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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251201T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251201T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T004707
CREATED:20260227T055804Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060337Z
UID:95866-1764576000-1764608400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “G20 in Johannesburg: Outcomes and Assessment”
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Mohanasakthivel J.\, Research Analyst\, made a presentation on “G20 in Johannesburg: Outcomes and Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 01 December 2025. Dr. Rajeesh Kumar\, Research Fellow\, moderated the meeting. Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary:\nThe presentation offered a detailed analysis of the G20 Summit held in Johannesburg\, South Africa on 22 November 2025 and 23 November 2025. This Summit was historic\, marking the first time an African nation held its Presidency. It also highlighted the Global South’s ability to set action-oriented agenda at multi-lateral Summits.  \nDetailed Report:\nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. Rajeesh Kumar provided the details of the proceedings of the G20 Summit held at Johannesburg. He highlighted the importance of this year’s Summit as it was the first time an African country held its Presidency. This G20 Summit also marked the end of Presidencies of Global South countries. He pointed out the absence of global leaders during this Summit and the complications in handing over the Presidency to the United States. The complications in the handover of Presidency have resulted in the U.S. barring South Africa from attending the G20 Summit to be held in 2026. Dr. Kumar also commended the ability of the nations to release their ‘outcome documents’ in lieu of conflicts. \nMr. Mohanasakthivel\, elaborated on this year’s G20 theme—Solidarity\, Equality\, and Sustainability. Alongside it being the first year of an African Presidency\, this year also marked the second year of African Union’s presence as a permanent member. He also highlighted that “Africa” was mentioned fifty-two times in the official G20 Leaders’ Declaration. He emphasised that the absence of world leaders did not affect the commitment-compliance trends of G20 with average attendance being 90% and illustrated this with the example of the 2022 G20\, under the Indonesian Presidency\, which marked the lowest attendance without it affecting the compliance rate of commitments. \nMr. Mohanasakthivel elaborated that the commitment trends varied across the years with highest being in 2017 and lowest in 2010 — also the year of global economic slowdown. On an average there are 197 commitments per Summit\, however there has been a dip in the same since 2017. On the other hand\, the compliance rate was at 70-75%\, with lowest being 60% during the 2010 Toronto Summit. The highest implementation was during India’s Presidency in 2023. He attributed the highest compliance during India’s Presidency to its preparatory process for commitment setting. It included policies and agendas in which the G20 countries already had a momentum\, were aligned with the major power’s interests\, and had international obligations. \nMr. Mohanasakthivel’s observations marked that higher attendance did not equate with compliance. G20 commitments connected to external frameworks showed higher levels of implementation\, whereas compliance generally declined when the total number of commitments increased. When there was involvement of engagement groups\, there was higher compliance. \nThe Speaker further expanded on this year’s G20 priorities — debt sustainability\, climate change and energy efficiency\, disaster resilience and response\, and harnessing critical minerals. He stated that the African nations owed most of their debt to private creditors\, which was the main driver of debt crisis in Africa. In the recent years\, the borrowing from multilateral banks has reduced and private lenders have increased\, leading to a debt trap in Africa. Factors like Covid-19\, Russia-Ukraine War\, and slow restructuring processes have further slowed the economies. He also drew attention to unfair treatment of the credit agencies towards the Global South. A major step towards dealing with this crisis was G20’s Declaration on Debt Sustainability. \nIn terms of climate and energy\, Mr. Mohanasakthivel stated that climate financing is low. He also asserted that climate change exacerbated debt distress in the region. The G20 promoted energy-efficiency gains and also held discussions on zero emissions. Regarding critical minerals\, Africa holds 30% of global reserves. It is predicted that the demand of these will surge by 500-700% in the coming years. He also pointed that weak governance affects the harnessing of free elements and green transition. For this\, G20 presented the Critical Mineral Framework. In terms of developing disaster resilience and response\, there was a need to explore the intersection between human security and geopolitics. Highlighting the loss and damage\, this year’s G20 agenda called for action towards identifying vulnerable regions and protecting them. \nThe Speaker stated that in his assessment\, the U.S. commitments this year remain vague. According to him\, the G20’s focus on industrialisation was a missed opportunity for South Africa to present a new economic order. He also stated that the prior Summits\, alongside this year’s Summit have insufficiently dealt with debt sustainability. \nIn terms of U.S.-South Africa relations there was a rupture\, as the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa accused Johannesburg of supplying weapons to Russia. U.S. also accused Johannesburg of committing genocide against white Africans. To pressurise South Africa to take action against genocide\, the U.S. is using economic pressure points like excluding Johannesburg from the African Growth and Opportunity Act and G20 Summit 2026. The U.S. also revoked the visa of former South African Foreign Minister\, Naledi Pandor. Nevertheless\, South Africa has continued to defend its right to be in the G20. \nThe U.S. administration under President Trump (2016–2020) demonstrated a relatively stable compliance trend within the G20. While compliance scores are not a definitive measure of policy effectiveness\, they do offer some indication of the administration’s engagement with G20 commitments during that period. However\, this may not necessarily be replicated in 2026\, especially as the current administration has signalled a “back to basics” approach\, though what this actually entails remains unclear. The G20 Troika\, currently constituted by South Africa (2025)\, United States (2026) the United Kingdom (2027)\, is likely to encounter considerable difficulty in navigating the growing divergence in priorities and preferences between Washington and Johannesburg. \nMoreover\, he remarked that the Global South has not been afforded the policy space required for industrialisation. He argued that the Summit represented a missed opportunity for South Africa to propose a “New Global Economic Order\,” which would have been particularly advantageous for developing countries. According to him\, the impetus for such an order lies in the collapse of the current neo-liberal structures. He further noted that existing global economic rules\, such as Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)\, Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)\, and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms\, disproportionately favour the Global North and remain major impediments to industrialisation in the Global South. \nHe also observed that the “Dutch Disease” continues to be widespread across the African continent. Illustrating this point\, he cited examples from Nigeria\, Angola\, Zambia\, the Democratic Republic of Congo\, Ghana\, and Mozambique\, explaining how the extraction of natural resources like oil\, copper\, cocoa\, and gas has produced adverse economic consequences and hindered these countries’ industrialisation prospects. \nWhile concluding his talk\, Mr. Mohanasakthivel noted that this year’s G20 Summit was nonetheless a success\, as it brought critical attention to the challenges faced by the Global South and went a step further by proposing initiatives aimed at addressing these structural issues. \nQ&A Session:\nIn the discussion that followed the Q&A session\, Dr. Kumar emphasised India’s role in aiding South Africa convening their Presidency. He also elaborated on Prime Minister Modi’s six point agenda presented at the Summit. He remarked that the absence of world leaders during the Summit is an extension of the current geopolitical situation. \nFurthering the discussion\, Amb. Sujan Chinoy stressed on the focus of G20 Summits on economic issues especially during 2009 to 2012. He mentioned that the second phase was marked with major power contestation\, supply chain politics\, and post-Covid recovery. He also opined that the normative structures were subpar and G20 provided a platform for a uniting and equal structure for the nations. He also remarked that the forthcoming G20 could be an opportunity for the U.S. to reset its economic relations with the world. The discussion also touched on trilateral talks held alongside the Summit\, the issue of global climate financing\, the Ubuntu legacy initiative\, and power contestation in multilateral forums. Lastly\, he discussed India’s role as a bridge between the West and the Global South. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Sharvari D. Patil\, Intern\, ALACUN Centre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-g20-in-johannesburg-outcomes-and-assessment
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251208T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251208T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T004707
CREATED:20260226T090902Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060400Z
UID:95854-1765180800-1765213200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting/Book Discussion: Authored Book by Dr. Uttam K. Sinha Trial by Water: Indus Basin and India–Pakistan Relations\, Penguin Random House India\, 2025
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha\, Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a talk on his recently published book Trial by Water: Indus Basin and India–Pakistan Relations (Penguin Random House India\, 2025) during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 8 December 2025. The session was moderated by Dr. Ashish Shukla\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA with Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA serving as the discussant. The meeting was attended by scholars and researchers of the institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session offered a rich exploration of the historical\, technical\, and political forces that shaped the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Opening the discussion\, moderator Dr. Ashish Shukla set the analytical framework by raising pointed questions on the securitisation of water\, the design and limitations of institutional mechanisms\, and the evolving scope of India’s river-development projects. His remarks steered the conversation toward the deeper strategic undercurrents embedded in the Treaty. \nAs discussant\, Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik broadened the lens by situating the book within the wider landscape of South Asian water-sharing arrangements. She contrasted the relative durability of the IWT with the more fragile or politically constrained agreements elsewhere in the region\, highlighting what sets the Indus Basin apart. The ensuing conversation probed how domestic politics\, shifting climatic and demographic pressures\, and the necessity of sustained technical cooperation will shape the next phase of India–Pakistan water relations. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Ashish Shukla opened the session by noting that Trial by Water: Indus Basin and India–Pakistan Relations dismantles several persistent myths surrounding the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). He observed that public debates often flatten the complexities of the Indus Basin’s hydrology and the broader geopolitical forces that shaped the Treaty\, turning water into an emotive symbol linked with strategy\, sovereignty\, and identity in South Asia. Calling it “a book for all seasons\,” he framed four key questions to guide the discussion: whether water in South Asia is being increasingly securitised; whether India is losing confidence in institutional mechanisms; whether water can realistically serve as a punitive instrument against Pakistan; and finally\, whether India is merely completing pending projects on the western rivers or preparing to conceive new ones within the Treaty’s ambit. \nIn his remarks\, Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha explained that the book is the product of a three-year research effort and builds on his earlier work\, Indus Basin Uninterrupted (2021). He emphasised that contemporary historical research on the Indus must be inherently interdisciplinary\, drawing not only from diplomatic history but from anthropology\, political science\, engineering\, climate studies\, and demography. This\, he argued\, is essential to escape the narrow\, linear narratives dominant in earlier accounts. One of the book’s most significant contributions\, he observed\, is its integration of engineering perspectives into the political history of the Indus Basin. Dr. Sinha highlighted how civil engineers and technical officers—particularly those in the Public Works Departments of pre-Partition and post-Partition Punjab—played a decisive yet largely overlooked role in designing headworks\, shaping canal networks\, and influencing the very contours of the Punjab Boundary. Their technical assessments and administrative decisions\, he noted\, ultimately positioned India advantageously by ensuring control over the Ferozepur headworks on the Sutlej\, a critical element in the early water politics of Partition. \nDr. Sinha structured his presentation around several core questions that animate the book.\nFirst\, on whether the IWT was inevitable\, he pointed out that the hydrological unity of the basin contrasted sharply with the political division of 1947\, making some form of agreement unavoidable. “Had there been no Partition\,” he argued\, “there would have been no treaty.”\nSecond\, on claims that the treaty is “unfair” to India\, he termed this a “central paradox”: both India and Pakistan insist they received the lesser bargain\, even though the Treaty followed a decade of intense negotiations. If it were truly unjust\, he asked\, why would seasoned negotiators have accepted it after detailed scrutiny?                                                                                     Third\, on who negotiated the treaty\, Dr. Sinha stressed that the IWT was negotiated not by diplomats but principally by engineers—an unusual feature that profoundly shaped the Treaty’s design. He situated the negotiations within the strategic environment of the 1950s: the Cold War\, the Eisenhower administration’s geopolitical calculations\, and the World Bank’s dual role as financier and facilitator. He underscored the significance of the Bank’s nearly one-billion-dollar financial package\, which proved decisive in pushing the treaty to completion. \nDr. Sinha drew attention to the Treaty’s “no-exit clause\,” noting that while it may appear extraordinary by current diplomatic standards\, it was intentionally crafted by the engineers who foresaw volatile political relations. This built-in constraint\, he argued\, is one reason for the Treaty’s durability through wars and crises. He concluded by emphasising the importance of “reading history without anger”—a phrase he often invokes in his water diplomacy work—warning against selective citations that distort context. For scholars\, he urged deep archival engagement and careful contextualisation rather than reliance on isolated statements. \nThe discussion also touched upon leadership styles and pivotal historical moments\, with particular attention to Jawaharlal Nehru’s role in shaping India’s early water diplomacy. Dr. Sinha referred to what he termed Nehru’s “main character syndrome”—not in a pejorative sense\, but to describe Nehru’s instinctive tendency to place himself at the centre of major national debates and developmental initiatives. This disposition\, he noted\, stemmed from Nehru’s belief that the Prime Minister must personally steer India’s modernisation project\, whether in foreign policy\, river valley development\, or national planning. Nehru’s hands-on involvement significantly influenced the political climate in which the Treaty was negotiated\, as well as the philosophical and developmental assumptions underlying India’s approach to the Indus waters. Dr. Sinha recalled the charged Parliamentary debate of November 1960\, where parliamentarians questioned the Treaty’s long-term consequences\, revealing the tension between idealism\, pragmatism\, and the developmental priorities of early independent India. He underlined the importance of appreciating the psychological and philosophical dispositions of the period in which the Treaty was negotiated. \nAs discussant\, Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik situated Trial by Water within the wider ecosystem of South Asian water-sharing agreements. She noted that the Indus often overshadows equally complex river issues in the eastern subcontinent—especially the Ganga and its tributaries. She asked why the IWT continues to attract enduring domestic and international attention\, while other treaties\, including the 1996 Ganges Treaty and water agreements with Nepal\, have struggled to advance or inspire similar institutional depth. She pointed out that several of these agreements remain only partly operationalised\, with incomplete projects and ambiguous benefit-sharing outcomes. \nDr. Pattanaik underlined how water distribution is inseparable from domestic politics: Pakistan’s tendency to externalise water challenges\, India’s state-level grievances across Punjab\, Haryana\, Bihar\, and West Bengal\, and the political sensitivities that accompany hydrological variability. The comparison with the Ganges Treaty also highlighted how review clauses\, absent in the IWT\, create a different political dynamic in eastern South Asia. \nThe discussion underscored the enduring relevance of the Indus Waters Treaty—an agreement that has survived wars\, crises\, and shifting political leaderships. Its durability\, participants noted\, stems from its technocratic foundations\, third-party mediation\, and the structural bind of the no-exit clause. At the same time\, new pressures—climate variability\, demographic change\, technological upgrades\, and domestic political contestation—have altered the Treaty’s operational environment. While the idea of using water as a punitive instrument periodically resurfaces\, the panel agreed that the long-term stability of the basin depends on predictable institutional arrangements\, technical solutions\, and measured legal pathways rather than coercive strategies. \nParticipants also noted that Trial by Water plays an important role in reshaping contemporary debates on the Indus by weaving together historical research\, engineering analysis\, and strategic insight. It challenges long-standing assumptions about fairness\, magnanimity\, and the nature of India–Pakistan engagement\, encouraging a more grounded and evidence-based understanding of the basin. \nQuestions and Comments\nParticipants debated the balance between idealism and pragmatism in India’s strategic culture\, particularly during Nehru’s tenure\, and whether India has effectively leveraged its upper-riparian position amid Pakistan’s recurring legal and diplomatic manoeuvres. \nSeveral comments emphasised the need to evaluate the treaty through the lens of the 1950s rather than contemporary expectations. Securing the eastern rivers for Indian Punjab—despite high financial costs—was a strategic imperative at the time\, and the treaty accomplished this objective. \nQuestions were raised about the rationale behind the no-exit clause\, its long-term implications\, and the risks associated with neutral expert proceedings and arbitration. Concerns were expressed that bypassing specific mechanisms could undermine confidence in the institutional framework as a whole. \nThe session also noted that the book has attracted considerable attention in Pakistan\, including among diplomats and policy practitioners—an indication that the Indus basin continues to serve as a critical lens for examining the broader contours of India–Pakistan relations. \nThe Report has been prepared by Dr. Bipandeep Sharma\, Research Analyst and Ms. Srotaswini Hazarika\, Intern\, NTS Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-book-discussion-authored-book-by-dr-uttam-k-sinha-trial-by-water
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251222T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251222T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T004707
CREATED:20260226T090003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060428Z
UID:95849-1766390400-1766422800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Role of Legal Autonomous Weapons Systems in Modern Day Warfare”
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Meghna Pradhan\, Research Analyst\, spoke on “Role of Legal Autonomous Weapons Systems in Modern Day Warfare” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 22 December 2025. Mr. Rohit Sharma\, Research Analyst\, moderated the meeting. The scholars of the Institute attended the discussion \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation examined the growing operational relevance of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) and the strategic\, ethical\, and legal challenges arising from their integration into modern warfare. LAWS were defined as weapon systems that\, once activated\, can independently select\, and engage targets without further human intervention. A key emphasis of the presentation was the absence of a universally accepted definition of LAWS\, with autonomy understood as a spectrum rather than a fixed threshold. Consequently\, current debates focus less on specific technologies such as artificial intelligence and more on the functional effects and operational consequences of delegating lethal decision-making authority to machines. \nDetailed Report\nMr. Rohit Sharma\, moderator\, highlighted why LAWS have become a critical concern for contemporary militaries and policymakers. Central to this is the compression of decision-making time in combat environments\, particularly in high-speed and highly contested domains such as air defence\, missile interception\, and electronic warfare. \nMs. Meghna Pradhan observed that by accelerating the Observe–Orient–Decide–Act (OODA) loop\, autonomous systems fundamentally alter the tempo of warfare\, reducing opportunities for human deliberation and increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation. This compression also shifts lethal authority from human operators to machine-driven processes\, raising profound questions about accountability\, command responsibility\, and escalation control. Ongoing conflicts were characterised as real-world testing grounds where these systems are being deployed\, refined\, and evaluated even as international regulatory frameworks remain unsettled. \nA conceptual clarification between automatic\, automated\, and autonomous systems formed an important analytical foundation of the presentation. Automatic systems operate on basic trigger–response mechanisms\, while automated systems execute predefined rules without discretion. Autonomous systems\, by contrast\, possess a degree of discretion within programmed parameters\, effectively substituting human judgement rather than merely human execution. This distinction was presented as central to understanding why LAWS represent a qualitative shift in warfare\, rather than a continuation of existing automation trends. Autonomy\, in this sense\, marks a transition from machines assisting human decisions to machines shaping or executing those decisions independently. \nThe presentation further situated LAWS within the OODA loop to illustrate how autonomy increasingly permeates all stages of military decision-making. While machines have long contributed to observation and orientation through sensors and data processing\, LAWS become particularly consequential at the decision and action stages\, where lethal force is authorised \n  \nand applied. Models of human control- ranging from human-in-the-loop to human-out-of-the-loop- were discussed to demonstrate the varying degrees of human involvement in autonomous systems. The concept of “meaningful human control” was identified as a central yet unresolved issue\, with no agreed standard for what constitutes sufficient human oversight\, especially when operational timelines are reduced to seconds or milliseconds. \nThe enabling technological ecosystem underlying LAWS was presented as broader than artificial intelligence alone. Autonomy is derived from a combination of sensor fusion\, decision algorithms\, edge computing\, secure communications\, human–machine interfaces\, and integrated command-and-control networks. Importantly\, the presentation stressed that LAWS do not inherently require artificial intelligence\, and that many autonomous functions can be achieved through rule-based or hybrid systems. At the same time\, these enabling technologies also support civilian and non-lethal military applications\, complicating regulatory efforts that seek to restrict autonomy without inhibiting broader technological development. \nA significant portion of the presentation addressed the risks associated with LAWS. These include the potential for unlawful harm arising from faulty data\, sensor degradation\, or biased datasets\, as well as the challenge of attributing responsibility when autonomous systems cause unintended damage. The “black box” nature of learning systems was highlighted as a particular concern\, as it limits transparency regarding how decisions are made once systems are deployed in dynamic battlefield environments. Cyber vulnerabilities and the rapid proliferation of autonomous technologies to non-state actors were identified as additional destabilising factors. Nevertheless\, the presentation also acknowledged potential operational advantages\, including force multiplication\, reduced exposure of personnel to hostile environments\, enhanced endurance in extreme terrains\, and\, under certain conditions\, the possibility of reducing collateral damage through precision targeting. \nThe applicability of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to LAWS was examined in depth. The presentation reaffirmed the widely accepted position that IHL applies fully to all weapon systems\, including autonomous ones. However\, it underscored persistent disagreements over whether LAWS can reliably comply with core IHL principles such as distinction\, proportionality\, precautions in attack\, military necessity\, humanity\, and accountability. Particular scepticism was expressed regarding the ability of machines to make context-sensitive judgements\, such as distinguishing civilians from combatants in complex environments or assessing proportionality where military advantage must be weighed against potential civilian harm. \nThe global governance debate on LAWS was analysed through the ongoing discussions under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)\, particularly within the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). The presentation traced the evolution of these discussions from early informal consultations to the adoption of guiding principles in 2019\, followed by increasing polarisation between advocates of a legally binding prohibition and those favouring regulation within existing legal frameworks. Current negotiations focus on issues such as defining LAWS\, clarifying the scope of prohibitions\, determining acceptable levels of autonomy\, and deciding whether outcomes should be binding or political in nature. The year 2026 was identified as a critical juncture for determining the future direction of the CCW process. \nIndia’s position on LAWS was presented as cautious and calibrated. India maintains that existing IHL frameworks are sufficient to address the challenges posed by autonomous systems and argues against premature bans that could constrain technological development. The emphasis remains on retaining human responsibility\, regulating the use and effects of systems rather than the underlying technologies\, and avoiding parallel regulatory processes outside the CCW. The presentation also outlined India’s evolving capabilities\, including the use of loitering munitions\, air defence systems\, and autonomous subsystems across multiple platforms\, while noting that these do not yet meet contested definitions of fully autonomous weapon systems. \nIn conclusion\, the presentation argued that LAWS are already an operational reality rather than a future contingency. The core unresolved issue remains the extent to which lethal decision-making can be delegated to machines without undermining legal accountability\, ethical restraint\, and strategic stability. While there is broad agreement that IHL applies\, consensus on definitions\, thresholds of autonomy\, and governance mechanisms remains elusive. The presentation concluded that a calibrated\, IHL-based regulatory approach within the CCW framework currently offers the most pragmatic path forward\, with forthcoming negotiations likely to shape the future trajectory of autonomous warfare. \nThe question-and-answer session reflected the depth of conceptual and policy-level contestation surrounding lethal autonomous weapon systems. Participants raised concerns regarding the ambiguity of autonomy thresholds\, particularly the blurred line between decision-support systems and autonomous targeting systems\, with reference to contemporary operational examples. Questions focused on accountability and state responsibility\, especially in scenarios where learning systems evolve in unpredictable ways once deployed\, and whether responsibility should rest with operators\, commanders\, developers\, or the deploying state. The discussion also engaged with the feasibility of meaningful human control under compressed decision-making timelines\, noting that in high-speed missile defence or drone interception scenarios\, decisions are effectively pre-delegated to machines. Participants debated whether machines could\, in some contexts\, reduce human bias and error\, while others emphasised that opacity\, data bias\, and cyber vulnerabilities introduce new risks rather than eliminating existing ones. The session further examined divergent state positions on regulation\, highlighting how major military powers favour non-binding political commitments grounded in existing International Humanitarian Law\, while smaller states advocate clearer prohibitions to mitigate asymmetries in technological capability. Overall\, the discussion underscored that while there is broad agreement on the applicability of IHL\, fundamental disagreements persist over definitions\, accountability\, and the governance of autonomy\, reinforcing the view that consensus on LAWS remains politically and technically elusive. \nThe Report was prepared by Ms. Khyati Singh\, Research Analyst\, North America and Strategic Technologies Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-role-of-legal-autonomous-weapons-systems-in-modern-day-warfare
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251229T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251229T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T004707
CREATED:20260707T094550Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260709T034402Z
UID:98992-1766995200-1767027600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Dr. Rajeesh Kumar’s Monday Morning Meeting on “U.S. National Security Strategy 2025: Competing for Power in a Fragmenting World”
DESCRIPTION:Executive Summary\nThe Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 December 2025\, featured a presentation by Dr. Rajeesh Kumar on the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025\, released by the second Trump administration. The strategy\, titled Competing for Power in a Fragmenting World\, reflects a significant shift in American strategic thinking. The presentation highlighted how the NSS frames the contemporary international system as fragmented\, with weakening alliances\, declining multilateral norms\, and increasing emphasis on material capabilities and technological competition. It also underscored the strategy’s regional prioritisation\, particularly the renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere\, the Indo-Pacific\, and strategic competition with China. The discussion explored the document’s philosophical underpinnings\, regional approaches\, and implications for India and the broader global order. \nDetailed Discussion\nDr. Abhishek Mishra initiated the discussion with an overview of the NSS 2025\, which was released on 4 December 2025 by the second Trump administration. The document was described as one of the most consequential strategic texts in recent U.S. foreign policy\, signalling a departure from the post–Second World War tradition of liberal internationalism. The strategy was presented as consolidating an “America First” worldview\, prioritising domestic industrial capacity\, border control\, technological dominance\, and national cohesion over the United States’ earlier role as a global security provider. It portrays the world as increasingly fragmented\, characterised by weakening alliances\, erosion of multilateral norms\, and competition based more on material capabilities than ideological alignment. \nDr. Mishra identified two philosophical foundations of the NSS. The first is civilizational realism\, which argues that the international system is returning to an era of competing civilizations. In this framework\, the strategy moves away from the traditional democracy–autocracy binary and instead emphasises the protection of American cultural identity and heritage as a central component of national security. Ideological universalism is replaced by an emphasis on civilizational continuity and cultural sovereignty. The second foundation is hard sovereignty\, which reasserts the primacy of the nation-state as the central actor in international politics. The strategy rejects what it describes as “globalist mandates” and the expanding role of supranational institutions\, asserting that the United States will act unilaterally when its core interests are at stake. Multilateral commitments are treated as conditional rather than binding. \nDr. Rajeesh Kumar began his presentation by situating the NSS within a broader global context marked by fragmentation\, multipolarity\, and overlapping crises. He argued that the strategy presents itself as a corrective document\, claiming that previous American strategies failed to clearly define national objectives or align them with available means. In this narrative\, the NSS 2025 is portrayed as consolidating a course correction initiated during Trump’s earlier Presidency. \nA central theme of the document\, as highlighted in the presentation\, is its attempt to answer two foundational questions: what the United States should seek from the world\, and what instruments it should employ to achieve those ends. The strategy places the survival and safety of the United States at the top of its hierarchy\, emphasising border security\, territorial protection\, national infrastructure\, and the maintenance of technological and military superiority. \nDr. Kumar highlighted that the NSS places strong emphasis on industrial and technological strength as the backbone of American power. The document presents the United States’ industrial base as the most robust in the world and argues that maintaining and expanding this advantage is central to national security. Economic dynamism and energy self-sufficiency are similarly framed as strategic assets. Technology\, particularly in areas such as artificial intelligence\, quantum computing\, and advanced manufacturing\, appears as a dominant thread throughout the strategy. According to the presentation\, the NSS suggests that contemporary strategic competition is increasingly shaped by industrial capacity\, technological leadership\, supply chain resilience\, and computational power\, rather than ideological contestation alone. \nIn terms of regional ordering\, the strategy places the Western Hemisphere at the top of its priorities. Dr. Kumar described this as a revival of a Monroe Doctrine–style approach\, aimed at reasserting U.S. pre-eminence in both North and South America. The document reportedly seeks to deny strategic space to external powers\, particularly China and Russia\, and signals a commitment to rolling back their political\, economic\, and security presence in Latin America. The Speaker noted that this emphasis is both strategic and symbolic\, indicating that the hemisphere is being elevated in priority\, potentially at the expense of other theatres. \nThe strategy’s operational approach to the Western Hemisphere is framed around two broad concepts: “enlist” and “expand.” Under the “enlist” approach\, the United States seeks to work with regional champions\, reward cooperative partners\, rebalance its global posture toward the hemisphere\, and expand the Coast Guard and Navy to secure sea lines of communication. It also emphasises commercial diplomacy and deeper economic engagement with regional partners. Under the “expand” approach\, the United States aims to remain the first-choice partner for states in the region\, while establishing interagency mechanisms to identify and secure strategic locations and resources. The Speaker also highlighted the strategy’s emphasis on strategic acquisitions and the role of the private sector in strengthening U.S. influence. \nAsia was presented as another central theatre\, with the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan emerging as focal points of strategic attention. The South China Sea is identified as a critical maritime corridor\, and the document links deterrence directly to economic access and influence. The NSS proposes a combination of economic and security measures\, including rebalancing trade relations with China\, addressing supply chain vulnerabilities\, restoring a favourable military balance\, and strengthening alliances and partnerships. The strategy also acknowledges the importance of the Global South\, suggesting that earlier U.S. approaches were insufficient and that Washington must engage emerging countries more effectively. \nThe Middle East is presented as an area of recalibration. According to the Speaker\, the NSS argues that the region no longer occupies the central strategic position it once did\, as U.S. energy self-sufficiency has reduced dependence on Middle Eastern resources. The strategy signals a reduced emphasis on democracy promotion and suggests a more pragmatic approach to regional political systems. Terrorism is not treated as the primary organising principle as in earlier strategies\, while trade\, technology cooperation\, and regional stability are given greater importance. \nEurope is addressed through a more critical lens. The strategy reportedly attributes Europe’s vulnerabilities to economic stagnation\, insufficient defence spending\, and migration-related challenges. It calls on European States to assume greater responsibility for their own defence and adopts a more transactional approach to alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is presented as an institution that cannot indefinitely rely on U.S. support\, and European markets are urged to become more open to American goods and services. \nAfrica\, in the strategy\, is framed primarily through the lens of minerals and investment. The presentation noted that the NSS appears to shift away from aid-centric engagement and instead emphasises investment and resource partnerships\, reflecting the continent’s importance in global supply chains and industrial competition. \nIndia features in multiple sections of the NSS. Dr. Kumar highlighted three broad contexts in which it appears. First\, India is positioned within the Indo-Pacific framework as a partner whose cooperation is essential for strengthening regional deterrence and stability. Second\, the strategy references India in relation to broader partnerships\, including potential support for U.S. objectives in the Western Hemisphere. Third\, India\, along with Japan\, is mentioned in the context of maritime security in the South China Sea\, with expectations that regional partners will shoulder a greater share of responsibilities in maintaining secure sea lanes and deterring coercive actions. \nThe Speaker concluded with a comparative assessment of the 2017\, 2022\, and 2025 National Security Strategies. According to him\, the 2025 NSS reflects a shift from expansive global leadership to a more conditional and selective form of engagement\, engaging where core interests are at stake while reducing commitments elsewhere. Great power competition remains central\, but the emphasis has shifted from ideological contestation to issues such as decoupling\, technology\, and supply chain security. Alliances\, in this framework\, are increasingly interest-based and transactional rather than treated as unconditional pillars of U.S. global leadership. The strategy also reduces emphasis on democracy promotion and human rights\, while elevating economic security\, industrial policy\, and technological leadership as primary instruments of statecraft. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr. Kumar characterised the NSS 2025 as a clear move toward a realist framework marked by selective engagement\, conditional partnerships\, and a focus on national interest\, economic nationalism\, and technological competitiveness. He noted that the strategy could intensify U.S.–China strategic rivalry\, reshape alliance structures\, and contribute to a global order defined increasingly by power\, data\, and industrial capacity. \nQ&A Session\nFollowing the presentation\, the Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R Chinoy\, observed that the strategy is layered and requires careful interpretation. He cautioned against assuming that the absence of certain terms automatically indicates a shift in U.S. threat perceptions\, noting that continuity between the 2017 and 2025 strategies should not be underestimated. He argued that the strategies collectively suggest an American reassessment of its role after decades of engagement with the post-1945 international order\, reflecting frustration with the constraints of transnational and supranational structures. \nAmb. Chinoyl suggested that the strategic implications of the NSS’s multiple references to India could be further explored. He noted that the document retains India’s status as a strategic partner while also signalling expectations for greater Indian engagement in the Western Hemisphere and reconsideration of its approach toward Russia and the Ukraine conflict. He also questioned the tendency to place India and Japan in the same analytical category\, given their different alliance structures and degrees of strategic autonomy. \nDuring the Q&A Session\, participants raised questions on the absence of North Korea’s denuclearisation\, the credibility of U.S. military assessments in a Taiwan contingency\, and the broader purpose of written NSS documents. In response\, the Speaker reiterated that the strategy prioritises competition with China\, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere\, and that the absence of certain issues should not automatically be interpreted as a major policy shift. The Session concluded with the observation that the NSS reflects the end of an era in which the United States sought to police the global order\, with Europe and the Middle East appearing relatively deprioritised compared to the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. \nReport prepared by Mr. Mohanasakthivel J\, Research Analyst\, ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/dr-rajeesh-kumars-monday-morning-meeting-on-u-s-national-security-strategy-2025
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