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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260302T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260302T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001122
CREATED:20260630T050633Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T052959Z
UID:98699-1772438400-1772470800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting Report “Iran: Overlapping Internal and External Crises”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Deepika Saraswat\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA\, delivered a presentation on “Iran: Overlapping Internal and External Crises” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 02 March 2026. The meeting was moderated by Dr. P. K. Pradhan\, Research Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA. MP – IDSA scholars participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation examined the present phase of crisis in Iran not as an isolated military exchange\, but as the culmination of overlapping internal and external pressures on Iran. Domestic unrest\, economic fragility and political contestation have intersected with external coercive diplomacy\, military signalling and direct strikes\, thereby pushing Tehran toward a more escalatory and risk-acceptant posture. In this interpretation\, Iran no longer sees the confrontation as limited to Israel alone; rather\, it views itself as being in direct conflict with the United States and considers US bases in the region to be legitimate targets if Washington is militarily involved. The Speaker traced the present crisis to a convergence of internal instability in Iran and renewed external pressure\, especially under a framework of coercive diplomacy and military escalation. The implication is that one cannot understand the current confrontation purely through nuclear diplomacy or military moves alone; rather\, it reflects a wider crisis of regional order. \nDetailed Report\nDr. P. K. Pradhan opened the Session by providing a concise background to the ongoing crisis. He traced the disruption of peace negotiations mediated by Oman and argued that the subsequent killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader precipitated a phase of military confrontation\, marked by retaliatory actions by Iran against the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Dr. Saraswat commenced her presentation by underscoring the dual pressures confronting Iran: the intensification of internal unrest on the one hand\, and the mounting external threats on the other. The protests and economic pressures within Iran overlapped with renewed US and Israeli threats\, thereby producing what the Speaker described as the worst-case strategic scenario for the Islamic Republic. Negotiations\, reportedly mediated by Oman\, were presented as having unfolded under highly coercive conditions. The Speaker argued that from Tehran’s perspective\, diplomacy under such terms came to resemble strategic surrender rather than meaningful compromise. This framing is essential to understanding why Iranian responses became earlier\, sharper and more regionally expansive. \nSlow strategic strangulation or sharp confrontation\, two options were left for Iran to respond in existential terms. Iran’s retaliatory logic\, as described by the Speaker is both strategic and asymmetric. Unable to match its adversaries symmetrically across all domains\, it has sought to target US bases\, symbolic infrastructure and economically sensitive sites in the Gulf. The purpose is not merely retaliation in a narrow military sense\, but the creation of a new deterrence equation in which insecurity is regionalised. In effect\, Tehran appears to be signalling that if Iran cannot be secure\, then no state closely aligned with US military operations should assume immunity from the consequences. \nDr. Saraswat argued that there is a direct U.S. – Iran escalation dynamics from brinkmanship. A key argument advanced by the Speaker is that Iran’s earlier strategy of calibrated response and “strategic patience” failed to arrest the lowering of escalation thresholds by Israel and the United States. The Speaker noted that what began as shadow conflict and indirect contestation has progressively moved toward direct strikes\, leadership decapitation attempts\, attacks on military infrastructure and threats to regime survival. In this context\, Tehran is said to have concluded that the only remaining option is to impose wider costs on its adversaries and on the regional system supporting them. \nDr. Saraswat also placed emphasis on the gradual lowering of escalation thresholds since 2024. What had once been shadow war and proxy competition is described as having evolved into direct missile exchanges\, sustained attacks on strategic facilities\, and even attempts to target top leadership. This historical sequencing matters\, because it supports the argument that Iran’s current posture is a response to the perceived failure of “strategic patience” and restrained retaliation. \nThe Speaker strongly suggested that Iran now sees the conflict through the lens of survival. Regime change remains a political objective for some actors\, but not an assured outcome.  If diplomacy under pressure is equated with strategic surrender\, then escalation becomes\, from Tehran’s perspective\, a means to restore deterrence and improve bargaining leverage. This includes attacks on US bases\, symbolic sites\, and vulnerable economic targets across the Gulf. Such a strategy is asymmetric: Iran cannot mirror the full technological reach of the US-Israel side\, so it seeks to distribute insecurity across the region instead. \nThe US-Israel strategy may have expanded beyond rollback of Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities toward weakening the regime’s coercive institutions and encouraging internal political rupture. However\, the Speaker is cautious: air power and decapitation efforts alone are unlikely to guarantee regime collapse. Iran’s governance system is described as operating through multiple councils and distributed institutions\, which may allow continuity even after severe shocks. Thus\, while the regime is under strain\, its breakdown should not be assumed. \nThe discussion repeatedly underscored that the Gulf monarchies did not want this war. Their position is structurally vulnerable because US military infrastructure on their soil makes them potential targets\, while their economies remain deeply exposed to even limited instability. If oil flows\, investor sentiment\, aviation routes\, or urban security are disrupted\, the political and financial fallout could be severe. The mention of attacks or spill over into civilian areas reinforces the point that Gulf vulnerability is not merely theoretical. This condition is described as “reverse entrapment\,” whereby weaker allies are drawn into conflict by the decisions of a stronger security partner. \nAnother escalation is on the Strait of Hormuz where the Speaker suggests that Iran’s objective is not necessarily full closure\, but calibrated disruption sufficient to raise freight costs\, unsettle energy markets and globalise the effects of the war. In such a scenario\, the conflict ceases to be geographically localised and becomes economically international\, with Asian economies—especially energy importers earing substantial costs. \nQuestion and Answer\nOne of the scholars asked how deeply entrenched the ideology of Iran’s Supreme Leader is in Iranian society as nation. The Speaker highlighted an important socio-political tension. On the one hand\, there are deep grievances against the Supreme Leader and against the State’s repressive apparatus. Some segments of society may indeed welcome visible setbacks to the regime. On the other hand\, external pressure may strengthen siege nationalism and reinforce cohesion among regime loyalists\, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Dr. Saraswat added that many Iranians may fear not only regime survival\, but the possibility of “Syrianisation” or “Libyanisation”—that is\, State collapse followed by prolonged civil conflict and fragmentation. \nOne participant asked whether Iran had done the right thing by escalating the war and whether it had the capacity to sustain such a campaign. The response was that\, from Tehran’s perspective\, escalation may have become unavoidable once the conflict was framed as existential and once external actors signalled willingness to widen objectives beyond nuclear rollback. \nAnother important line of questioning concerned whether Iran had missed the opportunity to acquire a nuclear weapon and thereby secure stronger deterrence. The Speaker argued that Iran may have deliberately avoided becoming a “North Korea\,” preferring threshold capability and ambiguity as tools of bargaining. Full weaponisation\, in this view\, would have imposed heavy isolation costs without necessarily solving Iran’s long-term security dilemma. \nQuestions on China\, Russia and wider global implications produced a broader geopolitical reading. The Speaker appeared skeptical of claims that the crisis should be seen primarily through a China-centred lens\, but acknowledged that Beijing would interpret it as evidence of continuing US willingness to maintain regional hegemony by force. Similarly\, the issue of Russian links to Shahed drone production was raised as a factor that could shape the conflict’s duration and operational character. \nReport prepared by Ms. Warisha Wasi\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-report-iran-overlapping-internal-and-external-crises
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260309T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260309T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001122
CREATED:20260630T042249Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053044Z
UID:98691-1773043200-1773075600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Post- Electoral Dynamics in Myanmar: Civil War Trajectories and Borderland Geopolitics”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Om Prakash Das\, Research Fellow\, made a presentation on “Post- Electoral Dynamics in Myanmar: Civil War Trajectories and Borderland Geopolitics” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 09 March 2026. Dr. Anand Kumar\, Associate Fellow\, moderated the meeting. Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation offered a detailed analysis of the 2025-26 General Elections held in Myanmar. It also discussed the impact of internal security in Myanmar on the broader regional security. The main focus of the presentation was on issues in bordering areas of India and Myanmar and measures to mitigate the same.   \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. Anand Kumar identified three key trends shaping contemporary geopolitics: the “Trump-triggered crises\,” challenges arising from Artificial Intelligence (AI)\, and the growing prevalence of civil wars and civil unrest in developing countries. He cited Myanmar as a clear example of the third trend. Following the 2021 military coup that ousted the elected government\, the country experienced widespread protests and a prolonged civil war involving resistance groups and ethnic militias\, many operating in border regions. \nDr. Kumar noted that the military junta conducted General Elections in 2025\, resulting in a landslide victory for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in early 2026. However\, the elections were widely criticised as neither free nor fair\, with several political parties banned and nearly 30% of Myanmar’s territory still affected by conflict. He emphasised that borderlands remain central to the conflict and have significant implications for regional stability\, particularly for India\, given their shared border and strategic interests. \nWith this backdrop\, Dr. Om Prakash Das analysed the 2026 General Elections in Myanmar\, noting that after the 2021 military coup\, the junta used the elections to restore constitutional continuity and seek political legitimacy. Conducted in three phases between January 2025 and January 2026\, the elections aimed to institutionalise post-coup governance within the framework of the 2008 Constitution. Results showed the dominance of the military-backed USDP\, which won 232 of the 263 contested seats in the 440-seat Lower House\, where 25% are reserved for the military. Dr. Das also highlighted contested regions controlled by ethnic armed groups\, particularly in border areas\, and described the USDP as rooted in military-bureaucratic networks. \nDr. Om Prakash Das examined Myanmar’s electoral trajectory from 2010 to 2026\, highlighting shifts in political dominance. In the 2010 General Elections\, held after the 2008 Constitution\, the National League for Democracy (NLD) did not participate\, enabling the military-backed USDP to win 76% of the seats. In the 2012 by-elections\, the NLD secured 96% of the contested seats. The 2015 General Elections\, which included all major parties\, resulted in a decisive NLD victory with 79% of the seats\, while the USDP won only 10%. A similar pattern appeared in the 2022 elections\, where the NLD won 82% and the USDP 7%. However\, in the 2026 elections\, pro-democratic parties were barred\, allowing the USDP to secure 88% of the seats. Voter turnout declined to 55%\, compared to about 77% earlier. Dr. Das noted that the 2023 Political Party Registration Law imposed strict requirements that reduced the number of registered parties from 92 to 52\, excluding the NLD. \nDr. Om Prakash Das noted that while Myanmar’s military continues to control key state institutions and major economic and administrative centres\, it lacked the capacity to fully eliminate resistance groups. At the same time\, resistance forces had captured territories in several regions but did not possess sufficient military strength to overthrow the regime. This balance had resulted in a prolonged civil war and sustained instability. Rural areas such as Thandwe and Magwe remained centres of resistance\, while borderlands were largely controlled by ethnic armed organisations. The resistance movement was highly decentralised\, with local militias coordinating with experienced ethnic armed groups and relying on asymmetric tactics such as ambushes\, sabotage\, and attacks on supply routes. Dr. Das argued that the elections sought to transform a wartime situation into political normalisation by installing a nominal civilian government to reduce diplomatic pressure. However\, divisions among ethnic armed groups and pro-democratic actors\, driven by demands for economic federalism and ethnic self-determination\, complicate prospects for a comprehensive peace settlement. \nDr. Om Prakash Das further explained that the National Unity Government (NUG) operated alongside networks of armed resistance groups known as the People’s Defence Force (PDF). Several ethnic armed organisations had also established parallel governance structures outside direct military control. In many areas\, these groups collected taxes\, administered local justice mechanisms\, and coordinated humanitarian assistance\, resulting in overlapping political systems within Myanmar. For many citizens\, the NUG represented the continuation of democratic governance\, while the military leadership viewed it as a direct challenge to its authority. \nDr. Das noted that recent military developments\, such as the recapture of key positions in northern Shan State and the consolidation of ethnic armed group control in parts of Rakhine State\, carried strategic implications\, particularly for infrastructure initiatives such as India’s Kaladan Multimodal Project. Despite these developments\, the military continued to retain significant strategic advantages. \nThe Speaker also highlighted the importance of external partnerships in sustaining the military’s capacity. Russia had emerged as a key military partner\, while China maintained complex relations with the regime\, combining economic engagement with cautious political guidance and continued involvement in infrastructure projects. \nDr. Das stated that more than 20 ethnic armed groups had opposed the junta since 2021. Although the possibility of negotiations could not be ruled out\, deep political divisions between the junta and the broader population made meaningful dialogue unlikely. Earlier peace initiatives\, including ceasefire frameworks linked to the 2008 Constitution and talks in 2015 had largely strengthened the military’s leverage\, rather than empowering ethnic groups seeking autonomy. \nDr. Om Prakash Das stated that the civil war had significantly reshaped the strategic environment along the Indo–Myanmar border. The collapse of state authority in regions such as Sagaing\, Chin\, and parts of Kachin had created governance vacuums and fragmented sovereignty. Multiple actors\, including the military\, ethnic armed organisations\, and local militias\, controlled different territories\, complicating border management and counter-insurgency efforts. The spread of cross-border insurgent networks had further affected security\, while issues such as narcotics smuggling\, illegal trafficking\, and timber extraction had intensified\, creating long-term challenges. \nDr. Das noted that India’s foreign policy had increasingly shifted towards securitisation\, reflected in the suspension of the Free Movement Regime (FMR) and plans to fence the border. However\, only about 60 km of the border had been fenced so far\, due to local opposition\, security constraints\, and rising costs. He concluded that Myanmar’s conflict remained complex\, as the military sought to institutionalise its authority through elections while deeper issues of legitimacy\, military dominance\, and territorial fragmentation persisted. Consequently\, the evolving situation would continue to pose security challenges for India and require a pragmatic border management strategy. \nQ&A Session and Discussion\nAmb. Sujan Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, emphasised that developments in Myanmar had important implications for India\, particularly regarding regional stability and border security. He noted that instability in Myanmar was not in India’s interest given the shared border and long-standing strategic and developmental ties between the two countries. Highlighting the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity\, he stressed that clearly defined borders were essential for maintaining stability in frontier regions. In this context\, he referred to India’s efforts to strengthen border management\, including the fencing of segments of the Indo–Myanmar border. \nAmb. Chinoy further observed that as India expanded its engagement with Southeast Asia through its Act East policy\, Myanmar continued to present both opportunities and challenges. He highlighted the strategic importance of connectivity initiatives such as the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project\, noting that its successful implementation depended on sustained peace and political stability. Drawing comparisons with developments related to Chabahar Port and the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor\, he remarked that infrastructure initiatives in politically sensitive regions often faced delays due to instability or lack of consensus. \nAmb. Chinoy concluded by stressing the need for a pragmatic and balanced approach towards Myanmar\, while remaining mindful of evolving geopolitical dynamics\, including the growing regional role of China. \nThe discussion that followed explored several related issues. Participants raised questions regarding governance arrangements in areas beyond the control of Myanmar’s central authorities and the prospects for engagement with local actors in border regions. It was noted that informal dialogues at the think-tank level had occasionally facilitated limited engagement with various groups operating along the border\, many of which maintained strong community linkages. \nIn the course of the discussion\, Dr. Om Prakash Das highlighted the importance of effective border management from India’s perspective. He noted that security forces\, including the Assam Rifles\, had increasingly relied on technological measures such as smart surveillance systems to monitor the border and track cross-border movements. Efforts to record biometric data of refugees entering through the border areas of Mizoram were also mentioned\, although several operational and logistical challenges remained. Participants also discussed the implications of divisions among ethnic armed groups and the role of external actors in the ongoing conflict. Overall\, the discussion underscored the complexity of the evolving situation and the need for carefully calibrated policy responses. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Sharvari Devendra Patil\, Intern\, ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-post-electoral-dynamics-in-myanmar-civil-war-trajectories-and-borderland-geopolitics
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260316T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260316T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001122
CREATED:20260702T061934Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053224Z
UID:98742-1773648000-1773680400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “AI Impact Summit 2026: Key Takeaways and India's Strategy”
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Khyati Singh\, Research Analyst\, spoke on “AI Impact Summit 2026: Key Takeaways and India’s Strategy” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 16 March\, 2026. The Session was moderated by Col. Nestor Derrick D’Souza\, Research Fellow. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute attended the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Speaker traced global AI governance from Bletchley Park to the AI Impact Summit 2026\, where India advanced the MANAV framework of moral\, accountable\, sovereign\, accessible and valid AI\, alongside initiatives for democratic diffusion and indigenous language models. It then examined AI’s weaponisation in U.S. operations in Venezuela and Iran\, showing its role in autonomous warfare and exposing the risks of dependence on commercial models. The Speaker highlighted the duality in AI-driven technologies\, while forwarding the central argument that India must pursue sovereign\, balanced AI development. \nDetailed Report\nCol. D’Souza began his Opening Remarks by asserting that human evolution has progressed through distinct ‘ages’\, from agriculture to industrialisation\, then the information technology or ‘knowledge’ age\, and now the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI) . Today\, AI shapes everyday life\, solving routine and complex problems alike\, even as individuals increasingly trade privacy for convenience under constant digital surveillance. Global leaders emphasise that dominance in AI will determine future world power\, intensifying international competition. In this context\, India’s AI Impact Summit highlighted a shift from dialogue to demonstrable impact\, guided by people\, planet\, and progress\, and inspired by Vasudeva Kutumbakam. The Summit addressed key concerns such as child safety\, job disruption\, ethics\, environmental impact\, and equitable growth\, while also showcasing India’s AI capabilities and fostering collaborative policy development through broad stakeholder engagement. \nMs. Khyati Singh began her presentation by stating that the trajectory of global AI governance can be understood through a series of international summits beginning in 2023. The first\, held in the United Kingdom at the Bletchley Park AI Safety Summit\, marked a defining moment as countries collectively came together to deliberate on AI. Attended by around 100 representatives from 30 technologically advanced nations\, it focused narrowly on AI safety\, risk mitigation\, and concerns surrounding artificial general intelligence escaping human control. The primary outcome was the establishment of AI Safety Institutes aimed at standardising testing methodologies before commercial deployment. \nMs. Khyati also pointed out that this safety-centric approach continued into the AI Seoul Summit of May 2024\, where efforts were made to formalise concerns through frontier AI safety commitments. Sixteen leading technology companies agreed to assess risk across the AI lifecycle\, define intolerable thresholds\, and halt developments that could significantly harm humanity. However\, compliance remained uneven\, with several corporate signatories establishing internal safeguards inconsistently. \nThe Speaker further highlighted that attempts to build geopolitical consensus during the Paris Summit remained incomplete. Countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States refrained from endorsing binding ethical standards\, arguing that such frameworks could hinder AI development\, particularly in contexts such as weapon development. This reluctance reflected a broader tension between ethical AI and strategic use\, especially as AI-enabled weapons and assistant systems have already been deployed in recent conflicts. \nThe AI Impact Summit in India in 2026 marked a definitive geographical departure\, being the first such event hosted in the Global South. Held at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi from February 16 to 21\, it witnessed participation of over 600\,000 individuals in person and approximately 900\,000 virtually. India was projected as a leader for both the AI world and the Global South\, signalling a shift in the centre of gravity of AI discourse. \nAccording to Ms. Khyati the most important outcome of the Summit was the articulation of a human-centric governance framework termed MANAV. The acronym encapsulates a unified structure: Moral and Ethical Systems emphasising fairness\, transparency\, and continuous human oversight embedded directly within algorithmic architecture; Accountable Governance ensuring transparent administrative rules and robust oversight mechanisms\, supported by the India AI Mission to democratise datasets and mandate safe AI principles; National Sovereignty asserting the inalienable right of States to protect domestic data within their own cultural\, linguistic\, and legal frameworks\, guided by the principle “whose data\, his right”; Accessible and Inclusive AI demanding systems that function across low-resource environments and diverse linguistic landscapes beyond English-speaking populations; and Valid and Legitimate Systems focusing on verifiability and trustworthiness of outputs to counter deepfakes and AI hallucinations through filtered\, legitimate data sources. \nThis comprehensive framework positions India as an ideological vanguard of the Global South\, advocating a balanced approach that avoids colonial-style data extraction and instead promotes a Make in India model\, allowing countries to store data within their own boundaries and build local cloud and dataset infrastructures. The Summit’s diplomatic outcomes included the New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact\, endorsed by approximately 92 countries and international organisations\, including major strategic rivals such as the United States\, China\, Russia\, and the United Kingdom\, reflecting a broad global consensus. \nAnother significant outcome was the Charter for Democratic Diffusion of AI\, supported by 22 countries and multiple institutions. This voluntary framework aims to break the oligopolistic control of foundational AI models by promoting local innovation ecosystems\, technology transfer\, and resilient infrastructure while respecting sovereign goals. Supporting initiatives included the Global AI Impact Commons to scale and share use cases\, the Trusted AI Commons as a repository of safety benchmarks and best practices\, and an equitable AI transition playbook developed with the International Labour Organization to address labour market disruption. \nThe Summit also highlighted India’s breakthrough use case models. Mission Bhashini and VoicERA were presented as national language infrastructure integrating over 350 AI models across 22 official languages\, enabling even illiterate individuals to access AI services through voice by simply dialling a number. These models demonstrated how AI can be made accessible to nearly 130 crore people in their own linguistic contexts. \nSarvam AI was introduced as a domestic entity developing sovereign foundational models trained on Indian datasets\, optimised for regional scripts and linguistic nuances. Its models enable real-time translation and application across sectors such as film production\, reducing costs and expanding reach. BharatGen AI\, a strictly government-funded multimodal model\, integrates text\, speech\, and document vision capabilities\, ensuring secure and sovereign public service delivery without third-party risk. Inya VoiceOS\, a multilingual speech model\, operates effectively under severe low-bandwidth conditions\, ensuring accessibility even in regions with limited connectivity. \nThe discussion then shifted to the global scale\, where alongside democratic and inclusive AI\, the weaponisation of AI has become evident. In January 2026\, the United States launched Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela\, capturing President Maduro within hours through AI-driven cyber and intelligence systems. AI enabled manipulation of grid systems\, real-time tracking of locations\, and predictive scenario modelling\, demonstrating effects-based operations with high precision and minimal human damage. \nThis was followed by Operation Epic Fury in Iran\, showcasing autonomous kinetic saturation through large-scale deployment of low-cost uncrewed combat systems. AI-enabled drone swarms communicated autonomously\, adjusted flight paths\, and executed coordinated multi-vector strikes while overwhelming defence systems. Simultaneously\, AI-assisted defence systems such as Iron Dome and Patriot batteries intercepted retaliatory attacks\, illustrating AI’s dual role in offensive and defensive operations. \nThese operations exposed structural vulnerabilities\, particularly the dependence on commercial AI platforms. The use of external models such as Claude led to disputes between private companies and the U.S. Government\, as corporate entities objected to military usage that violated their guidelines. Despite official discontinuation announcements\, such models continued to be used due to deep integration\, highlighting the difficulty of replacing embedded AI systems without equivalent substitutes. \nIn her concluding remarks\, Ms. Khyati opined that the key takeaway for India is the need to maintain a dual AI strategy\, i.e.\, promoting development\, security\, and safety while asserting sovereignty. Ethical considerations must coexist with strategic imperatives through a balanced approach. India must develop indigenous\, government-funded AI models with locally stored datasets to avoid dependence on private or foreign entities. At the same time\, it must handhold small companies and emerging players to achieve scale\, ensuring that domestic innovation ecosystems can match global advancements while remaining rooted within national systems. \nQ&A Session\nIn the discussion that followed\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, noted that the rapid advancement of AI will soon surpass conventional research and analysis\, making its integration essential for scholars. He emphasised that India must balance concerns over job losses with strengthening capabilities in data sovereignty\, models\, software\, and computing power. Instead of pursuing perfect systems\, the priority should be early and practical diffusion. He highlighted the need to use AI to expand access to science and technology beyond English-speaking elites and across defence\, business\, and daily use. \nThe discussion also covered AI in warfare\, ethical guardrails\, defence applications\, the role of private entities\, human agency\, and challenges of data and indigenisation in India. \nReport prepared by Ms. Meghna Pradhan\, Research Analyst\, Centre for North America and Strategic Technologies\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-ai-impact-summit-2026-key-takeaways-and-indias-strategy
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260323T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260323T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001122
CREATED:20260630T043721Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053349Z
UID:98697-1774252800-1774285200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “India - Vietnam Strategic Partnership: Internal and External Dimensions”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Temjenmeren Ao\, Associate Fellow\, at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: Internal and External Dimensions” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 23 March 2026. Dr. Om Prakash Das\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the Session\, which was attended by scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session reviewed the internal political and external dynamics of the foreign policy of Vietnam\, its trajectory and progress of India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the last decade (2016-2026) in the light of growing defence cooperation and economic engagement which underpin the multifaceted bilateral relationship between India and Vietnam. Dr. Ao analysed the 14th Party Congress held in January 2026 which set out revised national and economic priorities and the emergence of Mr. To Lam as Vietnam’s dominant political figure. Linking these internal developments to  foreign policy ramifications\, Dr. Ao summarised Vietnamese foreign policy\, particularly analysing the foreign policy approach under General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)\, Mr. To Lam and also explored Vietnam’s bilateral ties with China and the US\, Party to Party ties with China’s CCP\, and defence collaboration.      \nDetailed Report\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Dr. Om Prakash Das gave a brief historical summary from the late 1970s when full bilateral relationship was established\, to upgradation of ties into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016\, marking 10 years of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between India and Vietnam. The bilateral cooperation among the two countries is multi-faceted and ranges from economic engagement and defence collaboration to energy\, space and digital cooperation and the Joint Vision statement of Peace\, Prosperity and People\, adopted by both the countries in 2020 aims to further strengthen the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. However\, Dr. Das also pointed out the asymmetry in trade and economic engagement\, with bilateral trade remaining below the target of US$20 billion\, among other issues. \nFollowing Dr. Das’s Introductory Remarks\, Dr. Temjenmeren Ao presented a detailed account of the India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and stated that there has been substantial improvement in terms of investments and security cooperation in the last decade\, with the India – Vietnam Strategic Partnership being very organic in nature. This was further strengthened by the adoption of the Joint Vision of Peace\, Prosperity and People by both the countries in 2020\, which emphasised extending co-operation to technology\, digitisation\, energy\, agrarian sectors\, and better governance among others. India has extended a Line of Credit (LOC) worth US$500 billion for Vietnam’s defence procurements besides another US $300 million microcredit for maritime security. Moreover\, the Joint Vision statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030\, signed in 2022\, provides scope to further bolster cooperation on maritime and non-traditional security challenges such as cyber security and terrorism. \nDr. Ao highlighted that bilateral trade from 2014 to 2024 has increased from US$9.2 billion to US$16 billion. India has invested around US$1.9 million in over 460 projects in Vietnam while Vietnam has invested US$14 million\, in 16 projects in India. The Vietnamese Conglomerate Vingroup in December 2025 has signed an MOU with the Government of Telangana for a multi-sectoral investment of US$3 billion. Dr. Ao also stated that ASEAN is yet to become a single market which is one of the major causes of India’s widening trade deficit with Vietnam. \nFocusing on the internal and external dimensions of this Strategic Partnership\, Dr. Ao pointed out that every five years\, the Party Congress of the CPV sets out the economic targets and national priorities to be achieved. The 14th Party Congress held in January 2026\, adopted an ambitious target of achieving US$8500 GDP per capita by 2030 and a 10% growth rate starting from this year\, in line with making Vietnam a high-income country by 2045. The current GDP of Vietnam is US$4\,740\, making it the sixth largest country by GDP in Southeast Asia. However\, as per the IMF projections\, at the current growth rate\, by 2030 Vietnam would have a GDP of US$6\,320 indicating a gap of over US$2\,000 dollars. Besides economic indicators\, Dr. Ao also talked about political developments\, with Mr. To Lam getting re-elected as the General Secretary of the CPV and emerging as a dominant political figure. Under Mr. To Lam’s leadership\, Vietnam is likely to adopt a more decisive and pragmatic approach as it looks to achieve its internal development priorities. Mr. To Lam is placing astronomical growth at the heart of his recipe for success. As the external geopolitical environment becomes more complex on account of further intensification of US-China competition; an unpredictable US trade policy; and the economic fallout of the ongoing war in West Asia\, it has prompted a shift in Vietnam’s strategic thinking. \nDr. Ao stated that Vietnam’s foreign policy continues to reflect pragmatic flexibility\, with Hanoi seeing Beijing as an important ideological and economic partner considering the close Party to Party ties\, while leveraging US to ensure regional balance and curtail China’s assertiveness in the region. Vietnam in the last decade has diversified its partnerships and now has a comprehensive strategic partnership with 14 countries\, that includes the United States\, China\, India\, Canada\, Australia\, and other countries in Southeast Asia. This outreach gives Vietnam the flexibility of not being dependent on a single power\, yet ensuring that its national interests and priorities are balanced. Vietnam continues to manage its relations between the US and China\, while at the same time diversifying its partnerships\, to avoid dependence on any single power. Based on its ‘bamboo diplomacy’ and under Mr To Lam’s pragmatic nationalism\, Hanoi is expected to become even more assertive in its expectation from its partners while committing to none. Vietnam is also prioritising defence modernisation that includes restructuring 5\,000 of its military units and plans to accelerate its defence industry development. Geo-political uncertainties and security challenges are pushing Vietnam towards deeper international integration through its defence diplomacy with its external partners such as India. \nQ &A Session\nThe presentation was followed by discussion moderated by Dr. O.P. Das. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP- IDSA\, observed that while India and Vietnam undoubtedly have good bilateral ties\, this cannot be stated as an exceptional partnership\, highlighting the absence of any defining breakthrough moments in the last decade\, due to structural limitations inherent to Vietnam. One such limitation is Vietnam’s political and strategic orientation towards China\, wherein Vietnam’s Party maintains excellent ties with the CCP and hence even in occasional moments of tensions and confrontational disputes in the South China Sea\, Vietnam controls such situations\, through its Party-to-Party relationship and dialogue. He further noted that Vietnam’s foreign policy anchored in its four NO’s doctrine\, a version of non-alignment\, infers that Vietnam is unlikely to take overt positions in India’s strategic disputes. He further pointed out that while Vietnam is a partner State\, at the same time\, it is an economic competitor for India in arenas of global supply chains. Vietnam benefits from trade agreements like RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) among others and is therefore able to attract significant Chinese and Japanese investment. This economic interdependence on China and strong engagement with India’s major partners like Japan\, create a structural limit\, obstructing further deepening of the India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership. \nOther participants raised questions. One query related to the conventional and non-conventional security threats that Vietnam faced. Another question focused on Vietnam’s military modernisation and its border negotiations with China. There were other questions about Vietnam’s perspective on ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ and whether convergence with India in that domain is possible. \nResponding to these questions\, Dr. Ao stated that conventional threats that Vietnam faces are mainly its borders and securing the disputed islands while it has also faced  the increasing non-conventional threat of terrorism in the last decade. On defence cooperation\, Dr. Ao highlighted that 80% of Vietnam’s equipment and military hardware is still based on the Russian platforms which are under sanctions\, thereby pushing Vietnam to diversify its partnerships and engage in defence diplomacy\, with partners like India. On the Indo-Pacific\, he highlighted that while Vietnam did not mention the word prior to 2019 until the ASEAN came out with the AOIP (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific)\, it is gradually adopting the term and focusing on it. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr Ao emphasised that moving to the next decade\, under Mr. To Lam’s pragmatic orientation to achieve vision 2045\, Vietnam is seeking diverse external partnerships that would aid it in building these capabilities. Though there are challenges\, the India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has enabled positive developments in their relations\, as both sides share strong convergences rooted in achieving their respective national goals. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Himanshu Kulkarni\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-india-vietnam-strategic-partnership-internal-and-external-dimensions
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260330T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260330T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T001122
CREATED:20260702T060344Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053332Z
UID:98739-1774857600-1774890000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Mr. Niranjan Oak's Monday Morning Presentation on "The Unravelling of the Global Nuclear Order"
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting featuring a presentation by Mr. Niranjan Oak\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA on “The Unravelling of the Global Nuclear Order.” The Session was moderated by Dr. Abhishek Verma\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Session examined the erosion of the global nuclear order and the key pillars that have supported nuclear governance since the Second World War. The Speaker argued that the current nuclear landscape shows institutional decline\, growing multipolarity\, weakening of the norms against nuclear weapon use\, and the disruptive impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Mr. Oak assessed four main pillars of the existing Global Nuclear Order: the international nuclear regime\, bipolar nuclear hegemony\, extended nuclear deterrence\, and the nuclear taboo\, and found that each is under serious stress. He also spoke about the impact of AI on Strategic Stability. Finally\, he discussed how India has harmonised its nuclear policies in accordance with the global nuclear regime\, despite being a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). \nDetailed Discussion\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Dr. Abhishek Verma\, introduced the topic by highlighting the renewed salience of nuclear weapons in current geopolitics. Referring to recent developments such as nuclear signalling during the Russia–Ukraine War\, France’s proposal of forward deterrence\, Germany’s interest in nuclear-sharing arrangements\, and Finland’s proposed legal changes to allow nuclear weapons on its territory\, he showed how the foundations of the existing nuclear order are being challenged. \nMr. Niranjan Oak began by noting that there is no fixed definition of the global nuclear order. He described it as a mix of international regimes\, institutions\, norms\, and practices that aim to maintain balance in the governance of nuclear technology. He defined it as a practical compromise between complete nuclear anarchy and disarmament. He argued that the current nuclear order can be assessed by four factors: the international nuclear regime\, bipolar nuclear hegemony\, extended nuclear deterrence\, and the nuclear taboo. \nMr. Oak described the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of global nuclear governance\, but despite being ratified by 191 States\, it is widely seen as structurally unfair. The Treaty’s commitment to disarmament prescribed by Article VI—which mandates an end to the arms race and meaningful movement toward total disarmament—remains unfulfilled. This failure has essentially permitted the five acknowledged Nuclear-Weapon States to maintain their stockpiles\, with global counts projected to increase. Furthermore\, Mr. Oak believes the Treaty’s credibility has been gravely compromised by U.S. and Israel’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites\, particularly as Iran is an NPT signatory asserting its rights under Article IV. \nOn the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)\, the Speaker noted that although it has not entered into force\, it has largely been followed since 1996 except by North Korea\, but its future is uncertain after indications in October 2025 of a possible U.S. return to testing. The U.S. accusations of low-yield tests by Russia and China remain unconfirmed\, while Vladimir Putin has warned of a matching response. \nOn bilateral arms control\, he stated that New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired on 5 February 2026\, marking the end of the arms control era that began eroding with the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Key barriers to a new agreement include disputes over participation\, weapons categories\, and defence capabilities\, compounded by the Ukraine War\, leaving no limits on deployed strategic weapons between the two main nuclear powers. \nAccording to Mr. Oak\, China’s accelerated nuclear growth—marked by the construction of new missile silos\, development of MIRV-capable intercontinental missiles\, and rising plutonium output—represents a significant geopolitical shift. He projected that China could achieve parity with the nuclear stockpiles of the U.S. and Russia by approximately 2030\, a development that risks triggering a three-way arms race through reactive military expansions. China’s rise is also generating pressure for nuclear growth in the Indo-Pacific\, with debates in Japan and South Korea alongside concerns about China’s non-proliferation record and territorial ambitions. \nThe Speaker observed that increasing skepticism regarding U.S. extended deterrence has led European nations to investigate autonomous alternatives. This shift is evidenced by the July 2025 Northwood Declaration\, which facilitates coordination between British and French forces\, alongside broadened “forward deterrence” frameworks. Concurrently\, comparable concerns have surfaced in the Indo-Pacific region\, specifically within South Korea and Japan\, amid changing security dynamics such as the Russia–North Korea Partnership and other nascent defence agreements. \nReferring to Dr. Nina Tannenwald\, he explained that the nuclear taboo reflects a belief in the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons\, which is now under pressure\, due to explicit threats by leaders\, risking erosion of long-standing restraint since 1945. He warned that increasing reliance on AI in military systems may heighten uncertainty\, as its limitations\, vulnerability to cyber-attacks\, and impact on secrecy and decision time could weaken second-strike capability and raise the risk of miscalculation\, despite human control formally remaining in place. \nMr. Oak concluded by reviewing India’s position on the matter. India has long supported a fair global system for non-proliferation and disarmament but did not accept the NPT\, calling it “nuclear apartheid” because it limits some States but not others. India has also not signed the CTBT but follows a voluntary testing pause\, and its non-proliferation record is clean\, with no proven cases of sharing nuclear technology. India has been formally integrated into global nuclear control systems through its 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver and participation in export control regimes. Its nuclear deterrent has been effective\, as shown by its ability to carry out conventional military actions under nuclear pressure in the India–Pakistan context\, exposing Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. \nQ&A Session\nThe presentation was followed by a lively discussion.  Dr. Abhishek Verma\, Dr. Hina. Pandey\, Dr. M. S. Prathibha\, Ms. Deepika Saraswat\, and Mr. Arnab Dasgupta made observations and raised questions\, which were addressed by Mr. Niranjan Oak. \nThe weakening U.S. extended deterrence in Europe and Asia was raised as a factor that could speed up nuclear proliferation in both regions\, alongside the possible role of the Saudi Arabia–Pakistan mutual defence pact in future India–Pakistan tensions. It was questioned whether the size of China’s nuclear arsenal matters in practical terms\, since even one nuclear weapon can deter. The situation was described as a “nuclear disorder” rather than a true order\, noting that no NPT Review Conference has produced a consensus document since 2015\, followed by major decline in the regime. Article 4 of the NPT was highlighted as long disputed\, with many States seeing it as an unconditional right to nuclear energy\, while the United States applies a narrower view and restricts some technologies even for allies. On New START\, the absence of inspections since 2017 was noted\, weakening its verification function well before its expiry. It was asked how India should respond if Japan and South Korea develop nuclear weapons\, given their importance as partners. The value of nuclear arsenals\, especially tactical versus strategic weapons\, was questioned. \nIt was argued that the nuclear order began weakening after the Cold War\, and that China’s nuclear rise should not be overstated given its focus on conventional missiles and minimal second-strike capability. \nAdditionally\, it was stated that India should avoid multilateral arms control arrangements involving China and Pakistan. \nIt was stated that U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea remain strong and are unlikely to change without a major decline in U.S. power. \nMr. Niranjan Oak replied that Japan and South Korea have the technical ability to quickly develop nuclear weapons. While their reliance on U.S. security has supported economic growth\, President Trump’s posture and the North Korean threat have increased domestic nuclear debates\, making regional proliferation possible. However\, a major shift in U.S. power would still be required before independent nuclear choices are made. On the Saudi–Pakistan pact\, he said Saudi Arabia is unlikely to give direct military support to Pakistan due to strong ties with India\, but Pakistan may use the pact to gain financial support from the Gulf. On arsenal size\, he noted that while equal numbers are not required for deterrence\, China’s expansion shows a desire for parity with the United States and Russia\, as noted in The Science of Military Strategy\, adding that China’s stated no-first-use and minimum deterrence policies do not match its actions\, including adopting a launch-on-warning posture. \nOn New START\, the Speaker noted that the U.S. compliance report found no suspicious activity in Russia’s arsenal. He said India would likely express concern but avoid active diplomatic steps if Japan and South Korea develop nuclear weapons. He added that nuclear deterrence works\, citing North Korea\, which has not been attacked\, unlike Iran. On China\, he said evidence suggests expansion of its nuclear capabilities\, though reliable information is limited\, noting that nuclear developments are largely opaque\, with most public data coming from the West\, while satellite images showing China building nuclear silos and its large-scale plutonium production raises further questions. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Cyrus Ghosh\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mr-niranjan-oaks-monday-morning-presentation-on-the-unravelling-of-the-global-nuclear-order
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