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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260406T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260406T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000158
CREATED:20260630T043411Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051300Z
UID:98695-1775462400-1775494800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “US-Japan Summit: Implications for Japan’s Security Posture
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Arnab Dasgupta\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “US-Japan Summit: Implications for Japan’s Security Posture” during the Monday Morning meeting held on 6 April 2026. Ms. Simran Walia\, Research Analyst\, MP- IDSA moderated the Session. The event was attended by Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session analysed the US-Japan Summit between President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi held on 19 March in Washington and its implications on Japan’s security posture. Dr. Dasgupta highlighted its significance in the backdrop of the US and Israel’s ongoing conflict with Iran and President Trump’s repeated calls for allies to step in and secure the Strait of Hormuz. He also analysed the economic and energy cooperation between the two countries\, besides highlighting Japan’s strategic concerns regarding Taiwan and its efforts to secure long term American commitment in the Indo-Pacific\, among other issues.   \nDetailed report\nIn her opening remarks\, Ms. Simran Walia briefly explained the context of the US-Japan Summit held on 19 March between President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi which took place amidst the ongoing conflict with Iran and President Trump’s repeated calls for allies to step up and support in securing the Strait of Hormuz. She stated that while Japan expressed political support to US\, it stopped short of providing military assistance due to constitutional limitations. She further highlighted that notwithstanding the complexities around the Iran conflict\, the two leaders successfully re-affirmed the US-Japan alliance by further deepening collaboration across domains such as defence\, economic security\, technology including co-development of missiles\, strengthening defence capabilities to advance the vision of a free and open Indo – Pacific\, alongside a critical minerals action plan\, with Japan pledging US$70 billion worth of investments in the US. \nFollowing this\, Dr. Arnab Dasgupta gave a detailed presentation on the security implications of the US-Japan Summit and briefly summarised the issues discussed during the Summit. He highlighted that this was the second meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Takaichi\, with the Iran War being the most significant issue discussed. He stated that while PM Takaichi reiterated Japan’s longstanding opposition to Iran seeking nuclear weapons and also condemned Iran’s act of closing the Strait of Hormuz\, she stopped short of providing military assistance citing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution\, which prohibits forward deployment of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces in areas where Japan’s survival is not threatened. According to Dr. Dasgupta\, while the de-escalation call after the Summit was a standardised Japanese response\, the mention of expanding US sourced energy exports to Japan and Asia generated ambiguity as the intent of this statement remained unclear and will be elucidated in due course of time. Regarding the Indo-Pacific\, he highlighted the strong emphasis on ‘Free and Open Indo- Pacific’ by Japan\, mentioning all Quad countries individually as likeminded partners without using the term Quad itself. Dr. Dasgupta noted that while China-related concerns received limited attention\, there were extensive discussions on North Korea including denuclearisation and abduction issues among others. \nDr. Dasgupta discussed the major economic and defence agreements signed during the Summit. Strategic Japanese investments in the US such as the US$600 million synthetic diamond manufacturing plan\, energy infrastructure projects in Texas\, Ohio and Pennsylvania\, along with investments in small modular nuclear reactors through a consortium involving GE Vernova and Hitachi\, and the fact that most of these energy projects were located in politically significant swing states\, indicated an electoral dimension to these investments. \nThe adoption of the Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience which seeks to address the vulnerabilities arising from ‘non market policies and perspectives’\, with the US and Japan envisaging cooperation on price floors\, stockpiling\, regulatory standards and coordinated responses to any economic coercion\, is another major development. While the scope of the agreement is not known yet\, the intention to jointly identify mining\, processing and manufacturing of critical minerals in third countries such as Australia\, Canada and Brazil besides their own territories was clear. He also discussed the newly signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on deep sea mineral resource development\, with a bilateral working group being established to work on exploration and extraction of rare earth sources in sites like Japan’s Minamitorishima Island. \nDr. Dasgupta stated that despite controversies\, the Summit was seen as a success by the Japanese Government due to four main reasons. These were: firstly\, ensuring sustained US commitment to the Indo – Pacific (Japan’s foremost strategic objective); secondly\, continued US involvement in defending the Senkaku Islands and extending nuclear deterrence; thirdly\, Japan was buying time for developing its own defence industrial and military capabilities and lastly\, the ideological alignment of Japan’s conservative leadership\, including PM Takaichi\, which has historically always sought close alignment with the US. \nThe Speaker further analysed Japan’s continued dependence on the US for defence\, especially while it is pursuing military and defence modernisation. He noted that Japan still requires extensive technological support from the US. Examples are: retrofitting the Japanese Aegis-class destroyers for Tomahawk missile deployment\, permission for production of Patriot batteries needed for ballistic missile defense\, and allowing the development of hypersonic glide vehicles. He discussed the continued evolution of the Distributed Lethality Doctrine across Japan’s southwestern islands near the Taiwan Strait\, and Japan’s intent of developing nuclear powered submarines.  He also described Japan’s ‘Taiwan panic’\, as Tokyo views the Taiwan Strait with greater urgency and concern than Washington does due to its geographic proximity and strategic importance. \nPM Takaichi’s assertive stance that any development in Taiwan Strait could qualify as a survival threatening situation requiring the deployment of Self Defence Forces (SDF) marks a significant departure from Japan’s traditional cultivation of ambiguity.  He also noted Japan’s deepening alignment with US while stating that overdependence could create further vulnerabilities for Japan and also affect its credibility amongst the Global South countries. \nQ & A Session\nThe presentation was followed by a discussion wherein the Director General\, MP- IDSA and scholars raised questions and discussed the outcomes of the US-Japan Summit and its implications for India. \nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, observed that Japan has a longstanding strategic and economic partnership\, and hence Japan pursuing closer ties with US would not necessarily impact its credibility with the Global South. Regarding Japan’s future naval strategy\, he stated that rather than independently pursuing development of advanced submarine capabilities etc.\, Japan could seek this potential by closer engagement with alliances such as AUKUS.  He highlighted the signing of the MOU on critical minerals and noted that Japan’s sophisticated sea bed mining program faces increasing competition from China’s own COMRA (China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association) program. He queried whether Japan would truly accept deeper US operational structures such as the proposal for a three-star US command\, especially taking into account Japan’s longstanding efforts towards achieving strategic autonomy\, and stated that Indo- Japan relations are today marked by high economic engagement. Nevertheless\, he underlined that economics and defence relations cannot be separated\, comparing it with India’s growing defence industrial cooperation with Israel and the US\, and suggested that even Japan will eventually view India as a long-term defence industrial and manufacturing partner. \nOther participants too raised questions regarding Japan’s large holdings of US treasury bonds and the implications of Yen depreciation. Another query focused-on lack of institutional and technological study and mapping between India and Japan\, particularly in emerging technologies and co-development initiatives. Other questions raised were regarding Japan’s deployment of advanced missile defence systems and surveillance infrastructure on Yonaguni Island\, Japanese investments in the US and its geopolitical implications. \nResponding to the questions\, Dr. Arnab Dasgupta clarified that Japan’s strategic behavior is aimed at ensuring continued US engagement in the Indo- Pacific and also agreed that Japanese investments in the US functioned partly as a strategic trade-off intended to preserve American commitment and reduce Japanese dependence on China. Regarding the Yonaguni Island\, he explained that its strategic significance derived from its proximity to Taiwan and the Chinese Coast\, making it an ideal location for surveillance\, missile defence\, and early warning systems and that a more capable and assertive Japan could potentially contribute positively to the regional strategic balance. \nTo conclude\, Dr. Dasgupta emphasised that Japan’s evolving security posture reflected both growing strategic anxieties and a desire to secure long-term US commitment in the Indo-Pacific.  Tokyo is steadily expanding its military and technological capabilities\, and its alliance with Washington remains central in this transition. While economic engagement currently is a more stable and less politically constrained foundation for Indo-Japan relations\, nevertheless there is a need for greater institutional-level coordination and technological collaboration between the two countries. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Himanshu Kulkarni\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-us-japan-summit-implications-for-japans-security-posture
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260413T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260413T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000158
CREATED:20260630T040113Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051320Z
UID:98687-1776067200-1776099600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on the “Drones in US-Israel-Iran War: Lessons for India”
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting on 13 April 2026\, featuring a presentation by Gp. Capt. (Dr.).R. K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA on “Drones in US-Israel-Iran War: Lessons for India.” The Session was moderated by Gp. Capt. Sukhbir Kaur Minhas\, Research Fellow at the Institute. Scholars of the Institute participated in the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session analysed the evolving character of the U.S-Israel and Iran conflict\, focusing on the operational limits of technological superiority in contemporary warfare. It argued that despite clear asymmetry in air power and the achievement of air superiority by U.S. and Israeli forces\, the persistence of losses and disruptions reflects the growing effectiveness of asymmetric tools\, particularly drones. These systems have emerged as central instruments of modern conflict\, capable of exploiting gaps in conventional air defence and targeting both military and civilian infrastructure. The discussion highlighted structural issues such as inadequate preparedness\, intelligence gaps\, and vulnerabilities of fixed assets\, while contrasting U.S. and Israeli operational approaches. It further examined the shift towards soft-target warfare and the implications for states like India\, emphasising the need for integrated\, layered defence systems\, indigenous capability development\, and Military-Civil Technological Fusion (MCTF) in future conflict scenarios. \nDetailed Report\nGp. Capt. Sukhbir Kaur Minhas made Introductory Remarks and invited Gp. Capt. Narang to make his presentation. Gp. Capt. Narang situated his analysis within the broader trajectory of U.S.- Israeli military operations against Iran\, arguing that while conventional indicators suggested overwhelming air superiority in favour of the United States and Israel\, the operational reality revealed significant asymmetries and vulnerabilities. He clarified the distinction between air superiority and air supremacy\, emphasising that despite U.S. and Israeli dominance in the air domain\, the persistence of losses demonstrated the limits of technological superiority in contested environments\, particularly to unmanned systems. He underlined that Iran\, despite facing a superior adversary\, was able to withstand sustained military pressure\, thereby raising questions about resilience\, strategic depth\, and the effectiveness of asymmetric responses. \nThe growing salience of unmanned systems and the associated challenges of unmanned traffic management (UTM) was the central theme of this discussion. Dr. Narang highlighted that the proliferation of drones has vitally altered the operational landscape\, introducing complexities in airspace management and significantly increasing the vulnerability of both military and civilian (soft) targets. He argued that while traditional air defence systems are optimised for high-altitude\, high-speed manned aircraft threats\, they remain less effective against low-flying\, slow-moving unmanned aerial vehicles\, thereby creating exploitable gaps in defence coverage. This asymmetry was evident in the ability of Iranian and proxy drone systems to penetrate U.S. and allied defences\, causing both material damage and operational disruption. \nThe Speaker further examined specific operational episodes\, including reported losses of advanced platforms such as F-15 and F-35 aircraft\, as well as the disruption of U.S. special operations. These incidents were interpreted not as indicators of systemic failure but as evidence of evolving threat environments where even advanced military systems are susceptible to multi-domain challenges. Dr. Narang stressed that stealth technology\, while still relevant\, is no longer invulnerable due to the increasing integration of multi-sensor detection systems\, including infrared capabilities. This demands a reassessment of platform survivability and sensor integration in future force planning. \nA critical facet of the analysis concerned the differential performance between U.S. and Israeli forces. Dr. Narang argued that Israel’s relatively lower losses could be attributed to better operational practices\, including asset dispersion\, hardened shelters\, and integrated defence systems. In contrast\, U.S. deployments in the Gulf were characterised by vulnerabilities arising from static positioning\, inadequate hardening of infrastructure\, and a peacetime operational mindset. He also pointed to gaps in intelligence integration and inter-operability\, suggesting that the US did not fully optimise capabilities with its regional partners\, thereby limiting collective effectiveness. \nThe discussion also addressed Iran’s ability to develop the Shahed drone can be attributed to the ownership of drone technology by its military and its single minded approach on building domestic manufacturing of critical systems. This shift underscores a broader transformation in warfare where economic and civilian assets become integral to strategic contestation. He emphasised that for developing countries like India\, this trend significantly amplifies vulnerability\, as economic growth and infrastructure expansion inherently increase the number of potential targets. \nQ&A Session\nThe presentation was followed by discussion moderated by Gp. Capt Sukhbir Kaur Minhas. Participants raised a series of questions on operational\, technological\, and structural issues relating to emerging drone warfare\, air defence vulnerabilities\, and India’s preparedness in this evolving threat environment. \nGp. Capt. Ajey Lele (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA\, asked a question regarding the adequacy of India’s counter-drone capability\, particularly in terms of detection\, tracking\, identification\, and neutralisation. Dr. Narang responded by outlining the layered requirements of effective counter-drone architecture\, noting that while India has made incremental progress\, significant gaps persist\, especially in sensor coverage\, integration\, and real-time tracking. He highlighted the limited operationalisation of initiatives such as Digital Sky and pointed to deficiencies in both civil and military segments\, particularly the absence of integrated command-and-control (C2) systems and insufficient medium and short range sensors and shooters to address swarm threats. \nAnother participant raised concerns about whether the proliferation of drone swarms signals a structural decline in the relevance of traditional manned aircraft\, and what organisational reforms may be required in response. Dr.Narang acknowledged the transformative impact of unmanned systems but rejected the notion of obsolescence of manned platforms. Instead\, he argued that the changing character of warfare necessitates structural reforms within India’s defence apparatus\, particularly in clarifying technological ownership and streamlining decision-making. He identified fragmentation among the stakeholders and ambiguities on ownership as key impediments to timely capability development\, advocating for a higher coordinating body to resolve institutional inefficiencies. \nParticipants also questioned the effectiveness of Israel’s integrated air and missile defence systems and whether such a model is replicable for India. In response\, Dr. Narang emphasised that Israel’s success is context-specific\, shaped by geography\, scale\, and operational depth. He noted that the extended flight time of incoming threats provides Israel with a temporal advantage for interception\, whereas larger geographies such as the Gulf or India face greater coverage challenges. He also added that while the technological model is instructive\, its direct replication without contextual adaptation would be analytically flawed. \nA significant line of inquiry focused on the protection of critical infrastructure\, particularly in the context of expanding economic assets and urbanisation. Participants raised the possibility of involving private sector entities in deploying anti-drone systems\, while also highlighting challenges related to autonomy\, integration with national air defence networks\, and resource allocation. Dr.Narang acknowledged the necessity of incorporating private sector capabilities but stressed that such integration must remain under a centralised command-and-control framework. He further emphasised the importance of military-civil technological fusion (MCTF) and selective delegation\, cautioning against unregulated decentralisation of defence responsibilities. \nParticipants also raised questions regarding India’s capacity to absorb sustained attacks\, especially in comparison to states like Iran\, which have demonstrated higher tolerance for attrition. Participants argued that India’s expanding infrastructure base increases its vulnerability\, necessitating a recalibration of defensive priorities. In response\, Dr. Narang emphasised the need for a proactive\, layered defence strategy focused on early interception and multi-layer interception approach for enhancing the effectiveness of threat neutralisation. He highlighted the importance of redundancy\, platform-level integration of counter-drone systems\, and indigenous capability development to ensure scalability during conflict. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Gp. Capt. Narang reiterated that current efforts\, including initiatives such as iDEX\, remain inadequate and insufficiently integrated. He stressed that without a holistic approach anchored in institutional reform\, technological integration\, and indigenous innovation\, India risks remaining underprepared for the evolving dynamics of drone-centric warfare. The discussion concluded with the recognition that future conflicts will be defined not only by advanced platforms but by the ability to integrate systems\, anticipate asymmetric threats\, and align organisational structures with technological realities. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Vinayak Rajpurohit\, Intern\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-the-drones-in-us-israel-iran-war-lessons-for-india
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260420T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260420T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000158
CREATED:20260630T042034Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051337Z
UID:98689-1776672000-1776704400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Pakistan- Afghanistan Conflict: Implications for the Region”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Ashish Shukla\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Pakistan- Afghanistan Conflict: Implications for the Region” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 20 April 2026. The Session was moderated by Dr. Ashok Behuria\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has reached a critical breaking point\, moving far away from the strategic partnership many expected after the Taliban returned to power. The main cause of this friction is the rise of the Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP). While Pakistan blames the Taliban for providing safe havens to militants\, Afghanistan denies these accusations\, creating a cycle of blame game that has stalled any real cooperation. This impasse escalated into high-intensity hostilities by early 2026. The standoff proves that current military and diplomatic tactics aren’t working\, largely because there is no clear strategy for dealing with the various armed groups operating in the region.  \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. Ashok Behuria provided a concise overview of the evolving tensions in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations\, situating them within the intensification of Tehreek -e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks within Pakistan. He noted that Pakistan attributes these attacks to elements based in Afghanistan\, a claim rejected by Kabul\, which treats them as an internal issue. He emphasised that this reflects a broader tendency to externalise domestic security challenges. Dr. Behuria assessed that the Taliban’s return on 15 August 2021 marked a key turning point\, though developments diverged from expectations of strategic alignment with Pakistan. Instead\, the Taliban’s ideological proximity to the TTP has intensified Pakistan’s internal security concerns. Noting the sustained frequency of TTP attacks\, largely concentrated in border regions\, he pointed out that while major urban centres and core economic infrastructure have remained relatively insulated\, the persistence of low-intensity violence continues to pose a significant challenge. He emphasised that the trajectory of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations reflect a complex interplay between internal insecurity and external diplomatic friction\, warranting closer analytical attention. \nDr. Ashish Shukla\, began his presentation by characterising Pakistan–Afghanistan relations as historically complex and often contentious\, tracing their origins to Afghanistan’s initial opposition to Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations in 1947. He noted that during the Afghan jihad\, Pakistan emerged as the principal conduit for US–Saudi support and assumed a central role in shaping the conflict. In the post-Soviet phase\, while maintaining links with multiple factions\, Pakistan extended decisive backing to the Mullah Omar-led Taliban\, thereby securing what has often been described as “strategic depth.” However\, Dr. Shukla emphasised that the post-9/11 period marked a significant shift\, as Pakistan formally aligned with the US-led War on Terror while continuing to maintain covert ties with the Taliban. He assessed that this dual-track approach reflected Pakistan’s attempt to balance external pressures with its regional strategic objectives\, particularly the pursuit of a compliant regime in Kabul to offset internal vulnerabilities and advance its broader geopolitical interests. \nDr. Shukla further observed that the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 fundamentally altered this dynamic. While Pakistan initially perceived the development as a strategic gain\, it soon encountered resistance from the Taliban leadership\, which asserted greater autonomy and refused to adhere to Pakistan’s expectations. He highlighted that the growing presence and operational capacity of the TTP in Afghanistan has since emerged as a central point of friction\, with Pakistan alleging cross-border sanctuaries and the Taliban dismissing these claims as internal matters. Citing estimates of thousands of TTP fighters operating from Afghan provinces such as Kunar\, Nangarhar\, Khost\, and Paktika\, he underscored the increasing frequency and intensity of attacks within Pakistan\, including over a thousand incidents in 2025 alone. Dr. Shukla also pointed to Pakistan’s escalating response\, ranging from diplomatic pressure and refugee deportations to cross-border military strikes\, particularly in late 2025 and early 2026\, which were met with strong Afghan retaliation and international concern over civilian casualties. He concluded that the relationship has entered a phase of heightened volatility\, marked by mutual accusations\, retaliatory actions\, and the absence of a sustainable conflict-resolution mechanism. \nDr. Shukla further examined the escalation of hostilities through official statements and military developments\, highlighting the sharp rhetoric emerging from the Afghan side. He noted that in an interview with Tolo News on 24 February\, Abdul Hamid Khorasani\, a Panjshir-based commander aligned with the Taliban\, warned that suicide bomber units were positioned within Pakistan and could be activated at any time\, even claiming that Pakistan could be overrun if ordered by the Taliban leadership. This was followed by remarks from Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid in an interview with Al Arabiya English on 25 February\, where he asserted that Pakistan would face a military response\, while also alleging significant civilian casualties from Pakistani airstrikes. Dr. Shukla analysed that these developments were accompanied by reciprocal military actions\, including cross-border firing and Pakistan’s launch of Operation Ghazab lil-Haq\, involving coordinated airstrikes across multiple Afghan cities such as Kabul\, Kandahar\, Paktia\, and Nangarhar. He noted that Afghan forces responded with counter-operations under Operation Radd al-Zulm. \nDr. Shukla assessed that the conflict witnessed further escalation through successive strikes in March 2026\, including Pakistan’s targeting of sites such as Bagram and Kandahar\, and a particularly controversial strike on a treatment facility in Kabul\, which\, according to Afghan and international reports\, resulted in significant civilian casualties and drew condemnation from global actors\, including human rights organisations and India. He noted that despite temporary pauses in hostilities during Eid\, facilitated by external actors such as Turkey\, Qatar\, and Saudi Arabia\, military operations resumed shortly thereafter\, indicating the fragility of de-escalation efforts. He further highlighted China’s emerging diplomatic role\, including its support for ceasefire efforts and facilitation of dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani representatives in Urumqi\, signalling Beijing’s strategic interest in regional stability. Concluding his assessment\, Dr. Shukla argued that Pakistan’s declaration of open confrontation with Afghanistan marks an unprecedented phase in bilateral relations. While officially seeking the expulsion or handover of TTP elements\, he suggested that Pakistan’s broader objectives include pressuring the Taliban to restrain anti-Pakistan militancy and countering perceived India–Afghanistan proximity. However\, he cautioned that despite Pakistan’s superior conventional military capabilities\, Afghanistan’s experience with asymmetric warfare\, combined with the potential alignment of the Taliban and TTP\, poses a significant challenge\, leaving the long-term trajectory of the conflict uncertain. \nQuestions and Answers\nOn the question of whether the situation would have differed under Imran Khan\, Dr. Ashish Shukla suggested that a variation in approach was possible given his relatively conciliatory stance towards the Taliban\, although ultimate authority rests with Pakistan’s security establishment. On China’s role\, he assessed that Beijing is acting cautiously\, seeking to mediate without antagonising either side\, particularly in light of its security concerns in Xinjiang. Addressing queries on the nature of the TTP\, he clarified that the group does not represent the Afghan state but shares ideological affinities with the Taliban\, which partly explains Kabul’s reluctance to act against it. He further noted that the TTP draws support primarily from Pakistan’s Pashtun regions\, where longstanding grievances\, governance deficits\, and discontent with state-led operations persist. \nOn questions related to the group’s operational resilience and ideological orientation\, Dr. Shukla highlighted that the TTP has evolved into a complex formation with overlapping influences\, including elements linked to other extremist groups such as ISKP. He emphasised that while Pakistan retains certain levers\, including trade access and border management\, its overall negotiating capacity remains limited\, and coercive measures have not produced decisive outcomes. Responding to queries on regional dynamics\, he pointed to the continued salience of the India factor in Pakistan’s strategic thinking\, alongside the complicating role of Baloch insurgent groups. He concluded that these intersecting dynamics contribute to a protracted and volatile security environment\, with no immediate pathway to resolution. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Sneha M\, Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-pakistan-afghanistan-conflict-implications-for-the-region
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260427T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260427T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T000158
CREATED:20260707T045519Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051921Z
UID:98910-1777276800-1777309200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on  ‘India-EU Security and Defence Partnership:  Defence Industrial Collaboration and Exports’
DESCRIPTION:Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, gave a presentation on “India-EU Security and Defence Partnership: Defence Industrial Collaboration and Exports’ at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 27 April 2026. Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.)\, Research Fellow and Coordinator\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, moderated the Session. \nExecutive Summary \nDefence cooperation was one of the key focus areas of the India-European Union (EU) Security and Defence Partnership (SDP)\, signed on 27 January 2026. The agreement opens up opportunities for Indian defence firms to participate in relevant EU defence procurement initiatives such as Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The SDP can be expected to further enhance defence-industrial cooperation and exports between India and the EU\, with opportunities in the ammunition sector\, defence electronics\, and other areas. The challenge for the Indian companies would be to navigate the EU policy framework\, including the Buy European preference requirements\, and embed themselves in EU supply chains.   \nDetailed Report\nDr. Rajiv\, in his presentation\, highlighted that defence was one of the key focus areas of the India-European Union (EU) Security and Defence Partnership (SDP)\, which was signed on 27 January 2026\, apart from maritime and cyber security\, space security\, counter terrorism\, countering hybrid threats\, among others. He noted that India was the ninth country with which the EU has signed an SDP. The EU views SDP’s as non-binding political instruments to enhance cooperation and interoperability on defence industrial collaboration. An India-EU Defence Industry forum was also established along with the signing of the SDP. \nThe Speaker pointed out that India’s participation in relevant EU initiatives could open up after the signing of the SDP. One such initiative is the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) financial instrument that provides loans to Member States for defence investment and common procurement. The Euros 150 billion SAFE Initiative was part of the Re-ARM Europe Plan\, presented to the European Parliament on 4 March 2025 by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. He flagged that ammunition and missiles\, artillery systems\, among others\, were part of the SAFE Priority Defence Products Category I. In contrast\, air and missile defence systems\, maritime surface and underwater capabilities\, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare\, among others\, were part of the SAFE Priority Defence Products Category II list of items. \nDr. Rajiv noted that\, as of 24 April 2026\, the National Defence Investment Plans of 18 EU Member States\, totalling Euros 129 billion\, have been endorsed by the European Commission\, while Hungary’s Euros 16.2 billion investment plan is under evaluation. Of the 18 countries\, Poland secured the largest SAFE loans of 43.7 billion euros\, followed by Romania (16.6 billion euros)\, France (15 billion euros)\, Italy (14.9 billion euros)\, and Belgium (8.3 billion euros). As for possible cooperation with these EU countries\, Dr. Rajiv noted that Indian defence companies will have to enter into partnerships with companies in some of these EU nations to manufacture defence products jointly. \nAn additional arena of cooperation concerns India’s possible participation in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects\, a treaty-based mechanism launched by the EU in 2017. Dr. Rajiv highlighted that at the first-ever India-EU Security and Defence Consultations\, held at Brussels on 10 June 2022\, cooperation in ‘co-development and co-production of defence equipment\, including India’s participation in PESCO’\, was discussed. The Speaker noted that 74 PESCO projects related to training\, strategic enablers\, force multipliers\, land systems\, cyber\, C4ISR\, maritime\, air systems\, and space are currently being pursued. Among the countries that signed the SDP with the EU – Canada\, Norway and the United Kingdom are part of the EU Military Mobility project under PESCO. \nThe Speaker then highlighted that industry associations such as the Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers (SIDM) have flagged opportunities for Indian shipyards\, electronics firms\, and sensor manufacturers to integrate into EU naval supply chains\, as well as co-production and lifecycle support (MRO). The SIDM notes that opportunities for European firms are also there to benefit from cost-effective engineering by partnering with Indian firms. At the same time\, Indian firms will have to ensure stringent compliance with EU defence\, export control\, and security standards. \nDr. Rajiv noted that the SDP with the EU is a result of the EU’s enhanced focus on strengthening partnerships with key strategic partners such as India\, even as it builds more robust defence capabilities and increases intra-EU defence procurement. The EU’s defence spending has more than doubled over the past decade\, and the EU has ambitious plans to increase it to five per cent of GDP by 2035. EU ammunition companies are not only ramping up production but also entering into JVs with firms in other countries (including the Indian defence industry) to meet rising demand. \nRheinmetall\, for instance\, has entered into a Joint Venture with Reliance Defence for the supply of explosives and propellants for medium and large calibre ammunition. The company also bagged a defence exports order of Rs. 600 Crore in June 2025 from Rheinmetall. Other companies\, such as Bharat Forge\, have also secured multiple orders for ammunition shells and will likely enter into production and manufacturing agreements with EU firms in the near future. Defence Public Sector Undertaking\, Munitions India Limited has also exported to European nations\, including the Czech Republic and Romania\, in the recent past. \nDr. Rajiv noted that the SDP is expected to further enhance defence-industrial cooperation and exports between India and the EU\, with opportunities in the ammunition sector\, defence electronics\, and other areas. He\, however\, noted that the challenge for Indian companies would be to navigate the EU policy framework\, including the Buy European preference requirements\, and to embed themselves in EU supply chains to utilise opportunities in the priority weapons procurement categories of initiatives such as SAFE. \nQ&A Session\n Discussion focused on the possibility of acquisitions\, joint ventures\, and prospects for technology transfer. The Speaker noted that some Indian defence companies are acquiring EU-based companies or entering into partnerships for manufacturing niche equipment. The Indian defence industry is also receiving export orders from EU countries for equipment\, including ammunition. The Speaker noted that in the future\, the SDP could open up prospects for further collaboration. In response to a question on the role of France as a key partner within the European Union\, Dr Rajiv highlighted that France remains a prominent defence partner for India and could serve as an important avenue for expanding joint ventures and participation in projects led by European Original Equipment Manufacturers. \nQuestions also related to India’s engagements with Russia and implications for closer defence collaboration with the EU. Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh noted that recent agreements with Russia\, including logistical arrangements\, have been under discussion for several years. Finally\, the discussion touched upon whether the latest developments vis-à-vis the EU reflected a broader strategic alignment or remained largely transactional and demand-based. Dr Rajiv observed that while recent geopolitical developments have provided momentum\, India–EU relations are rooted in long-standing strategic engagement\, suggesting a combination of demand-driven dynamics and strategic alignment. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Rahul Wankhede\, Research Analyst\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-india-eu-security-and-defence-partnership
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