BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Asia/Kolkata
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0530
TZOFFSETTO:+0530
TZNAME:IST
DTSTART:20250101T000000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260601T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260601T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T234159
CREATED:20260709T034031Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260709T034031Z
UID:99008-1780300800-1780333200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “US-China Summit:  Key Issues and Challenges”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA\, spoke on “US-China Summit:  Key Issues and Challenges” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 01 June 2026.  The Session was moderated by Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA. The Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation aimed to analyse the US- China Summit that took place between 13 May and 14 May 2026. Contextualising the Summit by underlining the critical areas of rare earth minerals\, market access\, and trade imbalance\, Dr. Prathiibha explored the deepening US-China competition and its international ramifications through the lens of the Summit. The Speaker further expanded on the changing nature of the United States’ policy toward China\, marked by a shift away from a strategic partnership to attempts at strategic stability\, driven in part by the limited success of efforts to decouple from the Chinese market ecosystem. \nDetailed Report\nThe meeting started with Opening Remarks from the moderator\, Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey\, who underscored the importance of the Summit\, which marks President Donald Trump’s return to China after a nine-year gap. Tracing the evolution of US- China relations\, the moderator divided them into three distinct phases: ice-breaking\, competition\, and containment. Against this historical background\, multiple instances of outbreaks of trade wars and tariff imposition\, interspersed with periods of thaw and continued economic engagement\, have underlined the limitations of tariffs as instruments for correcting trade imbalances. These developments have led to the acknowledgement of the deep interdependence and complexity of contemporary global supply chains. It is in this background that the Summit emerges. The moderator pointed to a new emerging shift in the US policy toward China\, which moves away from the earlier idea of strategic partnership. Instead\, there is an acknowledgment of the existence of both competition and differences\, while there is a simultaneous attempt to establish firm boundaries. \nDr. Prathibha began by laying the background of the US-China Summit\, which\, according to the Speaker\, is taking place in a much broader context. According to the Speaker\, the Donald Trump Presidency came about with a promise of following a different China policy as compared to previous administrations\, given the belief that the old liberal order was not benefiting the US and that there would be an imposition of trade tariffs and a limitation to technological cooperation. There is also the matter of the interim trade deal and the following truce in 2020. The above back and forth can be traced to 2018\, when an investigation by US agencies took place\, which looked into Chinese dealings of forced technology transfer. \nAccording to Dr. Prathibha\, China’s response to tariff imposition was limited in the beginning\, but over time\, as more and more tariffs were imposed by the US\, China also began to increase tariffs. Retaliatory tariffs initially targeted a narrow set of commodities\, such as wine\, ethanol\, and sorghum\, but later expanded to encompass larger and more strategically important sectors. This to and fro continued throughout 2018 and 2019. It was only after the Phase One trade deal that some relief was evident\, if only for some time. Post 2020\, however\, we see a major shift in China’s negotiation strategy. Dr. Prathibha states that this was due to China’s ability to leverage its dominance in rare earth minerals. Additionally\, the COVID pandemic added much stress on the Chinese economy\, leading to an increase in technological competition with the US\, and eventually integrated it more firmly with the high-tech value chain in the international order. \nDr. Prathibha explained that it was in this complex background that the Summit took place. On the part of the US\, President Trump declared the visit to be a huge success. He stated that China had agreed to buy 200 Boeing jets\, along with additional agricultural products. China has\, in turn\, pushed for greater inclusion into advanced tech\, along with an agreement to expand cooperation in trade\, agriculture\, healthcare\, and tourism. Both nations agreed to base their relationship on strategic stability\, moving in the same direction and effectively managing differences. It was acknowledged that Taiwan presents a challenge in this regard and has the potential to rupture the tentative relationship between the US and China\, with the Speaker further noting that the Summit underlines the incompatibility of the Taiwan issue with ideas of strategic stability. \nAccording to Dr. Pratibha\, this Summit also displays the broader technological competition/cooperation between the US and China\, as seen by the US and China meeting on Artificial Intelligence (AI) on the sidelines of the Summit. It showcased China’s desire for further and greater cooperation on AI with the US\, but also the US’s apprehension regarding cooperation that could lead to less control over chips and manufacturing. In this regard\, the US has already imposed trade restrictions on certain Chinese tech companies\, such as Nvidia.  Thus\, China wishes to ensure its economic and technological development is not derailed\, while the US desires continued access to Chinese critical minerals but remains wary of China’s growing technological dominance. Trade talks\, according to the Speaker\, reflect a pause in great-power competition\, allowing the US to build its manufacturing strategy while enabling China to continue developing its technological capabilities. This pause also reflects a growing realisation in the US that while competition between the two exists\, the presence of US companies in China is highly beneficial\, as their success in the Chinese market helps sustain innovation and technological development at home. \nWhile concluding\, Dr. Prathibha highlighted that while China has largely managed to withstand US pressure through diversification strategies\, these efforts have not been without costs\, particularly in the form of capital outflows. Moreover\, China continues to depend on access to US markets and technology firms\, while trade imbalances underscore the continued dependence of the US on Chinese supply chains. Despite the interdependence of the two economies\, the Summit should not be interpreted as a thaw in bilateral relations. Previous episodes of detente\, including the Phase One trade deal\, were accompanied by continued tariff disputes. The long-term significance of the Summit will depend largely on whether the US relaxes its export-control measures and\, more broadly\, on the extent to which both sides implement the commitments made. Given the unpredictability that now characterises US policy under President Trump\, the durability of these agreements remains uncertain. \nComments and Questions\nFollowing the presentation\, scholars posed a multitude of questions. One scholar inquired about China’s growing confidence\, questioning the sources of this confidence and its potential implications for the future trajectory of US–China relations. In response\, the Speaker pinned this confidence\, in part\, to the confidence displayed by President Xi Jinping with regard to the Chinese economy. By 2015\, China had already prepared a blueprint on how to leapfrog forward in terms of technology\, with structural reforms already taking place. While this plan was not altogether successful\, over a span of a decade\, it has allowed China substantial growth\, which in turn has allowed it to challenge the US. \nAnother scholar asked how ongoing geopolitical developments are being perceived by the United States and China. According to the Speaker\, the position of the US and its support of Israel in West Asia can be seen\, in part\, as opposition to China. On the other hand\, for China\, the War in West Asia is seen as an attempt to interfere in global energy chains. It is due to this that the Gulf region has transformed into a delicate balancing act for China. Thus\, while Iran remains an important ally\, Gulf nations take priority\, given China’s attempts to secure its energy supply. \nAnother question inquired about the tech entourage that arrived in China along with Donald Trump. It was followed up with a question about the possibility of Chinese weaponry being deployed in Iran. In response\, Dr. Prathibha remarked that the presence of tech founders signifies the US’s continued desire for Chinese market access. This stems mainly from the fact that American companies remain highly dependent upon Chinese joint production and the current impossibility of divesting from both the joint ecosystem and the Chinese market. With regard to the deployment of Chinese weaponry in the West Asia conflict\, the Speaker held that one cannot go beyond speculation for now. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Anveshi Bisht\, Intern\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-us-china-summit-key-issues-and-challenges
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260608T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260608T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T234159
CREATED:20260702T055333Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T052426Z
UID:98732-1780905600-1780938000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “What Does the Nordic Mean? India’s Engagement with a Distinct Political Culture”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha\, Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Security Analyses (MP IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “What does the Nordic Mean? India’s Engagement with a Distinct Political Culture” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 8 June 2026. Dr. Opangmeren Jamir\, Associate Fellow\, MP IDSA moderated the Session\, which was attended by scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary \nThe Session examined the outcomes of the Third India–Nordic Summit and assessed its implications for India’s evolving engagement with the Nordic countries. The discussion highlighted the transformation of India–Nordic relations from a dialogue-oriented framework to a more institutionalised partnership centered on trade\, technology\, innovation\, sustainability\, and strategic cooperation. The presentation underscored how recent developments\, including the India-EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA)\, the India–EU Free Trade Agreement\, and global energy transitions\, have elevated the strategic significance of the Nordic region for India. \nDetailed Report\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Dr. Opangmeren Jamir contextualised the recently concluded Third India–Nordic Summit\, situating it within the broader trajectory of India–Nordic engagement. \nDr.. Uttam Kumar Sinha\, presented a detailed analysis of India’s relations with the Nordic States and began by outlining the evolution of the India–Nordic Summit process since its inception in 2018. He noted that the Third Summit reflected a qualitative shift in the relationship\, moving beyond political dialogue towards a more structured and outcome-oriented partnership. Dr. Sinha stated that the outcomes of the Summit were shaped by major developments in the international system. Firstly\, he highlighted the significance of the India– European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA)\, both of which have provided a legally binding institutional framework for economic engagement with the countries\, including Iceland and Norway. He observed that the agreement is expected to facilitate large-scale investments\, job creation\, and long-term economic integration. \nSecondly\, Dr. Sinha highlighted the conclusion of the India–EFT  Agreement in February 2026\, which has substantially expanded India’s economic opportunities by linking India with one of the world’s largest economic spaces. Together\, the India–EU FTA and the India- EFTA (TEPA) create an integrated ecosystem connecting trade\, technology\, and investment across Europe and the Nordic region with India. \nThird\, he identified global energy uncertainty and the transition towards renewable energy as major drivers of India’s growing interest in Nordic countries. As countries seek alternatives to fossil fuel dependence\, Nordic expertise in renewable energy\, sustainability\, and green technologies has become strategically valuable. \nDr. Sinha explained that these global developments played a role in elevating the India–Nordic partnership to a new level\, and will also reflect in the creation of what has been termed as “Trusted Green Technology and Innovation Partnership.” He noted that this framework seeks to combine Nordic technological innovation with India’s scale and market potential to create resilient and sustainable solutions. \nHighlighting country-specific areas of cooperation between India and the Nordic countries\, Dr. .Sinha noted that India’s engagement with Iceland will focus primarily on geothermal energy and fisheries\, while cooperation with Norway will center on geoeconomics\, Arctic science\, and maritime navigation. Sweden is expected to emerge as an important partner in advanced manufacturing and defence technologies\, Finland in telecommunications and digital technologies\, and Denmark in cybersecurity and healthcare innovation. \nThe presentation also reflected on the broader historical evolution of India’s relations with Nordic countries\, particularly Norway. Dr. Sinha highlighted that Norway was among the earliest countries to establish relations with independent India and has a long record of developmental cooperation with India. He highlighted Norwegian technical assistance to Kerala’s fisheries sector in the early post-independence period as one of the earliest examples of technical cooperation between the two countries. \nDrawing on his academic engagements with Nordic institutions\, Dr. Sinha emphasised the importance of Track-II interactions between think tanks such as IDSA’s collaboration with Nordic think tanks –  the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)\, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)\, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPR) in strengthening India–Nordic relations. He further highlighted long-standing institutional collaborations between Indian and Nordic research organisations in areas such as peace studies\, conflict resolution\, nuclear issues\, and strategic affairs. \nA major component of the presentation focused on understanding the distinctive characteristics of Nordic societies and governance systems. Dr.. Sinha argued that India’s future engagement with the Nordic region should not be limited to trade and investment but should also involve learning from their institutional experiences. \nHe further stated that Nordic countries have developed a distinctive socio-economic model that combines market competitiveness with extensive welfare provisions. Their governance systems are characterised by strong institutions\, social trust\, transparency\, accountability\, and effective public service delivery. These features have enabled Nordic countries to maintain high levels of economic freedom while simultaneously providing universal welfare benefits\, including healthcare\, education\, childcare\, and social protection. \nHe described the Nordic economy model as a pragmatic reconciliation between market-driven economic growth and social welfare objectives. While embracing globalisation\, innovation\, and entrepreneurship\, Nordic countries have also maintained robust labour protections\, progressive taxation systems\, and strong public institutions. This balance\, he argued\, offers valuable insights for countries seeking inclusive and sustainable development. \nDr. Sinha observed that India’s rise as a major power will increasingly depend not only on economic growth but also on institutional credibility\, administrative effectiveness\, social cohesion\, and governance capacity. In this regard\, Nordic experiences in welfare delivery\, urban management\, technological modernisation\, and state capacity-building provide useful reference points for India’s future development trajectory. He also examined the Nordic self-perception in international politics. He noted that Nordic countries often view themselves as peaceful\, socially progressive\, and consensus-oriented societies that prioritise institutions over personalities. Historically\, this identity enabled them to play active roles in peace mediation\, conflict resolution\, and international diplomacy despite their relatively small size. \nDrawing upon examples from Norway’s peace initiatives and academic institutions\, Dr.. Sinha discussed the country’s long-standing engagement in peacebuilding efforts across different regions. However\, he also noted that contemporary scholarship has increasingly questioned certain assumptions regarding Nordic exceptionalism and peace mediation. This has led to greater introspection within Nordic societies about their international role. \nQ & A Session \nParticipants raised questions regarding the future trajectory of Nordic cooperation with India\, opportunities for defence collaboration\, Arctic governance\, Nordic relations with the European Union\, and the impact of contemporary challenges such as immigration and demographic change in Nordic societies. \nResponding to these questions\, Dr. Sinha emphasised that India must move beyond signing agreements and focus on effective implementation\, monitoring\, and institutional follow-through. He argued that Nordic countries place considerable emphasis on accountability\, transparency\, and measurable outcomes\, making implementation essential to build a successful partnership. \nOn India’s Arctic engagement\, Dr. Sinha highlighted India’s growing scientific and strategic interests in the Arctic region\, including climate research\, environmental monitoring\, and maritime connectivity. Referring to India’s research activities in Svalbard and its observer status in the Arctic Council\, he emphasised that India has developed substantial engagement with Arctic governance mechanisms. At the same time\, he argued that India’s Arctic interests require balanced engagement with all stakeholders\, including both Nordic countries and Russia. Given the growing geopolitical significance of the Arctic and the region’s vast resource potential\, sustained cooperation with Norway and other Nordic states will remain important for advancing India’s Arctic objectives. \nOn contemporary challenges facing Nordic societies\, Dr. Sinha observed that issues such as immigration\, demographic ageing\, social integration\, and political polarisation have increasingly become part of the Nordic political landscape. Nevertheless\, he argued that these challenges do not diminish the significance of Nordic innovations in governance\, technology\, and public administration. \nLastly\, Dr. Sinha emphasised that there remains significant potential for expanding cooperation in defence manufacturing\, advanced technologies\, energy security\, Arctic research\, and sustainable development. He concluded by underlining that Nordic experiences in institution-building\, innovation\, and governance continue to offer important lessons for India’s long-term development and strategic ambitions. \nThe Report was prepared by Mr. Himanshu Kulkarni\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-what-does-the-nordic-mean-indias-engagement-with-a-distinct-political-culture
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260615T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260615T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T234159
CREATED:20260703T113740Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T052532Z
UID:98829-1781510400-1781542800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of The Monday Morning Meeting On "President Putin’s Visit to China: An Assessment”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Rajorshi Roy\, Research Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “President Putin’s Visit to China: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 15 June 2026. Dr. Mayuri Banerjee\, Associate Fellow\, moderated the meeting. The scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker assessed the evolving Russia-China strategic partnership in the context of President Putin’s visit to Beijing in May 2026\, coinciding with the thirtieth anniversary of bilateral  \ntrategic coordination. He examined the historical trajectory of the relationship\, the economic\, defence\, and diplomatic drivers for both countries\, structural asymmetries and limitations\, and the implications for India. He argued that while significant convergence of interests exists\, a formal military alliance remains unlikely\, and the partnership is best characterised by the formula: never against each other\, but not always with each other. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Mayuri Banerjee\, the moderator\, provided the contextual backdrop to the meeting\, noting that President Putin’s two-day visit to China from 20-22 May 2026 coincided with the thirtieth anniversary of strategic coordination between Russia and China\, and was widely celebrated in the Chinese media as marking their twenty-fifth bilateral summit. She further noted that the visit \nwas interpreted as a significant diplomatic achievement for Xi Jinping as China was seen courted by both US and Russia. Against this backdrop\, she posed three questions to the Speaker: whether the relationship is evolving towards a “no-limits partnership”; how strategic trust between the two countries should be assessed; and what a closer Russia and China relationship implies for India\, particularly in the context of the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle. \nDr. Rajorshi Roy began by situating the visit within the longer arc of the Russia-China relationship\, which has traversed the full spectrum from friendship and alliance to adversarial rivalry and back to what he described as a “historic high.” He traced the key inflection points in this trajectory\, noting that it was from 1989 onwards that a deliberate effort was made to reset ties\, culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness in 2001. He identified Ukraine 1.0 in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022\, followed by the joint declaration of a “no-limits partnership”\, as the critical accelerants that deepened the relationship to its present level. He also highlighted the qualitative and quantitative improvement in the partnership over the last decade\, characterised by extensive cooperation across trade\, energy\, defence\, and diplomacy\, as well as a new pattern of interaction that has seen a growing Chinese footprint in areas traditionally considered Russia’s sphere of influence\, including Central Asia\, the Arctic\, and the Russian Far East. \nDr. Roy then outlined the drivers behind the partnership for each side. For Russia\, he argued that a strategic embrace of China has become a necessity to withstand Western geopolitical and geoeconomic pressure\, particularly in the context of sanctions. China is now Russia’s largest trade partner\, with bilateral trade having grown by fifty percent over the last four years and thirty-five percent of Russia’s exports directed towards China. He underlined the complementarity between the two economies\, Russia as an exporter of natural resources and China as an exporter of finished commodities\, while also noting the increasing use of national currencies\, with the yuan functioning as a de facto reserve currency for Russia. Energy\, he observed\, remains the backbone of the economic relationship\, with China absorbing Russian oil and gas previously destined for Europe through pipelines such as Power of Siberia and ESPO (Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean)\, with ongoing negotiations over the proposed Power of Siberia II. \nOn the defence front\, the Speaker noted the remarkable reversal in fortunes: Russia\, which has traditionally prided itself as one of the world’s leading arms manufacturers\, is now dependent on China for dual-use electronics\, commercial drones\, and microelectronic components. He also emphasised the political-diplomatic driver\, whereby China has consistently supported Russia on core concerns\, including opposition to NATO expansion\, Western interference\, and colour revolutions\, while maintaining a studied neutrality on the territorial dimensions of the Ukraine conflict. \nTurning to the drivers for China\, Dr. Roy noted that while they mirror Russia’s in broad terms\, there are important differences. On the economic front\, Russia represents a captive market for Chinese manufactured goods and provides a reliable\, discounted energy source at a time when China’s traditional energy suppliers in Venezuela and West Asia have faced instability. China also benefits from Russia’s importance as a node in the Belt and Road Initiative’s Silk Road Economic Belt connectivity project. He further pointed to the significance of bilateral trade in RMB as a step towards the internationalisation of the yuan. On the defence front\, China has sought specific areas where Russia retains competitive edge\, including missile defence and fighter jet engines\, while drawing broader strategic lessons from the Ukraine War regarding Western-imposed geopolitical and geoeconomic pressure. The Speaker noted China’s interest in a US strategically distracted in Europe rather than focused on the Indo-Pacific\, and highlighted Russia’s support for China’s maritime ambitions through joint patrols in the South China Sea\, Sea of Japan\, and Taiwan Strait. A key dimension underlined was China’s sustained investment in shifting Russian public perception\, historically negative\, through educational scholarships\, cultural outreach\, and tourist infrastructure\, particularly targeting younger Russians. \nDr. Roy then addressed the question of whether a formal military alliance is in the offing. He argued that despite the rhetoric of a “no-limits partnership\,” structural limitations persist. The relationship\, he contended\, reflects strategic compulsion on Russia’s part more than organic convergence\, and the growing asymmetry\, with Russia clearly the junior partner\, represents a remarkable historical reversal from the Mao era that makes Russia deeply uncomfortable. He identified several sources of friction: the risk of hollowing out of Russian domestic manufacturing due to dependence on Chinese goods; fears of Chinese encroachment into Central Asia\, the Arctic\, and the Russian Far East; divergences in foreign policy strategy\, including Russia’s arms exports to India and the Philippines\, and its deepening engagement with North Korea; and the persistent Russian fear of a G2 arrangement between China and the United States that would leave Russia marginalised. The Speaker also noted unresolved historical fault lines\, including Chinese territorial claims rooted in the nineteenth-century unequal treaties. Against this backdrop\, he described Russia’s approach as one of “subtle balancing”\, engaging countries that have frictions with China without overtly challenging Beijing\, and maintaining Institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of which China is not a member. The formula that best captures the relationship\, he argued\, is: never against each other\, but not always with each other. \nOn the implications for India\, the Speaker maintained that the deepening Russia-China Partnership complicates India’s strategic environment\, with Russia backing China on the Indo-Pacific and weapons exports resuming as a point of concern. He noted that a weakened Russia may find it increasingly difficult to resist Chinese pressure on issues of importance to India. Nevertheless\, Dr. Roy argued that India should continue to invest in the bilateral relationship with Russia\, as it gives Moscow strategic breathing space and provides India with leverage to prevent a Russia-China axis from acting against Indian interests. He recalled instances of Russia maintaining strategic autonomy\, including during the Taiwan crisis\, on Article 370\, and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) amidst a China-Pakistan tandem\, as evidence that Russian equities in India remain significant. The Speaker concluded by identifying four benchmarks that would shape the trajectory of the partnership: the terms on which the Ukraine War ends and whether Russia subsequently recalibrates towards the West; China’s actions in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea and Russia’s response; the outcome of Power of Siberia II negotiations as an indicator of Chinese leverage; and the question of leadership succession in Russia and whether a post-Putin leadership would seek accommodation with the West. \nQ&A Session\nParticipants raised questions on a range of issues\, including Russia’s position as the pivot in the US-Russia-China strategic triangle\, China’s negotiating leverage over the Power of Siberia II pipeline\, Russia’s tacit support for Chinese drone technology being supplied to both Russia and Ukraine\, China’s growing security footprint in Central Asia and its treaty engagements with Tajikistan and other Central Asian republics\, India’s potential to strategically cap China’s engagement in Russia\, Russia’s perception of Xi Jinping’s centennial goals and the China Dream\, and the implications of the Russia-North Korea military compact for the Russia-China relationship. Participants also raised observations on the evolution of the bilateral relationship\, the role of transboundary river agreements in achieving border stability\, and the centrality of personal ties between Putin and Xi in sustaining the partnership. The Speaker provided comprehensive responses to questions raised during the Session. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Aquib Mohd. Khan\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-president-putins-visit-to-china-an-assessment
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260622T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260622T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T234159
CREATED:20260707T094411Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T094411Z
UID:98990-1782115200-1782147600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Dr. Gulbin Sultana’s Monday Morning Presentation on "The Sri Lankan Economy: Recent Challenges"
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting on 22 June 2026\, featuring a presentation by Dr. Gulbin Sultana\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA on “The Sri Lankan Economy: Recent Challenges.” The Session was moderated by Dr. Smruti S Pattnaik\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session examined the ongoing recovery of the Sri Lankan economy following the 2022 economic crisis and the measures undertaken by the governments of President Ranil Wickremesinghe and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to facilitate this recovery. The Speaker discussed the short-term and medium-to-long-term measures employed\, along with the policy reforms that helped the economy recover from a negative GDP growth rate of -7.3 percent to a positive 5 percent between 2022 and 2025. The Speaker assessed the monetary and policy reforms implemented by the Sri Lankan Government during this period\, as well as their impact on the country’s working class. She concluded with an assessment of the impact of the West Asian conflict and Cyclone Ditwah on the country\, while providing projections for monitoring Sri Lanka’s contemporary vulnerabilities. \nDetailed Discussion\nIn her Opening Remarks\, Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik\, introduced the topic by providing a brief overview of Sri Lanka’s recovery following the economic crisis of 2022 amid the adverse effects of Cyclone Ditwah and the West Asian conflict on the economy. Referring to the country’s economic growth\, she explained how Sri Lanka exceeded the projections made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The tourism industry\, however\, continued to show a bearish trend compared to the previous year. \nDr. Gulbin Sultana began with an overview of Sri Lanka’s economic trajectory from 2022 to 2025. She highlighted the improvement in GDP growth\, which transitioned from a negative -7.3 percent to a positive 5 percent. Additionally\, she pointed to a decline in public debt\, and increase in gross official reserves to US$6.8 billion during this period. She provided the context for the 2022 economic crisis\, emphasising how government corruption and mismanagement\, alongside widespread public discontent\, ultimately led to a regime change. The newly formed administration of President Dissanayake prioritised economic stability\, restoration\, and recovery as its primary objectives. \nTo address its economic vulnerabilities\, Sri Lanka adopted a combination of policy shifts and monetary adjustments categorised into short-term measures (implemented primarily in 2022 to address immediate challenges) and medium-to-long-term strategies\, as detailed by Dr. Gulbin Sultana. Sri Lanka initially suspended debt servicing and imposed trade restrictions on the import of non-essential items. The debt moratorium discouraged multilateral organisations from aiding Sri Lanka. Consequently\, the country relied on bilateral support\, including a US$400 million currency swap facility from India and an arrangement with Iran under which US$5 million worth of Ceylon tea per month over a multi-year period was used to settle the US$251 million legacy oil debt. Sri Lanka also completed a debt restructuring that suspended repayments on official bilateral loans and restructured international sovereign bonds until 2028. \nAccording to the Speaker\, for medium-to-long-term stability\, Sri Lanka engaged with the IMF\, securing financing through its Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Programme. This engagement proved pivotal in encouraging other multilateral institutions to provide financial assistance to the country. \nDr. Sultana talked about several policy reforms that were introduced under the IMF’s EFF\, including the Public Debt Management Act and the Public Financial Management Act. Tax reforms\, such as the IMF-backed expansion of the Value Added Tax (VAT)\, were also introduced. Although the implementation of the IMF-backed VAT expansion has been postponed\, it continues to face public opposition because of its inherently regressive nature. Furthermore\, structural reforms were proposed to make State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) more cost-effective\, alongside the introduction of the Aswesuma Programme for targeted low-income communities. However\, SOE restructuring remains in its nascent stages\, and the Aswesuma Programme continues to face implementation bottlenecks and systemic corruption. These challenges are further compounded by the IMF’s expenditure ceiling\, which restricts investment in these programmes\, thereby limiting their effectiveness. \nDr. Sultana explained that the public remained largely dissatisfied with the nature of the reforms undertaken by the Government. This resentment was reflected in the Local Council Election results. The Government\, however\, remained optimistic\, with former President Wickremesinghe describing the period as one of “short-term pain for long-term gain.” The IMF and ADB nevertheless continue to identify key vulnerabilities\, including natural disasters\, susceptibility to external shocks due to import dependence\, and US tariffs on Sri Lanka. In addition\, Sri Lanka’s preferential access to the European Union (EU) market under the GSP+ scheme remains under scrutiny. Its continuation depends on compliance with 27 international conventions\, with the EU specifically requiring that counter-terrorism legislation be brought fully in line with international human rights standards. \nDr. Sultana focused on the impact of Cyclone Ditwah and the West Asian conflict on Sri Lanka. Striking Sri Lanka in late 2025\, Cyclone Ditwah triggered the island nation’s worst weather disaster in recent history. It caused over 600 deaths\, affected 2.3 million people\, and inflicted an estimated US$4.1 billion in direct physical damage. The IMF subsequently approved US$206 million in emergency financial assistance for Sri Lanka under the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) to help the country address immediate balance-of-payments and fiscal pressures resulting from the cyclone. Meanwhile\, the ongoing West Asian conflict has adversely affected the country’s tourism\, energy\, and apparel sectors. Fertiliser prices also increased\, while inflation reached 5.5 percent\, exceeding the IMF’s projection of 5 percent. \nDr. Gulbin Sultana concluded by outlining the priorities that the island nation should focus on in the coming years. Diversifying exports\, strengthening climate resilience\, and attracting greater foreign investment should remain Sri Lanka’s primary priorities. Given the country’s heavy reliance on exports and its vulnerability to adverse climatic conditions\, these measures would help mitigate current economic challenges while strengthening resilience against future shocks. Despite the end of the immediate crisis\, structural vulnerabilities persist. While economic growth has resumed\, greater emphasis must now be placed on sustaining the growth momentum. \n  \nQ&A Session\nThe discussion began with Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy’s remarks on the presentation. He emphasised India’s role in promoting the growth and development of the neighbourhood. About Sri Lanka\, he noted that India should expand investment initiatives and absorb a larger share of Sri Lankan exports. Referring to India’s multi-pronged financial and humanitarian assistance package worth over US$4 billion\, he also enquired about the conditions India places on Sri Lanka while extending such significant assistance. In response\, Dr. Gulbin Sultana explained that the US$400 million currency swap facility would be repaid to India\, while agreements in the oil and energy sectors would prove mutually beneficial for both countries. However\, she also noted that legacy issues\, Rajapaksa-era geopolitics\, and the high cost of investment have historically discouraged Indian investment in Sri Lanka. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang\, Dr. Mayuri Banerjee\, Dr. Ashish Shukla and Dr. Deepika Saraswat raised questions and made observations. They focused on Sri Lankan public perceptions of India\, the nature of current Chinese investments in Sri Lanka\, India’s defence ties with Sri Lanka\, and the limited presence of Indian private-sector investment in the country. \nDr. Gulbin Sultana noted that Sri Lankan public opinion towards India remains largely favourable\, particularly considering India’s timely nationwide economic assistance and humanitarian support since the 2022 economic crisis. She observed that China’s investment sin large infrastructure projects have declined since the crisis. However\, China’s proactive engagements in the northern province were noted by the Speaker. On defence cooperation\, she highlighted India’s investments in the maritime sector. For instance\, at the Port of Colombo\, India’s warship and submarine builder\, Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL)\, acquired a controlling 51 percent stake in Colombo Dockyard. In addition\, India continues to provide technical cooperation and capacity building to Sri Lanka. Private investment\, however\, has remained limited. Some of the Indian companies including Adani Group and the real estate firm Krrish Group have faced significant corruption and financial controversies related to their operations in the country. Indian companies continue to remain cautious because of these challenges. However\, this reluctance is not unique to Indian firms\, as the overall investment environment in Sri Lanka remains challenging. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Cyrus Ghosh\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/dr-gulbin-sultanas-monday-morning-presentation-on-the-sri-lankan-economy-recent-challenges
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260629T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260629T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T234159
CREATED:20260709T114924Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260709T115004Z
UID:99024-1782720000-1782752400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “China’s Security Capabilities in the Domain of Cognitive Warfare”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Abhishek K. Darbey\, Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, made his presentation on “China’s Security Capabilities in the Domain of Cognitive Warfare” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 June 2026. Col. Nester Derrick D’Souza\, Research Fellow at MP-IDSA\, moderated the session. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director – General\, MP-IDSA\, and Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker primarily looked at China’s security in the cognitive domain that covered themes such as the concept of cognitive security\, correlation of emerging technologies and cognitive security\, methods and mechanism of cognitive security\, significance of the cognitive security system\, China’s cognitive security system involving legislative and technological tools etc. He explained that the cognitive security system\, is a machine based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies primarily\, natural language processing\, machine learning\, and generative AI. He noted that by means of these technologies the system can automatically access\, store\, and assess the data available on cyberspace enabling the system to understand the psychological patterns of individual or group or community to manipulate them according to the attacker’s set objectives. The Speaker discussed China’s institutional framework for cognitive domain security that includes the Ministry of State Security and concerned services of the People’s Liberation Army. He elaborated on legislative tools to secure cognitive security involving agencies such as Cyberspace Administration of China and various laws and regulations. The discussion explored the challenges cognitive warfare poses for democratic societies\, and India’s preparedness against cognitive domain threats.   \nDetailed Report\nIn his introductory remarks\, the moderator observed that the character of warfare has undergone significant transformation with the rapid advancement of digital technologies. Modern conflicts are no longer confined to conventional military operations but increasingly involve competition in cyberspace\, the information domain and the cognitive sphere. He noted that cognitive warfare seeks to influence the perceptions\, beliefs\, and decision-making processes of individuals and societies\, thereby weakening an adversary’s political resolve without necessarily resorting to kinetic force. Against this backdrop\, he introduced the presentation as an examination of China’s growing capabilities in the domain of cognitive warfare and its implications for contemporary security studies. \nDr. Abhishek K. Darbey began by explaining that China conceptualises cognitive security as the protection of the cognitive space of its population against internal and external attempts to manipulate public opinion\, undermine ideological unity\, or challenge the authority of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Unlike traditional military operations that focus on physical destruction\, cognitive warfare targets human cognition by shaping narratives\, influencing perceptions\, and altering behaviour through sophisticated information operations. In China’s strategic thinking\, safeguarding public cognition has become an essential component of national security. \nDr. Darbey emphasised that AI constitutes the technological foundation of China’s cognitive security architecture. AI\, particularly machine learning\, deep learning and generative AI\, enables the collection\, processing and analysis of enormous volumes of structured and unstructured data. These technologies assist in identifying misinformation\, detecting hostile narratives\, predicting cognitive threats\, and generating tailored responses in real time. Machine learning models continuously improve through adaptive learning\, enabling the system to respond more effectively to evolving information threats. \nDr. Darbey explained that China’s AI-enabled cognitive security system performs several interconnected functions. It rapidly detects content considered harmful to national interests\, analyses patterns of information dissemination and supports automated decision-making regarding the removal or restriction of sensitive material. Human analysts work alongside AI systems\, allowing faster identification of emerging threats while ensuring oversight over critical decisions. Such integration of artificial intelligence with cybersecurity has significantly strengthened China’s ability to regulate its domestic information environment. \nThe Speaker elaborated on two principal dimensions of China’s cognitive security framework. The first concerns cyber and data security\, where AI supports threat detection\, intelligence analysis\, and protection of digital infrastructure. The second relates directly to the cognitive domain by preventing manipulation of public opinion\, protecting ideological stability\, and ensuring that citizens receive information consistent with state narratives. According to Dr. Darbey\, China considers security in the cognitive domain as important as the other areas of national security. \nDr. Darbey explained the Institutional mechanisms supporting China’s cognitive security strategy. Among the Institutions\, the Ministry of State Security (MoSS) is the principal agency responsible for security against cognitive domain attacks in China. Other agencies include the United Front Work Department\, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Cyberspace Force\, PLA Information Support Force\, Cyberspace Administration of China etc. The MoSS protects the public and establishment from perceived foreign ideological subversion by aggressively tracking disinformation\, algorithm manipulation\, and deep-fake attacks. The United Front Work Department\, an organ of the CPC\, is given the task to create a positive narrative and perception about the Party and China across the world by means of their long-term associations with foreign political elites\, academic institutions\, and the Chinese diaspora. \nWithin the military establishment\, the People’s Liberation Army has integrated cognitive warfare into its doctrine of “intelligentised warfare”. The PLA Cyberspace Force and the PLA Information Support Force are two specialised services of the PLA set up in 2024 for cyber and information domains warfare\, which are key components of Cognitive Warfare. Network Information System is the key system built under PLA Information Support Force to store and secure data by means of AI-based applications. \nThe Speaker noted the central role of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) in regulating China’s digital ecosystem. The CAC administers and regulates all internet platforms in China\, and its key tasks include: checking and maintaining a clean and healthy cyberspace ecosystem\, and regulating all AI algorithms and machine learning models etc. The CAC conducts ‘Operation Qinglang’\, a campaign to clear all anti-China/anti-government content from their cyberspace thereby preventing their citizens from exposure to such content. These measures\, according to the speaker\, illustrate China’s comprehensive approach to managing both technological infrastructure and public discourse. \nThe Speaker discussed the legal framework underpinning China’s cognitive security strategy. Laws such as the Cybersecurity Law\, Data Security Law\, and Personal Information Protection Law regulate data governance\, information flows\, and cybersecurity practices. Additional regulations governing generative AI services\, deep synthesis technologies\, and AI-generated content require developers to ensure that training data and AI applications remain consistent with state regulations. Together\, these legal instruments provide an institutional basis for China’s broader objective of protecting cognitive security. \nDr. Darbey observed that China’s approach combines technological capability with ideological governance. Domestically\, the State exercises extensive control over cyberspace by restricting access to undesirable information\, maintaining strict narrative management\, and promoting ideological unity. Dr. Darbey argued that China’s ability to regulate its digital environment has enabled it to respond rapidly to misinformation campaigns and minimise the influence of anti-state narratives within the country. \nDr. Darbey noted certain limitations in China’s cognitive warfare capabilities in foreign social cognition. China has been building and improving its cognitive security system to safeguard and regulate the cognition of its population against malicious disinformation and influence operations. However\, it lacks dominant platforms in digital space to influence the international population in their favour. Consequently\, Beijing continues to rely on its mass-media\, foreign missions\, United Front Work Department to carry out its influence operations in foreign lands to promote favourable narratives globally. \nIn his concluding remarks\, the Speaker highlighted that China has developed a strong security system and resilience against cognitive attacks waged on its domestic population. By controlling the flow of information\, the Government of People’s Republic of China can maintain a pro-regime perception among its domestic population. However\, it has great limitations to do so outside of China\, because it cannot control the flow of information in other countries’ cyberspaces. Nevertheless\, the country has built effective mechanisms to counter-anti-China narrative which is already propagated in foreign lands. \nQ&A Session\nThe interactive discussion focused on several conceptual\, technological\, and strategic dimensions of cognitive warfare. \nThe Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, reflected on the evolution of China’s methods of narrative control since the Mao-era. Whereas the earlier campaigns relied on political mobilisation of the masses by the Party cadres\, now with AI-based technologies these campaigns are easier\, faster and more intense. He noted that democratic societies face more complex challenges of security in balancing freedom of expression with the need to safeguard national security against hostile information operations. He emphasised that India must strengthen its technological capabilities while preserving democratic openness. \nParticipants questioned whether algorithmic censorship could reliably distinguish between legitimate criticism and threats to national security\, particularly in democratic societies where freedom of expression remains a fundamental value. Concerns were also raised regarding the ethical implications of allowing AI systems to influence decisions affecting public discourse. \nResponding to these observations\, Dr. Darbey agreed that AI has significantly enhanced the State’s capacity to regulate information compared with earlier methods of narrative control. He also acknowledged the importance of examining India’s preparedness in this domain and noted that understanding cognitive warfare requires continuous engagement with evolving digital ecosystems and social media platforms. \nOn the question of China’s lessons on cognitive domain capabilities drawn from the Russia-Ukraine War and 2026 Iran War\, Dr. Darbey emphasised that this is probably the first time in war with substantial practice of cognitive domain operations\, and not only China\, but militaries around the world are drawing lessons on cognitive domain operations from the ongoing wars. He argued that large-scale use of emerging technologies such as AI-based technologies has led to massive malicious disinformation and misinformation campaigns through digital platforms that has influenced the social cognition in shaping perceptions about the wars. \nThe discussion also examined the broader implications for India’s digital security and the importance of developing indigenous technological capabilities to enhance national resilience against cognitive domain operations. The Speaker suggested building indigenous infrastructures in digital domains such as social media platforms\, digital communication apps\, search engines\, and robust infrastructures in cyber and information domains for the future inteligentized warfare. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Pushpendra Singh\, Intern\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.  \n 
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-chinas-security-capabilities-in-the-domain-of-cognitive-warfare
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260630T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260630T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T234159
CREATED:20260730T114535Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260730T114719Z
UID:99298-1782806400-1782838800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Book Discussion on The Durian Flavour: India and ASEAN After a Decade of the Act East Policy at MP-IDSA
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a discussion on Ambassador Gurjit Singh’s latest book\, The Durian Flavour: India and ASEAN After a Decade of the Act East Policy\, Rupa Publications\, 2026 on 30 June 2026. The discussion brought together MP-IDSA scholars to reflect on the evolution of India’s engagement with Southeast Asia over the past decade under the Act East Policy and to deliberate on the emerging strategic\, economic and geopolitical dynamics shaping India-ASEAN relations. The discussion was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. Dr. Om Prakash Das\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, was the Internal Discussant. \nExecutive Summary\nThe discussion on The Durian Flavour: India and ASEAN After a Decade of the Act East Policy examined the evolution\, achievements and limitations of India’s Act East Policy\, highlighting the growing strategic importance of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific and the need to strengthen connectivity\, defence cooperation and regional partnerships. It also underscored that sustaining ASEAN centrality and advancing a rules-based\, inclusive Indo-Pacific will require deeper India-ASEAN engagement\, faster implementation of key initiatives and greater strategic convergence amidst intensifying great-power competition.  \nDetailed Report\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy gave a brief introduction about the book during his Opening Remarks and emphasised the innovative title of the book by highlighting the Durian fruit dichotomy and also focused on how the book rightly explains the transformation from India’s Look-East Policy to the Act-East Policy. \nOpening the discussion\, Ambassador Gurjit Singh provided an overview of the central arguments presented in his book. He explained that the title\, The Durian Flavour\, symbolises the complex yet rewarding nature of India’s engagement with ASEAN. Much like the tropical fruit\, whose distinctive characteristics often evoke mixed reactions\, India-ASEAN relations have evolved through phases of adaptation and eventual appreciation. He argued that while the Act East Policy has significantly expanded India’s engagement with Southeast Asia since its launch in 2014\, the relationship has reached a stage where both sides need to move beyond symbolism towards more substantive and result-oriented cooperation. \nAmbassador Singh observed that the transformation from the earlier Look East Policy to the Act East Policy reflected India’s recognition of Southeast Asia’s growing strategic importance within the wider Indo-Pacific and also gave insights into the time when he was serving as Ambassador. He noted that over the last decade\, India has broadened cooperation with ASEAN across political\, economic\, security\, connectivity\, digital\, maritime and people-to-people domains. At the same time\, he cautioned that expectations have risen on both sides\, making it necessary to assess whether existing institutional mechanisms and policy instruments are sufficient to meet the demands of a rapidly evolving regional order. \nAmb. Gurjit Singh also discussed ASEAN’s enduring centrality in the Indo-Pacific architecture. Ambassador Singh argued that despite intensifying strategic competition among major powers\, ASEAN continues to provide an indispensable platform for regional dialogue and confidence-building and that it was in 2018 when Indonesia formed the ‘ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ (AOIP).  He emphasised that India’s Indo-Pacific vision remains firmly anchored in ASEAN centrality and the principles of inclusivity\, openness and adherence to international law. However\, he suggested that maintaining ASEAN centrality would require greater unity within the organisation as well as stronger partnerships with countries such as India that support a rules-based regional order. \nReflecting on the achievements of the Act East Policy\, Ambassador Singh highlighted progress in maritime cooperation\, defence engagement\, digital connectivity\, infrastructure development and educational exchanges. He pointed to growing defence interactions\, naval exercises and capacity-building initiatives as indicators of increasing strategic convergence between India and ASEAN member states. Nevertheless\, he acknowledged that several connectivity projects have progressed more slowly than anticipated and emphasised the need to expedite their implementation to strengthen India’s economic integration with Southeast Asia. \nThe strategic implications of an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific also formed an important component of the discussion. Ambassador Singh noted that geopolitical competition has created both opportunities and challenges for India and ASEAN. While strategic competition has increased the importance of regional partnerships\, it has also complicated the diplomatic environment in which ASEAN operates. He argued that India should continue to pursue an independent and inclusive regional approach that complements ASEAN’s own efforts to preserve strategic autonomy while promoting regional stability. Amb. Singh also emphasised that it is important to keep engaging ASEAN and also focus on fostering more trilateral frameworks involving ASEAN and other like-minded countries. \nDr. Om Prakash Das\, Internal Discussant\, commended the book for providing a comprehensive assessment of India’s engagement with ASEAN during a transformative period in regional geopolitics and pointed out how Amb. Gurjit Singh has given on-the-ground experiences of his time as an Ambassador in the book. He noted that the book effectively combines diplomatic experience with strategic analysis\, making it valuable for policymakers\, scholars and students alike. Dr. Das observed that the work highlights both the achievements and limitations of the Act East Policy\, encouraging readers to critically evaluate India’s progress beyond official narratives. Dr. Das further emphasised that the book contributes to understanding the changing nature of ASEAN amid intensifying great-power competition and the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as the principal strategic theatre. \nChairing the discussion\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy appreciated Ambassador Gurjit Singh’s extensive diplomatic experience\, which lends both credibility and practical insight to the book. He observed that India’s engagement with ASEAN has acquired increasing strategic significance in light of evolving regional security dynamics and the growing salience of the Indo-Pacific. Ambassador Chinoy further underlined that India’s partnership with ASEAN extends beyond conventional diplomacy and increasingly encompasses defence cooperation\, maritime security\, resilient supply chains\, emerging technologies and sustainable development. \nThe interactive session that followed witnessed an exchange of views and questions between the author and scholars.  Questions related to ASEAN’s future role in the Indo-Pacific\, India’s connectivity initiatives\, and the potential of trilateral frameworks amidst great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific. \nThe report has been  prepared by Ms. Simran Walia\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA).
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/book-discussion-on-the-durian-flavour-india-and-asean
CATEGORIES:BOOK DISCUSSION FORUM,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR