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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250407T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250407T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T015822
CREATED:20250516T063542Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T061820Z
UID:92408-1744003800-1744003800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on Aeronautics R&D and Self-Reliance in India”
DESCRIPTION:Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Rajiv Kumar Narang\, Senior Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Aeronautics R&D and Self-Reliance in India” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 07 April 2025. The session was chaired by Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session explored the history of aeronautics R&D in India\, with a particular focus on the development of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). It examined the key factors behind the delays in the project and discussed the path forward for achieving greater self-reliance and efficiency in indigenous aircraft development. \nDetailed Report\nCol.(Dr.) Rajneesh Singh began his talk by emphasising the importance of understanding the nuances of the defence ecosystem in order to grasp the full journey of its development. This understanding\, he said\, is essential to understand the way forward. Tracing the history of India’s defence industry\, he noted that it dates back to the East India Company\, which set up the first ordnance factory in the 18th century\, followed by the establishment of a gunpowder factory. During World War II\, the number of defence factories in India significantly increased. After independence\, policymakers placed a strong emphasis on Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) to develop the country’s ordnance capabilities. \nCol. Singh further outlined the post-independence trajectory of India’s defence sector in four distinct phases. From 1947 to the 1960s\, the primary focus was on achieving self-sufficiency. Between 1963 and the mid-1980s\, the emphasis shifted towards self-reliance. This was followed\, up until the late 1990s\, by a period marked by the import of advanced defence platforms. Subsequently\, there was a transition towards self-reliance through co-production with foreign companies. Following the Kargil conflict\, the focus moved further towards self-reliance\, with increased collaboration and involvement of the private sector. He further emphasised that India is now witnessing a return to the spirit of the “Marut Movement\,” symbolising a renewed push for indigenous defence production and self-reliance. \nGp. Capt Narang began his presentation by clarifying that the current phase is not a revival of the Marut movement but also the “Orpheus engine moment.” He highlighted the concerns expressed by Indian Air Force Chief\, Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh\, regarding the delays in delivery of the LCA Tejas Mk-1A during the Aero India 2025. \nTracing the historical context\, he emphasised the importance of understanding the complexities behind the delays in India’s indigenous fighter development programs. He pointed out that challenges were not limited to the LCA alone but also included issues related to the naval variant\, the Kaveri engine program\, and other indigenous development projects that were delayed due to systemic\, synergy\, and decision-making challenges. He stressed that identifying the root causes of these delays is essential to finding long-term solutions. \n  \nHe then outlined the history of the LCA program. In 1983\, a decision was made to develop the LCA\, but he noted that a decision does not equate to the immediate start of a project\, as approvals and groundwork take time. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) was established in 1984 to oversee the project\, and Dr. Raj Mahindra\, then the most respected engineer at HAL\, was appointed as the LCA’s first project director. The Indian Air Force formulated the Qualitative Requirements (QRs) in 1985. However\, the appointment of Dr. Mahindra soon became a point of contention\, marking the beginning of internal challenges within the program. This led to the resignation of Dr. Raj Mahindra\, causing significant setbacks to the program. In addition\, the LCA project again faced criticism and came under scrutiny when a Parliamentary Committee was set up to review the project in 1989; however\, the committee cleared the project. As a result\, the LCA project experienced delays\, and it was in 2001 that the aircraft took its maiden flight\, nearly 40 years after the Marut. \nGp. Capt. Narang went on to explain that several additional factors contribute to delays in defence projects and must be adequately understood. The LCA\, like any other development project\, has undergone multiple modifications and upgrades requiring the integration of new and advanced systems. When a new system has to be integrated into an indigenous aircraft\, it involves multiple layers of decision-making\, ranging from identifying suitable manufacturers to conducting negotiations and addressing challenges in software and hardware integration. Moreover\, the certification process is extremely stringent\, and while improvements in capabilities are essential\, they also introduce further delays. \nIn 2009\, the two-seater LCA trainer completed its first flight\, which was followed by the Initial Operational Clearance of LCA in 2013. By 2015\, the first Tejas aircraft was formally delivered to the Indian Air Force. The LCA Mk-1 also served as a testbed for the development of the advanced Mk-1A variant. In November 2023\, the IAF signed a deal for the procurement of 83 LCA Mk-1A aircraft. However\, the introduction of new QRs in the contract added complexity and time to the development process\, as integrating additional enhancements naturally extends the timeline. \nTurning to the issue of the LCA Navy\, Gp. Capt. Narang highlighted that naval requirements are fundamentally different from those of the Air Force. Also\, the Indian Navy joined later in the LCA project when the naval variant of the LCA was officially sanctioned in 2003\, and its first flight took place in 2012\, primarily because the entire design had to be reworked to meet the Navy’s specific operational needs. It was later decided to develop LCA Mk-2 with a more powerful engine to enhance range and payload carrying capacity. This necessitated significant redesigns by ADA\, including modifications to the wings\, reduction in aerodynamic drag\, improvements in maintainability\, and an increase in payload capacity. \nHe also emphasised that financial considerations play a critical role in such long-term development projects. The development delays are often influenced by irregular or phased funding. For a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges\, he stressed the need to closely examine the year-wise pattern of fund approvals and actual disbursements. \nRegarding the Kaveri engine of LCA\, Gp. Capt. Narang drew a parallel with the Orpheus engine of Marut fighter aircraft\, noting that both faced similar challenges. The Orpheus engine was initially unable to meet the thrust requirements of the Marut. Similarly\, the Kaveri engine\, developed by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) in 1986\, partnered with international firms such as Snecma to aid in Kaveri’s development. However\, disagreements over cost and terms eventually led to the partnership’s breakdown. The development of the Kaveri engine was delayed\, and India opted to procure the General Electric F404 in 2008 and\, later\, the more advanced F414 engine. The challenges of the Orpheus engine were not addressed\, and its upgradation did not persist\, and the Kaveri engine faced similar challenges. \nFurthermore\, he identified several key reasons for delays in the LCA program: international sanctions and component denial post-nuclear tests\, prolonged testing and certification processes\, and manufacturing delays by HAL. He\, however\, expressed concerns regarding delays in launching the indigenous Naval fighter development program as the Indian Navy has neither joined the LCA Mk-2 nor the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) development program. Indian Navy has instead sought the development of Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) aircraft\, which is yet to be approved. He also highlighted the need to revisit the Indian Navy’s approach to seeking the development of 4.5 generation TEDBF instead of 5.5 generation AMCA as TEDBF due to envisaged survivability challenges against fifth and sixth generation fighters of China. A swift decision on a naval fighter is crucial to prevent long-term import dependency. At last\, he outlined a ten-point template to understand delays in defence projects\, highlighting issues like delays in approvals\, funding\, lack of engine testing infrastructure\, project downgrading\, stakeholder inefficiencies\, changing QRs\, and lack of accountability and need for establishing a Defence and Aeronautics Commission on the lines of the Space Commission. \nQ&A Session\nA lively Q&A session followed the talk. On the question of ensuring a steady annual supply of aircraft\, Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised that while imports may offer a limited edge\, true sustainability lies in going indigenous. He stressed the need for India to continue with the development of its after-burner variant of the Kaveri engine while pursuing the Transfer of Technology (ToT) of the GE 414. In contrast\, he noted that China began from a similar position but made faster progress by focusing on specifics\, especially during ToT agreements\, which enabled them to develop their engines effectively. India\, he argued\, must adopt a similar approach with focused\, parallel development programs. \nThe Report was prepared by Mr. Rohit Kumar Sharma\, Research Analyst\, North America and Strategic Technologies Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-aeronautics-rd-and-self-reliance-in-india
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250417T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250417T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T015822
CREATED:20250731T035528Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T061905Z
UID:93166-1744867800-1744867800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Eminent Persons Lecture by His Excellency Ambassador (Dr.) Shankar P. Sharma\, Ambassador of Nepal to India\, on “Strengthening India-Nepal Relations.”
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a lecture by H.E. Ambassador (Dr.) Shankar P. Sharma\, Ambassador of Nepal to India\, under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series on 17 April 2025. The theme of the lecture was “Strengthening India-Nepal Relations.” Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, chaired the event. The Institute’s scholars were in attendance. \nExecutive Summary\nIndia-Nepal relations have deepened through enhanced cooperation in energy\, infrastructure\, trade\, and digital connectivity. Hydropower agreements\, cross-border petroleum pipelines\, and railway projects have strengthened economic ties\, while integrated check posts are streamlining trade flows. Digital payment systems are expanding\, though regulatory issues persist. Progress in education\, agriculture\, and environmental cooperation is evident\, yet challenges remain in areas like certification standards and seasonal power shortages. Migration and youth mobility continue to shape bilateral dynamics. Despite political fluctuations and administrative delays\, both countries are moving toward a more structured\, investment-driven partnership grounded in shared geography and cultural proximity. \nDetailed Report\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy introduced the speaker by outlining his distinguished career as a diplomat\, academic\, and policymaker. He highlighted the strong civilisational and cultural ties between India and Nepal\, emphasising their open border\, shared traditions\, and growing economic connectivity. He underscored recent developments in physical infrastructure\, such as new railway links and pipelines\, that are bringing the two countries closer together and making them active partners in each other’s economic progress. He noted that the enormous movement of people across the border\, with many Indians working in Nepal and vice versa\, reflects this deepening integration. \nAmbassador (Dr.) Shankar P. Sharma began by focusing on recent developments\, particularly over the last three years\, in key sectors such as hydropower\, digital payment systems\, infrastructure\, education\, and others. In the hydropower sector\, he highlighted a landmark agreement signed in 2022 between the Prime Ministers of India and Nepal. This long-term strategic document envisions electricity generation in Nepal and its subsequent transmission and trade with India. He highlighted that the agreement\, which initially commenced with a capacity of 39 megawatts (MW) in October 2021\, has evolved to allow Nepal to export up to 1\,000 MW of electricity to India. He noted that under this framework\, India has committed to importing 10\,000 MW over the next ten years. This advancement is anticipated to contribute substantially to Nepal’s revenue generation and aid in narrowing its significant trade deficit. However\, he pointed out Nepal’s seasonal limitation: hydropower generation drops to around 1\,000 MW during winter due to river conditions. During these lean months\, Nepal imports electricity from India\, a mechanism in place for years. \nDiscussing the Indian Pubic Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and companies like National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) Limited and Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVN) Limited\, Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma noted that they are engaged in several hydropower projects in Nepal. The investment so far has been government-to-government (G2G)\, he emphasised the need to attract private sector participation. A key issue has been the expected 21.9 per cent free energy provision by Nepal. Some projects cannot offer this due to financial non-viability—especially in western Nepal. This makes commercial negotiation models critical. He underlined the need to liberalise electricity trade so that private companies from both sides could participate. Although currently regulated\, he suggested opening up the power trade to the private sector in both countries.  Given India’s growing energy demand\, this would be a significant opportunity. \nAmbassador (Dr.) Sharma also informed the audience that Nepal has set an ambitious target to develop 28\,500 MW of hydropower by 2035 for three main reasons: to meet domestic demand year-round\, especially during winter; to cater to increasing domestic consumption; and to export to third countries\, including Bangladesh. He noted that a tripartite agreement involving Nepal\, India\, and Bangladesh aims to enable 500 MW of power exports to Bangladesh. The estimated investment needed for this development is USD 46 billion\, equivalent to ₹4 trillion. He acknowledged that attracting foreign investment will be essential and that India would play a central role. He said that the efforts are ongoing to bring more investors on board to realise this 10-year development vision in Nepal. \nAmbassador (Dr.) Sharma then discussed the growing success of digital payment systems between the two countries\, citing that Indians transfer around ₹66 million using QR codes in a single day—a reflection of the increasing convenience for tourists visiting from India. He also underlined ongoing issues\, such as limits on how much cash can be officially carried across the border. He also emphasised that expanding digital infrastructure and addressing regulatory hurdles will be crucial to further unlocking the potential of this technology for both economies. \nFurther discussing infrastructure cooperation\, particularly the petroleum pipeline projects\, Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma explained that one such project—the Motihari-Amlekhgunj pipeline—was completed two years ago\, marking a milestone as South Asia’s first transnational petroleum pipeline. Two additional extensions are currently under construction with Indian support\, including the development of storage terminals and distribution infrastructure. He assessed that these pipelines are expected to save Nepal millions of dollars annually by reducing dependence on expensive\, leak-prone\, and inefficient tanker truck transport. In addition to economic benefits\, the speaker noted that the shift to pipeline-based supply contributes to environmental gains by lowering emissions and easing congestion along key road corridors and border points. \nTurning to transport infrastructure\, Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma highlighted progress in railway connectivity. A Detailed Project Report (DPR) for one of the proposed cross-border rail corridors has been completed and is currently under inter-ministerial review. This railway line is expected to play a significant role in facilitating trade and reducing overland transport costs. The speaker also mentioned that three out of five planned Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) have been completed—at Raxaul-Birgunj\, Jogbani-Biratnagar\, and Sunauli-Bhairahawa. Construction of the remaining ICPs is underway\, and once completed\, these facilities will form the backbone of a corridor-based connectivity strategy aimed at integrating Nepal more effectively into regional economic and trade networks. \nOn education\, Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma cited the MoU between IIT Madras and Kathmandu University\, alongside scholarship contributions by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR). He also pointed to multiple joint initiatives in sustainable development\, agriculture\, sanitation\, environment\, and biodiversity.  In agriculture\, he mentioned that the Kathmandu lab has been accredited by India\, allowing the export of nine agricultural products without additional testing. Ongoing negotiations aim to expand this list. \nAmbassador (Dr.) Sharma also addressed the occasional politicisation of trade issues\, such as palm oil exports\, which are benefiting from Nepal’s zero per cent tariff regime. Although exports have grown rapidly\, he argued they remain a small fraction of India’s total consumption. However\, he flagged concerns about India’s Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) certification requirement for Nepalese industrial exports. With around 70 small manufacturers needing certification\, it places a disproportionate burden on both Nepali exporters and Indian regulators. He proposed mutual recognition of certificates or expedited inspection processes\, noting that as of now\, 30 companies have been certified. \n Q& A Session\nThe Q&A session opened with inquiries into Nepal’s evolving political landscape and its implications for bilateral ties with India. Responding to a question on the frequent governmental changes in Kathmandu\, Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma noted that while coalition politics remains the norm\, this has led to policy paralysis on key strategic issues\, especially those requiring long-term planning. \nParticipants then turned their attention to the open border arrangement\, questioning its future in light of emerging security challenges. Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma supported the arrangement as a model of regional integration but acknowledged vulnerabilities due to inadequate documentation and weak border surveillance. He added that misuse of the open border by third-country nationals has remained a point of concern\, particularly as transnational crime networks and trafficking rings become more active across South Asia. \nThe conversation shifted to energy cooperation\, where participants challenged the slow pace of hydropower exports despite repeated political assurances. Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma agreed that the figures often quoted in public discourse—like Nepal’s theoretical 80\,000 MW capacity—rarely translate into actual exports. He attributed this to delayed project clearances\, lack of transmission infrastructure\, and inconsistent political support within Nepal. Nonetheless\, he highlighted the recent entry of Indian private sector players into Nepal’s energy space as a positive development\, signalling a shift towards commercially driven partnerships\, less reliant on G2G frameworks. \nOn the economic front\, questions arose regarding Nepal’s agricultural stagnation and the role cross-border trade could play in reviving rural livelihoods. Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma observed that Indian subsidies and support mechanisms have unintentionally distorted incentives for Nepali farmers\, making it difficult for them to compete. He proposed more targeted bilateral agreements in food processing\, access to regional value chains\, and institutional support for smallholders. One suggestion was to capitalise on emerging corridors like the one linking Eastern Nepal to Siliguri\, which could offer seamless access to Indian and Bangladeshi markets. \nFinally\, participants raised questions on youth migration\, particularly the long-term impact of Nepali students studying abroad. Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma underscored that while migration offers economic relief through remittances\, it also fuels a brain drain when students relocate to Western countries and do not return. He recommended expanding scholarships in Indian institutions as a way to retain talent within the region\, arguing that students trained in India tend to maintain cultural and professional links with Nepal. In his closing remarks\, he urged both governments to move beyond symbolic gestures and implement structural changes—especially in education\, infrastructure\, and institutional coordination—to convert goodwill into durable partnerships. \nAfter the Q&A session\, Ambassador Chinoy made his closing remarks and brought the discussion to a close. He thanked the speakers and audience for their engagement and emphasised the importance of continued dialogue on India-Nepal relations. \nReport prepared by Ms. Sneha M\, Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/eminent-persons-lecture-by-his-excellency-ambassador-dr-shankar-p-sharma-ambassador-of-nepal-to-india-on-strengthening-india-nepal-relations
CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250421T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250421T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T015822
CREATED:20250519T222647Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T061933Z
UID:92429-1745213400-1745213400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Monday Morning Meeting on "Defence R&D Ecosystem in India: A Strategic Overview"
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, delivered a talk on “Defence R&D Ecosystem in India: A Strategic Overview” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 21 April 2025. Brig. Jogendra Singh Sial chaired the session. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session explored the evolution and current structure of India’s defence research and development (R&D) ecosystem. Drawing from detailed data and recent initiatives\, the speaker assessed the country’s defence innovation landscape\, its institutional frameworks\, funding mechanisms\, and collaboration between DRDO\, academia\, and industry. The discussion highlighted India’s relatively low R&D spending in comparison to other leading defence economies despite being the fourth-largest global military spender. Emphasis was laid on national programs and policy mechanisms such as the Technology Development Fund\, iDEX\, ADITI\, and the Deep Tech Startup Policy to support innovation among Micro\, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and startups. Several DRDO-academia collaborative efforts were showcased as examples of the ongoing transformation. The session concluded by identifying key challenges — including low R&D investment\, limited private sector maturity\, and delays in testing and certification — and recommendations aimed at building a more robust and future-ready innovation ecosystem. \nDetailed Report\nBrig. Jogendra Singh Sial briefly introducing the topic’s relevance in the current strategic context. He emphasised the importance of innovation and indigenous capabilities in India’s defence preparedness. \nDr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed began her presentation by mentioning that as per Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data\, India was the fourth-largest global military spender in 2023\, with expenditures reaching USD 83.6 billion. However\, she pointed out that India continues to rank relatively low in innovation\, placing 39th in the Global Innovation Index 2024 published by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). This dichotomy — between high defence spending and modest innovation standing — formed the entry point for her analysis. \nThe speaker underscored that defence R&D is not only essential for strategic autonomy but also central to achieving the goals of the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. Highlighting the policy shift towards indigenisation\, Dr.. Shayesta referred to the growing emphasis on defence exports\, diversification of arms imports\, and the ambition to “Make in India\, Make for the World.” She noted that while these efforts have slightly reduced India’s import dependence\, sustained progress requires investment in R&D infrastructure and talent. \nDr.. Shayesta\, then presented year-wise allocations for defence R&D in India from 2014–15 to 2025–26\, based on data compiled from Ministry of Defence annual reports. She highlighted a steady upward trend\, with allocations increasing from ₹13\,447 crore in 2014–15 to ₹26\,816 crore projected for 2025–26. However\, she drew attention to India’s R&D expenditure as a share of GDP — currently at 0.64 percent — which remains significantly below global leaders such as South Korea (4.8 percent)\, Israel (5.56 percent)\, the United States (3.5 percent)\, and China (2.43 percent). \nShe further analysed India’s defence innovation performance\, comparing Indian defence firms with their global counterparts. Indian firms reported lower R&D intensity (1.2 percent vs. 3.4 percent globally)\, a smaller percentage of Ph.D employees (0.1 percent vs. 0.3 percent)\, fewer research publications per USD billion revenue (88.5 vs. 37.9)\, and significantly lower patent output (7.3 patents vs. 240 patents globally). \nThe presentation then turned to the institutional mechanisms supporting R&D\, particularly the role of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). Dr. Shayesta elaborated on DRDO’s key initiatives to bridge academia and industry\, including the DRDO-FICCI ATAC programme\, which promotes commercialisation of DRDO technologies; the Extramural Research Scheme that supports collaborations through research boards like AR&DB\, NRB\, ARMREB\, and LSRB; and the Grant-in-Aid Scheme\, which funds scientific talent and research infrastructure in academic institutions. She also mentioned the Contract for Acquisition of Research Services (CARS)\, which allows DRDO labs to engage academia directly for specific projects. \nHighlighting collaborative projects\, the speaker presented several recent DRDO-academia partnerships. These included IIT Delhi’s agreements for developing lightweight bullet-resistant jackets\, ballistic materials\, and extreme weather clothing; IIT Madras’s work on 155mm smart ammunition and FSAPDS; and IIT Kanpur’s development of Kamikaze UAVs and drone incubation programs. Notable quantum technology collaborations were also mentioned\, such as the demonstration of a 6-qubit quantum processor by DRDO and TIFR. \nThe speaker then shifted focus to funding mechanisms designed to boost the participation of startups and MSMEs in defence R&D. The Technology Development Fund (TDF) — with 78 sanctioned projects amounting to ₹333 crore — was highlighted as a flagship initiative. In addition\, she discussed platforms like iDEX and ADITI\, which provide funding ranging from ₹10 to ₹25 crore per project for deep-tech innovation. The ‘Dare to Dream’ competition and open access to DRDO patents were mentioned as efforts to further democratise the innovation ecosystem. \nDr.. Shayesta also addressed the role of DRDO’s Centres of Excellence\, which are now organised under 82 research verticals spanning critical domains such as compound semiconductors\, AI\, RF technologies\, quantum communication\, and space systems. Institutions like IIT Bombay\, IIT Kanpur\, and IIT Hyderabad are among those engaged in these research areas. \nSeveral recent government initiatives were also shared with the scholars. These included DRDO’s allocation of ₹1\,200 crores for academic research in 2022–23; the earmarking of 25 percent of the defence R&D budget for the private sector and academia; the Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF) Act 2023; and the National Deep Tech Startup Policy (NDTSP) announced in the February 2025 Budget with an allocation of ₹20\,000 crores. The speaker also noted the launch of the National Establishment for Technology Readiness Assessment (NETRA)\, the National Supercomputing Mission\, and the National Quantum Mission as major developments contributing to India’s scientific and technological advancement. \nIn her concluding remarks\, Dr. Shayesta identified key structural and procedural challenges that hinder India’s defence innovation capacity. These included limited R&D investment as a share of GDP\, over-reliance on public sector institutions\, insufficient academia-industry linkages\, lack of streamlined procedures for collaborative funding\, and delays in testing and certification. She called for the creation of a National Industrial Strategy Task Force and recommended the establishment of a dedicated Defence R&D Commission to accelerate decision-making and ensure focused execution. She concluded by stating that to meet the long-term goals of Viksit Bharat 2047\, India must significantly scale up its R&D investments\, encourage private-sector-led innovation\, promote blue-sky research\, and enable risk-taking in early-stage scientific exploration. She also emphasised the role of universities in leading upstream research\, which could then be commercialised by industry. \nBrig. Sial in his remarks addressed concerns like implementation challenges\, institutional reforms\, and opportunities to build a resilient and competitive defence R&D ecosystem. \nThe session concluded after an insightful exchange of views between scholars during the Q&A session. \nThe report has been prepared by Ms. Brahmashakti\,\, Intern\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-monday-morning-meeting-on-defence-rd-ecosystem-in-india-a-strategic-overview
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250428T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250428T053000
DTSTAMP:20261121T015822
CREATED:20250516T061058Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T062003Z
UID:92406-1745818200-1745818200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on "Turkish Policy towards Israel - Hamas War"
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Abhishek Yadav\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Turkish Policy towards Israel-Hamas War” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 28 April 2025. Dr P.K. Pradhan\, Research Fellow and Coordinator\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, moderated the meeting. Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA\, and the scholars of the institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation offered a detailed analysis of the historical trajectory\, ideological shifts\, and strategic recalibrations in Türkiye’s foreign policy toward Israel\, particularly in the wake of the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza. It provided valuable insights into Ankara’s enduring position on Palestine\, its ties with Hamas\, legal and diplomatic initiatives\, and growing tensions with Israel across multiple domains\, including trade\, NATO\, and the Syrian theatre. \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. P.K. Pradhan provided a brief background of Türkiye’s foreign policy and the current war situation in Gaza Strip. Türkiye’s foreign policy has undergone a shift shaped by domestic pressures\, ideological positioning\, and strategic calculations. Dr. Abhishek Yadav began by outlining the historical foundations of Türkiye–Israel relations. Türkiye was the first Muslim-majority country to recognise Israel in 1949. Bilateral ties grew steadily\, culminating in a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and a series of military agreements in 1996 that enabled joint exercises\, naval port calls\, and cooperation in arms production and counter-terrorism. However\, relations sharply deteriorated following the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident\, in which Israeli forces killed ten Turkish activists aboard a Gaza-bound flotilla\, which was trying to break land and sea blockade in Gaza. The incident led to the recall of ambassadors and a freeze in high-level engagements. \nThe speaker noted that Israel and Türkiye driven by strategic and economic interests\, began the rapprochement process in June 2016 leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations and full normalisation by 2022. The 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the ensuing Israeli military campaign in Gaza drastically altered Ankara’s posture. Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan immediately called for restraint and a de-escalation of hostilities. Ankara convened the Gaza Contact Group meeting during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2025\, pushing for a permanent ceasefire and rejecting US President Trump’s plan which mandated displacement of Palestinians from Gaza. Türkiye also endorsed the Qatar–Egypt–US trilateral ceasefire efforts and supported the Arab League’s US$53 billion Gaza reconstruction initiative. President Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s commitment to a two-state solution based on 1967 borders and condemned Israel’s actions in Gaza as war crimes\, accusing it of disregarding the lives of civilians\, including women and children. Türkiye has intervened in the genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ)\, filing its submission in August 2024. Citing the 1948 Genocide Convention\, Ankara argued that it had a legal obligation to act against what it termed Israel’s genocidal actions in Gaza. However\, Dr. Yadav noted concerns amongst the opposition parties about potential reciprocal legal claims\, particularly regarding the Armenian issue. \nA notable aspect of Ankara’s policy has been its overt engagement with Hamas. Erdoğan publicly described Hamas as a resistance movement or liberation group\, not a terrorist organisation\, and led a large pro-Hamas rally in Istanbul on 28 October 2023. Senior Turkish officials\, including Intelligence Chief İbrahim Kalin and Foreign Minister Fidan\, held direct meetings with Hamas leaders in Ankara in April 2025 to discuss humanitarian aid\, halting Israeli operations\, and advancing ceasefire proposals. Such alignment reflects both ideological affinities and Erdoğan’s long-standing political narrative that frames Türkiye as a defender of Palestinian rights and Islamic solidarity. Türkiye-Hamas ties can be divided into two key aspects. Firstly\, the ideological and political ties\, which includes the Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood; secondly\, diplomatic support\, including high-level negotiations\, hosting Hamas figures. Regarding aid efforts to Gaza\, Türkiye has been a consistent donor to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)\, contributing US$ 88.34 million from 2020 to 2023. \nNotably\, Türkiye is Israel’s fifth largest source of imported goods; the bilateral trade volume was US$ 7.06 billion in 2023. In response to domestic pressure and regional developments\, Türkiye escalated its economic measures against Israel. On 9 April 2024\, Ankara imposed export bans on 1\,019 construction-related items. On 2 May 2024\, Türkiye completely suspended all bilateral trade with Israel\, one of the most severe economic steps taken by any country in protest of the Gaza war. Dr. Yadav emphasised the political motivations behind these decisions\, noting that Erdoğan’s AKP had suffered electoral setbacks in the March 2024 local elections. The Islamist Yeniden Refah Party (YRP) capitalised on public anger over Gaza\, capturing two AKP stronghold provinces and forcing Erdoğan to take a tougher stand to retain support from conservatives. \nThe deterioration in bilateral ties has extended beyond diplomacy and trade into multilateral forums and regional security. At the July 2024 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Summit\, Türkiye publicly opposed Israeli participation in NATO-related initiatives\, blocking its involvement in an emergency preparedness drill scheduled in Bulgaria. Erdoğan declared that Türkiye would not support Israeli engagement within NATO until a sustainable peace based on the two-state solution was realised. \nMoreover\, Türkiye denied Israeli military aircraft and President Isaac Herzog overflight permissions\, forcing rerouting and leading to the cancellation of Herzog’s participation in the COP29 summit in Baku. Additionally\, tensions have emerged over Syria. Israeli strikes disrupted Türkiye’s attempts to survey and access Syrian airbases for joint defence operations in April 2025. Ankara warned Israel against testing Türkiye’s patience. A high-level deconfliction meeting was held in Baku in April 2025\, mediated by Azerbaijan. However\, Turkish airspace was denied to the Israel’s delegation for this meeting. \nDr. Yadav concluded that Türkiye’s foreign policy toward Israel since October 2023 reflects an ideological–strategic convergence with Palestinian cause and support for Hamas. Türkiye\, through its support for the Palestinian issue\, seeks to display its ideological commitment and claim a regional leadership role in the West Asian region. Bilateral ties currently are at an all-time low\, and economic interdependence has been unable to stabilise ties particularly this time. The emerging areas of conflict now span legal\, military\, economic\, and multilateral domains that include the ICJ case\, bilateral trade\, NATO-Israel ties\, airspace denial\, and rivalry in post-Assad Syria. \nQ&A Session\nThe session concluded with an insightful exchange of views among scholars during the Q&A session regarding Türkiye’s dynamics with Gulf States\, AKP-Muslim Brotherhood ideological affinity\, Ankara’s position on Hezbollah and Palestinian factions and Türkiye-US ties. Dr. Abhishek Yadav responded to the comments and the questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars. \nThe report has been prepared by Dr. Hirak Jyoti Das\, Research Analyst\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-the-monday-morning-meeting-on-turkish-policy-towards-israel-hamas-war
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