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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250602T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250602T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013818
CREATED:20250610T221926Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T062326Z
UID:92646-1748842200-1748842200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Monday Morning Meeting on “Indus Water Treaty: An Assessment”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Uttam K Sinha\, Senior Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA) spoke on “Indus Waters Treaty: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 2 June 2025. Dr Ashok K Behuria\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA moderated the meeting. Scholars of MP-IDSA participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session provided a focused and critical evaluation of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)—its historical design\, evolving bilateral tensions\, and future strategic direction. The discussion emphasised India’s underutilisation of its treaty rights\, the political and technical pitfalls of the original agreement\, and the urgency of a renegotiation grounded in engineering and strategic foresight. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Ashok Behuria opened the session by contextualising the Treaty’s current status of “abeyance\,” highlighting the political friction between India and Pakistan. He noted that Pakistan has accused India of reducing water flow by 21%\, a claim not supported by hydrological evidence. On the contrary\, due to climate variability\, Pakistan has received ample water over the past two decades. He attributed Pakistan’s anxieties to the reduced per capita availability of water over the last decade. \nDr. Behuria pointed out that the IWT is a “partition treaty”—a cooperative framework within a rigid division. He noted that Pakistan’s water mismanagement is systemic: despite having access to 146 MAF\, it effectively uses only about 102 MAF. He stressed the need for treaty reform\, especially with greater participation from technical experts\, not just legal authorities. \nDr. Sinha structured his analysis around three key axes: Kashmir\, cross-border terrorism\, and water sharing. He emphasised that the IWT\, signed in 1960 amid political hostility\, has no exit clause but has endured for 65 years. Its origins reflect contrasting strategies—India’s technical engagement vs. Pakistan’s legal internationalisation\, backed by the World Bank. He explained that firstly the Indus basin\, one of the world’s most complex\, was unnaturally divided post-Partition. India retained the eastern rivers; Pakistan was allocated the western ones. Secondly\, India has achieved only 0.7 MAF of its 3.6 MAF water storage entitlement on the western rivers\, weakening its upstream position. Thirdly the Treaty is not one of water sharing\, but of water allocation by dividing the Indus Basin into western and eastern rivers. Terms like “stoppage” are politicised by Pakistan to evoke international sympathy. \nDr. Sinha clarified that India has not abrogated the Treaty—it is in abeyance\, meaning India is re-evaluating its adherence. The current Indian approach emphasises exercising full entitlements under the Treaty\, reframing the language of water discourse—from legalistic semantics to engineering-cantered pragmatism\, and constructing strategic storage infrastructure on the western rivers\, to retain water that currently flows unused to Pakistan. \nAccording to Dr. Sinha\, Pakistan’s control of 65% of the basin’s catchment has not translated into efficiency. The real strategic threat lies in Pakistan’s politicisation of hydrology\, not in India’s actions. \nDr. Sinha elucidated that India is advocating for a technically driven renegotiation of the IWT such that future negotiations must incorporate climate change\, low-flow patterns\, and hydrological variability. The dispute resolution mechanism should exclude third-party arbitration\, replacing it with bilateral engineering panels. Also\, India seeks to evolve the Treaty from a narrow dispute resolution mechanism into a basin governance framework. \nQ&A Session\nParticipants raised questions about whether India’s move toward abeyance signals a step toward abrogation and whether it could incentivise Pakistan to renegotiate. Others asked about China’s role as the upper riparian in the Brahmaputra basin and how that might influence India’s position. \nDr. Sinha in response\, stated that abeyance is a deliberate administrative action\, not a symbolic gesture. It signals India’s intent to assert its rights. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) does not apply to India\, which never signed it\, and the IWT predates it. Pakistan has signed it but not ratified it. The Treaty must evolve alongside India’s developmental needs. Engineers\, not just diplomats or legalists\, should shape future negotiations. He opined that China’s upstream position over the Brahmaputra introduces another layer of complexity\, making it essential for India to strengthen internal water resilience and regional diplomatic coalitions. \nAccording to Dr. Sinha\, India’s current position reflects a mature and strategic reassessment of the IWT. The goal is not unilateral withdrawal\, but a technically sound renegotiation that reflects today’s geopolitical realities and climatic challenges. India must build storage capacity\, invest in climate-resilient infrastructure\, and assert its rights within a restructured\, bilateral framework. \nReport prepared by Mr. Atharva Samir Mulye\, Intern\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, MP-IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-monday-morning-meeting-on-indus-water-treaty-an-assessment
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250609T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250609T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013818
CREATED:20250626T055046Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T062342Z
UID:92788-1749447000-1749447000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Contesting Secularism and Republicanism: The Revival of Monarchist Demands in Nepal”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Nihar Ranjan Nayak\, Research Fellow\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Contesting Secularism and Republicanism: The Revival of Monarchist Demands in Nepal” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 9 June 2025. Ms. Sneha M.\, Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA moderated the session. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session examined the recent resurgence of pro-monarchy protests in Nepal\, situating them within the broader debate over the country’s republican and secular order. These demonstrations—primarily mobilised by royalist and conservative actors such as the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)—centre on demands for the reinstatement of the monarchy and the re-establishment of Nepal as a Hindu state. Since the abolition of the monarchy in 2008\, Nepal has witnessed significant political instability\, marked by the formation of 14 governments in 17 years\, which has contributed to widespread public disillusionment. It was noted that the movement faces several internal challenges\, including leadership rivalries\, the absence of a coherent political strategy\, and limited mass appeal. While mainstream political parties such as the Nepali Congress\, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) officially oppose restoration of monarchy\, certain factions within these parties appear receptive to re-engaging with questions surrounding Nepal’s Hindu identity. \nDetailed Report\nMs. Sneha\, the moderator opened the session by giving a brief introduction on how the protests are arising in Nepal\, and giving an overview of Nepal’s transition to a republic in 2008\, following a decade-long civil war and the 2006 peace agreement. Despite abolishing the 240-year-old monarchy\, Nepal now witnesses a resurgence of pro-monarchy protests\, particularly since March 2025. She also spoke about how these demonstrations\, led by royalist groups like the RPP\, blend demands for restoration of monarchy with calls to reinstate Hinduism as the state religion. However\, Ms. Sneha emphasised that the protests also reflect grievances pertaining to political instability\, corruption\, and the economic crisis which democratic governments have failed to address. \nDr. Nihar Nayak opened his presentation by contextualising the present tensions between monarchist and democratic forces in Nepal as part of a long-standing historical struggle\, tracing it back to the 1950s when the Nepali Congress first advocated for a democratic political order. He noted that while the conflict is not new\, it has acquired renewed relevance in contemporary debates. Dr. Nayak further observed that monarchist groups frequently present the monarchy as a viable alternative to democracy\, often asserting that a monarchical system—rather than the current democratic framework—is more suitable for Nepal’s political stability and governance. \nDr. Nayak identified three primary factors underpinning the resurgence of monarchist sentiment in Nepal. The first is the historical legacy rooted in King Prithvi Narayan Shah’s unification of Nepal in 1768\, which involved bringing together various tribal regions under a central authority. The second factor concerns cultural and religious symbolism\, particularly the traditional portrayal of the monarch as a reincarnation of Lord Vishnu. The third factor relates to perceptions of external influence in shaping Nepal’s political transitions\, including widely held beliefs regarding foreign involvement in the abolition of the monarchy. Dr Nayak also highlighted the recent public engagements of former King Gyanendra—such as domestic tours and interactions with prominent figures abroad—as contributing to the renewed visibility of the royal institution. He noted that supporters of the monarchy view it as a unifying symbol of national identity\, sovereignty\, and stability. In contrast\, proponents of the democratic process argue that the monarchy historically reinforced a centralised Hindu identity at the expense of Nepal’s ethnic diversity and indigenous economic systems. \nDiscussing the key drivers behind the monarchist movement\, Dr. Nayak emphasised that prolonged political instability\, evident in the formation of 14 governments over 17 years\, has contributed significantly to public disillusionment\, particularly due to the state’s inability to deliver consistent governance and development. He further highlighted widespread corruption\, noting that several senior political figures have been implicated in major scandals. Dr. Nayak then drew attention to Nepal’s challenging economic condition\, citing an inflation rate of 7.41 percent\, an unemployment rate of 12.6 percent\, and a public debt burden amounting to NPR 2.622 trillion. These economic pressures have forced a growing number of young Nepalis to seek employment abroad\, reflecting broader societal frustration with the government’s performance and reinforcing support for alternative political visions\, including monarchism. \nDr. Nihar talked about how political responses are mixed. Major parties\, such as the Nepali Congress\, the CPN-UML\, and the CPN (Maoist Centre)\, reject the restoration of the monarchy but face internal divisions over demands for a Hindu state. Public support for the monarchy remains low\, but economic despair and distrust in politicians create an open-minded audience for anti-establishment rhetoric. He also mentioned that India’s stance is unclear\, while royalist visits to Delhi spark speculation\, and official policy remains neutral. \nDr. Nayak concluded by stating that the royalists have two primary options to achieve their goals. The first is to build pressure on the government and garner public support through rallies and protests aimed at restoring the monarchy. The second option involves taking the parliamentary route by introducing amendments to the constitution to facilitate these political changes in Nepal. However\, both strategies face challenges\, as the rightist factions lack a parliamentary majority and substantial public backing to sustain their movement on the streets.\nAmong the two key demands of the pro-royalists—restoration of the monarchy and the establishment of a Hindu Rashtra—the likelihood of achieving the latter is greater than that of reinstating the monarchy. \nQuestions and Comments\nParticipants raised critical questions about the pro-monarchy movement’s possibilities and external influences. One query focused on King Gyanendra’s visits to India\, whether they were privately invited or state-sponsored. Dr. Nihar clarified that they were either at the invitation of religious organisations or personal visits\, but not official visits. As per the 1950 Treaty\, Nepalese citizens are treated on par with Indian nationals. They do not require a Visa to visit India. \nAnother question concerned the Nepali Army’s loyalty\, and Dr. Nayak confirmed its adherence to civilian rule\, despite retired officers’ sympathy for the monarchy. Doubts were also raised about the revival of Hindu Rashtra\, and Dr. Nihar responded by explaining that 60% of the population is in support\, while 40% are not. He also said\, Hindu Rashtra is possible but it will take a lot of time. \nOthers questioned India’s role\, with reference to some Nepali leaders accusing Delhi of tacit support for royalists\, a claim India denies. Dr. Nihar concluded the discussion by expressing doubt about the movement’s prospects\, given its fragmentation and lack of a compelling successor to Gyanendra. He mentioned that his grandson is a potential figurehead but remains politically untested. Overall\, the protests show that the royalists are taking advantage of people’s frustration with the democratically elected governments\, but they are neither organised nor enjoy wide support to the extent that could pose a challenge to Nepal’s republican system any time soon. \nReport prepared by Mr. Mohd Kaif\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-contesting-secularism-and-republicanism
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250616T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250616T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013818
CREATED:20250627T052349Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T071307Z
UID:92793-1750051800-1750051800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “User Challenges in Capability Development of Indian Army through Defence Industry”
DESCRIPTION:Brigadier Jogendra Singh Sial\, Senior Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “User Challenges in Capability Development of Indian Army through Defence Industry” held on 16 June 2025. The session was moderated by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, and scholars of the Institute\, attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nBrig. Sial highlighted user challenges in the Indian Army’s capability development through the defence industry\, including the equipment lifecycle concept\, user expectations\, standardisation\, comprehensive TOT (transfer of technology) blueprints\, sustainment support\, and obsolescence management. The case studies of Tanks – T-90 and MBT Arjun Mk 1\, Pinaka Artillery Gun System and Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) with relevance and industrial accountability were also presented. \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, Gp. Capt. (Dr.) RK Narang (Retd.) began by highlighting the nuances and complexities associated with Transfer of Technology (ToT)\, which may provide what and how of technology\, but does not provide the whys of the technology. This becomes a limitation in the modification\, upgradation\, and development of future indigenous variants. He highlighted the need for a scientific mechanism to ascertain indigenous content in terms of materials\, components and software that are manufactured by Indian partners to optimally leverage ToT for capability building. He observed that ToTs are not a replacement for indigenously designed systems but are interim solutions till indigenous capability is developed. Also\, ToTs should complement indigenous development programs and not have an adverse impact on them. The ToTs should have a roadmap for the manufacturing of various systems by Indian entities in a time-bound manner. The ToTs should have a long-term impact and understanding of the challenges of the Defence Services besides industry demands\, bridging two divergent perspectives\, the Army’s operational urgency and industry’s commercial timelines. \nThe Speaker\, Brig Jogendra Singh Sial outlined the military capability development core parts along with the major role of Indian Defence Industry in equipment management. A clear focus on understanding the equipment Life Cycle was presented wherein three phases\, Acquisition Phase\, In-Service and Discard/ Obsolescence Phases were explained. While all the procurement related processes and procedures form the mainstay of Acquisition Phase\, the exploitation of an equipment through its major life span is in the In-Service Phase wherein it throws seen and unforeseen operational challenges including sustainment issues. The whole Supply Chain Management for the specific equipment gets tested in real time. By the time equipment is approaching the Obsolescence Phase strategic decisions on whether to extend the equipment’s operational life or to phase it out altogether are on the anvil. Also\, alongwith the life phases of an equipment the three distinct categories of equipment under exploitation were also discussed i.e. Niche Tech laden new equipment\, the second category equipment forming the back bone in various Services (present in large quantity in the domain of war fighting viz. Air Defence\, Armoured Tanks\, Artillery Guns\, Communication\, Mobility\, Electronic Warfare etc.) and lastly the third category of legacy equipment which is being phased out. \nBrig. Sial portrayed an outline of the user’s perspective\, allegorical to an iceberg. While a finished product conforming to users technical and operational requirements is the need of the hour\, however\, a complete range of back end activities\, processes and procedure linked to its intricate design and production assumes equal importance\, more so if we want to earnestly progress in the direction of Aatmanirbharta in Defence Production and Viksit Bharat 2047. He focused on four major challenges of equipment management to include ToT\, Sustainment\, Standardisation\, and Obsolescence Management. The larger gambit of issues in defence production by industry also includes Processes Transparency and Procedures (ISO Stds)\, Certifications\, Capacity Building\, Quality Control\, Size of Business\, Experience in manufacture of Similar Products and proven track record of the manufacturer. While laying emphasis on the ToT two major categories were highlighted where in the first one is between a foreign OEM and its Indian Partner\, second type of  ToT is in relation to the indigenised product development where DRDO and its allied lab pass on the technology to its Development Partner (DP). \nBrig. Sial explained that a ToT includes the complete blueprint of a product should an attempt be subsequently undertaken to manufacture the product locally. Even the minutest of details w.r.t. metallurgy\, manufacturing specification\, various processes and procedures is documented and handed over during a ToT. The issue which needs to be absorbed is that for a product each of the sub systems and sub assemblies will have a respective ToT.  Further\, this ToT is different from MToT which is from the maintenance point of view. Hence\, based on the various factors of finance\, production\, operational and sustainment requirements ToTs/ MToTs should be executed diligently failing which there are time and cost penalties to be incurred by MoD/user with adverse impact on operational preparedness. The indigenously developed  Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT)\, with its German-origin engine\, and the T-90 Tanks\, produced under license from Russia at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) in Avadi\, are key case studies that demonstrate gaps in technology transfer. For Arjun-Mk 1\, with German MTU engines\, technology gaps and production stoppages have impacted timelines\, pushing engine availability and the Arjun Mk 2 version well into 2029. \nSustainment requirements form another major challenge. From SMTs (Special Maintenance Tools) and STEs (Special Test Equipment) to spares and technical literature\, the entire sustainment ecosystem must be aligned from the outset. For instance\, SMTs like those for TATRA truck steering geometry are required for regular maintenance but are often unavailable\, affecting operational readiness. Additionally\, standardisation challenges arise across equipment families. \nCase studies viz Pinaka and ATAGS further highlight the operational and sustainment challenges faced by the Army. The Pinaka Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL)\, developed by DRDO’s Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE)\, has been split between L&T and Tata for contract execution\, leading to challenges at the sub system levels and interchanging/ interoperability of various parts. Likewise\, ATAGS (Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System)\, while promising\, revealed issues in split manufacturing orders—60% by KSSL and 40% by Tata—highlighting the need for better coordination and standardisation in large-scale defence procurements. \nOne of the most pressing issues is obsolescence management\, particularly for legacy equipment. The need for upfront contractual provisions for spare parts and assembly line support cannot be overstated. Without these\, assembly lines go cold\, leading to challenges in sourcing parts and escalating costs. \nBrig. Sial proceeded to provide the detailed progress that  India has made in developing indigenous defence capabilities\, however\, the challenges in technology transfer\, sustainment\, standardisation\, and obsolescence management remain significant. These can be effectively addressed through better collective planning and detailed deliberations during procurement stage. The road ahead requires realistic expectations\, coordinated efforts between all stake holders and a firm commitment to achieving true capability development for the Indian Army. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, DG\, MP-IDSA\, complimented Brig. Sial for his presentation on a pertinent subject\, discussing the importance of technology upgradation and modernisation\, while highlighting modern requirements with reference to Atmanirbhar Bharat. Questions from the research scholars aimed at seeking clarity on various challenges in procurement processes\, the impact of lack of transparency in ToT management by various private and public organisations\, the supply chain management implementation under various scenarios\, the blockchain concept and the concept of National Champions. \nThe session concluded after an insightful exchange of views between scholars during the Q&A session \nThe Report was prepared by Ms. Neha Kaushal\, Intern\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-user-challenges-in-capability-development-of-indian-army-through-defence-industry
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250620T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250620T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013818
CREATED:20250730T224709Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T061144Z
UID:93153-1750397400-1750397400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar “Private Sector Defence Joint Ventures: Exports and Role of Offsets”
DESCRIPTION:An MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar conducted by Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Research Fellow\, on ‘Private Sector Defence Joint Ventures: Exports and Role of Offsets’ took place on 20 June 2025. It was chaired by Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.)\, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Defence Economics and Industry Centre at MP-IDSA. The External Discussants for the paper were Shri Amit Cowshish\, former Financial Advisor (Acquisition)\, Additional Secretary and Member of the Defence Procurement Board at the Ministry of Defence (MoD)\, and Shri Puneet Sharma\, Indian Defence Accounts Service\, Additional CDA (Air Force)\, PCDA Air Force\, New Delhi. The Internal Discussant was Cmde. Abhay K. Singh (Retd.)\, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre at MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation focused on the private sector defence industry’s role and contribution to India’s defence exports. It examined the exports of private sector defence joint ventures with US\, French\, and Israeli original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Dr. Rajiv highlighted that the private sector has contributed to India’s defence exports through policies such as offsets. Dr. Rajiv added that changes to offset policies will impact the private sector’s share of exports. With India targeting INR 50\,000 crore in defence exports by 2028–29\, the private sector will be crucial in reaching this target. \nDetailed Report\nCol. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.) began the proceedings by highlighting the growing role of India’s private sector in defence exports\, driven by policy reforms and strategic imperatives. In FY 2024–25\, India’s defence exports reached a record ₹23\,622 crore\, with the private sector contributing ₹15\,233 crore—about 64.5 per cent. Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) also saw a sharp 42.85 per cent rise in exports. As the government aims for ₹50\,000 crore in defence exports and ₹3 lakh crore in total defence production by 2029\, the private sector—now contributing 21 per cent of defence production—is expected to play a crucial role through innovation\, efficiency\, and global competitiveness. Col.(Dr.)Singh (Retd.) noted that while the defence offsets policy may have contributed to exports by private sector defence companies\, it has not effectively enabled meaningful technology transfers and access to advanced technologies. \nDr. Rajiv began his presentation with an empirical overview of India’s defence export performance over the last decade. Between 2015 and 2025\, India achieved cumulative defence exports worth ₹109\,997.6 crore. A striking feature of this growth trajectory has been the pivotal role played by the private sector\, which accounted for ₹71\,328.97 crore\, representing 65 per cent of total exports. Even as the public sector dominates India’s defence industrial base\, the private sector has played an essential role in contributing a larger share of India’s defence exports in recent years. \nDr. Rajiv gave the historical background of the policy framework relating to offsets\, from the 2006 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) to the 2020 Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP)\, highlighting their respective stipulations for offset obligations. The 2006 DPP mandated 30 per cent offsets for defence procurements above ₹300 crore under ‘Buy (Global)’ or ‘Buy and Make with Transfer of Technology’ (ToT) categories. Over the years\, the framework became more nuanced with multipliers for Micro\, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)\, DRDO-oriented ToTs\, and investments in Defence Industrial Corridors (DICs). By 2020\, offset applicability was limited to contracts above ₹2\,000 crore and excluded intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) and single-vendor cases. The cumulative offset contracts reached US$13.2 billion by March 2025\, with verified claims worth US$6 billion. \nDr. Rajiv then highlighted Indian private sector joint ventures with foreign OEMs. India has procured defence equipment from the US under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programmes. India was designated a Major Defence Partner in June 2016. Dr. Rajiv highlighted that Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) is a prime example of a successful offset-driven private sector company. TASL subsidiaries such as Tata Boeing Aerospace Limited (TBAL) have become the global sole supplier of Apache AH-64 fuselages\, having delivered nearly 200 units. TASL also collaborates with Raytheon to produce Stinger missile control assemblies. \nThe 2016 Rafale fighter aircraft deal marked a significant advancement in Indo-French defence cooperation\, with an offset requirement of 50 per cent\, significantly above the typical 30 per cent. Three joint ventures—Dassault Reliance Aerospace Ltd. (DRAL)\, Thales Reliance Defence Systems Ltd. (TRDSL)\, and L&T MBDA Missile Systems Ltd.—have been formed to fulfil these commitments. DRAL\, a partnership between Reliance Infrastructure and Dassault Aviation\, commenced operations in 2018\, producing fuselage components for the Falcon 2000 and Rafale aircraft. TRDSL\, on the other hand\, became the first Indian company to assemble and test the AESA radar for export to France. L&T MBDA Missile Systems\, established in 2017\, constructed a missile integration facility in Coimbatore\, investing heavily in infrastructure and Technology Transfer (ToT). \nIndo-Israeli defence collaborations have mainly concentrated on missile systems and unmanned platforms. The Kalyani Rafael Advanced Systems (KRAS) joint venture\, founded in 2015\, was India’s first private missile subsystem manufacturer. KRAS showcases successful high-technology exports from India\, with 95 per cent of its revenues derived from exports. The Adani Group\, another major player\, has partnered with Elbit Systems through several entities\, including Adani Elbit Advanced Systems and Atharva Advanced Systems. These joint ventures produce Sky Striker loitering munitions and Drishti-10 (Hermes 900) UAVs in Hyderabad for international markets. Linked to the Adani group\, Alpha Design Technologies also has significant export sales. \nDr. Rajiv concluded the presentation by noting that while the offset policy has historically catalysed private sector participation and exports\, its evolving scope—especially under DAP 2020—raises both opportunities and challenges. However\, these challenges are offset by promising trends. Private defence firms like Kalyani Strategic Systems Limited (KSSL)\, Solar Industries\, and Zen Technologies have secured substantial export orders independent of offset obligations. Moreover\, global defence spending—particularly by European countries—offers vast opportunities for Indian firms to integrate into global supply chains. \nShri Amit Cowshish\nShri Cowshish began by commending the speaker for a well-structured presentation. He highlighted the limitations of the Defence Offsets Policy in enhancing domestic defence capabilities\, noting that only one offset contract was signed between 2021 and 2025. Shri Cowshish pointed out that the 2020 reforms raised the contract value threshold to ₹2\,000 crore and excluded intergovernmental and single-vendor deals. Although contracts worth US$13.52 billion were signed\, only US$6.85 billion in claims were processed by 2024\, with limited success in integrating Indian firms into global supply chains and minimal gains in technology transfer or innovation capability. \nDesign flaws\, such as permitting vendors to opt for easier offset routes like direct purchases and burdensome bureaucratic procedures\, further weakened the policy’s impact\, leaving it disconnected from broader self-reliance goals under Atmanirbhar Bharat. While acknowledging that the offsets have indeed contributed to India’s defence exports\, as succinctly brought out by the presenter\, Shri Cowshish stressed the need for India to move beyond offsets and develop a cohesive defence industrial strategy focused on targeted R&D\, greater private sector participation\, long-term partnerships with OEMs\, and co-development models built on trust and innovation. \nShri Puneet Sharma\nShri Sharma commended the presentation and stressed the importance of assessing whether current measures effectively enhance indigenous technological capacity. He highlighted the need for focused training in core manufacturing skills to strengthen domestic capabilities. Shri  Sharma highlighted some key changes in the policy framework relating to Atmanirbharta\, including revisions to the Offset Policy with an emphasis on attracting investment and facilitating technology transfer through the provision of higher multipliers\, the establishment of two Defence Industrial Corridors in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu\, the opening of defence research and development (R&D) to industry\, start-ups\, and academia\, with 25 percent of the defence R&D budget earmarked for this purpose\, and the gradual increase in the defence budget allocation for military modernisation through procurement from domestic sources. \nShri Sharma emphasised the importance of monitoring offset obligation compliance through audits and progress reviews\, to use capital acquisitions to strengthen India’s defence industry by promoting globally competitive enterprises\, boosting R&D capacity in defence\, and supporting related sectors like civil aerospace and internal security. \nCommodore Abhay K. Singh (Retd.)\nCommodore Singh appreciated the presentation for effectively highlighting India’s offset policy’s evolution\, outlining its strengths and weaknesses and its contributions to India’s defence exports. He noted the significant rise in defence exports\, especially by the private sector\, which reached a record ₹21\,083 crore in FY 2023-24\, marking a 32.5 per cent increase over the previous year and a 31-fold jump since 2013-14. With exports now reaching over 100 countries\, India’s defence sector appears to be at a turning point. India’s defence industrial ecosystem is also buttressed by the government’s large defence order pipeline and increasing private sector participation. \nQ&A Session\nThe Q&A session mainly focused on technology transfer\, defence exports\, foreign vendor involvement\, research and development\, joint ventures\, and high-value technological collaborations. Col. (Dr) Singh (Retd.) observed that India has adopted an offset policy to leverage large arms imports to build a strong indigenous defence industry. Despite numerous offset contracts signed since 2005\, Col. (Dr.) Singh (Retd.) reinforced Shri Cowshish’s point that only one offset contract has been signed in recent years. Moreover\, reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) and various analysts have highlighted the policy’s limited success in ToT\, among other factors. \nIt was also pointed out that the offset policy has not been able to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) or bring high-end manufacturing and technology into India. However\, the policy has benefited civilian aerospace component exports. Dr. Rajiv stated that the paper was limited to investigating whether offsets have supported defence exports by enabling domestic sourcing of parts for imported platforms and facilitating joint ventures and component exports by Indian offset partners. The Chair\, Col. (Dr.) Singh (Retd.) mentioned that the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 is being revised and stated that it will be interesting to see if there will be changes to the offsets policy as well. Dr. Rajiv expressed gratitude for the constructive comments and suggestions for future research. \nReport prepared by Dr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, Research Analyst\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-private-sector-defence-joint-ventures-exports-and-role-of-offsets
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250623T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250623T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013818
CREATED:20250711T061454Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T061258Z
UID:92904-1750656600-1750656600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Transactional Alliances: How Trump Has Reshaped Burden Sharing Debates”
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Khyati Singh\, Research Analyst\, North America and Strategic Technologies Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Transactional Alliances: How Trump Has Reshaped Burden Sharing Debates” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 23 June 2025. Dr. Rajorshi Roy\, Associate Fellow\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA moderated the session. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session examined how Donald Trump transformed U.S. alliance policy through a transactional approach\, treating security commitments as financial exchanges. His “pay up or else” strategy\, demanding allies increase defence spending significantly\, yielded results with more North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members meeting spending targets and substantial increases in total alliance defence budgets. However\, this approach fractured alliance cohesion\, weakened Western unity against China\, and prompted European pursuit of defense autonomy\, raising questions about whether short-term financial gains justify long-term alliance fragmentation. \nDetailed Report\nThe moderator\, Dr. Rajorshi Roy\, noted that several pillars of U.S. foreign policy\, especially the post–World War II U.S.-led alliance system\, have been upended under the Trump administration. He highlighted the traditional US approach to burden sharing of security where allies were seen as strategic assets rather than financial burden. Today\, however\, President Trump has questioned the U.S. participation in NATO and demanded allies raise defence spending from existing below 2 per cent of their GDP to over 5 percent. The seemingly US transactional approach has been extended to Indo-Pacific partners like Japan and South Korea as well. . \nMs. Khyati Singh explained that Trump’s Presidency ushered in a transactional view of alliances\, demanding short-term bargains in exchange for U.S. security. He repeatedly branded NATO “obsolete\,” threatening withdrawal unless members met higher defense spending targets with a clear message: allies must “pay up” or risk losing U.S. support. \nTrump’s “America First” doctrine\, formalised in the 2017 National Security Strategy\, placed U.S. sovereignty above multilateral commitments\, declaring the United States “will always choose independence and cooperation over global governance.” This transactional view manifested at the 2018 Brussels Summit\, where Trump publicly scolded Germany for under-investing in defence\, and at a 2024 South Carolina rally\, where he told ‘delinquent allies’ they couldn’t count on U.S. protection unless they “paid their bills.” \nMs. Singh clarified that burden sharing debates aren’t new—previous presidents addressed this issue through softer diplomatic approaches. However\, President Trump’s approach was distinct: he cast partners as economic dependents rather than strategic allies\, using public shaming\, troop withdrawal threats\, and explicit “pay or else” demands. This heightened transatlantic tensions while prompting several allies to accelerate defence budgets\, but exposed fractures in alliance cohesion by prioritising bilateral deals over collective strategy. \nPresident Trump’s pressure campaign yielded significant results in defence spending increases across NATO members and prompted restructuring of cost-sharing formulas. After 2021\, Trump remained influential in foreign policy debates\, with his comments prompting Congressional safeguards requiring two-thirds Senate approval for NATO withdrawal. By mid-2025\, his “deals not vows” approach extended to AUKUS\, with demands for Australia to increase defence spending significantly. \nFrom a geopolitical perspective\, Trump’s confrontational policies weakened Western unity when cohesion was needed to counter China. While he designated Beijing as the chief “pacing challenge\,” the resulting transatlantic rift created opportunities for China. European leaders began pursuing greater defence autonomy\, reviving plans for an EU military headquarters and exploring independent arrangements. \nDomestically\, Congress responded with legislative safeguards around NATO commitments\, while public opinion remained solidly pro-NATO. Ironically\, Trump’s “pay up” demands coincided with a record high in Pentagon budgets and\, under Biden\, continued defence spending increases driven by strategic competition rather than alliance disputes. \nMs. Singh concluded that Donald Trump’s transactional approach to alliances—treating security commitments as financial exchanges—led to increased defence spending by allies but at the cost of trust and cohesion. His rhetoric broke diplomatic norms\, prompting partners to seek greater autonomy. The era of “Transactional Alliances” has reframed burden sharing debates and exposed the true costs of collective defence. Whether this results in a more balanced system or enduring fragmentation remains to be seen\, but the question “Where is the profit?” is better suited to a businessman than the President of the United States. \nDr. Rajorshi\, in his closing remarks\, mentioned that the key takeaway of the discussion was that appears to be a recalibration among traditional US allies\, especially as there are now questions regarding credibility of US as a strategic partner. \nQ&A Session\nParticipants raised questions pertaining to various themes like the impact of President Trump’s attitude towards burden sharing on countries around Russia (particularly the Baltic states)\, implications of Marco Rubio joining the cabinet given his previous position on NATO\, Trump’s claims about European under-contribution despite increased spending data\, India’s role in QUAD\, use of tariffs as geopolitical tools\, permanence of transactional approaches\, benefits to China from this strategy\, burden sharing mechanisms and funding\, India’s potential as a defence partner\, China’s dual-use technology stakes in Europe\, Trump’s transactional relationship with Israel\, Middle East conflict costs\, and the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement’s split on Israel policy. \nThe Speaker provided detailed and insightful responses to the comments and queries received from the attendees. \nThe Report was prepared by Ms. Meghna Pradhan\, Research Analyst\, North America and Strategic Tehnologies Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/your-issue-brief-titled-iranian-nuclear-question-and-israels-threat-perceptions-has-been-posted-on-the-mp-idsa-website
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250630T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250630T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T013818
CREATED:20250829T080934Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T061456Z
UID:93555-1751261400-1751261400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Monday Morning Meeting on China-Pakistan Nexus: China’s Role post-Pahalgam Attack
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Namita Barthwal\, Research Analyst\, Military Affairs Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “China-Pakistan Nexus: China’s Role post-Pahalgam Attack” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 30 June 2025. The session was moderated by Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, and scholars of the Institute\, attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe discussion focused on China’s multifaceted involvement following terrorist attacks like Mumbai (2008)\, Pulwama (2019)\, and now Pahalgam (2025)\, as well as the strategic support that China has historically and recently given to Pakistan. It described China’s strategy of using information warfare\, intelligence sharing\, and diplomatic protectionism to strengthen Pakistan’s position. The implications for India’s strategic planning were highlighted through a critical analysis of specific examples\, such as China’s position at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)\, military-industrial cooperation\, and the growth of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). \nDetailed Report\nCol. Vivek Chadha (Retd.)\, the moderator\, after his introductory remarks\, invited Ms. Barthwal to make her presentation. \nMs. Barthwal began her presentation by giving the historical context of the China – Pakistan relationship. Using a 1965 statement by India’s Ambassador to the United States about China’s censure of India and its diplomatic support for Pakistan during the war\, Ms. Namita Barthwal began her presentation by going over the history of the strategic alliance between China and Pakistan. She pointed out that the relationship has been especially adaptable in times of conflict\, changing and intensifying during tensions between India and Pakistan. The phase following the most recent Pahalgam attack\, was presented as a new strategic turning point\, setting the stage for the current analysis of China’s involvement. \nMs. Barthwal highlighted China’s deliberate attempt to limit or counterbalance India’s regional influence. China’s public diplomacy toolkit included strategic terms like ‘all-weather friendship’ and ‘ironclad friend’\, for Pakistan\, which were highlighted during the presentation. Additionally\, China’s actions during previous crises\, such as the Kargil conflict in 1999\, the Mumbai attacks in 2008\, and the Pulwama bombing in 2019\, were attributed to a broader\, ongoing pattern of strategic alignment and diplomatic cover with Pakistan. \nGiving the example of the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament\, Ms. Barthwal explained how China attempted to reimpose strategic cooperation with Pakistan and deflect international attention from Islamabad’s role in attack\, thereby highlighting China’s diplomatic shield for Pakistan\, in the process. It was investigated how Pakistan’s narrative was amplified through state-led media campaigns and Chinese-controlled social media\, especially with regard to diversionary strategies like bringing up the Indus Water Treaty at international forums. The speaker examined how such actions are intended to exacerbate crises\, and muddy India’s international image. \nMs. Barthwal then discussed China’s military and non-kinetic support to Pakistan. Beyond diplomacy\, she delved into China’s alleged provision of non-kinetic capabilities and real-time intelligence. It was hypothesised that Chinese satellites\, fishing boats\, and military surveillance capabilities would subtly but significantly improve Pakistan’s situational awareness. Deepening congruity between the two militaries was evident due to the discussions regarding potential presence of Chinese military advisers in Pakistan and the use of Chinese-made military equipment during operations. In addition to enhancing Pakistan’s operational preparedness\, Ms. Barthwal argued that these trends establish China as a dependable security partner. \nMs. Barthwal went into further detail about China’s information warfare strategy\, specifically how it used the Pahalgam incident to significantly influence perceptions both at home and abroad. She pointed out the increase in anti-Indian narrative on Chinese social media sites as well as joint attempts by Chinese academics and think tanks to advance Beijing’s military industrial capabilities while claiming neutrality. She emphasised how China strategically uses information operations to delegitimise India’s security response to the international community\, while simultaneously showcasing China’s military might. The two countries’ technological cooperation\, including the transfer of J-10 fighter jets and the co-production of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)\, were also discussed. Important elements of the developing military alliance between China and Pakistan were identified\, including the former’s assistance in intelligence sharing\, and the presence of Chinese and Turkish personnel in Pakistan during the operations. \nWith reference to China’s role post-conflict\, the speaker’s presentation demonstrated that in the post crisis phase of any conflict between India and Pakistan\, China has stuck to its regular pattern of frequently reestablishing its strategic alignment with Pakistan and repositioning itself as an impartial mediator in the India-Pakistan conflict. Ms. Barthwal detailed China’s initiatives to hold informal talks with Pakistan and Afghanistan\, strengthen Pakistan’s counterterrorism capabilities\, and expand initiatives like CPEC into areas that are disputed. \nMs. Barthwal concluded the presentation by highlighting three persisting trends: \n\nChina’s continued tri-domain support (diplomatic\, military\, and informational) for Pakistan remains a strategic constant post any conflict between India and Pakistan.\nChina maintains its role of playing a silent strategist during conflicts like Operation Sindoor\, influencing outcomes without direct confrontation.\nInformation warfare remains being the central pillar of China’s approach\, aiming at influencing global narratives while undermining India’s regional image.\n\nShe warned that therefore\, careful monitoring is necessary of China’s use of Pakistan as a regional proxy\, especially as Beijing looks to expand its commercial and geopolitical influence in South Asia. \nQuestions and Comments\nDuring the question-and-answer session\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, emphasised the need for more scholarly research on the Pakistan-China relationship. He also suggested including Pakistan’s strategic view of China in the discussion in order to gain a deeper understanding of the bilateral dynamics. \nHe suggested focusing on the evolution of China-Pakistan relations from the 1950s\, particularly Pakistan’s strategic alignments with China and the United States. Key turning points—such as Pakistan’s entry into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact. \nOther scholars raised critical questions and observations. One of them pertained to the fact that after the 1963 Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement the strategic relationship between the two countries deepened further. \nA question about China’s participation in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was brought up. Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd)\, the moderator\, responded by explaining that China’s involvement in the FATF is rather limited due to the organization’s strong Western influence. He added that the FATF’s consensus-based decision-making process is often vague and subject to the influence of nations offering technical assistance\, allowing dominant powers to control the outcome. \nAnother research scholar raised a question regarding the potential use of JF-17s by China and if there has been any change in the technological trajectory. The speaker\, Ms. Namita Barthwal replied by stating that JF-17s were transferred by China to Pakistan. Additionally\, an increased collaboration could be see between the two counties since the war on terror was announced in 2001. \nFinally\, the conversation touched upon India’s military preparedness in the context of a potential two-front conflict as the China-Pakistan nexus appears to be an evolving\, hybrid threat \,  reinforcing the need for robust doctrinal planning and technological self-reliance on India’s part. \nThe Report was prepared by Ms. Saanya Sidhra\, Intern\, South Asia Centre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-monday-morning-meeting-on-china-pakistan-nexus-chinas-role-post-pahalgam-attack
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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