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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260706T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260706T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T233154
CREATED:20260708T115308Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260709T034249Z
UID:99005-1783324800-1783357200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting On “Turkish Defence Exports: An Assessment”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Abhishek Yadav\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Turkish Defence Exports: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 6 July 2026. Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the meeting. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute attended the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker examined the rise of Türkiye as a major arms exporter by tracing the evolution of its defence industry from import dependence to indigenous production\, analysing its export figures and destinations\, and assessing the drivers of its success alongside its structural vulnerabilities. Dr. Yadav highlighted the implications for India arising from Türkiye’s deepening defence cooperation with Pakistan and its growing strategic footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. \nDetailed Report\nDr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, the moderator\, laid out the context by tracing the widening geography of Turkish defence exports. As per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)\, Türkiye exported defence items to 55 countries during 2016 to 2025\, up from 24 in the previous decade\, 12 during 1996 to 2005\, and only one country\, Pakistan\, during 1986 to 1995. As per Türkiye’s Secretariat of Defence Industries (SSB)\, the value of its defence and aerospace exports in 2025 stood at over US$ 10 billion\, against a turnover of about US$ 20 billion. Five Turkish companies figured in the Defense News Top 100 Defence Companies for 2025 (Aselsan\, TUSAŞ\, Roketsan\, ASFAT and MKE)\, as against two Indian companies (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Bharat Electronics Limited). Pakistan accounted for 14 per cent of Turkish defence exports over 2016-25\, as per SIPRI figures. He then invited Dr. Abhishek Yadav to present his assessment. \nDr. Abhishek Yadav structured his presentation in three sections covering the evolution of the Turkish defence industry\, its export figures and destinations\, and a critical assessment with implications for India. Citing SIPRI’s March 2026 Report\, he noted that Türkiye now ranks among the world’s top 11 arms suppliers\, its share of global arms exports having risen from 0.9 per cent during 2016 to 2020 to 1.8 per cent during 2021 to 2025\, the second-highest growth rate after Italy. He brought up the 1964 letter from US President Lyndon B. Johnson\, which stated that American-supplied equipment could not be used for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus\, and the US arms embargo after the 1974 Cyprus operation\, episodes that set in motion a sustained policy of indigenisation. \nThe Speaker described a transformation unfolding across five decades: direct procurement before 1990\, co-production during the 1990s\, partial design capability between 2000 and 2010\, full indigenous design between 2010 and 2020\, and the current decade to achieve complete localisation. The ecosystem now comprises over 4\,000 companies and more than one lakh direct employees. \nDr. Yadav attributed this growth to seven structural reforms\, including the restructuring of the procurement agency SSM into the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) under President Erdoğan\, the National Technology Initiative of 2017 linking TÜBİTAK (the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye)\, the State agency responsible for funding and conducting scientific and defence-related research\, with universities and industry\, a domestic supply chain for armour materials\, radars and rocket propellants\, and substantial investment in space and satellite technology through the Türksat and Göktürk programmes. Türkiye’s defence localisation rate rose from about 20 per cent in 2002 to 80 per cent at present\, and in 2025 alone the SSB organised 485 international activities across 94 countries. \nAccording to Dr. Yadav\, Turkish defence and aerospace exports grew from about US$ 1.95 billion in 2016 to over US$ 10 billion in 2025\, roughly doubling every two years after 2021. Pakistan is currently Türkiye’s largest arms export market with 16 per cent of the total\, followed by the UAE at 12 per cent and Ukraine at 8.4 per cent. \nDr. Yadav then turned to a region-wise breakdown of these exports. In Europe\, Ukraine has received Bayraktar TB2 drones and has MILGEM-class vessels on order. Spain signed an agreement in 2025 for Hürjet trainers; Poland became the first NATO and EU country to operate the TB2; and Romania took delivery of a Hisar-class vessel in June 2026\, Türkiye’s first warship export to a NATO and EU member state. Major customers in Africa include Algeria\, Tunisia\, Morocco\, Ethiopia and Libya. In West Asia\, the UAE has procured Turkish systems for over two decades\, Qatar has bought patrol boats and hundreds of armoured vehicles\, and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in July 2023 for Akıncı drones with technology transfer and licence production. Ankara has also given armoured vehicles as military aid to post-Assad Syria. In Southeast Asia\, Indonesia signed a contract in July 2025 for 48 fifth-generation KAAN fighters alongside earlier purchases of light tanks and drones\, Malaysia has received many infantry vehicles of Turkish design\, and the Philippines has taken attack helicopters and Cirit missiles. \nThe Speaker stated that closest to India’s concerns in South Asia\, Pakistan maintains an extensive and expanding defence relationship with Türkiye encompassing Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones\, targeting pods and MILGEM-based Babur class frigates\, two of them under licenced production at Pakistan’s shipyard. Bangladesh has received armoured personnel carriers\, guided bombs\, rocket launchers\, TB2 drones and howitzers\, and the Maldives has received armoured vehicles\, TB2 drones and a patrol boat. Türkiye thus maintains meaningful defence relationships with three of India’s neighbours. \nThe Speaker attributed Türkiye’s success against established suppliers to six factors: combat proven systems; willingness to offer technology transfer\, co-production and localisation; a pragmatic export policy with fewer end user restrictions; conformity with NATO standards; rapid delivery timelines; and flexible financing terms. Dr. Yadav then set out the vulnerabilities. Critical platforms still rely on foreign engines\, which exposes exports to licensing restrictions imposed by engine supplier nations\, while imported semiconductors\, sensors and precision electronics create supply chain risks. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions and tensions over the S-400 acquisition from Russia affect Western technology approvals\, and Turkish lira volatility raises production costs. \nDr. Yadav also noted that President Erdoğan\, during the 2023 Election\, presented the indigenous defence industry as a symbol of strategic autonomy\, national prestige and domestic political messaging. For India\, he identified three implications. First\, Türkiye’s defence cooperation with Islamabad is strengthening Pakistan’s military capability and industrial base\, a dynamic visible during Operation Sindoor in May 2025\, when Türkiye stood with Pakistan in condemning India’s military operations\, while Indian authorities found evidence of usage of Turkish Songar and YIHA drones by Pakistan. Second\, Bangladesh’s new government has signalled Ankara’s growing importance to Dhaka\, with Foreign Minister Dr. Khalilur Rahman choosing Türkiye for his first major bilateral visit in March 2026\, ahead of his April visit to India. Third\, Türkiye is combining arms exports with training\, flexible financing and industrial partnerships to expand its footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral\, where India seeks to maintain influence. \nQ&A Session\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, observed that Türkiye’s journey from procurement to co-production\, partial design and finally indigenous design mirrors India’s own aspirations\, and that much of its recent success was built on the wars of the past decade\, with the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict that brought the Bayraktar drones to prominence. Noting that Türkiye wears many hats as a member of both the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)\, he suggested studying whether this dual identity has enabled or inhibited its defence exports. Amb. Chinoy also asked the Speaker to explore how Türkiye’s flexible export policy would sit with the European Union’s Readiness 2030 agenda of integrated procurement\, supply chains and research. \nThe Director General remarked that the threat from Turkish weapons in the region should be viewed in context\, as they are no more insidious than Chinese or American ones\, since the contradiction between India and Türkiye is not a fundamental bilateral one; the deeper concern lies in Ankara’s aspirations of leadership in the Islamic world and the overall support it extends to Pakistan. Amb. Chinoy suggested that the theme of India-Türkiye cooperation should also be explored. \nOther participants also raised questions regarding the strategic dependence created by the sale of complete system of systems\, the risks and absorption limits of technology transfer to Saudi Arabia\, the public-private split in production and exports\, and the role of TÜBİTAK and state funding in research and startups. Questions were also raised regarding sanctions navigation\, Türkiye’s outreach to the Maldives\, capacity building with Bangladesh\, and Türkiye’s prioritisation of Pakistan in its defence supplies. Dr. Yadav provided comprehensive responses to all comments and questions raised during the session. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Aquib Mohd. Khan\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-turkish-defence-exports-an-assessment
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260713T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260713T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T233154
CREATED:20260730T113401Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260730T113401Z
UID:99296-1783929600-1783962000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “The 11th NPT Review Conference:  An Assessment”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Hina Pandey\, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) spoke on “The 11th NPT Review Conference: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 13 July 2026. Mr. Niranjan Oak\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the discussion\, attended by scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker  in her  assessment of the 11th Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference\, which concluded on 22 May 2026\, highlighted that the conclusion of the Review Conference  without a consensus outcome document was expected as it took  place  amidst geopolitical challenges such as  the Iranian nuclear crisis\, suspension of cooperation between the US and Russia\, withering away of nuclear norms of nuclear restraint and a growing deep divide between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) on the disarmament accountability on Article VI of the NPT. The estrangement in US-Russia relations as one of the factors contributing to the failure of the Conference was also highlighted in addition to the shifting of language in the drafts of the outcome documents. The discussion concluded with an assessment of future implications as well as key takeaways for India. \nDetailed Report\nThe moderator\, Mr. Niranjan Oak\, set the context of the discussion by putting forward relevant   questions such as the significance of the NPT\, in preventing nuclear proliferation vis-à-vis US extended deterrence nuclear guarantees and NPTs relevance for India\, as it had rejected the NPT for creating nuclear haves and have nots. \nDr. Hina Pandey argued that while India remains outside of the Treaty and thus\, cannot accept any obligations arising out of it\, stocktaking of the issues within and surrounding the Treaty remains crucial from the standpoint of nuclear diplomacy. Further she noted\, that NPT exists as a reality of the global nuclear order and has also often figured in India’s domestic debates and that while India rejects the Treaty\, its non-proliferation record is consistent with the key provisions of the Treaty. Further\, she noted that since India regularly holds disarmament dialogues and consultations with both NNWS and NWS State parties of the NPT such as Australia\, Japan\, UK\, RoK\, more recently New Zealand and Norway\, stocktaking of the NPT Review Conference and the issues dominating it thus remains important. Furthermore\, the assessment of the Review Conference in general remains important as it is the only formal multilateral platform where the NNWS and Civil societies assess the compliance of the NWS. Over the years\, the NNWS have become more vocal in demanding accountability and reporting requirements. The 11th NPT Review Conference too brought forward these concerns by the NNWS on slow pace of disarmament\, nuclear modernisation programs by the NWS contradicting the spirit of the Treaty\, lack of arms control and escalating nuclear rhetoric. \nDr. Pandey presented the assessment of the Rev Con on three parameters i.e. purpose of the Treaty\, the status of the grand bargain vis-a-vis article VI and the expectations from the Rev Con versus the reality. Article VIII of the NPT requires a Conference every five years to examine the implementation and compliance of the Treaty obligations by the State Parties. This has often translated as reaffirmation of support\, wherein the delivery of a consensus manifests as further actionable steps to advance the Treaty’s objective\, making it theoretically action oriented.  Since the NPT is a contract Treaty designed to deliver on the grand bargain\, a part of the grand bargain implies a quid pro quo wherein the NNWS have voluntary forgone the will to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for peaceful nuclear energy benefits. The Speaker observed that while NNWS have held their part of the bargain\, nuclear weapon states have avoided accountability. A point on successful outcomes of the previous Review Conferences\, for example: “Thirteen Practical Steps” – a historic consensus document that identified practical steps in the sixth NPT Review Conference (2000) was also highlighted.  In addition\, the Speaker also noted that the discussion on the 64-item action plan\, put forward in the 2010- NPT Review Conference (as a landmark\, comprehensive consensus framework) advancing specific actions on three pillars of the Grand Bargain repeatedly highlighted in this year’s Rev Con Agenda\, too remain stalled.  The run-up to the final document was marred by a significant shifting and weakening of language on disarmament\, removal of critique of nuclear arsenal modernisation\, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety principles. North Korea\, which found a mention in the previous (10th NPT Review Conference) draft final document too was removed in the final most version in 2026. The Speaker also highlighted dichotomy between negotiating and achieving disarmament as a perpetual irritant to disarmament and also pointed out the weak link between non-proliferation and disarmament as structural inadequacy. She raised a question on newer geopolitical issues as diluting the Treaty’s foundational spirit and noted that towards the next Review cycle\, that will resume in 2028 to 2031 much is left to be discussed in the absence of a final consensus outcome document. \nDr. Pandey also made a point on  a frequently overlooked reason for the failure of the Rev Con as the collapse of the US-Russia strategic stability dialogue and argued breakdown of bilateral talks by early 2022\, and the subsequent  failure to renew the New START Treaty in February 2026\, the suspended\, withdrawn agreements/treaties between the US and Russia including the previously concluded Plutonium Management and Disposition Act\,  Intermediate – Range Nuclear Forces Treaty\, and Open Skies Treaty had ended traditional management of the global nuclear order by the two countries\, also contributed to the failure of the NPT’s 11th Review Conference. On Iran\, the Speaker highlighted\, that while considerable onus was also placed on the Iranian issue in derailing the consensus\, however\, it is not this straightforward as at the most fundamental level\, the Iranian issue is tied to the unresolved ‘inalienable right to nuclear energy’ within the NPT-which the State Parties too failed to address in the recent Review Conference \nIn her concluding remarks Dr. Pandey suggested takeaways for India including – keeping a note on the continuation of the unresolved discussions of the NPT at various forums\, as most likely the civil societies would take forward these conversations in alternative forums. Recommendations for India included the continued expansion of disarmament dialogues\, consultations and conversations with other countries and to observe the P-5 discussions on multilateral arms control. \nQ & A Session\nThe Q &A session included questions on NPT being a low-cost method devised during the Cold War by the P-5 to constrain NNWS and the possibility of change of the ‘grand bargain’. The discussion further highlighted the inherent structural inadequacies and limitations of the NPT- such as addressing of only horizontal proliferation\, and limitation in addressing the supply side of proliferation. The speaker also cautioned about taking an extreme compartmentalised view of the NPT and stated that the global nuclear order heavily relies on a network of norms\, treaties\, transparency mechanisms\, and confidence-building measures tied directly to the NPT. \nOn IAEA safeguards effectiveness\, the Speaker explained inherent limits exist\, including jurisdictional boundaries\, financial constraints\, and the absolute requirement for state cooperation\, which can be sabotaged by political dynamics. On Artificial Intelligence (AI)\, the Speaker argued that the NPT may not be the appropriate forum to discuss as it leaves out countries outside of the Treaty. Addressing the comment on nuclear-sharing arrangements\, the Speaker concurred that it remains in conflict with the spirit and core principles of the NPT. \nThe Report was prepared by Ms. Nisarga G R\, Intern\, Internal Security Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-the-11th-npt-review-conference-an-assessment
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260720T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260720T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T233154
CREATED:20260812T045644Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260812T045733Z
UID:99375-1784534400-1784566800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “The Role of Artificial Intelligence in China’s Military Modernisation: Implications for India”
DESCRIPTION:Col. Nestor D’Souza\, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) spoke on “The Role of Artificial Intelligence in China’s Military Modernisation: Implications for India” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 20 July 2026. Dr M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the discussion. The meeting was attended by the Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker examined the footprint of Artificial Intelligence (AI) across the theory\, practice and means of the military modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)\, arguing that its influence is visible at every stage from the framing of Military Strategic Guidelines to the development of operational concepts\, force structuring and capability acquisition and that the relationship is iterative rather than linear. He highlighted that intelligentisation\, notwithstanding its prominence in Chinese discourse\, has not yet displaced informatisation as the Military Strategic Guideline\, and that at present it is being used to enhance informatised warfighting rather than to replace it. Tracing the concepts of systems-of-systems warfare\, multi-domain integrated joint operations\, multi-domain precision warfare and kill webs\, the Speaker assessed that full mission autonomy remains a distant prospect\, constrained as much by the Party’s reluctance to cede control as by the maturity of technology. The presentation concluded with implications for India\, including operating under persistent surveillance\, the risk of a widening and potentially generational capability gap\, and the case for indigenous and asymmetric capability development. \nDetailed Report\nDr. M.S. Prathibha\, the moderator\, set the context by situating the discussion within the intensifying technological competition between the United States and China\, noting that announcements as recent as June 2026 of investments of the order of US$ 260 billion in data-centre strategies underline that the race between the two most consequential players in the international system is firmly underway. While such investment is largely commercial in character\, its military significance is considerable. She observed that the United States continues to lead in the development of frontier AI models\, and that several debates are underway within the PLA on how AI will reshape warfare. Chinese writings\, she noted\, underscore that science and technology constitute a link that cannot be bypassed in building a world-class military\, with improvements to radar systems among the earliest concrete claims of AI-derived military benefit. Chinese discourse\, she added\, identifies three defining features of future intelligentised warfare: machines as principal combatants\, the interconnection of all things\, and algorithmic dominance. \nThe Speaker\, Col. Nestor D’Souza\, opened with two caveats. Since military modernisation is a classified subject in any country\, and particularly so in China\, the arguments advanced were largely inferential\, drawn from Chinese publications and from Western and Japanese scholarship that follows the PLA closely; the presentation therefore dealt in the realm of possibilities rather than certainties. Second\, it confined itself deliberately to the military dimension of modernisation\, setting aside the political drivers of reforms such as theaterisation\, on the premise that such decisions are taken at a level above the military leadership. The presentation was structured around the strategic bridge of ends\, ways and means. Theory\, the Speaker argued\, is drawn from a nation’s values and historical experience- a particularly significant consideration in the case of a civilisational state such as China -which shape national interests and\, in turn\, national objectives or ends. These inform national policy and strategy across the diplomatic\, informational\, military and economic instruments\, and within the military instrument produce the Military Strategic Guidelines\, which shape doctrine\, operational concepts\, the design of operations and force structures. The means follow: weapon systems\, support systems\, logistics and training. \nLocating the ends\, the Speaker noted that China’s national strategy is framed by the China Dream of great national rejuvenation and the restoration of China to what it regards as its rightful place in the comity of nations after a century of humiliation. From this flows the grand strategy of building the PLA into a world-class military by 2049\, with the tasks of protecting economic growth and territorial sovereignty and\, above all\, of being prepared to fight and win wars\, pursued under the guiding strategy of active defence\, in which the qualifier “active” carries a distinctly offensive connotation. \nTracing the evolution of the Military Strategic Guidelines from People’s War in 1949 through People’s War under Modern Conditions\, Local War under Modern Conditions and Local War under High-Technology Conditions in the 1980s\, to Informatisation in 2014\, the Speaker observed that the early emphasis on protracted guerrilla warfare became untenable as industrial and agricultural capacity improved and the requirement shifted to halting an adversary at or before the border\, with the 1980s bringing a conscious move away from a peasant-army self-image towards mechanisation. The 1991 Gulf War proved decisive\, as the PLA leadership was deeply impressed by the coalition’s use of information to link sensors and shooters into network-centric operations. Each of these stages\, he emphasised\, was defined by human analysis; intelligentisation\, which entered the discourse in the second decade of this century\, envisages machine analysis substituting for or augmenting it – less creative\, perhaps\, but more accurate\, more resilient and immune to fatigue. Crucially\, however\, intelligentisation does not yet enjoy the status of a Military Strategic Guideline. Citing the PLA scholar Li Minghai\, the Speaker summarised the logic in a single line – that the dominant means of production shapes the Military Strategic Guideline – and noted that because the field is still evolving\, informatisation continues to be the guideline in force. \nExplaining that a Military Strategic Guideline in PLA construct answers six questions\, the Speaker identified the opponent as the reigning hegemon\, the United States; the primary strategic direction as having shifted from a ground-centric to a maritime orientation; the basis of preparation as systems-of-systems warfare; the basic form of operations as Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations\, as designated in the 2020 edition of The Science of Military Strategy; the style of fighting as Multi-Domain Precision Warfare; and the strategic guiding thought as securing military advantage through information superiority. Informatisation\, he noted\, rests on three pillars – systems warfare\, integrated joint operations\, and cross-domain coordination extending beyond land\, sea\, air and space to the electromagnetic spectrum\, cyber and the cognitive domain- each of which intelligentisation seeks to enhance through autonomous hardware\, human–machine teaming and machine-speed decision support. \nTurning to systems-of-systems warfare\, the Speaker noted that discussion of information systems-based systems-of-systems operations began around 2005\, during the Hu Jintao era. Integrated joint operations had been spoken of earlier but could not be operationalised\, largely because the PLA’s older structure of general departments and military regions\, dominated by the ground forces\, made it unworkable; the reforms and theaterisation of 2015–16 created joint structures and\, with them\, the space for such concepts to succeed. The premise of systems warfare is that an integrated aggregation of systems should project greater power than the arithmetic sum of its parts\, its aim being to strike the adversary’s vulnerabilities while protecting one’s own\, and its objective being paralysis rather than annihilation – leaving the enemy’s faculties intact but preventing him from applying them coherently. The operational system comprises five principal components – firepower\, ISR\, information networks\, command and control\, and support – each disaggregating into successive layers of subsystems\, so that the military is viewed not as army\, navy and air force\, nor even by domain\, but as a set of systems defined by function. The adversary is correspondingly viewed as a target set of four kinds: information links and nodes\, whose destruction produces paralysis; the five elements of his operational system; his operational structures and organisations; and\, once these have been struck\, his operational momentum\, that is\, the speed at which he observes and decides. \nExecuting systems warfare\, the Speaker explained\, requires subordinate concepts that tell forces how to interact. Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations\, designated the basic form of operations in 2020 and formalised through a joint operations outline\, or gangyao\, issued in November 2020\, is an upgrade on the 1999 formulation\, whose structures could not effectively integrate the fruits of cyber\, space and cognitive-domain operations into warfighting. In 2021 the PLA articulated Multi-Domain Precision Warfare as its new core operational concept\, drawing on well-established Chinese structures for extracting lessons from contemporary conflicts\, in which non-contact precision warfare had become increasingly prominent. The Speaker stressed why such terminological precision matters: once a concept is specified in this manner it enters planning\, and force structuring organises itself around it\, whereas concepts that remain nebulous are not implemented. AI-enabled capabilities are envisaged to enhance the networks required for precision strike\, executed through kill webs – the practical manifestation of the entire chain of concepts. A kill web is modular\, flexible and mission-oriented; such structures do not exist in peacetime\, and it is AI and machine-based decision support that permit one to be assembled in preparation for\, or during\, an operation\, aggregating capabilities across domains at machine speed\, with hybrid intelligence determining the attachment and detachment of constituent systems as the target picture changes. \nTurning to means\, the Speaker outlined the broad heads under which PLA combat capabilities are being developed – autonomous vehicles\, autonomous weapons and intelligent munitions; ISR; command\, control and communications; decision support; sensor fusion and targeting; and information and electronic warfare\, which together constitute C5ISR&T – to which are added predictive maintenance and logistics\, simulation and training\, and cognitive domain operations\, an upgrade on the earlier Three Warfares that seeks to use algorithms to design cognitive effects. These heads\, he cautioned\, were separated only for clarity; to imagine them working in silos would defeat the very concept of systems warfare\, since an unmanned aerial vehicle is simultaneously a weapon and an ISR platform. \nSummarising his inferences\, the Speaker observed that the footprint of AI is visible at every stage of military modernisation and that the relationship is iterative\, with AI shaping concepts and concepts in turn directing AI research. At present\, intelligentisation is powering informatised warfare rather than replacing it: it is proceeding at the level of tactical equipment\, where ethical questions do not arise and fully autonomous systems are therefore envisaged\, but technology has not matured to a point where the killing of a human being can be delegated to it higher up the hierarchy. Full mission autonomy\, he assessed\, is not imminent\, since the PLA does not consider that it has achieved the requisite levels of informatisation or jointness\, its joint structures are still being consolidated\, and its operational commanders are not assessed as sufficiently competent to execute joint operations. More fundamentally\, the ceding of control runs against the grain of the Party\, which is unwilling to cede authority even to its own generals\, making the surrender of control to machines a distant prospect. Consequently\, lower-level systems are being intelligentised wherever this does not threaten the PLA’s way of functioning\, while supervisory systems are simply becoming better informatised. \nIn his concluding remarks\, the Speaker identified the implications for the Indian armed forces. India will have to operate in an environment of persistent technical and cognitive surveillance\, with data being gathered in peacetime to feed databases and algorithms that seek to predict Indian responses\, the more dangerous prospect being the sharing of such information with inimical neighbours; there is consequently considerable scope for improving efforts at information denial and deception. Any adversary that persists with domain-oriented or siloed approaches may be in for a surprise\, since systems warfare permits considerable flexibility in the application of power. The machine-versus-human contest is already a reality\, as videos of FPV drones pursuing soldiers demonstrate\, and extends beyond hardware such as robotic platforms and humanoids to decision-making itself\, where creativity may remain a human advantage but speed and resilience will favour the machine. A growing number of Indian observers assess that the qualitative and quantitative gap is widening and must be mitigated before it becomes generational. Finally\, the approach to imbibing technology into warfighting should preferably be unique and indigenous\, so that India retains the element of surprise in seeking military advantage. \nQ & A Session\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, complimented the Speaker on the choice of a subject of considerable relevance to India’s security. AI\, he observed\, is a field in which even marking time means falling behind. Roughly 85 per cent of global work in the field is attributable to the United States and about 15 per cent to the People’s Republic of China\, with the rest accounting for very little\, which raises the central question of where that leaves India. \nPointing to the World Artificial Intelligence Conference held in Shanghai from 17 to 20 July 2026\, the Director General drew attention to the establishment of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO)\, the agreement for which was signed by 29 countries on 16 July 2026\, on the eve of the Conference. This is not China’s first such initiative: the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation similarly competes with the Japan-led Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum\, of which India is a member while remaining outside the Chinese platform. The WAICO signatories are drawn from Asia\, Africa\, Europe and elsewhere\, and include Russia; no major Western state is among them\, but several countries of consequence to India in its neighbourhood\, notably Pakistan\, and in Southeast Asia\, are closely aligned with China and have joined. India\, by contrast\, is part of the US-led Pax Silica initiative on semiconductors and allied critical technologies. \nBeyond the question of funding India’s own research\, the Director General asked what India’s plugging points globally are for keeping abreast of progress elsewhere. India has been active in the AI summit process\, having hosted one summit with another hosted by France\, and has argued at the level of the Prime Minister that AI should be open and accessible\, that data should be protected\, that ethical considerations should be observed and that the interests of the Global South should be safeguarded. This position\, he noted\, is not far removed from what was articulated at the Shanghai Conference – including the striking assertion\, which drew headlines\, that man should not cede control to the machine\, an ethical formulation that bears directly on the future of lethal autonomous weapon systems. Whether this reflects an appeal to the Global South\, or a realistic Chinese assessment that others are ahead and an attempt to make a virtue of necessity\, remains an open question. What is clear is that AI governance has not yet been put together and that the contest will continue. \nTurning to implications\, the Director General noted that Indian platforms will increasingly depend on AI and on intelligentised warfare systems\, raising questions of system integrity and protection against intrusion\, from simple systems being compromised to larger ones. His central question was whether India needs to take a fresh look at whom it cooperates with\, and whether it should be plurilateral across all the emerging contending camps rather than committing to a single grouping in a fractured landscape – since no one grouping may meet all of India’s requirements in the future\, and capabilities may yet be denied. \nDr. M.S. Prathibha\, the moderator\, observed that international assessments of AI power increasingly turn on the ability to build AI models\, an area in which the United States leads on the strength of its data centres\, which explains China’s data-centre strategy and investments reported at around US$ 295 billion. She also noted that Chinese analysts regard new-energy and hypersonic weapons as principal threats to intelligentised systems\, and concluded the session by observing that Chinese thinking appears to envisage command shifting between the centre and forward troops depending on the state of battlefield awareness\, rather than a straightforward move towards centralisation or decentralisation. \nA participant raised the question of India’s own AI and digital foundations\, noting that policy focus has rested on subsidies and on encouraging research\, yet a majority of the GPU capacity available in the country belongs to foreign providers rather than Indian entities\, and argued that sovereign AI must be examined in terms of investment\, intellectual property\, and whether Indian models are built from the ground up or layered on open-source foundations. He further asked about the role of the PLA and its research institutions in China’s AI development\, the vulnerabilities that arise if Indian scholars and innovators build on Chinese models offered to the world\, and the risk of embedded components or hidden functions proliferating into government and military systems. Another participant offered three illustrations of how Chinese effort has translated into implementable capability over roughly two decades: the prominence given in the official Chinese press to the death of a PLA Colonel in a road accident in July 2023\, a graduate of the National University of Defence Technology who had studied statistics abroad before returning to work on an AI decision-support system\, now in its third iteration\, which reportedly generates draft plans\, conducts risk assessment and provides contingency options on the basis of incomplete data; a 2023 study finding that of 340 articles on military theory in a year’s output of the PLA’s official newspaper\, 132 dealt with AI\, concentrated in decision-making\, unmanned systems\, cognitive warfare and situational awareness; and displays at the Zhuhai air show in which a Chinese defence major demonstrated fused sensors tracking a target\, passing instructions to shooters and conducting post-strike damage assessment. Further interventions related to the realignment of Indian manpower and training policies for the future battlefield – a ten-minute decision cycle being of little value if reporting takes twenty minutes – the retention of technically skilled personnel in service\, a clarification on whether informatisation is primarily about disrupting an adversary’s decision-making or about sharing information within one’s own system\, and a question on how far these Chinese concepts were visible in Pakistani operations during Operation Sindoor. \nResponding\, the Speaker agreed that dependence on foreign-origin technology remains a vulnerability across critical technologies\, not AI alone\, as experience shows such dependencies are leveraged in times of conflict\, and that this can be addressed only through foundational research and capacity. On the PLA’s role in AI development\, he pointed to military-civil fusion as the germane framework\, a subject deliberately left out of the presentation as it is driven by the national leadership rather than the military; most of the technologies listed are dual-use\, sensor fusion in space using the Internet of Things and laser inter-satellite communication being presented as a means of measuring ocean temperature even as the same capability can track a ship — a framing that affords both flexibility and deniability. Recalling the AlphaGo–Lee Sedol match and the celebrated “Move 37”\, he acknowledged that machines have a demonstrable role in decision-making\, but assessed that neither the technology nor the confidence exists at present to hand decision-making over to them\, with the existential dimension weighing heavily since no one knows what artificial general or superintelligence will look like. He noted that Chinese authorities have used facial recognition and cognitive AI in social engineering applications\, and affirmed that fusing sensors and coupling them to kinetic elements is the entire principle of systems-of-systems warfare. He agreed that the widening gap must first be mitigated\, with overtaking being a much later question\, and that the human remains central\, noting that the PLA has itself revised its training curriculum to develop officers with better joint operational skills as a precursor to employing technology. Elaborating on paralysis\, he offered the analogy of the enemy as a human being whose brain is his command and control and whose spine is his network of nodes and connections: with these removed\, his limbs and organs may function perfectly well but he cannot fight back coherently. This may be achieved through hard kill\, cyber or electromagnetic means\, selective jamming\, or selective decapitation – not by killing the commander but by keeping him out of touch – the choice being determined by the operational effect sought. The ambition of systems warfare\, he concluded\, is that anyone should be able to communicate with anyone\, an infantry soldier being able to reach a satellite to call in a hypersonic missile or naval fires from a destroyer at sea\, what matters being not the chain but the effect brought to bear on the target. On Operation Sindoor the Speaker declined to comment\, noting only that commercial satellite imagery providers had made detailed imagery openly available on the internet\, an arrangement that remains deniable and cannot be firmly attributed. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Khyati Singh\, Research Analyst\, North America & Strategic Technologies Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-the-role-of-artificial-intelligence
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260727T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260727T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T233154
CREATED:20260812T042557Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260812T042557Z
UID:99373-1785139200-1785171600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Recent Political and Foreign Policy Developments in Nepal”
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting on 27 July 2026\, featuring a presentation by Ms. Sneha M.\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA on “Recent Political and Foreign Policy Developments in Nepal.” The Session was moderated by Dr. Ashish Shukla\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nUnder Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s leadership\, Nepal has undergone significant political and institutional transformation following the 2025 Gen Z movement and the March 2026 parliamentary elections. During its first four months in office\, the government has prioritised anti-corruption measures\, institutional restructuring\, administrative reforms\, and economic liberalisation as part of a broader governance reform agenda. While these initiatives reflect a strong commitment to institutional reform\, their implementation has remained uneven owing to governance bottlenecks and limited administrative capacity. Externally\, Nepal appears to be pursuing a balanced and independent foreign policy centred on developmental diplomacy; however\, intensifying strategic competition among India\, China\, and the United States has made the pursuit of strategic equilibrium increasingly complex\, particularly as Nepal prepares for its graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in November 2026. \nDetailed Discussion\nThe moderator\, Dr. Ashish Shukla situated recent developments within Nepal’s broader democratic trajectory since 2008\, observing that prolonged political instability\, institutional weaknesses\, and persistent corruption culminated in the September 2025 Gen Z movement. He described the movement as marking a generational shift in Nepal’s politics\, noting that the Rastriya Swatantra Party’s (RSP’s) electoral victory in the March 2026 parliamentary elections represented the first single-party mandate of its kind since 1959. \nHighlighting the government’s initial policy orientation\, Dr. Shukla explained that Prime Minister Balendra Shah had adopted a zero-tolerance approach to corruption\, citing the dismissal of ministers facing corruption allegations and the Prime Minister’s increasingly central role in decision-making as defining features of the new administration. He further observed that\, despite the government’s ambitious reform agenda\, implementation of its proposed 100-day action plan has remained uneven\, with a substantial number of commitments yet to be fully realised. Referring to Nepal’s external engagement\, he noted that the government has sought to maintain balanced relations with both India and China while pursuing a foreign policy guided primarily by domestic priorities and national interests. He also underlined that Balendra Shah has been making an attempt to introduce new political and governance culture in the country. \nMs. Sneha M. began her presentation by tracing Nepal’s democratic transition since 2008. She observed that recurring political instability\, institutional fragility\, entrenched political leadership\, and systemic corruption collectively generated widespread public dissatisfaction\, ultimately contributing to the Gen Z protests of September 2025. She explained that the parliamentary elections conducted on 5 March 2026 resulted in a decisive electoral mandate for the RSP\, leading to the appointment of Mr. Balendra Shah as Prime Minister. \nDiscussing the government’s domestic reform agenda\, the Ms. Sneha organised policy initiatives under three principal pillars comprising anti-corruption and accountability\, institutional and administrative reforms\, and economic reforms. She noted the high-profile arrests of former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and former Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak\, the reduction in the number of federal ministries\, the introduction of e-governance initiatives such as expansion of the Government Integrated Office Management System (GIOMS) and the Nagarik App\, However\, she noted that challenges remain. Many of those arrested have been released due to insufficient evidence\, exposing weaknesses in the government’s prosecution capacity. She observed that major reforms\, including the Civil Service Bill and proposed constitutional amendments\, are likely to face political resistance\, particularly as the RSP lacks the two-thirds majority required in both Houses of Parliament. She added that opposition from Madhesh-based parties\, which view the provincial system as essential for political representation\, inclusion\, and regional autonomy\, could further impede these reforms. \nExamining Nepal’s economic conditions\, she outlined the country’s largest-ever national budget for FY 2026–27\, highlighting its emphasis on privatisation\, urban infrastructure development and 7 per cent annual growth in GDP. She assessed that Nepal continues to function as a lower-middle-income economy with average annual GDP growth of around 4–5 per cent\, while a weak manufacturing base has sustained import dependence despite the services sector remaining the main driver of economic activity. She noted that the government has adopted an ambitious market-oriented reform agenda to attract investment and accelerate growth. However\, declining foreign direct investment\, Nepal’s grey-listing by the Financial Action Task Force and the World Bank’s growth projection of 3.9 per cent against the government’s seven per cent target underscore the gap between policy ambitions and economic realities\, making effective implementation the key challenge. \nAssessing governance performance\, she observed that the government continues to face criticism over cabinet coordination\, administrative effectiveness\, land governance disputes\, and policy implementation. She noted that the Prime Minister’s relatively low cabinet attendance\, the appointment of party-affiliated individuals to ministerial positions\, and the incomplete implementation of the government’s 100-day governance roadmap have raised concerns regarding administrative capacity and the effective translation of policy commitments into measurable outcomes. \nTurning to Nepal’s external engagement\, she noted that the RSP government has articulated a balanced and independent foreign policy centred on development diplomacy\, so far. She observed that while these principles continue to shape Nepal’s external engagement\, evolving regional strategic dynamics have increased the complexity of maintaining equilibrium among major external partners. \nDiscussing Nepal’s relations with India\, she observed that India has remained Nepal’s largest trade and investment partner despite initial frictions following the RSP government’s policy changes\, including customs duties on Indian imports and the postponement of a planned visit by India’s Foreign Secretary. She noted that subsequent diplomatic outreach\, including visits by RSP Chairman Rabi Lamichhane and Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal to India\, together with continued cooperation in the energy sector and other high-level bilateral engagements\, reflected both governments’ commitment to preserving the traditionally close bilateral relationship. \nReferring to Nepal’s relations with China\, she observed that Beijing has traditionally enjoyed closer political relations with Communist-led governments\, which initially resulted in cautious engagement with the RSP government. She explained that Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal during his mid-June 2026 visit to China reaffirmed Nepal’s commitment to the One China Principle and support for the Belt and Road Initiative\, while both sides reiterated their commitment to strengthening cooperation in infrastructure\, energy\, trade\, and investment. She further noted that although Chinese-funded infrastructure projects remain central to bilateral cooperation\, controversies surrounding projects such as the Pokhara International Airport have highlighted implementation and operational challenges amid Nepal’s evolving political landscape. She added that the visit underscored China’s interest in safeguarding its long-term strategic and economic interests in Nepal. Remarks by Foreign Minister Wang Yi reflected Beijing’s preference for prioritising relations with neighbouring countries amid evolving regional geopolitical dynamics. \nOn Nepal’s engagement with the United States\, she emphasised the increase in working-level diplomatic engagement during the early months of the RSP government. Discussions focused on the implementation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact\, investment promotion\, trade\, digital infrastructure\, and telecommunications cooperation\, including Starlink. She observed that these developments reflected Washington’s growing economic and strategic interest in Nepal\, particularly in areas extending beyond traditional development cooperation. At the same time\, she noted that Nepal has sought to engage the United States pragmatically while carefully balancing its relations with India and China\, as initiatives such as Starlink have generated geopolitical sensitivities and the relationship has yet to progress to sustained high-level political engagement. \nConcluding\, she argued that Nepal’s foreign policy has gradually evolved from diplomatic idealism towards greater pragmatism. While the traditional balancing strategy remains central to Nepal’s external engagement\, intensifying strategic competition among India\, China\, and the United States has narrowed the country’s diplomatic space. She further observed that Nepal’s scheduled graduation from Least Developed Country status in November 2026 is likely to reduce concessional financing\, preferential trade access\, and technical assistance\, thereby increasing the importance of maintaining constructive engagement with all major development partners. These developments\, she concluded\, demonstrate the growing interdependence between Nepal’s economic priorities and its foreign policy choices. \nQ&A Session\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy noted Nepal’s continuing interest in participating in Indian-led developmental initiatives. He further observed that Nepal’s appeal for UK’s involvement in the Kalapani issue does not align with India’s longstanding position that boundary disputes should be addressed exclusively through established bilateral mechanisms. \nAddressing broader regional strategic developments\, Ambassador Chinoy situated India–Nepal relations within the evolving strategic competition among India\, China\, and the United States\, observing that the United States is increasingly emerging as an important strategic factor influencing bilateral dynamics. He also highlighted persistent trust deficits and declining people-to-people engagement between the younger populations of India and Nepal\, citing the reduction in the number of Nepali students pursuing higher education in India alongside China’s expanding engagement with Nepal’s youth. Responding to these observations\, Ms. Sneha noted that although Nepal has sought to strengthen youth-led exchanges\, India’s engagement through youth-focused initiatives appears to have declined in recent years when compared to China and the US. She added\, however\, India’s cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance\, energy\, and development continues to remain robust. \nSubsequently\, MP-IDSA scholars raised questions regarding public perceptions of Prime Minister Balendra Shah\, the nature of United States engagement in Nepal\, governance constraints affecting the RSP administration\, the implications of the Nepal–China counter-terrorism exercise\, the party’s approach towards Madhesi politics\, the evolving role of traditional political parties\, and the government’s handling of India–Nepal border issues. \nResponding to the discussion\, Ms. Sneha stated that the present government has not downplayed border disputes\, noting that established bilateral mechanisms continue to provide the primary institutional framework for addressing such issues through sustained diplomatic engagement. She further observed that left-oriented political parties appear to be moving towards greater unity in preparation for the forthcoming provincial elections. With regard to Madhesi representation\, she highlighted continuing concerns regarding limited participation within state institutions\, as reflected in cabinet composition and engagement with region-specific priorities. Discussing Nepal–China counter-terrorism exercises\, she assessed that the initiative was unlikely to evolve into broader military cooperation between the two countries. \nIn conclusion\, she observed that the RSP government’s first 100 days reflect an ambitious commitment to strengthening governance\, transparency\, and institutional accountability\, although significant implementation challenges persist owing to administrative centralisation and weak interinstitutional coordination. She noted that sustained political stability and stronger coordination across government institutions will be essential for translating reform commitments into effective policy outcomes. On foreign policy\, she argued that the government’s initial emphasis on strategic autonomy has gradually evolved into a more pragmatic approach towards neighbouring states\, reflecting the enduring influence of geography\, economic interdependence\, and regional geopolitical constraints. Overall\, she concluded that while the RSP leadership may reshape the style of governance and diplomacy\, the scope for lasting policy change will continue to be determined by Nepal’s institutional capacity and broader structural realities. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Cyrus Ghosh\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-recent-political-and-foreign-policy-developments-in-nepal
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260730T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260730T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T233154
CREATED:20260812T035512Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260812T035548Z
UID:99371-1785398400-1785430800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Lt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma\, PVSM\, UYSM\, AVSM\, VSM\, PhD (Retd) discusses his book “War is a True Chameleon: Strategising for Future Wars in Indian Context”
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a discussion on Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma’s latest book\, War is a True Chameleon: Strategising for Future Wars in Indian Context (Sabre and Quill\, 2026) on 30 July 2026. The discussion brought together MP-IDSA scholars to reflect on the modernisation transformation needed within India’s Armed Forces\, capability development\, and politico-military dialogue. The discussion was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary\nThe discussion explored the evolving\, multispectral nature of modern global conflict and the necessity of strategising for future wars within the Indian context. Emphasising an administrative and capabilities-driven perspective\, the discussion highlighted that the traditional grammar of war is highly contested. With warfare now expanding to encompass non-military and non-violent domains\, the concept of victory has shifted from a zero-sum military outcome to one that is largely perceptional. Sustaining national security in this environment requires India to move beyond platform-centric approaches\, develop distinct asymmetric capabilities and ensure that military modernisation is tightly aligned with clear politico-military objectives. \nDetailed Report\nThe Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy delivered the Opening Remarks. Welcoming the Author\, Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd)\, former MP-IDSA Executive Council Member and Distinguished Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation. Amb. Chinoy highlighted Lt. Gen. Sharma’s extensive operational experience\, including his command of the Indian Army’s 14 Corps (Fire and Fury Corps)\, and noted that his role brought a vital administrative and force-modernisation perspective to the analysis of future wars. Introducing the theme\, Amb. Chinoy observed that warfare today is changing kaleidoscopically\, driven by multi-domain operations\, the increasing role of the private sector and the critical importance of narrative warfare. \nLt. Gen\, (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.) noted the increasing frequency of global conflicts\, citing ongoing crises in Ukraine\, Gaza\, the South Caucasus and tensions around Taiwan. He explained that his book seeks to challenge prevailing orthodoxies regarding how wars are fought and won. He structured his presentation around the three core themes of his book: the blurring lines between war and peace\, the evolution from old to new wars and strategic recommendations for India. \nThe author explained that the only point of agreement between his book and classical military theorist Carl von Clausewitz is the concept of war as a ‘chameleon’: an entity that constantly changes its nature. He argued that the traditional grammar of war requires expansion as modern conflicts span a full spectrum of military and non-military\, as well as violent and non-violent actions. Discussing the concept of victory\, the author noted that while traditionally viewed as a zero-sum game\, modern outcomes tell a different story. He cited Russia’s inability to achieve rapid regime change in Ukraine and the United States’ protracted challenges with Iran as examples of how traditional metrics of victory no longer apply. Today\, victory is largely perceptional and fought in the information domain. This perceptional shift explains why adversaries leverage third-party channels – such as Pakistan broadcasting via Chinese networks during Operation Sindoor – to shape narratives. \nOn Deterrence\, the author argued that the traditional concept is effectively dead\, questioning what actually deters India’s adversaries today. While conventional deterrence has gained focus in recent decades\, he pointed out its complete inadequacy in countering sub-conventional threats like terrorism. Regarding India’s developmental vision of a ‘Viksit Bharat’ (developed India) with a US$30 trillion economy\, he cautioned that these economic ambitions rest on fragile security foundations. He warned against assuming a near-term resolution of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). He noted that Pakistan is unlikely to collapse without an internal revolution and China will continue to deepen its footprint in South Asia. Given these factors\, the author questioned whether escalation control can truly be guaranteed in the region. \nTransitioning to the nature of current conflicts\, the author observed that ‘old wars’ and border conflicts – characterised by narrow frontages like the early phases of the Russia-Ukraine War – remain a persistent reality. However\, he urged a shift away from platform-centric warfare towards outcome-oriented capability development. Noting India’s budget constraints\, he  emphasised that military capabilities must be strictly tailored to politico-military objectives. Among the critical capabilities needed\, he highlighted battlefield transparency\, institutional resilience\, integrated air defence systems and asymmetric warfare. Using Iran’s extensive subterranean military infrastructure as an example of resilience\, the author pointed out a vulnerability in India’s borderlands which lack comparable underground bunkers and fuel depots. To gain a strategic advantage\, he argued that India must develop its own ‘kill webs’ and ‘asymmetric structures’. \nFocusing on strategic planning for India\, the author lamented the absence of a dedicated cognitive institution for long-term strategic thought. He recalled the erstwhile Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff\, which served as a vital bridge between political and military establishments\, noting that a disconnect often exists today between political objectives and military preparedness. Stressing the need for continuous politico-military dialogue to shape future war scenarios and fighting doctrines\, he asked whether India is currently ‘arming without aiming’. He advocated for an outcome-oriented approach to military transformation\, where modernisation plans clearly outline the specific methods required to achieve defined strategic goals. \nQ & A Session\nThe interactive session that followed witnessed an exchange of views on the boundary question\, wargaming\, the expanding nature of war\, an Indian definition of war\, asymmetric warfare\, and strategic communications. \nThe Director General\, Amb. Chinoy\, summarised the discussion by stating that while India is modernising\, it is not yet fully transforming. He echoed the need for annual transformation goals driven by constant dialogue between political and military leaderships. He agreed that subterranean warfare allows a state to conserve its capabilities\, and while it worked for Iran\, India must find its own tailored solutions. Amb. Chinoy also noted that India requires directed focus on improving its communications and satellite surveillance capabilities. \nOn the boundary question\, the author surmised that a comprehensive resolution is unlikely in the near term due to broader geopolitical factors\, though localised resolutions might be possible. Noting India’s position of strength in Doklam over the past two years\, it was suggested by Gen. Sharma that this could be an opportune time to engage China in dialogue. \nThe discussion also addressed the lack of formal politico-military wargaming mechanisms in India\, highlighting that wargaming has the potential to serve as a highly effective dialogue tool. The author debated whether structures\, technology\, or strategy should come first\, ultimately concluding that a clear strategy must lead the way. The need for a dedicated government department for grey-zone warfare and cognitive operations\, separate from the Armed Forces\, was also underlined. \nAddressing a question on whether the author’s strategic assumptions had been adequately stress-tested against historical experiences like the 1962 War or the 2020 Galwan Valley clash\, it was noted that India possesses five decades of military stress-testing. However\, questions remained regarding India’s preparedness to fight adversaries other than China or Pakistan. Amb. Chinoy noted the cardinal rule of warfare: one must never underestimate the enemy\, but rather\, consistently overestimate them to ensure adequate preparedness. \nFinally\, regarding an Indian definition of war\, the room agreed that with victory now based on perception\, strategic communication must be strengthened and wielded as a primary tool of deterrence. \nAmb. Chinoy thanked the author and the audience before concluding the session. \nThe report has been prepared by Mr. Siddhant Hira\, Research Analyst\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/lt-gen-rakesh-sharma-pvsm-uysm-avsm-vsm-phd-retd-discusses-his-book
CATEGORIES:BOOK DISCUSSION FORUM,EVENT REPORT
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