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TZID:Asia/Kolkata
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DTSTART:20250101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260504T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260504T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235152
CREATED:20260630T043107Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051930Z
UID:98693-1777881600-1777914000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “India – South Korea Cooperation in Arms Production and Shipbuilding”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Ranjit Kumar Dhawan\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “India – South Korea Cooperation in Arms Production and Shipbuilding” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 04 May 2026.  The Session was moderated by Dr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. The scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session aimed to contextualise and analyse evolving relations between India and South Korea through the lens of defence production and shipbuilding cooperation. Both of these sectors have emerged as significant pillars of partnership between the two countries\, signalling the convergence of a growing desire for self-reliance in the field of manufacturing industry and strengthening ties in arms cooperation. Tracing the historical roots of South Korea’s defence industry and keeping in mind the shifting geopolitical landscape\, Dr. Dhawan provided a comprehensive understanding of the deepening relations between the two nations. The Session underscored how growing ventures between India and South Korea signalled not only broadening engagement but also the growing manufacturing capabilities of both countries. \nDetailed Report\nThe meeting started with Opening Remarks by the Moderator\, Dr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, who began by emphasising the timeliness of the topic on account of strengthening relations between India and South Korea\, as seen by the signing of the Joint Strategic Vision of 2026-2030 during the recent visit of the South Korean President Lee Jae Myung. She also pointed out that the convergence of India’s Act East Policy and South Korea’s New Southern Policy at the strategic level\, shows the shift from a purely economic engagement to an Indo-Pacific security partnership exemplified by the 2+2 dialogue\, defence industry agreements\, and multiple maritime collaborations. \nDr. Dhawan began by outlining the scope of the presentation and introducing the topic. According to the Speaker\, South Korea represents a “rags-to-riches story”\, especially with regard to its manufacturing industry. He credited the Chaebols (family-owned South Korean companies) such as Hyundai\, Samsung\, LG\, etc.\, and their participation in defence manufacturing as a key turning point in South Korea’s success. \nWhile highlighting the rise of South Korean “soft power” through the global popularity of K-pop and K-dramas (known as the Hallyu)\, he stressed the increasing assertion of South Korea in the sphere of “hard power”. With regard to arms manufacturing\, this has been underscored by multiple factors\, including South Korea’s emergence as the second-largest exporter of defence equipment to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries between 2021 and 2025. The Speaker also mentioned the rapid pace of arms exports from South Korea\, rising from US$ 3 billion in 2017 to US$ 17 billion in 2022\, a five-fold increase in five years. Such rapid development is not limited to arms exports alone and can be seen in the shipbuilding sphere\, with South Korea emerging as the second-largest shipbuilder in the world. This includes a multitude of vessels\, including container ships and LNG carriers. \nDelving into the historic background of South Korea’s meteoric rise to an economic power status\, the Speaker began by tracing the civil war that erupted in 1950 between North and South Korea and its escalation into an international conflict. Despite this setback\, South Korea was able to rise to the status of an “Asian Tiger Economy” in a short amount of time. This\, according to Dr. Dhawan\, was made possible due to a state-led economic development model. He further pointed to the interconnectedness of Asian economies and highlighted how this developmental and industrial model initially originated in Japan before diffusing across the region. Termed as the “Flying Geese model”\, this model allowed for the movement of industries from developed economies to developing economies through the regional division of labour. Additionally\, the rise of South Korea’s manufacturing sector hinged upon the following two factors: land reforms and the implementation of universal education. The former was a crucial factor\, especially as South Korea differed from its neighbours\, who followed a communist form of governance. In comparison\, South Korea took the route of compensated land reforms\, with the compensation to the former landlords eventually facilitating the rise of an entrepreneurial class\, which led to the industrial development in the country. Educational reforms were undertaken to build a highly disciplined and skilled workforce. \nBoth land and educational reforms played a significant role in the economic development in the 1960s under the military general (and President) Park Chung-Hee\, who implemented an export-led economic development model. Beginning with a labour-intensive and later moving to a capital-intensive industrialisation strategy\, South Korea was able to develop at a rapid pace. A major impetus was also provided by the United States’ threat to withdraw military support to South Korea\, giving a fillip to South Korea’s arms industry. The economic development that followed went hand in hand with the rise of defence industries\, a process that was helped by the participation of the Chaebols. Since then\, South Korea’s defence production has undergone rapid evolution and includes in its midst the development of the Light Combat Aircraft FA-50 Fighting Eagle\, which has been bought by several countries\, the K2 Hyundai Rotem Main Battle Tank\, LIG Nex1-missile interceptors\, Daewoo submarines\, etc. The K9 Vajra Howitzers\, produced through the transfer of technology from South Korea\, remain of particular interest to India as it has inducted 100 units into its armed forces and has recently contracted to produce 100 more units. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr. Dhawan reflected that the timing of India-South Korea collaboration seems ripe\, especially taking into account the fact that India faces a severe shortage of cargo ships\, with just 20 percent of natural gas imports carried on Indian-owned vessels. Against this backdrop\, India’s Amrit Kaal Vision 2047 aims to expand the country’s maritime fleet through investments valued at US$ 24 billion. He further emphasised South Korea’s importance within India’s Act East Policy framework. Dr. Dhawan also stressed that this partnership is far from a one-sided engagement\, as South Korea is also actively seeking deeper ties with India. He argued that cooperation need not remain limited to defence equipment alone\, and gave the examples of nuclear-powered submarines\, sixth-generation fighter aircraft\, and jet propulsion systems as future areas of collaboration. \nComments and Questions\nThe presentation was followed by Questions and Comments from the Scholars. One query pertained to the bottlenecks that may appear in the Chips-to-Ships model of the Chaebols in the future\, and why South Korea\, unlike India\, had a comparatively higher R&D investment. In an integrated response\, Dr. Dhawan underlined South Korea’s early role as an imitator of technology rather than an innovator and how an attempt to rectify this has led to South Korea’s vast investment in R&D (almost 5% of its GDP). This shift\, according to him\, is primarily due to South Korea’s unique position\, sandwiched between a technological giant\, Japan\, and a manufacturing giant\, China. South Korea also faces increasing competition from new regional and global competitors. \nAnother question related to the heavy dependence of South Korea on the United States. and how the import of American technology creates an impediment to the usage of similar technology by India\, which lacks the required level of authorisation. There were also concerns over the frequent collapse of India–South Korea defence deals\, and a question was raised about China’s response to defence collaboration between New Delhi and Seoul. The Speaker affirmed the high dependence of South Korea in terms of its engagement with the US\, but he emphasised South Korea’s push toward self-reliance. He similarly affirmed the failure of past deals between the two countries\, giving the example of the POSCO steel project in Odisha\, and defence initiatives like the Gangnam Corporation’s mine sweeper deal in Goa\, but highlighted the recent resurgence in collaborative efforts as seen by the POSCO-Jindal Steel agreements\, offering grounds for optimism. With regard to the China factor\, the Speaker maintained that reports indicate that Beijing remains wary of the expanding defence cooperation between India and South Korea. \nAnother query\, related to the recent Japan-India agreement on quantum technology sharing\, and whether South Korea would be as willing to engage in similar high-technology transfers with India. Responding to the question\, the Speaker emphasised that geo-economics cannot be separated from geopolitics. Hence\, Tokyo’s precarious geopolitical positioning has made it more open to technological transfers\, whereas South Korea remains relatively more cautious. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Anveshi Bisht\, Intern\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-india-south-korea-cooperation-in-arms-production-and-shipbuilding
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260511T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260511T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235152
CREATED:20260702T055907Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051946Z
UID:98737-1778486400-1778518800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting On “Israel–Hezbollah Conflict: The Path Ahead”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Hirak Jyoti Das\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Israel–Hezbollah Conflict: The Path Ahead” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 11 May 2026. Dr. Abhishek Yadav\, Research Analyst\, moderated the meeting. The scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation examined the changing dynamics of the Israel–Hezbollah conflict by analysing the strategic interests of Hezbollah\, Israel\, and the Lebanese Government within Lebanon’s confessional political system and the evolving geopolitical landscape in West Asia. It highlighted Hezbollah’s political–military role\, challenges surrounding disarmament\, Israel’s military operations in southern Lebanon\, and the fragile nature of regional diplomacy amid recurring escalation. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Abhishek Yadav\, the Moderator\, laid out the context\, tracing the emergence of Hezbollah in 1982 during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon\, its evolution into one of the West Asia’s most formidable non-state armed groups\, and its deepening ties with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He noted that Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria in support of Bashar al-Assad after the Arab Spring greatly expanded its regional footprint. Within this long-standing framework\, after the outbreak of the Gaza War in October 2023\, Hezbollah intensified its operations along the Israel–Lebanon border\, leading to a prolonged military campaign by Israel  that resulted in the killing of Hezbollah’s long-time leader Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024 and a US-brokered ceasefire in November 2024. Dr. Yadav further stated that the relative calm collapsed in March 2026 following US-Israeli military operations against Iran\, triggering a renewed phase of conflict that ended with a temporary ceasefire on 16 April 2026\, with a third round of US-hosted negotiations scheduled in Washington on 14-15 May 2026. \nDr. Hirak Jyoti Das outlined the priorities of the principal stakeholders in the conflict\, namely Hezbollah\, Israel and the Lebanese Government\, evaluating the likely future trajectory of the confrontation. The Speaker explained that Lebanon follows a confessional political system based on sectarian representation among the recognised religious communities. He talked about the demographic composition of different sectarian groups\, including Christians\, Sunnis\, Shiites\, Druze\, and other communities\, and noted that the system has institutionalised sectarian loyalty\, patronage networks\, and feudal political structures. \nDr. Das traced the emergence of Hezbollah during the Lebanese civil war in 1982 and noted that Hezbollah was exempted from disarmament under the 1989 Taif Accord. Over time\, Hezbollah became a hybrid political-military actor often characterised as a “state within a state”. He examined how repeated attempts to disarm Hezbollah failed due to Iranian and Syrian support\, Israel’s ongoing occupation of disputed areas such as Shebaa Farms\, and the limited military capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). \nThe Speaker analysed Hezbollah’s military role after Hamas’ attack on Israel in October 2023. Hezbollah launched rocket and drone attacks on northern Israel to showcase support for the Palestinian cause and pursued a strategy of limited attritional warfare. Dr. Das discussed Israel’s “Operation Northern Arrows” between September and November 2024\, during which Israel intensified military operations against Hezbollah through extensive airstrikes\, intelligence operations\, and targeted assassinations\, killing a large number of Secretary Generals\, including Hassan Nasrallah. The subsequent ceasefire enabled Israel to establish strategic positions and security zones within southern Lebanon. \nDr. Das noted that the Lebanese Government under President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has prioritised state sovereignty\, economic reforms\, and reconstruction of southern Lebanon\, while simultaneously trying to reduce Hezbollah’s military role. LAF however faces serious institutional\, logistical and financial constraints that limit their capacity to implement nationwide disarmament. The Speaker also pointed out that while the United States (US) continues to be the main external backer of LAF\, Washington tailors its military aid to ensure that it does not undermine Israel’s military dominance in the region. \nThe Speaker highlighted Hezbollah’s rejection of nationwide disarmament\, arguing that all discussions regarding weapons should remain an internal Lebanese matter upon the complete withdrawal of Israel’s forces and cessation of Israel’s military activities within Lebanon. Dr. Das noted that post-November 2024 ceasefire\, Israel conducted hundreds of airstrikes inside Lebanon\, providing Hezbollah justification for preserving its arsenal. \nThe Speaker analysed the renewed escalation that began in March 2026 with US-Israeli operations against Iran. Hezbollah resumed military activity\, claiming it was part of a broader regional resistance strategy. According to Dr. Das\, the group’s military focus has shifted from deep strikes into north Israel to drone and anti-tank missiles attacks on Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) positions in south Lebanon. Israel seeks to further degrade Hezbollah’s military infrastructure\, undermine its domestic legitimacy and cut its strategic ties to Iran. A key point of disagreement was the creation of a ‘security zone’ extending to the Litani River\, causing large-scale displacement and risking the revitalisation of Hezbollah’s legitimacy as a resistance force. \nIn summary\, the Speaker argued that the conflict is likely to remain stuck in a cycle of reciprocal military operations\, limited penetration and fragile ceasefires. Hezbollah’s political survival hinges on its ability to keep its resistance credentials alive\, and Israel is committed to preserving strategic deterrence and security control in south Lebanon. Sustainable peace would require gradual security arrangements\, stronger Lebanese State institutions and meaningful regional diplomacy\, noting that ongoing regional rivalries and repeated ceasefire violations continue to undermine prospects for long-term stability. \nQ&A Session\nParticipants raised questions regarding Hezbollah’s ability to sustain its military strength despite the Lebanese Government’s engagement with Western actors and negotiations with Israel. Questions were also raised regarding the wider regional geopolitical dynamics shaping the conflict\, Hezbollah’s military adaptation\, drone capabilities\, and supply routes. \nThe Speaker provided comprehensive responses to all comments and questions raised during the Session. \nThe Report was prepared by Mr. Aquib Mohd. Khan\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-israel-hezbollah-conflict-the-path-ahead
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260518T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260518T000000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235152
CREATED:20260629T125131Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T052213Z
UID:98682-1779062400-1779062400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Security in the Strait of Hormuz: Assessing the Limits of Military Options”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. R. Vignesh\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Security in the Strait of Hormuz: Assessing the Limits of Military Options” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 18 May 2026. Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA moderated the meeting. Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session highlighted the operational significance of anti-access and area-denial capabilities including missiles\, drones\, naval mines\, fast attack craft\, and midget submarines. It argued that even overwhelming conventional superiority faces severe constraints in narrow maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. The discussion further emphasised that contemporary maritime conflict increasingly reflects broader transformations in warfare characterised by non-contact operations\, autonomous systems\, dispersed infrastructure\, and asymmetric escalation. The Speaker concluded that sustainable stability in the Strait cannot be ensured through military means alone and requires sustained diplomatic engagement and negotiated security arrangements.  \nDetailed Discussion\nIn his Opening Remarks\, the moderator\, Col. Chadha observed that the recent Strait of Hormuz crisis had exposed important limits of conventional military superiority. Despite the overwhelming disparity in economic and military power between the United States and Iran\, the United States had not been able to decisively impose its will in the maritime theatre. He argued that the crisis demonstrated how geography\, operational circumstances\, and the changing character of warfare could enable a relatively weaker actor to neutralise the advantages of a technologically superior military. Referring to the difficulties involved in securing maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz\, he noted that even extensive naval and air capabilities could not guarantee freedom of navigation when confronted with layered asymmetric threats such as missile batteries\, naval mines\, drones\, and dispersed coastal systems. He emphasised that the issue carried broader lessons regarding the future utility and limitations of military force. \nDr. Vignesh structured his presentation around five themes: the strategic geography of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz\, the historical legacy of the tanker wars\, the evolution of Iran’s asymmetric naval doctrine\, the operational challenges involved in securing the Strait militarily\, and the broader strategic implications emerging from the current conflict. \nThe Speaker began by outlining the geographical and economic significance of the Persian Gulf. The Gulf\, bordered by eight littoral states including Iran\, Iraq\, Oman\, Saudi Arabia\, Qatar\, Kuwait\, Bahrain\, and the UAE\, contains a substantial proportion of global crude oil and natural gas reserves. Iran possesses the longest coastline in the Gulf\, stretching across the northern rim and providing it with significant geographical leverage. Prior to the present disruption\, the maritime routes in the region carried around 20 percent of global LNG trade. The Strait of Hormuz\, at its narrowest point approximately 33 Km wide\, remains one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints\, through which a substantial portion of global seaborne oil trade and petroleum consumption passes daily. Therefore\, any instability in the Strait has immediate implications for global energy security\, maritime commerce\, and international economic stability. \nTracing the historical origins of the current crisis\, Dr. Vignesh revisited the tanker war phase of the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s. After the war reached military stalemate in 1982\, both Iran and Iraq increasingly targeted commercial shipping and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Between 1981 and 1987\, hundreds of vessels were attacked and significant losses were inflicted on maritime traffic. In response to growing threats to shipping\, the United States launched Operation Earnest Will in 1987 to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers. However\, the mission gradually evolved into direct confrontation with Iran\, culminating in Operation Praying Mantis after the American frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian naval mine in 1988. The succeeding American retaliation destroyed several Iranian naval assets and offshore platforms. As a result\, Iran shifted rapidly toward asymmetric and hybrid naval warfare strategies. \nFurther\, Dr. Vignesh pointed out Iran’s dual naval structure comprising the conventional Islamic Republic of Iran Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN). While the conventional navy focuses on blue-water operations\, the IRGCN was specifically organised for asymmetric and irregular maritime warfare. Its doctrine emphasises hit-and-run tactics\, swarm tactics\, ambushes\, and shoot and scoot. The purpose of this strategy\, he argued\, was not to achieve conventional naval superiority but to impose costs\, create uncertainty\, and complicate operations for a technologically superior adversary. \nDr. Vignesh explained that since the 1990s\, Iran has increasingly viewed the Strait of Hormuz as a critical strategic asset. Iranian leaders repeatedly signalled that disruption or closure of the Strait could be used in response to external pressure or sanctions. Statements by Iranian political leaders during the 2011–12 sanctions period\, following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018\, and after the reported U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025\, reflected continuity in Iran’s strategic signalling. He argued that the Strait had evolved beyond a geographical chokepoint into a coercive diplomatic tool central to Iran’s deterrence posture. \nThe presentation then assessed Iran’s principal asymmetric maritime capabilities. Dr. Vignesh highlighted Iran’s extensive network of land-based anti-ship missile systems\, including both ballistic and cruise missiles deployed along the southern coastline. Iran’s geography\, particularly its mountainous terrain\, underground tunnel networks\, and mobile launchers\, significantly enhances the survivability of these systems. He discussed systems such as the Khalij Fars and Hormuz-2 anti-ship ballistic missiles\, as well as anti-ship cruise missiles (Abu Mahdi) reportedly capable of striking targets at distances exceeding 1\,000 kilometers. \nDr. Vignesh further examined the role of the IRGCN’s fast attack craft\, which are designed for swarm attacks and high-speed manoeuvres. Their low radar signatures and heavy armament make them effective for asymmetric maritime warfare. Iran’s growing use of aerial drones\, unmanned surface vessels (USVs)\, and unmanned undersea vessels (UUVs) was also highlighted. \nNaval mines were identified as another critical element of Iran’s anti-access strategy. Even limited mine deployment\, he argued\, could significantly disrupt maritime traffic\, delay naval operations\, and increase insurance and transit costs. He also discussed Iran’s fleet of midget submarines\, particularly the Ghadir-class submarines designed for shallow-water operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Their small size\, low acoustic signature\, and ability to conduct ambush-style attacks and mine-laying operations make them difficult to detect in congested maritime environments. \nA recurring theme throughout the presentation was the strategic role of geography. Dr. Vignesh argued that Iran’s terrain\, dispersed deployment patterns\, underground infrastructure\, and mobility created a “whack-a-mole” operational problem for the United States and Israel\, wherein destroyed launch sites could rapidly be replaced or relocated\, thereby complicating efforts to fully neutralise Iran’s strike capabilities. \nTurning to the operational challenges of securing the Strait militarily\, Dr. Vignesh argued that both offensive and defensive approaches faced severe limitations. Offensive operations aimed at neutralising Iranian capabilities would likely require sustained ground deployments to physically secure coastal areas and islands around the Strait. While such operations could theoretically be undertaken by U.S. Marine Corps and airborne units already deployed in the region\, maintaining long-term control would involve high casualties\, logistical strain\, and sustained resource commitments. \nThe Speaker also assessed the limitations of defensive naval escort operations. Modern convoy operations would require layered protection against missiles\, drones\, submarines\, mines\, and fast attack craft simultaneously. Large commercial convoys stretching across several kilometers would remain vulnerable to coordinated multi-domain attacks despite substantial naval protection. He therefore argued that such operations would be resource-intensive\, operationally complex\, and potentially unsustainable over prolonged periods. \nDr. Vignesh referred to the short-lived U.S. maritime security initiative termed “Project Freedom\,” announced in May 2026\, as evidence of these operational difficulties. Although intended to establish maritime security zones and offensive interdiction capabilities\, the operation was suspended shortly after its announcement following coordinated Iranian missile and drone strikes against shipping targets. According to Dr. Vignesh\, the episode illustrated the practical limitations of rapid maritime security constructs in the Strait of Hormuz. \nOn the legal dimension\, Dr. Vignesh argued that Iran’s attempts to impose transit fees or exercise unilateral control over the Strait would face significant international resistance. Since the Strait constitutes an international waterway governed by principles of transit passage and freedom of navigation\, major maritime and energy-importing powers would be unlikely to accept unilateral restrictions. He suggested that negotiated arrangements involving sanctions relief and security concessions would likely prove more sustainable than attempts to impose coercive transit regimes. \nIn his concluding observations\, Dr. Vignesh argued that the crisis reflected an increasingly unstable escalatory dynamic in the maritime domain with direct implications for global energy markets. He stressed that Iran did not need to sink large numbers of vessels to generate strategic effects; even limited disruption or the perception of insecurity was sufficient to alter shipping behaviour and increase insurance and transportation costs. Despite overwhelming conventional superiority\, the United States remained constrained by geography\, operational complexity\, political limitations\, and Iran’s long-developed asymmetric capabilities. He concluded that military means alone were insufficient to ensure stable maritime transit and that sustained diplomatic engagement remained the only viable long-term solution. \nDuring the discussion\, participants raised questions regarding Iran’s defence-industrial adaptation\, reverse engineering practices\, societal resilience\, the limitations of conventional military power\, the role of intelligence assessments\, the Houthis and Red Sea operations\, the use of satellite navigation systems\, and the broader transformation of warfare. \nDr. Vignesh\, in response to questions regarding reverse engineering and asymmetric innovation\, noted that Iran had extensively reverse engineered foreign technologies\, including fast attack boats originally developed for recreational purposes. He also emphasised the importance of geography in military operations\, citing historical examples such as the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest to illustrate how terrain can negate numerical and technological superiority. \nThe Session concluded with broader reflections on the transformation of warfare in an era increasingly characterised by non-contact operations\, multi-domain conflict\, drones\, autonomous systems\, and asymmetric escalation. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Vinayak Rajpurohit\, Intern\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-security-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-assessing-the-limits-of-military-options
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260525T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260525T170000
DTSTAMP:20261120T235152
CREATED:20260702T055643Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T052357Z
UID:98734-1779696000-1779728400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Global Youth Radicalisation”
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai\, Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “Global Youth Radicalisation” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 25 May 2026. Dr Adil Rasheed\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the Session\, which was attended by scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session examined the growing challenge of online radicalisation globally\, particularly among children and adolescents\, and the implications it has for contemporary counter-terrorism efforts. The discussion addressed the psychological\, technological\, and social dimensions of radicalisation as well as the impact of mental health vulnerabilities\, role of belonging\, identity\, and lack of unconditional acceptance in the offline world in facilitating extremist recruitment of young people. The presentation further highlighted the role of social media platforms\, online gaming communities\, encrypted applications and algorithm driven content ecosystems in reducing the age threshold of recruitment along with accelerating the recruitment process.  \nDetailed Report\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Dr. Adil Rasheed highlighted recent global developments relating to political violence\, extremism\, and radicalisation. Referring to recent incidents in the United States and Europe\, he noted the growing debate regarding the causes of radicalisation\, particularly among young individuals. Dr. Rasheed highlighted the two schools of thought within the counter-radicalisation literature\, with some scholars emphasising ideological indoctrination while others focusing on psychological vulnerabilities\, identity crises\, social alienation\, and cognitive dissonance as primary drivers. According to him\, this debate on the relationship between mental health\, nihilism\, and violent extremism\, raises important questions about whether ideology serves as the primary motivator or merely as a vehicle through which pre-existing psychological vulnerabilities are exploited. \nMs. Saman Ayesha Kidwai presented a detailed analysis of the radicalisation of children and teenagers\, which she highlighted has become a frontline security issue. She stated that technological developments have enabled extremist actors to bypass traditional gatekeepers such as families\, schools\, and communities\, creating what she described as an acceleration gap between the pace of radicalisation and the ability of states to respond effectively. \nExploring a biological perspective on radicalisation\, Ms. Kidwai noted that adolescents are particularly vulnerable because of developmental and neurological factors. The prefrontal cortex\, responsible for impulse control and decision-making\, remains underdeveloped during adolescence\, making younger individuals more susceptible to emotionally charged and sensational content. These vulnerabilities are often compounded by experiences of bullying\, trauma\, neglect\, social exclusion\, and identity-related uncertainty. \nShe stated that it is against this backdrop that extremist narratives succeed because they address three unmet psychological needs: belonging\, significance\, and certainty. Extremist communities offer vulnerable individuals a sense of acceptance and identity\, portraying them as part of a larger struggle while providing simplistic explanations for complex social and political realities. These narratives\, by meeting the three psychological needs\, become particularly appealing to adolescents seeking recognition and purpose. \nFurthermore\, she highlighted alarming global trends regarding youth radicalisation. Citing recent studies\, she noted that the process of radicalisation has become significantly faster than in it was in previous decades\, with recruitment increasingly taking place entirely online. She emphasised that contemporary extremist networks exploit digital technologies to reach young audiences across geographical boundaries. \nShe then focused on Nihilistic Violent Extremism (NVE)\, an emerging form of extremism that differs from traditional ideological movements. She highlighted that rather than pursuing a clearly defined political or religious objective\, NVE promotes violence\, chaos\, and societal collapse. This is evident in the fact that online communities associated with NVE often target psychologically vulnerable individuals\, encouraging self-harm\, coercion\, harassment\, and acts of violence. \nMs. Kidwai emphasised the pattern of extremist recruitment which typically begins on mainstream social media platforms before gradually shifting to more obscure online spaces. Extremist actors use recommendation algorithms\, online forums\, and gaming communities to identify and engage vulnerable youth. Online gaming platforms are increasingly becoming recruitment spaces because they provide opportunities to establish trust and social connections before introducing extremist content. \nFocusing on the nexus between mental health and extremism\, Ms. Kidwai cautioned against equating mental illness with terrorism\, and explained that social isolation\, loneliness\, bullying\, and psychological distress are vulnerability amplifiers\, increasing a young individual’s susceptibility to extremist recruitment rather than being direct causes of violence. \nOn the role of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies\, Ms. Kidwai explained that AI-enabled platforms can facilitate the dissemination of extremist content and enable radicalisation processes that remain largely invisible to traditional surveillance mechanisms. This represents a significant transformation in the contemporary threat environment. \nDrawing lessons from international experiences\, Ms. Kidwai highlighted Finland’s media literacy framework as an example of preventive intervention. She emphasised that Finland’s strategy of including digital literacy in the nationwide education curriculum\, inculcating critical thinking and awareness of misinformation from an early age\, has contributed to strengthening societal resilience against extremist narratives. Finland has consistently been ranked at the top of the European Media Literacy Index. While acknowledging differences in context\, Ms. Kidwai suggested that certain elements of this approach could inform India’s future counter-radicalisation strategies. \nTurning to India\, Ms. Kidwai acknowledged that the country has developed substantial counter-terrorism capabilities and there have been successful de-radicalisation programmes reported in states such as Kerala and Maharashtra. Nevertheless\, she proposed the creation of a legal framework addressing radicalisation through the establishment of a nationwide counter-violent extremism strategy involving multiple ministries. She further highlighted the need for greater integration of mental health support systems such as training school counsellors in early warning identification signs\, enhancing digital literacy initiatives and strengthening international cooperation to address transnational online extremist networks. \nLastly\, Ms. Kidwai emphasised that while current strategies focus more on de-radicalisation frameworks\, however there is a need for greater focus on prevention\, which remains significantly more effective than post-radicalisation interventions.  Finally\, she underscored that for prevention programmes to be successful\, families\, schools\, communities\, and state institutions must collectively work together towards identifying early warning signs\, promote media literacy\, thereby strengthening societal resilience against extremist influences. \nQ & A Session\nQuestions were raised regarding the challenges associated with the identification of radicalised individuals\, effectiveness of de-radicalisation programmes\, emerging threats within the Indian context\, manosphere networks\, platform accountability\, and the responsibilities of technology companies in preventing extremist content dissemination. \nThe Speaker responded to all the comments and questions raised. \nThe Report was prepared by Mr. Himanshu Kulkarni\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-global-youth-radicalisation
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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