanctions. China is now Russia’s largest trade partner\, with bilateral trade having grown by fifty percent over the last four years and thirty-five percent of Russia’s exports directed towards China. He underlined the complementarity between the two economies\, Russia as an exporter of natural resources and China as an exporter of finished commodities\, while also noting the increasing use of national currencies\, with the yuan functioning as a de facto reserve currency for Russia. Energy\, he observed\, remains the backbone of the economic relationship\, with China absorbing Russian oil and gas previously destined for Europe through pipelines such as Power of Siberia and ESPO (Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean)\, with ongoing negotiations over the proposed Power of Siberia II. \nOn the defence front\, the Speaker noted the remarkable reversal in fortunes: Russia\, which has traditionally prided itself as one of the world’s leading arms manufacturers\, is now dependent on China for dual-use electronics\, commercial drones\, and microelectronic components. He also emphasised the political-diplomatic driver\, whereby China has consistently supported Russia on core concerns\, including opposition to NATO expansion\, Western interference\, and colour revolutions\, while maintaining a studied neutrality on the territorial dimensions of the Ukraine conflict. \nTurning to the drivers for China\, Dr. Roy noted that while they mirror Russia’s in broad terms\, there are important differences. On the economic front\, Russia represents a captive market for Chinese manufactured goods and provides a reliable\, discounted energy source at a time when China’s traditional energy suppliers in Venezuela and West Asia have faced instability. China also benefits from Russia’s importance as a node in the Belt and Road Initiative’s Silk Road Economic Belt connectivity project. He further pointed to the significance of bilateral trade in RMB as a step towards the internationalisation of the yuan. On the defence front\, China has sought specific areas where Russia retains competitive edge\, including missile defence and fighter jet engines\, while drawing broader strategic lessons from the Ukraine War regarding Western-imposed geopolitical and geoeconomic pressure. The Speaker noted China’s interest in a US strategically distracted in Europe rather than focused on the Indo-Pacific\, and highlighted Russia’s support for China’s maritime ambitions through joint patrols in the South China Sea\, Sea of Japan\, and Taiwan Strait. A key dimension underlined was China’s sustained investment in shifting Russian public perception\, historically negative\, through educational scholarships\, cultural outreach\, and tourist infrastructure\, particularly targeting younger Russians. \nDr. Roy then addressed the question of whether a formal military alliance is in the offing. He argued that despite the rhetoric of a “no-limits partnership\,” structural limitations persist. The relationship\, he contended\, reflects strategic compulsion on Russia’s part more than organic convergence\, and the growing asymmetry\, with Russia clearly the junior partner\, represents a remarkable historical reversal from the Mao era that makes Russia deeply uncomfortable. He identified several sources of friction: the risk of hollowing out of Russian domestic manufacturing due to dependence on Chinese goods; fears of Chinese encroachment into Central Asia\, the Arctic\, and the Russian Far East; divergences in foreign policy strategy\, including Russia’s arms exports to India and the Philippines\, and its deepening engagement with North Korea; and the persistent Russian fear of a G2 arrangement between China and the United States that would leave Russia marginalised. The Speaker also noted unresolved historical fault lines\, including Chinese territorial claims rooted in the nineteenth-century unequal treaties. Against this backdrop\, he described Russia’s approach as one of “subtle balancing”\, engaging countries that have frictions with China without overtly challenging Beijing\, and maintaining Institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of which China is not a member. The formula that best captures the relationship\, he argued\, is: never against each other\, but not always with each other. \nOn the implications for India\, the Speaker maintained that the deepening Russia-China Partnership complicates India’s strategic environment\, with Russia backing China on the Indo-Pacific and weapons exports resuming as a point of concern. He noted that a weakened Russia may find it increasingly difficult to resist Chinese pressure on issues of importance to India. Nevertheless\, Dr. Roy argued that India should continue to invest in the bilateral relationship with Russia\, as it gives Moscow strategic breathing space and provides India with leverage to prevent a Russia-China axis from acting against Indian interests. He recalled instances of Russia maintaining strategic autonomy\, including during the Taiwan crisis\, on Article 370\, and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) amidst a China-Pakistan tandem\, as evidence that Russian equities in India remain significant. The Speaker concluded by identifying four benchmarks that would shape the trajectory of the partnership: the terms on which the Ukraine War ends and whether Russia subsequently recalibrates towards the West; China’s actions in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea and Russia’s response; the outcome of Power of Siberia II negotiations as an indicator of Chinese leverage; and the question of leadership succession in Russia and whether a post-Putin leadership would seek accommodation with the West. \nQ&A Session\nParticipants raised questions on a range of issues\, including Russia’s position as the pivot in the US-Russia-China strategic triangle\, China’s negotiating leverage over the Power of Siberia II pipeline\, Russia’s tacit support for Chinese drone technology being supplied to both Russia and Ukraine\, China’s growing security footprint in Central Asia and its treaty engagements with Tajikistan and other Central Asian republics\, India’s potential to strategically cap China’s engagement in Russia\, Russia’s perception of Xi Jinping’s centennial goals and the China Dream\, and the implications of the Russia-North Korea military compact for the Russia-China relationship. Participants also raised observations on the evolution of the bilateral relationship\, the role of transboundary river agreements in achieving border stability\, and the centrality of personal ties between Putin and Xi in sustaining the partnership. The Speaker provided comprehensive responses to questions raised during the Session. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Aquib Mohd. Khan\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-president-putins-visit-to-china-an-assessment
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260608T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260608T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260702T055333Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T052426Z
UID:98732-1780905600-1780938000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “What Does the Nordic Mean? India’s Engagement with a Distinct Political Culture”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha\, Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Security Analyses (MP IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “What does the Nordic Mean? India’s Engagement with a Distinct Political Culture” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 8 June 2026. Dr. Opangmeren Jamir\, Associate Fellow\, MP IDSA moderated the Session\, which was attended by scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary \nThe Session examined the outcomes of the Third India–Nordic Summit and assessed its implications for India’s evolving engagement with the Nordic countries. The discussion highlighted the transformation of India–Nordic relations from a dialogue-oriented framework to a more institutionalised partnership centered on trade\, technology\, innovation\, sustainability\, and strategic cooperation. The presentation underscored how recent developments\, including the India-EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA)\, the India–EU Free Trade Agreement\, and global energy transitions\, have elevated the strategic significance of the Nordic region for India. \nDetailed Report\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Dr. Opangmeren Jamir contextualised the recently concluded Third India–Nordic Summit\, situating it within the broader trajectory of India–Nordic engagement. \nDr.. Uttam Kumar Sinha\, presented a detailed analysis of India’s relations with the Nordic States and began by outlining the evolution of the India–Nordic Summit process since its inception in 2018. He noted that the Third Summit reflected a qualitative shift in the relationship\, moving beyond political dialogue towards a more structured and outcome-oriented partnership. Dr. Sinha stated that the outcomes of the Summit were shaped by major developments in the international system. Firstly\, he highlighted the significance of the India– European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA)\, both of which have provided a legally binding institutional framework for economic engagement with the countries\, including Iceland and Norway. He observed that the agreement is expected to facilitate large-scale investments\, job creation\, and long-term economic integration. \nSecondly\, Dr. Sinha highlighted the conclusion of the India–EFT  Agreement in February 2026\, which has substantially expanded India’s economic opportunities by linking India with one of the world’s largest economic spaces. Together\, the India–EU FTA and the India- EFTA (TEPA) create an integrated ecosystem connecting trade\, technology\, and investment across Europe and the Nordic region with India. \nThird\, he identified global energy uncertainty and the transition towards renewable energy as major drivers of India’s growing interest in Nordic countries. As countries seek alternatives to fossil fuel dependence\, Nordic expertise in renewable energy\, sustainability\, and green technologies has become strategically valuable. \nDr. Sinha explained that these global developments played a role in elevating the India–Nordic partnership to a new level\, and will also reflect in the creation of what has been termed as “Trusted Green Technology and Innovation Partnership.” He noted that this framework seeks to combine Nordic technological innovation with India’s scale and market potential to create resilient and sustainable solutions. \nHighlighting country-specific areas of cooperation between India and the Nordic countries\, Dr. .Sinha noted that India’s engagement with Iceland will focus primarily on geothermal energy and fisheries\, while cooperation with Norway will center on geoeconomics\, Arctic science\, and maritime navigation. Sweden is expected to emerge as an important partner in advanced manufacturing and defence technologies\, Finland in telecommunications and digital technologies\, and Denmark in cybersecurity and healthcare innovation. \nThe presentation also reflected on the broader historical evolution of India’s relations with Nordic countries\, particularly Norway. Dr. Sinha highlighted that Norway was among the earliest countries to establish relations with independent India and has a long record of developmental cooperation with India. He highlighted Norwegian technical assistance to Kerala’s fisheries sector in the early post-independence period as one of the earliest examples of technical cooperation between the two countries. \nDrawing on his academic engagements with Nordic institutions\, Dr. Sinha emphasised the importance of Track-II interactions between think tanks such as IDSA’s collaboration with Nordic think tanks –  the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)\, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)\, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPR) in strengthening India–Nordic relations. He further highlighted long-standing institutional collaborations between Indian and Nordic research organisations in areas such as peace studies\, conflict resolution\, nuclear issues\, and strategic affairs. \nA major component of the presentation focused on understanding the distinctive characteristics of Nordic societies and governance systems. Dr.. Sinha argued that India’s future engagement with the Nordic region should not be limited to trade and investment but should also involve learning from their institutional experiences. \nHe further stated that Nordic countries have developed a distinctive socio-economic model that combines market competitiveness with extensive welfare provisions. Their governance systems are characterised by strong institutions\, social trust\, transparency\, accountability\, and effective public service delivery. These features have enabled Nordic countries to maintain high levels of economic freedom while simultaneously providing universal welfare benefits\, including healthcare\, education\, childcare\, and social protection. \nHe described the Nordic economy model as a pragmatic reconciliation between market-driven economic growth and social welfare objectives. While embracing globalisation\, innovation\, and entrepreneurship\, Nordic countries have also maintained robust labour protections\, progressive taxation systems\, and strong public institutions. This balance\, he argued\, offers valuable insights for countries seeking inclusive and sustainable development. \nDr. Sinha observed that India’s rise as a major power will increasingly depend not only on economic growth but also on institutional credibility\, administrative effectiveness\, social cohesion\, and governance capacity. In this regard\, Nordic experiences in welfare delivery\, urban management\, technological modernisation\, and state capacity-building provide useful reference points for India’s future development trajectory. He also examined the Nordic self-perception in international politics. He noted that Nordic countries often view themselves as peaceful\, socially progressive\, and consensus-oriented societies that prioritise institutions over personalities. Historically\, this identity enabled them to play active roles in peace mediation\, conflict resolution\, and international diplomacy despite their relatively small size. \nDrawing upon examples from Norway’s peace initiatives and academic institutions\, Dr.. Sinha discussed the country’s long-standing engagement in peacebuilding efforts across different regions. However\, he also noted that contemporary scholarship has increasingly questioned certain assumptions regarding Nordic exceptionalism and peace mediation. This has led to greater introspection within Nordic societies about their international role. \nQ & A Session \nParticipants raised questions regarding the future trajectory of Nordic cooperation with India\, opportunities for defence collaboration\, Arctic governance\, Nordic relations with the European Union\, and the impact of contemporary challenges such as immigration and demographic change in Nordic societies. \nResponding to these questions\, Dr. Sinha emphasised that India must move beyond signing agreements and focus on effective implementation\, monitoring\, and institutional follow-through. He argued that Nordic countries place considerable emphasis on accountability\, transparency\, and measurable outcomes\, making implementation essential to build a successful partnership. \nOn India’s Arctic engagement\, Dr. Sinha highlighted India’s growing scientific and strategic interests in the Arctic region\, including climate research\, environmental monitoring\, and maritime connectivity. Referring to India’s research activities in Svalbard and its observer status in the Arctic Council\, he emphasised that India has developed substantial engagement with Arctic governance mechanisms. At the same time\, he argued that India’s Arctic interests require balanced engagement with all stakeholders\, including both Nordic countries and Russia. Given the growing geopolitical significance of the Arctic and the region’s vast resource potential\, sustained cooperation with Norway and other Nordic states will remain important for advancing India’s Arctic objectives. \nOn contemporary challenges facing Nordic societies\, Dr. Sinha observed that issues such as immigration\, demographic ageing\, social integration\, and political polarisation have increasingly become part of the Nordic political landscape. Nevertheless\, he argued that these challenges do not diminish the significance of Nordic innovations in governance\, technology\, and public administration. \nLastly\, Dr. Sinha emphasised that there remains significant potential for expanding cooperation in defence manufacturing\, advanced technologies\, energy security\, Arctic research\, and sustainable development. He concluded by underlining that Nordic experiences in institution-building\, innovation\, and governance continue to offer important lessons for India’s long-term development and strategic ambitions. \nThe Report was prepared by Mr. Himanshu Kulkarni\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-what-does-the-nordic-mean-indias-engagement-with-a-distinct-political-culture
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260601T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260601T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260709T034031Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260709T034031Z
UID:99008-1780300800-1780333200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “US-China Summit:  Key Issues and Challenges”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA\, spoke on “US-China Summit:  Key Issues and Challenges” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 01 June 2026.  The Session was moderated by Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA. The Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation aimed to analyse the US- China Summit that took place between 13 May and 14 May 2026. Contextualising the Summit by underlining the critical areas of rare earth minerals\, market access\, and trade imbalance\, Dr. Prathiibha explored the deepening US-China competition and its international ramifications through the lens of the Summit. The Speaker further expanded on the changing nature of the United States’ policy toward China\, marked by a shift away from a strategic partnership to attempts at strategic stability\, driven in part by the limited success of efforts to decouple from the Chinese market ecosystem. \nDetailed Report\nThe meeting started with Opening Remarks from the moderator\, Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey\, who underscored the importance of the Summit\, which marks President Donald Trump’s return to China after a nine-year gap. Tracing the evolution of US- China relations\, the moderator divided them into three distinct phases: ice-breaking\, competition\, and containment. Against this historical background\, multiple instances of outbreaks of trade wars and tariff imposition\, interspersed with periods of thaw and continued economic engagement\, have underlined the limitations of tariffs as instruments for correcting trade imbalances. These developments have led to the acknowledgement of the deep interdependence and complexity of contemporary global supply chains. It is in this background that the Summit emerges. The moderator pointed to a new emerging shift in the US policy toward China\, which moves away from the earlier idea of strategic partnership. Instead\, there is an acknowledgment of the existence of both competition and differences\, while there is a simultaneous attempt to establish firm boundaries. \nDr. Prathibha began by laying the background of the US-China Summit\, which\, according to the Speaker\, is taking place in a much broader context. According to the Speaker\, the Donald Trump Presidency came about with a promise of following a different China policy as compared to previous administrations\, given the belief that the old liberal order was not benefiting the US and that there would be an imposition of trade tariffs and a limitation to technological cooperation. There is also the matter of the interim trade deal and the following truce in 2020. The above back and forth can be traced to 2018\, when an investigation by US agencies took place\, which looked into Chinese dealings of forced technology transfer. \nAccording to Dr. Prathibha\, China’s response to tariff imposition was limited in the beginning\, but over time\, as more and more tariffs were imposed by the US\, China also began to increase tariffs. Retaliatory tariffs initially targeted a narrow set of commodities\, such as wine\, ethanol\, and sorghum\, but later expanded to encompass larger and more strategically important sectors. This to and fro continued throughout 2018 and 2019. It was only after the Phase One trade deal that some relief was evident\, if only for some time. Post 2020\, however\, we see a major shift in China’s negotiation strategy. Dr. Prathibha states that this was due to China’s ability to leverage its dominance in rare earth minerals. Additionally\, the COVID pandemic added much stress on the Chinese economy\, leading to an increase in technological competition with the US\, and eventually integrated it more firmly with the high-tech value chain in the international order. \nDr. Prathibha explained that it was in this complex background that the Summit took place. On the part of the US\, President Trump declared the visit to be a huge success. He stated that China had agreed to buy 200 Boeing jets\, along with additional agricultural products. China has\, in turn\, pushed for greater inclusion into advanced tech\, along with an agreement to expand cooperation in trade\, agriculture\, healthcare\, and tourism. Both nations agreed to base their relationship on strategic stability\, moving in the same direction and effectively managing differences. It was acknowledged that Taiwan presents a challenge in this regard and has the potential to rupture the tentative relationship between the US and China\, with the Speaker further noting that the Summit underlines the incompatibility of the Taiwan issue with ideas of strategic stability. \nAccording to Dr. Pratibha\, this Summit also displays the broader technological competition/cooperation between the US and China\, as seen by the US and China meeting on Artificial Intelligence (AI) on the sidelines of the Summit. It showcased China’s desire for further and greater cooperation on AI with the US\, but also the US’s apprehension regarding cooperation that could lead to less control over chips and manufacturing. In this regard\, the US has already imposed trade restrictions on certain Chinese tech companies\, such as Nvidia.  Thus\, China wishes to ensure its economic and technological development is not derailed\, while the US desires continued access to Chinese critical minerals but remains wary of China’s growing technological dominance. Trade talks\, according to the Speaker\, reflect a pause in great-power competition\, allowing the US to build its manufacturing strategy while enabling China to continue developing its technological capabilities. This pause also reflects a growing realisation in the US that while competition between the two exists\, the presence of US companies in China is highly beneficial\, as their success in the Chinese market helps sustain innovation and technological development at home. \nWhile concluding\, Dr. Prathibha highlighted that while China has largely managed to withstand US pressure through diversification strategies\, these efforts have not been without costs\, particularly in the form of capital outflows. Moreover\, China continues to depend on access to US markets and technology firms\, while trade imbalances underscore the continued dependence of the US on Chinese supply chains. Despite the interdependence of the two economies\, the Summit should not be interpreted as a thaw in bilateral relations. Previous episodes of detente\, including the Phase One trade deal\, were accompanied by continued tariff disputes. The long-term significance of the Summit will depend largely on whether the US relaxes its export-control measures and\, more broadly\, on the extent to which both sides implement the commitments made. Given the unpredictability that now characterises US policy under President Trump\, the durability of these agreements remains uncertain. \nComments and Questions\nFollowing the presentation\, scholars posed a multitude of questions. One scholar inquired about China’s growing confidence\, questioning the sources of this confidence and its potential implications for the future trajectory of US–China relations. In response\, the Speaker pinned this confidence\, in part\, to the confidence displayed by President Xi Jinping with regard to the Chinese economy. By 2015\, China had already prepared a blueprint on how to leapfrog forward in terms of technology\, with structural reforms already taking place. While this plan was not altogether successful\, over a span of a decade\, it has allowed China substantial growth\, which in turn has allowed it to challenge the US. \nAnother scholar asked how ongoing geopolitical developments are being perceived by the United States and China. According to the Speaker\, the position of the US and its support of Israel in West Asia can be seen\, in part\, as opposition to China. On the other hand\, for China\, the War in West Asia is seen as an attempt to interfere in global energy chains. It is due to this that the Gulf region has transformed into a delicate balancing act for China. Thus\, while Iran remains an important ally\, Gulf nations take priority\, given China’s attempts to secure its energy supply. \nAnother question inquired about the tech entourage that arrived in China along with Donald Trump. It was followed up with a question about the possibility of Chinese weaponry being deployed in Iran. In response\, Dr. Prathibha remarked that the presence of tech founders signifies the US’s continued desire for Chinese market access. This stems mainly from the fact that American companies remain highly dependent upon Chinese joint production and the current impossibility of divesting from both the joint ecosystem and the Chinese market. With regard to the deployment of Chinese weaponry in the West Asia conflict\, the Speaker held that one cannot go beyond speculation for now. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Anveshi Bisht\, Intern\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-us-china-summit-key-issues-and-challenges
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260525T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260525T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260702T055643Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T052357Z
UID:98734-1779696000-1779728400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Global Youth Radicalisation”
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai\, Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “Global Youth Radicalisation” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 25 May 2026. Dr Adil Rasheed\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the Session\, which was attended by scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session examined the growing challenge of online radicalisation globally\, particularly among children and adolescents\, and the implications it has for contemporary counter-terrorism efforts. The discussion addressed the psychological\, technological\, and social dimensions of radicalisation as well as the impact of mental health vulnerabilities\, role of belonging\, identity\, and lack of unconditional acceptance in the offline world in facilitating extremist recruitment of young people. The presentation further highlighted the role of social media platforms\, online gaming communities\, encrypted applications and algorithm driven content ecosystems in reducing the age threshold of recruitment along with accelerating the recruitment process.  \nDetailed Report\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Dr. Adil Rasheed highlighted recent global developments relating to political violence\, extremism\, and radicalisation. Referring to recent incidents in the United States and Europe\, he noted the growing debate regarding the causes of radicalisation\, particularly among young individuals. Dr. Rasheed highlighted the two schools of thought within the counter-radicalisation literature\, with some scholars emphasising ideological indoctrination while others focusing on psychological vulnerabilities\, identity crises\, social alienation\, and cognitive dissonance as primary drivers. According to him\, this debate on the relationship between mental health\, nihilism\, and violent extremism\, raises important questions about whether ideology serves as the primary motivator or merely as a vehicle through which pre-existing psychological vulnerabilities are exploited. \nMs. Saman Ayesha Kidwai presented a detailed analysis of the radicalisation of children and teenagers\, which she highlighted has become a frontline security issue. She stated that technological developments have enabled extremist actors to bypass traditional gatekeepers such as families\, schools\, and communities\, creating what she described as an acceleration gap between the pace of radicalisation and the ability of states to respond effectively. \nExploring a biological perspective on radicalisation\, Ms. Kidwai noted that adolescents are particularly vulnerable because of developmental and neurological factors. The prefrontal cortex\, responsible for impulse control and decision-making\, remains underdeveloped during adolescence\, making younger individuals more susceptible to emotionally charged and sensational content. These vulnerabilities are often compounded by experiences of bullying\, trauma\, neglect\, social exclusion\, and identity-related uncertainty. \nShe stated that it is against this backdrop that extremist narratives succeed because they address three unmet psychological needs: belonging\, significance\, and certainty. Extremist communities offer vulnerable individuals a sense of acceptance and identity\, portraying them as part of a larger struggle while providing simplistic explanations for complex social and political realities. These narratives\, by meeting the three psychological needs\, become particularly appealing to adolescents seeking recognition and purpose. \nFurthermore\, she highlighted alarming global trends regarding youth radicalisation. Citing recent studies\, she noted that the process of radicalisation has become significantly faster than in it was in previous decades\, with recruitment increasingly taking place entirely online. She emphasised that contemporary extremist networks exploit digital technologies to reach young audiences across geographical boundaries. \nShe then focused on Nihilistic Violent Extremism (NVE)\, an emerging form of extremism that differs from traditional ideological movements. She highlighted that rather than pursuing a clearly defined political or religious objective\, NVE promotes violence\, chaos\, and societal collapse. This is evident in the fact that online communities associated with NVE often target psychologically vulnerable individuals\, encouraging self-harm\, coercion\, harassment\, and acts of violence. \nMs. Kidwai emphasised the pattern of extremist recruitment which typically begins on mainstream social media platforms before gradually shifting to more obscure online spaces. Extremist actors use recommendation algorithms\, online forums\, and gaming communities to identify and engage vulnerable youth. Online gaming platforms are increasingly becoming recruitment spaces because they provide opportunities to establish trust and social connections before introducing extremist content. \nFocusing on the nexus between mental health and extremism\, Ms. Kidwai cautioned against equating mental illness with terrorism\, and explained that social isolation\, loneliness\, bullying\, and psychological distress are vulnerability amplifiers\, increasing a young individual’s susceptibility to extremist recruitment rather than being direct causes of violence. \nOn the role of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies\, Ms. Kidwai explained that AI-enabled platforms can facilitate the dissemination of extremist content and enable radicalisation processes that remain largely invisible to traditional surveillance mechanisms. This represents a significant transformation in the contemporary threat environment. \nDrawing lessons from international experiences\, Ms. Kidwai highlighted Finland’s media literacy framework as an example of preventive intervention. She emphasised that Finland’s strategy of including digital literacy in the nationwide education curriculum\, inculcating critical thinking and awareness of misinformation from an early age\, has contributed to strengthening societal resilience against extremist narratives. Finland has consistently been ranked at the top of the European Media Literacy Index. While acknowledging differences in context\, Ms. Kidwai suggested that certain elements of this approach could inform India’s future counter-radicalisation strategies. \nTurning to India\, Ms. Kidwai acknowledged that the country has developed substantial counter-terrorism capabilities and there have been successful de-radicalisation programmes reported in states such as Kerala and Maharashtra. Nevertheless\, she proposed the creation of a legal framework addressing radicalisation through the establishment of a nationwide counter-violent extremism strategy involving multiple ministries. She further highlighted the need for greater integration of mental health support systems such as training school counsellors in early warning identification signs\, enhancing digital literacy initiatives and strengthening international cooperation to address transnational online extremist networks. \nLastly\, Ms. Kidwai emphasised that while current strategies focus more on de-radicalisation frameworks\, however there is a need for greater focus on prevention\, which remains significantly more effective than post-radicalisation interventions.  Finally\, she underscored that for prevention programmes to be successful\, families\, schools\, communities\, and state institutions must collectively work together towards identifying early warning signs\, promote media literacy\, thereby strengthening societal resilience against extremist influences. \nQ & A Session\nQuestions were raised regarding the challenges associated with the identification of radicalised individuals\, effectiveness of de-radicalisation programmes\, emerging threats within the Indian context\, manosphere networks\, platform accountability\, and the responsibilities of technology companies in preventing extremist content dissemination. \nThe Speaker responded to all the comments and questions raised. \nThe Report was prepared by Mr. Himanshu Kulkarni\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-global-youth-radicalisation
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260518T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260518T000000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260629T125131Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T052213Z
UID:98682-1779062400-1779062400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Security in the Strait of Hormuz: Assessing the Limits of Military Options”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. R. Vignesh\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Security in the Strait of Hormuz: Assessing the Limits of Military Options” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 18 May 2026. Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA moderated the meeting. Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session highlighted the operational significance of anti-access and area-denial capabilities including missiles\, drones\, naval mines\, fast attack craft\, and midget submarines. It argued that even overwhelming conventional superiority faces severe constraints in narrow maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. The discussion further emphasised that contemporary maritime conflict increasingly reflects broader transformations in warfare characterised by non-contact operations\, autonomous systems\, dispersed infrastructure\, and asymmetric escalation. The Speaker concluded that sustainable stability in the Strait cannot be ensured through military means alone and requires sustained diplomatic engagement and negotiated security arrangements.  \nDetailed Discussion\nIn his Opening Remarks\, the moderator\, Col. Chadha observed that the recent Strait of Hormuz crisis had exposed important limits of conventional military superiority. Despite the overwhelming disparity in economic and military power between the United States and Iran\, the United States had not been able to decisively impose its will in the maritime theatre. He argued that the crisis demonstrated how geography\, operational circumstances\, and the changing character of warfare could enable a relatively weaker actor to neutralise the advantages of a technologically superior military. Referring to the difficulties involved in securing maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz\, he noted that even extensive naval and air capabilities could not guarantee freedom of navigation when confronted with layered asymmetric threats such as missile batteries\, naval mines\, drones\, and dispersed coastal systems. He emphasised that the issue carried broader lessons regarding the future utility and limitations of military force. \nDr. Vignesh structured his presentation around five themes: the strategic geography of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz\, the historical legacy of the tanker wars\, the evolution of Iran’s asymmetric naval doctrine\, the operational challenges involved in securing the Strait militarily\, and the broader strategic implications emerging from the current conflict. \nThe Speaker began by outlining the geographical and economic significance of the Persian Gulf. The Gulf\, bordered by eight littoral states including Iran\, Iraq\, Oman\, Saudi Arabia\, Qatar\, Kuwait\, Bahrain\, and the UAE\, contains a substantial proportion of global crude oil and natural gas reserves. Iran possesses the longest coastline in the Gulf\, stretching across the northern rim and providing it with significant geographical leverage. Prior to the present disruption\, the maritime routes in the region carried around 20 percent of global LNG trade. The Strait of Hormuz\, at its narrowest point approximately 33 Km wide\, remains one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints\, through which a substantial portion of global seaborne oil trade and petroleum consumption passes daily. Therefore\, any instability in the Strait has immediate implications for global energy security\, maritime commerce\, and international economic stability. \nTracing the historical origins of the current crisis\, Dr. Vignesh revisited the tanker war phase of the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s. After the war reached military stalemate in 1982\, both Iran and Iraq increasingly targeted commercial shipping and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Between 1981 and 1987\, hundreds of vessels were attacked and significant losses were inflicted on maritime traffic. In response to growing threats to shipping\, the United States launched Operation Earnest Will in 1987 to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers. However\, the mission gradually evolved into direct confrontation with Iran\, culminating in Operation Praying Mantis after the American frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian naval mine in 1988. The succeeding American retaliation destroyed several Iranian naval assets and offshore platforms. As a result\, Iran shifted rapidly toward asymmetric and hybrid naval warfare strategies. \nFurther\, Dr. Vignesh pointed out Iran’s dual naval structure comprising the conventional Islamic Republic of Iran Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN). While the conventional navy focuses on blue-water operations\, the IRGCN was specifically organised for asymmetric and irregular maritime warfare. Its doctrine emphasises hit-and-run tactics\, swarm tactics\, ambushes\, and shoot and scoot. The purpose of this strategy\, he argued\, was not to achieve conventional naval superiority but to impose costs\, create uncertainty\, and complicate operations for a technologically superior adversary. \nDr. Vignesh explained that since the 1990s\, Iran has increasingly viewed the Strait of Hormuz as a critical strategic asset. Iranian leaders repeatedly signalled that disruption or closure of the Strait could be used in response to external pressure or sanctions. Statements by Iranian political leaders during the 2011–12 sanctions period\, following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018\, and after the reported U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025\, reflected continuity in Iran’s strategic signalling. He argued that the Strait had evolved beyond a geographical chokepoint into a coercive diplomatic tool central to Iran’s deterrence posture. \nThe presentation then assessed Iran’s principal asymmetric maritime capabilities. Dr. Vignesh highlighted Iran’s extensive network of land-based anti-ship missile systems\, including both ballistic and cruise missiles deployed along the southern coastline. Iran’s geography\, particularly its mountainous terrain\, underground tunnel networks\, and mobile launchers\, significantly enhances the survivability of these systems. He discussed systems such as the Khalij Fars and Hormuz-2 anti-ship ballistic missiles\, as well as anti-ship cruise missiles (Abu Mahdi) reportedly capable of striking targets at distances exceeding 1\,000 kilometers. \nDr. Vignesh further examined the role of the IRGCN’s fast attack craft\, which are designed for swarm attacks and high-speed manoeuvres. Their low radar signatures and heavy armament make them effective for asymmetric maritime warfare. Iran’s growing use of aerial drones\, unmanned surface vessels (USVs)\, and unmanned undersea vessels (UUVs) was also highlighted. \nNaval mines were identified as another critical element of Iran’s anti-access strategy. Even limited mine deployment\, he argued\, could significantly disrupt maritime traffic\, delay naval operations\, and increase insurance and transit costs. He also discussed Iran’s fleet of midget submarines\, particularly the Ghadir-class submarines designed for shallow-water operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Their small size\, low acoustic signature\, and ability to conduct ambush-style attacks and mine-laying operations make them difficult to detect in congested maritime environments. \nA recurring theme throughout the presentation was the strategic role of geography. Dr. Vignesh argued that Iran’s terrain\, dispersed deployment patterns\, underground infrastructure\, and mobility created a “whack-a-mole” operational problem for the United States and Israel\, wherein destroyed launch sites could rapidly be replaced or relocated\, thereby complicating efforts to fully neutralise Iran’s strike capabilities. \nTurning to the operational challenges of securing the Strait militarily\, Dr. Vignesh argued that both offensive and defensive approaches faced severe limitations. Offensive operations aimed at neutralising Iranian capabilities would likely require sustained ground deployments to physically secure coastal areas and islands around the Strait. While such operations could theoretically be undertaken by U.S. Marine Corps and airborne units already deployed in the region\, maintaining long-term control would involve high casualties\, logistical strain\, and sustained resource commitments. \nThe Speaker also assessed the limitations of defensive naval escort operations. Modern convoy operations would require layered protection against missiles\, drones\, submarines\, mines\, and fast attack craft simultaneously. Large commercial convoys stretching across several kilometers would remain vulnerable to coordinated multi-domain attacks despite substantial naval protection. He therefore argued that such operations would be resource-intensive\, operationally complex\, and potentially unsustainable over prolonged periods. \nDr. Vignesh referred to the short-lived U.S. maritime security initiative termed “Project Freedom\,” announced in May 2026\, as evidence of these operational difficulties. Although intended to establish maritime security zones and offensive interdiction capabilities\, the operation was suspended shortly after its announcement following coordinated Iranian missile and drone strikes against shipping targets. According to Dr. Vignesh\, the episode illustrated the practical limitations of rapid maritime security constructs in the Strait of Hormuz. \nOn the legal dimension\, Dr. Vignesh argued that Iran’s attempts to impose transit fees or exercise unilateral control over the Strait would face significant international resistance. Since the Strait constitutes an international waterway governed by principles of transit passage and freedom of navigation\, major maritime and energy-importing powers would be unlikely to accept unilateral restrictions. He suggested that negotiated arrangements involving sanctions relief and security concessions would likely prove more sustainable than attempts to impose coercive transit regimes. \nIn his concluding observations\, Dr. Vignesh argued that the crisis reflected an increasingly unstable escalatory dynamic in the maritime domain with direct implications for global energy markets. He stressed that Iran did not need to sink large numbers of vessels to generate strategic effects; even limited disruption or the perception of insecurity was sufficient to alter shipping behaviour and increase insurance and transportation costs. Despite overwhelming conventional superiority\, the United States remained constrained by geography\, operational complexity\, political limitations\, and Iran’s long-developed asymmetric capabilities. He concluded that military means alone were insufficient to ensure stable maritime transit and that sustained diplomatic engagement remained the only viable long-term solution. \nDuring the discussion\, participants raised questions regarding Iran’s defence-industrial adaptation\, reverse engineering practices\, societal resilience\, the limitations of conventional military power\, the role of intelligence assessments\, the Houthis and Red Sea operations\, the use of satellite navigation systems\, and the broader transformation of warfare. \nDr. Vignesh\, in response to questions regarding reverse engineering and asymmetric innovation\, noted that Iran had extensively reverse engineered foreign technologies\, including fast attack boats originally developed for recreational purposes. He also emphasised the importance of geography in military operations\, citing historical examples such as the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest to illustrate how terrain can negate numerical and technological superiority. \nThe Session concluded with broader reflections on the transformation of warfare in an era increasingly characterised by non-contact operations\, multi-domain conflict\, drones\, autonomous systems\, and asymmetric escalation. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Vinayak Rajpurohit\, Intern\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-security-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-assessing-the-limits-of-military-options
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260511T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260511T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260702T055907Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051946Z
UID:98737-1778486400-1778518800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting On “Israel–Hezbollah Conflict: The Path Ahead”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Hirak Jyoti Das\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Israel–Hezbollah Conflict: The Path Ahead” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 11 May 2026. Dr. Abhishek Yadav\, Research Analyst\, moderated the meeting. The scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation examined the changing dynamics of the Israel–Hezbollah conflict by analysing the strategic interests of Hezbollah\, Israel\, and the Lebanese Government within Lebanon’s confessional political system and the evolving geopolitical landscape in West Asia. It highlighted Hezbollah’s political–military role\, challenges surrounding disarmament\, Israel’s military operations in southern Lebanon\, and the fragile nature of regional diplomacy amid recurring escalation. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Abhishek Yadav\, the Moderator\, laid out the context\, tracing the emergence of Hezbollah in 1982 during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon\, its evolution into one of the West Asia’s most formidable non-state armed groups\, and its deepening ties with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He noted that Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria in support of Bashar al-Assad after the Arab Spring greatly expanded its regional footprint. Within this long-standing framework\, after the outbreak of the Gaza War in October 2023\, Hezbollah intensified its operations along the Israel–Lebanon border\, leading to a prolonged military campaign by Israel  that resulted in the killing of Hezbollah’s long-time leader Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024 and a US-brokered ceasefire in November 2024. Dr. Yadav further stated that the relative calm collapsed in March 2026 following US-Israeli military operations against Iran\, triggering a renewed phase of conflict that ended with a temporary ceasefire on 16 April 2026\, with a third round of US-hosted negotiations scheduled in Washington on 14-15 May 2026. \nDr. Hirak Jyoti Das outlined the priorities of the principal stakeholders in the conflict\, namely Hezbollah\, Israel and the Lebanese Government\, evaluating the likely future trajectory of the confrontation. The Speaker explained that Lebanon follows a confessional political system based on sectarian representation among the recognised religious communities. He talked about the demographic composition of different sectarian groups\, including Christians\, Sunnis\, Shiites\, Druze\, and other communities\, and noted that the system has institutionalised sectarian loyalty\, patronage networks\, and feudal political structures. \nDr. Das traced the emergence of Hezbollah during the Lebanese civil war in 1982 and noted that Hezbollah was exempted from disarmament under the 1989 Taif Accord. Over time\, Hezbollah became a hybrid political-military actor often characterised as a “state within a state”. He examined how repeated attempts to disarm Hezbollah failed due to Iranian and Syrian support\, Israel’s ongoing occupation of disputed areas such as Shebaa Farms\, and the limited military capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). \nThe Speaker analysed Hezbollah’s military role after Hamas’ attack on Israel in October 2023. Hezbollah launched rocket and drone attacks on northern Israel to showcase support for the Palestinian cause and pursued a strategy of limited attritional warfare. Dr. Das discussed Israel’s “Operation Northern Arrows” between September and November 2024\, during which Israel intensified military operations against Hezbollah through extensive airstrikes\, intelligence operations\, and targeted assassinations\, killing a large number of Secretary Generals\, including Hassan Nasrallah. The subsequent ceasefire enabled Israel to establish strategic positions and security zones within southern Lebanon. \nDr. Das noted that the Lebanese Government under President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has prioritised state sovereignty\, economic reforms\, and reconstruction of southern Lebanon\, while simultaneously trying to reduce Hezbollah’s military role. LAF however faces serious institutional\, logistical and financial constraints that limit their capacity to implement nationwide disarmament. The Speaker also pointed out that while the United States (US) continues to be the main external backer of LAF\, Washington tailors its military aid to ensure that it does not undermine Israel’s military dominance in the region. \nThe Speaker highlighted Hezbollah’s rejection of nationwide disarmament\, arguing that all discussions regarding weapons should remain an internal Lebanese matter upon the complete withdrawal of Israel’s forces and cessation of Israel’s military activities within Lebanon. Dr. Das noted that post-November 2024 ceasefire\, Israel conducted hundreds of airstrikes inside Lebanon\, providing Hezbollah justification for preserving its arsenal. \nThe Speaker analysed the renewed escalation that began in March 2026 with US-Israeli operations against Iran. Hezbollah resumed military activity\, claiming it was part of a broader regional resistance strategy. According to Dr. Das\, the group’s military focus has shifted from deep strikes into north Israel to drone and anti-tank missiles attacks on Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) positions in south Lebanon. Israel seeks to further degrade Hezbollah’s military infrastructure\, undermine its domestic legitimacy and cut its strategic ties to Iran. A key point of disagreement was the creation of a ‘security zone’ extending to the Litani River\, causing large-scale displacement and risking the revitalisation of Hezbollah’s legitimacy as a resistance force. \nIn summary\, the Speaker argued that the conflict is likely to remain stuck in a cycle of reciprocal military operations\, limited penetration and fragile ceasefires. Hezbollah’s political survival hinges on its ability to keep its resistance credentials alive\, and Israel is committed to preserving strategic deterrence and security control in south Lebanon. Sustainable peace would require gradual security arrangements\, stronger Lebanese State institutions and meaningful regional diplomacy\, noting that ongoing regional rivalries and repeated ceasefire violations continue to undermine prospects for long-term stability. \nQ&A Session\nParticipants raised questions regarding Hezbollah’s ability to sustain its military strength despite the Lebanese Government’s engagement with Western actors and negotiations with Israel. Questions were also raised regarding the wider regional geopolitical dynamics shaping the conflict\, Hezbollah’s military adaptation\, drone capabilities\, and supply routes. \nThe Speaker provided comprehensive responses to all comments and questions raised during the Session. \nThe Report was prepared by Mr. Aquib Mohd. Khan\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-israel-hezbollah-conflict-the-path-ahead
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260504T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260504T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260630T043107Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051930Z
UID:98693-1777881600-1777914000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “India – South Korea Cooperation in Arms Production and Shipbuilding”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Ranjit Kumar Dhawan\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “India – South Korea Cooperation in Arms Production and Shipbuilding” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 04 May 2026.  The Session was moderated by Dr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. The scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session aimed to contextualise and analyse evolving relations between India and South Korea through the lens of defence production and shipbuilding cooperation. Both of these sectors have emerged as significant pillars of partnership between the two countries\, signalling the convergence of a growing desire for self-reliance in the field of manufacturing industry and strengthening ties in arms cooperation. Tracing the historical roots of South Korea’s defence industry and keeping in mind the shifting geopolitical landscape\, Dr. Dhawan provided a comprehensive understanding of the deepening relations between the two nations. The Session underscored how growing ventures between India and South Korea signalled not only broadening engagement but also the growing manufacturing capabilities of both countries. \nDetailed Report\nThe meeting started with Opening Remarks by the Moderator\, Dr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, who began by emphasising the timeliness of the topic on account of strengthening relations between India and South Korea\, as seen by the signing of the Joint Strategic Vision of 2026-2030 during the recent visit of the South Korean President Lee Jae Myung. She also pointed out that the convergence of India’s Act East Policy and South Korea’s New Southern Policy at the strategic level\, shows the shift from a purely economic engagement to an Indo-Pacific security partnership exemplified by the 2+2 dialogue\, defence industry agreements\, and multiple maritime collaborations. \nDr. Dhawan began by outlining the scope of the presentation and introducing the topic. According to the Speaker\, South Korea represents a “rags-to-riches story”\, especially with regard to its manufacturing industry. He credited the Chaebols (family-owned South Korean companies) such as Hyundai\, Samsung\, LG\, etc.\, and their participation in defence manufacturing as a key turning point in South Korea’s success. \nWhile highlighting the rise of South Korean “soft power” through the global popularity of K-pop and K-dramas (known as the Hallyu)\, he stressed the increasing assertion of South Korea in the sphere of “hard power”. With regard to arms manufacturing\, this has been underscored by multiple factors\, including South Korea’s emergence as the second-largest exporter of defence equipment to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries between 2021 and 2025. The Speaker also mentioned the rapid pace of arms exports from South Korea\, rising from US$ 3 billion in 2017 to US$ 17 billion in 2022\, a five-fold increase in five years. Such rapid development is not limited to arms exports alone and can be seen in the shipbuilding sphere\, with South Korea emerging as the second-largest shipbuilder in the world. This includes a multitude of vessels\, including container ships and LNG carriers. \nDelving into the historic background of South Korea’s meteoric rise to an economic power status\, the Speaker began by tracing the civil war that erupted in 1950 between North and South Korea and its escalation into an international conflict. Despite this setback\, South Korea was able to rise to the status of an “Asian Tiger Economy” in a short amount of time. This\, according to Dr. Dhawan\, was made possible due to a state-led economic development model. He further pointed to the interconnectedness of Asian economies and highlighted how this developmental and industrial model initially originated in Japan before diffusing across the region. Termed as the “Flying Geese model”\, this model allowed for the movement of industries from developed economies to developing economies through the regional division of labour. Additionally\, the rise of South Korea’s manufacturing sector hinged upon the following two factors: land reforms and the implementation of universal education. The former was a crucial factor\, especially as South Korea differed from its neighbours\, who followed a communist form of governance. In comparison\, South Korea took the route of compensated land reforms\, with the compensation to the former landlords eventually facilitating the rise of an entrepreneurial class\, which led to the industrial development in the country. Educational reforms were undertaken to build a highly disciplined and skilled workforce. \nBoth land and educational reforms played a significant role in the economic development in the 1960s under the military general (and President) Park Chung-Hee\, who implemented an export-led economic development model. Beginning with a labour-intensive and later moving to a capital-intensive industrialisation strategy\, South Korea was able to develop at a rapid pace. A major impetus was also provided by the United States’ threat to withdraw military support to South Korea\, giving a fillip to South Korea’s arms industry. The economic development that followed went hand in hand with the rise of defence industries\, a process that was helped by the participation of the Chaebols. Since then\, South Korea’s defence production has undergone rapid evolution and includes in its midst the development of the Light Combat Aircraft FA-50 Fighting Eagle\, which has been bought by several countries\, the K2 Hyundai Rotem Main Battle Tank\, LIG Nex1-missile interceptors\, Daewoo submarines\, etc. The K9 Vajra Howitzers\, produced through the transfer of technology from South Korea\, remain of particular interest to India as it has inducted 100 units into its armed forces and has recently contracted to produce 100 more units. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr. Dhawan reflected that the timing of India-South Korea collaboration seems ripe\, especially taking into account the fact that India faces a severe shortage of cargo ships\, with just 20 percent of natural gas imports carried on Indian-owned vessels. Against this backdrop\, India’s Amrit Kaal Vision 2047 aims to expand the country’s maritime fleet through investments valued at US$ 24 billion. He further emphasised South Korea’s importance within India’s Act East Policy framework. Dr. Dhawan also stressed that this partnership is far from a one-sided engagement\, as South Korea is also actively seeking deeper ties with India. He argued that cooperation need not remain limited to defence equipment alone\, and gave the examples of nuclear-powered submarines\, sixth-generation fighter aircraft\, and jet propulsion systems as future areas of collaboration. \nComments and Questions\nThe presentation was followed by Questions and Comments from the Scholars. One query pertained to the bottlenecks that may appear in the Chips-to-Ships model of the Chaebols in the future\, and why South Korea\, unlike India\, had a comparatively higher R&D investment. In an integrated response\, Dr. Dhawan underlined South Korea’s early role as an imitator of technology rather than an innovator and how an attempt to rectify this has led to South Korea’s vast investment in R&D (almost 5% of its GDP). This shift\, according to him\, is primarily due to South Korea’s unique position\, sandwiched between a technological giant\, Japan\, and a manufacturing giant\, China. South Korea also faces increasing competition from new regional and global competitors. \nAnother question related to the heavy dependence of South Korea on the United States. and how the import of American technology creates an impediment to the usage of similar technology by India\, which lacks the required level of authorisation. There were also concerns over the frequent collapse of India–South Korea defence deals\, and a question was raised about China’s response to defence collaboration between New Delhi and Seoul. The Speaker affirmed the high dependence of South Korea in terms of its engagement with the US\, but he emphasised South Korea’s push toward self-reliance. He similarly affirmed the failure of past deals between the two countries\, giving the example of the POSCO steel project in Odisha\, and defence initiatives like the Gangnam Corporation’s mine sweeper deal in Goa\, but highlighted the recent resurgence in collaborative efforts as seen by the POSCO-Jindal Steel agreements\, offering grounds for optimism. With regard to the China factor\, the Speaker maintained that reports indicate that Beijing remains wary of the expanding defence cooperation between India and South Korea. \nAnother query\, related to the recent Japan-India agreement on quantum technology sharing\, and whether South Korea would be as willing to engage in similar high-technology transfers with India. Responding to the question\, the Speaker emphasised that geo-economics cannot be separated from geopolitics. Hence\, Tokyo’s precarious geopolitical positioning has made it more open to technological transfers\, whereas South Korea remains relatively more cautious. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Anveshi Bisht\, Intern\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-india-south-korea-cooperation-in-arms-production-and-shipbuilding
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260427T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260427T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260707T045519Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051921Z
UID:98910-1777276800-1777309200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on  ‘India-EU Security and Defence Partnership:  Defence Industrial Collaboration and Exports’
DESCRIPTION:Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, gave a presentation on “India-EU Security and Defence Partnership: Defence Industrial Collaboration and Exports’ at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 27 April 2026. Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.)\, Research Fellow and Coordinator\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, moderated the Session. \nExecutive Summary \nDefence cooperation was one of the key focus areas of the India-European Union (EU) Security and Defence Partnership (SDP)\, signed on 27 January 2026. The agreement opens up opportunities for Indian defence firms to participate in relevant EU defence procurement initiatives such as Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The SDP can be expected to further enhance defence-industrial cooperation and exports between India and the EU\, with opportunities in the ammunition sector\, defence electronics\, and other areas. The challenge for the Indian companies would be to navigate the EU policy framework\, including the Buy European preference requirements\, and embed themselves in EU supply chains.   \nDetailed Report\nDr. Rajiv\, in his presentation\, highlighted that defence was one of the key focus areas of the India-European Union (EU) Security and Defence Partnership (SDP)\, which was signed on 27 January 2026\, apart from maritime and cyber security\, space security\, counter terrorism\, countering hybrid threats\, among others. He noted that India was the ninth country with which the EU has signed an SDP. The EU views SDP’s as non-binding political instruments to enhance cooperation and interoperability on defence industrial collaboration. An India-EU Defence Industry forum was also established along with the signing of the SDP. \nThe Speaker pointed out that India’s participation in relevant EU initiatives could open up after the signing of the SDP. One such initiative is the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) financial instrument that provides loans to Member States for defence investment and common procurement. The Euros 150 billion SAFE Initiative was part of the Re-ARM Europe Plan\, presented to the European Parliament on 4 March 2025 by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. He flagged that ammunition and missiles\, artillery systems\, among others\, were part of the SAFE Priority Defence Products Category I. In contrast\, air and missile defence systems\, maritime surface and underwater capabilities\, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare\, among others\, were part of the SAFE Priority Defence Products Category II list of items. \nDr. Rajiv noted that\, as of 24 April 2026\, the National Defence Investment Plans of 18 EU Member States\, totalling Euros 129 billion\, have been endorsed by the European Commission\, while Hungary’s Euros 16.2 billion investment plan is under evaluation. Of the 18 countries\, Poland secured the largest SAFE loans of 43.7 billion euros\, followed by Romania (16.6 billion euros)\, France (15 billion euros)\, Italy (14.9 billion euros)\, and Belgium (8.3 billion euros). As for possible cooperation with these EU countries\, Dr. Rajiv noted that Indian defence companies will have to enter into partnerships with companies in some of these EU nations to manufacture defence products jointly. \nAn additional arena of cooperation concerns India’s possible participation in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects\, a treaty-based mechanism launched by the EU in 2017. Dr. Rajiv highlighted that at the first-ever India-EU Security and Defence Consultations\, held at Brussels on 10 June 2022\, cooperation in ‘co-development and co-production of defence equipment\, including India’s participation in PESCO’\, was discussed. The Speaker noted that 74 PESCO projects related to training\, strategic enablers\, force multipliers\, land systems\, cyber\, C4ISR\, maritime\, air systems\, and space are currently being pursued. Among the countries that signed the SDP with the EU – Canada\, Norway and the United Kingdom are part of the EU Military Mobility project under PESCO. \nThe Speaker then highlighted that industry associations such as the Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers (SIDM) have flagged opportunities for Indian shipyards\, electronics firms\, and sensor manufacturers to integrate into EU naval supply chains\, as well as co-production and lifecycle support (MRO). The SIDM notes that opportunities for European firms are also there to benefit from cost-effective engineering by partnering with Indian firms. At the same time\, Indian firms will have to ensure stringent compliance with EU defence\, export control\, and security standards. \nDr. Rajiv noted that the SDP with the EU is a result of the EU’s enhanced focus on strengthening partnerships with key strategic partners such as India\, even as it builds more robust defence capabilities and increases intra-EU defence procurement. The EU’s defence spending has more than doubled over the past decade\, and the EU has ambitious plans to increase it to five per cent of GDP by 2035. EU ammunition companies are not only ramping up production but also entering into JVs with firms in other countries (including the Indian defence industry) to meet rising demand. \nRheinmetall\, for instance\, has entered into a Joint Venture with Reliance Defence for the supply of explosives and propellants for medium and large calibre ammunition. The company also bagged a defence exports order of Rs. 600 Crore in June 2025 from Rheinmetall. Other companies\, such as Bharat Forge\, have also secured multiple orders for ammunition shells and will likely enter into production and manufacturing agreements with EU firms in the near future. Defence Public Sector Undertaking\, Munitions India Limited has also exported to European nations\, including the Czech Republic and Romania\, in the recent past. \nDr. Rajiv noted that the SDP is expected to further enhance defence-industrial cooperation and exports between India and the EU\, with opportunities in the ammunition sector\, defence electronics\, and other areas. He\, however\, noted that the challenge for Indian companies would be to navigate the EU policy framework\, including the Buy European preference requirements\, and to embed themselves in EU supply chains to utilise opportunities in the priority weapons procurement categories of initiatives such as SAFE. \nQ&A Session\n Discussion focused on the possibility of acquisitions\, joint ventures\, and prospects for technology transfer. The Speaker noted that some Indian defence companies are acquiring EU-based companies or entering into partnerships for manufacturing niche equipment. The Indian defence industry is also receiving export orders from EU countries for equipment\, including ammunition. The Speaker noted that in the future\, the SDP could open up prospects for further collaboration. In response to a question on the role of France as a key partner within the European Union\, Dr Rajiv highlighted that France remains a prominent defence partner for India and could serve as an important avenue for expanding joint ventures and participation in projects led by European Original Equipment Manufacturers. \nQuestions also related to India’s engagements with Russia and implications for closer defence collaboration with the EU. Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh noted that recent agreements with Russia\, including logistical arrangements\, have been under discussion for several years. Finally\, the discussion touched upon whether the latest developments vis-à-vis the EU reflected a broader strategic alignment or remained largely transactional and demand-based. Dr Rajiv observed that while recent geopolitical developments have provided momentum\, India–EU relations are rooted in long-standing strategic engagement\, suggesting a combination of demand-driven dynamics and strategic alignment. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Rahul Wankhede\, Research Analyst\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-india-eu-security-and-defence-partnership
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260420T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260420T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260630T042034Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051337Z
UID:98689-1776672000-1776704400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Pakistan- Afghanistan Conflict: Implications for the Region”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Ashish Shukla\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Pakistan- Afghanistan Conflict: Implications for the Region” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 20 April 2026. The Session was moderated by Dr. Ashok Behuria\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has reached a critical breaking point\, moving far away from the strategic partnership many expected after the Taliban returned to power. The main cause of this friction is the rise of the Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP). While Pakistan blames the Taliban for providing safe havens to militants\, Afghanistan denies these accusations\, creating a cycle of blame game that has stalled any real cooperation. This impasse escalated into high-intensity hostilities by early 2026. The standoff proves that current military and diplomatic tactics aren’t working\, largely because there is no clear strategy for dealing with the various armed groups operating in the region.  \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. Ashok Behuria provided a concise overview of the evolving tensions in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations\, situating them within the intensification of Tehreek -e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks within Pakistan. He noted that Pakistan attributes these attacks to elements based in Afghanistan\, a claim rejected by Kabul\, which treats them as an internal issue. He emphasised that this reflects a broader tendency to externalise domestic security challenges. Dr. Behuria assessed that the Taliban’s return on 15 August 2021 marked a key turning point\, though developments diverged from expectations of strategic alignment with Pakistan. Instead\, the Taliban’s ideological proximity to the TTP has intensified Pakistan’s internal security concerns. Noting the sustained frequency of TTP attacks\, largely concentrated in border regions\, he pointed out that while major urban centres and core economic infrastructure have remained relatively insulated\, the persistence of low-intensity violence continues to pose a significant challenge. He emphasised that the trajectory of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations reflect a complex interplay between internal insecurity and external diplomatic friction\, warranting closer analytical attention. \nDr. Ashish Shukla\, began his presentation by characterising Pakistan–Afghanistan relations as historically complex and often contentious\, tracing their origins to Afghanistan’s initial opposition to Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations in 1947. He noted that during the Afghan jihad\, Pakistan emerged as the principal conduit for US–Saudi support and assumed a central role in shaping the conflict. In the post-Soviet phase\, while maintaining links with multiple factions\, Pakistan extended decisive backing to the Mullah Omar-led Taliban\, thereby securing what has often been described as “strategic depth.” However\, Dr. Shukla emphasised that the post-9/11 period marked a significant shift\, as Pakistan formally aligned with the US-led War on Terror while continuing to maintain covert ties with the Taliban. He assessed that this dual-track approach reflected Pakistan’s attempt to balance external pressures with its regional strategic objectives\, particularly the pursuit of a compliant regime in Kabul to offset internal vulnerabilities and advance its broader geopolitical interests. \nDr. Shukla further observed that the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 fundamentally altered this dynamic. While Pakistan initially perceived the development as a strategic gain\, it soon encountered resistance from the Taliban leadership\, which asserted greater autonomy and refused to adhere to Pakistan’s expectations. He highlighted that the growing presence and operational capacity of the TTP in Afghanistan has since emerged as a central point of friction\, with Pakistan alleging cross-border sanctuaries and the Taliban dismissing these claims as internal matters. Citing estimates of thousands of TTP fighters operating from Afghan provinces such as Kunar\, Nangarhar\, Khost\, and Paktika\, he underscored the increasing frequency and intensity of attacks within Pakistan\, including over a thousand incidents in 2025 alone. Dr. Shukla also pointed to Pakistan’s escalating response\, ranging from diplomatic pressure and refugee deportations to cross-border military strikes\, particularly in late 2025 and early 2026\, which were met with strong Afghan retaliation and international concern over civilian casualties. He concluded that the relationship has entered a phase of heightened volatility\, marked by mutual accusations\, retaliatory actions\, and the absence of a sustainable conflict-resolution mechanism. \nDr. Shukla further examined the escalation of hostilities through official statements and military developments\, highlighting the sharp rhetoric emerging from the Afghan side. He noted that in an interview with Tolo News on 24 February\, Abdul Hamid Khorasani\, a Panjshir-based commander aligned with the Taliban\, warned that suicide bomber units were positioned within Pakistan and could be activated at any time\, even claiming that Pakistan could be overrun if ordered by the Taliban leadership. This was followed by remarks from Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid in an interview with Al Arabiya English on 25 February\, where he asserted that Pakistan would face a military response\, while also alleging significant civilian casualties from Pakistani airstrikes. Dr. Shukla analysed that these developments were accompanied by reciprocal military actions\, including cross-border firing and Pakistan’s launch of Operation Ghazab lil-Haq\, involving coordinated airstrikes across multiple Afghan cities such as Kabul\, Kandahar\, Paktia\, and Nangarhar. He noted that Afghan forces responded with counter-operations under Operation Radd al-Zulm. \nDr. Shukla assessed that the conflict witnessed further escalation through successive strikes in March 2026\, including Pakistan’s targeting of sites such as Bagram and Kandahar\, and a particularly controversial strike on a treatment facility in Kabul\, which\, according to Afghan and international reports\, resulted in significant civilian casualties and drew condemnation from global actors\, including human rights organisations and India. He noted that despite temporary pauses in hostilities during Eid\, facilitated by external actors such as Turkey\, Qatar\, and Saudi Arabia\, military operations resumed shortly thereafter\, indicating the fragility of de-escalation efforts. He further highlighted China’s emerging diplomatic role\, including its support for ceasefire efforts and facilitation of dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani representatives in Urumqi\, signalling Beijing’s strategic interest in regional stability. Concluding his assessment\, Dr. Shukla argued that Pakistan’s declaration of open confrontation with Afghanistan marks an unprecedented phase in bilateral relations. While officially seeking the expulsion or handover of TTP elements\, he suggested that Pakistan’s broader objectives include pressuring the Taliban to restrain anti-Pakistan militancy and countering perceived India–Afghanistan proximity. However\, he cautioned that despite Pakistan’s superior conventional military capabilities\, Afghanistan’s experience with asymmetric warfare\, combined with the potential alignment of the Taliban and TTP\, poses a significant challenge\, leaving the long-term trajectory of the conflict uncertain. \nQuestions and Answers\nOn the question of whether the situation would have differed under Imran Khan\, Dr. Ashish Shukla suggested that a variation in approach was possible given his relatively conciliatory stance towards the Taliban\, although ultimate authority rests with Pakistan’s security establishment. On China’s role\, he assessed that Beijing is acting cautiously\, seeking to mediate without antagonising either side\, particularly in light of its security concerns in Xinjiang. Addressing queries on the nature of the TTP\, he clarified that the group does not represent the Afghan state but shares ideological affinities with the Taliban\, which partly explains Kabul’s reluctance to act against it. He further noted that the TTP draws support primarily from Pakistan’s Pashtun regions\, where longstanding grievances\, governance deficits\, and discontent with state-led operations persist. \nOn questions related to the group’s operational resilience and ideological orientation\, Dr. Shukla highlighted that the TTP has evolved into a complex formation with overlapping influences\, including elements linked to other extremist groups such as ISKP. He emphasised that while Pakistan retains certain levers\, including trade access and border management\, its overall negotiating capacity remains limited\, and coercive measures have not produced decisive outcomes. Responding to queries on regional dynamics\, he pointed to the continued salience of the India factor in Pakistan’s strategic thinking\, alongside the complicating role of Baloch insurgent groups. He concluded that these intersecting dynamics contribute to a protracted and volatile security environment\, with no immediate pathway to resolution. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Sneha M\, Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-pakistan-afghanistan-conflict-implications-for-the-region
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260413T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260413T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260630T040113Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051320Z
UID:98687-1776067200-1776099600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on the “Drones in US-Israel-Iran War: Lessons for India”
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting on 13 April 2026\, featuring a presentation by Gp. Capt. (Dr.).R. K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA on “Drones in US-Israel-Iran War: Lessons for India.” The Session was moderated by Gp. Capt. Sukhbir Kaur Minhas\, Research Fellow at the Institute. Scholars of the Institute participated in the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session analysed the evolving character of the U.S-Israel and Iran conflict\, focusing on the operational limits of technological superiority in contemporary warfare. It argued that despite clear asymmetry in air power and the achievement of air superiority by U.S. and Israeli forces\, the persistence of losses and disruptions reflects the growing effectiveness of asymmetric tools\, particularly drones. These systems have emerged as central instruments of modern conflict\, capable of exploiting gaps in conventional air defence and targeting both military and civilian infrastructure. The discussion highlighted structural issues such as inadequate preparedness\, intelligence gaps\, and vulnerabilities of fixed assets\, while contrasting U.S. and Israeli operational approaches. It further examined the shift towards soft-target warfare and the implications for states like India\, emphasising the need for integrated\, layered defence systems\, indigenous capability development\, and Military-Civil Technological Fusion (MCTF) in future conflict scenarios. \nDetailed Report\nGp. Capt. Sukhbir Kaur Minhas made Introductory Remarks and invited Gp. Capt. Narang to make his presentation. Gp. Capt. Narang situated his analysis within the broader trajectory of U.S.- Israeli military operations against Iran\, arguing that while conventional indicators suggested overwhelming air superiority in favour of the United States and Israel\, the operational reality revealed significant asymmetries and vulnerabilities. He clarified the distinction between air superiority and air supremacy\, emphasising that despite U.S. and Israeli dominance in the air domain\, the persistence of losses demonstrated the limits of technological superiority in contested environments\, particularly to unmanned systems. He underlined that Iran\, despite facing a superior adversary\, was able to withstand sustained military pressure\, thereby raising questions about resilience\, strategic depth\, and the effectiveness of asymmetric responses. \nThe growing salience of unmanned systems and the associated challenges of unmanned traffic management (UTM) was the central theme of this discussion. Dr. Narang highlighted that the proliferation of drones has vitally altered the operational landscape\, introducing complexities in airspace management and significantly increasing the vulnerability of both military and civilian (soft) targets. He argued that while traditional air defence systems are optimised for high-altitude\, high-speed manned aircraft threats\, they remain less effective against low-flying\, slow-moving unmanned aerial vehicles\, thereby creating exploitable gaps in defence coverage. This asymmetry was evident in the ability of Iranian and proxy drone systems to penetrate U.S. and allied defences\, causing both material damage and operational disruption. \nThe Speaker further examined specific operational episodes\, including reported losses of advanced platforms such as F-15 and F-35 aircraft\, as well as the disruption of U.S. special operations. These incidents were interpreted not as indicators of systemic failure but as evidence of evolving threat environments where even advanced military systems are susceptible to multi-domain challenges. Dr. Narang stressed that stealth technology\, while still relevant\, is no longer invulnerable due to the increasing integration of multi-sensor detection systems\, including infrared capabilities. This demands a reassessment of platform survivability and sensor integration in future force planning. \nA critical facet of the analysis concerned the differential performance between U.S. and Israeli forces. Dr. Narang argued that Israel’s relatively lower losses could be attributed to better operational practices\, including asset dispersion\, hardened shelters\, and integrated defence systems. In contrast\, U.S. deployments in the Gulf were characterised by vulnerabilities arising from static positioning\, inadequate hardening of infrastructure\, and a peacetime operational mindset. He also pointed to gaps in intelligence integration and inter-operability\, suggesting that the US did not fully optimise capabilities with its regional partners\, thereby limiting collective effectiveness. \nThe discussion also addressed Iran’s ability to develop the Shahed drone can be attributed to the ownership of drone technology by its military and its single minded approach on building domestic manufacturing of critical systems. This shift underscores a broader transformation in warfare where economic and civilian assets become integral to strategic contestation. He emphasised that for developing countries like India\, this trend significantly amplifies vulnerability\, as economic growth and infrastructure expansion inherently increase the number of potential targets. \nQ&A Session\nThe presentation was followed by discussion moderated by Gp. Capt Sukhbir Kaur Minhas. Participants raised a series of questions on operational\, technological\, and structural issues relating to emerging drone warfare\, air defence vulnerabilities\, and India’s preparedness in this evolving threat environment. \nGp. Capt. Ajey Lele (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA\, asked a question regarding the adequacy of India’s counter-drone capability\, particularly in terms of detection\, tracking\, identification\, and neutralisation. Dr. Narang responded by outlining the layered requirements of effective counter-drone architecture\, noting that while India has made incremental progress\, significant gaps persist\, especially in sensor coverage\, integration\, and real-time tracking. He highlighted the limited operationalisation of initiatives such as Digital Sky and pointed to deficiencies in both civil and military segments\, particularly the absence of integrated command-and-control (C2) systems and insufficient medium and short range sensors and shooters to address swarm threats. \nAnother participant raised concerns about whether the proliferation of drone swarms signals a structural decline in the relevance of traditional manned aircraft\, and what organisational reforms may be required in response. Dr.Narang acknowledged the transformative impact of unmanned systems but rejected the notion of obsolescence of manned platforms. Instead\, he argued that the changing character of warfare necessitates structural reforms within India’s defence apparatus\, particularly in clarifying technological ownership and streamlining decision-making. He identified fragmentation among the stakeholders and ambiguities on ownership as key impediments to timely capability development\, advocating for a higher coordinating body to resolve institutional inefficiencies. \nParticipants also questioned the effectiveness of Israel’s integrated air and missile defence systems and whether such a model is replicable for India. In response\, Dr. Narang emphasised that Israel’s success is context-specific\, shaped by geography\, scale\, and operational depth. He noted that the extended flight time of incoming threats provides Israel with a temporal advantage for interception\, whereas larger geographies such as the Gulf or India face greater coverage challenges. He also added that while the technological model is instructive\, its direct replication without contextual adaptation would be analytically flawed. \nA significant line of inquiry focused on the protection of critical infrastructure\, particularly in the context of expanding economic assets and urbanisation. Participants raised the possibility of involving private sector entities in deploying anti-drone systems\, while also highlighting challenges related to autonomy\, integration with national air defence networks\, and resource allocation. Dr.Narang acknowledged the necessity of incorporating private sector capabilities but stressed that such integration must remain under a centralised command-and-control framework. He further emphasised the importance of military-civil technological fusion (MCTF) and selective delegation\, cautioning against unregulated decentralisation of defence responsibilities. \nParticipants also raised questions regarding India’s capacity to absorb sustained attacks\, especially in comparison to states like Iran\, which have demonstrated higher tolerance for attrition. Participants argued that India’s expanding infrastructure base increases its vulnerability\, necessitating a recalibration of defensive priorities. In response\, Dr. Narang emphasised the need for a proactive\, layered defence strategy focused on early interception and multi-layer interception approach for enhancing the effectiveness of threat neutralisation. He highlighted the importance of redundancy\, platform-level integration of counter-drone systems\, and indigenous capability development to ensure scalability during conflict. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Gp. Capt. Narang reiterated that current efforts\, including initiatives such as iDEX\, remain inadequate and insufficiently integrated. He stressed that without a holistic approach anchored in institutional reform\, technological integration\, and indigenous innovation\, India risks remaining underprepared for the evolving dynamics of drone-centric warfare. The discussion concluded with the recognition that future conflicts will be defined not only by advanced platforms but by the ability to integrate systems\, anticipate asymmetric threats\, and align organisational structures with technological realities. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Vinayak Rajpurohit\, Intern\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-the-drones-in-us-israel-iran-war-lessons-for-india
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260406T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260406T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260630T043411Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051300Z
UID:98695-1775462400-1775494800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “US-Japan Summit: Implications for Japan’s Security Posture
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Arnab Dasgupta\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “US-Japan Summit: Implications for Japan’s Security Posture” during the Monday Morning meeting held on 6 April 2026. Ms. Simran Walia\, Research Analyst\, MP- IDSA moderated the Session. The event was attended by Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session analysed the US-Japan Summit between President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi held on 19 March in Washington and its implications on Japan’s security posture. Dr. Dasgupta highlighted its significance in the backdrop of the US and Israel’s ongoing conflict with Iran and President Trump’s repeated calls for allies to step in and secure the Strait of Hormuz. He also analysed the economic and energy cooperation between the two countries\, besides highlighting Japan’s strategic concerns regarding Taiwan and its efforts to secure long term American commitment in the Indo-Pacific\, among other issues.   \nDetailed report\nIn her opening remarks\, Ms. Simran Walia briefly explained the context of the US-Japan Summit held on 19 March between President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi which took place amidst the ongoing conflict with Iran and President Trump’s repeated calls for allies to step up and support in securing the Strait of Hormuz. She stated that while Japan expressed political support to US\, it stopped short of providing military assistance due to constitutional limitations. She further highlighted that notwithstanding the complexities around the Iran conflict\, the two leaders successfully re-affirmed the US-Japan alliance by further deepening collaboration across domains such as defence\, economic security\, technology including co-development of missiles\, strengthening defence capabilities to advance the vision of a free and open Indo – Pacific\, alongside a critical minerals action plan\, with Japan pledging US$70 billion worth of investments in the US. \nFollowing this\, Dr. Arnab Dasgupta gave a detailed presentation on the security implications of the US-Japan Summit and briefly summarised the issues discussed during the Summit. He highlighted that this was the second meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Takaichi\, with the Iran War being the most significant issue discussed. He stated that while PM Takaichi reiterated Japan’s longstanding opposition to Iran seeking nuclear weapons and also condemned Iran’s act of closing the Strait of Hormuz\, she stopped short of providing military assistance citing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution\, which prohibits forward deployment of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces in areas where Japan’s survival is not threatened. According to Dr. Dasgupta\, while the de-escalation call after the Summit was a standardised Japanese response\, the mention of expanding US sourced energy exports to Japan and Asia generated ambiguity as the intent of this statement remained unclear and will be elucidated in due course of time. Regarding the Indo-Pacific\, he highlighted the strong emphasis on ‘Free and Open Indo- Pacific’ by Japan\, mentioning all Quad countries individually as likeminded partners without using the term Quad itself. Dr. Dasgupta noted that while China-related concerns received limited attention\, there were extensive discussions on North Korea including denuclearisation and abduction issues among others. \nDr. Dasgupta discussed the major economic and defence agreements signed during the Summit. Strategic Japanese investments in the US such as the US$600 million synthetic diamond manufacturing plan\, energy infrastructure projects in Texas\, Ohio and Pennsylvania\, along with investments in small modular nuclear reactors through a consortium involving GE Vernova and Hitachi\, and the fact that most of these energy projects were located in politically significant swing states\, indicated an electoral dimension to these investments. \nThe adoption of the Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience which seeks to address the vulnerabilities arising from ‘non market policies and perspectives’\, with the US and Japan envisaging cooperation on price floors\, stockpiling\, regulatory standards and coordinated responses to any economic coercion\, is another major development. While the scope of the agreement is not known yet\, the intention to jointly identify mining\, processing and manufacturing of critical minerals in third countries such as Australia\, Canada and Brazil besides their own territories was clear. He also discussed the newly signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on deep sea mineral resource development\, with a bilateral working group being established to work on exploration and extraction of rare earth sources in sites like Japan’s Minamitorishima Island. \nDr. Dasgupta stated that despite controversies\, the Summit was seen as a success by the Japanese Government due to four main reasons. These were: firstly\, ensuring sustained US commitment to the Indo – Pacific (Japan’s foremost strategic objective); secondly\, continued US involvement in defending the Senkaku Islands and extending nuclear deterrence; thirdly\, Japan was buying time for developing its own defence industrial and military capabilities and lastly\, the ideological alignment of Japan’s conservative leadership\, including PM Takaichi\, which has historically always sought close alignment with the US. \nThe Speaker further analysed Japan’s continued dependence on the US for defence\, especially while it is pursuing military and defence modernisation. He noted that Japan still requires extensive technological support from the US. Examples are: retrofitting the Japanese Aegis-class destroyers for Tomahawk missile deployment\, permission for production of Patriot batteries needed for ballistic missile defense\, and allowing the development of hypersonic glide vehicles. He discussed the continued evolution of the Distributed Lethality Doctrine across Japan’s southwestern islands near the Taiwan Strait\, and Japan’s intent of developing nuclear powered submarines.  He also described Japan’s ‘Taiwan panic’\, as Tokyo views the Taiwan Strait with greater urgency and concern than Washington does due to its geographic proximity and strategic importance. \nPM Takaichi’s assertive stance that any development in Taiwan Strait could qualify as a survival threatening situation requiring the deployment of Self Defence Forces (SDF) marks a significant departure from Japan’s traditional cultivation of ambiguity.  He also noted Japan’s deepening alignment with US while stating that overdependence could create further vulnerabilities for Japan and also affect its credibility amongst the Global South countries. \nQ & A Session\nThe presentation was followed by a discussion wherein the Director General\, MP- IDSA and scholars raised questions and discussed the outcomes of the US-Japan Summit and its implications for India. \nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, observed that Japan has a longstanding strategic and economic partnership\, and hence Japan pursuing closer ties with US would not necessarily impact its credibility with the Global South. Regarding Japan’s future naval strategy\, he stated that rather than independently pursuing development of advanced submarine capabilities etc.\, Japan could seek this potential by closer engagement with alliances such as AUKUS.  He highlighted the signing of the MOU on critical minerals and noted that Japan’s sophisticated sea bed mining program faces increasing competition from China’s own COMRA (China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association) program. He queried whether Japan would truly accept deeper US operational structures such as the proposal for a three-star US command\, especially taking into account Japan’s longstanding efforts towards achieving strategic autonomy\, and stated that Indo- Japan relations are today marked by high economic engagement. Nevertheless\, he underlined that economics and defence relations cannot be separated\, comparing it with India’s growing defence industrial cooperation with Israel and the US\, and suggested that even Japan will eventually view India as a long-term defence industrial and manufacturing partner. \nOther participants too raised questions regarding Japan’s large holdings of US treasury bonds and the implications of Yen depreciation. Another query focused-on lack of institutional and technological study and mapping between India and Japan\, particularly in emerging technologies and co-development initiatives. Other questions raised were regarding Japan’s deployment of advanced missile defence systems and surveillance infrastructure on Yonaguni Island\, Japanese investments in the US and its geopolitical implications. \nResponding to the questions\, Dr. Arnab Dasgupta clarified that Japan’s strategic behavior is aimed at ensuring continued US engagement in the Indo- Pacific and also agreed that Japanese investments in the US functioned partly as a strategic trade-off intended to preserve American commitment and reduce Japanese dependence on China. Regarding the Yonaguni Island\, he explained that its strategic significance derived from its proximity to Taiwan and the Chinese Coast\, making it an ideal location for surveillance\, missile defence\, and early warning systems and that a more capable and assertive Japan could potentially contribute positively to the regional strategic balance. \nTo conclude\, Dr. Dasgupta emphasised that Japan’s evolving security posture reflected both growing strategic anxieties and a desire to secure long-term US commitment in the Indo-Pacific.  Tokyo is steadily expanding its military and technological capabilities\, and its alliance with Washington remains central in this transition. While economic engagement currently is a more stable and less politically constrained foundation for Indo-Japan relations\, nevertheless there is a need for greater institutional-level coordination and technological collaboration between the two countries. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Himanshu Kulkarni\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-us-japan-summit-implications-for-japans-security-posture
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260330T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260330T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260702T060344Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053332Z
UID:98739-1774857600-1774890000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Mr. Niranjan Oak's Monday Morning Presentation on "The Unravelling of the Global Nuclear Order"
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting featuring a presentation by Mr. Niranjan Oak\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA on “The Unravelling of the Global Nuclear Order.” The Session was moderated by Dr. Abhishek Verma\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session examined the erosion of the global nuclear order and the key pillars that have supported nuclear governance since the Second World War. The Speaker argued that the current nuclear landscape shows institutional decline\, growing multipolarity\, weakening of the norms against nuclear weapon use\, and the disruptive impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Mr. Oak assessed four main pillars of the existing Global Nuclear Order: the international nuclear regime\, bipolar nuclear hegemony\, extended nuclear deterrence\, and the nuclear taboo\, and found that each is under serious stress. He also spoke about the impact of AI on Strategic Stability. Finally\, he discussed how India has harmonised its nuclear policies in accordance with the global nuclear regime\, despite being a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). \nDetailed Discussion\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Dr. Abhishek Verma\, introduced the topic by highlighting the renewed salience of nuclear weapons in current geopolitics. Referring to recent developments such as nuclear signalling during the Russia–Ukraine War\, France’s proposal of forward deterrence\, Germany’s interest in nuclear-sharing arrangements\, and Finland’s proposed legal changes to allow nuclear weapons on its territory\, he showed how the foundations of the existing nuclear order are being challenged. \nMr. Niranjan Oak began by noting that there is no fixed definition of the global nuclear order. He described it as a mix of international regimes\, institutions\, norms\, and practices that aim to maintain balance in the governance of nuclear technology. He defined it as a practical compromise between complete nuclear anarchy and disarmament. He argued that the current nuclear order can be assessed by four factors: the international nuclear regime\, bipolar nuclear hegemony\, extended nuclear deterrence\, and the nuclear taboo. \nMr. Oak described the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of global nuclear governance\, but despite being ratified by 191 States\, it is widely seen as structurally unfair. The Treaty’s commitment to disarmament prescribed by Article VI—which mandates an end to the arms race and meaningful movement toward total disarmament—remains unfulfilled. This failure has essentially permitted the five acknowledged Nuclear-Weapon States to maintain their stockpiles\, with global counts projected to increase. Furthermore\, Mr. Oak believes the Treaty’s credibility has been gravely compromised by U.S. and Israel’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites\, particularly as Iran is an NPT signatory asserting its rights under Article IV. \nOn the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)\, the Speaker noted that although it has not entered into force\, it has largely been followed since 1996 except by North Korea\, but its future is uncertain after indications in October 2025 of a possible U.S. return to testing. The U.S. accusations of low-yield tests by Russia and China remain unconfirmed\, while Vladimir Putin has warned of a matching response. \nOn bilateral arms control\, he stated that New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired on 5 February 2026\, marking the end of the arms control era that began eroding with the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Key barriers to a new agreement include disputes over participation\, weapons categories\, and defence capabilities\, compounded by the Ukraine War\, leaving no limits on deployed strategic weapons between the two main nuclear powers. \nAccording to Mr. Oak\, China’s accelerated nuclear growth—marked by the construction of new missile silos\, development of MIRV-capable intercontinental missiles\, and rising plutonium output—represents a significant geopolitical shift. He projected that China could achieve parity with the nuclear stockpiles of the U.S. and Russia by approximately 2030\, a development that risks triggering a three-way arms race through reactive military expansions. China’s rise is also generating pressure for nuclear growth in the Indo-Pacific\, with debates in Japan and South Korea alongside concerns about China’s non-proliferation record and territorial ambitions. \nThe Speaker observed that increasing skepticism regarding U.S. extended deterrence has led European nations to investigate autonomous alternatives. This shift is evidenced by the July 2025 Northwood Declaration\, which facilitates coordination between British and French forces\, alongside broadened “forward deterrence” frameworks. Concurrently\, comparable concerns have surfaced in the Indo-Pacific region\, specifically within South Korea and Japan\, amid changing security dynamics such as the Russia–North Korea Partnership and other nascent defence agreements. \nReferring to Dr. Nina Tannenwald\, he explained that the nuclear taboo reflects a belief in the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons\, which is now under pressure\, due to explicit threats by leaders\, risking erosion of long-standing restraint since 1945. He warned that increasing reliance on AI in military systems may heighten uncertainty\, as its limitations\, vulnerability to cyber-attacks\, and impact on secrecy and decision time could weaken second-strike capability and raise the risk of miscalculation\, despite human control formally remaining in place. \nMr. Oak concluded by reviewing India’s position on the matter. India has long supported a fair global system for non-proliferation and disarmament but did not accept the NPT\, calling it “nuclear apartheid” because it limits some States but not others. India has also not signed the CTBT but follows a voluntary testing pause\, and its non-proliferation record is clean\, with no proven cases of sharing nuclear technology. India has been formally integrated into global nuclear control systems through its 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver and participation in export control regimes. Its nuclear deterrent has been effective\, as shown by its ability to carry out conventional military actions under nuclear pressure in the India–Pakistan context\, exposing Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. \nQ&A Session\nThe presentation was followed by a lively discussion.  Dr. Abhishek Verma\, Dr. Hina. Pandey\, Dr. M. S. Prathibha\, Ms. Deepika Saraswat\, and Mr. Arnab Dasgupta made observations and raised questions\, which were addressed by Mr. Niranjan Oak. \nThe weakening U.S. extended deterrence in Europe and Asia was raised as a factor that could speed up nuclear proliferation in both regions\, alongside the possible role of the Saudi Arabia–Pakistan mutual defence pact in future India–Pakistan tensions. It was questioned whether the size of China’s nuclear arsenal matters in practical terms\, since even one nuclear weapon can deter. The situation was described as a “nuclear disorder” rather than a true order\, noting that no NPT Review Conference has produced a consensus document since 2015\, followed by major decline in the regime. Article 4 of the NPT was highlighted as long disputed\, with many States seeing it as an unconditional right to nuclear energy\, while the United States applies a narrower view and restricts some technologies even for allies. On New START\, the absence of inspections since 2017 was noted\, weakening its verification function well before its expiry. It was asked how India should respond if Japan and South Korea develop nuclear weapons\, given their importance as partners. The value of nuclear arsenals\, especially tactical versus strategic weapons\, was questioned. \nIt was argued that the nuclear order began weakening after the Cold War\, and that China’s nuclear rise should not be overstated given its focus on conventional missiles and minimal second-strike capability. \nAdditionally\, it was stated that India should avoid multilateral arms control arrangements involving China and Pakistan. \nIt was stated that U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea remain strong and are unlikely to change without a major decline in U.S. power. \nMr. Niranjan Oak replied that Japan and South Korea have the technical ability to quickly develop nuclear weapons. While their reliance on U.S. security has supported economic growth\, President Trump’s posture and the North Korean threat have increased domestic nuclear debates\, making regional proliferation possible. However\, a major shift in U.S. power would still be required before independent nuclear choices are made. On the Saudi–Pakistan pact\, he said Saudi Arabia is unlikely to give direct military support to Pakistan due to strong ties with India\, but Pakistan may use the pact to gain financial support from the Gulf. On arsenal size\, he noted that while equal numbers are not required for deterrence\, China’s expansion shows a desire for parity with the United States and Russia\, as noted in The Science of Military Strategy\, adding that China’s stated no-first-use and minimum deterrence policies do not match its actions\, including adopting a launch-on-warning posture. \nOn New START\, the Speaker noted that the U.S. compliance report found no suspicious activity in Russia’s arsenal. He said India would likely express concern but avoid active diplomatic steps if Japan and South Korea develop nuclear weapons. He added that nuclear deterrence works\, citing North Korea\, which has not been attacked\, unlike Iran. On China\, he said evidence suggests expansion of its nuclear capabilities\, though reliable information is limited\, noting that nuclear developments are largely opaque\, with most public data coming from the West\, while satellite images showing China building nuclear silos and its large-scale plutonium production raises further questions. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Cyrus Ghosh\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mr-niranjan-oaks-monday-morning-presentation-on-the-unravelling-of-the-global-nuclear-order
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260323T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260323T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260630T043721Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053349Z
UID:98697-1774252800-1774285200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “India - Vietnam Strategic Partnership: Internal and External Dimensions”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Temjenmeren Ao\, Associate Fellow\, at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: Internal and External Dimensions” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 23 March 2026. Dr. Om Prakash Das\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the Session\, which was attended by scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session reviewed the internal political and external dynamics of the foreign policy of Vietnam\, its trajectory and progress of India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the last decade (2016-2026) in the light of growing defence cooperation and economic engagement which underpin the multifaceted bilateral relationship between India and Vietnam. Dr. Ao analysed the 14th Party Congress held in January 2026 which set out revised national and economic priorities and the emergence of Mr. To Lam as Vietnam’s dominant political figure. Linking these internal developments to  foreign policy ramifications\, Dr. Ao summarised Vietnamese foreign policy\, particularly analysing the foreign policy approach under General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)\, Mr. To Lam and also explored Vietnam’s bilateral ties with China and the US\, Party to Party ties with China’s CCP\, and defence collaboration.      \nDetailed Report\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Dr. Om Prakash Das gave a brief historical summary from the late 1970s when full bilateral relationship was established\, to upgradation of ties into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016\, marking 10 years of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between India and Vietnam. The bilateral cooperation among the two countries is multi-faceted and ranges from economic engagement and defence collaboration to energy\, space and digital cooperation and the Joint Vision statement of Peace\, Prosperity and People\, adopted by both the countries in 2020 aims to further strengthen the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. However\, Dr. Das also pointed out the asymmetry in trade and economic engagement\, with bilateral trade remaining below the target of US$20 billion\, among other issues. \nFollowing Dr. Das’s Introductory Remarks\, Dr. Temjenmeren Ao presented a detailed account of the India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and stated that there has been substantial improvement in terms of investments and security cooperation in the last decade\, with the India – Vietnam Strategic Partnership being very organic in nature. This was further strengthened by the adoption of the Joint Vision of Peace\, Prosperity and People by both the countries in 2020\, which emphasised extending co-operation to technology\, digitisation\, energy\, agrarian sectors\, and better governance among others. India has extended a Line of Credit (LOC) worth US$500 billion for Vietnam’s defence procurements besides another US $300 million microcredit for maritime security. Moreover\, the Joint Vision statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030\, signed in 2022\, provides scope to further bolster cooperation on maritime and non-traditional security challenges such as cyber security and terrorism. \nDr. Ao highlighted that bilateral trade from 2014 to 2024 has increased from US$9.2 billion to US$16 billion. India has invested around US$1.9 million in over 460 projects in Vietnam while Vietnam has invested US$14 million\, in 16 projects in India. The Vietnamese Conglomerate Vingroup in December 2025 has signed an MOU with the Government of Telangana for a multi-sectoral investment of US$3 billion. Dr. Ao also stated that ASEAN is yet to become a single market which is one of the major causes of India’s widening trade deficit with Vietnam. \nFocusing on the internal and external dimensions of this Strategic Partnership\, Dr. Ao pointed out that every five years\, the Party Congress of the CPV sets out the economic targets and national priorities to be achieved. The 14th Party Congress held in January 2026\, adopted an ambitious target of achieving US$8500 GDP per capita by 2030 and a 10% growth rate starting from this year\, in line with making Vietnam a high-income country by 2045. The current GDP of Vietnam is US$4\,740\, making it the sixth largest country by GDP in Southeast Asia. However\, as per the IMF projections\, at the current growth rate\, by 2030 Vietnam would have a GDP of US$6\,320 indicating a gap of over US$2\,000 dollars. Besides economic indicators\, Dr. Ao also talked about political developments\, with Mr. To Lam getting re-elected as the General Secretary of the CPV and emerging as a dominant political figure. Under Mr. To Lam’s leadership\, Vietnam is likely to adopt a more decisive and pragmatic approach as it looks to achieve its internal development priorities. Mr. To Lam is placing astronomical growth at the heart of his recipe for success. As the external geopolitical environment becomes more complex on account of further intensification of US-China competition; an unpredictable US trade policy; and the economic fallout of the ongoing war in West Asia\, it has prompted a shift in Vietnam’s strategic thinking. \nDr. Ao stated that Vietnam’s foreign policy continues to reflect pragmatic flexibility\, with Hanoi seeing Beijing as an important ideological and economic partner considering the close Party to Party ties\, while leveraging US to ensure regional balance and curtail China’s assertiveness in the region. Vietnam in the last decade has diversified its partnerships and now has a comprehensive strategic partnership with 14 countries\, that includes the United States\, China\, India\, Canada\, Australia\, and other countries in Southeast Asia. This outreach gives Vietnam the flexibility of not being dependent on a single power\, yet ensuring that its national interests and priorities are balanced. Vietnam continues to manage its relations between the US and China\, while at the same time diversifying its partnerships\, to avoid dependence on any single power. Based on its ‘bamboo diplomacy’ and under Mr To Lam’s pragmatic nationalism\, Hanoi is expected to become even more assertive in its expectation from its partners while committing to none. Vietnam is also prioritising defence modernisation that includes restructuring 5\,000 of its military units and plans to accelerate its defence industry development. Geo-political uncertainties and security challenges are pushing Vietnam towards deeper international integration through its defence diplomacy with its external partners such as India. \nQ &A Session\nThe presentation was followed by discussion moderated by Dr. O.P. Das. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP- IDSA\, observed that while India and Vietnam undoubtedly have good bilateral ties\, this cannot be stated as an exceptional partnership\, highlighting the absence of any defining breakthrough moments in the last decade\, due to structural limitations inherent to Vietnam. One such limitation is Vietnam’s political and strategic orientation towards China\, wherein Vietnam’s Party maintains excellent ties with the CCP and hence even in occasional moments of tensions and confrontational disputes in the South China Sea\, Vietnam controls such situations\, through its Party-to-Party relationship and dialogue. He further noted that Vietnam’s foreign policy anchored in its four NO’s doctrine\, a version of non-alignment\, infers that Vietnam is unlikely to take overt positions in India’s strategic disputes. He further pointed out that while Vietnam is a partner State\, at the same time\, it is an economic competitor for India in arenas of global supply chains. Vietnam benefits from trade agreements like RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) among others and is therefore able to attract significant Chinese and Japanese investment. This economic interdependence on China and strong engagement with India’s major partners like Japan\, create a structural limit\, obstructing further deepening of the India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership. \nOther participants raised questions. One query related to the conventional and non-conventional security threats that Vietnam faced. Another question focused on Vietnam’s military modernisation and its border negotiations with China. There were other questions about Vietnam’s perspective on ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ and whether convergence with India in that domain is possible. \nResponding to these questions\, Dr. Ao stated that conventional threats that Vietnam faces are mainly its borders and securing the disputed islands while it has also faced  the increasing non-conventional threat of terrorism in the last decade. On defence cooperation\, Dr. Ao highlighted that 80% of Vietnam’s equipment and military hardware is still based on the Russian platforms which are under sanctions\, thereby pushing Vietnam to diversify its partnerships and engage in defence diplomacy\, with partners like India. On the Indo-Pacific\, he highlighted that while Vietnam did not mention the word prior to 2019 until the ASEAN came out with the AOIP (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific)\, it is gradually adopting the term and focusing on it. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr Ao emphasised that moving to the next decade\, under Mr. To Lam’s pragmatic orientation to achieve vision 2045\, Vietnam is seeking diverse external partnerships that would aid it in building these capabilities. Though there are challenges\, the India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has enabled positive developments in their relations\, as both sides share strong convergences rooted in achieving their respective national goals. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Himanshu Kulkarni\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-india-vietnam-strategic-partnership-internal-and-external-dimensions
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260316T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260316T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260702T061934Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053224Z
UID:98742-1773648000-1773680400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “AI Impact Summit 2026: Key Takeaways and India's Strategy”
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Khyati Singh\, Research Analyst\, spoke on “AI Impact Summit 2026: Key Takeaways and India’s Strategy” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 16 March\, 2026. The Session was moderated by Col. Nestor Derrick D’Souza\, Research Fellow. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute attended the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker traced global AI governance from Bletchley Park to the AI Impact Summit 2026\, where India advanced the MANAV framework of moral\, accountable\, sovereign\, accessible and valid AI\, alongside initiatives for democratic diffusion and indigenous language models. It then examined AI’s weaponisation in U.S. operations in Venezuela and Iran\, showing its role in autonomous warfare and exposing the risks of dependence on commercial models. The Speaker highlighted the duality in AI-driven technologies\, while forwarding the central argument that India must pursue sovereign\, balanced AI development. \nDetailed Report\nCol. D’Souza began his Opening Remarks by asserting that human evolution has progressed through distinct ‘ages’\, from agriculture to industrialisation\, then the information technology or ‘knowledge’ age\, and now the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI) . Today\, AI shapes everyday life\, solving routine and complex problems alike\, even as individuals increasingly trade privacy for convenience under constant digital surveillance. Global leaders emphasise that dominance in AI will determine future world power\, intensifying international competition. In this context\, India’s AI Impact Summit highlighted a shift from dialogue to demonstrable impact\, guided by people\, planet\, and progress\, and inspired by Vasudeva Kutumbakam. The Summit addressed key concerns such as child safety\, job disruption\, ethics\, environmental impact\, and equitable growth\, while also showcasing India’s AI capabilities and fostering collaborative policy development through broad stakeholder engagement. \nMs. Khyati Singh began her presentation by stating that the trajectory of global AI governance can be understood through a series of international summits beginning in 2023. The first\, held in the United Kingdom at the Bletchley Park AI Safety Summit\, marked a defining moment as countries collectively came together to deliberate on AI. Attended by around 100 representatives from 30 technologically advanced nations\, it focused narrowly on AI safety\, risk mitigation\, and concerns surrounding artificial general intelligence escaping human control. The primary outcome was the establishment of AI Safety Institutes aimed at standardising testing methodologies before commercial deployment. \nMs. Khyati also pointed out that this safety-centric approach continued into the AI Seoul Summit of May 2024\, where efforts were made to formalise concerns through frontier AI safety commitments. Sixteen leading technology companies agreed to assess risk across the AI lifecycle\, define intolerable thresholds\, and halt developments that could significantly harm humanity. However\, compliance remained uneven\, with several corporate signatories establishing internal safeguards inconsistently. \nThe Speaker further highlighted that attempts to build geopolitical consensus during the Paris Summit remained incomplete. Countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States refrained from endorsing binding ethical standards\, arguing that such frameworks could hinder AI development\, particularly in contexts such as weapon development. This reluctance reflected a broader tension between ethical AI and strategic use\, especially as AI-enabled weapons and assistant systems have already been deployed in recent conflicts. \nThe AI Impact Summit in India in 2026 marked a definitive geographical departure\, being the first such event hosted in the Global South. Held at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi from February 16 to 21\, it witnessed participation of over 600\,000 individuals in person and approximately 900\,000 virtually. India was projected as a leader for both the AI world and the Global South\, signalling a shift in the centre of gravity of AI discourse. \nAccording to Ms. Khyati the most important outcome of the Summit was the articulation of a human-centric governance framework termed MANAV. The acronym encapsulates a unified structure: Moral and Ethical Systems emphasising fairness\, transparency\, and continuous human oversight embedded directly within algorithmic architecture; Accountable Governance ensuring transparent administrative rules and robust oversight mechanisms\, supported by the India AI Mission to democratise datasets and mandate safe AI principles; National Sovereignty asserting the inalienable right of States to protect domestic data within their own cultural\, linguistic\, and legal frameworks\, guided by the principle “whose data\, his right”; Accessible and Inclusive AI demanding systems that function across low-resource environments and diverse linguistic landscapes beyond English-speaking populations; and Valid and Legitimate Systems focusing on verifiability and trustworthiness of outputs to counter deepfakes and AI hallucinations through filtered\, legitimate data sources. \nThis comprehensive framework positions India as an ideological vanguard of the Global South\, advocating a balanced approach that avoids colonial-style data extraction and instead promotes a Make in India model\, allowing countries to store data within their own boundaries and build local cloud and dataset infrastructures. The Summit’s diplomatic outcomes included the New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact\, endorsed by approximately 92 countries and international organisations\, including major strategic rivals such as the United States\, China\, Russia\, and the United Kingdom\, reflecting a broad global consensus. \nAnother significant outcome was the Charter for Democratic Diffusion of AI\, supported by 22 countries and multiple institutions. This voluntary framework aims to break the oligopolistic control of foundational AI models by promoting local innovation ecosystems\, technology transfer\, and resilient infrastructure while respecting sovereign goals. Supporting initiatives included the Global AI Impact Commons to scale and share use cases\, the Trusted AI Commons as a repository of safety benchmarks and best practices\, and an equitable AI transition playbook developed with the International Labour Organization to address labour market disruption. \nThe Summit also highlighted India’s breakthrough use case models. Mission Bhashini and VoicERA were presented as national language infrastructure integrating over 350 AI models across 22 official languages\, enabling even illiterate individuals to access AI services through voice by simply dialling a number. These models demonstrated how AI can be made accessible to nearly 130 crore people in their own linguistic contexts. \nSarvam AI was introduced as a domestic entity developing sovereign foundational models trained on Indian datasets\, optimised for regional scripts and linguistic nuances. Its models enable real-time translation and application across sectors such as film production\, reducing costs and expanding reach. BharatGen AI\, a strictly government-funded multimodal model\, integrates text\, speech\, and document vision capabilities\, ensuring secure and sovereign public service delivery without third-party risk. Inya VoiceOS\, a multilingual speech model\, operates effectively under severe low-bandwidth conditions\, ensuring accessibility even in regions with limited connectivity. \nThe discussion then shifted to the global scale\, where alongside democratic and inclusive AI\, the weaponisation of AI has become evident. In January 2026\, the United States launched Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela\, capturing President Maduro within hours through AI-driven cyber and intelligence systems. AI enabled manipulation of grid systems\, real-time tracking of locations\, and predictive scenario modelling\, demonstrating effects-based operations with high precision and minimal human damage. \nThis was followed by Operation Epic Fury in Iran\, showcasing autonomous kinetic saturation through large-scale deployment of low-cost uncrewed combat systems. AI-enabled drone swarms communicated autonomously\, adjusted flight paths\, and executed coordinated multi-vector strikes while overwhelming defence systems. Simultaneously\, AI-assisted defence systems such as Iron Dome and Patriot batteries intercepted retaliatory attacks\, illustrating AI’s dual role in offensive and defensive operations. \nThese operations exposed structural vulnerabilities\, particularly the dependence on commercial AI platforms. The use of external models such as Claude led to disputes between private companies and the U.S. Government\, as corporate entities objected to military usage that violated their guidelines. Despite official discontinuation announcements\, such models continued to be used due to deep integration\, highlighting the difficulty of replacing embedded AI systems without equivalent substitutes. \nIn her concluding remarks\, Ms. Khyati opined that the key takeaway for India is the need to maintain a dual AI strategy\, i.e.\, promoting development\, security\, and safety while asserting sovereignty. Ethical considerations must coexist with strategic imperatives through a balanced approach. India must develop indigenous\, government-funded AI models with locally stored datasets to avoid dependence on private or foreign entities. At the same time\, it must handhold small companies and emerging players to achieve scale\, ensuring that domestic innovation ecosystems can match global advancements while remaining rooted within national systems. \nQ&A Session\nIn the discussion that followed\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, noted that the rapid advancement of AI will soon surpass conventional research and analysis\, making its integration essential for scholars. He emphasised that India must balance concerns over job losses with strengthening capabilities in data sovereignty\, models\, software\, and computing power. Instead of pursuing perfect systems\, the priority should be early and practical diffusion. He highlighted the need to use AI to expand access to science and technology beyond English-speaking elites and across defence\, business\, and daily use. \nThe discussion also covered AI in warfare\, ethical guardrails\, defence applications\, the role of private entities\, human agency\, and challenges of data and indigenisation in India. \nReport prepared by Ms. Meghna Pradhan\, Research Analyst\, Centre for North America and Strategic Technologies\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-ai-impact-summit-2026-key-takeaways-and-indias-strategy
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260309T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260309T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260630T042249Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053044Z
UID:98691-1773043200-1773075600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Post- Electoral Dynamics in Myanmar: Civil War Trajectories and Borderland Geopolitics”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Om Prakash Das\, Research Fellow\, made a presentation on “Post- Electoral Dynamics in Myanmar: Civil War Trajectories and Borderland Geopolitics” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 09 March 2026. Dr. Anand Kumar\, Associate Fellow\, moderated the meeting. Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation offered a detailed analysis of the 2025-26 General Elections held in Myanmar. It also discussed the impact of internal security in Myanmar on the broader regional security. The main focus of the presentation was on issues in bordering areas of India and Myanmar and measures to mitigate the same.   \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. Anand Kumar identified three key trends shaping contemporary geopolitics: the “Trump-triggered crises\,” challenges arising from Artificial Intelligence (AI)\, and the growing prevalence of civil wars and civil unrest in developing countries. He cited Myanmar as a clear example of the third trend. Following the 2021 military coup that ousted the elected government\, the country experienced widespread protests and a prolonged civil war involving resistance groups and ethnic militias\, many operating in border regions. \nDr. Kumar noted that the military junta conducted General Elections in 2025\, resulting in a landslide victory for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in early 2026. However\, the elections were widely criticised as neither free nor fair\, with several political parties banned and nearly 30% of Myanmar’s territory still affected by conflict. He emphasised that borderlands remain central to the conflict and have significant implications for regional stability\, particularly for India\, given their shared border and strategic interests. \nWith this backdrop\, Dr. Om Prakash Das analysed the 2026 General Elections in Myanmar\, noting that after the 2021 military coup\, the junta used the elections to restore constitutional continuity and seek political legitimacy. Conducted in three phases between January 2025 and January 2026\, the elections aimed to institutionalise post-coup governance within the framework of the 2008 Constitution. Results showed the dominance of the military-backed USDP\, which won 232 of the 263 contested seats in the 440-seat Lower House\, where 25% are reserved for the military. Dr. Das also highlighted contested regions controlled by ethnic armed groups\, particularly in border areas\, and described the USDP as rooted in military-bureaucratic networks. \nDr. Om Prakash Das examined Myanmar’s electoral trajectory from 2010 to 2026\, highlighting shifts in political dominance. In the 2010 General Elections\, held after the 2008 Constitution\, the National League for Democracy (NLD) did not participate\, enabling the military-backed USDP to win 76% of the seats. In the 2012 by-elections\, the NLD secured 96% of the contested seats. The 2015 General Elections\, which included all major parties\, resulted in a decisive NLD victory with 79% of the seats\, while the USDP won only 10%. A similar pattern appeared in the 2022 elections\, where the NLD won 82% and the USDP 7%. However\, in the 2026 elections\, pro-democratic parties were barred\, allowing the USDP to secure 88% of the seats. Voter turnout declined to 55%\, compared to about 77% earlier. Dr. Das noted that the 2023 Political Party Registration Law imposed strict requirements that reduced the number of registered parties from 92 to 52\, excluding the NLD. \nDr. Om Prakash Das noted that while Myanmar’s military continues to control key state institutions and major economic and administrative centres\, it lacked the capacity to fully eliminate resistance groups. At the same time\, resistance forces had captured territories in several regions but did not possess sufficient military strength to overthrow the regime. This balance had resulted in a prolonged civil war and sustained instability. Rural areas such as Thandwe and Magwe remained centres of resistance\, while borderlands were largely controlled by ethnic armed organisations. The resistance movement was highly decentralised\, with local militias coordinating with experienced ethnic armed groups and relying on asymmetric tactics such as ambushes\, sabotage\, and attacks on supply routes. Dr. Das argued that the elections sought to transform a wartime situation into political normalisation by installing a nominal civilian government to reduce diplomatic pressure. However\, divisions among ethnic armed groups and pro-democratic actors\, driven by demands for economic federalism and ethnic self-determination\, complicate prospects for a comprehensive peace settlement. \nDr. Om Prakash Das further explained that the National Unity Government (NUG) operated alongside networks of armed resistance groups known as the People’s Defence Force (PDF). Several ethnic armed organisations had also established parallel governance structures outside direct military control. In many areas\, these groups collected taxes\, administered local justice mechanisms\, and coordinated humanitarian assistance\, resulting in overlapping political systems within Myanmar. For many citizens\, the NUG represented the continuation of democratic governance\, while the military leadership viewed it as a direct challenge to its authority. \nDr. Das noted that recent military developments\, such as the recapture of key positions in northern Shan State and the consolidation of ethnic armed group control in parts of Rakhine State\, carried strategic implications\, particularly for infrastructure initiatives such as India’s Kaladan Multimodal Project. Despite these developments\, the military continued to retain significant strategic advantages. \nThe Speaker also highlighted the importance of external partnerships in sustaining the military’s capacity. Russia had emerged as a key military partner\, while China maintained complex relations with the regime\, combining economic engagement with cautious political guidance and continued involvement in infrastructure projects. \nDr. Das stated that more than 20 ethnic armed groups had opposed the junta since 2021. Although the possibility of negotiations could not be ruled out\, deep political divisions between the junta and the broader population made meaningful dialogue unlikely. Earlier peace initiatives\, including ceasefire frameworks linked to the 2008 Constitution and talks in 2015 had largely strengthened the military’s leverage\, rather than empowering ethnic groups seeking autonomy. \nDr. Om Prakash Das stated that the civil war had significantly reshaped the strategic environment along the Indo–Myanmar border. The collapse of state authority in regions such as Sagaing\, Chin\, and parts of Kachin had created governance vacuums and fragmented sovereignty. Multiple actors\, including the military\, ethnic armed organisations\, and local militias\, controlled different territories\, complicating border management and counter-insurgency efforts. The spread of cross-border insurgent networks had further affected security\, while issues such as narcotics smuggling\, illegal trafficking\, and timber extraction had intensified\, creating long-term challenges. \nDr. Das noted that India’s foreign policy had increasingly shifted towards securitisation\, reflected in the suspension of the Free Movement Regime (FMR) and plans to fence the border. However\, only about 60 km of the border had been fenced so far\, due to local opposition\, security constraints\, and rising costs. He concluded that Myanmar’s conflict remained complex\, as the military sought to institutionalise its authority through elections while deeper issues of legitimacy\, military dominance\, and territorial fragmentation persisted. Consequently\, the evolving situation would continue to pose security challenges for India and require a pragmatic border management strategy. \nQ&A Session and Discussion\nAmb. Sujan Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, emphasised that developments in Myanmar had important implications for India\, particularly regarding regional stability and border security. He noted that instability in Myanmar was not in India’s interest given the shared border and long-standing strategic and developmental ties between the two countries. Highlighting the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity\, he stressed that clearly defined borders were essential for maintaining stability in frontier regions. In this context\, he referred to India’s efforts to strengthen border management\, including the fencing of segments of the Indo–Myanmar border. \nAmb. Chinoy further observed that as India expanded its engagement with Southeast Asia through its Act East policy\, Myanmar continued to present both opportunities and challenges. He highlighted the strategic importance of connectivity initiatives such as the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project\, noting that its successful implementation depended on sustained peace and political stability. Drawing comparisons with developments related to Chabahar Port and the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor\, he remarked that infrastructure initiatives in politically sensitive regions often faced delays due to instability or lack of consensus. \nAmb. Chinoy concluded by stressing the need for a pragmatic and balanced approach towards Myanmar\, while remaining mindful of evolving geopolitical dynamics\, including the growing regional role of China. \nThe discussion that followed explored several related issues. Participants raised questions regarding governance arrangements in areas beyond the control of Myanmar’s central authorities and the prospects for engagement with local actors in border regions. It was noted that informal dialogues at the think-tank level had occasionally facilitated limited engagement with various groups operating along the border\, many of which maintained strong community linkages. \nIn the course of the discussion\, Dr. Om Prakash Das highlighted the importance of effective border management from India’s perspective. He noted that security forces\, including the Assam Rifles\, had increasingly relied on technological measures such as smart surveillance systems to monitor the border and track cross-border movements. Efforts to record biometric data of refugees entering through the border areas of Mizoram were also mentioned\, although several operational and logistical challenges remained. Participants also discussed the implications of divisions among ethnic armed groups and the role of external actors in the ongoing conflict. Overall\, the discussion underscored the complexity of the evolving situation and the need for carefully calibrated policy responses. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Sharvari Devendra Patil\, Intern\, ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-post-electoral-dynamics-in-myanmar-civil-war-trajectories-and-borderland-geopolitics
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260302T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260302T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260630T050633Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T052959Z
UID:98699-1772438400-1772470800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting Report “Iran: Overlapping Internal and External Crises”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Deepika Saraswat\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA\, delivered a presentation on “Iran: Overlapping Internal and External Crises” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 02 March 2026. The meeting was moderated by Dr. P. K. Pradhan\, Research Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA. MP – IDSA scholars participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation examined the present phase of crisis in Iran not as an isolated military exchange\, but as the culmination of overlapping internal and external pressures on Iran. Domestic unrest\, economic fragility and political contestation have intersected with external coercive diplomacy\, military signalling and direct strikes\, thereby pushing Tehran toward a more escalatory and risk-acceptant posture. In this interpretation\, Iran no longer sees the confrontation as limited to Israel alone; rather\, it views itself as being in direct conflict with the United States and considers US bases in the region to be legitimate targets if Washington is militarily involved. The Speaker traced the present crisis to a convergence of internal instability in Iran and renewed external pressure\, especially under a framework of coercive diplomacy and military escalation. The implication is that one cannot understand the current confrontation purely through nuclear diplomacy or military moves alone; rather\, it reflects a wider crisis of regional order. \nDetailed Report\nDr. P. K. Pradhan opened the Session by providing a concise background to the ongoing crisis. He traced the disruption of peace negotiations mediated by Oman and argued that the subsequent killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader precipitated a phase of military confrontation\, marked by retaliatory actions by Iran against the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Dr. Saraswat commenced her presentation by underscoring the dual pressures confronting Iran: the intensification of internal unrest on the one hand\, and the mounting external threats on the other. The protests and economic pressures within Iran overlapped with renewed US and Israeli threats\, thereby producing what the Speaker described as the worst-case strategic scenario for the Islamic Republic. Negotiations\, reportedly mediated by Oman\, were presented as having unfolded under highly coercive conditions. The Speaker argued that from Tehran’s perspective\, diplomacy under such terms came to resemble strategic surrender rather than meaningful compromise. This framing is essential to understanding why Iranian responses became earlier\, sharper and more regionally expansive. \nSlow strategic strangulation or sharp confrontation\, two options were left for Iran to respond in existential terms. Iran’s retaliatory logic\, as described by the Speaker is both strategic and asymmetric. Unable to match its adversaries symmetrically across all domains\, it has sought to target US bases\, symbolic infrastructure and economically sensitive sites in the Gulf. The purpose is not merely retaliation in a narrow military sense\, but the creation of a new deterrence equation in which insecurity is regionalised. In effect\, Tehran appears to be signalling that if Iran cannot be secure\, then no state closely aligned with US military operations should assume immunity from the consequences. \nDr. Saraswat argued that there is a direct U.S. – Iran escalation dynamics from brinkmanship. A key argument advanced by the Speaker is that Iran’s earlier strategy of calibrated response and “strategic patience” failed to arrest the lowering of escalation thresholds by Israel and the United States. The Speaker noted that what began as shadow conflict and indirect contestation has progressively moved toward direct strikes\, leadership decapitation attempts\, attacks on military infrastructure and threats to regime survival. In this context\, Tehran is said to have concluded that the only remaining option is to impose wider costs on its adversaries and on the regional system supporting them. \nDr. Saraswat also placed emphasis on the gradual lowering of escalation thresholds since 2024. What had once been shadow war and proxy competition is described as having evolved into direct missile exchanges\, sustained attacks on strategic facilities\, and even attempts to target top leadership. This historical sequencing matters\, because it supports the argument that Iran’s current posture is a response to the perceived failure of “strategic patience” and restrained retaliation. \nThe Speaker strongly suggested that Iran now sees the conflict through the lens of survival. Regime change remains a political objective for some actors\, but not an assured outcome.  If diplomacy under pressure is equated with strategic surrender\, then escalation becomes\, from Tehran’s perspective\, a means to restore deterrence and improve bargaining leverage. This includes attacks on US bases\, symbolic sites\, and vulnerable economic targets across the Gulf. Such a strategy is asymmetric: Iran cannot mirror the full technological reach of the US-Israel side\, so it seeks to distribute insecurity across the region instead. \nThe US-Israel strategy may have expanded beyond rollback of Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities toward weakening the regime’s coercive institutions and encouraging internal political rupture. However\, the Speaker is cautious: air power and decapitation efforts alone are unlikely to guarantee regime collapse. Iran’s governance system is described as operating through multiple councils and distributed institutions\, which may allow continuity even after severe shocks. Thus\, while the regime is under strain\, its breakdown should not be assumed. \nThe discussion repeatedly underscored that the Gulf monarchies did not want this war. Their position is structurally vulnerable because US military infrastructure on their soil makes them potential targets\, while their economies remain deeply exposed to even limited instability. If oil flows\, investor sentiment\, aviation routes\, or urban security are disrupted\, the political and financial fallout could be severe. The mention of attacks or spill over into civilian areas reinforces the point that Gulf vulnerability is not merely theoretical. This condition is described as “reverse entrapment\,” whereby weaker allies are drawn into conflict by the decisions of a stronger security partner. \nAnother escalation is on the Strait of Hormuz where the Speaker suggests that Iran’s objective is not necessarily full closure\, but calibrated disruption sufficient to raise freight costs\, unsettle energy markets and globalise the effects of the war. In such a scenario\, the conflict ceases to be geographically localised and becomes economically international\, with Asian economies—especially energy importers earing substantial costs. \nQuestion and Answer\nOne of the scholars asked how deeply entrenched the ideology of Iran’s Supreme Leader is in Iranian society as nation. The Speaker highlighted an important socio-political tension. On the one hand\, there are deep grievances against the Supreme Leader and against the State’s repressive apparatus. Some segments of society may indeed welcome visible setbacks to the regime. On the other hand\, external pressure may strengthen siege nationalism and reinforce cohesion among regime loyalists\, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Dr. Saraswat added that many Iranians may fear not only regime survival\, but the possibility of “Syrianisation” or “Libyanisation”—that is\, State collapse followed by prolonged civil conflict and fragmentation. \nOne participant asked whether Iran had done the right thing by escalating the war and whether it had the capacity to sustain such a campaign. The response was that\, from Tehran’s perspective\, escalation may have become unavoidable once the conflict was framed as existential and once external actors signalled willingness to widen objectives beyond nuclear rollback. \nAnother important line of questioning concerned whether Iran had missed the opportunity to acquire a nuclear weapon and thereby secure stronger deterrence. The Speaker argued that Iran may have deliberately avoided becoming a “North Korea\,” preferring threshold capability and ambiguity as tools of bargaining. Full weaponisation\, in this view\, would have imposed heavy isolation costs without necessarily solving Iran’s long-term security dilemma. \nQuestions on China\, Russia and wider global implications produced a broader geopolitical reading. The Speaker appeared skeptical of claims that the crisis should be seen primarily through a China-centred lens\, but acknowledged that Beijing would interpret it as evidence of continuing US willingness to maintain regional hegemony by force. Similarly\, the issue of Russian links to Shahed drone production was raised as a factor that could shape the conflict’s duration and operational character. \nReport prepared by Ms. Warisha Wasi\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-report-iran-overlapping-internal-and-external-crises
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260225T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260225T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260302T120343Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260302T120343Z
UID:95893-1772006400-1772038800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Session VI: Strengthening Regional Institutions | 16th SOUTH ASIA CONFERENCE 2026
DESCRIPTION:Chair:             Amb. Riva Ganguly Das\, Former Secretary (East)\, Ministry of External Affairs\, Government of India \nSpeakers:        Vice Admiral SN Ghormade\, Former Vice Chief\, Indian Navy & Secretary General\, Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) on “Strengthening Regional Institutions: Colombo Security Conclave” \nProf. Sanjay Chaturvedi\, (IORA)\, Professor & Dean\, Faculty of International Studies (FIS)\, South Asian University on                                                           “Indian Ocean Regionalism at a Crossroads: IORA\, Interregnum\, and the Anthropocene” \nDr. Athaulla Ahmed Rasheed\, Head of Centre for Security and Strategic Studies\, Maldives National University on “Role of Small States in Shaping Indian Ocean Regional Institutions: Framing Maldives’ Security Narratives” \nMs. Bineswaree Aruna Bolaky\, Economic Affairs Officer\, UN Economic Commission for Africa on “Linking MAHASAGAR to Africa:  India’s role in the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement” \nDr. Loitongbam Bishwanjit Singh\, Assistant Professor\, Department of South East Asian Studies\, Manipur University on “Relooking BIMSTEC: Optimising Advantages and Dealing with the Disadvantages” \nThe sixth session discussed on the issue of “Strengthening Regional Institutions”. The session was chaired by Amb. Riva Ganguly Das\, Former Secretary (East)\, Ministry of External Affairs\, Government of India. The chair thanked the MP-IDSA for organising this conference and welcomed the presenters of this session. She introduced the theme of the session and said that the topic on the strengthening of regional institutions in the Indian Ocean region is an interesting issue\, particularly in the backdrop of the great power rivalry\, weaponisation of trade and the changing geopolitical situation in the region. According to Amb. Das\, MAHASAGAR is an idea to promote regionalism and inclusive development for the countries of the region. \nVice Admiral SN Ghormade\, Former Vice Chief\, Indian Navy & Secretary General\, Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) spoke on “Strengthening Regional Institutions: Colombo Security Conclave”. \n\nVice Admiral Ghormade began his presentation by outlining the significance of the Indian Ocean region. India Ocean is no longer merely a conduit of trade but has emerged as an arena of geopolitical rivalry\, economic fragmentation\, piracy\, international terrorism\, climate change\, human security and cyber security.\nVice Admiral Ghormade argued for the need to combine various regional institutions\, such as IORA\, IONS\, BIMSTEC\, and the CSC in the Indian Ocean region. This would create a synergy and integration among the different institutions would be beneficial to meet the challenges posed by complex geopolitical situation in the region.\nHe asserted that the major goals of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) is to provide  maritime safety and security\, strengthen the strategy to counter terrorist activities\, prevent radicalisation\, combat human trafficking and transnational organised crime\, increase cyber security and create mechanisms to protect critical infrastructure and technology. CSC also aims to provide humanitarian support and protection against natural disasters.\nA coherent strategy by linking the regional maritime institutions would develop mutual confidence and create more opportunities for the coming generations. Therefore\, the integration of various institutions would be beneficial for the nations in the region.\n\nProf. Sanjay Chaturvedi\, (IORA)\, Professor & Dean\, Faculty of International Studies (FIS)\, South Asian University spoke on “Indian Ocean Regionalism at a Crossroads: IORA\, Interregnum\, and the Anthropocene”. \n\nProf. Sanjay Chaturvedi focussed his presentation on the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)\, which according to him is the only “pan-Indian Ocean” institution to promote regional connectivity and could play a significant role in the backdrop of the changing geopolitical situation in the world. The countries of the Indian Ocean region also needs to respond to the regional challenges.\nWhile “Indo-Pacific” represents a strategic geography\, Indian Ocean has a political\, economic and cultural geography.\nIORA emerged as a regional organisation in the post-Cold War period and aimed to deepen economic cooperation among the nations in the region with a guiding principle for “open regionalism”.\nIn the due course\, the IORA has evolved into several other domains\, such as to increase cooperation in the provision of maritime security\, disaster management\, blue economy\, and promote more inclusive and sustainable development in the region.\nThe emerging geopolitics\, geo-economics and big power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region and challenges posed by the climate change have increased the need for regional cooperation and has enhanced the importance of IORA.\n\nDr. Athaulla Ahmed Rasheed\, Head of Centre for Security and Strategic Studies\, Maldives National University spoke on “Role of Small States in Shaping Indian Ocean Regional Institutions: Framing Maldives’ Security Narratives”. \n\nDr. Rasheed spoke on the importance and role of the small states in building various institutions with regards to the economic\, political and security in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.\nIn his presentation\, he particularly focused on the role of Maldives in institution building in the region and its participation in the regional institutions like the IORA and the Colombo Security Conclave.\nThe recent shifts in the regional security dynamics in the Indian Ocean region and the new regional initiatives by New Delhi and Beijing have increased the importance of the small states like Maldives.\nMaldives has been adjusting to the new security challenges in the region and has been pursuing a more “development-oriented security” strategy which would be helpful for the regional security.\nDr. Rasheed asserted in his presentation that the “vulnerabilities can increase the bargaining power of the states”\, and particularly\, smaller states like Maldives could exercise meaningful agency in the Indian Ocean region.\n\nMs. Bineswaree Aruna Bolaky\, Economic Affairs Officer\, UN Economic Commission for Africa spoke on “Linking MAHASAGAR to Africa:  India’s role in the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement”. \n\nMs. Bolaky’s presentation focussed on the linking of the Indian initiative of MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) with Africa. The MAHSAGAR is a strategy to develop maritime connections\, particularly with regards to the countries of the Global South.\nIn this regard\, India could play a pivotal role in increasing trade\, peace\, security\, and sustainable development in the Indian Ocean region and other parts of the world.\nOn the other hand\, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement is a notable strategy of some African nations to deepen the intraregional trade and economic development in the continent\, particularly in the eastern and southern Africa.\nMs. Bolaky asserted that there was a need to construct linkages between the MAHASAGAR and AfCFTA\, which would be helpful in building infrastructure facilities and strengthen trade in the entire Indian Ocean region. In this regard\, MAHASAGAR can positively contribute to the implementation of the AfCFTA.\n\nDr. Loitongbam Bishwanjit Singh\, Assistant Professor\, Department of South East Asian Studies\, Manipur University spoke on “Relooking BIMSTEC: Optimising Advantages and Dealing with the Disadvantages”. \n\nThe presentation by Dr. Singh provided an insight into the BIMSTEC as a regional institution which aims to enhance regional trade\, increase investment and development. This connectivity project has the potential to promote regional growth and could be a crucial maritime institution for the region.\nGeo-economics is the key variable in shaping the geopolitical situation in the Bay of Bengal region and BIMSTEC has emerged as an alternative to SAARC. But the weakness of the institutional framework and delays in the implementation of the policies have been hurdles in developing connectivity projects in the region.\nMistrust among the participating nations\, territorial disputes\, and China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” have also been the major challenges for the success of the BIMSTEC as a regional organisation.\nThere is a need to undertake reform measures to deepen cooperation among the member states of the BIMSTEC and promote regional integration. Sustainable peace is embedded in the creation of more economic opportunities.\n\nQ&A Session\nDuring the Q&A session\, participants raised a range of queries related to the perspectives presented by the presenters. Question was raised to the entire panel regarding the relevance of SAARC as a regional organisation in the midst of other regional institutions like BIMSTEC\, IORA and CSC. Prof. Sanjay Chaturvedi was asked about the purpose of India launching the MAHASAGAR initiative when New Delhi was already a part of the IORA. Also he was inquired as to how the landlocked states like Nepal and Afghanistan can become part of the MAHASAGAR initiative. Vice Admiral SN Ghormade was asked about the interoperability issue between the members of the CSC. A question was raised to Ms. Bineswaree Aruna Bolaky on the seriousness of the African countries in the success of the AfCFTA. Dr. Athaulla Ahmed Rasheed was asked a question on the issue of the Chagos Archipelago. \nKey Takeaways\n\nThe papers presented in this session highlighted the significance of the regional institutions in developing cooperation and promote sustainable development in the Indian Ocean region.\nThe papers also called for the need to link various regional institutions for enhancing trade\, peace and security\, developing infrastructure facilities and counter newly emerging threats and challenges.\nThe papers highlighted the role of the smaller states in the regional development and in the emerging geopolitical situation in the Indian Ocean region.\nThe newly emerging non-traditional threats such as climate change\, radicalisation\, terrorism\, natural disasters have also increased the need for more cooperation among the nations in the Indian Ocean region.\n\nThis report was prepared by Dr Ranjit Kumar Dhawan\, Associate Fellow in the East Asia Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA).
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/session-vi-strengthening-regional-institutions-16th-south-asia-conference-2026
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260225T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260225T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260227T064855Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260227T064946Z
UID:95868-1772006400-1772038800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Fifth Session: Navigating Geopolitical dynamic in the extended region | 16th SOUTH ASIA CONFERENCE 2026
DESCRIPTION:Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, chaired the session. Setting the tone of the session\, Amb. Chinoy in his opening remarks outlined a complex geopolitical landscape defined by “8 Ts”: trade\, technology\, terrorism\, territorial disputes\, transparency\, tenets\, trust\, and the influence of the Trump administration. He argued that while technology has “imploded” traditional geographic barriers\, it has also become a tool for containment and export controls\, particularly in the realm of Artificial Intelligence. The DG highlighted India’s leadership in advocating for “AI diffusion” to prevent a new form of “colonisation” of the Global South. On the security front\, he observed a shift towards deterrence through strength\, with the US seeking to limit China to the “first island chain” and a permanently altered status quo in the South China Sea due to militarisation. Regionally\, the DG noted a fractured ASEAN and significant friction between Pakistan and Afghanistan\, while positioning India as a “first responder” committed to the stability of maritime neighbours like Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Ultimately\, he maintained that in these “parlous and uncertain times\,” shared values and principles are becoming as important as geography in defining modern neighbourhoods. which are shaping the present geopolitics today. \nThe objective of the fifth session was to comprehend geopolitics in an around Indian Ocean region\, where five different speakers shared their thoughts. \nDr. Jabin Jacob\, Associate Professor\, Shiv Nadar University\, shared his thoughts on “Sagar to Mahasagar:  China in the way” by emphasising that China assertive foreign policy is driven mainly by the Communist Party for political survival. It discussed China’s cultural and educational investments around the world including language training and archaeological projects and its influence on political parties and governance practices in several countries. \n\nOn the concept of party-state\, he underscored that the communist party of China’s sole aim is survival. He outlined that for any country\, the standard concerns are: sovereignty and economic growth. But for China\, it is about political control\, where the Chinese government puts a lot of its effort to control its citizens\, expatriates and diaspora through political training and cultural hegemony.\nOn Chinese media and cultural hegemony\, Prof Jacob highlighted the extensive outreach of the Chinses media and publications in multiple languages and the Chinese government’s control over media content to ensure a sanitised portrayal of China outside.\nOn China’s interaction with political parties in other states\, Dr. Jacob underlined that the CCP has a dedicated department to deal with political parties in other countries.\nOn cultural and historical efforts\, China has made extensive investments in language training and cultural promotions in various countries and involved in archaeological projects and rewriting of history in South Asia.\nOn China’s global South rhetoric\, he said that although China supports the global south in multilateral forums\, there is discrepancy between what China states publicly and how it behaves in international organisations. Hence\, to understand Chinese influence and intentions better\, one needs to critically analyse China claims and actions.\n\nProf. Shahab Enam Khan\, spoke on “Beyond hedging and balancing: Bangladesh geo-economic statecraft in an era of transactional multiporlarity” where he argued that Bangladesh’s evolving foreign policy is a necessary structural adaptation to a transforming international and regional order\, driven by “economic necessity” and “regional institutional failure”\, rather than its strategic ambition or ideological choice. He posited that Bangladesh was moving towards ‘strategic autonomy’ through transactional relations in a post-liberal\, transactional multipolar environment. \n\nOn the shifting global and regional landscape\, Prof. Khan underlined the key drivers are: US\, China\, EU\, pursuit of strategic autonomy and the erosion of multilateral institutions like the WTO\, IMF\, World Bank and the rise of AIIB.\nSeveral reasons underpinned the reason for the Bangladesh to pursue transregional partnerships. The major factors include paralysis of SAARC\, underperformance of BIMSTC\, persistent Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) and geographical constraints. Hence\, due to institutional failure\, it necessitates Bangladesh to pursuit transregional partnerships e.g.\, RCEP\, BRICS\, QUAD\, and Africa.\nProf Khan also underscored the factors that Bangladesh economic growth can no longer insulated from security consideration. The three major factors are instability in India’s Northeast\, which is compounded by anti-Bangladesh narratives; Myanmar’s prolonged civil conflict and global geo-economics transformation which is mainly fuelled by unilateral imposition of tariffs by the United States.\nOn the implication of July Movement 2024\, Prof Khan termed it as a ‘watershed’ moment\, which ended the fifteen years of authoritarian governance and consequently altered Bangladesh’s political consciousness\, fostering a new national narrative centred on strategic autonomy and sovereign decision-making. However\, this shift has implication for bilateral relations\, especially with India\, Pakistan and Myanmar.\nThus\, Bangladesh’s foreign policy recalibration\, according to Prof. Khan\, is a rational structural adaptation to a post-liberal\, transactional multipolar order. Its “development-first” orientation now requires navigating a geo-economic landscape where security and economics are intrinsically intertwined. In fact\, the July Movement has reinforced popular demand for sovereign decision-making\, ensuring that future relations with all neighbours will be transactional and interest-based\, seeking mutual benefit rather than ideological alignment.\n\nDr. Juvence F. Ramsay\, Senior Lecturer\, the University of Toamasina in Madagascar\, shared his thoughts on Madagascar’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean. \n\nOn Madagascar’s diplomatic strategy and regional involvement\, Dr. Ramsay highlighted the conduct of its military and diplomatic strategies since 1970s. The ‘Fiavan’ Principle is an important feature for Madagascar policy which promotes solidarity unity and peace\, similar to Indian concept of ‘Vasudeva kutumbakam.\nHe also stated that Madagascar maintained a balanced relationship with regional and extra-regional partners like France\, US\, China and Russia\, in different areas of cooperation such as agriculture\, education\, culture energy and security.\nOn challenges and opportunities in Indian Ocean region\, he highlighted the importance of deep-sea bed resources and mining where multiple actors are involved. The impact of deep sea\, however\, cannot be ignored with potential risks to fish and other aquatic species.\nOn future prospects\, Dr. Ramsay underscored that Madagascar’s geopolitical balancing act is crucial for its energy security and development.\n\nMr. Muhammad Waffa Kharisma\, Centre for Strategic and international Studies\, Indonesia\, shared his thoughts on diversification of cooperation with reference to India and ASEAN relations in Indo-Pacific\, where he underlined that the Indo-Pacific is experiencing growing great power rivalry\, leading to fragmentation\, overlapping partnerships\, and challenges to the strategic autonomy of medium and smaller powers like ASEAN member states. In the backdrop of fragmentation in Indo-Pacific\, Mr. Kharisma argued the needs of strategic diversification to achieve strategic autonomy\, which involves widening strategic options and reducing over-dependence on any single power. \n\nOn ASEAN–India cooperation\, India’s engagement with ASEAN is characterised by a preference for functional\, issue-based cooperation over deep institutional embedding\, distinguishing it from partners like Japan\, the Republic of Korea\, and Australia\, who invest heavily in ASEAN’s institutional mechanisms.\nOn the potential areas of functional cooperation\, the key areas includes defence modernisation; maritime security; industrial diversification and energy transition in solar energy\, biofuels\, small modular reactors\, and critical minerals; Digital Public Infrastructure and Cybersecurity and Healthcare and Clinical Research Capacity.\nWhile cementing cooperation\, however\, he was cautious that relying too much on functionalism risks shallow cooperation and a fragmented regional architecture if it is not part of a clearer\, coherent ASEAN-wide strategy for managing external partnerships. Finally\, he said that ASEAN-India relations will be properly situated within their diversification strategy\, it can play a meaningful role in sustaining ASEAN’s strategic autonomy amid growing uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific.\n\nMr. Amara Thiha\, Non-resident Fellow\, China Program\, Stimson Center\, spoke on Myanmar’s coastal frontier and Indian Ocean security\, where profound strategic transformation in Myanmar’s civil war since the February 2021 military coup\, has shifted its center of gravity from traditional highland insurgency zones to the strategically significant coastal regions\, particularly Rakhine State and the Tanintharyi Region. \n\nFollowing the consolidation of power in Rankine state\, the Arakan Army (AA) have established a proto-state\, and by early 2026\, it controls 14 of Rakhine’s 17 townships and much of its coastline. Thus\, in the backdrop strategic transformation\, several seaports have become sites for geopolitical competition:\n\n(1). Sittwe: India’s Kaladana Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project gateway\, is now encircled by the AA\, creating a dilemma for New Delhi that balances its formal recognition of the junta with operational realities of AA control. \n(2). Kyaukphyu: China’s maritime gateway for the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)\, vital for energy security. The AA controls surrounding territory but refrains from direct capture\, while China has leveraged Myanmar’s Private Security Services Law (PSSL) 4/2025 to deploy armed foreign (Chinese) private security firms\, blurring lines of sovereignty. \n(3). Dawei: Russia’s emergent strategic anchor in the Andaman Sea\, supported by growing military cooperation\, arms transfers\, and joint naval exercises (Marumex-2025) aimed at establishing a sustained maritime presence\, despite persistent local insurgency. \n\nErosion of governance has enabled a rapid expansion of illicit maritime-centered economies. He talked about Methamphetamine ‘Golden Seaway’\, and said Myanmar was the global center of synthetic drug production\, with increasing reliance on maritime routes through the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea to reach markets in Asia and beyond\, driven by sheer volume and weak maritime enforcement. It has also given rise to cyber-scam\, where Industrial-scale cyber fraud operations (investment\, cryptocurrency scams) have been thrive in remote coastal areas\, protected by junta-aligned militias\, relying on trafficked labour and generating billions annually while posing severe humanitarian risks.\nOn the broader implication from such transformation of strategic shift\, he said it has fuelled humanitarian crisis\, where millions have been displaced and are in need of assistance\, exacerbated by natural disasters\, with aid access severely constrained by conflict and fragmented authority. It demands new approaches from regional and international policymakers (India\, China\, and ASEAN).\n\nQ&A session:\n\nOn China’s debt-trap\, its Global Initiatives and emphasis on people-to-people relations\, it was stated that on the issue of debt-trap and global initiatives\, maintaining accountability was vital. On the other hand\, legitimate interaction between people to people was essential to understand each other and this would contribute to cultural and economic development.\nOn India-Japan cooperation in ASEAN countries\, the potential area to enter cooperation includes oil and gas exploration and critical minerals.\nOn potential security cooperation in and around South East Asian Region\, cooperation on sea cable hold promise due to the increasing risk of state-sponsored attacks.\n\nTake away Points   \n\nChina’s foreign policy has been shaped by the ‘survival’ needs of the Chinese Communist Party.\nBangladesh’s evolving foreign policy is a necessary structural adaptation to a transforming international and regional order\, driven by “economic necessity” and “regional institutional failure”\, rather than strategic ambition or ideological choice.\nMadagascar’s geopolitical balancing act based on the principle of ‘Fiavan’ which promotes solidarity unity and peace is crucial for its strategic energy and development in the Indian Ocean region.\nConsolidation of power by the Arakan Army in the Rankine state of Myanmar has only fuelled geopolitical competition around the seaports in the Indian Ocean region.\n\nPrepared by: Dr. Opangmeren Jamir
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fifth-session-navigating-geopolitical-dynamic-in-the-extended-region
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260225T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260225T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260225T101842Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260227T065000Z
UID:95835-1772006400-1772038800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Session III: Reconnecting History: Cultural Diplomacy in South Asia | 16th SOUTH ASIA CONFERENCE 2026
DESCRIPTION:Chair  \nAmb. Veena Sikri\, Former High Commissioner of India to Bangladesh \n\nIn the opening remarks the Chair emphasised on the importance of remembering shared historical narratives in South Asia\, akin to the collaborative efforts seen in Europe\, specifically between France and Germany post-World War II. This cooperation led to a common historical project to reconcile their past.\nSouth Asia’s rich civilizational history is often underrepresented in Western literature\, noting that significant archaeological findings extend back to 9000 BC rather than the commonly cited 3000 BC.\nNeed for historian to engage in cultural diplomacy in order to build a collective understanding on South Asia’s rich and diverse antiquity.\n\nSpeakers \nAmb. K. Nandini Singla\, Director General\, Indian Council for Cultural Relations \n– “Cultural Diplomacy in India’s Foreign Policy” \n\nThe concept of MAHASAGAR as a modern geopolitical idea is rooted in the historical and cultural connections between India and states in its extended neighbourhood over 2\,000 years. The Indian Ocean historically facilitated the exchange of not only goods but also ideas\, language\, and culture. MAHASAGAR symbolises a return to a time of inclusive cooperation that contributed to regional prosperity.\nIndia’s cultural influence is significant with its values\, deeply rooted in its civilization\, promote ideals like interconnectedness and environmental stewardship which resonates globally. India’s cultural diplomacy includes sending artists abroad and hosting international talent while promoting Indian values through education and cultural exchange programs.\nWith a long-standing democratic tradition\, India values pluralism and strategic autonomy\, maintaining good relations across the global landscape. India’s message of interconnectedness\, derived from the concept of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam\, based on the belief that all entities are interconnected. This interconnectedness helps in fostering values important for global discourse\, such as democracy and human rights\, which are deeply rooted in India’s 5000-year-old civilization.\nNandini said that the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) plays a significant role in promoting cultural ties through various programmes. ICCR further supports this outreach by providing scholarships to foreign students and fostering interest in Indian culture worldwide.\n\nDr. Sandagomi Coperahewa\, Professor & Head\, Dept. of Sinhala\, University of Colombo  \n“Beyond Political Boundaries: Tagore’s Vision of India–Sri Lanka Cultural Dialogue” \n\nCultural relations between India and Sri Lanka have a long history\, with significant influence from Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore in the 20th century. His travels to Sri Lanka in 1922\, 1928\, and 1934 exemplified his commitment to cultural diplomacy\, fostering exchanges based on shared civilizational values.\nTagore’s visits underscore Sri Lanka’s role as a vital link in his intellectual journey\, fostering friendships and shared values. Tagore’s optimism for cooperation and his engagement with Sri Lankan scholars reinforced a shared cultural consciousness\, viewing both nations as partners in a common heritage.\nTranslation has been a key tool in Tagore’s cultural diplomacy in Sri Lanka\, facilitating the spread of his ideas through Sinhala translations of various literary forms. This ongoing translation effort democratizes literary exchange and serves as a lasting source of soft power.\nTagore’s exchanges with local scholars and artists helped create a shared humanistic vision grounded in Asian cultural values.\n\nDr. Niloy Ranjan Biswas\, Professor\, Dept. of International Relations\, Dhaka University \n “Reconnecting History: Cultural Diplomacy\, MAHASAGAR\, and the Global South Reimagined from South Asia” \n\nSouth Asia is historically interconnected yet it remains strategically fragmented. The Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea have long served as cultural channels that linked the subcontinent with Southeast Asia\, East Africa\, and the Middle East\, fostering shared traditions and cosmopolitan cultures. However\, post-colonial nationalism and hardened borders have prioritized rivalry over connectivity.\nThe interplay of culture\, diplomacy\, and regional order challenges the traditional emphasis on military strength and state-centric views within international relations. Increasingly\, cross-disciplinary research acknowledges culture as a crucial element in fostering cooperative frameworks. This is particularly relevant for South Asia\, where diverse civilizational influences have historically intersected.\nAlthough informal cultural connections thrived within diaspora communities\, they often lacked of admission by the state. In this context\, cultural diplomacy has emerged as a significant analytical and policy framework aimed at fostering trust and shared norms through cultural engagement\, as opposed to merely enhancing external state image. This approach is particularly relevant for South Asia\, where culture plays a critical role in shaping collective memory and interstate relations.\nThe strategic initiative MAHASAGAR embodies a major shift\, promoting comprehensive cooperation that includes economic and societal links\, thereby positioning cultural diplomacy as a fundamental element of regional connectivity rather than a secondary tool.\nNeed for a systematic approach to integrating culture within institutional frameworks\, to enhance collaboration and avoid bureaucratic delays. Bangladesh and South Asian nations to regard MAHASAGAR as a collaborative venture rooted in shared maritime history\, positioning Bangladesh as a pivotal state in promoting ecological and cultural links in the region.\n\nDr. Gaurav Bhattarai\, Assistant Professor\, Dept. of International Relations\, Tribhuvan University \n“From Himalaya to MAHASAGAR: Making Sense of Nepal’s Cultural Ties with India through Transit Access\, and Open Borders” \n\nNepal can only connect to the seas through India\, being landlocked. It is primarily dependent on Indian ports\, and uses Indian railways and cross-border roads for trade\, making India’s maritime activities crucial for its access to international markets.\nThe Indian Ocean holds a unique significance\, during the 19th century\, Jung Bahadur\, the first Rana Prime Minister\, crossed the ocean\, breaking societal taboos and stigmas associated with crossing the sea. Post-1950\, after the end of Rana rule\, new political leaders viewed the sea as a vital connectivity and development resource.\nNepal has experienced various political regimes since 1950\, all adopting a non-alignment foreign policy\, which is also enshrined in its 2015 Constitution. This stance allows Nepal to navigate pressure during geopolitical rivalries without forming military alliances.\nIndia faces challenges in the Indo-Pacific\, including geopolitical rivalry\, security issues\, and economic factors. Nepal’s ambition to connect with global markets through India may become entangled with India’s maritime priorities which could complicate and delay negotiations regarding transit agreements.\nNepal views the Indian Ocean primarily as a source of economic and trade benefits\, rather than a basis for military alignment. Instead of aligning with maritime security structures\, Nepal prefers to frame its role around economic connectivity\, preserving strategic independence. This enables Nepal to influence regional discourse\, promoting collaborative partnerships that extend from security to civilizational and developmental agendas\n\nDr. Ashok Behuria\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA \n“Dharma Diplomacy: Reclaiming the Mandala in India’s Foreign Policy” \n\nHe focussed on India’s efforts to integrate its Buddhist heritage into foreign policy and held that the main aim has been to help foster mutual respect and understanding among nations\, leveraging teachings of compassion and non-violence.\nIndia employs a mandala model\, it contrasts with China’s more state-controlled approach in its Belt and Road Initiative. India is seeking to build soft power through Buddhist cultural exchanges and promoting a collaborative Pan-Asian identity instead of competing with China. This strategy reflects India’s commitment to utilising its cultural heritage in diplomacy and fostering grassroots goodwill throughout the region.\nIndia differentiates its approach by emphasising on compatibility of Buddhism with democracy beyond religious diplomacy. This comprehensive strategy reinforces India’s role in global cultural discourse and enhances its soft power by fostering deeper connections through spirituality and shared values.\n\nQ &A  \n\nThe rising anti-India sentiment whereby the role of cultural diplomacy could become a valuable tool. Deeper cultural integration would be important in addressing ongoing political tensions to help build trust.\nDuring the 1930s and 40s\, various Sri Lankan artists\, particularly musicians and writers\, began to incorporate Indian influences into their works\, notably through their encounters with Tagore. The poetry of this period\, reflected daily life in Sri Lanka\, infused with Tagore’s ideas\, illustrating a rich interplay between Indian and Sri Lankan artistic traditions.\n\nMajor Takeaways  \n\nIndia’s role as a civilizational partner is aimed at collective growth in the region through soft power\, leveraging cultural influences rather than military force. India’s post-independence leadership used Buddhism to establish a moral identity and position itself as a stabiliser in a shifting global landscape.\nTagore’s recognition as a prominent Indian poet and philosopher in Sri Lanka reflects the depth of this cultural engagement\, serving as a model for transcending political boundaries through dialogue and shared intellectual heritage in contemporary India-Sri Lanka relations.\nSouth Asia’s maritime history was characterised by interconnected trade and knowledge networks\, yet today’s regional dynamics are hampered by nationalism and rivalry. India’s shift from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR reflects a new strategic outlook that integrates South Asia within a Global South framework\, emphasising cultural diplomacy as essential for regional order.\nNeed for a shift from territorial to oceanic regionalism to facilitate cooperation among Global South countries\, acknowledging shared histories and ecological systems. This approach is a strategic necessity within a context of geopolitical fragmentation and ecological challenges.\nThe success of MAHASAGAR relies on reimagining South Asia’s political identity\, transforming collective memory into shared responsibility and fostering a sustainable regional order.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/session-iii-reconnecting-history-cultural-diplomacy-in-south-asia
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260224T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260224T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260224T114351Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260227T065136Z
UID:95831-1771920000-1771952400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Special Address by Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA | 16th SOUTH ASIA CONFERENCE 2026
DESCRIPTION:“SAGAR to MAHASAGAR: Strategic and Development Partnerships” \nDay One: Tuesday\, 24 February 2026 \nInaugural Session: Special Address by Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA \nIn his opening remarks\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy extended a warm welcome to the delegates and attendees. He commenced the inaugural session by recalling the themes of the two previous iterations of the South Asia Conference (SAC) held in 2023. The first conference was organised under the theme “One Earth\, One Family\, One Future” in the context of India’s Presidency of the G20\, while the second centred on “Achieving Economic Integration in South Asia.” \nHe observed that this year’s SAC is being held against the backdrop of significant transformations at both the regional and international levels. In setting the context for the deliberations\, Amb. Chinoy outlined key developments at the national level in India\, across the South Asian neighbourhood\, and at the global level. \nIndia’s Resolute Counter-Terrorism Posture. In April 2025\, Pakistan-backed terrorists carried out a deadly attack in Pahalgam\, claiming innocent lives\, including that of a Nepali national. In response\, India launched Operation Sindoor\, targeting terrorist safe havens and sending a clear message to both perpetrators and their sponsors. The operation marked a decisive shift in India’s counter-terrorism posture\, establishing a ‘New Normal’ whereby no distinction would be made between terrorists and those who support\, shelter\, or sponsor them. \nPolitical Transformations in South Asia. Since the last iteration of the SAC\, South Asia has witnessed significant political transformations. Most notably\, youth-led (“Gen Z”) movements in Bangladesh (2024) and Nepal (2025) have reshaped domestic political landscapes and signalled a generational shift in political participation. \nShifts in the Global Order. At the global level\, the world is experiencing unprecedented turbulence. The rules-based international order\, represented by the UN and its treaty-based agencies\, has been significantly weakened\, limiting its ability to address contemporary challenges such as economic recovery\, climate action\, and the resolution of protracted conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia. Major Powers are increasingly seeking to assert their influence outside the normative order\, leveraging economic and military asymmetries to gain unilateral advantages. \nUS Unilateral Economic Measures. The world is currently grappling with the effects of reciprocal\, and at times punitive\, tariffs imposed by the United States on both allies and partners. These measures have created unprecedented economic uncertainties for South Asian countries. Despite these challenges\, India has managed to safeguard its economic interests and maintain stability in the region. \nHighlighting the developments outlined above\, Amb. Chinoy noted that India has performed remarkably well despite global and regional turmoil. He emphasised that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has remained steadfast in safeguarding India’s strategic autonomy while engaging in pragmatic and patient negotiations. To substantiate this\, Amb. Chinoy pointed to India’s recent economic achievements\, including a pathbreaking trade agreement with the European Union (EU) and an interim trade deal with the United States\, alongside other free trade agreements with the United Kingdom (UK)\, Australia\, New Zealand\, Oman\, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)\, Mauritius\, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). \nAmb. Chinoy highlighted that the concept of ‘neighbourhood’ is no longer a static idea defined solely by geography. The rapid expansion of infrastructure\, connectivity\, and economic cooperation has redefined neighbourhoods\, leading to overlapping and interconnected spheres of interaction. As a result\, neighbourhoods can no longer be viewed as exclusive domains. He identified two distinct paradigms arising from this development. The first creates situations where shared neighbourhoods become contested spaces\, while the second offers opportunities to foster collaborative spaces for mutual benefit. Amb. Chinoy emphasised that efforts should focus on the latter paradigm\, promoting cooperation and collaboration rather than competition or conflict. \nLaying emphasis on the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct\, Amb. Chinoy noted that it represents a more inclusive neighbourhood than the traditional Asia-Pacific\, which was historically limited to a few countries along Asia’s eastern seaboard. He observed that rejecting the Indo-Pacific framework in favour of outdated concepts like the Asia-Pacific effectively perpetuates exclusivity for a select few.  Speaking on India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy\, Amb. Chinoy highlighted that India aims to assist regional partners by sharing its resources and capacities for the broader good\, without expecting strict reciprocity. This approach is reflected in India’s responses during crises\, including natural disasters and economic emergencies\, demonstrating a commitment to regional welfare and cooperation. \nWith his remarks establishing a contextual backdrop for the thematic deliberations of the 16th South Asia Conference\, Amb. Chinoy proceeded to highlight key aspects under the theme “SAGAR to MAHASAGAR: Strategic and Development Partnerships.” \nSAGAR to MAHASAGAR: Broadening India’s Maritime Vision. Unveiled exactly 11 years ago\, the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) framework was primarily regional\, focusing on South Asia and neighbouring states of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In contrast\, MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions)  embodies a broader vision\, extending beyond the IOR to encompass the shared aspirations of the Global South\, thereby imparting a new strategic and developmental dimension to India’s maritime and regional engagement. \nAn Inclusive Vision for Global South. By encompassing South Asia\, Southeast Asia\, and Africa\, MAHASAGAR seeks to align policies across the extended neighbourhood\, fostering economic prosperity through enhanced trade and strategic stability via cooperative security frameworks. This approach reinforces the strategic autonomy of Global South countries amid geostrategic uncertainties and advances their shared interests in multilateral forums. Importantly\, the Global South is a geopolitical rather than strictly geographic concept\, encompassing countries across Asia\, Africa\, and Latin America that collectively represent the developing world. \nA Framework for Economic Integration. On the economic front\, MAHASAGAR aims to link South Asia’s 1.9 billion-strong market with the dynamic economies of Southeast Asia and the resource-rich states of Africa\, fostering greater regional economic integration within India’s extended neighbourhood. \nPromoting Maritime Security Cooperation. Strengthening maritime cooperation and security is a core objective of MAHASAGAR. Strategically\, it enhances maritime stability through initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)\, Colombo Security Conclave (CSC)\, Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)\, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). India has further bolstered regional coordination by establishing International Fusion Centres (IFCs)\, notably the IFC-IOR in the Indian Ocean\, hosted by the Indian Navy\, to improve information-sharing and collaborative responses. \nHarnessing the Potential for Blue-Economy. Through MAHASAGAR\, India recognises the importance of leveraging ocean resources for collective regional progress. This includes tapping deep-seabed resources for critical minerals\, governed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA)\, the regulatory body established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). \nHuman-Centric Outlook to Development. Through MAHASAGAR\, India seeks to promote a human-centric approach to development\, encompassing digital public infrastructure\, climate action\, and capacity building. India’s strategy ensures that technological advances in cyber\, space\, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are harnessed for the benefit of humanity. The recently concluded AI Impact Summit\, hosted by India\, produced a declaration endorsed by 89 countries and international organisations\, reflecting a broad-based global consensus on leveraging AI for economic growth and social good. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Amb. Chinoy emphasised that expanding neighbourhoods are complex and present myriad challenges that require a stable order. He noted that achieving such an order depends on the preservation of sovereignty\, independence\, strategic autonomy\, and a balance of power rooted in Westphalian principles of statehood. He underscored that any order imposed through military force\, economic coercion\, or the weaponisation of soft power would be detrimental to both regional and global peace. \nHe highlighted that India’s approach is to address challenges collaboratively\, as equals\, resolving disputes through peaceful negotiations rather than overwhelming unilateral power. Additionally\, he stressed that regional development projects and assistance must respect the priorities and sensitivities of host nations. With these remarks\, Amb. Chinoy formally initiated the deliberations of the 16th South Asia Conference. \n********************* \nReport Prepared By Dr. R.Vignesh\, Associate Fellow\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/16th-south-asia-conference-2026-2
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260216T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260216T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T231944
CREATED:20260630T051020Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060947Z
UID:98701-1771228800-1771261200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “The Question of Greenland in Arctic Geopolitics”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Bipandeep Sharma\, Research Analyst\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, delivered a presentation on “The Question of Greenland in Arctic Geopolitics” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 16 February 2026. The meeting was moderated by Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha\, Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, participated in the discussion along with other scholars. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation examined the rapidly evolving strategic landscape of the Arctic\, with Greenland as a focal point of great power competition. It explored the evolution of Greenland as a central theatre for geopolitical maneuver involving the United States\, China\, Russia and the European Union. The presentation provided a detailed analysis of the historical\, military and economic dimensions defining great power competition in the High North. The land holds 25 out of 34 minerals classified as “critical raw materials” highlighting the resource potential which plays a crucial role in renewed interest in Greenland. The repeated acquisition attempts by United States reflect that Greenland has long been a subject of U.S. interest\, contributing to contemporary geopolitical tensions in the Arctic region. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Uttam Kumar Sinha opened the session by highlighting the significance and intersection of Geopolitics\, Geoeconomics and Geophysics in explaining the entire Arctic region. Dr. Bipandeep Sharma commenced his presentation by contextualising the history of Greenland\, underlining the strategic as well as economic importance of Greenland\, particularly to United States. He emphasised that the idea of buying or annexing Greenland is not new but can be traced back to the Report on Resources of both Iceland and Greenland compiled by US mining engineer\, Benjamin Mills Peirce in 1867. Dr. Sharma mentioned that the U.S. first proposed buying Greenland in 1867 following the purchase of Alaska. The land swap proposal in 1910 involving the Philippine Island\, suggested by U.S. to Denmark\, marks the second attempt toward acquisition of Greenland. The third development regarding Greenland occurred in 1940\, when Germany invaded Denmark\, and a subsequent breakdown in relations between Copenhagen and the Danish authorities in Greenland ensued. Fearing German invasion of Denmark as a direct threat to Greenland\, Danish authorities in Greenland in May 1940 requested American protection. Acting in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine and the Act of Habana\, the United States established a consulate in Nuuk\, sent its Coast Guard ships\, and made Greenland a de facto US protectorate. Dr. Sharma highlighted that the US made several more attempts to acquire Greenland\, particularly in 1946 through a formal offer by President Truman proposing US$ 100 million of gold. In 1955\, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to President Eisenhower to reconsider purchasing Greenland. However\, both the proposals were rejected by Denmark. \nDr. Sharma underscored the strategic importance of Greenland by discussing major facts about the country. He pointed out that as an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark\, Greenland receives a substantial budget from Denmark\, covering about two-thirds of its budget. Dr. Sharma also traced the strategic significance of Greenland in Western defense architecture. He highlighted that during the Cold War period\, United States constructed a complex network of radars and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line was established to detect any Soviet attack on the U.S. Dr. Sharma mentioned that the modern North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) capabilities reflect the advanced system of radars providing early warning systems and sense of security to the NATO alliance through strategic infrastructure. The Speaker also highlighted key aspects of the US planned ‘Golden Dome’ project and pointed out that Greenland’s Pittufik Space Base would serve as the command and control node. The Speaker also assessed the current debate regarding “GIUK Gap” (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom)\, a vital naval choke point for NATO to counter Russian submarine activity. He emphasised it as a contested maritime space where both Russia and western states compete for gaining strategic domination. \nDr. Sharma further noted the resource potential of Greenland as another driver of the renewed interest in Greenland. He highlighted Greenland’s Tanbreez and Kvanefjeld mineral deposits. Dr. Sharma pointed out that these deposits contain rare earth elements essential for the development of advanced military weapon systems such as hypersonic glide weapons which contribute in making them crucial for the U.S.\, in terms of realigning supply chains of critical minerals. Dr. Sharma argued that despite this optimism regarding Greenland’s resources\, extraction of these resources faces domestic hurdles. \nThe Speaker in the final part of his presentation discussed the claims and assertions made by President Trump regarding rival powers. Dr. Sharma further elaborated on the contemporary geopolitical tensions in the region as a result of EU’s solidarity with Denmark. He highlighted that eight westerns states in total hold over US$ 1.7 trillion in US treasuries\, most of which is held in pension funds. Clear signals of state sell-offs of these Treasury Bonds became one of the most significant factors in Trump’s reversal of his tariff decision. The Speaker concluded his presentation by presenting a hypothetical scenario of U.S. aspirations to attain sovereignty over Greenland which according to him will further complicate the geopolitics in the High North. The region is now characterised by great power rivalry with high militarisation and visible signs of doubt in the credibility of NATO as an effective alliance. \nIn his closing remarks\, Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha raised several issues\, including whether Greenland represents a return to classical geopolitics\, the resilience of existing governments and institutional mechanisms and what kind of different governments will be emerging amidst rising competition in power politics. He invited the audience to reflect on what Greenland reveal’s about the broader idea of global power distribution. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, reflected on sovereignty within a post-Westphalian framework and emphasised Greenland’s unique convergence of economic\, strategic\, and security interests. He also drew attention to anti-colonial sentiments in the Global South\, where Greenland’s territorial status is sometimes viewed through the lens of colonial legacy and the principles of self-determination under the United Nations framework. \nDr. Adil Rasheed\, Research Fellow\, asked questions regarding the provision of autonomy to Greenland by Denmark and the present status of the people of Greenland\, concerning Danish sovereignty over it. He also enquired about the political dynamics surrounding the Golden Dome. Dr. Sharma emphasised on the fact that public opinion is highly divided regarding autonomy and independence of Greenland from Denmark. On the issue of Golden Dome\, Dr. Sharma mentioned that though the US approach towards Greenland has been currently downplayed by Putin\, it remains a source of concern for Moscow. \nDr. Rajorshi Roy\, Research Fellow\, enquired about the future of the Arctic Council and Russia’s participation in the Council. Dr. Sharma replied that the Arctic Council has been suspended since 2022 following Russia’s launch of military action in Ukraine. He noted that the Council was non-functional during Russia’s Presidency of the Council. \nDr. Uttam Kumar Sinha closed the discussion by stating that the Arctic is witnessing a breakdown of “Arctic Exceptionalism” where power dictates the outcomes. Security in the Arctic presents a multilevel dynamic processes. \nReport prepared by Ms. Warisha Wasi\, Research Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-the-question-of-greenland-in-arctic-geopolitics
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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