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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251006T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251006T000000
DTSTAMP:20261121T010150
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LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060034Z
UID:94334-1759708800-1759708800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Defence Agreement: Implications for India”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. P.K. Pradhan\, Research Fellow\, spoke on “Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Defence Agreement: Implications for India” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 6 October 2025. Dr. Priyanka Singh\, Associate Fellow\, moderated the meeting. Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute attended the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation offered a detailed analysis of the Saudi Arabia–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed on 17 September 2025 marking a deepening of long-standing military cooperation and reflecting Riyadh’s bid to diversify security partnerships amid regional volatility. The deal underscores shifting Gulf alignments\, revived Pakistan-US ties\, and emerging multipolar security dynamics in West Asia. The discussion focused on the implications of the defence deal for India.  \nDetailed Report\nIn her opening remarks\, Dr. Priyanka Singh provided an overview of the recently concluded Saudi Arabia–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SDMA)\, underscoring Pakistan’s long-standing military presence in the Kingdom and its nuclear capabilities. Dr. Singh highlighted the potential for a calibrated outsourcing of nuclear technology to Riyadh\, particularly in the wake of Israel’s airstrikes in Qatar\, which have altered the Gulf region’s security calculus. Dr. Singh noted that Pakistan’s renewed relevance within the US strategic framework\, particularly after Operation Sindoor\, warrants an examination of Washington’s motives in supporting the deal. \nDr. Pradhan elaborated on the agreement’s provisions\, noting its emphasis on a shared commitment by both states to enhance their security and strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression. The pact stipulates that any act of aggression against one state shall be considered an aggression against both\, signaling an expansion of defence cooperation beyond conventional means. While explicit reference to nuclear collaboration is absent\, the SDMA’s comprehensive nature implies inclusion of missile and nuclear defence components. Dr. Pradhan opined that the agreement can be seen as a formalisation and institutionalisation of the long-standing military partnership between Riyadh and Islamabad. \nThe speaker noted that since the 1960s\, Pakistan has been a critical security partner for Saudi Arabia. Both countries signed a defence cooperation agreement in 1967. Pakistani pilots flew Saudi aircraft and provided training to Saudi military forces. In return\, Pakistan has received huge financial assistance from Saudi Arabia. Following the 1970s oil boom\, Saudi financial support to Pakistan increased substantially. In 1982\, both countries signed a protocol agreement on deputation of armed forces and approximately 15\,000 Pakistani military personnel in Saudi Arabia. This defence cooperation deepened over subsequent decades\, extending to joint exercises\, defence industrial cooperation\, and deployment of around 6\,000 Pakistani troops during the 1990–91 Gulf War as well as after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US. \nDr. Pradhan mentioned that there is huge speculation that Saudi Arabia has provided financial support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme\, though neither of these countries has declared it officially. Visits by senior Saudi leaders\, including Crown Prince Abdullah (1998) and Defence Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz (1999\, 2002) to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities signalled Riyadh’s interest in Islamabad’s nuclear weapons. \nDr. Pradhan observed that Pakistan’s neutral stance during the Arab Spring strained its ties with Saudi Arabia temporarily\, as Saudi Arabia expected Islamabad’s active support to suppress anti-monarchy protests in Bahrain. Pakistan declined direct intervention but permitted private recruitment of Pakistani nationals to reinforce Saudi security forces. Similarly\, Islamabad refrained from direct military involvement in the Yemeni conflict (2015)\, pledging instead to defend Saudi territorial integrity and the sanctity of the two holy mosques. The appointment of Gen. Raheel Sharif as commander of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) in 2017 reaffirmed Riyadh’s trust in Pakistan’s military leadership. \nDr. Pradhan noted that Israel’s recent airstrikes in Qatar targeting the Hamas leaders was a key catalyst behind the new agreement\, prompting Saudi Arabia to diversify its defence partnerships and reduce dependence on the US. Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities\, military experience and defence ties with China make it an attractive strategic partner for Riyadh amid shifting regional power dynamics. Pakistan\, for its part\, has effectively leveraged its narrative of nuclear deterrence and missile prowess\, particularly following Operation Sindoor. Saudi Foreign Minister’s visits to New Delhi and Islamabad during the tensions display Riyadh’s interest in de-escalating the conflict. \nDr. Pradhan said that the US support for Israel’s air strike in Qatar\, has generated unease in Riyadh about Washington’s reliability as a security guarantor. Meanwhile\, the US-Pakistan engagement has deepened as President Donald Trump has expressed interest in regaining American control over the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.  \nAccording to Dr. Pradhan\, for Saudi Arabia\, the SDMA serves to mitigate vulnerabilities arising from internal security challenges\, hostilities with Houthis\, rivalry with Iran\, and the expanding footprint of Israel’s military activities in the Gulf. The agreement is mutually beneficial: Pakistan\, despite its fragile economy\, possesses robust military capabilities and remains the only Muslim-majority state with nuclear weapons; Saudi Arabia\, despite high defence spending has a weak army and faces multiple security challenges. The pact should not be construed as Riyadh choosing Islamabad over New Delhi. Saudi Arabia’s strong economic engagement with India — bilateral trade exceeding US$ 41 billion\, with Saudi investments in India around US$3.2 billion and Indian investments in the Kingdom approximating US$3 billion — reflect a pragmatic balance in Riyadh’s approach. India is a key market for Saudi oil. Besides\, both have elevated their ties to a strategic level. \nDr. Pradhan further stated that\, Saudi Arabia’s post-2001 shift from its pro-Pakistan stance on Kashmir\, now supporting bilateral resolution consistent with India’s position\, reinforces this balancing act. Consequently\, Saudi military intervention in any India-Pakistan conflict appears highly improbable. Riyadh has historically refrained from participating in combat operations beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Thus\, the defence deal primarily represents asymmetric cooperation—military support from Pakistan and financial support from Saudi Arabia—rather than an alliance aimed against a third party. \nNonetheless\, the SDMA presents new strategic challenges for Pakistan\, especially in terms of Pakistan’s involvement in maritime security in the Arabian Sea\, participation in Saudi internal security\, and refusal of Saudi requests for military support. Regionally\, the pact’s implications for the US security architecture in the Gulf warrant careful scrutiny. Iran supports the agreement as it could signal the emergence of an alternative regional security framework that may diminish US influence. \nThe Indian Government has stated that it will study the implications of the Saudi-Pakistan agreement for India’s national security as well as for regional and global stability. From India’s perspective\, the SDMA is a strategic concern rather than an immediate security threat. The agreement represents a diplomatic setback for India. New Delhi needs to intensify engagement with Riyadh to preserve its strategic and economic interests. Saudi Arabia\, aware of its economic interdependence with India\, is unlikely to jeopardise its partnership with New Delhi. \nQ & A Session\nIn the discussion that followed during the Q&A session\, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy emphasised the enduring and multifaceted nature of Saudi–Pakistani ties\, recalling Pakistan’s assistance during the 1979 Mecca incident. He noted that while Pakistan’s military strategy vis-à-vis India remains unpredictable and potentially reactive to terrorism-related triggers\, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to intervene in any ensuing conflict. Riyadh’s primary regional competitors — Israel\, Iran\, Turkey\, and Houthi-led Yemen — continue to shape its strategic priorities\, with limited scope for Pakistan’s direct involvement in Saudi Arabia’s regional confrontations. Amb. Chinoy noted that Saudi Arabia cannot feasibly procure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons\, given international scrutiny and logistical constraints. He recommended that India further consolidate ties with Riyadh\, enhancing strategic dialogue and economic interdependence. The discussion also touched upon the US’ role in the deal\, the possibility of formation of an “Islamic NATO” and China’s dissatisfaction with Pakistan’s intelligence-sharing activities with the US. \nReport pepared by Dr. Hirak Jyoti Das\, Research Analyst\, West Asia Centre\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-saudi-arabia-pakistan-defence-agreement
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251009T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251009T000000
DTSTAMP:20261121T010150
CREATED:20251114T110438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251114T110438Z
UID:94576-1759968000-1759968000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Professor K.P. Vijayalakshmi Speaks on ‘U.S.-India Tariff Tensions: Strategic Negotiations\, Geopolitical Challenges and Opportunities’
DESCRIPTION:Executive Summary\nThe talk addressed evolving dynamics in international politics\, focusing on India’s strategic autonomy within an emerging multipolar world order. The Speaker reflected on the trajectory of India–U.S. relations\, the implications of anti-globalisation trends\, and the technological and geopolitical dimensions of Indo-Pacific security. The discussion was set against the backdrop of shifting global power equations\, including the growing contestation between the United States and China\, and India’s efforts to navigate an increasingly complex environment. \nDetailed Discussion\nThe Director General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy chaired the interaction. He welcomed the Speaker\, Professor K.P. Vijayalakshmi\, currently with the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education\, who previously taught at the School of International Studies\, Jawaharlal Nehru University. \nAmb. Chinoy introduced the topic of the session – “U.S.-India Tariff Tensions and Strategic Negotiations: Geopolitical Challenges and Opportunities.” He noted that India’s relationships with both China and the United States are evolving within a complex geopolitical environment. The U.S.-India Partnership\, he emphasised\, is strong and vital irrespective of political leadership in either country. \nAmb. Chinoy stated that over the past two decades\, India’s global stature has risen\, driven by its economic growth and technological capabilities. He highlighted India’s inclination for multipolarity at both regional and global levels\, contrasting it with China’s ambitions and Washington’s unease over a changing international order. His remarks closed with reflections on how India’s actions and choices at this stage will shape its strategic trajectory and relations with major powers. \nProfessor Vijayalakshmi began by situating the discussion within a global context characterised by rising nationalism\, anti-globalisation sentiments\, and a gradual movement toward multipolarity. It was emphasised that while globalisation is not retreating completely\, it has fragmented into multiple regional and interest-based blocs. The Speaker underscored that the world is now experiencing a “multi-polarising” trend where no single power dominates – creating both opportunities and uncertainties for India’s foreign policy. \nFocusing on India’s position\, the Speaker noted that India’s geopolitical approach remains rooted in strategic autonomy\, though it increasingly intersects with issue-based alignments such as the Quad and Indo-Pacific frameworks. The United States\, while maintaining a leadership role\, is seen to be re-evaluating its own strategic commitments amid domestic and structural constraints. \nThe Speaker highlighted the following aspects: \n\nInterdependence and Multipolarity:\n\nThe world is no longer defined by a unipolar or bipolar framework. Instead\, new poles of influence are emerging\, driven by technological innovation\, economic interdependence\, and national capabilities. India’s policy discourse must evolve beyond Cold War binaries and recognise the fluidity of modern power relations. \n\nAnti-Globalisation:\n\nThe rise of anti-globalisation in several countries\, including advanced economies\, has disrupted the liberal order and complicated international economic and political coordination. This has particularly affected the U.S.\, where protectionist tendencies have reshaped its global engagement. \n\nIndia’s Strategic Autonomy:\n\nIndia continues to pursue an independent path\, balancing relations with major powers while preserving its decision-making flexibility. The Speaker underlined that strategic autonomy should not be confused with isolationism but viewed as a calibrated engagement model. \n\nS.–India Relations and Policy Shifts:\n\nThe Speaker traced the evolution of bilateral relations from early cooperation to contemporary technological and defence partnerships. Despite temporary political strains- particularly during Trump’s first term- both countries have maintained a robust institutional framework of dialogue. \nThe bilateral relationship has been sustained through mutual trust\, shared strategic goals\, and a recognition that a strong\, prosperous India aligns with American interests. \n\nTechnological Cooperation and Restrictions:\n\nA significant portion of the talk dealt with technology transfers and defence-industrial collaboration. The Speaker observed that while India seeks greater access to advanced technologies\, the U.S. remains cautious due to compliance frameworks and trust deficits. There is a need to institutionalise mechanisms that ensure mutual benefits\, particularly in emerging domains like AI\, quantum technologies\, and defence co-production. \n\nChina and the Indo-Pacific:\n\nThe talk emphasised that India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific is not one of containment but of ensuring regional stability and open supply chains. The U.S.–China technological and strategic rivalry has implications for India\, which must avoid binary alignments while deepening strategic cooperation where interests converge. \n\nPerceptions and Public Diplomacy:\n\nThe Speaker also highlighted the importance of perception management and consistent political signalling in India–U.S. ties. While structural mechanisms like the 2+2 Dialogue and Quad have created institutional depth\, public and political narratives continue to shape policy outcomes. \nThe discussion underscored that India’s foreign policy must operate within the reality of an interdependent yet fragmented global system. While multipolarity allows for greater manoeuvrability\, it also demands agility and strategic clarity. The future of India–U.S. relations lie in sustained trust-building\, technological collaboration\, and maintaining a balance between autonomy and alignment. \nThe Speaker’s reflections also indicated that while the U.S. remains a crucial partner\, India’s global aspirations necessitate diversified partnerships across Asia\, Africa\, and Europe. The long-term success of bilateral cooperation will depend on aligning national capabilities with shared strategic outcomes rather than declaratory statements alone. \nQ&A Session\nThe Q/A session revolved around U.S. foreign policy under Trump\, shifts in U.S. views toward India\, the China–Pakistan dynamic\, and broader geopolitical trends in the Indo-Pacific. It included interventions by the Chairperson\, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy. \nA question was raised on whether the change in U.S. perception of India was a lasting “transformational shift” or just a temporary Trump-era phenomenon. The Speaker argued that there was indeed a transformational shift under Trump\, marked by more direct\, pragmatic\, and transactional behaviour. However\, she added that it might not be permanent- rather\, a reactive phase driven by domestic pressures such as immigration\, inflation\, and trade issues. \nThe discussion noted the fracturing of bipartisan consensus in U.S. politics\, which has historically underpinned foreign policy stability. The Speaker emphasised that this division was not caused by India\, but reflected deeper domestic political polarisation between Democrats and Republicans. The weakening of bipartisan consensus made U.S. foreign policy appear less predictable and more populist. \nThe “Make America Great Again (MAGA) Club” was described as a distinct faction within the Republican Party- comprising populists\, conservatives\, and militarists. These groups seek U.S. global primacy but differ from traditional Republicans who valued stability and alliance-based order. The Speaker noted that Trumpists tend to admire strong\, centralised leadership styles (even referencing Xi Jinping) and believe that “order must be created from chaos.” This ideological shift affects how Republicans approach relations with India\, China\, and global governance. \nA number of questions pertained to the China–Pakistan relationship and whether a trust deficit exists. The Speaker suggested that while Beijing and Islamabad have strategic cooperation\, the relationship lacks deep trust due to asymmetric dependence. Historically\, the U.S. tolerated Pakistan’s balancing role between Washington and Beijing\, viewing it as useful rather than threatening. India\, by contrast\, is now seen as a more stable partner- but one still navigating the ambiguity of U.S. intentions. \nProfessor K.P. Vijayalakshmi highlighted that the U.S.–India relationship remains the most crucial within the Quad\, as other members (Japan\, Australia) already have formal treaty alliances with Washington. The future of the Quad depends largely on how strongly the Indo–U.S. partnership develops. There are still doubts about whether the Quad represents a coherent new order (“G2 or G2.0”) or remains a fragile alignment. \nThe Speaker and the Chairperson agreed that India must balance its freedom of action- especially concerning its China and Pakistan policies- without overcommitting to U.S. preferences. \nThe final part of the discussion reviewed the Cold War context\, noting that the U.S. never truly objected to China–Pakistan rapprochement. Even during the 1950s\, Pakistan was part of both SEATO and CENTO\, serving as a medium of engagement between Washington and Beijing. Professor Vijaylakshmi concluded that while Trump’s rhetoric brought attention to these linkages\, U.S. policy continuity toward Pakistan remains strong\, though India now occupies a larger strategic space. \nThe discussion ended on the note that Trumpism introduced a new\, volatile dynamic in U.S. foreign policy. While India benefited from strategic convergence\, its future depends on how enduring these shifts are\, beyond Trump’s personality-driven politics. \nThe Director General\, Amb. Chinoy thanked the speaker and the audience. \nReport prepared by Ms. Khyati Singh\, Research Analyst\, North America and Strategic Technologies Centre\, MP-IDSA.  
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/professor-k-p-vijayalakshmi-speaks-on-u-s-india-tariff-tensions-strategic-negotiations-geopolitical-challenges-and-opportunities
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251013T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251013T000000
DTSTAMP:20261121T010150
CREATED:20260101T061258Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060135Z
UID:95093-1760313600-1760313600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report on Monday Morning Meeting on “China’s Peripheral Diplomacy
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Manoj Kewalramani\, Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution\, Bengaluru\, delivered a talk on the “Changing Nature of China’s Peripheral Diplomacy”\, during the Monday Morning Meeting on 13 October 2025. The talk was moderated by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator\, East Asia Centre MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the Institute’s scholars participated in the discussion. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, in his introductory remarks noted the context of the topic. He observed that in October 2013\, Beijing had organised a work conference on Peripheral Diplomacy. More than a decade later\, in April 2025\, the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries was held in Beijing. This transformation from an adhoc to calendar event reflects the increasing importance of the neighbourhood in China’s larger diplomatic strategy. Further\, it also indicates towards the growing interlinkage between China’s neighbourhood diplomacy and major-power diplomacy. \nFollowing Dr. Singh’s remarks\, Dr. Kewalramani made his presentation. He noted that the April 2025 Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries had created considerable speculation regarding Beijing’s approach towards its periphery and its diplomatic strategy. Deliberating on China’s perception of its periphery\, Dr. Kewalramani noted that China sees the periphery as important for achieving development and prosperity. While previously\, the Chinese leadership saw the periphery as an important\, but not necessarily the central factor in their diplomacy. In recent years\, the periphery has come to rank higher than major powers and Beijing now sees the neighbourhood as key not only for safeguarding national security but also for managing major power relations. The Speaker emphasised that within Chinese foreign policy discourse\, the logic of managing periphery for better management of major power relations has become the predominant thinking. He noted that the changed perception of the neighbourhood reflects China’s increasing stake in its immediate neighbourhood and also its expanding periphery. Thereby\, we are likely to witness a surge in active diplomacy from China in the region. \nDr. Kewalramani observed that the rhetoric of building a community of common destiny is part of the diplomatic outreach to the neighbourhood. Besides\, the various initiatives like the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI)\, Global Development Initiative (GDI)\, Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Governance Initiative (GGI) are well thought out programmes to not only engage the international community but also the region. He noted that the primary objective is to bind the neighbouring countries to China not only through economic diplomacy but also through people to people exchanges. The Chinese leadership perceives that while China has been successful in engaging the elites across the world\, it needs to engage the public to gain a favourable public perception. This logic also applies to the neighbourhood where we see significant public engagement efforts through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and other platforms. Dr. Kewalramani observed that while the structure of the BRI has shifted from infrastructure to energy\, it continues to be an important platform. He also briefly discussed Chinese strategy to build an Asian Security model which extends beyond traditional defence issues to encompass macroeconomic security\, network and cyber security and monetary fraud among others. \nShifting to China’s perception of the periphery Dr. Kewalramani noted that Beijing has adopted an expansive view of the neighbourhood whereby Ukraine is also considered part of the periphery. Further\, the leadership considers that in an era when global challenges are likely to impact the region more than it did in the past\, China would have to formulate a more focused policy towards the region.  The United States’ increasing presence in the Chinese neighbourhood is also a major concern which in Beijing’s view has to be countered with an integrated policy of engagement with the region. With regard to Chinese foreign policy towards the neighbouring countries\, he contended that while China aims to bring the neighbouring countries within the ambit of overwhelming domination\, it also intends to cultivate deference and at worst neutrality. Towards the end of his presentation\, the Speaker concluded that as China is endeavouring to integrate the neighbouring countries more closely to its economic and diplomatic system\, it is looking into regional dynamics and inventing new platforms to enhance cooperation. \nThe Director General’s Remarks\nFollowing Dr. Kewalramani’s presentation\, DG\, MP-IDSA\, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, observed that China has always been concerned with its periphery and neighbourhood and this highlights China’s own anxiety over encirclement on the one hand and its own policy of containment against its neighbours. There is a very distinct past in China’s history when they wanted to keep away the barbarians from Central Asia and the Steppes and that is why the Great Wall of China was built. This has shaped China’s diplomacy and world view of its neighbourhood since then including the Wei Qi principle\, the containment and encirclement concepts. China has been at the receiving end and has also exercised its choices in this regard\, including in South Asia today. \nAfter 1949\, the neighbourhood in that same vein assumed extremely high priority in China’s security policies. Besides\, China’s colonial experience also shaped Chinese perception of its periphery. He observed that when one looks at the 1960s\, Mao was very enthusiastic in supporting the so-called communist revolutions\, primarily in the periphery – the Indonesians\, the Malaysians\, the Thai – everybody was at the receiving end. This also went as far as Africa in terms of supporting the revolution there. In the next decade\, China went in for its modernisation in 1979\, the Open Door Policy began with its periphery. One must keep in mind that the earliest investments that came into China\, whether from states like Japan or Korea or Singapore or Hong Kong were all on China’s periphery. The overseas Chinese population was located in China’s periphery. They were crucial in terms of fuelling China’s modernisation programme and Open Door policy. Today\, one can see that China is broadly trying to make the region a part of its own concept – the flying geese formation – with China in the lead and rest of the region  flocking  behind in a manner which is conducive to the region’s own economic development. \nNo great power has emerged without there being some kind of regional consensus on its emergence. China is particularly keen to implement this concept. This is being manifested in many ways in the Belt and the Road Initiative (BRI). Amb. Chinoy contended that without the BRI succeeding in China’s neighbourhood\, there was no question of expanding to the greater extended neighbourhood\, be it Eurasia or the heart of Europe. In China’s case\, the concept of neighbourhood is expanding very rapidly. This redefinition takes it across to South China Sea\, East China Sea or as far away as Palau in the Pacific\, French Polynesia and Micronesia – where China is rubbing shoulders with the French but also in South Asia where it rubs up against India’s definition of neighbourhood and the extended neighbourhood China’s expanding sphere of influence must be studied more in detail. \nAmb. Chinoy contended that one should draw similarities with the Mandala principle of Chanakya because Chanakya had said that one cannot be Chakravartin unless one subdues or dominates its neighbours. There is a very big parallel between Chanakya’s teaching and Xi Jinping’s own definition of China as a Middle Kingdom. Notably\, “peripheral work” instead of “peripheral diplomacy” indicates a whole of government approach. This is something which needs to be studied very carefully. However\, we must keep in mind that it is not all success for China in its periphery. When Trump claims to have brokered peace between Thailand and Cambodia\, it is a setback to China’s regional diplomacy because of the acute interdependencies China has created in the region. He concluded\, stating that it remains to be seen how China will respond to Trump’s claims of mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. \nQ&A Session\nDuring the Q&A session\, the scholars posed various questions to the Speaker. It was asked whether due to Beijing’s expansive view of the neighbourhood\, China will treat the territories between the US and China as part of the wider neighbourhood that need to be brought under Chinese control. The Speaker was also probed about Chinese perception of priorities and success in its neighbourhood work and the alignment between Chinese private enterprises and Beijing’s geostrategic and economic interests. Further\, questions were raised with regard to the challenges posed by the Chinese conception of the core and periphery to the Heartland theory by Halford Mackinder. \nThe Speaker responded by stating that the approach differs according to the region. He reiterated that with regard to immediate periphery\, China intends to connect these countries closely to its own regime stability\, while with Europe and further regions the objective is to ensure neutrality in an event of China-US conflict. He also noted that China no longer intends to capture territories but subdue them to Chinese interests. Also\, in terms of periphery work China imagines its neighbourhood in concentric circles reflecting different challenges to China’s security. \nReport prepared by Ms. Mayuri Banerjee\, Research Analyst\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-on-monday-morning-meeting-on-chinas-peripheral-diplomacy
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251024T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251024T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T010150
CREATED:20260707T043558Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060201Z
UID:98905-1761292800-1761325200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Fellow Seminar by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA
DESCRIPTION:Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, made a presentation for his Fellow Seminar on “Atmanirbharta in Naval Fighter Aircraft” on 24 October 2025. The Seminar was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. It was attended by serving and retired naval officers\, scientists\, and scholars of MP-IDSA. The External Discussants were Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (Retd.)\, Member\, Governing Council\, Indian Council for World Affairs\, Professor Hari Babu Srivastava\, former DG DRDO\, currently Professor of Practice at IIT Delhi & Distinguished Fellow at Vivekananda International Foundation\, and Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.)\, Executive Vice President for Technology Development (Aerospace & Defence)\, Newspace Research & Technologies Pvt. Ltd. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session evaluated India’s naval aviation trajectory and indigenous fighter development. Key concerns included inconsistent programme continuity and loss of hard-won technological expertise. Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised that NLCA Mk-I must be inducted in limited numbers for data generation and naval technology validation\, assessed Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) as obsolete\, and recommended prioritising Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) for long-term capability. He cautioned that shutting Naval Light Combat Aircraft (NLCA) would erode institutional knowledge and that India must choose an “India variant” aligned with national requirements. The discussion underscored the need for continuity\, coordinated development and decisive high-level direction. \n  \nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy opened the Session by framing the pressures on India’s military aviation to match global standards in both scale and capability\, noting that the pace of technological development and absorption ultimately depends on funding. He traced the Navy’s trajectory in carrier aviation: after committing to the naval LCA Mk-I in 2003\, the service took a step back in 2016\, leaving the aircraft at the stage of a technology demonstrator rather than advancing it toward induction. The Navy has also not committed to the LCA Mk-II or the developing AMCA\, while exploring options such as import of the Rafale Marine and the development of TEDBF. Amb. Chinoy emphasised that TEDBF and AMCA are interlinked\, as their designs and engine requirements cannot be treated separately\, and future progress will hinge on co-development of ~120 kN-class engines with France as well as indigenous development of Kaveri engine. Another point to consider regarding the LCA is that production capacity comprises 8×2 in Bengaluru; 8×1 in Pune\, totalling 24  aircraft per year\, which is constrained by dependence on US G-404/G-414 engines. Given the 30–50 year lifespan of fighter aircraft and India’s challenges in the development of Kaveri engine\, such long-term reliance on external suppliers remains a concern. \n  \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\nGp. Capt. Narang began by stating that his paper is built upon three hypotheses: First\, limited induction of Naval LCA Mk-1 (fighter) is essential for data generation\, development & validation of navy specific technologies\, and it will be useful for developing advanced indigenous naval fighters since there is a difference between naval and land based LCA performance. Second\, TEDBF has become obsolete. Third\, the Indian Navy joining AMCA will be better for meeting future threats and self-reliance. With these hypotheses as his organising frame\, Gp. Capt. Narang proceeded to set out the technical lineage\, programme milestones\, platform specifications and the programmatic choices that inform India’s carrier-borne aviation options. \nHe began with the LCA family and the NLCA programme. The LCA Mk-I is a single-engine aircraft with a weight of 13\,500 and up to 3 tons in payload capacity. Gp. Capt. Narang traced the programme chronology precisely as recorded in the transcript. The Indian Air Force issued its requirement in 1983; the Navy submitted requirements in 1985. In 1986 the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) was asked to conduct a feasibility study on NLCA; that study was carried out between 1989 and 1992\, and the resultant report was approved in 1985. The IAF recorded the type’s first flight in 2001; NLCA Mk-1 approval came in 2003; and the naval prototype’s first flight occurred in 2012\, a development Gp. Capt. Narang noted occurred within a relatively short eight-year to nine-year window from formal approval. He recorded the Navy’s withdrawal of consent from the naval LCA programme in 2016\, and yet underlined subsequent operational milestones: NLCA completed landings on INS Vikramaditya (2020) and on INS Vikrant (2023). He stated the sanctioned cost of LCA Mk-1 at INR1\,714 Cr and noted the comparative per-aircraft figure for a single Rafale as roughly INR 2\,000 Cr.+ to illustrate the fiscal implications of import. \nTurning to navalisation features\, Gp. Capt. Narang drew on Cmde Jaideep Maolankar’s assessments to set out what distinguishes NLCA Mk-I for carrier use. Leading Edge Vortex Control (LEVCON) enhances controllability at low speeds; an arrestor hook enables carrier recovery; landing gear has been strengthened to withstand high axle loads during deck landings; and components and Line Replaceable Units have been re-certified from IAF to naval specifications. He acknowledged the known challenges the programme encountered — delays\, technology denial\, structural complexity and component supply delays — but emphasised that indigenous innovation and pragmatic engineering at multiple stages mitigated many of these hurdles. He warned that closure of the NLCA programme would set industry capability back by decades because the scientists and engineers holding project knowledge would eventually retire\, compelling a return to the drawing board rather than building on accumulated experience. \nTo reinforce the operational dimension\, Gp. Capt. Narang screened a demonstration video of NLCA to anchor discussion in flight-test experience and the incremental accumulation of naval-aviation know-how. \nGp. Capt. Narang then introduced LCA Mk-II. LCA Mk-II is a single-engine aircraft of 17.5 tons Maximum All up Weight (AUW) and was developed to meet naval requirements by increasing payload and range. In practice\, the Indian Air Force found the Mk-II particularly useful because reduced drag and increased payload capacity made it effective for replacing Mirage-2000 class aircraft and for boosting squadron strength. Two naval prototypes (NP-3 and NP-4) were approved\, but the Navy redirected sanctioned funds toward the Twin-Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF). Gp. Capt. Narang recorded that\, notwithstanding earlier setbacks\, the LCA Mk-II project received approval for a prototype in 2023. \nTEDBF is a 4.5-generation twin-engine aircraft weighing around 26 tons. Its higher payload and extended range were conceived to meet carrier requirements and to counter regional threats. Proponents argued TEDBF would require less development time than AMCA. The initial requirement for TEDBF had been forecasted for three carriers; which was not approved. The Navy subsequently acquired the Rafale  through a global RFP for the  Multi Role Carrier Based Fighter (MRCBF). Gp. Capt. Narang stressed that the Navy withdrew consent for N-LCA and for naval LCA Mk-II in 2016 and that in 2017 it issued an RFI for 57 MRCBF\, reflecting a change in procurement preference away from the indigenous naval LCA path. \nOn AMCA\, Gp. Capt. Narang stated that AMCA is twin-engine\, 25-ton weight and incorporates a stealth airframe. He emphasised the Navy’s operational question about whether stealth modules can be reliably maintained in a saline environment\, and he noted that experience with other similar stealth platforms indicates viability\, though the issue remains operationally salient for naval adoption. He compared AMCA’s ambitions with contemporary foreign designs\, observing that China has inducted fifth generation such as the J-35 carrier based fighter and fielded the J-20  land variants\, and has demonstrated J-36 and J-50\, which he characterised as 5+ generation designs with potential to evolve further. Against this regional context\, Gp. Capt. Narang highlighted resource constraints — funding\, manpower and institutional capacity — that affect LCA Mk-II\, TEDBF and AMCA alike. \nOne of the bottlenecks in his account is institutional constraints due to limited design and test resources. ADA is responsible for designing LCA Mk-II\, TEDBF and AMCA; the programmes share test pilots\, production facilities\, certification agencies and supply chains. This commonality\, combined with a limited pool of skilled personnel for design and development\, creates competition for resources and contributes to significant schedule delays. \nGp. Capt. Narang characterised India’s indigenous Kaveri engine experience as ambiguous and mixed\, and he set out unit costs to illustrate procurement pressures: LCA Mk-II costs INR 643 Cr. per aircraft\, while the Rafale-M figure he cited is INR 2\,453 Cr. per aircraft. These numbers\, he argued\, directly condition choices when budgets are constrained and timelines are tight. \nGp. Capt. Narang summarised practitioner inputs to emphasise operational imperatives. He relayed the perspective  of Adm Arun Prakash (Retd.) that a carrier-borne Tejas flight or squadron could perform fleet air-defence duties while generating valuable operational data for follow-on indigenous designs\, tempered by concerns about HAL’s ability to ramp production. He also summarised counsel by Cmde. CD Balaji (Retd.) that maintaining a couple of NLCA squadrons would prudently preserve lessons learned from deck-based fighter development pending a successor design\, thereby avoiding loss of institutional memory. \nIn his concluding assessment\, Gp. Capt. Narang called for systemic reforms: an honest audit and analytical culture to diagnose delays and cancellations; stronger operator-developer feedback loops to generate mission data and validate naval technologies; explicit attention to saline-environment certification for sensitive modules; clearer ownership\, leadership in decision-making and accountability to prevent inaction; adoption of spiral development to permit incremental capability growth; and a higher decision body to ensure roadmaps\, reliable timelines and funding for course corrections. His specific prescription for the Navy aligned with his opening hypotheses: limited induction of LCA Mk-I to generate operational data; rejection of TEDBF as the principal path; and a concentrated effort to modify and operationalise AMCA for naval purposes. He closed by invoking Dr. Abdul Kalam’s words about the broader national imperative that India moves from being a low-cost assembly base to original research\, design and manufacture if true Atmanirbharta in defence is to be realised. \nCmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.)\nCmde. Jaideep Maolankar began by warning that naval carrier aviation does not have a bright future on its current trajectory. Drawing from his experience in the LCA programme as Chief Test Pilot of the LCA Mk-1 (Navy) Fighter\, he said the project suffered deep neglect\, particularly in allocation of resources. The programme functioned on a shoestring budget and was structurally dependent on Air Force designs and resources. Even so\, he argued\, the central lesson is that a naval aircraft can be built indigenously\, since despite resource scarcity the programme delivered results. However\, he cautioned that this success has created a degree of technical arrogance that is unwarranted. \nCmde. Maolankar then outlined his first major point: the Navy’s understanding of aviation fundamentals needs a review . The organisation simultaneously inducts STOBAR carriers and dismisses their relevance\, asserting that naval aviation will benefit with induction of 65\,000-ton plus  carriers for using catapults and EMALS. According to him\, the belief that catapults are indispensable is a myth. There is a strong case for lighter carriers\, and it is better to have two smaller carriers that the Navy is willing to risk than one large carrier considered too precious to expose. In this sense\, he argued\, the Navy must return to basics in its thinking on aircraft and carrier requirements. \nCmde. Maolankar’s second concern was the handling of technology and human resource. “Technology is HR\,” he stated\, noting that lessons from NLCA Mk-I are being lost as those who worked on the programme depart\, due to absence of an indigenous program or retirement. These insights cannot be captured fully through documentation. For example\, during NLCA Mk-I development\, non-critical LRUs underwent recertification and shop testing while critical LRUs—in some instances—were not tested and were allowed to pass based on analysis and risk acceptance. Such judgement calls reflect expertise that cannot simply be recorded; they must be experienced and retained. \nCmde. Maolankar criticised the fact that while the Navy is proud of its ships\, it lacks an indigenous aircraft and has opted instead for Rafale\, which he observed that is likely to become as outdated as TEDBF. He recalled that certain design changes once deemed too risky for Navy LCA Mk-II were later accepted without objection for Rafale\, raising questions about whether such decisions were based on engineering logic or institutional decisions \nCmde. Maolankar also noted that India currently retains only one sanctions-proof technology gained from the United States—carrier suitability design and testing—acquired through paid training of U.S. personnel. However\, the experts who absorbed that knowledge are retiring\, putting even that singular capability at risk. \nShifting to structural concerns\, Cmde. Maolankar said the three pillars of carrier aviation—ship\, aircraft and weapons—should be designed concurrently\, whereas in India they are developed separately. According to him\, the ship should accommodate compromises so that the aircraft remains least compromised\, and weapons must be customised specifically for the aircraft. The lack of such integration is likely to face fundamental challenges. \nCmde. Maolankar pointed out that there is inadequate appreciation of nuances of naval aviation and highlighted inherent flaws in giving priority to land based aircraft at the expense of carrier aviation. Unless the Navy fielded a carrier-aircraft-weapon ecosystem that delivered demonstrable capability\, support would not materialise\, and naval aviation would continue to be undermined. He added that foreign aircraft are obsolete the moment they are inducted and carrier aviation has not attracted due attention\, which contradicts the broader logic of national air power. He noted that TEDBF appears in DRDO posters and Aero India displays yet has no sanction. \nDiscussing the prospect of merging TEDBF and AMCA\, he described the first lesson from Mk-I as the error of adapting a land-based aircraft for naval use\, necessitating Mk-II. The second lesson from the IAF Mk-I programme is that India lacks proper understanding of specifications; certification agencies enforce specifications rigidly instead of using them as guidelines. For AMCA\, the IAF prioritises precision bombing\, whereas the Navy needs anti-ship missiles\, which are heavier and longer. Whether these requirements will be integrated remains uncertain\, and the Navy may end up carrying weapons externally in non-stealth mode as with TEDBF. A merger is only viable\, if Navy takes the lead in developing navy specific fighter. \nHe reiterated the importance of comprehensive data generation\, noting that data from Mk-I should be leveraged for naval aircraft development\, which requires design intuition\, human judgement and data across varied scenarios. \nIn conclusion\, he asserted that both TEDBF and Rafale are likely to become obsolete\, and that AMCA risks obsolescence by the time it is ready. India must take timely decisions if naval aviation is to survive. \nAdm. Shekhar Sinha (Retd.)\nAdm. Shekhar Sinha began by stating that delays in decisions on aircraft carriers stem from the fact that such decisions are taken at much higher levels. He stressed that ships\, especially aircraft carriers\, must not be developed independently of the aircraft intended to operate from them. According to him\, the absence of concurrent development has directly led to problems of weight\, lift and wing fold in naval aircraft\, and the same applies to weapons integration\, which must also occur alongside aircraft development. \nReflecting on past practices\, Adm. Sinha recalled that in the case of the Harrier\, the engine was designed first and the airframe afterwards. Though considered the best approach at the time\, this contributed to the Harrier’s limitations. He contrasted this with the F-35\, whose configuration does not rely on a lift engine. While Harriers use maximum power during take-off and landing\, the F-35 uses maximum power during cruise. \nAdm. Sinha argued that adapting an Indian Air Force platform into a naval aircraft is a fundamentally flawed starting point. Naval fighters should not be derivative variants of Air Force platforms because their operational environments and mechanisms are different. As an example\, he referred to the MiG-29K\, which originated from the MiG-29B airframe and was not suited to naval demands\, resulting in failures during testing. He described this as a continuation of the “jugaad” mentality—forcing a platform into a role for which it was not designed. \nAt this point\, Amb. Chinoy briefly intervened to say that there are rare circumstances in which “jugaad” may be justified\, citing the case of the Mirage-2000 in Kargil\, but agreed that such logic cannot guide complex\, high-end systems. Returning to his point\, Adm. Sinha stressed that while the Navy can propose requirements based on threat perception\, delays occur because decisions pass through several forums and ultimately rest with higher authorities who may not be technical experts. Even so\, he expressed cautious optimism that good decisions will eventually be made. He noted India’s longstanding dependence on imported aircraft and emphasised the need for self-reliance . \nAdm\, Sinha added that future capability will depend on compatibility with emerging weapons. Electrically driven components may be explored\, but each must be certified to withstand landing-induced shocks on carriers. This reinforces the need for trials and data generation. He mentioned that the United States had earlier approached India and that France remains a friend\, suggesting that collaboration could lead to carriers tailored to national requirements. \nAdm. Sinha said that throughout India’s defence research and development history\, the air element has not been taken seriously enough. Import dependence has been persistent\, and only recently has some transfer of technology been insisted upon. Scientists will need to have a bigger role\, since pure science is an intrinsic part of aviation development and engineers alone are insufficient. \nOn the possible merger of TEDBF and AMCA\, he cautioned that there are technical complications. In his view\, ship\, aircraft and weapons development must run concurrently\, and the priority must be futuristic capability. Systems development must take into account shifts in the Indian Ocean Region. He described how Chinese systems are being tested in Pakistan and\, by extension\, against India. He pointed to China’s Beidou satellite network with more than 600 satellites over the Indian Ocean\, enabling tracking that no aircraft or ship can evade. Combined with ISR satellite launches and optical fibre linkage between China’s Western Theatre Command and Rawalpindi\, he argued that India now faces a single front dominated by China rather than a two-front problem. \nAdm. Sinha said that if India wants to reset aviation development without losing gains already made\, programmes must be continued rather than terminated midway. LCA\, he argued\, can preserve and advance carrier-aircraft know-how\, and even a small number of aircraft can serve as development demonstrators. He compared this logic to the Bofors case\, where rather than discarding available technology\, it should be used to support future developments. \nAdm. Sinha concluded by stating that aircraft carriers\, aircraft and weapons must be developed as a composite whole rather than separate efforts. \nContinuing the discussion\, Amb. Chinoy said that both Cmde. Maolankar and Adm. Sinha had highlighted an important point—that TEDBF and AMCA merger should take into consideration  specific naval requirements. Stealth requirements and naval weapon systems may not be compatible and integrating them could compromise stealth itself. If those compromises become unavoidable\, the merger would defeat its purpose. \nAdm. Sinha added that an aircraft carrier\, the fighter designed to operate from it and the weapon systems cannot be developed in isolation. To ensure unified development\, he proposed the establishment of an apex-level coordinating body—potentially a Defence Science and Technology Council—headed at the highest political level and including key national security stakeholders. Such a body would assign responsibility\, set timelines and ensure accountability. \nAmb. Chinoy cited private-sector participation in AMCA as an example of the structural gaps that require such oversight. He noted that the programme is focusing on engines but lacks clarity on scale of requirement and responsibility. He mentioned that the Prime Minister recently called for a fighter engine programme in mission mode. He also noted international trends\, remarking that the J-10 has been viewed favourably in countries such as Indonesia\, which appears to prefer it over Rafale based on perceptions of performance during Operation Sindoor. \nDr. Haribabu Shrivastava\nProf. Haribabu Shrivastava noted at the outset that India has witnessed more programme closures than inductions across the services\, and regardless of the explanations\, the outcome represents a failure for the country. He emphasised the need for a national-level debate on LCA\, TEDBF and AMCA\, with participation from all three services and senior authorities\, and stressed that the decision emerging from such a process should be binding on every stakeholder involved. \nProf. Shrivastava observed that one structural problem in India’s defence ecosystem is the “problem of plenty\,” in which organisations or individuals claim capabilities they cannot practically deliver. This\, he said\, consumes limited resources and time that the country cannot afford to lose. Constraints span funding\, manpower\, manufacturing capacity and available facilities. According to him\, progress will not come from data-sharing alone; there must be reflection on why advancement has stalled. He proposed a comparative study between the IAF and the Navy\, accompanied by an assessment of current assets\, future needs and collaborative avenues. \nWhile India often benchmarks itself against China\, Prof. Shrivastava stated that the financial and manpower bases are not comparable. He pointed out that DRDO employs approximately 7\,000 scientists and only a few thousand work on relevant technologies in the private sector\, illustrating the scale difference with the United States\, China and Russia. Until India reaches that level\, he said\, the country must manage its limitations strategically\, by accepting shortcomings in some areas while securing gains in others. \nProf. Shrivastava also addressed persistent concerns regarding the treatment of engineers as scientists. DRDO\, he explained\, includes its own research corps\, the extra-mural research corps and the DRDO–Industry–Academia Centres of Excellence (DIACoEs). Earlier\, a single proposal would be sequentially forwarded from one DRDO department to another until one eventually granted clearance\, creating prolonged ambiguity and delays within approval chain. However\, national research culture remains risk-averse. Most defence-related academic projects are concentrated in IITs\, where large numbers of schemes leave limited time for direct faculty oversight. M.Tech and PhD scholars develop technology during their studies\, but once they graduate\, the technology effectively disappears with them\, and supervising professors may not know the detailed technical work. The absence of mechanisms to integrate such scholars into defence organisations results in the loss of specialised manpower. He illustrated this with the example of scholars who developed a bulletproof jacket but\, lacking continuity in the system\, later took employment in a pipe manufacturing company. \nProf. Shrivastava concluded that a national debate is essential and that the final decision must be taken at a level that cannot be bypassed—by development agencies\, procurement agencies or any service. \nAmb. Chinoy expanded the discussion by noting that the issue is not limited to the large number of DRDO projects with IITs. As with MTech and PhD research\, when senior directors and professors retire or relocate\, the technologies they worked on move with them\, sometimes even abroad. There is no legacy system\, corporate databank or shared platform to retain and provide access to this accumulated knowledge\, and Amb. Chinoy stressed the need to address this gap\, even by superimposing decisions if voluntary agreement is not achieved. He recalled the Prime Minister’s call for such reforms before the next DRDO Foundation Day and expressed optimism. Adm. Shekhar Sinha differed with Prof. Haribabu’s earlier suggestion of a national debate\, arguing it would create a “too many cooks spoil the broth” scenario and amount to going back to basics. \nQ/A session\nThe Q&A began with a comment noting that the 1986 feasibility study lacked ship motion data and relevant publications\, relying solely on experience from INS Vikrant. Within the LCA programme\, the airframe had not been marinised apart from the engine—already in service on the F-18 Hornet—and faced issues such as delayed thrust recovery after touchdown\, wing loading\, rollers and angle of attack. The comment detailed the structural modifications required for marinisation: strengthening to withstand catapult forces\, increasing undercarriage and nosewheel weight to prevent slamming\, redesigning the cockpit to improve visibility and protect against humidity and salt ingress\, and removing magnesium alloy to reduce corrosion. Persistent procrastination was also highlighted and that outcomes depend on human decision-making rather than equipment alone\, with a call for the Navy to lead naval aviation design and create a dedicated cell for it. \nThe discussion then turned to whether the LCA Navy Mk-I has any meaningful operational role\, given its seventeen-minute endurance at thirty miles from the carrier. This was seen as potentially limiting for training and air defence. In response\, Cmde. Maolankar argued that the question hinges on defining the intended role of the N-LCA. He emphasised that during its final trials it exceeded expectations and therefore warranted continued evaluation to improve performance. He said the N-LCA could be used for data generation and training\, but if its primary purpose is data generation\, then holding it to full operational standards would be counterproductive. \nSupporting this view\, Gp. Capt. Narang said that what is needed now is test data generated in realistic conditions\, which can only be achieved if operational pilots—not test pilots—fly the aircraft. Requirements derived from operational scenarios\, rather than idealised environments\, are necessary for credible development. \nThe debate then moved to whether TEDBF and AMCA should be merged. One intervention argued that a naval fighter must be designed as such from the outset\, as modifying a land-based aircraft later results in long delays and obsolescence. If a merger must happen\, the suggestion was that it should produce an “AMCA Navy” variant\, noting that a carrier-borne aircraft can operate from land\, but a land-based aircraft cannot operate from a carrier. Responding to this\, Gp. Capt. Narang clarified that if a merger produces a naval AMCA that meets national requirements\, he would support it. He noted that the LCA Mk-II programme had benefited the Air Force\, demonstrating that cross-service adaptation is possible\, and that AMCA can also be adapted if required. Whatever platform India chooses now\, he stressed\, will serve the fleet for the next three to four decades\, making the decision strategically decisive. \nA question followed on whether march-in rights through bodies like the Anusandhan National Research Foundation could prevent technology loss. Prof. Shrivastava noted that\, while such rights exist and documentation is thorough\, the “art” of engineering judgment—held by the individuals who worked on the technology—is lost when they leave. While PhD papers and theses are available digitally under the “one nation\, one subscription” framework\, documentation alone cannot reproduce an aircraft. \nAnother participant argued that India is still “landlocked in thinking\,” despite the fact that aircraft are the longest-reach weapon available to a fleet. With a limited number of aircraft and rising threat levels\, platforms must be omni-role and uncompromised. While Rafale and TEDBF are described as outdated\, their avionics are comparable to AMCA except for stealth\, which is less relevant for naval strike roles\, where payload capacity matters more. India\, must be prepared for current contingencies rather than hypothetical future ones. \nTo this\, Gp. Capt. Narang agreed that India must seek the best capability available within its limited manpower\, resources and development capacity. He stated that India does not need a “land” or “naval” variant but an “India variant”—a platform designed to meet national rather than organisational demands\, even if it requires designing from scratch. At the same time\, he warned that China has already deployed the J-35 from carriers\, and India must consider whether TEDBF can credibly compete with aircraft such as the J-35 or J-20. He added that developing technology follows a different trajectory from buying technology\, and historically India has purchased the best available systems rather than developed them. He stressed that India must not fall behind technologically. \nIn closing\, Gp. Capt. Narang said that the art and science of naval fighter development must not be allowed to disappear\, or the larger vision of Viksit Bharat will suffer. Decisions must be taken in national interest\, and now is the appropriate moment for a unified approach. He warned that the naval fighter programme must not face a “Marut moment” due to indecision. On TEDBF\, Rafale and AMCA\, he said that India must field capability that can counter the J-35 and take the most optimal step for the next two decades. He emphasised the importance of giving indigenous aircraft the same leeway that foreign platforms receive\, cited past rotorcraft programmes to show how maturity results from accumulated experience\, and reiterated that technology loss through delays and indecision must be prevented through higher-level intervention. He added that aircraft and carrier design must proceed concurrently and echoed the earlier call for a higher-level scientific decision-making body for the national interest. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Meghna Pradhan\, Research Analyst\, North America and Strategic Technologies Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fellow-seminar-by-gp-capt-dr-r-k-narang-retd-senior-fellow-mp-idsa
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251027T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251027T000000
DTSTAMP:20261121T010150
CREATED:20260101T052233Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T060226Z
UID:95089-1761523200-1761523200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning meeting on “Decline of Left-Wing Extremism in India”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Abhishek Verma\, Research Analyst\, at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “Decline of Left-Wing Extremism in India” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 27 October 2025. Dr Pushpita Das\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the session. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General of MP-IDSA\, attended the meeting along with scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session examined the decline of left wring extremism\, how the successive governments tackled the problem of left-wing extremism (LWE)\, and whether the problem can be eliminated from the country. \nDr. Verma traced the historical background of left-wing extremism in India\, discussed the intensification of Maoist insurgency in India and subsequently explained the Union Government’s response to Maoist violence. He further explained how the Union Government strengthened counterterrorism cooperation\, improved regional connectivity\, and pushed for structural reforms. He also explained the current situation of left-wing extremism in India and challenges faced by the government in addressing these problems.  \nThe question-and-answer round added further depth\, as MP-IDSA scholars raised issues ranging from surrender of insurgents to the functioning of rehabilitation policies as well as various frontal organisation of the Maoist organisation.  \nDetailed Report\nDr. Pushpita Das began the session by explaining the genesis of Naxalite movement and intensification of insurgency with the creation of People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army. Further\, she pointed out that the intensification of violence related to LWE compelled the then Prime Minister of India\, Dr. Manmohan Singh\, to declare (in 2006) “LWE as one of the most potent internal security threats that the country was facing”. \nFollowing Dr. Das’s introductory remarks\, Dr. Abhishek Verma gave a detailed presentation on the decline of LWE in India and the Union Government’s approach towards it. He outlined the historical evolution of LWE in India\, tracing its origins to the growing discontent of the 1940s which included the Telangana Peasant Rebellion. Subsequently\, the insurgency continued in phases with intermittent revival of Maoist violence and crackdown by the security forces. The emergence of various Maoist factions and the expansion of their dominance across central India (post-1980s)\, ultimately contributed to the intensification of the Maoist movement. The trend further intensified due to the formation of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army and the merger of CPI- (M-L) People’s War and Maoist Communist Centre. Reflecting the gravity of these developments\, former Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh characterised Naxalism as India’s most significant internal security threat. \nDr. Verma further elaborated on the Union Government’s measured security response\, which emphasised modernising police forces\, strengthening state capacities\, and deploying paramilitary units in Naxal-affected regions\, while deliberately avoiding large-scale militarisation. \nDr. Verma underlined the formation of Commando Battalion for Resolute Action in order to enhance operational capability for general warfare. On development front\, initiatives like Integrated Action Plan and Road Requirement Plan were launched to improve governance and connectivity in LWE affected districts. He noted that the government sought to address long-standing grievances related to land acquisition by enacting the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition\, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act in 2013. The law attempted to rectify issues that had historically fuelled discontent\, particularly forced displacement and the loss of livelihoods without proper compensation. Dr. Verma also referred to several major attacks on security forces—such as the Sukma–Bijapur incident (2021) in Chhattisgarh—which exposed continuing gaps in operational planning\, weaknesses in intelligence sharing\, and inadequate readiness for guerrilla-style tactics. At the same time\, these episodes highlighted the need for a more coordinated and technology-oriented strategy. It was against this backdrop that the Union Home Minister introduced the SAMADHAN Doctrine\, an approach built around smart leadership\, an assertive strategy\, improved training and motivation\, actionable intelligence\, monitoring through dashboards and key performance indicators\, the use of technology\, sector-specific action plans\, and tighter control over the financial channels available to extremist groups. \nLooking back over two decades\, Dr. Verma described how India has intensified its counter-Maoist operations\, weakening the insurgency through coordinated security and developmental measures. He explained the state’s approach of integrating intelligence-led operations with governance reforms to address the root causes of the conflict. He also highlighted India’s success in dismantling Maoist leadership structures\, through targeted eliminations and surrender policies. Further\, he pointed out the decline in recruitment\, shrinking territorial expanse and internal fragmentation as positive outcomes of sustained pressure. At the same time\, he admitted that challenges like implementation gaps\, the tribal welfare issue and persistent tribal alienation still remain. \nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy stated that the government needs to be appreciated for the progress made while addressing the LWE challenge. However\, he cautioned that in the presence of conditions that gave rise to LWE\, the insurgency may resurface. He acknowledged the pressing need for development that genuinely includes local communities and respects their tribal history\, cultural traditions\, land rights\, natural resources\, and ways of life. He further underscored the need to critically examine how even large democracies can inadvertently marginalise such groups\, and to consider how these states can reintegrate and uplift communities that have been left behind\, doing so with sincerity and commitment. \nQuestions and Comments\nDr. Ashok Behuria offered valuable insights on the cultural predispositions within society\, noting the deep sense of alienation and exclusion experienced by many communities. Dr. Verma concurred with his assessment\, emphasising that cultural hierarchies and broader structural issues linked to them constitute the core underlying causes that must be addressed to resolve the problem effectively. Several other participants raised substantive queries during the discussion. Dr. Om Prakash Das sought clarification on how security operations are being conducted in Chhattisgarh. Mr. Niranjan C. Oak asked whether retired Agniveer personnel might influence the future trajectory of the Maoist movement. Dr. Deepika Saraswat raised questions regarding the concept of the Red Corridor\, the meaning of a unified command structure\, and its operational role\, particularly in border areas. Dr. Nihar R. Nayak\, after commending the presentation\, questioned the actual effectiveness of the government’s approach\, noting that while the state has focused primarily on military campaigns\, political mobilisation by Maoists remains active. Deputy Commandant\, ITBP\, Mr. Selopal\, referred to conversations with colleagues deployed in LWE-affected regions\, highlighting a shift among surrendered cadres from acting as informants to seeking stable livelihoods and development opportunities\, and the need for policies and infrastructure to support this transition. Col. Rajneesh Singh\, drawing on his experience in Jammu & Kashmir\, pointed out policy gaps whereby surrendered Naxalites struggle to receive clearance certificates\, depriving them of government rehabilitation benefits and employment opportunities despite attending skill development programmes. \nResponding to these queries\, Dr. Verma explained that operational challenges in Chhattisgarh have stemmed partly from security forces’ limited familiarity with local terrain and guerrilla tactics. This gap is now being addressed by integrating surrendered Naxalites into operational planning\, improving situational awareness and adaptability. On the potential role of retired Agniveers\, he remained open and agreed that this emerging dimension warrants further examination. Clarifying the issue of unified command\, he noted that Naxalite movement across state borders—such as between Chhattisgarh and Telangana\, creates jurisdictional complications\, making coordinated inter-state action essential. On the broader assessment of government effectiveness\, he acknowledged the validity of concerns that while military operations have weakened Maoist capacities\, political mobilisation persists and requires greater attention. Dr. Abhishek also agreed with observations about the evolving aspirations of surrendered cadres and the need for supportive developmental policies. Finally\, he concurred fully with Col. Rajneesh Singh on the shortcomings in rehabilitation mechanisms\, emphasising the need for policy reform to ensure that surrendered individuals receive timely legal clearances\, benefits\, and meaningful opportunities for reintegration. \nReport prepared by Mr. Jai Verma\, Intern\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
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CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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