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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250904T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250904T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T011039
CREATED:20260707T041159Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T054222Z
UID:98903-1756972800-1757005200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellow Seminar on “Faultlines in Pakistan: An Analysis”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Ashish Shukla\, Associate Fellow\, South Asia Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, presented his Fellow Paper on “Faultlines in Pakistan: An Analysis” on 4 September 2025 at 1500 hrs. The Seminar was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador TCA Raghavan\, Former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan and Professor Ajay Darshan Behera\, Professor at the Academy of International Studies at Jamia Milia Islamia joined as External Discussants. Dr. Ashok Behuria\, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA contributed as an Internal Discussant. Scholars of the Institute were in attendance. \nExecutive Summary\nPakistan’s internal landscape is shaped by a dense web of ideological\, ethnic\, sectarian\, economic\, and institutional fault lines that have accumulated over decades of post-colonial state-building and elite-driven governance. The country’s struggle to define a cohesive national identity\, sharpened by competing religious and civic narratives\, has fed intolerance and empowered radical groups. Ethnic grievances among Baloch\, Pashtuns\, Sindhis\, and Muhajirs stem from centralised power structures that privilege a narrow elite while side-lining regional aspirations\, producing cycles of insurgency\, protest\, and repression. Moreover\, long-standing economic fragilities\, repeated Internatiional Monetary Fund (IMF) dependence\, weak tax structures\, and a rent-seeking political culture have further eroded the state’s capacity to govern effectively. These tensions converge with institutional imbalances marked by political polarisation\, weak civilian authority\, and the military’s pervasive influence over policy and power. The discussion focussed thoroughly on these systemic crisis of identity\, governance\, and legitimacy that continues to shape Pakistan’s instability and its enduring significance for India’s foreign policy. \nDetailed Report\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy welcomed the Discussants and audience to the Fellow’s Seminar featuring Dr. Ashish Shukla’s paper\, “Fault Lines in Pakistan: An Analysis.” He highlighted the paper’s relevance given Pakistan’s enduring significance in India’s foreign policy. Ambassador Chinoy noted that while Pakistan’s ideological\, ethnic\, economic\, and sectarian divisions merit close study\, equal focus should be placed on its institutional resilience. He emphasised that analyses of this nature must align with the principles of sovereignty\, good neighbourliness\, and non-interference\, which underpin India’s foreign policy approach. \nDr. Ashish Shukla began by expressing gratitude to the Chair and Discussants. He briefly outlined his approach\, noting that Pakistan’s political\, economic\, ideological\, and social divides stem from its post-colonial formation and remain deeply embedded in its national fabric. Instead of fostering inclusive governance or long-term institutional reform\, successive civil-military elites have pursued short-term political gains\, reinforcing instability and fragmentation. \nDr.. Shukla explained that Pakistan’s ideological divide has been central to its national trajectory. Founded on the Two-Nation Theory\, the State was projected as a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. However\, right since the beginning\, it struggled to create a unifying identity. He referred to Jinnah’s contrasting speeches\, his March 1940 Lahore Address in which he emphasised on the differences between Hindus and Muslims and his August 1947 Constituent Assembly Speech in which he advocated for a presumably secular State. He highlighted that after 1971\, despite the loss of East Pakistan\, the military and political establishment continued to frame Pakistan’s identity around Islam and perceived hostility towards India. He said that this narrative persists today\, as reflected in General Asim Munir’s public remarks urging Pakistanis to view their State as founded on religious ideals. \nDr. Shukla highlighted how this ideological foundation has fostered radical and sectarian divisions. Successive political measures\, including the Objectives Resolution of 1949\, Bhutto’s declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims\, Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation\, and the blasphemy laws\, deepened intolerance and strengthened extremist forces in the country. Dr. Shukla noted that besides the Shia-Sunni tensions\, the intra-Sunni rivalries between Deobandi and Barelvi groups have further fractured society. He drew attention to increasing violence against minorities\, such as Ahmadis\, Hindus and Christians who face systemic persecution at the hands of radical forces. The State and its institutions often condone such violence which emboldens the radical outfits in the country. Quoting survey data\, he observed that nearly half of the Pakistanis disapprove of befriending people from different religions or sects\, illustrating the entrenched social divisions. \nDr. Shukla then discussed ethnic fault lines\, calling them among the most visible and enduring. Pakistan’s political and military elite\, dominated primarily by Punjabis\, have consistently failed to accommodate the country’s linguistic and regional diversity. This centralised control has provoked resentment and separatism among Baloch\, Sindhi\, Pashtun\, and Muhajir groups. While state coercion subdued Sindhi and Muhajir movements\, insurgency in Balochistan remains active. He referred to five distinct phases of Baloch resistance. The latest phase started around 2000 and continues to be alive. He also noted that the rise of the Baloch Liberation Army and its adoption of suicide tactics have rattled the security establishment in the country. What is surprising is the fact that BLA’s suicide squad includes significant number of women.  In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa\, he highlighted the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement’s peaceful campaign against human rights violations and the State’s repressive response\, including its ban in 2024. Both cases\, he noted\, show how Pakistan’s refusal to share power and resources continues to fuel alienation in its peripheries. \nTurning to the economy\, Dr. Shukla observed that Pakistan’s structural weaknesses have persisted since independence. The country has approached the IMF nearly 25 times\, reflecting chronic fiscal mismanagement and over-reliance on external aid. In 2023\, it narrowly avoided default due to an IMF bailout. This was followed by a 37-month Extended Fund Facility. He attributed Pakistan’s economic miseries to low tax compliance\, below normal tax to GDP ratio\, presence of exemptions\, and most importantly no serious attempt to introduce much needed structural reforms. Moreover\, Pakistan’s rentier mindset\, he argued\, allows its leaders to depend on international aid\, loans and strategic patronage. \nOn the political and institutional front\, he pointed to the 26th Constitutional Amendment\, which gave Parliament power to nominate the Chief Justice\, undermining judicial independence. Dr. Shukla underlined that the 2024 elections deepened political polarisation\, with Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) -backed independents emerging as the largest group but unable to form a government; Shehbaz Sharif\, strongly supported by the military establishment. In the wake of the security establishment’s micromanagement\, the PPP agreed to support PML-N Government from outside.  PTI’s attempts to mobilise public support\, seek judicial intervention\, and negotiate through backchannels failed to secure the release of Imran Khan and other senior leaders. Still\, the party retained its political relevance\, and Imran Khan remains the most popular politician in Pakistan. Dr. Shukla added that subsequent legal amendments extended the tenure of the three Service Chiefs from three to five years\, ensuring General Asim Munir’s continuation until 2027. Dr. Shukla concluded by stating that Pakistan’s multiple internal fractures\, including economic stagnation\, ethnic alienation\, ideological rigidity\, and institutional decay\, are not episodic but systemic. They represent an enduring crisis of governance and identity that continues to undermine state cohesion. \nAmbassador TCA Raghavan complimented Dr. Ashish Shukla’s paper for its analytical maturity and focus on Pakistan’s internal dynamics beyond the traditional military lens. He noted the challenge Indian scholars face in studying Pakistan due to limited access\, but observed that comparative insights from India’s own context often fill this gap. He welcomed Dr. Shukla’s structured framework for analysing Pakistan’s faultlines across ideological\, sectarian\, ethnic\, economic\, and institutional dimensions\, and suggested situating sectarian divisions within broader geopolitical shifts such as the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet-Afghan war. \nAmbassador Raghavan appreciated the nuanced discussion of Baloch and Pashtun issues but stressed the need to factor in tribal dynamics and the limited scale of insurgencies\, citing the loyalty of Pashtun soldiers as evidence of Pakistan’s enduring state cohesion. He cautioned against underestimating the consolidation of Pakistani nationalism alongside regional and sectarian identities. On the economy\, he agreed that recent stabilisation is superficial\, while institutional weaknesses\, particularly the military’s dominance\, remain central. He proposed looking beyond Indian democratic benchmarks\, suggesting comparisons with Thailand or Myanmar to grasp Pakistan’s national security state. \nProfessor Ajay Darshan Behera referring to Ambassador Raghavan’s comments\, acknowledged the challenges Indian scholars face due to limited access to Pakistan but pointed out that the extensive work of Pakistani academics already provides a solid empirical base. He suggested that Indian scholars should focus on developing new analytical frameworks rather than seeking new data\, and emphasised the value of understanding regional languages like Punjabi to grasp local realities better than Urdu-based sources allow. \nOn Dr. Ashish Shukla’s paper\, Professor Behera praised the categorisation of Pakistan’s ideological\, sectarian\, ethnic\, economic\, and political fault lines but noted that it needs greater focus on how Pakistan historically manages these divisions. He stressed on studying the intersections among fault lines and called for a theoretical framing. Highlighting elite capture as a stabilising mechanism\, he explained how bureaucratic and military elites\, rooted in land and class hierarchies\, have historically managed contradictions and maintained state stability through control over the economy and politics. He urged attention to the political fault lines\, especially the rise of Imran Khan’s educated middle-class base\, which challenges elite and military dominance. Concluding\, he suggested that Dr. Shukla’s rich data should drive analysis explaining how Pakistan navigates its internal contradictions\, offering interpretive depth beyond description. \nDr. Ashok Behuria began by appreciating the discussion and called for deeper research on Pakistan’s linguistic and ethnic dynamics. He noted the paradox of Punjabi dominance in governance alongside the marginalisation of the Punjabi language and traced historical shifts in language use among writers and newspapers. He highlighted the Saraiki community’s ongoing struggle for recognition and cultural rights as an area needing closer study. Discussing ethnic representation\, he examined the position of Hazaras\, and Pashtuns in the armed forces\, pointing to their limited inclusion and long-standing grievances. He explained how recruitment patterns in the Baloch regiment and tribal affiliations influence both loyalty and dissent\, linking the rise of movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement to historical exclusion and marginalisation in former FATA areas\, with broader regional implications tied to pan-Pashtun nationalism and Taliban networks. \nDr. Behuria also underlined the need to study inter-ethnic dynamics in urban centres\, especially among Mohajirs\, Sindhis\, and Baloch\, to understand their impact on Pakistan’s social and political cohesion. While some groups hold sway in higher administrative positions\, representation at lower levels remains uneven\, perpetuating structural inequalities. Dr. Behuria stressed that Pakistan’s management of these divisions through policy\, elite negotiation\, and historical contingencies must be examined to grasp its internal governance mechanisms. He concluded that incorporating linguistic and ethnic dimensions into research is essential for a fuller\, more nuanced understanding of Pakistan’s state and society. \nQuestion and Comments\nThe discussion focused on Pakistan’s fault lines\, including ethnic\, sectarian\, and political divisions\, and how these interact with state structures and elite capture. Key themes included the criteria for prioritising fault lines\, the role of sectarian groups like Tehreek – e – Taliban Pakistan in deepening existing divides\, and the state’s use of religion as a political tool\, creating overlapping conflicts. Questions addressed why large-scale revolts among Pashtuns and Baloch have not materialised\, with insights pointing to disciplined military and tribal structures\, early training\, and regimented socialisation as containment factors. The discussion also highlighted the impact of social media on political awareness\, the significance of elite management in controlling insurgency and ethnic tensions\, and the importance of evaluating which fault lines have interstate relevance. \nReport prepared by Ms. Sneha M\, Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.  \n 
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellow-seminar-on-faultlines-in-pakistan-an-analysis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250908T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250908T000000
DTSTAMP:20261121T011039
CREATED:20251009T040252Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T054242Z
UID:94078-1757289600-1757289600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “India and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Jason Wahlang\, Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “India and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 8 September 2025 at MP-IDSA. Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Fellow at MP-IDSA\, moderated the session. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General of MP-IDSA\, attended the meeting along with scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session aimed to discuss India’s engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)\, its evolving strategy in the region\, and its approach towards multilateral cooperation amid changing global dynamics. \nThe session examined India’s role and engagement with the SCO\, placing special focus on the most recent summit in Tianjin\, China. Dr. Wahlang traced India’s participation in the grouping over the past two decades and explained how New Delhi has tried to shape its strategy around three main themes: Security\, Connectivity\, and Opportunity. He noted India’s work in strengthening counterterrorism cooperation\, its efforts to improve regional connectivity\, and its continuing push for reform within the organisation. The session also drew attention to India’s careful positioning\, balancing China’s influence and Pakistan’s presence in the SCO while maintaining its principle of strategic autonomy. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Prashant Kumar Singh during his remarks\, placed the recent SCO summit in Tianjin within a larger global backdrop. He pointed out how ongoing geopolitical shifts\, including the trade turbulence during US President Donald Trump’s second term\, have shaped the environment in which India engages with multilateral forums. \nFollowing Dr. Singh’s introduction\, Dr. Jason Wahlang gave a detailed presentation on the SCO’s growth and India’s evolving role within it. He described how the organisation has expanded over the years\, now including a wide mix of members\, observers\, and dialogue partners\, stretching its reach well beyond Central Asia. Focusing on India’s association with the SCO over the past twenty years\, Dr. Wahlang explained that New Delhi’s approach is best understood through three themes: Security\, Connectivity\, and Opportunity. On the security front\, he underlined India’s commitment to multilateral counterterrorism mechanisms. He stressed that New Delhi has consistently pushed for stronger cooperation against terror financing and radicalisation\, while also ensuring that terrorism in South Asia is not sidelined in SCO discussions. Connectivity\, he argued\, is more than just about trade or infrastructure. For India\, it is also a tool to build trust\, strengthen regional ties\, and widen its reach into Central Asia. At the same time\, the Opportunity dimension reflects India’s calls for institutional reform inside the SCO and for expanding collaboration in new fields\, including organised crime and cyber security. Dr. Wahlang pointed out that India has had some notable diplomatic successes. One example was the inclusion of the Pahalgam attacks in the SCO joint declaration\, something that underscored New Delhi’s strong stance on terrorism despite resistance from other members. At the same time\, he noted that India has refused to support statements that did not reflect its concerns\, showing a readiness to stand firm even in a consensus-driven grouping. \nLooking back over two decades\, Dr. Wahlang described how India has used the SCO\, along with bilateral ties\, to steadily build its profile in Central Asia and with Russia. This approach\, he argued\, has reinforced India’s broader principle of strategic autonomy\, keeping balanced relations with both Western powers and the Eurasian bloc. He also highlighted India’s role in raising Afghanistan-related concerns\, particularly through the SCO’s Afghanistan Contact Group\, and pointed to growth in trade\, energy cooperation\, and people-to-people exchanges as positive outcomes of India’s steady engagement. At the same time\, he admitted that challenges remain. China’s dominant position in the SCO\, coupled with India being the only major country outside the Belt and Road Initiative\, makes it harder for New Delhi to gain from SCO-led economic projects. Pakistan’s role has also been problematic\, often blocking progress on initiatives such as the TAPI gas pipeline. The continued reluctance of the SCO to address South Asian terrorism in its declarations has been another sticking point for India. \nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy added his perspective\, stressing that while the SCO is largely a China-driven forum\, India’s active involvement helps to balance the narrative and prevent it from leaning too heavily towards anti-West positions. He reminded participants of how India had missed earlier opportunities to shape the narrative at groupings such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit\, and stressed that consistent engagement with the SCO was vital to safeguard Indian interests. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy pointed out India’s role in keeping anti-Western postures in check within the SCO. He also spoke about India’s position on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).  He also raised a point about Azerbaijan\, noting its closeness with Pakistan and Turkey\, and wondered how that would affect India’s ties with it. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) RK Narang (Retd.) asked about how to improve India-Azerbaijan relations\, especially given Azerbaijan’s alignment with Pakistan and Turkey. Dr. Wahlang replied that while India and Azerbaijan have historical and cultural links\, political realities make things complicated. He mentioned that Azerbaijan’s government and public opinion often support Pakistan. He also noted India’s support for Armenia\, which adds another layer of tension. \nDr. Wahlang added that India still has concerns about sovereignty\, particularly with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. He also noted that India could focus on building direct ties with Central Asian countries\, even without fully supporting the BRI. \nDr. Deepika Saraswat brought up peace in the South Caucasus\, including the Zangezur corridor. Dr Wahlang said mistrust and political instability make a lasting peace unlikely soon. He noted that tensions and sporadic actions are expected to continue. \nDr. Abhishek Mishra asked about Central Asia and the growing influence of China versus Russia. Dr. Wahlang pointed out that China is increasing its economic and security presence\, like setting up a police mission in Tajikistan. Russia is still active\, trying to maintain influence. India\, he said\, can still pursue its own multi-aligned strategy. \nFinally\, when asked about India’s future in the SCO\, Dr. Wahlang said he was optimistic. He mentioned that India has balanced its ties with Russia and China while staying engaged in Central Asia. He also highlighted opportunities with the SCO’s new dialogue partners in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Overall\, he stressed that India should keep being active in the SCO to protect its interests and shape the organisation’s direction. \nDr. Wahlang added that India has slowly strengthened its position over the last twenty years. He said participation is not only about attending meetings. It is about raising concerns\, protecting national interests\, and keeping India’s strategic independence. India balances its ties with China and Russia\, and also engages with other Central Asian countries. \nAt the end\, Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh wrapped up the discussion by observing that India’s role in the SCO is important\, even though challenges remain. China continues to have a strong influence\, and Pakistan still blocks some initiatives. Some connectivity projects are slow\, but India’s presence is necessary to protect its interests. \nReport prepared by Mr. Athul T. Dharan\, Intern\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-india-and-the-sco
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250912T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250912T170000
DTSTAMP:20261121T011039
CREATED:20260707T040903Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T054328Z
UID:98901-1757664000-1757696400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Fellow Seminar by Dr. MS Prathibha\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA
DESCRIPTION:On 12 September 2025\, Dr. M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow at the East Asia Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, presented a paper on “Great Changes Unseen in a Century: China’s Conception of the Evolving World Order” for her Fellow Seminar. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA chaired the meeting. Two External Discussants (Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan\, Centre for International Politics\, Organisation and Disarmament\, School of International Studies\,  Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and Professor T.G. Suresh\, Associate Professor\, Centre for Political Studies\, School of Social Sciences\, JNU) as well as two Internal Discussants (Dr. Saurabh Mishra\, Research Fellow\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean and UN (ALACUN) Centre and Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey\, Associate Fellow\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA) commented on the paper. Scholars from MP-IDSA actively participated in the Q&A. \nOpening Remarks by the Chair\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Ambassador Chinoy began by praising the Speaker’s paper as one that was both timely and apposite\, given the worldwide attention being paid to China’s rise. Amb. Chinoy related his experiences during recent trips to China\, where he heard Chinese narratives of confidence in the decline of the United States of America and the commensurate pre-eminence of China\, indicating that China itself believes that its time has come to play a dominant role on the world stage. He posited that China was now prepared to not only keep the US out of its perceived area of interest\, but to replace it as the power underwriting the global order. This is in large part due to General Secretary Xi Jinping\, whose role in the formation of this narrative has been decisive. \nAmb. Chinoy went on to state his fundamental doubt of the premises of this argument. He noted that while China as a nation-state may endure into the future\, it is not a historical given that the same can be said of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Further\, it is not inevitable that Xi’s ambitious ‘China Dream’ would be the means by which that country attains ‘greatness’\, as that inevitably requires that Beijing take some form of action on the self-ruled island of Taiwan. Though there have been some Chinese successes internationally\, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic\, Amb. Chinoy suggested that this may have as much to do with the fact that the US is now showing itself uninterested in playing its role in the current global order\, leading some to view China as a ‘noble equivalent’. \nNevertheless\, the international headwinds China’s economy has faced in recent years is a key reason why it has chosen now to focus internally on developing science and technology as well as innovation as two waves of the next phase of its development. Terming it a lesson in the might of the Scientific Revolution\, Amb. Chinoy called on the Speaker to elucidate further as to how these themes would come together in her presentation. \nPresentation by Dr. M.S. Prathibha\nThanking the Chair for his trenchant remarks\, Dr. Prathibha entered into her presentation with an outline of its structure. She then described the theoretical bases of her presentation\, noting that the future of the world order is indeed uncertain and that there is growing discussion of the role played by China. Pointing out that existing scholarship on China’s role within the international order largely attempted to compare China’s past to its present (for example\, by comparing Xi Jinping’s leadership to his predecessors’)\, which is a Eurocentric perspective\, she stated that her paper would focus only on the CPC’s vision of itself at the helm of China in years to come. \nDr. Prathibha expressed the view that the CPC compares China’s rise to the rise of the West as its operating paradigm. As such\, it does not wish to deconstruct the existing world order\, but to replace key elements of it. Thus\, a key question arises: is China a revisionist world power or an integrationist world power? She proposed that in order to answer this question\, it would be important to understand some of the concepts propounded by Xi Jinping and the CPC\, namely\, the ‘Great Changes Unseen in a Century’ and the ‘New Era’. \nDr. Prathibha highlighted certain definitional aspects of the concept of ‘Great Changes Unseen in a Century’. She noted that a key element of the concept is the role played by the CPC in forming historical judgments about world events\, which it views through its own lens. The CPC argues that the current period of time should be called a ‘New Era’\, where big changes are happening that are leading China to a ‘New Historic Starting Point’. \nThis latter idea sees China at a crossroads\, where export-driven consumption patterns are changing rapidly\, driven in part by falling economic momentum globally. At the same time\, China believes that the world is undergoing a historic power transition from the global West to the global East in tandem with the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Domestically\, this leads to an internal transition whereby the development of a science and technology base in line with ‘higher aspirations of the Chinese people’ is proceeding hand-in-hand with an orientation away from the export-led economic model. \nIn this scenario\, if China can exploit the opportunity accordingly\, the CPC holds that China can become a ‘modern socialist power’ leading the ‘next science and technology revolution’. For this\, the CPC needs to take certain major strategic decisions in the coming years\, which primarily involve encouraging innovation within society so as to provide strategic support to its comprehensive national power. The deadline for these objectives is 2049\, when the CPC reaches its centenary and the ‘China Dream’ is slated to be achieved. The end goal is the completion of the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’\, which China after 2049 will notionally have achieved. If this project fails\, however\, Chinese thinkers see their country as falling victim to strategic passivity. \nDescribing the characteristics of the Great Changes\, Dr. Prathibha highlighted that the CPC\, as the entity in control of the ship of the state\, believes that it has a unique mission to seize the historical initiative and exercise strategic judgment in order to steer China through the uncertainty currently prevailing in the world order. At the same\, it is burdened with the responsibility of thinking about the bottom line\, that is\, to prepare for every eventuality\, welcome or unwelcome. She posited that China under Xi Jinping believes that wisdom itself is not enough\, and taking appropriate actions at the appropriate time is equally important. As such\, ‘Chinese-style modernisation’ and other revolutionary changes need to be taken if China is to avoid a second Century of Humiliation\, which it believes the West desires. \nAssessing these concepts in the final portion of her presentation\, the Speaker highlighted the fact that China’s actions have already invited a response and challenge from the global West\, which has resisted Chinese calls for more multipolarity in the global system. In the face of this resistance\, China has begun stressing on the need to reform global governance\, a message through which it seeks to appeal to the Global South. \nHowever\, she expressed scepticism about these moves\, which she proposed reflected an instrumental support for multipolarity as opposed to an earnest seeking of multipolarity. She contended that China at present is merely following global trends out of a desire to win supporters in its domestic quest for glory. She also contended that China at present was determined to partially reject the prevailing Western model\, especially as it impinged upon domestic affairs and internal economic governance. \nComments by External Discussants\nAmb. Chinoy called on Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan to deliver his Remarks on the paper. Prof. Rajagopalan in his review deliberated on some structural aspects of the paper and delivered a critique. He focused on the framing of certain subjects as well as the degree of accessibility for non-specialist readers. \nProf. Rajagopalan queried whether the CPC’s analysis of historical trends could be considered reliable\, as these could well be used as justification for its continued control of Chinese politics. He commented on the ‘pedestrian’ nature of the CPC’s analysis of the so-called ‘Great Changes’\, as it contains nothing ground-breaking or innovative at all. He argued that in fact\, the CPC’s reading of history may be to blame for the strategic ineptitude by which the administration of Xi Jinping has alienated broad swathes of the world. As such\, he doubted whether the reading of history espoused by Xi could significantly alter the world order in his favour. \nAnother salient point raised by Prof. Rajagopalan concerned the Speaker’s analysis of China’s emphasis on unleashing innovation through party fiat. Noting that while scientific innovation has always emerged out of a conducive environment provided by the State\, it is difficult to state that such innovation can be commanded from the top-down. As such\, while scientific progress has societal value as hypothesised by the CPC\, such value can also be used to maintain political control by the Party\, especially if it emerges out of a command economy. \nAmb. Chinoy\, praising Prof. Rajagopalan’s astute observations\, called on Professor T.G. Suresh to deliver his remarks. Prof. Suresh complimented the paper for being substantive and comprehensive\, before sharing his critique of the paper. He first discussed the necessity of characterising the Chinese Government and governance as seen in modern times. He proposed that externally-applied labels such as ‘post-socialist’ or ‘neo-Marxist’ were no longer relevant to describe China’s current rulers. \nSecondly\, he expressed his opinion that the concept of contention between China and the West may not be tenable. He cited the degree of comfort Chinese academics and officials display in talking and working with Western counterparts as proof of this. \nThirdly\, he questioned the basis of the CPC’s judgment on the factors that triggered China’s Century of Humiliation. He contended that unlike the isolationism cited by the Party as the primary cause of the decline of the Qing Empire in the mid-nineteenth century\, contact with the West\, particularly Imperialist Britain through the Opium Wars (1839-1842; 1856-1860)\, may have been the decisive factor for China’s decline. He suggested that the Party may be cherry-picking history to suit present circumstances. \nFinally\, he repeated Prof. Rajagopalan’s contention that a top-down command economy based on a ‘highly totalitarian state and culture’ may not be best placed to encourage the kind of innovation necessary to achieve dramatic advances in science and technology. He stated that China lacks the knowledge-based societal base that is necessary to produce the kind of innovation necessary to successfully navigate the Fourth Industrial Revolution. He also pointed out China currently does not possess the ‘vocabulary of hegemony’ that was a hallmark of both European and American narratives in the past. Thus\, Prof. Suresh contended that the emphasis on science and technology and innovation may be read as a way for the Party to secure a new ‘social contract’ that can justify the continued legitimacy of its rule. \nAmb. Chinoy thanked both External Discussants for their insightful comments and offered his own thoughts on the paper. Noting that China’s heavy reliance on science and technology could be traced back to the 1950s\, he recounted instances where India too played a prominent role as a supplier of advance scientific know-how to the Chinese. He informed the audience that the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1960s could partially be attributed to the Soviet Union’s denial of technology in the wake of Joseph Stalin’s demise in 1953\, which resulted in China and the US coming closer together. Terming current US policies towards China as an echo of the Soviet denial regime\, he noted that there is a continuum in Chinese worldviews. \nOffering his thoughts on various sections of Dr. Prathibha’s paper\, Amb. Chinoy pointed out the importance of distinguishing between decisions made by Xi himself and those made by the Party as an organisation in order to fix ‘responsibility’ for decisions. Addressing the point made by the two External Discussants on the relationship between political regimes and technology development\, Amb. Chinoy stated that technology\, not being as fungible as trade\, intrinsically admitted of a greater role for the sovereign to intervene. He pointed out the experience of several Western powers such as Britain\, France and Germany as illustrative in this regard. \nOn China’s interest in the world order\, he conveyed his impression that China is not interested in ‘reforming’ the current world order\, but to be at the head of it\, while creating parallel structures. He offered the examples of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as analogues of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). \nFinally\, he stated that the extent of Western sanctions on China is a moot question\, as it is clear that the global West will generally follow the lead of the US despite the European Union’s purported claims of being separate from Washington. He then invited the Internal Discussants to deliver their comments on the paper. \nComments by Internal Discussants\nDr. Abhishek Darbey urged the Speaker to consider the Four Global Initiatives launched by Xi as linked to the Great Changes and its end-goal\, the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. He also invited the Speaker to consider the clarification of the Great Changes as offered by Yuen Fung\, a commentator with a military background\, who has referred to the concept as ‘a strong political expression of the Chinese people to achieve the Chinese Dream’. \nDr. Saurabh Mishra\, praised the innovative perspective taken by the Speaker’s paper\, but offered technical critique on certain aspects\, such as the use of certain terms in the title as well as the focus placed on statements made by the CPC hierarchy rather than China’s real-world behaviour. \nAmb. Chinoy also offered further thoughts on the Speaker’s paper. He highlighted that the Great Changes concept actually refers to two centuries. The first is the Century of Humiliation from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century\, when China was the victim of predatory Western powers. The Party saw itself in this scheme as the political expression of Mao’s phrase\, ‘The Chinese people have stood up’. The end of the Maoist period with Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up era from the late 1970s to 2008 would thus conclude\, according to the Party\, with the Century of Unprecedented Changes where China would become a strong socialist power on the world stage. \nAmb. Chinoy also commented on the similarities between Chinese thinking on interstate relations and the US’ thinking\, especially under President Trump. He noted that both China and the US seem now to be running mirror versions of each other’s foreign policy\, where both instinctively do not seek multipolarity in their relations\, preferring to deal with a lone strongman or a small oligarchic elite instead. With these thoughts he invited the Speaker to respond to the Discussants’ Remarks. \nDr. Prathibha responded to some of the comments offered. Firstly\, she answered Prof. Suresh’s statement regarding the CPC’s analysis of the failure of the Qing Empire vis-à-vis imperialist Western powers. She stated that the Party’s interpretation held China’s premodern rulers\, the Qing Empire\, responsible for the Century of Humiliation (instead of the West) because they believe that the Qing failed to adequately create economies of scale despite having a technological edge over Western countries\, instead choosing to retain that technological know-how with the elites. She conveyed that the Party’s understanding of its historical background revolves firmly around the premise that the need for the state to achieve military superiority drives its accommodation of and encouragement to industrial innovation and growth\, not property or common law as theorised by Western academics. \nNext\, the Speaker replied to the ‘social contract’ lens offered by Prof. Suresh. She averred that the Party actually has very little room for serious policy mistakes as these could negatively impact regime legitimacy\, so they are very conscious of ensuring that the correct narrative and policy is followed consistently. The Great Changes concept can also be seen in this light as an attempt to rhetorically justify the continuance of CPC control over China’s governmental machinery. \nQ&A\nAmb. Chinoy invited comments and questions from the floor. Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Fellow\, offered an observation that China cannot be considered to be anti-hegemony\, only anti-Western hegemony. It is interested in propounding and propagating a ‘moral realist’ hegemony that it believes would be superior to the West. It has a strong tendency to see the world in its own view. \nThe Speaker added to this observation by noting that China believes the current world order to be rooted in Western ideas that create simplistic binaries between which conflict is unavoidable. As such\, the West is interested in maintaining the current world order in so far as it can help avoid the Thucydides Trap. China’s challenge to this world order draws on its rejection of global governance models based on such paradigms\, instead focusing on state capacity-based approaches as favoured by noted Western academics such as Samuel Huntington. \nProfessor Vijaylakshmi joined the meeting online to offer some comments on the Speaker’s paper as well. She cited the importance of analysing China’s internal debates in context\, and mentioned an internal report prepared by certain CPC-affiliated bodies working on historical issues which explicitly states that ‘liberal democracy is not the pinnacle of human evolution’\, thus drawing a clear demarcation line between the Western penchant for equating Westernisation with modernisation. \nFurther\, she proposed that area studies scholars studying China ought to focus on the formation of a knowledge-producing apparatus within the CPC as a promising field of study. She pointed out that Xi may be surrounded by a group of scholars and strategic thinkers to assist him in the formulation of concepts such as the Great Changes\, so studying these persons’ thought processes may be a fruitful way to develop Indian expertise on China’s strategic culture further. In conclusion\, she noted that the delineation of China’s behaviour alone would not suffice. An understanding of China’s\, and the CPC’s\, ideological underpinnings is necessary too. \nThe Seminar concluded with Amb. Chinoy thanking all present for their participation. \nThe Report was prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta\, Research Analyst\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fellow-seminar-by-dr-ms-prathibha-associate-fellow-mp-idsa
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250915T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250915T000000
DTSTAMP:20261121T011039
CREATED:20251009T043003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T054403Z
UID:94080-1757894400-1757894400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Understanding Nepal Unrest: Social Media Mobilisation and State Reaction.”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Nihar Ranjan Nayak\, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Understanding Nepal Unrest: Social Media Mobilisation and State Reaction” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 15 September 2025. The session was moderated Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nDr. Nihar Ranjan Nayak’s presentation examined the socioeconomic causes\, outside influences\, and state responses to the student-led protests in Nepal. He emphasised the critical role of social media as a means of youth livelihood and mobilisation\, the government’s contentious ban that sparked the unrest\, and the rise in protests after police brutality. The economic harm\, the suspected role of international civil society\, and the government’s use of coercive tactics in the face of political unrest were also covered in the session. During the discussion\, concerns were expressed about Nepal’s brittle democracy\, the viability of Gen Z-led movements\, corruption\, external interventions. It was also emphasised that Nepal’s crisis has broader regional and geopolitical ramifications. \nDetailed Report\nIn his presentation\, Dr. Nihar Ranjan Nayak examined the root causes\, internal factors\, and government reactions to the recent wave of student-led protests in Nepal. He underlined that the situation is still very unstable and calls for close monitoring and discussion.  An overview of South Asian unrest trends was given at the start of the presentation\, placing Nepal’s problems within a larger regional trend of youth-led movements. Dr. Nayak drew comparisons to Bangladesh\, Sri Lanka  and other regional examples to emphasise the crucial role played by the youth in the current era. He pointed out that youth participation in protests is frequently associated with unemployment\, economic dissatisfaction\, deprivation and the use of social media to find one’s identity and means of subsistence. \nThe decision by the Nepali Government to ban social media on 4 September 2025\, which led to massive protests\, was a major topic of discussion. For many young people in Nepal\, social media—especially sites like Instagram and TikTok—is a source of income in addition to being a tool for communication. The younger generation became even more irate over the ban\, which they saw as an act of censorship. Another contributing factor was the government’s disregard for Supreme Court rulings regarding social media registration. \nThe Gen-Z group started the protests by calling for the ban to be lifted and corruption to be addressed. However\, the movement grew to include five main demands after 19 protesters were killed during demonstrations on 8 September 2025. Despite being peaceful at first\, disruptive elements infiltrated the protests\, which caused the unrest to escalate. \nDr. Nayak also talked about the economic consequences\, pointing out that Nepal has already suffered property damage estimated at USD 1.50 billion. The crisis is made worse by high unemployment rates\, decreasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)\, increasing labour migration and a dependence on revenue streams derived from social media. \nOne major theme of the presentation\, was the role of external donors and other stakeholders\, indirectly affecting the dynamics. The media reports in Nepal mentioned that the Gen-Z movement allegedly received financial support from American donors\, such as the Barbara Foundation and an unnamed international civil society\, in spite of its disorganised structure and lack of a central leadership\, although this detail has not been verified. \nMoving on to state responses\, Dr. Nayak described how the army participated in negotiations and how the government relied on police force\, including the use of batons and bullets. The United Nations\, Prime Minister Narendra Modi\, and India’s Ministry of External Affairs have all made statements in response to the rapid international outcry. Notably\, the Dalai Lama also congratulated the new Nepali Government. \nDr. Nayak concluded by considering the difficulties the new government faces\, such as the need to restore order in the face of lawlessness\, political resistance to the dissolution of parliament\, and the formation of a cabinet. He emphasised that although the new government structure may benefit India in the short term\, India and Nepal continue to have differences. The demonstrations show how social media has developed into a potent force behind youth mobilisation\, serving as a forum for both expression and financial survival. Nepal’s political leadership\, economy\, and regional stability are all seriously threatened by current events. The situation presents opportunities as well as risks for India and other stakeholders\, highlighting the necessity of ongoing engagement and observation. \nQuestions and Comments\nA wide range of concerns about Nepal’s current political trajectory were raised in the discussion that followed the presentation. Setting the tone\, Ambassador Sujan Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, posed questions regarding Nepal’s persistent political unrest\, pointing out the absence of fresh leadership and the reappearance of previous coalitions. He underlined that Nepal has not yet undergone a full transition and highlighted the “grey area” that exists there between conflict and peace. He also raised concerns about the 28 Gen Z groups’ cohesion and sustainability\, specifically their capacity to quickly re-establish order\, and emphasised the need for more research on their internal dynamics. The attacks on hotels during protests\, the possible strain Nepal’s instability could place on India\, were among the other issues he brought up. Additionally\, Ambassador Chinoy called for a more thorough analysis of China’s perspective on the political shifts in Nepal. \nWith their own enquiries and observations\, MP-IDSA research scholars expanded on these ideas. A scholar questioned the possible rise of a new political force in Nepal during the discussion\, comparing it to Sri Lankan politics. In response\, Dr. Nihar explained that Nepal’s struggle with the seventh constitution and the multiple amendments made over the previous ten years demonstrate the country’s ongoing political instability. He also criticised Nepal’s political leadership for lacking a clear vision and strategy\, calling it disorganised and improperly coordinated. Regarding the role of outside intervention in Nepali politics\, another scholar emphasised the importance of evaluating the intentions of any foreign engagement. Dr. Nihar responded by criticising the idea of a convergence of interests between China and the United States. He pointed to China’s increasing influence in Nepal\, especially in relation to the Tibetan issue\, and emphasised the importance of the United States keeping its largest embassy in Kathmandu\, highlighting its regional significance. \nThe audience also discussed whether corruption has been made worse by China’s increasing influence in Nepal; some participants blamed this on institutional flaws and outside funding. The ineffectiveness of Nepal’s seventh constitution and the political leaders’ lack of vision were reflected in the country’s frequent constitutional amendments\, which sparked concerns. The United States’ increasing influence in Nepal\, especially the fact that it is home to the biggest American embassy in South Asia\, and whether or not American and Chinese strategic interests aligned in influencing Nepali politics were the topics of another line of conversation. Some scholars disagreed\, pointing out that India’s position had already become more complex due to Western misgivings about specific South Asian leaders since 2009. \nOverall\, the discussion emphasised how Nepal’s political crisis is intricately linked to regional geopolitics\, corruption\, constitutional fragility\, and conflicting external interests rather than being solely an internal issue. \nReport prepared by Ms. Saanya Sidhra\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-understanding-nepal-unrest
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250922T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250922T000000
DTSTAMP:20261121T011039
CREATED:20251010T084457Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T055922Z
UID:94117-1758499200-1758499200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Emerging Debates on Deep Seabed Mining”
DESCRIPTION:The Monday Morning Meeting at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) on 22 September brought the depths of the ocean to the surface of strategic debate. Dr. Bipandeep Sharma\, Research Analyst at MP-IDSA\, made a presentation on “Emerging Debates on Deep Seabed Mining”.  The session was steered by Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha\, Senior Fellow\, and was attended by scholars of the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe discussion shed light on the current debates around deep-sea mining — a domain that straddles science\, environment\, and geopolitics. Dr. Sharma underscored the need for a strong regulatory framework before commercial mining begins\, warning of the immense risks to biodiversity and fragile ecosystems. \nDr. Uttam Kumar Sinha drew attention to China’s widening maritime footprint and its implications for India’s security and influence. Scholars raised questions on technology gaps\, ecological concerns\, and legal complexities. The consensus was clear: India must enhance its scientific\, regulatory\, and diplomatic capacities while balancing environmental protection with national interest. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Sharma began by situating the debate in the larger global context. Many major powers and corporations\, he noted\, are holding back exploitation until the International Seabed Authority (ISA) finalises its rules. Beyond the 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zones\, it is the ISA — established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) — that regulates the seabed\, designated as the “common heritage of humankind”. \nBut the heritage is fragile. The polymetallic nodules\, sulfides\, and cobalt-rich crusts found in these depths are not just minerals; they are habitats for unique and little-understood species. Mining them without adequate safeguards\, Dr. Sharma warned\, risks irreparable harm to marine biodiversity. \nDr. Sharma highlighted that while UNCLOS gives the ISA the mandate to regulate seabed resources\, its mining code is still under negotiation. He further mentioned that the ISA to date has approved 31 applications submitted by 22 countries and companies to undertake exploration activities in deep seabed minerals in various parts of high seas. If commercial operations begin without binding rules\, both legal authority and environmental protections could be undermined. He in his presentation pointed that the challenges to ISA’s authority are further compounded by unilateral actions such as the Executive Order (EO) signed by the U.S. President Donald J. Trump in April 2025. The order authorises U.S. Departments\, under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA)\, to issue exploration and exploitation licenses for seabed minerals even in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Dr. Sharma argued that as the United States is not a party to UNCLOS\, this move bypasses the international framework established under the ISA and sets a dangerous precedent for global ocean governance. \nDr.  Sharma in his presentation highlighted how corporations and states are increasingly intertwined in deep seabed ventures. He pointed that The Metals Company\, a Canadian firm\, is emerging as a private leader in polymetallic nodule extraction\, while the U.S. has moved aggressively with executive orders to fast-track exploration permits. \nThe response has been polarising: environmental groups such as Greenpeace fear that unilateral moves could fracture multilateral governance and tip the balance toward exploitation. \nDr. Sharma stated that for India\, the seabed is both a scientific frontier and a strategic imperative. Through ISA contracts\, India holds exploration rights over 75\,000 sq. km. in the Central Indian Ocean Basin for polymetallic nodules and an additional 10\,000 sq. km. for sulphides. \nDr. Sharma outlined the “Deep Ocean Mission” — India’s flagship programme launched in 2021 with a budget of ₹4\,077 crore. At its heart is “MATSYA-6000”\, a crewed submersible capable of plunging 6\,000 meters below the surface\, being developed by National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT). Alongside\, India is developing autonomous vehicles\, advanced sensors\, and marine biotechnology capabilities\, aiming to turn oceanic exploration into a blend of science\, strategy\, and sustainability. \nThe discussion concluded on a forward-looking note. Dr. Sharma pointed to intriguing discoveries — such as “dark oxygen” production in the ocean’s depths and methane hydrates in China’s maritime zones — which underline both the promise and perils of ocean exploration. \nThe Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement was seen as a hopeful step\, linking seabed governance to equitable sharing and conservation. Yet the uncertainties are vast. \nDr. Sinha stated\, “Where there is wealth\, people will exploit.” The real challenge is to ensure that the race for deep-sea resources does not undermine planetary health. \nKey Takeaways\n\nDeep-sea mining is a frontier of science\, strategy\, and environmental risk.\nRegulatory clarity through the ISA is urgently needed before commercial exploitation.\nIndia needs to enhance and fast-track its technological\, infrastructural\, scientific\, and diplomatic capabilities with regards to deep seabed mining.\nSustainability\, transparency\, and equity must remain the guiding principles.\n\nThe session closed with consensus: deep-sea mining offers opportunities\, but the oceans are not just another resource frontier — they are the planet’s last great wilderness\, and their stewardship will test both national ambition and global responsibility. \nReport prepared by Ms. Srotaswini Hazarika\, Intern\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-emerging-debates-on-deep-seabed-mining
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250929T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250929T000000
DTSTAMP:20261121T011039
CREATED:20251021T112002Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T055946Z
UID:94261-1759104000-1759104000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Cyber Security Risks to Space Assets”
DESCRIPTION:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Cyber Security Risks to Space Assets” \nMr. Rohit Sharma\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Cyber Security Risks to Space Assets” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 September 2025. The session was moderated by Ms. Khyati Singh\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session highlighted the growing centrality of satellite systems in everyday civilian\, economic\, and military life and the escalating cyber security vulnerabilities targeting these assets. The presenter discussed the risks posed by legacy systems\, increase in commercial mega-constellations\, and gaps in global governance over space cyber threats. Emphasis was placed on both kinetic and non-kinetic forms of attack\, with examples such as jamming\, spoofing\, supply chain vulnerabilities\, and recent high-profile incidents affecting Indian and foreign assets. Recommendations for enhanced policy frameworks\, technological innovation\, and coordination among Indian defence and civilian cyber agencies were discussed to reinforce the resilience of India’s critical space infrastructure. \nDetailed Report\nMs. Khyati opened the session by introducing the topic and highlighting the importance of cyber security in the space domain. She noted that while satellites underpin global connectivity—from navigation and communication to surveillance and banking—their vulnerability to silent\, non-kinetic attacks such as jamming\, spoofing\, and malware insertion poses significant risks to both civilian and military operations. \nMr. Rohit Kumar Sharma began his presentation by discussing the growing dependence on space networks in both civilian and defence sectors. He described the architecture of space networks which comprises satellites\, ground stations\, user terminals\, and communication links. The increasing complexity\, proliferation of satellites via mega-constellations\, and growing commercialisation\, with the rise of companies like SpaceX\, has expanded the threat surface. He observed that while over 12\,000 satellites are currently in orbit\, nearly two-thirds belong to private players like SpaceX which further complicates global governance and security efforts. \nDiscussing the strategic appeal of cyberattacks\, he noted that these operations offer cost-effective\, debris-free alternatives to kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) strikes\, allowing actors to disrupt networks without attribution. The speaker then elaborated on the unique risk features in space networks relative to terrestrial systems: Remoteness and physical inaccessibility\, which limit security upgrades for satellites; long operational lifespans and legacy systems\, often using outdated\, non-patchable technology; complex supply chains\, that  introduce many points of cyber vulnerability; states and non-state actors have been exploiting these for both direct and indirect gains\, with attacks ranging from kinetic ASAT strikes to jamming\, spoofing\, and malware targeting critical communications. \nThe Speaker also drew attention to the ICARUS Matrix\, a framework developed by the California Polytechnic Institute to simulate potential cyberattack scenarios in space. The matrix identified 42 hypotheticals\, but plausible attack scenarios\, such as compromised 3D printers used for in-orbit repairs and falsified planetary probe data. He then outlined some real time incidents\, such as the 2011 jamming of Thuraya satellite telecommunications by Libya\, Russia’s alleged spoofing of US drones\, and daily cyberattacks reportedly faced by ISRO. \nElaborating on India’s Cyber Security landscape response\, the speaker reviewed the country’s evolving cyber governance architecture which includes several security policies\, statutes\, as well as a number of agencies. He discussed the role of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In)\, the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC)\, Defence Cyber Agency\, and the National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC). He also cited recent legislative initiatives such as the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 and the Telecom Cybersecurity Rules 2024. He also mentioned InSpace’s recent guidelines for private ground-station vendors\, reinforcing the focus on supply chain and endpoint security standards as well as India’s plan to develop “Bodyguard Satellites” to defend critical satellites through co-orbital protection mechanisms. \nHe concluded with a set of best practices for securing space systems\, including supply chain management through zero-trust frameworks\, data encryption\, endpoint protection\, regular security audits\, and network segmentation. He further emphasised employee training\, incident response planning\, and the need for India to invest in quantum key distribution (QKD) and post-quantum cryptography to future-proof its systems. \nMr. Rohit concluded his presentation by emphasizing how outer space is a vital security domain which requires constant adaptation to evolving threats. With AI and new technologies reshaping risks\, defenders must adopt updated threat models and understand both actor motivations and system vulnerabilities to safeguard critical space assets. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA commended the speakers for addressing a subject which is both complex and underexplored in security studies. It was observed that future warfare will increasingly be shaped by technology and network-centric operations rather than traditional force deployment. \nDr. Ajey Lele\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA\, expanded on the operational aspects of jamming and spoofing\, noting that uplink jamming poses a greater threat due to its potential to seize control of satellites\, whereas downlink jamming affects limited geographic areas.   China and Russia’s collaboration in developing advanced cyber-electromagnetic weapons was highlighted as also the global shift towards quantum-based communication as a countermeasure. \nIt was noted that the United States is already investing in post-quantum cryptography\, preparing for a future where quantum technologies themselves may be exploited and India must accelerate its efforts in this domain to avoid falling behind technologically. \nQuestions were directed towards the speaker about the institutional mechanism coordinating India’s cyber defence across civilian\, private\, and military domains. In response\, the speaker explained that while National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC) serves as the primary interface between government and defence agencies\, bodies such as CERT-In and sectoral CERTs handle operational coordination. The Defence Cyber Agency\, he noted\, has both defensive and potential offensive mandates\, though the latter remains opaque. \nOther interventions emphasized how\, like critical terrestrial infrastructure\, many space systems rely on outdated software that is difficult to update without causing operational downtime. It was clarified that DRDO and ISRO are already working on relevant systems\, implying contingency or backup measures are under development. Though India does not yet have a fully operational backup satellite mechanism\, efforts are ongoing within DRDO and ISRO to strengthen resilience and incorporate guidance and redundancy schemes into future systems. \nTo a question about the trajectory of cyber diplomacy\, asking whether India is benefitting from such engagements and how its capabilities compare to Pakistan and China\, given China’s use of artificial intelligence (AI) in cyber operations\, the speaker explained that although India participates in global forums like the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)\, there has been limited dialogue specifically addressing cybersecurity in space. \nTo a question about the intersection of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence in the health sector\, particularly with the emergence of remote surgeries\, the speaker noted that AI-driven healthcare systems fall within the digital governance domain and are vulnerable to threats such as data poisoning\, pointing towards the need to embed cybersecurity measures into AI model design. \nTo a question about the role of non-state actors in compromising cyber infrastructure in South Asia and India’s preparedness to respond\, the speaker mentioned several ransomware incidents\, including the AIIMS breach\, as an example of infiltration by non-state actors. He noted that such actors often publicise their operations on encrypted platforms like Telegram\, though many operate as proxies for state-sponsored groups. \nMs Khyati concluded the discussion by pointing towards how most non-state cyberattacks are indirectly supported by state entities and work as proxy actors on their behalf\, seeking plausible deniability\, pointing to China and North Korea as prime examples of this tactic. \nReport prepared by Ms. Ishanya Sharma\, Intern\, North America and Strategic Technologies Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-cyber-security-risks-to-space-assets
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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