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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260105T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260105T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T003024
CREATED:20260306T115658Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060454Z
UID:95936-1767600000-1767632400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on "Atmanirbharta in Defence: Integrating National Security with Development"
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Rahul Wankhede\, Research Analyst\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, spoke on “Atmanirbharta in Defence: Integrating National Security with Development” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 5 January 2026. The presentation was based on his paper for the Field Marshal Manekshaw Essay Competition (2025) organised by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)\, for which he was awarded the first prize in October 2025. Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Research Fellow\, moderated the meeting. Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nDetailed Report The presentation examines the relationship between defence and development\, arguing that the traditional framing as competing priorities is flawed. Atmanirbharta in Defence offers a framework to view defence spending as developmental investment. While recent reforms have strengthened India’s defence industrial base through institutional changes and policy support\, structural constraints including technology dependence\, execution gaps\, and resource competition persist. Success requires sustained R&D investment\, skilled human resources\, and committed political-military leadership. \nDetailed Report\nMr. Rahul Wankhede commenced his presentation by addressing the conceptual framework surrounding the relationship between defence and development in India. He argued that the debate framing these two sectors as competing priorities is analytically flawed and historically misleading. Contrary to the persistent belief that they are mutually exclusive\, he posited that investments in defence capabilities can generate significant industrial growth\, technological innovation\, and economic resilience. Globally\, defence investment has often served as a catalyst for industrialisation and technological advancement. Within this context\, the concept of self-reliance\, most recently articulated through Atmanirbharta in Defence\, offers a new framework to view defence spending as a developmental investment rather than non-productive consumption. \nThe Speaker traced the historical roots of the perceived dichotomy between defence and development. In the post-independence era\, policy naturally prioritised economic and social reconstruction over military expansion. Consequently\, defence expenditure was viewed largely as non-productive consumption rather than economic investment. The maintenance of large standing forces and domestic weapons production were seen as diverting scarce resources from critical sectors\, and the developmental deficits made this trade-off appear legitimate at the time. This resulted in a persistent belief that defence growth necessarily constrained development. The speaker highlighted the shift in thinking by contrasting the National Development Council’s 1962 statement\, which urged that the Emergency should not affect development schemes\, with Prime Minister Nehru’s speech that signalled a nuanced position by acknowledging development as a vital input to defence. \nMr. Wankhede noted that self-reliance is not a new idea but a policy continuity India has pursued since the 1950s\, primarily through state-led institutions. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) enabled capability creation but operated largely within a protected ecosystem. Flagship programmes such as the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) and the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft built significant design competence but lacked production depth. There were technology spillovers without a sustained industrial multiplier effect. The outcome was partial autonomy\, with continued dependence on critical subsystems and technologies. \nThe Speaker elaborated on how recent initiatives attempt to bridge the gap. The ‘Make in India’ initiative (2014) expanded manufacturing capacity across 14 sectors\, with defence being both a beneficiary and a driver. Subsequently\, Atmanirbhar Bharat reframed self-reliance around technology control and supply-chain security. Defence manufacturing has become a strategic anchor due to its high-tech demands\, skill requirements\, and spillover effects. \nIn terms of innovation and research support\, Atmanirbharta in Defence has restructured defence R&D from closed laboratories to an open innovation ecosystem. Reforms such as Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) and the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) have institutionalised the participation of start-ups and Micro\, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). The focus has shifted from technology import to problem-driven indigenous solutions\, with armed services launching parallel innovation challenges to align user needs with developers. \nRegarding structural reforms and policy support\, defence procurement policy has been redesigned to privilege domestic value addition. The government has released Positive Indigenisation Lists covering over 4\,000 items. The DAP-2020 mandates minimum indigenous content across most acquisition categories. Crucially\, budgetary signals reinforced this intent\, with approximately 75 per cent of the capital acquisition budget ring-fenced for domestic procurement\, along with windows created for MSMEs and start-ups. \nThe Speaker highlighted the strengthening of India’s defence industrial base\, noting a transition from a DPSU-dominated model to a multi-actor industrial ecosystem. There has been a significant expansion of licensed private defence firms and MSMEs across the supply chain. The private sector now plays a decisive role\, contributing to approximately 60 per cent of defence exports\, although its share in production stands at roughly 23 per cent. Defence industrial corridors in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have enabled geographic clustering and scale\, with state governments becoming active stakeholders in defence manufacturing. \nMr. Wankhede presented data indicating an upward trajectory. The Uttar Pradesh Defence Corridor has attracted investments worth Rs. 37\,721 crore\, while the Tamil Nadu Defence Corridor has attracted Rs. 28\,702 crore. The iDEX initiative has engaged 662 start-ups and MSMEs\, with 520 contracts signed. Under Mission Raksha Gyan Shakti\, 6\,888 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have been filed. Currently\, there are over 900 registered defence start-ups in the country. \nDespite progress\, the Speaker identified structural constraints. Long gestation cycles delay economic and operational returns from defence investments. Policy announcements often outpace execution\, particularly in contracting\, testing\, and induction phases. The defence sector competes with multiple other sectors for political attention and industrial resources. Continued dependence on foreign-controlled critical technologies limits true strategic autonomy. The industry remains fragmented\, with few firms capable of systems integration and scale. Institutional silos between users\, developers\, and producers continue to slow decision-making. Furthermore\, defence production and exports remain shaped by geopolitics\, sanctions\, and technology controls. \nMr. Wankhede concluded his presentation with several recommendations. He called for time-bound acquisition\, especially for iDEX and low-to-medium complexity systems. He suggested levelling the procurement playing field between DPSUs and private industry through transparent cost\, risk\, and order-allocation rules. There is a need to establish defence-literate financial institutions capable of revaluating long-gestation\, high-risk technologies. He emphasised institutionalising failure tolerance through phased development\, spiral induction\, and assured follow-on orders. Reforms must be driven by sustained top-level political and military leadership rather than episodic policy announcements. Finally\, he advocated for actively promoting civil–military technology spillovers to maximise developmental returns from defence investment. \nIn conclusion\, the Speaker traced the evolution of thought from Nehru’s view of development as an input to defence\, to Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s 2025 articulation that investments in defence drive economic growth and technological progress\, and Prime Minister Modi’s view of defence self-reliance as strategic leverage. He asserted that India now recognises the reverse logic: defence investment itself drives growth\, innovation\, and resilience. \nDirector General’s Remarks\nFollowing the presentation\, Director General Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy was requested to offer his comments. Amb. Chinoy observed that countries globally are increasing their defence expenditures and India should aim to enhance defence spending significantly given emerging threats and the current era of unilateralism. He emphasised linking defence spending to the overall GDP growth trajectory. Amb. Chinoy stated that while defence manufacturing and Atmanirbhar Bharat are positive developments\, Research and Development (R&D) remains critical. He pointed out that the country spends only about 0.67 per cent on R&D overall\, which should ideally increase to 2.5–3 per cent. He raised a crucial question regarding the scaling and availability of human resources for excellence in defence manufacturing. He stressed the need for higher education to focus on high-end technologies and for skilled trainers. Finally\, citing examples of countries with robust R&D ecosystems like China\, Russia\, and Japan that conduct R&D in their own languages\, he suggested that India should consider conducting R&D in Indian languages to improve comprehension and innovation. \nQ&A Session\nDr. Samuel Rajiv provided the historical context regarding defence expenditure trends. Defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP peaked at 4.2 per cent in 1987 following tensions with China and stood at over 4 per cent in 1963 after the 1962 war\, while currently it is around 2 per cent. He noted that while the political leadership recognised defence claims on the budget as paramount\, they have also consistently emphasised the need for ensuring adequate funds for addressing development priorities. \nThe discussion that followed centred on persistent structural challenges hampering indigenisation efforts. A key issue highlighted was the failure of technology transfer despite allowing 100 per cent foreign investment\, contrasting unfavourably with China’s approach of compelling technology sharing. Questions related to challenges of indigenisation\, with examples of platforms such as Tapas\, Rustom 1\, Kaveri engines\, and HTT40. The discussion emphasised that defence and development\, while conceptually complementary\, require careful fund allocation aligned with national aspirations and secured environments. Scholars stressed the need for structural reforms\, enhanced STEM education\, and strengthening domestic manufacturing capabilities including critical inputs like machinery and tooling. The Speaker acknowledged that Atmanirbharta requires sustained R&D investment\, skilled human resources\, political leadership commitment without bureaucratic restraints\, and resolution of persistent challenges in technology transfer\, raw material access\, and commercialisation for private sector participation. \nThe Report was prepared by Mr. Aadhvick Pal\, Intern\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-atmanirbharta-in-defence
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260112T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260112T000000
DTSTAMP:20261121T003024
CREATED:20260226T085636Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060514Z
UID:95847-1768176000-1768176000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Deobandism and Its Offshoots: Taliban and Tableeghi Jamaat”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Adil Rasheed\, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “Deobandism and Its Offshoots: Taliban and Tableeghi Jamaat” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 12 January 2026. Dr. Ashok K. Behuria\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the session. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General of MP-IDSA\, participated in the meeting along with other scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary \nDeobandism is a historically rooted Islamic movement whose evolution from an anti-colonial reformist response in late nineteenth-century India has given it enduring religious\, political\, and security significance in South Asia. Originating in 1866 in the aftermath of the 1857 revolt\, the Deobandi tradition developed within a Hanafi–Ash’ari–Maturidi theological framework that sought to preserve Islamic identity under colonial rule while disciplining Sufi practice through strict adherence to Shariah. Over time\, the movement generated divergent trajectories. The discussion situated these strands within contemporary regional dynamics\, including India’s calibrated engagement with the Afghan Taliban\, the deteriorating Pakistan–Taliban relationship\, and persistent ideological contestations over nationalism\, jihad\, and the Durand Line. Overall\, Deobandism is not a monolith but an internally contested tradition whose historical legacy continues to shape religious authority\, militancy\, and state–society relations across the subcontinent.  \nDetailed Report \nDr. Behuria provided a historical and theological overview of Deobandism\, noting that it emerged in 1866\, nine years after the 1857 Revolt. The movement was a response to the severe persecution of the Muslim community by the British\, who reportedly executed thousands of Ulema. To preserve Islamic faith and identity under this assault\, founders\, including Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Maulana Rasheed Ahmad Gangohi\, established the Darul Uloom seminary in Deoband. Theologically\, Deobandism is identified as a Hanafi-Ash’ari-Maturidi tradition that occupies a middle ground between literalist Atharis and rationalist Mu’tazilites. It has also revolutionised Islamic thought in India. While Dr. Behuria noted that the Barelvi denomination views them as heretics\, the movement has achieved significant global influence\, spreading across Africa\, the Americas\, and Europe\, and is the school of thought practiced by the Taliban. \nDr. Adil Rasheed provided a detailed\, layered examination of Deobandism as a religious movement\, political force\, and ideological framework with deep historical roots and significant contemporary implications for South Asia’s security and geopolitics. He traced Deobandism’s intellectual genealogy to Mughal-era reformist thought\, particularly the synthesis attempted by Shah Waliullah Dehlawi between Sufi spirituality and Salafi-Wahhabi ideology\, and explained how this synthesis was institutionalised through the establishment of Darul Uloom Deoband in 1866 as a form of cultural and ideological resistance to British colonialism. Furthermore\, he carefully distinguished between Deobandism’s multiple manifestations: its missionary expression (with insidious undertones) through the Tableeghi Jamaat; its nationalist and constitutionalist strand in India that historically aligned with the Congress and upheld secularism as compatible with Islamic principles; and its militant political expression in Pakistan and Afghanistan\, most notably through the Afghan Taliban and allied jihadist groups. Dr. Rasheed situated these strands within evolving regional dynamics\, particularly the deteriorating Pakistan-Taliban relationship\, India’s calibrated engagement with the Afghan Taliban\, and the ideological roots of conflicts involving the Durand Line and Pashtun nationalism. \nIn addition\, he explained Deobandism’s adherence to Hanafi jurisprudence and Ash’ari-Maturidi philosophy\, its scepticism of Western rationalism and scientific causality\, and its emphasis on disciplined\, Sharia-bound Sufism\, which together shape Deobandi attitudes towards jihad\, nationalism\, and state authority. At the same time\, he underscored persistent critiques of Deobandism—from Salafi-Wahhabis\, Barelvi Sufis\, Shia groups\, and liberal Muslim intellectuals—while noting its disproportionate influence over religious institutions\, madrassas\, and Muslim public discourse in the subcontinent. Overall\, he framed Deobandism not as a monolith but as a complex\, internally contested tradition whose historical evolution continues to shape contemporary politics\, militancy\, and state–religion relations in South Asia. \nQ/A Session \nThe Q&A session delved into the complexities of the Muslim Ummah and its identity\, questioning its transnational nature and the prevalence of dynastic leadership within religious groups—a practice that contradicts the Islamic principle of equality. The discussion also explored the historical impact of philosophical movements such as Darwinism and Marxism on religion\, specifically highlighting the roles of Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. Furthermore\, participants examined the influence of the Deobandi tradition on women’s rights in India and Afghanistan\, the distinctions between classical Sufism and other movements\, and the disconnect between elite intellectual debates and the lived realities of radicalised groups and the masses. Finally\, the session addressed the potential for broader reconciliation among ecclesiastical traditions and the regional unease sparked by Afghan Foreign Minister\, Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to India. \nThe speaker provided comprehensive responses to all comments and questions raised. \nThis report was prepared by Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai\, Research Analyst\, Counter-Terrorism Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-deobandism-and-its-offshoots
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260119T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20260119T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T003024
CREATED:20260306T120409Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060758Z
UID:95938-1768809600-1768842000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Dr. Saurabh Mishra’s Monday Morning Presentation on “President Trump’s MAGA Adventure in Venezuela: The Ideology and Praxis of a Global Strategy”
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting on 19 January 2026\, featuring a presentation by Dr. Saurabh Mishra\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA on “President Trump’s MAGA Adventure in Venezuela: The Ideology and Praxis of a Global Strategy.” The Session was moderated by Dr. Cherian Samuel\, Research Fellow at the Institute. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute participated. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session examined the strategic\, ideological\, and economic motivations behind recent U.S. actions in Venezuela and situated the episode within the broader trajectory of U.S. foreign policy under President Trump’s second term. The presentation argued that the Venezuela episode represents an intersection of ideological framing and strategic interests\, reflecting the operationalisation of the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) worldview in the Western Hemisphere. It highlighted the administration’s emphasis on counter-narcotics\, energy security\, and political legitimacy\, while also pointing to deeper structural considerations\, including great-power competition and the changing distribution of global power. The discussion further explored the conceptual distinction between MAGA ideology and MAGA praxis and assessed the implications of this episode for regional order\, international norms\, and U.S. global strategy. \nDetailed Discussion\nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. Cherian Samuel\, drew attention to the fast-moving and often unpredictable character of U.S. foreign policy during President Trump’s second term. He noted that the week had already witnessed significant developments\, including tariff measures against several countries and discussions around alternatives to existing multilateral arrangements. Against this backdrop of norm contestation and strategic disruption\, he framed the central question of the session: why Venezuela had emerged as a focal theatre for the projection of “MAGA praxis\,” and what this indicated about the evolving U.S. approach to power\, sovereignty\, and regional order. \nDr. Saurabh Mishra began by characterising the Venezuela episode as an “adventure\,” capturing both the speed and the high-risk\, high-uncertainty nature of the developments. He argued that while the U.S. administration offered a set of justifications\, the sequence of actions suggested a more complex interaction of ideological framing and strategic calculations. He recalled that on 3 January 2026\, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife were reportedly seized and taken into U.S. custody. While U.S. official language described the action as an “arrest” under domestic legal grounds\, Dr. Mishra noted that the manner of the operation raised serious questions under international law\, particularly regarding sovereignty and non-intervention. Even the choice of terminology such as arrest\, seizure\, or abduction became politically and legally significant in shaping international reactions. \nDr. Mishra placed these developments within a broader policy arc\, arguing that the Western Hemisphere was being repositioned as a central theatre of U.S. strategic attention. A military build-up had reportedly been underway for several months\, publicly justified through counter-narcotics and anti-cartel narratives. The administration’s designation of drug cartels as terrorist organisations\, he suggested\, appeared designed to expand the legal and political scope for the use of force. \nTurning to the counter-narcotics argument\, Dr. Mishra acknowledged the seriousness of the U.S. overdose crisis\, noting that deaths had risen steadily over several years\, peaking above 100\,000 in 2022 before declining. He highlighted the role of fentanyl\, particularly its mixing into counterfeit substances\, which significantly increases overdose risks. He also noted that drug control had been a major theme of President Trump’s second-term campaign\, including proposals for maritime interdiction and stronger action against trafficking networks. \nDr. Mishra then examined whether Venezuela credibly fits the administration’s counter-narcotics rationale. He argued that\, as a source country\, Venezuela is not central to the U.S. drug supply chain in the manner suggested by official rhetoric. Venezuela does not produce coca\, the primary raw material for cocaine\, and major synthetic drug production networks\, particularly those associated with fentanyl\, are concentrated elsewhere. While Venezuela has functioned as a transit corridor\, he noted that trafficking flows using Venezuelan routes are often destined for European markets rather than the United States. The principal entry pathways into the U.S. continue to be associated with the southern land border and eastern Pacific routes\, rather than the Caribbean theatre where the operation unfolded. In this context\, he suggested that the scale and symbolism of the intervention appeared disproportionate to Venezuela’s role in the U.S. domestic overdose crisis. \nAt the same time\, Dr. Mishra noted that the U.S. administration had constructed a specific legal-political case around Venezuela’s leadership. He referred to allegations that elements within Venezuela’s military and security establishment had been accused of facilitating trafficking networks. Within this framing\, President Nicolás Maduro was portrayed as a central figure within a broader trafficking ecosystem. The Speaker suggested that these allegations were used to strengthen a law enforcement narrative\, even as the wider strategic context pointed to motivations extending beyond counter-narcotics objectives. \nDr. Mishra then turned to the second major explanation for the intervention: oil and energy security. He argued that this dimension appeared understated in initial public messaging\, creating analytical uncertainty\, as early official statements did not foreground oil as a central justification. However\, he suggested that the energy logic becomes clearer when viewed from a longer historical and prospective perspective. \nThe Speaker recalled that Venezuela had historically been a major contributor to U.S. crude imports\, particularly during periods when U.S. dependence on imported petroleum was higher. Over time\, however\, the United States reduced its reliance on Venezuelan oil due to several factors\, including the shale revolution\, diversification of import sources\, and growing political tensions with Caracas. While U.S. import dependence did not disappear entirely\, the Venezuelan component declined significantly as imports were redirected toward more stable suppliers\, particularly within North America. \nDr. Mishra also pointed to Venezuela’s long-term production decline\, with output peaking earlier and subsequently facing constraints due to underinvestment\, governance challenges\, and political decisions affecting the oil sector. These developments reduced Venezuela’s short- to medium-term leverage as a key supplier. Nevertheless\, he cautioned against assuming that Venezuelan oil had lost its strategic relevance. \nThe Speaker argued that future-oriented energy projections offer a clearer explanation for renewed U.S. interest. Although the United States has expanded domestic production through shale and unconventional sources\, projections suggesting that the shale boom could plateau or decline in the coming years creating incentives for long-term hedging. In this context\, Venezuela’s vast reserves despite the complexities of heavy crude extraction and the need for substantial investment retain strategic significance. \nDr. Mishra also noted that parts of the U.S. refining system\, particularly in the southern United States\, are configured to process heavier crude grades. Re-engagement with Venezuelan supply chains could therefore be framed not only as securing volume but also as stabilising refinery inputs and shaping long-term market conditions. Taken together\, he argued\, the counter-narcotics narrative alone is insufficient to explain the intervention; the energy-security dimension helps clarify why Venezuela emerged as a focal point. \nDr. Mishra then turned to the political and legitimacy dimensions of the intervention. He noted that the operation did not occur in isolation\, but against the backdrop of Venezuela’s prolonged political crisis and disputed electoral processes. According to the Speaker\, the U.S. action was accompanied by efforts to elevate opposition figures as alternative centres of authority. He referred in particular to developments involving opposition leader María Corina Machado\, whose international visibility had increased significantly. These developments\, he suggested\, indicated that the intervention was not limited to a law-enforcement or counter-narcotics operation\, but also carried a political objective of reshaping leadership outcomes in Venezuela. \nDr. Mishra observed that the U.S. action appeared to remove the head of state while leaving the broader institutional structure intact\, an approach he described as unusual in the historical record of U.S. interventions. This raised questions about the intended end state\, whether the objective was regime change\, coercive leverage\, or long-term strategic positioning. He noted that significant uncertainties remained regarding the viability of Venezuela’s oil sector\, the willingness of U.S. companies to reinvest\, and the scale of capital required to revive production. Figures as high as US$100 billion had been discussed in policy circles. At the same time\, several companies were reportedly seeking compensation for earlier nationalisation decisions\, making rapid reinvestment uncertain. \nThe Speaker then moved to the conceptual core of his presentation: the distinction between “MAGA ideology” and “MAGA praxis.” He argued that the slogan “Make America Great Again” is not new\, having appeared in earlier U.S. political campaigns across party lines. However\, under President Trump\, it has taken on a more personalised and centralised ideological character\, shaped by the President’s own interpretation of national greatness and historical precedent. \nDr. Mishra described MAGA ideology as rooted in a form of strategic nostalgia\, evoking periods of American economic and geopolitical dominance\, particularly the mid-twentieth century. He suggested that the external expression of this ideology draws on elements of U.S. exceptionalism\, historically associated with doctrines such as the Monroe Doctrine\, which framed the Western Hemisphere as a zone of privileged U.S. influence. \nIn contrast\, he characterised MAGA praxis as the operationalisation of these ideas in concrete policy actions. In this praxis\, ideology is not always explicitly articulated; instead\, it manifests through selective targeting\, strategic pressure\, and the use of coercive tools against governments perceived as ideologically opposed to the United States. He pointed to the pattern of attention directed toward left-leaning governments in parts of Latin America\, suggesting that ideological alignment remained an underlying\, though often unstated\, criterion. \nAt the same time\, Dr. Mishra cautioned that attempts to revive strategic practices reminiscent of the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries face significant structural constraints. The global distribution of power\, he argued\, has changed fundamentally. Emerging economies possess advanced technological capabilities\, financial and production centres are more widely dispersed\, and the relative power differential between major and smaller states has narrowed. In such a context\, strategies based on earlier models of unilateral intervention or economic dominance may prove difficult to sustain. \nHe concluded this segment by posing a broader question: whether the Venezuela episode represents a temporary\, personality-driven phase in U.S. foreign policy\, or a deeper structural shift in American strategic thinking. The answer\, he suggested\, would depend on domestic political dynamics within the United States and the durability of the ideological currents associated with the MAGA movement. \nQ&A Session\nThe presentation was followed by discussion moderated by Dr. Cherian Samuel\,  during which the Director General of MP-IDSA and other participants raised a number of conceptual and strategic questions regarding the U.S. intervention in Venezuela. \nIn his intervention\, the Director General\,  Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy observed that while the Speaker had unpacked the various justifications offered by the Trump administration\, a central question remained: why Venezuela was chosen as the principal site for the demonstration of MAGA praxis. He suggested that the administration’s approach could be interpreted as the selective application of an “America First” logic across different international orders\, ranging from pre-Westphalian coercive practices to post-Westphalian\, rules-based frameworks. In this spectrum\, the United States appeared willing to shift between normative and coercive approaches depending on strategic convenience. \nThe Director General questioned the strength of the counter-narcotics argument\, noting that countries such as Mexico present a far more substantial narcotics challenge to the United States. Drawing on his diplomatic experience\, he observed that drug production\, trafficking\, and synthetic drug manufacturing networks are far more deeply entrenched in Mexico than in Venezuela. If the primary concern were narcotics\, he argued\, Mexico would logically have been the focus of U.S. attention. \nAmb. Chinoy then addressed the oil dimension\, pointing to a potential contradiction in the administration’s energy strategy. On the one hand\, President Trump has emphasised domestic shale production\, which generally requires relatively higher oil prices to remain viable. On the other hand\, domestic political pressures often demand lower fuel prices to control inflation and public discontent. In this context\, the Director General suggested that long-term strategic control over major oil reserves\, such as those in Venezuela\, could provide leverage over global energy markets and help manage these competing pressures. \nPlacing the episode in historical perspective\, he noted that U.S. intervention in Latin America is not unprecedented. From earlier actions in Cuba and Panama to Cold War-era interventions in Chile\, the United States has repeatedly exercised coercive power in the Western Hemisphere. In this sense\, he argued\, the Venezuela episode reflects a continuation of a long-standing strategic pattern\, though executed in a more direct and personalised manner under the current administration. \nOther participants raised additional questions. One query related to whether the developments represented the emergence of a more explicit American imperial order\, or instead a defensive attempt to preserve an existing one. Another question focused on whether such actions could revive anti-imperial or decolonisation narratives across the Global South. There were also queries regarding the implications of the Western Hemisphere’s renewed priority for U.S. commitments in the Indo-Pacific\, and the extent to which policy blueprints such as Project 2025 may have influenced the administration’s decisions. \nResponding to these interventions\, Dr. Mishra argued that Venezuela was likely chosen because it combined strategic value with relative vulnerability. Unlike Mexico\, which has strong nationalist traditions and deep interdependence with the United States\, or Cuba\, which retains strong ideological and external partnerships\, Venezuela appeared more susceptible to coercive pressure. He also pointed to the scale of Chinese investments in Venezuela’s energy and infrastructure sectors\, suggesting that strategic competition with China may have reinforced Washington’s focus on the country. \nOn the broader theoretical questions\, Dr. Mishra suggested that the current phase of U.S. policy does not represent the creation of a new empire\, but rather a defensive attempt to preserve strategic primacy under changing global conditions. Structural shifts in technology\, finance\, and production\, he argued\, have narrowed power differentials between states\, making nineteenth century-style coercive strategies difficult to sustain. \nIn his concluding remarks\, the Speaker emphasised that the long-term viability of such policies would depend heavily on domestic political dynamics within the United States\, including Congressional constraints and electoral outcomes. The Session concluded with the observation that the Venezuela episode may represent either a temporary phase in U.S. foreign policy or the beginning of a deeper strategic reorientation\, an issue that would require continued analytical attention. \nThe Report has been prepared by Mr. Mohanasakthivel J\, Research Analyst\, ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/dr-saurabh-mishras-monday-morning-presentation-on-president-trumps-maga-adventure-in-venezuela
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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