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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250707T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250707T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013119
CREATED:20250725T054238Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053556Z
UID:93109-1751866200-1751866200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting On “Nuclear Factor in Israel-Iran War”
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Niranjan Oak\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Nuclear Factor in Israel-Iran War” held on 7 July 2025. The session was moderated by Mr. Abhishek Verma\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session examined the escalating nuclear dimension of the Iran-Israel conflict\, focusing on how recent Israeli and U.S. strikes under Operation Rising Lion and Operation Midnight Hammer\, respectively\, severely damaged Iran’s nuclear sites at Natanz\, Fordow\, Isfahan\, and Arak. Despite these attacks\, Iran preserved key stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and retained its technological infrastructure\, keeping its nuclear breakout capability intact. In response\, Iran launched Operation True Promise III\, unleashing waves of ballistic missiles and drones on Israeli strategic assets and U.S. bases in Qatar. The discussion traced Iran’s nuclear trajectory from the 1950s\, through post-1979 clandestine activities\, and its expanding uranium enrichment beyond Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) constraints\, reaching levels close to weapons grade. It was noted that while Israeli operations might delay Iran’s programme by years\, they risk pushing Iran to overtly pursue nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent. This evolving confrontation revealed deep weaknesses in the NPT regime and eroded confidence in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safeguards\, posing broader challenges to regional stability and global non-proliferation norms. \nDetailed Report\nMr. Abhishek Verma opened the session by outlining the tense developments in the Iran-Israel conflict\, noting that after the recent 12-day war and strikes by the U.S. and Israel on Iranian nuclear sites\, Iran suspended cooperation with the IAEA\, blocking inspectors from monitoring its nuclear programme. Iran has demanded security guarantees for its nuclear facilities and recognition of its right to enrich uranium. Meanwhile\, the IAEA’s 12 June 2025 report highlighted Iran’s continued non-compliance with safeguard obligations\, including failing to explain uranium traces at undeclared sites in Varamin\, Marivan\, and Turquzabad. Iran’s threat to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could signal a push towards nuclear proliferation to deter future attacks or to extract concessions from the U.S. \nMr. Niranjan Oak began his presentation by stating that on 13 June 2025\, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion targeting Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure\, military personnel\, and nuclear sites. The strikes eliminated significant Iranian leadership and killed ten nuclear scientists with key facilities at Natanz\, Isfahan and Arak. Subsequently\, on 22 June 2025\, under Operation Midnight Hammer the U.S. deployed aircraft to strike Iran’s Fordow\, Natanz\, and Isfahan nuclear sites. Fordow is believed to house advanced IR-6 centrifuges enriching uranium up to 60% and deeply buried\, seven B-2 bombers dropped 14 GBU-57 bunker busters\, capable of penetrating 60 feet of concrete and 200 feet of earth\, while two dozen Tomahawk missiles targeted Isfahan\, delivering a severe blow to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. \nIn response to the U.S. strikes\, Iran launched Operation True Promise III\, marking its third major retaliation. Operation True Promise III involved 22 waves of hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones targeting Israel’s facilities. Iranian media claimed two Israeli F-35s were downed. Additionally\, in retaliation against the U.S.\, Iran fired missiles at the Al Udeid U.S. base in Qatar under Operation Harbinger of Conquest. This escalation prompted President Trump to call for a ceasefire\, with Iran declaring it had taught a “historic lesson” to Israel and Israel claiming victory. \nAgainst this backdrop\, Mr. Oak emphasised that Israel sees Iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat. He recalled that while Iran is an original NPT signatory and began its nuclear programme in the 1950s\, the late 1990s saw Iran’s leadership approve the Amad Plan to develop nuclear weapons by 2004. This trajectory was disrupted when secret sites at Natanz and Arak were exposed in 2002\, followed by the 2009 revelation of Fordow near Qom\, breaching Iran’s Safeguards Agreement obligations. \nThe JCPOA (2015) capped Iran’s enrichment at 3.67% and limited stockpiles to 300 kg\, but after the U.S. exit in 2018 under Trump\, Iran resumed 20% enrichment in 2020\, deployed advanced centrifuges\, and produced uranium metal. Biden’s Treaty revival efforts failed\, with Iran reaching 60% enrichment by 2023. By June 2022\, Iran had disconnected all JCPOA monitoring equipment\, accelerating its nuclear programme and deepening global concerns. \nIsrael is not a NPT signatory. It is widely believed to possess nuclear warheads\, though it maintains a deliberate policy of nuclear opacity. The 1969 Nixon-Meir understanding cemented U.S. acceptance of Israel’s ambiguous nuclear status\, so long as it remained invisible and opaque. Israel’s security doctrine was shaped by the Begin Doctrine (1981). Israel has since covertly targeted Iran’s nuclear programme. \nMeanwhile\, indirect U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in April 2025 offered Iran civilian reactors and a multinational enrichment model in exchange for halting domestic enrichment\, but Iran rejected this\, demanding complete sanctions relief and insisting on its NPT right to enrich uranium. Simultaneously\, IAEA reports in May and June 2025 highlighted Iran’s alarming 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium\, its failure to explain uranium traces at undeclared sites and Iran’s suspension of JCPOA monitoring measures\, prompting Israel to brand Iran’s actions a clandestine weapons drive. \nIn this climate\, the U.S. and Israel struck Iranian nuclear sites\, claiming major damage. However\, satellite images showed Iran had safeguarded key uranium stockpiles and retained core infrastructure. The IAEA confirmed serious damage but warned Iran could still produce nuclear weapons within months due to its industrial and technological capacity. In response\, Iran threatened to end IAEA cooperation and claimed undisclosed facilities were secured. The incident highlighted ambiguities in the NPT\, especially its lack of clear limits on uranium enrichment levels. \nMr. Oak observed that Israel’s recent strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have severely undermined the credibility of both the IAEA and the global non-proliferation regime. The attacks may send a message that the IAEA does not ensure the security of nuclear infrastructure\, potentially discouraging other states from adhering to non-proliferation commitments. He noted that Iran has exploited ambiguities within the NPT\, enriching uranium up to 60% without explicit treaty violations. \nWhile the Israeli operations have demonstrated unmatched air superiority and intelligence penetration\, temporarily slowing Iran’s nuclear progress and reinforcing deterrence\, they have not eliminated Iran’s accumulated uranium or the nuclear knowledge. Mr. Oak concluded by highlighting that Iran could rebuild its capabilities and rapidly produce a nuclear weapon\, driven by the strategic logic of compensating for conventional weaknesses. \nQuestions and Comments\nDuring the discussion\, participants raised several critical questions and observations. They deliberated on how Israel might respond if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons and what the broader implications would be if Iran were to quit the NPT regime. Concerns were voiced about whether the repeated targeting of nuclear facilities by state actors signals a new normalisation of such pre-emptive strikes on nuclear sites. It was noted that Iran has never unilaterally withdrawn from agreements; rather\, it has often been in response to the U.S. decisions.  However\, it was wrong on the part of Iran to enrich uranium near weapons grade\, though technically Iran has the right to enrich uranium under the NPT. Iran has not given any justification regarding the utility of uranium enriched up to 60%.  The proposal for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East was also discussed. Finally\, there was a discussion on the independence of the IAEA. Mr. Oak answered all the questions and the session was concluded after an insightful exchange. \nThe Report was prepared by Ms. Bhawna\, Research Intern\, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-nuclear-factor-in-israel-iran-war
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250714T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250714T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013119
CREATED:20250721T013746Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053615Z
UID:93024-1752471000-1752471000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Israel-Iran War: Implications for the Region”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Deepika Saraswat\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Israel-Iran War: Implications for the Region” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 14 July 2025. Dr. Abhishek Yadav\, Research Analyst\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the meeting. Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA\, and the scholars of the institute attended the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation offered a detailed analysis of the Israel-Iran war by focusing on the Iran-Israel deterrence relationship and the mechanics of escalation during the conflict. The discussion also covered the response of regional states\, the US’ interests in the region and the possibility of new regional uncertainties in the context of a weaker Iran.  \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, moderator\, Dr. Abhishek Yadav provided a brief background of the 12-day war between Iran and Israel\, emphasising a ‘new normal’\, i.e.\, the possibility of US and Israeli military action if Iran attempts to advance its nuclear programme. He also noted that a weak Iran could create a vacuum of power and influence\, creating new sites of regional tensions in Syria\, Iraq and Lebanon. \nThe speaker\, Dr. Deepika Saraswat outlined five broad themes\, i.e. unravelling of the Israel-Iran deterrence relationship; mechanics of escalation during the war; the US role; regional responses; a reconfigured regional geopolitical landscape and the way forward for Iran. \nDr. Saraswat noted that Israel’s military campaign since October 2023 has eroded Iran’s indirect deterrence strategy. Iran\, lacking in air power\, has prioritised ballistic missiles at the core of its strategy of deterrence by punishment through a credible threat of significant retaliation. Iran\, post-October 2023 attack\, followed a restrained approach and attempted to limit Hezbollah’s actions against Israel\, which led Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to seize the strategic initiative and expand their campaign against the Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance.’ Iran’s previous missile attacks in April and October 2024 were intended to send a strategic message and deter the opponent. The deterrence however did not work. \nIsrael’s strategic calculus post-October attack and its expanded risk tolerance further undermined the Iranian deterrence strategy. With greater US support\, Israel has sustained its military momentum to degrade Iran’s allies and damage Iran’s nuclear and military assets with the broader objective of changing the map of the region. Dr. Saraswat opined that Israel acted on this window of opportunity while framing it as a much-needed preemptive strike to eliminate a supposed ‘imminent threat’. The US intelligence and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief have pointed to the absence of an active plan by Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Further\, nuclear weapons are often sought as a tool for state survival and deterrence. \nDr. Saraswat noted that in terms of the mechanics of escalation\, several top military leaders and nuclear scientists were killed. IDF targeted strikes against Iran’s air defence and offensive capabilities and industry in order to make it difficult for Iranian forces to retaliate. IDF expanded the scope of the conflict by striking the energy infrastructure and issued repeated evacuation orders for districts in Tehran. Israel’s key objectives were to erode military and nuclear capabilities and create popular pressure and unrest forcing the regime’s surrender or collapse. Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Haifa refinery and the Weizmann Institute of Science demonstrated Iran’s capabilities of symmetrical action. Iran primarily used smaller missiles\, possibly due to damage to its missile deployment sites. Iran shifted towards countervalue strikes against major urban centres to raise the cost for Israel and potentially deter further Israeli military actions. \nSaudi Arabia and Turkiye condemned Israel’s pre-emptive attack. Dr. Saraswat mentioned that these states provided a more muted response to US strikes\, calling for restraint. Notably\, Gulf States\, since the October 2023 attack\, have engaged in continuous dialogue and intensive diplomacy with Iran to avoid regionalisation of the conflict. While the US military assets positioned in the Gulf States were not used in the American operations against Iran; however\, there was no guarantee that they will not become a target in retaliation by Iran. Gulf States could benefit from a weak Iran\, and its regional retreat may moderate sectarian geopolitics\, leading to greater Arab cohesion. A more internally focused Iran could slow down backing of sectarian groups in the region. \nIsraeli-driven geopolitical change is a challenge to regional stability. Israel seeks security through military dominance. Dr. Saraswat focused on pertinent issues like the possibility of the return of inter-state wars\, the status of the Abraham Accords and the Turkish threat perceptions of a militarily ascendant Israel. Post 2011 Arab Spring\, non-Arab players\, Iran and Turkiye expanded their regional influence. There is looming potential for confrontation between Israel and Turkiye in Syria. \nWith reference to the way forward\, Dr. Saraswat stated that Iran will struggle to counter possible Israeli covert operations. Iran will focus on a defensive strategy of strengthening its counter-intelligence architecture\, rebuilding its defence industrial base and seeking greater unity between government and people. Iran has to decide between a conciliatory diplomatic approach and pursuing its nuclear option to gain strategic parity with Israel. \nQ & A Session\nDuring the Q&A session\, Dr. Yadav invited the participants to pose questions on the Israel-Iran war. Questions raised from the floor were with reference to the new rules of engagement; narrative building within Iran; US’ long term interest; Israel-Azerbaijan alliance; China’s role; Iran’s deterrence vis a vis Saudi Arabia and and the impact of Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) within Iran. \nDr. Saraswat argued that the US has maintained coercive diplomacy to contain Iran’s nuclear programme. The US has escalation dominance\, which can escalate conflict and de-escalate based on its interests. In terms of new rules of engagement\, Israel\, with western support\, has normalised the idea of direct attack on Iran. To overcome the current predicament\, the Islamic Republic may respond positively to a creative diplomatic solution to the enrichment issue. The speaker opined that Iran agreed to an agreement like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)\, which contained but normalised Iran’s nuclear program. Hassan Rouhani came to power because he sought to balance between the nuclear aspirations and domestic considerations to revive the economy. \nDr. Saraswat mentioned that Iran\, while being aware of the Israel-Azerbaijan alliance and the use of Azeri airspace by the IDF\, has limited options. Due to Turkiye’s backing of Azerbaijan\, Iran has primarily employed a deterrent posture. Moreover\, the Azeri population also shapes Iran’s foreign policy behaviour. It has so far avoided coercive posture. The speaker responded that Iran’s post-war state narrative is focused on greater national unity. The public narrative has become more Iran-centric rather than Ummah-centric. The MKO has ties with the US neo-conservatives and Israel. The group\, however\, does not enjoy support within Iran. Deep Israeli intelligence penetration could provide a role for the group. \nDr. Saraswat noted that China sees value in Iran’s ability to frustrate US designs in the region. Beijing\, however\, does not support Tehran’s adventurous regional postures\, leading to instability. Beijing brokered a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran to foster regional stability necessary for China’s economic projects. Following the recent war\, there is a growing perspective within Iran that the Saudi deal has\, in fact\, limited Iran’s military options in the fight against Israel. While Iran’s deterrence is weakened\, it still has sufficient capabilities to externalise the costs through overt and covert actions in the Strait of Hormuz\, deterring the US from escalating the situation. \nThe report has been prepared by Dr. Hirak Jyoti Das\, Research Analyst\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-israel-iran-war-implications-for-the-region
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250721T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250721T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013119
CREATED:20250730T052558Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053649Z
UID:93150-1753075800-1753075800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Bangladesh's Interim Government and the Evolving Security Landscape in India's Northeast”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Anand Kumar\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Bangladesh’s Interim Government and the Evolving Security Landscape in India’s Northeast” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 21 July 2025. The session was moderated by Dr. Om Prakash Das\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe discussion addressed the political shift in Bangladesh under the interim government led by Professor Muhammad Yunus and its implications for India’s national security\, especially in the northeastern states. Dr. Anand Kumar highlighted the concerning rise in illegal border crossings\, the escalation of Islamist extremism\, and the expanding power of a strategic China-Pakistan-Bangladesh-Turkey axis. The shifting foreign policy posture of Bangladesh\, which has grown more hostile towards India\, and the growing influence of outside players like Turkey and Pakistan were given special consideration. Enhanced surveillance\, diplomatic reorientation\, and the selective suspension of development projects were all part of India’s strategic response. Recommendations for immediate\, medium-\, and long-term policy changes to protect India’s eastern frontier and wider strategic interests were made at the end of the discussion. \nDetailed Report\nDr. O.P. Das introduced the topic and invited Dr. Kumar to make his presentation. Dr. Anand Kumar began the presentation by providing background information on the formation of Bangladesh’s interim government and its stated intention to carry out reforms before the next elections. He maintained that the government’s actions signalled a dramatic change in Bangladesh’s political stance both domestically and internationally\, especially in relation to India. He also pointed out that prior restrictions on organisations like Jamaat-e-Islami have been lifted by the interim government\, enabling them to publicly spread Islamist beliefs. Additionally\, a number of educational and medical institutions with established ties to Islamists have gained authority. This action comes at a time when extremist activity has significantly increased throughout Bangladesh\, with militant organisations re-establishing infrastructure and networks. Particularly in light of recent violent events in West Bengal\, cross-border radicalisation was highlighted. Dr. Kumar raised concerns about Bangladesh’s public self-identification as an “extension of China’s economy”. \nAccording to Dr. Kumar\, pro-Pakistan and Islamist elements are currently filling the political void left by the fall of an India-friendly government in Dhaka. He emphasised the antagonistic stance taken by the interim leadership towards India\, as demonstrated by the rise in anti-India rhetoric and policy initiatives. The development of a new strategic axis involving China\, Pakistan\, and Bangladesh was highlighted by citing Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan’s statement. The speaker highlighted China’s growing strategic and economic influence in Bangladesh citing current infrastructure projects like the expansion of Mongla port and possible long-term management contracts. \nDr. Kumar explained how Pakistan has acted quickly to re-establish connections with radical Islamist groups and resurrect its dormant intelligence networks in Bangladesh. It is believed that this re-engagement is a component of a larger effort to encircle India and exacerbate regional instability. Turkey’s increasing prominence in Bangladesh as a recent and alarming development was also addressed. Turkish military cooperation\, including the export of drones for reconnaissance missions close to India’s eastern border\, was mentioned by the speaker. According to intelligence reports\, Turkey is actively supporting Islamic organisations in Bangladesh and is thinking about collaborating on defence-related industrial projects there. With ongoing leadership changes in nations like Sri Lanka\, Nepal\, and the Maldives\, the changing political landscape in South Asia was examined. The Rakhine Corridor\, a planned logistical project that has provoked protests from the Bangladesh Army over sovereignty\, was mentioned. \nIn order to combat Turkish and Chinese influence\, Dr. Kumar highlighted India’s multi-pronged strategic response\, which consists of heightened border monitoring\, targeted diplomatic outreach\, and utilising global alliances. While development and soft power initiatives in Indian border regions have increased\, a strategic suspension of certain Indian projects in Bangladesh was characterised as a symbolic gesture meant to convey diplomatic disapproval. \nDr. Kumar outlined a thorough\, three-tiered plan for India to respond to the changing circumstances in Bangladesh as he wrapped up his presentation. He suggested strengthening border security\, improving intelligence cooperation\, and pursuing selective diplomatic engagement with Dhaka in the near future. He underlined the significance of restoring India’s political and cultural clout in Bangladeshi civil society over the medium term and advancing contemporary Islamic discourse in opposition to extremist narratives. In order to prepare for hybrid threats posed by the emerging China-Pakistan-Bangladesh-Turkey strategic axis\, Dr. Kumar recommended that the northeastern states of India prioritise economic and industrial development while also fortifying their military infrastructure. He emphasised that India’s response needs to be multifaceted\, striking a balance between defence and diplomacy. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, began his comments by considering the intricate internal politics of Bangladesh and its changing relationship with India. He pointed out that although Sheikh Hasina’s administration had always had friendly ties with New Delhi\, this did not always mean that Bangladeshi society as a whole was pro-India. Ambassador Chinoy also underlined the fine balancing act Hasina has had to do between maintaining diplomatic ties with India and appeasing domestic anti-Indian elements. He also questioned why the United States was left out of the larger conversation\, pointing out Washington’s ongoing strategic presence in South Asia\, and urged a more nuanced understanding of the geopolitical dynamics surrounding Bangladesh’s outreach to China and Turkey. \nA number of speakers expressed apprehension regarding the political void resulting from the banning of Awami League\, cautioning that it could hasten the radicalisation of disenchanted young people. One scholar emphasised how educated\, urban youth along India’s eastern border are being radicalised by digital ecosystems\, such as Telegram. One emerging threat that necessitates proactive strategic attention is the possibility of ideological realignment\, particularly in areas that border northeastern India. \nProfessor Yunus’ draft constitution\, which controversially substitutes the terms ‘pluralism’ and ‘equality’ for the term ‘secularism’ was also the focus of attention. Scholars discussed how this shift would affect India-Bangladesh relations\, particularly in light of recent events such as the building of the Lalmonirhat Air Base\, where possible Chinese involvement has sparked concerns in Indian security circles. In this context\, the Bangladesh Army’s impact on the interim government and the schedule for the country’s national elections were also covered. \nIn order to combat the changing geopolitical landscape in South Asia\, the session concluded with a call for India to take a multifaceted\, flexible approach that combines diplomatic outreach with strategic assertiveness. \nReport has been prepared by Ms. Saanya Sidhra\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-bangladeshs-interim-government-and-the-evolving-security-landscape
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250725T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250725T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013119
CREATED:20250829T065046Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053739Z
UID:93546-1753421400-1753421400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar: ‘Maritime Capacity Building in the Western Indian Ocean: Analysing the Role of International Maritime Organisation\, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the European Union’
DESCRIPTION:The MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar by Dr. Abhishek Mishra Associate Fellow\, on ‘Maritime Capacity Building in the Western Indian Ocean: Analysing the Role of International Maritime Organisation\, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the European Union’ was held on 25 July 2025. It was chaired by Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha\, PVSM\, AVSM\, NM & Bar (Retd.)\, Chairman\, Board of Trustees\, India Foundation\, New Delhi. The External Discussant was Rear Adm. Monty Khanna\, AVSM\, NM (Retd.)\, Member\, National Security Advisory Board (Online from Goa) and the Internal Discussants were Cmde. Abhay K. Singh (Retd.)\, Research Fellow\, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre\, MP-IDSA; Dr. R. Vignesh\, Associate Fellow\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation examined the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) as a vital maritime region where international organisations and external actors have tested varied models of capacity building over the last two decades. Initially driven by counter-piracy imperatives\, efforts have since broadened to encompass maritime security and blue economy priorities. Case studies of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)\, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)\, and the European Union (EU) illustrate distinct approaches: institutional capacity development (Djibouti Code of Conduct)\, criminal justice reform (Maritime Crime Programme)\, and integrated security–development frameworks (Operation Atalanta and CRIMARIO).  \nDetailed Report\nPresentation by Dr. Abhisek Mishra\nDr. Mishra began by outlining the rationale of his study\, observing that the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) is a coherent geographic region stretching from Somalia to South Africa and including island nations such as Seychelles\, Mauritius\, Madagascar\, and Comoros. With a coastline of nearly 15\,000 kilometres\, a continental shelf of 450\,000 square kilometres\, and natural assets worth an estimated USD 333.8 billion\, the WIO is a region of immense strategic and economic significance. Historically\, it served as a vital trade corridor between the Persian Gulf\, the Indian subcontinent\, and beyond. Yet\, after the wave of decolonisation\, the region fell into relative neglect\, as global attention shifted to other theatres. \nThe early 2000s\, however\, marked a turning point. Rising incidents of piracy off Somalia\, the 2000 attack on USS Cole\, and the 2002 Limburg bombing in Yemen underscored the vulnerability of maritime traffic and catapulted the WIO into the international security agenda. Dr. Mishra emphasised that piracy was not just a law enforcement problem but a systemic threat to global commerce. By 2008\, the situation had escalated to such an extent that the international community began to mobilise a broad array of responses\, turning the WIO into a testing ground for capacity-building initiatives designed to address maritime insecurity. \nFrom a conceptual standpoint\, Dr. Mishra explained that capacity building has its roots in post-World War II development assistance\, which initially involved technical training\, financial aid\, and institution-building in newly independent states. By the 1990s\, with the rise of discourse on “failed states” and security sector reform\, capacity building assumed a prominent place in international security practice. In the maritime domain\, this took the form of both capacity building assistance—providing hardware such as vessels\, radars\, or coastal surveillance systems—and capability enhancement through training\, legal reform\, and skill development. The WIO\, he argued\, became an “international laboratory” for experimenting with such capacity building approaches. \nIn this context\, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) played a central role through the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC)\, signed by 21 countries. Loosely modelled on the earlier ReCAAP agreement in Asia\, the DCoC sought to build regional capacity against piracy by establishing information-sharing centres in Mombasa\, Dar es Salaam\, and Sanaa\, although the latter has been defunct since 2019 due to conflict. It also created training facilities such as the Djibouti Regional Training Centre\, supported by Japan and European donors. Over time\, amendments broadened its scope to include wider maritime crime and even blue economy issues. Nevertheless\, Dr. Mishra noted that these initiatives faced limitations: they focused too narrowly on piracy without integrating multi-agency approaches\, while littoral states such as Seychelles and Kenya often prioritised tangible assets like patrol vessels over workshops and training measures. Moreover\, coordination problems and lack of sustainable funding hampered the effectiveness of such training programs\, thereby underscoring that no single agency could monopolise the maritime domain and that inter-agency cooperation and local ownership were indispensable. \nA complementary but distinct effort was made by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) through its Maritime Crime Programme (MCP)\, launched in 2009 to address the absence of robust criminal justice mechanisms to prosecute pirates. The programme facilitated prisoner transfer agreements\, developed prosecution models\, and strengthened judicial capacity in countries like Seychelles and Kenya. By reforming criminal justice frameworks and mentoring police and coastguard agencies\, the UNODC sought to move beyond narrow counter-piracy responses toward more holistic maritime security governance. Combined with bureaucratic inefficiencies and under-resourcing\, this meant that the MCP achieved only partial success. Nonetheless\, its emphasis on legal and judicial capacity represented a valuable innovation in the WIO region’s maritime governance landscape. \nParallel to these developments\, the European Union emerged as a particularly active actor through its Common Security and Defence Policy. Operation Atalanta\, launched in 2008\, deployed naval forces to protect World Food Programme vessels and deter piracy. This military mission was complemented by civilian-led initiatives such as the MASE program and CRIMARIO\, which emphasised information sharing and maritime domain awareness. The EU even expanded its focus geographically\, extending CRIMARIO’s scope from the WIO to the broader Indo-Pacific. Despite these ambitious efforts\, EU programmes often suffered from excessive bureaucracy\, overlapping mandates\, and donor-driven priorities. African stakeholders frequently complained that these initiatives were designed with little consultation\, privileging European energy routes over African community concerns such as illegal\, unreported\, and unregulated fishing. While the EU succeeded in building some regional information networks\, its fragmented approach raised questions about sustainability and local ownership. \nBringing these threads together\, Dr. Mishra argued that India must draw lessons from these experiences as it recalibrates its maritime strategy. Under SAGAR— “Security and Growth for All in the Region”—India positioned itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean. With the recent articulation of India’s MAHASAGAR framework\, this vision has expanded to include East African littorals and the wider Indo-Pacific. India must back its declaratory visions with delivery\, consistency\, and trust-building. This requires balancing naval deployments with capacity building\, integrating African priorities such as combating IUU fishing\, and ensuring sustained cooperation in maritime domain awareness. Only by doing so can India consolidate its credibility and strengthen its role as a responsible stakeholder in the evolving maritime order of the Western Indian Ocean. \nDiscussants’ Comments\nRear Adm. Monty Khanna (External Discussant)\nRear Adm. Khanna commended the paper’s comprehensive scope and its timely focus on the WIO\, a region of increasing importance for India. He nevertheless pointed to critical gaps. First\, he noted the absence of a clear India angle in the written paper\, even though the presentation included some references. He urged Dr. Mishra to integrate India’s interests and contributions more explicitly. Second\, he suggested including China as a major external actor\, given its expanding naval and economic presence in the region. \nOn the case studies\, Rear Adm. Khanna highlighted that the IMO’s DCoC had achieved significant progress in training and information sharing\, but fell short in translating skills into assets and surveillance systems. He criticised the UN for allowing fragmented coalitions to dominate counter-piracy operations rather than establishing a centralised UN maritime framework. The EU\, he argued\, was hampered by excessive acronyms\, institutions\, and bureaucratic overlap. Khanna also stressed that India’s MAHASAGAR initiative must not remain a slogan like SAGAR. It needs policy depth\, institutional mechanisms\, and branding\, similar to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. He proposed a “comparative analysis” in the paper to identify which of the three models was most successful and why\, as this would make the research more policy-relevant. \nCmde. Abhay K. Singh (Internal Discussant)\nCmde. Singh focused on the theoretical underpinnings of capacity building. He drew a distinction between capacity building assistance (providing physical assets such as radars\, vessels\, or platforms) and capability enhancement (skills\, training\, and knowledge). Using this prism\, he argued\, one can better evaluate whether initiatives truly addressed African needs. For example\, the UNODC focused primarily on capability enhancement through legal reforms\, while the IMO attempted a mix of both hardware and training. He cautioned that much of the international approach has been elitist\, prioritising piracy  which threatened global shipping over issues like IUU fishing that affect African communities more directly. He cited critiques that EU programs were overly military-centric\, donor-driven\, and insufficiently consultative. For India\,  Cmde. Abhay K. Singh argued\, the lesson is to avoid top-down approaches and instead build cooperative frameworks that resonate with African priorities. \nDr. R. Vignesh (Internal Discussant)\nDr. Vignesh praised the paper’s information-rich narrative but suggested strengthening its analytical depth. He recommended including a dedicated comparative case study section that identified common successes and limitations of the three initiatives. Such a section\, he argued\, would provide a useful template for future multi-actor capacity building projects. He also urged incorporating African perspectives\, particularly criticisms that donor-driven programs often undermined African autonomy. Dr. Vignesh highlighted the importance of law enforcement challenges: for example\, during the height of piracy\, captured suspects were often released because of jurisdictional gaps. The UNODC’s prisoner transfer program partially addressed this\, but similar models could be extended to other maritime crimes such as IUU fishing. Finally\, he recommended elaborating on the role of external powers. While the paper mentioned militarisation and competition\, it could examine more closely how actors like China\, France\, and the US shape maritime security dynamics in the WIO. \nChair’s Comments: Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha\nVice Admiral Sinha congratulated Dr. Mishra for producing a timely and well-researched paper. He echoed the discussants’ view that India’s role must be central to the analysis. Specifically\, he pointed out that the paper overlooked the role of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and India’s recent membership in Combined Task Forces (CTFs)\, which are crucial to maritime security in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman. On MAHASAGAR\, Sinha cautioned against confining its scope to the Indo-Pacific. Since it is increasingly linked to the Global South\, its definition should remain flexible enough to encompass Africa\, Latin America\, and beyond. Drawing a parallel with China’s BRI\, he emphasised the need for institutionalisation. Slogans and vision statements must be backed by policies\, resources\, implementation\, and monitoring mechanisms. Without this\, India risks repeating the limitations of SAGAR. \nHe further highlighted Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as India’s most impactful contribution. By integrating African states into India’s Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) and regional MDA networks\, India can provide tangible value. He cited the importance of combating IUU fishing\, which affects African livelihoods but often receives less attention than piracy. For India\, MDA offers a credible entry point to align with African priorities while reinforcing its security provider image. \nDirector General’s Comments: Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\nAmbassador Chinoy offered strategic perspectives. He suggested that the paper should incorporate Indo-US cooperation on critical and emerging technologies. India’s designation as a “Major Defence Partner” (2016) and STA-1 status (2018) has opened avenues for technology transfers such as the GE-414 jet engine deal. These developments have implications not only for India’s defence industrial base but also for its maritime exports and capacity building. \nAmbassador Chinoy underscored that MAHASAGAR must not be confined to the Indo-Pacific alone. Rather\, it should be conceptualised as a flexible and inclusive framework that positions India as a maritime partner for the entire Global South. He argued that India’s engagement with Africa\, Latin America\, and other regions should fall under its ambit\, ensuring that Mahasagar becomes a global rather than a regional initiative. Drawing parallels with China’s Belt and Road Initiative\, he stressed that Mahasagar must evolve beyond a declaratory slogan into a robust framework supported by branding\, secretarial support\, institutional backing\, and monitoring mechanisms. Only through such institutionalisation\, he noted\, could India’s maritime vision achieve sustained visibility and strategic impact. \nQuestion & Answer \nThe Q&A session touched on several practical issues. Participants asked about the difference between capacity building and capability enhancement\, to which Rear Adm. Khanna clarified: capacity building involves hardware (radars\, coastal stations\, platforms)\, while capability enhancement is software (training\, legal frameworks\, skill sets). Both are essential\, but without training\, hardware investments yield little value. \nAnother question addressed India’s coordination with EU and US programs. Dr. Mishra explained that India cooperates mainly through information sharing under the Djibouti Code of Conduct and regional centres\, though structured joint programs are still limited. Recent green shoots of India-EU naval cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea were noted as promising. Other interventions raised the issue of African ownership. \nParticipants also highlighted law enforcement challenges. During peak piracy years\, navies often had to release captured suspects due to lack of jurisdiction. The UNODC’s prosecution models helped\, but further reforms are needed. Questions were also raised about regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the Indian Ocean Commission\, which could play stronger roles in setting African priorities. Finally\, participants urged India to strengthen its presence in Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives and integrate African states more fully into platforms such as the IFC-IOR and the Colombo Security Conclave. \nDr. Abhishek Mishra thanked all discussants and participants for their constructive feedback. He acknowledged that this was a working paper and committed to incorporating suggestions on India’s role\, comparative analysis\, and African perspectives in the final version. The Seminar underscored the strategic importance of the Western Indian Ocean and the need for sustainable maritime capacity building. International initiatives led by the IMO\, UNODC\, and EU have made valuable contributions but also revealed structural weaknesses\, ranging from donor-driven priorities to limited African ownership. For India\, the key lesson is to design cooperative frameworks that balance hard capacity building with skill enhancement\, align with African priorities such as IUU fishing and MDA\, and back declaratory visions like Mahasagar with institutional depth. Only then can India consolidate its role as a credible maritime partner for Africa and the wider Global South. \nThe report has been prepared by Mr. Mohanasakthivel J.\, Research Analyst\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean and UN (ALACUN) Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fellow-seminar-report
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250728T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250728T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013119
CREATED:20250808T065106Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053855Z
UID:93275-1753680600-1753680600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Japan's Official Security Assistance Policy towards Southeast Asia”
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Simran Walia\, Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a presentation on “Japan’s Official Security Assistance Policy towards Southeast Asia” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 28 July 2025. Dr. Arnab Dasgupta\, Research Analyst at MP-IDSA\, moderated the session. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General of MP-IDSA\, attended the meeting along with scholars from the Institute. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session analysed the evolution of Japan’s foreign policy post-World War II\, particularly the advent of its Official Security Assistance (OSA) programme directed at Southeast Asian nations. Ms Walia examined the transformation of Japan from an imperial power to a trusted economic partner in the region. The shift was significantly influenced by the Fukuda doctrine of 1977. She underscored the establishment of the OSA in 2023\, marking a significant reorientation in Japan’s foreign policy\, fuelled by China’s assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific region. OSA is designed as a non-lethal aid initiative that aims to bolster the defence capabilities of recipient countries. The subsequent discussion delved into the implications of Japan’s domestic political shifts\, the challenges to ASEAN’s cohesion\, the OSA effectiveness\, its future trajectory\, its role in the region\, and its relevance for the India-Japan defence partnership. \nDetailed Reported\nDr. Arnab Dasgupta\, the moderator\, started the session by providing the Japanese historical context. He underscored the significance of the meeting occurring on the eve of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and the legacy of the Japanese imperial expansion\, which left a profound impact on Southeast Asian nations. These nations felt apprehension towards Japan\, and its economic resurgence met with protest\, which led to a strategic policy adjustment. This was the reason for the promulgation of the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977\, which laid the base for Japan’s commitment to renouncing its military power\, and led to a trustworthy regional relationship with ASEAN. Dr. Dasgupta also reiterated that this trust has also facilitated the reengagement in security matters\, primarily through the Japanese Official Security Assistance (OSA) Programme\, which was conceptualised in 2023. The OSA initiative complements the long-standing official development assistance (ODA) programme. It is mainly a response to China’s increased assertiveness and the USA’s recent pullback from the Indo-Pacific region. \nMs. Simran Walia presented her analysis and outlined Japan’s adherence to a pacifist constitution\, mainly its Article 9\, which prohibits the country from using force to resolve international disputes. Article 9 and its legal framework were crucial in historically guiding Japan’s foreign policy toward economic diplomacy and non-military engagement through the ODA. However\, increasing coercive actions by China in the region have compelled Japan to reexamine its security stance. This reassessment led to significant policy and institutional reforms\, such as the establishment of Japan’s National Security Council in 2013 and the reinterpretation of Article 9 of its constitution in July 2014\, which permitted the country to adopt a policy of collective self-defence and the comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2022. \nMs. Walia noted that the OSA initiative was first proposed in the revised NSS\, which was formally adopted in April 2023\, distinguishing the OSA from the ODA. OSA primarily aims to enhance the military defence capabilities of the ODA recipient countries exclusively for non-lethal purposes like maritime surveillance\, cybersecurity\, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). This initiative underlines its departure from its historical reluctance to provide security-related aid and reflects the growing consensus that development and security are interlinked. OSA funding has substantially increased in recent years from 13.8 million USD in 2023 to 56 million USD projected for the 2025 fiscal year. \nMs. Walia assessed that OSA’s strategic and geopolitical implications are far-reaching because it redefines Japan’s post-Second World War identity\, transforming the country from a purely aid-providing nation to a practical security provider. This has allowed Japan to expand its regional strategic footprint without formal alliances. Secondly\, the OSA initiative’s primary strategic goal is to provide Southeast Asian countries with a viable substitute in place of China’s Belt and Road infrastructure assistance initiative (BRI)\, which will increase the dependencies of these countries on China. Japan’s OSA provides a transparent and rule-based engagement model in contrast to China’s initiative. Thirdly\, OSA also harmonises with the United States-Japan alliance\, encouraging Japan to assume greater responsibility for regional security. OSA is crucial in addressing aggression and upholding the freedom of navigation in the region. It has helped strengthen the capabilities of like-minded Southeast Asian countries and by complementing multilateral frameworks like the QUAD.  Over time\, OSA will play a critical role in shaping the region’s informal security architecture and increasing the trust between Japan and the Southeast Asian nations. \nMs. Walia also discussed that the OSA faces several challenges despite its strategic promises because Japan’s pacifist constitution continues to limit the scope of its military engagement. While OSA simultaneously avoids the direct provision of lethal weaponry\, the significant difference between the non-lethal security assistance and militarisation can be ambiguous and further inflame the domestic debate. Also\, Japan’s increasing security role\, namely in disputed maritime zones\, will likely increase the risk of mending ties with China\, which sees these moves as a containment strategy or coercive threat by the broader US-Japan engagement in the region. Another critical challenge is the strict emphasis of the OSA’s non-lethal aid based on surveillance equipment and training\, which will restrict the impact of operations compared to other significant military assistance programs operated by other countries. Ms. Walia analysed that providing security equipment may not suffice in addressing interstate hostilities in the region. She also underscored that the value of the OSA initiative endures despite these limitations. Japan’s decades of engagement in the Southeast Asian region have demonstrated that its more measured approach to security has cemented its position as the preferred and secure partner. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, delivered his remarks on the presentation before the Q&A session by drawing from his experience as former Ambassador to Japan. He reiterated Japan’s historical reluctance to adopt a military posture and the inherent challenges in altering this stance. He underscored that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had initiated significant reforms in the security sector\, such as the formation of the National Security Council and the review and evaluation of collective security guidelines. Ambassador Chinoy questioned the overall effectiveness of OSA towards contributing to the security of the Southeast Asian region. As regards the India-Japan Partnership\, Ambassador Chinoy asserted that India is seeking a more equal partnership with Japan\, which goes beyond donor-recipient relationships. \nDuring the question-and-answer session\, Ms. Anushka Chavan\, Intern\, asked about  Bangladesh-China relations under Mohammad Yunus and how they influence Japan’s security strategy towards   Bangladesh. Ms. Walia responded that Bangladesh is a recipient of OSA\, and Japan is helping Bangladesh with its economic and infrastructure development as a developing country. However\, in the current scenario\, Bangladesh is turning towards China\, and the hostility between Japan and China will surely affect Japan’s OSA stance on Bangladesh. \nDr. Ranjit Kumar Dhawan\, Associate Fellow\, inquired about Japan’s stand on Taiwan. Ms. Walia responded that Taiwan does not receive Japan’s OSA because it is not an internationally recognised state. It does not fulfil the minimum necessary qualifications for obtaining an OSA. In future\, if China ever tries to invade Taiwan\, Japan will support the US in defending Taiwan. \nIn response to queries posed by the Moderator\, Ms. Walia underscored the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) recent loss of majority in the upper house election of the National Diet. She then mentioned the emergence of parties like the Sanseito party\, which advocates the increase in Japanese defence spending to 3 -3.5 per cent of the GDP\, and the party also opposes the presence of US troops in Japan. \nMs. Walia responded to another query by the Moderator\, by stating that the recent military conflict between Thailand and Cambodia may not directly impact the OSA initiative\, but will push Japan’s departure from its historically pacifist stance. She also recognised the dilemma faced by the Southeast Asian countries in the region\, which would need to balance trade relations with China against receiving the OSA from Japan\, pointing towards the need for strategic navigation. \nReport has been prepared by Mr. Athul T. Dharan\, Intern\, East Asia Centre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-japans-official-security-assistance-policy-towards-southeast-asia
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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